THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

IN

PLOTINUS



CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

: FETTER LANE, E.G.
C. F. CLAY, MANAGER



: 100 PRINCES STREET

Berlin: A. ASHER AND CO.

ILdpjtg: F. A. BROCKHAUS
Neto lorfc : G. P. PUTNAM S SONS
anU (Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.



All rights reserved.



THE PEOBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS


B. AV G. FULLER

SOMETIME INSTRUCTOR IN PHILOSOPHY AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY



CAMBEIDGE

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1912


PREFACE

FOR their many kindnesses in helping me prepare
this book for the press, I wish to thank Mr. F. R.
Maxwell, jun. and Mr. F. Schenck who have read
the proofs in part, also Professors George Santayana
and R. B. Perry of Harvard University, who have
read them in whole. But, above all, I am indebted
to Mr. S. C. Roberts of Pembroke College and the
University Press, Cambridge, whose revision of the
translations from the Greek and suggestions for
the improvement of my own text, as well as the
friendly interest which he has shown and the en
couragement which he has given, have made him a
collaborator rather than an assistant in my work.



B. A. G. FULLER.



PARIS, June 1912.



CONTENTS



INTRODUCTION

PAGE

Preliminary Considerations. Division of the subject.
Definition and discussion of metaphysical, physical,
and moral evil. The apportionment of reward to merit .

Reasons why evil presents a distinct problem. Primitive
yet sophisticated character of the question

Types of attempted solution of the problem of Evil.
Four in number :

(1) ybertarmnism. Evil the result of a misuse of free-
^nr~XFalrfrom an original perfection. Inherit
ance of consequent sin and suffering.

(2) Ethical Monism. Transubstantiation of Evil by

the Absolute. Reality better for the inclusion of
Evil.

(3) Naturalism. Evil as well as good purely relative

to the human point of view. Reality unmoral and
indifferent.

(4) Pluralism (Dualism). Evil as absolutely real as

good. Existence in the universe of obstacles and
limitations to the prevalence of the divine will,
and the establishment of the Good .
Review of the development of the problem of Evil in
the history of Greek philosophy. The Pre-Socratic
philosophers and contemporary "lay thought." Plato
and Aristotle. The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics.
The Neo-Pythagoreans and Neo-Platonists



vii



viii THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS



CHAPTER I

SOME GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE PLOTINIAN SYSTEM

Statement of the Problem of Evil. Consideration of
pertinent features of the Plotinian system. Plotinus s
inheritance from Plato .... 43

The Plotinian Trinity :

(a) The Soul. Suggested by the World-Soul in the
Timaeus. Her nature and functions. The prin
ciple of sensation and vitality. Reasons for not
regarding her as the First Principle. (1) Her
multiple character and omnipresence. (2) The
incomplete character of her functions of sensation
and synthetic reasoning . . . . 4fi

(6) The Mind. Synoptic Reason, intuitive of Truth.
A combination of the world of Platonic Ideas and
the Aristotelian God . . . .51

(c) The One. Its incomprehensible and ineffable
character. Pure unity transcending all multipli
city and variety, even the duality of subject and
object in thought. Inability of our experience to
furnish any predicate or category descriptive of
it. Nefther quantity, nor quality, nor being, nor
good, nor consciousness, nor mind, nor even one
in the ordinary use of the term ; but above and
beyond them all. Describable in negative terms
only. Union with it attained only in a super-
rational and super-conscious state of ecstasy . 54



CHAPTER II

METAPHYSICAL EVIL

Metaphysical Evil and dualism a corollary of mysticism.
Philo an example ...... 63

Inability of Plotinus to admit either metaphysical Evil
or dualism. The intention of his system monistic.
Attempted solution of the difficulty by the doctrine of
emanation. Creation regarded as a spontaneous over-



CONTENTS ix

PAOE

flow of the divine nature realizing every possibility of
being and perfection . .66

Initial difficulties involved in the theory of emanation :

(a) Of distinguishing the emanation from its source.

(b) Of accounting for variety and multiplicity within

the emanation.

Plotinus s treatment of these difficulties. Distinction of
two acts or operations, one of conserving, the other of
communicating the essence. Necessity that the emana
tion should be different from its source. Otherwise un-
distinguishable from its source. The emanation from
the One, necessarily not-one, that is, Many . . 71

Deduction of Mind from the One. Backward look of the
emanation towards its source. Recognition of itself as
separate from its source. Constitution of itself as Truth
and Reason. Identity of Thought and Being in an Intel
lect the object of its own thought. Deduction of the
Categories and Ideas . 73

Derivation of the Soul from Mind. Soul an emanation
from Mind, the principle of life and sensation, creating,
sustaining, and animating all Nature . 78

Derivation of the Universe from Soul. Impossible that
the power of emanation should stop with Soul. Further
possibilities of being and perfection. The corporeal
world an emanation or " overflow " from the Soul . 82

The place of Evil in such a system. Implication of
metaphysical Evil. The emanation of Mind from the
One properly a fall. Plotinus s rejection of the implica
tion. His denial of metaphysical Evil. Exclusion of
Evil from the realms of Mind and Soul

Consideration of the difficulties involved in the Plotinian
rejection of metaphysical Evil. Discussion of the term
" perfection." Distinction of mechanical or natural,
from moral perfection. Analysis of the expression " per
fect after its kind." Impossibility of maintaining a
theory of degrees of perfection. Perfection superlative . 89

Incidental bearing of the discussion on Theology. No
distinctions of better and worse in a perfect state. In
Paradise no difference in point of perfection and happi
ness between God and the redeemed spirits. Heaven
polytheistic .

Failure to distinguish between natural and moral
perfection in the systems of Plato and Aristotle . . 98



x THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

PAGE

Confusion consequent upon Plotinus s failure to dis
tinguish between natural and moral perfection. The
contradiction involved in considering the perfection of
Soul as less perfect than that of Mind and the perfection
of Mind as less perfect than that of the One. The
impropriety of regarding Universe, Soul, and Mind as at
the same time perfect and not self-sufficient. General
weakness and incompleteness of the Plotinian discussion
of metaphysical Evil . . . . .99

Plotinus s defence of the perfection of the Universe
against the pessimism of the Gnostics. Outline of the
Valentinian doctrine. Its resemblance to the system of
Plotinus. The superior logic of its treatment of meta
physical Evil ...... 103

The Plotinian assertion of the goodness of the world.
Equality of perfection not to be expected of all things.
Evil in the part not destructive of the perfection of the
whole. The folly of demanding of the sensible, the per
fection of the intelligible world. The World-Soul not
obstructed and corrupted by the body of the Universe
as the individual soul by the individual body. The perfec
tion after its kind of each particular genus and species
in the Universe ...... 107

The absurdities of the pretensions of the Gnostics ex
posed by Plotinus. Their impiety in arrogating to
themselves a spiritual nature and a special favour of
Providence denied by them to the heavenly bodies
and the earth. The foolishness of their doctrine of
the "Paradigm." The anarchistic results to Ethics of
their refusal to see any differences between the beautiful
and the ugly, the good and the evil, in the sensible
world . . . . . . .117

Discussion of the Plotinian refutation of the Gnostics . 125



CHAPTER III

PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL

Internal imperfection of the Universe. Its failure to
realize even its proper mundane perfection. The internal
conflict and reciprocal destruction of its parts. The
presence of suffering, and, in humanity, of sin . .130



CONTENTS xi

PAOB

Division of the subject. Physical evil, moral evil,
and the relation between the two. Physical evil. The
Plotinian point of view broader than the Christian.
The inclusion of animal suffering in the problem.
Four symptoms of physical evil for Plotinus. (a) The
mutability of all things. (6) The failure of things
to realize their proper types and perfections. (c)
The conflict between types as such, (d) The conflict
between particulars . . . . . .133

The Plotinian treatment of these symptoms :

(a) The Mutability of all things. Generation and
corruption to be regarded as part of the nature,
and hence of the perfection of a sensible, as dis
tinguished from an intelligible world. Neither the
formal structure of the Universe as a whole, nor
any particular form affected by it.

(b) The failure of the particular to realize its proper

entelechy. Application to particulars of the prin
ciple of varieties of perfection. Each individual,
like each Form, or like the Universe, Soul and
Mind, possessed of its individual entelechy and
justified in its individual existence. Realization of
the type by the particular equivalent, on the
principle of the identity of indiscernibles, to the
destruction of the individual as such . . 137

Criticism of the iPlotinian argument. The perfection
of the individual made dependent on the failure of the
particular to realize the perfection of its type. An example
of the contradiction involved in regarding perfection as
graded . .142

Possible avoidance of the difficulty by recourse to the
doctrine of Ideas of individuals. This doctrine, though
held by Plotinus, not invoked by him in this connection . 146

Similarity of Plotinus s method of dealing with the
difficulty to modern systems of ethical monism. Com
parison of his assertion that the particular, though
justified in not realizing, must still strive to realize the
universal, with the Neo-Hegelian theory that the Universe
is perfect for the very reason that we feel and act as
if it were imperfect. Both theories saved from absurdity
only by a concealed naturalism

(c) The conflict of types. An obscure and difficult point.

The Plotinian appeal to logical subsumption and



xii THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

PAGE

organization irrelevant. Logical consistency of a
world not sufficient for its perfection; The
scientific not the only human interest. Evil not
banished by being understood and explained . 149
(d) The conflict of particulars. The Plotinian justifica
tion of the internecine conflict between the
different parts of the Universe. The particular by
nature perishable. The death of one thing, the
life of another. Form and Matter eternal. The
transitoriness of particulars likened to the same
actor s change of mask and role. Better a mortal
and mutable world than no sensible world at all . 154
The Plotinian treatment of physical evil in its immediate
bearing upon human life. Similarity to the Stoic
Theodicy. Denial that Evil exists for the wise and
virtuous. Invocation of the dramatic analogy. The
vicissitudes of human life to be regarded as indifferent
to essential human excellences . . . .157

Conflict of Mysticism and Stoicism in the Plotinian con
ception of the sage. Comparison of the Mystic and
the Stoic attitudes towards life. Their agreement in
disparaging external goods and ills The difference in
the quality of their equanimity. Absolute optimism v.
absolute pessimism. The Plotinian sage possessed of
both attitudes ...... 158

Discussion of the danger involved in both attitudes
Their latent antinomianism. The identity of absolute
optimism and pessimism. Pessimism, or naturalism,
preferable ethically to absolute optimism. Absolute
optimism destructive of all effort to improve the world.
A Reality already perfect incapable of improvement.
Sin and imperfection apparent only and unimportant in
such a system. Moral action always action as if the
absolute of the ethical monists, or an omnipotent Deity
did not exist. Ethical monism only saved from moral
anarchy by a latent naturalism. Statement of the
difficulties in terms of the dramatic analogy. Plotinus s
recognition of the dangers of this position. Postponement
of the consideration of his argument . .- . 161

Necessity of the existence of physical evil for the sinner.
No contradiction involved in asserting its existence for
the sinner, while denying its existence for the virtuous
and wise. A Universe in which sin is punished better



CONTENTS xiii

PAGE

from a moral point of view than one in which it is not.
The Plotinian development of the punitive relation
between physical and moral evil. Immortality, transmi
gration of souls. Karma, or the law of moral causality.
Intermediate states . .167

Plotinus s theory of an economy in vice on the part of
the Universe. The criminal pressed into the service of
the divine justice. The violence suifered by the victims
of crime, a just punishment for misdeeds in former
existences. The criminality of the perpetrator none
the less a fact. Punishment remedial not vindictive.
** Karma" a proof of the providential government of the
world ... .171

The difficulty of reconciling the doctrines of transmigra
tion and " Karma " with the theory of Ideas of individuals.
The Idea, and therefore the essence, of the individual
immutable and incapable of variation in moral value.
The Plotinian treatment of the difficulty. Introduction
of the principle of Matter. Approximation to the Kantian
distinction between the "empirical" and "intelligible"
characters in the individual. Variations in moral
values involved in transmigration and the operation of
Karma, attributable to the " empirical " character only.
Discussion . .174

Continuation of Plotinus s treatment of the problem of
reward and merit. His failure to make sufficient use of
the notions of Karma and transmigration. His reversion
to the argument of grades of perfection. Perfect
apportionment of reward to merit not to be demanded
of a sensible world. His attack on the theory and
practice of non-resistance to evil. Possible reference to
the Christians . 179

Criticism of the Plotinian discussion. Inadequacy of
the judicial analogy, (a) The inexplicable tardiness of
the divine justice. (&) The divine justice as commonly
understood a sign of imperfection not of perfection
in the Universe. Punishment of sinners a mere
"policing" of the Universe necessitated by the
existence of Evil

Moral Evil. The problem of sin. Difficulty of account
ing for it in the Plotinian system. Attempt to shift
responsibility for moral evil from God to man. Freewill.
The implicit determinism of the Plotinian philosophy.



xiv THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

PAGE

Emanation governed by necessity. Rigid determina
tion within the realm of Mind, Soul, and the physical
Universe. The difficulty of reconciling moral responsi
bility with such a theory . . . . ige

Plotinus s treatment of the difficulty. His attempt to
detach notions of responsibility and freedom from the
idea of the indifference of the will. His review and
criticism of the atomistic, hylozoistic, astrologistic, Hera-
cleitean, and Stoic theories of causation . . .194

His identification of freedom with self-determination.
The Soul a principle, active not passive, modifying as
well as modified by outer stimuli. Comparison of the
Plotinian with the Kantian view of freedom . .194

The dangers, involved in such a theory, of freeing Pro
vidence from responsibility for good as well as for evil.
Plotinus s method of dealing with the problem. His
distinction between action in accordance with Providence,
and by Providence. The " will of God " not the source
of human volition, but a standard of good, without which
volition has no moral significance . . . * .199

Another difficulty. The problem of reconciling re
sponsibility with the freedom of self-determination.
The will,when self-determined (free), incapable of willing
other than the good ; when determined by outer in
fluences, e.g. the solicitations of sense, not free, and
therefore not responsible. Further comparisons of
Plotinus with Kant. The inadequacy of his treatment
of the question. His irrelevant appeal to the theory
of grades of perfection . . . . .201

Criticism of the Plotinian discussion of the problem of
freedom and determinism. A possible method of dealing
with the difficulty. The process of emanation neither
free nor determined. The antinomy of freedom and
necessity not a dilemma. The terms only significant and
opposed in an imperfect world, where the expression of
the will is hampered by limitations . . . 204

Resumption of the Plotinian argument regarding moral
Evil. Attempts to explain Evil as positively contributive
to the perfection of the Universe :

(a) Reapplication of the theory of degrees of perfec
tion. Human excellence an inferior kind of
excellence. Complete moral virtue not to be ex
pected of man. I



CONTENTS xv

PAGE

(b) Parts, imperfect in themselves, capable in combina

tion of forming a perfect whole.

(c) Evil productive of good.

(d) Appeal to the aesthetic analogy. Comparison of
the opposition of good and evil to that of hero and
villain in the play, or of notes in a musical instru
ment. Explicit declaration of the i nterdependence

of contraries ... 206

Dualistic qualifications of the foregoing arguments
by Plotinus. (a) Sin not a sine qua non of virtue, but
due to a residuum of irrationality which the divine
order is unable to subdue. (6) Evil necessary, not
as a contrast to set off the good, but as a lack or
diminution of good, (c) Grades of perfection identified
for the moment with grades of imperfection, (d) The
material for the world-drama found, not created by,
the divine playwright

The Plotinian discussion of the nature of the opposition
between good and evil. Transition to dualism and a theory
of Matter. Opposites not necessary to one another s
existence. Evil not necessary to good, Not-being not
necessary to Being. Evil necessary to good in the sense
that a last term in a series is necessary to a first. Evil
the last term in the series of emanations from the
Good. This " last " also Matter . 219

Discussion of dualism. Defence of moral dualism. The
question of the omnipotence of God. Analysis of the
religious demand that God shall be conceived as
almighty ....



CHAPTER IV

MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL

Evil excluded by Plotinus from the sphere of real exist
ence and identified with Not-being. The problem of the
existence of Not-being in Plato and Aristotle. Not-
being for Plotinus relative and equivalent to the not-good.
Evil for Plotinus incidental to a progressive degeneration
from higher to lower levels of being. Distinction



xvi THE PIIOBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

PAGE

between primary and secondary, substantival and ad
jectival evil. Vice not substantival evil, but accidental
and adjectival in the soul. The essence of the soul pure.
Inconsistency of the Plotinian theory of Evil as a de
generation of the Good with the doctrine of degrees of
perfection. Final definition by Plotinus of primary
and secondary evil ...... 225

Evil not determination of Matter by Form, but a blurring
of Form by Matter. Matter the indefinable substratum
of all qualities and modifications .... 234

Difficulties connected with regarding Matter as an
indefinable substratum :

(a) Epistemological difficulty of "knowing" the inde
finable. Plotinus s reply. Adjectival or secondary
evil known through the agency of, and by contrast
with, the Form partially obscured. Substantival
evil known by a spurious knowledge, the Platonic
vodos \oyi(r/j.6s ..... 235

(6) The ethical difficulty of ascribing an evil character,
to that which is without quality or determination.
The difficulty in Aristotle. Implicit attribution
by him to Matter of a positive recalcitrancy, as
well as a positive inclination, to the Good.
Self-contradictions of the doctrine. Plutarch s
criticism. Introduction of a positive principle of
evil antagonistic to God. Matter neutral. The
doctrine of Numenius. Philo s theory of Matter.
The Plotinian solution of the difficulty. Identifi
cation of the positively Evil principle demanded by
Plutarch with precisely the absolute lack of form,
determination, and quality of the Aristotelian
TrpuTT) v\r). All qualification good. Opposition of
good and evil not an opposition of qualities or
characters, but of an absolute lack of form and *
character to determination as such . . .7 240

Criticism of the Plotinian argument. The implicit
attribution of positive existence to Not-being. Its vacil
lation between the conceptions of Not-being as relative
and as absolute. Similar vacillation between conceptions
of the plurality of Ideas and particulars as a variety of
types of perfection, and as grades of imperfection. Im
possibility of regarding Not-being as the cause of Evil . 257
Resumption of the Plotinian discussion. Privation or



CONTENTS xvii

PAGE

<TTtpr)(ris absence of essence. Vice not a privation of
good in the soul. Privation again not a quality. The
relation of Privation to Matter. Agreement of Privation
and Matter in point of indeterminateness. The relation
of Matter to indeterminateness. Indeterminateness not
a property, but the essence of Matter. Matter not
identical with all " otherness " or " difference," but only
with difference from Being as such. Matter, then, or
Not-being identical simply with privation of Being.
Privation not destroyed by the advent of determination.
Matter not in itself rendered good by its union with the
Good . . .... 259

Further questions regarding the nature of moral evil.
Vice not the same as the entrance of the Soul into Matter,
body, and generation. Matter, then, the cause of evil in
the soul. Plotinus s rejection of the Aristotelian theory
of the particular the rode TL composed of Form and
Matter. Abolition of all but a nominal distinction
between moral and physical evil .... 270

Matter as a physical substratum. Plotinus s adoption
of the Aristotelian Argument. Form alone insufficient to
account for Change. His criticism of the hylozoistic and
atomistic theories of Matter. More detailed criticism of
Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Anaximander, and Leucippus.
Conclusion that Matter in itself is without qualities,
primary or secondary ..... 274

Intelligible Matter. Plotinus s distinction between in
telligible and sensible Matter. Intelligible Matter the
common quality and basis in the Ideas and Forms, i.e.
Being. Matter implied or created by the Idea of Differ
ence as the medium in which the differentiation of the
Forms takes place. The indefiniteness of intelligible
Matter an image of the infinity of the One ; the indeter
minateness of sensible Matter the image of the indefinite-
ness of intelligible Matter . . 277

Review of the Plotinian theory of Matter. Plotinus s
combination of the Platonic and Aristotelian Theories.
Matter a law or condition rather than a stuff. Plotinus s
modifications of the Platonic and Aristotelian Teaching.
His tendency to regard Matter as absolute Not-being.
Individuation of Forms and Souls due to the Idea of
Difference .... .282

Criticism of the Plotinian Theory. Not a corrrection



xviii THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

PAGE

but an exposure of the self-contradictions latent in the
Platonic and Aristotelian views. Opposed tendencies
towards naturalism and mysticism. Failure of both
systems to regard the plurality of Forms and Ideas as
due to the division and diminution by an evil principle
of a single transcendent Good. Their silence regarding
the cause of the plurality of Ideas and Forms . . 284

The Plotinian confusion of the functions of Matter and
those of the Idea of Difference :

(a) Usurpation of functions of Matter by the Idea of
Difference. The difference of the particular from
its Form or Idea already logically implied in the
differentiation of particulars from one another.
Impossibility of assuming different principles for
the individuation of human and of non-human
particulars. Idea of Difference responsible for all
individuation or for none. A dilemma between
naturalism and mysticism.

(b) Usurpation of the functions of the Idea of difference
by Matter. Matter responsible for difference of
all particulars from their perfections, and hence
for the difference of all lower kinds of perfection
from the supreme perfection of the One . . 288

The Plotinian transition from dualism to monism . 298



CHAPTER V

THE THEORY OF EMANATION

The Plotinian attempt to deduce Matter from the One.

Review of the theory of emanation. The procession of

Mind from the One, and of Soul from Mind. Necessity

of further emanation realizing every possibility of Being,

and displaying the powers of creation and illumination in

the Soul. Consequent necessity of a physical Universe.

Matter the limit of indeterminateness ; the last term in a

series of which the One is the first .... 299

Two aspects of the Plotinian theory of emanation :

(a) An endeavour to show that a series of emanations

as such logically implies imperfection. Emanation



CONTENTS xix

PAGE

equivalent to departure and separation, and hence
to differentiation of the generated from the
generator. But differentiation from perfection
implicative of imperfection.

(6) An attempt to derive existence and nature of
Matter from the One. Matter not an absolute
and independent principle. Caused by the ex
haustion of the powers of the Soul. Matter
dependent upon and relative to Being, as the
negation of Being ..... 305
Difficulties involved in the Plotinian theory. Implica
tion of metaphysical evil and of the imperfection of Mind
and Soul. Self-contradiction of the Plotinian rejection
of the implication. Confusion of degrees of imperfec
tion with kinds of perfection. Consequent denial that
emanation involves deterioration .... 308

Difficulties connected with the problem of moral evil.
No " fall " involved in the procession of Mind from the
One, of Soul from Mind, or of the Universe from the
World-Soul. Question as to why the emanation of
the particular body from the individual Soul should
involve moral evil. Confused character of Plotinus s
reply :

(a) On the one hand possession or creation of a

particular body regarded as not in itself a "fall"
but rather as an unfolding of the nature and
perfection of the individual Soul. Moral evil due
to a special relation to the body.

(b) On the other hand separation of the individual Soul

from the World-Soul, and her mere attachment to
any particular body regarded as the origin of
moral evil.

In either case the " fall " of the soul due to a diversion
of her interest from the contemplation of truth to the
solicitations of sense ..... 310

The problem whether this diversion of the interest of the
soul from the universal to the particular be necessitated
by the process of emanation or be an act of free-will.
Plotinus s attempt to deny the dilemma of free-will and
necessity. The process of emanation neither free nor
determined, or both free and determined, i.e. actuated
by an inner necessity of the nature, equivalent to a free
expression of the " will," of the One, Mind, and Soul.



xx THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

PAGE

Application of this doctrine to the solution of the
problem of moral evil. The diversion of the attention
of the soul from contemplation to sensation both neces
sary and free. Explanatory of moral evil qua necessary,
not responsible for moral evil qua free. The process of
emanation in general explanatory of evil without being
to blame for it ...... 319

Fallacy of the Plotinian argument. Its equivocation.
Its description of the " fall " of the soul as both free
and determined really fatal to the purpose of the Plotinian
theodicy. A dilemma :

(a) Qua determined, the diversion of attention of the
soul from the universal to the particular the fault
riot of the soul but of the process of emana
tion. Consequent dualism, or else attribution of
responsibility for evil to God.

(6) Qua free, the diversion of the attention of the soul

from the universal to the particular a contradiction

in terms. In so far and so long as it is free, the

attention of the soul always directed towards the

universal and the Good. The unfree will only

capable of sin. Evil then either inexplicable, or

explained in ways contrary to the intention of

Plotinus. Further confusion by Plotinus of

emanation regarded both as an evolution of

different sorts of perfection, and as a degradation

of a sole and single kind of perfection.

General criticism of the theory of emanation. Its

reliance upon metaphors and analogies. Latent dualistic

implications of these analogies. In every case the

diminution of the emanation due to no logical necessity

inherent in the source or process, but to the agency of

an external principle. Without such a principle, the

inferiority of the generated to the generator, e.g. of the

Universe to the One, inexplicable. Perfection unimpeded

incapable of producing anything less perfect than itself.

General reassertion of ethical dualism. Impossibility of

finding the origin of Evil in the Good. Necessity of

positing a principle other than the Good to account for

the presence of Evil in the universe . . . 323

Resume of the book. Conclusion 329



INTRODUCTION

ATTEMPTS to give a definition of Evil are proved by
history to have little bearing upon the problem which
Evil presents. Philosophers have found it sufficient
to take the fact that there is Evil at its face value,
and that value in all the looseness of its extension.
They have not worried over our varying uses of the
word, and the apparent lack of external connection
between the facts to which it is applied. They
have not found it necessary for their purpose either
to distinguish between sin, imperfection, suffering,
disappointment, failure, or to exhibit the bond
of union between them. Crime and colic seem
irrelevant regarded as facts, yet both instantaneously
agree in being evil, and may be treated without
further inquiry as presenting aspects of the same
problem. In short, the problem of Evil has little
or no interest in the classification of phenomena and
the analysis of their common value. Its interest lies
rather in estimating the metaphysical position and
significance of such a value in reality, and pays little
heed to the apparent heterogeneity of the facts that



2 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

possess it. Definitions of a sort we shall find, to be
sure, in plenty, but their intention is not so much
to describe the evil phenomena as to explain them.

We may then, I think, decline with justice to
be drawn into any discussion of what the peculiar
quality of an evil fact is. But at the same time it
will be convenient for the better handling of the
subject to distinguish roughly between certain of
the more salient differences that separate one class
of evil phenomena from another. To this end I have
adopted f^ fi wpll-knnwn partition of Evil into three
kinds metaphysical, physical, and moral, a division
classic since the time of Leibnitz. A fourth division
might also be added to include the question of thq
discrepancy between reward and merit, which always
proves so fundamental and insistent an aspect of
our problem. I may, however, have departed some



what from Leibnitz s understanding of the terms in
my use of them. The expression "metaphysical evil"
I have employed to express that a priori dissatis
faction with the mere fact of the finite, quite apart
from any a posteriori valuation of it, which is
characteristic of so much mystic thought. The
world from this point of view is evil for no other
reason than that it is a world ; the individual
imperfect because he is himself and not another, one
fact among many and not the only fact. Perfection
can be attained only by transcending all finite and
particular experience, both the manifold of sense
and the manifold of discursive thought, and in



INTRODUCTION 3

one s self wholly becoming the one whole ineffable
Reality. So-called finite goods and perfections are
illusions, preferable only to finite evils because by
pursuit of them one sooner escapes from them. The
mere existence of the universe, then, is sufficient to
damn it. The world, inasmuch as it exists, is already
evil, and of this metaphysical evil physical and
moral evil are natural symptoms.

" Physical evil " I have used to express the fact
that there is suffering in the world. The universe
does not all pull together. One part in its behaviour
conflicts with another. There is constant struggle
between the different forms of existence, involving
mutilation and destruction of one part by another.
In this fact of conflict and destruction there is, of
course, no intrinsic evil. Each occurrence in the
flux has its sufficient reason, is perfectly natural,
and therefore " naturally " perfect. But in the case
of living and sentient beings, the cosmic friction
stunts organic development and inflicts pain. Thus,
to set aside for the moment the other animals, man
finds his environment recalcitrant to his purpose,
his will thwarted by a thousand stubborn physical
facts. His existence and happiness are in continual
jeopardy. He is subject to disease and calamity
and untimely death ; in a word, to ill-treatment at
the hands of Nature, against which his shrewdest
measures, defensive and offensive, are as yet unable
to protect him.

As physical evil means the conflict of human



4 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

interest with natural processes, so the term " moral
evil" has been used to express the conflict of one
human interest with another. It will be noted at
once that I have thus covered by the term much
more than the mere phenomenon of sin, expressing
by it, indeed, the whole complex human situation of
which sin is but a symptom. For sin, I take it,
means, broadly defined, the performance of an act
which we know at the time to be wrong. It is the
failure to conform to an ideal to which we know we
ought to conform. I have no intention here of
entering upon a discussion of what we mean by
" wrong " or by " ought," nor yet to touch upon the
idea of free will and moral responsibility suggested
by the term " sin." I would merely point out that
these ideas, the distinctions between "right" and
" wrong " and " ought " and " is," and the conscious
ness of a choice between good and evil, all point to
a condition of human life in which the real root
of sin and the foundation of all moral evil are to
be found.

This condition is primarily exemplified in the
case of any single human will detached for purpose
of analysis from its social relation. Supposing tha.t
there were only one man in the world, he would still
find himself confronted with a situation which might
almost be described as ethical. He would find
himself so constituted that it would be impossible
for him to develop all his interests and gratify all
his desires. His will would be to some extent self-



INTRODUCTION 5

contradictory and in need of systematization. He
would have to choose among a variety of possible
purposes and satisfactions. To attain one good he
would be obliged to renounce another. He would
be what he is, in a word, only by the sacrifice of
the many other rich and living selves he might have
been.

If now we restore him to his social environment,
the situation becomes more complex and more un
satisfactory. Not only is his will not at one with
itself, but it also conflicts to some degree with the
wills of his fellows. His self-expression interferes
with that of his neighbour. Good clashes with
good, ideal with ideal. And the outer conformity
of his purpose with the general social purpose in
volves sacrifice and renunciation of possible goods
to a far greater extent than does its inner con
sistency with itself.

This, then, is the moral problem first, to pro
portion the interests of any one individual in order
that they may group themselves in self-consistent
unity, and secondly, so to proportion them that
this unity may express a purpose accordant with
the conceived ideal harmony of all wills. It is in
the deliberate shirking of the solution that our
faults consist, in the failure to hit upon it that
those imperfections lie which are misfortunes rather
in our moral relations.

But the morally evil character of our world rests
ultimately not upon our faulty handling of the



6 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

problem, nor upon the difficulty of satisfactorily
solving it, but upon the fact that it exists at all.
For however satisfactory a solution of it we may
appear to have attained, and however harmonious
a society be the result, they have been attained only
at great cost. The moral victory is won only by
a pitiful carnage of possible and a priori innocent
satisfactions. The irony of the ethical situation
lies in the fact that each sin refrained from, as each
sin committed, means the loss of a real good. A
possible satisfaction has been foregone. The moral is
really no less " red in tooth and claw " than the natural
world. It is as wanton in its suppression of values
as is the physical order in its destruction of facts.

Could we believe that the rejected goods were
only counterfeit, could we believe that the selves
to which we must die were not worth living for,
optimism would not be so difficult. But we cannot.
Vistas of rich and happy experience, as real and
possible as the good we follow, open out before us
every day ; and from them the limitations of our
natures alone force us to turn away.

The fulfilment of our final, circumscribed purpose
cannot alter the fact that other purposes have been
lost in the attainment, or discount the " might have
beens," any more than the happy issue of the meta
physical world-process can conceal, though it may
atone for, the immense waste of good by which the
successful denouement has been brought to pass. We
may rise upon the stepping-stones of our dead selves



INTRODUCTION 7

to higher things, but those selves are none the less
dead, and with them have been for ever eliminated
from the universe capacities of full and satisfying
life, for the loss of which Reality is, absolutely speak
ing, so much the poorer. In short, more interests
exist than can co-exist in harmony, there is a greater
potentiality of good than can be actualized.

It is here, and in the consequent struggle between
interests and goods, that the real secret of Evil lies.
The fact that we are so cramped in the pursuit of the
good both by the inner constitution of our nature and
the outer conditions of our life that we must choose
and forgo, renouncing vast fields of experience in
order that others may be developed, marks more
profoundly the existence of moral imperfection than
do the sin and suffering which result therefrom. It
is worse from the point of view of the problem of
Evil that there should be some things which we
ought not to do, than that we should do them.

I do not mean by this to advocate pessimism or
to apologize for sin. The moral obligation is im
perative if human happiness is to be attained.
Virtue is a sine qua non of the realization of the
sovereign Good. And the sacrifices it necessitates
do not in point of fact wholly impoverish our
nature. We can sufficiently develop enough
interests, sufficiently fulfil enough purposes, suffi
ciently actualize enough possibilities of good to
realize a full and happy life, harmonious with the
social ideal. Physiologically, moreover, the fact



8 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

of life would seem to justify its own existence.
Even the poorest and most repressed lives yield
enough happiness to make them, if not positively
valuable, at least tolerable, and thus to secure their
own continuance.

Nor, I think, are we forced to so great a measure
of theoretic pessimism as might at first seem pressed
upon us. A facile and unmitigated optimism is
indeed scarcely tenable. In practice we have either
to whitewash the truth to keep it sweet and clean, or
to hush it up. Only when many of its features have
been veiled and painted is its face the face of God
for us. So, too, in philosophic theory it is a
Procrustean system that fits the true to the measure
of the beautiful and the good, or the morally desir
able to the measure of the real. For it is hard
to see how, if untortured, the yearning after the
Beatific Vision can find its satisfaction in any vision of
the totality of existence, even though it be seen under
all the grandeur of " the aspect of eternity." That
features of the world have been found evil and ugly
is part and parcel of the eternal truth about the
world. The fact is not irrational. It is neither
contradictory nor inexplicable. It takes its place
along with other facts in the causal nexus. But it
conclusively thwarts, as it seems to me, the effort to
find in Reality, absolutely considered, an object in
which the demands for aesthetic and moral as well
as for logical and "natural" perfection shall find
their satisfaction and their peace. Otherwise, indeed,



INTRODUCTION 9

the fact must knock logic as well as morals on the
head. For it satisfies no sense save that of humour
to proclaim it to be part of the beauty of the world
that we find it ugly, part of its goodness that we
find it evil.

The truth, however, that the totality of existence
is imperfect, need only slightly, if at all, mar what
I will call, in contradistinction to the absolute, the
ultimate goodness of the world. This point is
perhaps best raised and brought home in the form
in which it has engaged the attention of theology.
The redeemed, perfected soul in Paradise must be
absolutely happy. Otherwise it would not be in
Paradise, but in Purgatory. Other exigencies of
the doctrine of immortality, however, demand that
at the same time the soul should remember its
earthly and imperfect past. But must this not
involve a contradiction ? Will not the soul s bliss
in the Beatific Vision be necessarily alloyed by this
knowledge ?

The Church answers this question by appealing
to the cleansing power of the divine grace. The
sense of the divine forgiveness wipes out the sense
of sin. Knowledge of the past remains, to be sure ;
knowledge, if you will, that the past has been sinful,
but sorrow and repentance have disappeared in the
feeling that the past has been atoned for and
pardoned in God s eyes, and that the soul is now
pure and at one with the divine will. As Folco
tells Dante :



10 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

Non pero qui si pente, ma si ride,

Non della colpa_, ch a mente non torna^

Ma del valore ch ordino e provide. 1

It may be, of course, that this view in ultimate
analysis is untenable, and that it is unthinkable that
memory of past evil should not to some degree chill
delight in present good. In that case, unless with
the mystics we frankly abandon the satisfaction of
the scientific interest as a factor in happiness, the
world is not only absolutely imperfect but ultimately
imperfect as well. Still our interests as they stand
display characteristics which tend to justify the
theological contention in some measure at least, and
to suggest that the clouding of perfection by the
inclusion within it of memory or knowledge of im
perfection would be almost negligible.

Take, in the first place, the moral and aesthetic
aspirations the demands of our nature for a
righteous and beautiful world. These are interests
whose direct dealings are with the present. It is
their aim to find or to create immediate experience
of a quality in which they can rest content. That
experience once attained, the process by which it
has been reached no longer matters to them. Their
only concern is with the fruition of value, and
the value is independent of the character of the
soil in which it has been grown. Our aspiration
for beauty, for instance, would be satisfied were the
world suddenly to turn beautiful. Our eye would
1 Paradiso, ix. 103-105.



INTRODUCTION 11

not be pained by the knowledge that heretofore
there had been ugliness in existence. So, too, in the
course of moral progress, the failing that has been
overcome becomes unimportant, as far as the estima
tion of present value is concerned. We judge of a
man s worth by what he is here and now, not by
what he has been. The fact that he has fought and
conquered is enough. And in the inner experience of
the struggling individual, whether he represent it
to himself in religious or in merely ethical terms,
the theological contention is amply justified. The
sense of having made good wipes away the stain of
having been evil. The sin repented of and the weak
ness overcome no longer detract from our self-respect.
In the sight of the moral ideal they are forgiven
and obliterated. Though they were as scarlet they
are washed white as snow. It is not merely that
they are whitewashed, but that, as far as the re
generate experience is concerned, they are removed.
Under the aspect of eternity, indeed, they still
exist, and must be reckoned as part of the truth
about the world, but in estimating the ultimate
value of the world, or the value of the world at any
one moment sub specie boni, they have no being.
The waters of Eunoe forgetfulness of evil and
remembrance of good only of which Dante tells
us, do not run on the summit of Purgatory alone,
their streams overflow to sweeten and refresh the
daily life of every human soul.

At the basis of this moral and religious experi-



12 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

ence perhaps lies the psychological commonplace
that recollection of past evil is often not itself an
evil thing. Forsan et haec, we may murmur of
much that at the moment appears intolerable.
There is some kindly alchemy of our nature which
distils most of our memories nearly clear of sadness.
When we recall past suffering, we recall, as a rule,
merely the fact that we have suffered, not what we
have suffered. The pain of illness, the grief at loss
have faded. And even if the fact still rings with
value the resonance is deadened and remote.

I would suggest, too, in passing, that the same
psychological commonplace may account for our
ability to oppose a " scientific " interest in things to
our moral and aesthetic attitudes to wards them, to view
the world dispassionately without regard to the reac
tion their immediate presence tends to provoke, and to
think them rational at the same time that we feel them
to be evil. Had memory not this happy character
istic, were the past as vibrant with immediate value
as the present, one might well question whether the
principle of sufficient reason could ever have rid
itself of moral and aesthetic predispositions. Only
from the " immortal calm " of a past on which all
the storms of value have subsided, could we perhaps
get some hint of the true nature of those silent
currents which bear all the toss and tempest of the
present on their surface. However that may be,
our interest in the past is almost entirely historical
and scientific. And the scientific interest in knowing



INTRODUCTION 18

the truth finds, as the wise Parmenides found, nothing
evil and nothing base, and does not despise what
according to the standards of morals and aesthetics
are the meanest things.

Considerations such as these the absorption of
the moral and aesthetic interests in immediate
experience and that happy heedlessness of the past
if only the present be good, the self-expurgation of
memory, and the indifference of the scientific interest
in knowing the truth to the moral values and bear
ings of things would seem to justify, to some extent
at least, an optimistic outlook as to the perfectibility
of the world. Whether on other grounds the vision
of perfection may not have to be regarded as an
ideal limit continually approached but never attained,
is a point which it does not fall within our province
to discuss. Indeed we have already strayed too
far from our subject.

To return, however, from our digression : we
have, after dealing with moral evil, to give our
attention to a phenomenon in which moral and
physical evil are brought into direct relation with
one another I mean the apparent injustice with
which Nature apportions reward to merit. Of
all the questions connected with our problem,
this perhaps is the most urgent. If physical evil
always followed upon wrong - doing, the entire
problem would be simplified, though by no means
solved. Physical evil might then be explained as
the due wages of sin, though the fact of sin would



14 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

still challenge us. But unfortunately for theology
and philosophy there is apparently no such causal
connection. The innocent are often the most
roughly, the guilty the most tenderly handled by
Nature. The best that can be said of her in this
respect is that she is impartial in her dealings, and
apparently indifferent to moral considerations
unmoral, though not immoral.

Such are the main aspects into which the
problem of Evil may be resolved for purposes of
discussion. They are sufficient to show how im
portant and intimate the question is to all reflective
thought. Yet one may perhaps ask at this
point, " Where is the problem ? " How is it that
these facts that we have been discussing constitute
a problem in any wise different or separate from the
problem presented by the existence of any facts at
all ? Why should we metaphysically worry over
the Evil that there is in the world ? Why should
we expect the world to be other than it is ?

In truth, the problem of Evil viewed from one
point of view is thoroughly sophisticated, and pre
supposes not only an articulate feeling for, and a
reasoned discontent with, the faultiness of our
world as we find it, but also much theological
and ethical meditation, and a clear vision of the
ideal. Perfection must have been begotten by the
will, and conceived by the imagination, before our
perpetual miscarriage can mean more than dumb
physical suffering, and attain cosmic and meta-



INTRODUCTION 15

physical significance. We must explicitly desire our
world to be better before we wonder why of itself
it is not so.

Yet at the same time the problem may also be
regarded as among the oldest perhaps, indeed, the
foundation of all the questionings which haunt the
human mind. It is the evil aspects of life which
are the first to challenge the resources of our
nature. Life we take for granted and accept the
provision Nature has made for it with little comment
or thanks. The satisfactory calls for no explanation.
Like the gold piece, it is received at its face value
everywhere, with no scrutiny of the date and place
of its issue, and no demand for the promise of future
redemption. Indeed, speculation itself is in a sense
a mark of imperfection. However wide of the
mark it may fly in the end, it is aimed in the
beginning with practical intent. Primarily we do
not live in order to reason, but we have to reason
in order to live. The exercise of reason, it is true,
like that of any other healthy function, is in part
its own reward ; but its explanation in point of
origin and, to a large extent, of purpose, is to be
found in the life and well-being it helps to attain
and sustain. Reason is as much a tool as hand
or tooth or claw, and more ; and its function of
collation, comparison, subsumption, and inference,
is our most efficient means of adaptation and self-
preservation. By its help we are building out of
chaotic experience an orderly world such as may



16 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

be a secure and commodious dwelling for ourselves
and a fitting habitation for our ideals. Felix
qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. For such know
ledge enables him the more surely and easily to
foresee, to prepare for, and to direct the future to
good purpose.

In science the practical nature of speculation is
readily seen. Science frankly confesses that her
effort to understand and formulate the world is
originally inspired by a solicitude for our safety
and happiness. Her interest may have grown,
indeed, to include investigation for its own sake,
but the direction of that interest is still in the
main practical and productive of practical results.
And the popular denunciation of philosophy as
useless has for argument not that her ideal is
worthless, but that it cannot be attained. There
is no one, I think, who would not admit the
advantage of knowing absolute truth if we could.
The objection is that we cannot.

If, then, speculation be essentially practical,
evolved like any other function by the exigencies
of the occasion for the sake of coping with them,
its operation would cease to be important as
soon as perfect and permanent adjustment of the
organism to its environment was secured. For a
perfect world we should require no justifications.
It would be irrelevant and superfluous to seek
behind or beyond its existence for its explanation.
The well in which its truth dwelt would be so



INTRODUCTION 17

transparent that one need look no further than
the surface to see the bottom. From moment to
moment the mere fact of its existence and the per
fection of its appearance could completely absorb
all thought and pacify all thinking.

But where Nature fails or foils us we are startled.
Our instincts are found to be inadequate in their
guidance and adjustment. The fact of life cannot be
taken for granted, or its provisions for happiness
accepted as a birthright. Consciousness, instead of
coming into that estate of joyous contemplation and
free and harmonious activity to which it feels itself
the heir, is obliged to make a living. It must stand
over instinct ; it must direct, stimulate, and restrain
activity. It is this aspect of its life that provokes
it to discursive and speculative thought. It is the
evil facts that set it its first problem and of which it
first seeks the causes, if by knowledge thereof it may
provide against them in the future. The crudest of
fetish and devil worship is in its way an answer to
our problem. For the assumption of unfriendly
beings at work in Nature is an induction from, and an
explanation of, the facts which are problematic. And,
finally, as its grasp of its immediate facts becomes
wider and more and more complicated with other
ranges of experience, and as its vision of their signifi
cance and their implication with the rest of the
world-order grows more clear, this speculation to which
the existence of Evil gives rise, not only formulates
its own problems more adequately and offers to



18 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

them more profound solutions, but raises as well
other problems of science and philosophy.

It is with these more profound solutions, naturally,
that philosophy is most concerned and we shall have
most to do. Generally the problem is directly raised
in connection with the problem of the existence of
God ; always after the first animistic explanation of
the world has been outgrown, it bears some latent
reference thereto. The conclusion, it is true, to
which a study of it may force us, may be an
atheistic interpretation of the world; but we can
never reach that conclusion wholly innocent of some
consideration of the possibility of the existence of a
deity.

Indeed, the problem of Evil in its most popular
significance, and in that with which we have to deal
with it in Plotinus, is the problem of reconciling
the hypothesis of a good and beneficent deity with
existence of an apparently evil and imperfect world.
Or, since omnipotence is commonly regarded as a
necessary attribute of divinity, it asks how God
can be at once omnipotent and entirely good.
For, given the conjunction of the premises in
question, we are entitled a priori to infer a perfect
world in which there is no appearance of evil what
soever. But the apparent result is quite other than
the logical conclusion to be drawn from the premises.
The world which we find, far from being the blame
less order we should expect, is a world in which there
is every appearance of evil and imperfection. How



INTRODUCTION 19

then does all-powerful beneficence tolerate, much
less create it ? Create, I say, because goodness un
opposed, as the assertion of its omnipotence implies,
could bring into being no other than a perfect
universe, if it is to be true to itself and to our
definition of it ; tolerate, because the divine benefi
cence must imply at the very least a dissatisfaction
with what is, as profound, and a desire for what
ought to be, as keen, as our own, while its omnipo
tence signifies the non - existence for it of those
limitations in power which alone seem to hinder us
from realizing our ideal of a happy and perfect
order. Confronted, then, with the discrepancy
between the conclusion to which our premises en
title us, and that to which the facts force us, -we
return to examine and question the premises. Have
we been right in assuming them, and, if so, how
are we to explain the apparent illogicality of the
conclusion ?

From this return one of four possible trains
of thought may result. We may reaffirm the
validity of the premises, and seek to reconcile the
apparent contradiction between what should be their
logical conclusion and what appears to be their
actual outcome. This method of dealing with the
problem has been popular since the rise of Christi
anity. The religious consciousness has always tended
to unite, and has indeed been justified in uniting to
a certain extent the natural and moral attributes of
God f as world-power and world-ideal. Both the



20 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

conception of the efficient and that of the final
relation of God to the universe have sufficient
reason in the history of speculation, and these
natural tendencies Christianity has reinforced, raising
both ideas to the absolute degree, and declaring
the Godhead to be absolute goodness and absolute
power.

The reconciliation of the two attributes, or what
amounts in this case to the same thing, of the good
ness of God with the imperfection of the world, may
be attempted in two ways. We may, on the one
hand, adopt the Christian doctrine of free will and
an original fall. God, we may say, out of the
plenitude of goodness and power created a perfect
world and perfect man. First the angels and then
man sinned of their own free will, and through no
fault of their Creator, and by their sin brought Evil
into the world. The logical conclusion from the
premises, and the actual outcome would have coin
cided, had it not been for the pride of Lucifer and
the disobedience of Adam. And by the process of
redemption the world as it is is in part being slowly
but surely restored to the status of the world as it
ought to be, and as it wholly would have been had the
fall not occurred; till in the end, when the correc
tive and redemptive work has been accomplished,
as much of the world as has not been altogether lost
shall regain perfection.

On the other hand, we may deny that there is
any real discrepancy between the logical and the



INTRODUCTION 21

actual conclusion. The discrepancy is illusory.
Evil has no real existence qua evil. It is but an
appearance, a partial aspect, an erroneous opinion,
a finite point of view. The existence of this illusion
we may leave unexplained as in many mystic systems ;
or we may attempt to deduce it from Reality, and
give it positive foothold in Reality as a misunderstood
fragment thereof, considering it either as a means
towards perfection justified and transfigured by the
end, or as an integral and contributive factor in
perfection itself. We may " reckon that the suffer
ings of this present time are not worthy to be
compared with the glory which shall be revealed
to us," or may regard them as something for which
the totality of experience is absolutely the richer
and better. Evil exists that God may triumph over
and transcend it in an act of victory in which his
perfection consists ; the opposition of good and
evil, that God may have the supreme happiness of
identifying them in a higher unity. In a word, Evil
is in reality transubstantiated.

The two other ways of dealing with our problem
begin by asserting the failure of the derivative
and transmutatory methods, and the impossibility
of forcing the facts of the case into conformity
with the conclusion which logically follows if both
premises be true. Both premises, then, cannot be/
true. God cannot be both all-good and all-powerful. I
We must choose between the attributes.

The choice of the latter alternative lies, roughly



22 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

speaking, at the bottom of all so-called naturalistic
cosmologies. They maintain the entire relativity
of all moral distinctions to the human point of
view, and their irrelevance to a Reality which they
conceive as unmoral, and as equally expressed in
good and evil alike. All thought of the world as
a moral order is excluded as incompatible with the
high indifference of that energy, or system, or sub
stance, which underlies phenomena, and to whose
proper perfection their moral character makes no
difference ; a power in whose sight, if it be possessed
of it, all things and events are sub specie aeterni-
tatis equally necessary, equally important, equally
significant. In maintaining this indifference of the
true nature of things to the judgments of value
we pass upon them, and the independence of its
perfection of their moral character and worth, all
"naturalistic" systems are agreed, however much
they may differ in conceiving its ultimate structure.
Of this view in modern times Spinoza is a noble
example, though it is shared and set forth by all
mechanico-materialistic theories. In ancient phil
osophy it is most systematically and splendidly
formulated by the Epicureans.

In the second place, we may stand by the idea
that the universe is a moral order, morally governed
and directed according to the purpose of a beneficent
deity, and reconcile our faith with the facts of the
case by supposing him not to be omnipotent. The
divine beneficence, we may say, and its government



INTRODUCTION 23

of the world for the best meet with real obstacles
which limit their efficiency, and in part vitiate the
character of the cosmic order. These limitations to
the power of God may be conceived in a number of
ways. The situation is perhaps most often con
ceived as a dualism of God and Matter or of God
and the Devil. To God is opposed an inert and
intractable, yet co-eternal substance, or an actively
malignant principle of evil, or a conjunction of both,
to whose lack of compliance to a divine creative act,
or positive thwarting of the divine design, the im
perfection of the world is to be attributed.

But other ways of conceiving this limitation are
also possible. Some thinkers, for example, have sug
gested an absolute element of chance in the world
with which the divine foresight is unable to cope
successfully and the divine power unable to control.
Or again, we might suppose God to be confronted
with wills, uncreated and independent, rebellious to
his purpose, and discordant with one another. In
such a case Evil would be symptomatic of a real discord
between the different parts of the universe, and the
world-process might be conceived as God s attempt
to reduce these warring elements to peace with one
another and with himself. Or one might retain
the moral significance of the world -process while
dispensing with the notion of a God, or of any
one supreme directing agent. Reality might be
thought of as a discordant and, therefore, imperfect
collection of eternal individuals, of whose lives we



24 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

ourselves represented moments or stages, and cosmic
evolution as a possible progress on their part towards
a final state of mutual adaptation in a sort of
commonwealth of perfected and deified spirits, the
attainment of which might be entirely a matter of
their free will and effort.

Finally, we might reject every proposed method
and take refuge in agnosticism, if indeed it is any
solution of a problem to declare it insoluble; or
deny both premises and reject not only the idea of
a moral order in the world, but of a natural order
as well, declaring the whole to be in reality chaotic
and meaningless, and experience mere delirium. But
for such a point of view there could be no problem
of Evil, since a wholly irrational universe, if it could
exist, would present no problems of any sort.

Such are the general types of solution which
a study of the problem may suggest. I do not
mean, however, that they are alternatives, and that
philosophers may be labelled according as they hold
one or the other. There is, it is true, a leading
motive dominant in every philosophic treatment of
the subject, but there is also (among the Greek
thinkers) a use of other possible answers as sub
sidiary themes, generous to the point of discord.
This is especially true of Plotinus. His main theme
is, I venture to think, original, but it is interwoven
with, and to some degree founded upon, reminiscences
of almost every solution of the problem of Evil pro
posed by ancient philosophy.



INTRODUCTION 25

It will be well to review briefly these reminis
cences, and to trace in outline the development of
the problem in ancient thought. It is fair, I think,^
to say that the problem of Evil does not appear as /
a definitely conceived philosophic problem before I
the time of Plato, even if it does so then. For I
Plato and Aristotle it is certainly not an interesting
or important problem. Neither faces it directly.
They merely find that in the course of solving
other and to them far more vital questions they
have answered it.

In fact, in one aspect of pre-Socratic thought we
find an interest in the problem far more intense
than that of the Platonic school, though the level
on which it moves is theological rather than philo
sophical. Philosophy proper has little to say, but
what I may call the " lay " thought of the period is
preoccupied with the more immediate and practical
phases of the question. Already in Homer / we see
the idea of the gods as righteous beings slowly rising
out of an animistic conception of them as capricious,
irresponsible sources of good and ill alike, and with
this new and higher idea our problem appearing as
the problem of reconciling with their moralized
characters the existence of evil and suffering in the
world. There, too, we are aware of the presence
in germ of two great types of solution. On the
one hand, we note the tendency to a dualistic opposi
tion of some of the gods to others as of evil powers
to good ; on the other, the tendency to regard evil



26 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS



as man^s doing, suffering as the wages of sin, and
sin as man s own fault. Of these two tendencies
the later thought of the pre-Socratic period seems
to be little more than a development. Where
meditation upon " the ways of God to man " does
not lead, as in the case of Theognis, to mere blind
rebellion against them and rejection of the notion
of a divine justice, it generally seeks to justify them,
as with Pindar, Aeschylus and Sophocles, by explain
ing human misery as due to freely-willed human
wrong -doing, or by combining this solution with
the notion of a positively evil element (Matter, or
the flesh, for instance) in the world, to whose exist
ence and influence sin itself is ultimately due. This
latter we find to be the thought of the religious
mysteries.

Meantime the history of the philosophy proper
of the time displays, as we have said, little or no
reflection upon our problem. The prevalent atti
tude towards it, if attitude it can be called, is
naturalistic, though we find a nascent dualism of
God and Matter expressed by Pythagoras in its
ethical, by Anaxagoras in its scientific implications ;
and in the system of Empedocles a dualism of two
principles contending for mastery over an inert
world-stuff, which is curiously anticipatory of some
Neo-Platonic thought. But altogether, the con
nection of good anH evil values with the terms of
these oppositions seems vaguely felt and more
vaguely expressed.



INTRODUCTION 27

After an interim of Scepticism represented in
philosophy by the Sophists, and in lay thought by
Euripides, dualism, reappears in the systems of Plato
and Aristotle as the dominant method of dealing
with our problem. As has already been said, the
problem itself was of but secondary interest to
each philosopher. Plato s treatment of it is more
theological than philosophical, and is couched in
figurative and mythological language. To the
influence of the Good conceived as exerting both
an efficient and a final causality in the world, he
opposes another principle as the source of imper
fection. This principle is variously conceived in
response now to one, now to another interest ; but
the various conceptions and appellations, such as
"not-being," "the other," "the great and the
small," "the indeterminate," "matter," "void,"
etc., are left but vaguely related and with little
in the way of reduction to a common denominator.
Certain of the larger and more cosmic features of
physical imperfection are referred directly to the
intractability of this material principle ; but those
which bear directly upon human life, as suffering
and misfortune, are regarded as the just results of
moral evil. The existence of moral evil receives
an elaborate but not altogether consistent explana
tion. The notions of a primal fall, of the misuse
of free will, of transmigration and immortality are
employed, T)ut with insufficient attention to their
implications. In the end, however, moral evil also



28 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

is derived from the intractability of Matter. The
soul herself is invaded by its influence, and finds
/within herself a dualism of rational and irrational
/ parts, the one akin to the divine, the other to the
^riaterial principle. By their contest she is dis
traught, and through the blinding of reason by the
solicitations of passion and sense she falls into sin.
Virtue is knowledge, vice ignorance. Were there
no Matter there would be no such solicitation, no
ignorance, and no vice. The soul would always
know the truth and do the right.

By Aristotle the problem was given greater pre
cision though not greater importance. Plato had
been so enamoured of the Ideal, and so preoccupied
with the reminiscences thereof which he found in
the world, that the residuum of recalcitrancy and
formlessness, though noted by his eye, did not
engage his attention. Aristotle, on the other
hand, is essentially a man of science, preoccupied
no more with one aspect of life than with another.
His business is not the elucidation of the Ideal, but
an accurate and unprejudiced description of the facts
as he finds them. If his account of the universe
includes an ideal element as an ultimate and con
trolling factor, it is not as a belief calculated to
cheer and uphold the moral life, but primarily as
a scientific hypothesis necessary to explain the
motions and complete the dynamic unity of the
world. Similarly, the existence of Evil does not
arouse his repugnance, but his curiosity. He views



INTRODUCTION 29

it dispassionately as a physician might disease, more
interested in its diagnosis than in its cure. And the
problem it presents resolves itself in the last resort
into a question of analysing and relating to the
hypothesis of the Good as the final cause of the
world-process, certain kinetic and dynamic aberra
tions which it is incapable of explaining.

But his work to this end proved of great import
ance so far as the history of our problem is con
cerned. He did not, indeed, introduce any novel
factors or explanations, but he developed and
analysed at great length the ideas hinted at by
Plato. The relation of the Good to the world
received at his hands a profound and clear formula
tion. The concept of Matter, both as a necessary
substratum of a world and as necessarily an obstacle
to its perfection, he considered with great care,
though, as we shall see later, not altogether
adequately for our purpose. These are the two
points of prime importance as regards our problem
in the Aristotelian system.

After Aristotle the dualistic method of dealing
with Evil disappeared for a time, and two novel
forms of solution offered themselves : on the one
hand the monism of the Stoics, on the other the
naturalism of the Epicureans. The significance,
however, of these systems, especially of that of
the Stoics, lies in more than their suggestion of
a new access to the problem. Before even the
road pointed out by Plato and Aristotle could be



30 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS



pursued to further advantage, it was necessary for
speculation to pause and consider what its real
object and question were. It was necessary, in
a word, for the problem of Evil to be detached
from other metaphysical problems and gain force
and attention as a separate philosophical question.
In the systems of neither Plato nor Aristotle had
this been the case. Neither had approached it
along what seem to us the lines of least resistance.
To neither had occurred the direct question : How
can the Evil in the world be reconciled with the
goodness of God ? It was, however, precisely in this
form, so familiar to us, and with all the points and
considerations of the question in its modern shape,
that the problem presented itself to the Stoics. In
them we find for the first time a true theodicy.

From the Stoic pantheism followed directly the
necessary perfection of the world, in spite of all
appearances in it to the contrary. God is the
sustaining and animating soul and substance of the
world ; he and the world taken together as a single
complete system and order are one and the same
being, and this being is a living, intelligent, com
pletely self- realized organism satisfied with its own
intrinsic goodness and with no end beyond it.
Further, the Stoics laid great stress on the argu
ment of design. All things exist for the use and
benefit of man ; man exists to contemplate the glory
and perfection of the world.

By this insistence upon the perfection and



INTRODUCTION 31

beneficence of the world -order the problems of
physical and moral evil were naturally raised in
explicit and accentuated form. How reconcile
with the existence of Evil the goodness of God, the
rationality of the world-order, and the direction of
all things to the best ? If the world, for example,
be designed to serve man s needs, how comes it that
it also serves them so badly, and is not merely
insufficient but absolutely inimical to the end to
which it has been created ? If there be gods or a
God who regard justice, how comes it that the
world is so unjust? Such were the questions
hitherto answered, without being stated, that the
Stoic put and replied to directly.

His first answer was to deny the existence of
physical evil. What we call physical evil is a
matter of erroneous opinion. To the wise and
virtuous man nothing external is evil. For that!
alone is evil which harms one s proper perfection, and
the proper perfection of man is virtue. Suffering
and misfortune cannot touch it, and hence are
matters of indifference to it. Furthermore, man by
virtue of his reason shares in the point of view of
the whole. The events which are indifferent to
him as a part of the whole, will be seen by him, so
far as he rises to the cosmic point of view, to be
necessary parts of the system of facts which compose
the universe, and, as such, necessary factors towards
its perfection, i.e. positively good.

But having thus denied, the Stoic proceeds with



32 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

curious inconsistency to justify the existence of
physical evil. This he attempts in various ways.
Though the parts of the world taken by themselves
are imperfect, together they form a perfect whole.
Evil is unavoidably incidental to the design of
Nature, a by-product in the generation of good. It
is good put to a wrong use, or it is to be palliated
because of the good end it serves.

Moral evil, however, presented a graver problem.
How does it happen that in a perfect universe there
should be any who do not share in the point of
view of the whole, and see things in their true
values ? This question was the more insistent, as
the Stoics thought most men to be vicious and
were bound to admit that to all appearances they
flourished.

The discrepancy between merit and reward they
again dealt with by a denial of the facts. The
wicked do not flourish, the good are not cast down,
since external goods are as hollow as external
evils. And the same inconsistency is repeated of
justifying that the existence of which is denied.
Misfortune is a test of character. The value of
the good is enhanced by the price we have to pay
for it. The misfortunes of the wicked are by
another inconsistency explained on punitive grounds.

But how explain the fact of sin at all? God
cannot be responsible for it; on that point the
Stoics were explicit. They then not unnaturally
took refuge in the device of free will and human



INTRODUCTION



33



responsibility, which they were at great pains to
reconcile with" their pantheistic determinism. They
also called to their aid arguments already used in
connection with physical evil. Evil is a necessary
by-product of virtue. Sin is turned into good in
the end. Finally, they invoked the interdependence
of contraries. Without vice there would be no
virtue. By contrast with vice the value of virtue
is enhanced. Sin is like the villain in the play :
without it the spectacle would be incomplete and
imperfect.

The Stoic position was denied in toto by the
Epicureans, who adopted a thoroughly naturalistic
method of dealing with the problem. Their meta
physics, founded on the atomism of Democritus,
involved a priori a rejection of the hypotheses of
final causes, design, and a moral government of the
world. Reality in ultimate analysis turned out to
be a fortuitous concourse of atoms moving in empty
space or the void, according not to the intelligent
plan or purpose of a guiding reason, but to a law in
part of mechanical causation, in part of spontaneous
self-determination. This rejection of the teleological
interpretation of Nature, already implied as it was
by their system, the Epicureans supported precisely
by an appeal to the existence of Evil in the world.
The argument from design they attacked with
especial severity. As man is a priori but one of
the innumerable combinations incidental to the

concourse of atoms, so the world of human interests

D



34 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

is an insignificant by-product of no particular im
portance or relevance to the course of Nature as a
whole. To the Stoic arguments drawn from the
apparent adaptation of the world to human
purposes, they opposed the incompleteness of such
adaptation. The existence of physical evil is
sufficient proof that the gods are not beneficent.
The existence of moral evil is enough to show that
they are not just. The world is full of wickedness,
vice goes unpunished, virtue unrewarded. The
hypothesis of a moral government of it is absurd
on the face of it.

/ The Stoic theodicy was also attacked by the new
Scepticism initiated by Pyrrho and carried on by
Carneades in the New Academy. According to
the Sceptics positive knowledge of any sort was
impossible. Good and evil were merely relative
values, appearances of things to us, not necessarily
relevant to the nature of the thing in itself. We
cannot know that there is a God, much less that he
is wise and beneficent. But not content with resting
his case on epistemological considerations, the Sceptic
also urged against the Stoic the criticisms of the
Epicureans, and at length involved him in the
dilemma that either his Providence must be ignorant
of its power, or neglectful of human affairs, or in
capable of judging what is for the best.

The Epicureans, however, they attacked with
greater vigour. The irrationality of the Stoic
theology was, they held, no greater than the



INTRODUCTION 35

absurdity of that of the Epicureans, and had the
advantage of providing an emotional and religious
sanction for moral conduct. Belief in a moral
government of the world was to be provisionally
admitted and respected because of its practical
value. It was a good working theory even for the
agnostic. The same sceptical point of view was
urged again by Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus.

The Scepticism of the Academy plays a part in
the history of our problem in many ways similar
to that of the Sophists. As Sophism called all
the thought that had preceded it to account, so
Scepticism proceeded to eviscerate the positive
teaching of the Stoics and Epicureans, and to assert
once more the impossibility of knowing the true
nature of things, and of solving any metaphysical
questions, the problem of Evil among them. And
like its earlier analogue it too proves to be but an
interregnum. Out of the midst of the Sophistic
movement came Socrates, and after him Plato ; the
former to reaffirm the practical, the latter the
absolute and theoretic validity of knowledge, and
thus to restore to experience a rational and moral
coherence, metaphysically explained and justified. In
like manner out of the later Empiricism in which
Stoicism and Epicureanism were dissolved, there
arises a new interest in metaphysical speculation,
a new faith in its power to yield truth, a new
endeavour to give positive answers to the great
problems of philosophy. This renaissance of the



36 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

metaphysical spirit disclaimed for itself all originality.
It pretended to no more than a rediscovery of anti
quity. It was essentially a return for inspiration to
names of great repute, a growing interest in the
older ways of dealing with the deep questions of
philosophy, a reviving faith in the older solutions
proffered. It believed itself to be regenerating and
reinterpreting ancient, authoritative thought. The
two names which became the watchwords of the
new movement, the two systems to which it aimed
at giving new expression and new life, were those
of Pythagoras and Plato. Its great prophet and
exponent, at least so far as the cult of Plato is
concerned, is Plotinus.

For our problem, the interest of the early jep-
rthagoreanism lies in its revival of dualism as
means ot dealing with Evil. Like their tradi
tional forbears, the Neo - Pythagoreans reduced the
heterogeneity of the universe to a basic opposition
between Monad and Dyad, the odd and the even.
But for them this numerical opposition became the
nucleus of a thorough-going metaphysical dualism
with which the Aristotelian and Platonic dualisms
were amalgamated. The Monad was identified
with God, spirit, mind, the good ; the Dyad with
matter, irrationality, indeterminateness, evil. To
gether with this metaphysical dualism went a whole
eschatological and religious system of a mystic type.
The soul was contrasted with the body, spirit with
matter, and the whole life of the senses objectified



INTRODUCTION 37

in the multiple and phenomenal world with a higher
state of ecstatic communion and union with the
deity. Senses, body, matter, world are essentially
corrupt. The spirit is of like if not of the same
substance with the divine. Tainted by the world,
the flesh, and the dyad, she wanders from body to
body. The end of the moral life is to escape from
the sensible world and to attain communion with
God. The necessary means are a life of strictest
human virtue, of ascetic self-discipline according to
the Pythagorean rule, and of final ecstatic tran
scendence and unconsciousness of all earthly things.

From such a point of view physical evil was to
be attributed in part to the recalcitrancy of dyadic
Matter, in part to human misconduct of which it is
the divinely ordained punishment. Sin is due to a
conflict of appetite and reason within the soul, with
which the soul is forced to take sides, and in taking
sides is responsible for her choice. Upon the fact
of free will there is considerable insistence, though
no analysis of its meaning. The wrong choice of
the soul, however, is ultimately referable to Matter.
Were there no Matter there would be no incentive
to the misuse of freedom, no sin, no punishment,
no suffering due to other causes, no evil of any
sort.

The Neo-Pythagorean, however, was not yet free
of the problem. To his exoteric dualism we are
told that he added an esoteric monism. " Accord
ing to their highest teaching (aywTarw Ao yos)," Sim-



38 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

plicius quotes from Eudorus, "we must say that
the Pythagoreans hold the One to be the principle
of all things ; according to a secondary teaching
(Sevre/oos Aoyo?) that they hold that there are two
principles of created things, the One and the nature
opposed to it. . . ." 1 But of their derivation of
the Dyad from the Monad they give no explanation,
and thus after all their pains left the crux of the
problem untouched. This avwrarw Aoyos becomes
later the theme of Plotinus s final and most magnifi
cent attempt at solution. Meantime, it was ignored
or rejected by Plutarch and Philo Judaeus, 2 who
developed the dualism of the Sevrepos Aoyos.

The theodicy of Plutarch starts with the assump
tion that God is good and author only of the good
in the world. God is both the efficient and the
final cause of all things. He is the end toward
which all things strive ; but he is also an over
ruling and beneficent providence directing all things
to the best. Whence, then, Evil ?

The Stoic suggestion that apparent evil may be
resolved into real good he rejects in toto. He finds
not only irrational, but morally repugnant, any
attempt to make the perfect responsible for the im
perfect. Indeed, he devotes the whole six chapters
of one treatise, and eight chapters of another, to a
very able expose and refutation of the Stoic theodicy.

1 Simplicius, Phys. 181. -13. Cf. Diogenes, viii. 24.

2 Cf., however, Vacherot, Histoire de VEcole d Alexandrie,
vol. i. pp. 151-152, who finds also in Philo some anticipations
of the Plotinian doctrine of emanation.



INTRODUCTION 39

Evil, in fine, is as real as good, and its presence in
the world can only be reconciled with the goodness
of God by supposing it to be due to the opposition
of another principle Matter. But the concept of
Matter as it had been left by Aristotle involves
certain difficulties to which we shall later have
occasion to recur, and Plutarch finds himself obliged,
not only to modify the Aristotelian teaching, but
also to introduce a third element, a positive and
malignant principle of Evil whose influence shall
account for the otherwise unaccountable opposition
of Matter to the Divine Will.

Physical evil is attributable in part immediately
to the presence of the malignant principle, in part
to be explained as the punishment of sin. In the
explanation of sin we come upon the familiar opposi
tion of soul to body, and within the soul of reason
to the irrational appetites. We are virtuous as
long as reason dominates. Sin is the usurpation of
the will by the irrational. The will, however, is
free. It is to blame for its evil choice. The ap
parent discrepancy between reward and merit is
accounted for on the hypothesis of transmigration.
We are reaping in this life the fruit of past exist
ences. The difficulty involved in the earlier Neo-
Pythagorean doctrine of giving any reason for the
lapse of the soul from an original state of perfec
tion is avoided by the doctrine that the soul is
at first, if not at the last, of a mixed and imperfect
nature.



40 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS



In llnjx^ we find a more extreme dualism and
mysticism. His God is superintelligible and beyond
all predicates. All that we can comprehend concern
ing him is that he exists, but beyond his existence we
can know nothing of him. Communion, or rather
union, with him is only to be attained by some super-
rational faculty of experience. Yet in such union
only is the true perfection of the soul attained. The
natural complement of this mystic insistence upon
the ineff ability of God and the sovereign Good, is a
keen sense of metaphysical evil. There is only one
perfection and that is God. Not to be God, then,
is prima facie to be evil. The world is, as it were,
condemned unheard. The fact of its existence is
sufficient evidence against it, quite apart from
subsequent evidence respecting its character. The
physical and moral evil, indeed, with which we find
it vitiated are only to be expected.

But where is there any sufficient reason for such
a world, or indeed for any world at all ? For its
existence God would not, for its essence he could
not be responsible. 1 Philo falls back on the hypo-
thesis of Matter, as a co-eternal principle with God.
In the face of its utter evil and corruption, God,
being good, is bound to create, i.e. to bring what
good out of, or rather into Matter he can. The
existence, then, of Matter is responsible for the exist
ence of a world at all, its essence for the failure of
the world to embody even a modicum of perfection.
1 Cf. p. 38, note 2.



INTRODUCTION 41

Physical evil Philo refers in part to Matter
directly, in part to the sinfulness of man. Sin is
due to the corruption of the soul by Matter. Philo\s
vituperation of the body and the senses is unre
strained. Virtue consists in as complete an abstrac
tion from them as possible. The reward of virtue
is a final transcendence and annihilation of all
things earthly or cosmic. For her enchainment
and corruption by the body the soul is responsible.
Men are originally fallen angels. The reason of
the fall, and the difficulty of explaining how a
perfect will could misuse its freedom are left un
explained. But once in the body there begins for
her a round of birth and death governed by a cosmic
law of moral causality. In the end the purified
soul returns to God. A hell awaits the incorrigible.

With this straightforward mystic and dualistic
way of treating the problem, Philo mingles Stoic
arguments. He appeals to the advantage of the
whole to justify the suffering of the part. And he
denies the fact that the innocent are overwhelmed
with calamities, the wicked with favours. Nothing
is good but virtue, nothing evil but vice.

The minor members of the school require little
comment. Maximus of Tyre is more dualist than
Stoic in his way of dealing with our problem.
Numenius is an out-and-out dualist of Philonic
type, but Plutarchian in his doctrine of Matter, and
in his assumption of a third principle of active
malignant evil. Celsus maintained dualism against



42 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

Christian doctrine, at the same time attacking the
conception of a personal devil. Finally in the
Hermetic writings we get a dualism and general
doctrine like that of Numenius, much crossed and
confused by a pantheistic tendency of thought that
reminds one of the Stoics.

So much by way of introduction.



CHAPTER I

SOME GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE PLOTINIAN SYSTEM

THE problem of Evil presents itself to Plotinus
in the explicit form in which it challenged the
Stoics, Epicureans, and earlier Neo-Platonists. In
the opening lines of the first of his two treatises
" On Providence " he tells us that though it is
evident on a priori grounds and from his arguments
that " to ascribe the being and constitution of the
universe to spontaneity or chance is absurd, and
the mark of a man who lacks the faculties both
of reasoning and of perception, 1 yet " it will be
well to take up the argument from the beginning
and make a searching inquiry into the way in which
each particular component has come into being and
been created. For as some of these have been, as
it were, wrongly created, doubts have been raised
concerning universal Providence, and some have
been prompted to say that there is no Providence,
others, that the universe has been brought into
being by an evil Creator." : Neither answer, how-

1 iii. 2, 1 (254). The references are to the Volkmann Text
in the Teubner series. 1. To ntv T$ auro/xdro; KCU

43



44 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

ever, will Plotinus tolerate for a moment. His
task is to allay these doubts, to establish the cer
tainty of a moral government of the world, in a

word to

assert eternal Providence
And justify the ways of God to man.

Before, however, entering upon our examination
of the Plotinian theodicy, it will be well to give
some attention to such features of his system in
general as may make our later discussion more to
the point. In his theology Plotinus is, if possible,
more of a mystic than Philo. But his conclusion,
unlike that of Philo, is not merely the expression of
the home-sickness of a profoundly mystic spirit for
an ineffable peace and perfection such as our world
cannot give or even help to portray. To deny,
indeed, that one of whom his biographer relates
that he saw God many times face to face in ecstatic
vision during his life, was such a spirit, and that
he was forever haunted by a " nostalgic de Tau-dela
et de la samtete" would be absurd. Plotinus is one
of the great mystics of all times. But his is also
one of the great intellects. His reasoning is none
the less profound for his ability, as he fancies, to

rovde TOV TravTbs ryv ovtriav /cat avaTaatv us &\oyov Kal avdpbs otfre
vovv OUTC afodrjaw KKTr)fj.frov, ofj\ov TTOV /cat irpb \6yov /cat TroAAot
iKavol /caTa/3e/3\7?j/Tai deticvtivTes TOVTO \6yoi TO de TIS 6 rpo-iros TOV
yiveadai. e/caora Kal TreTroirjo-Oai, ^ &v /cat iv iuv ws OVK opffus
aTTopetv irepl TTJS TOV TTCLVTOS irpovoias a-v^aivei, /cat rots
7r7J\6e fj.-rjde elvcu direlv, rots oe cus UTTO Ka/coO d-rjfjuovpyov eort

[6 /COORDS], eTTKr/ce ^ao-^at TrpoariKet. avudev /cat
TOV \6yov Xa/Soiras.



THE PLOTINIAN SYSTEM 45

get beyond it in the end. He puts his mysticism
to metaphysical and rational test and forces it upon
us as a logical conclusion. He tells us why God must
be ineffable, apart from the fact that he finds him so.
As has been said already, Plotinus considered
himself the interpreter of Plato. Not unnaturally,
then, the direction of his thought was suggested by
the Platonic system, as he understood it. Of that
system, the problem of the One and the Many was
the fundamental consideration, as, indeed, it had
been the burning question of all Greek philosophy
since first the Milesians by their dictum that the
world was substantially one, led men to ask how,
and then whether it could develop into multiplicity.
The Platonic treatment was suggested by Socrates,
who had eschewed metaphysics, and limited his
search for unity among the many to what might
prove relevant to human interests (conceived rather
narrowly) and useful in human life. But Plato
pressed his search for the One far beyond the point
at which Socrates had discreetly abandoned it. It
landed him in the world of Platonic Ideas, a realm
of glorified class-concepts, where the humble Socratic
universals, abstracted from a comparison of particular
instances in the service of a common virtue and a
stable happiness, awoke to find themselves TO, 6Vroj
ovra, the only realities, endowed with all metaphysical
functions and perfections, eternal, immutable, per
fect, the final and efficient causes, each of them, of
its proper particulars and of all the being and



46 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

goodness they possessed. In a word, instead of their
being justified, as with Socrates, by their relevance
to life, life was justified by reference to them as the
bases of its facts and the sources of its values. 1

By thus seeing the world double, Plato imagined
that he had explained it, though, as Aristotle
pointed out, he had only increased the number of
phenomena that needed to be accounted for. As
regards the quest of the One, however, it must be
said that Plato made some real progress into the
interior of the world of Ideas when he discovered
in their perfection a characteristic common to all
the Ideas, and made of it the Idea of the Good,
a sort of universal of universals. But he did not
push his way farther, though it led to a rich and
unexplored country of implications, in the direction,
that is, of the El Dorado of the absolute One.

Plotinus follows in Plato^s footsteps. Like him,
he passes beyond the phenomenal world to an arche
typal order, eternally creating and sustaining it.
But he does not make the Platonic salto mortale
from the one to the other, but uses as an inter
mediary step a concept furnished indeed by Plato,
but in a different context, to wit, that of the World-
Soul in the Timaeus.

The propriety of introducing such an inter
mediary principle is evident on psychological
grounds. The state of consciousness corresponding

1 This interpretation of Plato, of course, would not be held
by some modern critics,



THE PLOTINIAN SYSTEM 47

to the Platonic Idea or the Intelligible world of
Plotinus, was static and contemplative reason, the
vovs 00/w7Tt/cos of Aristotle: It had neither part in,
nor consciousness of, the vital functions, the opera
tions of sense, or even the processes of discursive
and synthetic thought and the actions of practical
virtue. On the other hand, matter and body cannot
perceive, 1 or think, 2 or practise virtue, 3 and what
life they possess is due to the presence within them
of a foreign principle. 4 These activities then
require a separate metaphysical principle called by
Plotinus foxy or Soul.

This principle is incorporeal and immortal. 5 It
is life. 6 The virtues are native to it. 7 Its synthetic
reason seeks to know the eternal. 8 In a word, it
bears the stamp of the divine.

But it is by no means an ultimate principle. It
is not absolutely one. It is one-many, both indi
visible and divisible. It is like the form of an
object, which, though divided in one sense, if the
object be divided, in another still keeps its unity. 9
For example, if a pitcher be broken to fragments,
it is still a broken pitcher. The "pitcher-ness" is

1 iv. 7, 6, T (461) [vol. ii. pp. 126-128].

2 iv. 7, 8 (461-462) [vol. ii. p. 127].

3 iv. 7, 8 (462) [vol. ii. pp. 129-130].

4 iv. 7, 8 (458) [vol. ii. p. 122, 11. 10-20].

5 iv. 7, 10 (464) [vol. ii. p. 137].

6 iv. 7, 11 (465-466) [vol. ii. p. 139].

7 iv. 7, 10 (464) [vol. ii. pp. 137-138].

8 iv. 7, 10 (465) [vol. ii. p. 139].

9 iv. 2, 1 (362) [vol. ii. p. 5, 1. 8 et seq.].



48 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

spread throughout every part, and is in its entirety
present in every part. Else we could not say of
each fragment that it was part of a pitcher, and of
nothing else. Plotinus^s own example is that of a
colour \vhich is unaffected by the division of the
coloured material. By the aid of such similes, then,
we must think of the soul as unextended in herself,
residing nowhere in particular, yet present in her
entirety in every part of the body. And as each
soul stands to her body, so the World-Soul stands
to the universe.

The imperfect unity of the soul is again betrayed
by the relations of the individual souls to the
World-Soul. This question put Plotimis to some
perplexity. All souls cannot be one in the sense
of being ultimately one consciousness. The same
subject cannot perceive and think in all, for in that
case every one would experience everybody else s
experience. 1 Yet if the soul is not one, how explain
the unity of the universe ? Plotinus s treatment of
the difficulty is as follows. The World-Soul is a
unity in which all souls are bound. She is present
in all souls precisely as a science is present by im
plication in its entirety in each of its parts. 2 Each
logically involves and potentially contains all the
others and the whole. We select now one part,
now another, but each would be useless out of its



1 iv. 9, 1 (477-478) [vol. ii. pp. 153-154].

2 iv. 9, 5 (480) [vol. ii. p. 157]. Cf. iii. 9, 2 (357) [vol. i,
p. 348].



THE PLOTINIAN SYSTEM 49

relation to the others, and to the whole. If it could
be detached there could be no logical deduction.
Thus, if a single theorem be given, it contains both
all that it presupposes, and all that follows from it.
In a similar way individual souls are related to one
another, and to the World -Soul. In her internal
relations, then, as well as her external, the soul is a
one-many, and not a pure One. 1

Finally, the operations of synthetic reason betray
a dependent and relative nature. Discursive thought
contains within itself neither the material, the formal,
nor the final conditions of its thinking. It reasons
about data given it by sense, according to a priori
principles, in order to acquire knowledge. It is an
activity of pursuit, not of possession. Its aim is
self-confessedly to transcend and annihilate itself in
a state of immediate and intuitive apprehension of
truth, which provides its own object neither a priori
nor a posteriori and to no other end save its own
existence. At least such, I think, is something of
Plotinus s meaning when he tells us that

"Of the kinds of knowledge which exist in the
rational soul, one is of the objects of perception if,
indeed, we ought to speak of knowledge of such
things and not rather give it the name of opinion -
and, as facts are antecedent to it, so it is a reflection
of facts.

" But the other, which is the real knowledge, is
derived from the objects of the understanding, and
1 iv. 9, 5 (480-481) [vol. ii. p. 15?].



50 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

entering into the rational soul from Mind, is con
cerned with no perceptible object.

"And inasmuch as this is real knowledge, it in
itself is the object of its own activity, and contains
within itself both the object of thought and the
faculty of thinking. For within it is the Mind,
primal, always in harmony with itself, itself a motive
power ; the Mind does not strive to possess, as one
that has not, or as one that longs to acquire or
to explore data not already at hand (for such are
the experiences of Soul) ; but, itself at rest, it at
once embraces all things in itself, yet without any
exercise of thought for the purpose of bringing them
into being." l

Soul, then, or ^x^? cannot be regarded as an
ultimate principle. Her content is many and she seeks
therein the One; irrational and full of error, and
she would find therein truth. Her means are dis
cursive thought, which can at the best bring things
to synthetic unity ; her ends, immediate and synoptic
vision. Such a condition requires further explana-

1 v. 9, 7 (560-561) [vol. ii. p. 254, 1. 20 et seq.]. Cf. v. 3, 2
(497 et seq.} [vol. ii. p. 179]. 7. at 5^ ^Trto-r^uat tv ^vxy \oytKrj
o$<rai at fiev rdv aiad rjTutj ei del ^Trian^ua? TOVTUV \yew, irptirei
8k atTcus TO r?}s 86%T)s Svo/Jia vcrrepcu T&V irpayjAdTuv oiVat eiKoves
elffi TOIJTUV at 8 TUV vorjT&v, at BTJ /cat 8i>Tus fTrtcrr^uat, Trapa
vov et s \oytKT]v \j/vxr)v \6ovcrai aladrjrbv fj.ei> ovdev voovvt xadbcrov
5^ elffiv dTTLO TTJfJ.ai, eifflv avra /ca<rra a vooOat, /cat Zvdodev TO re
vot]Tov TT)v re voycriv ^ovtnv, 5rt 6 vovs fadov, 6s ecrriv avra TO,
Trpwra, cvvuv avr ael /cat tvepyeia virapxuv /cat OVK ^7rt/3aXAwj/ ws
OVK ~xw v $ ^7ri/CTci/Ae^os r) die^odetjojv ov 7rpo/cexftptcr y u^i a ifsvxys
yap ravra Trddrj dXX ^ffTtjKev tv OLVT^ 6//,ou Travra &v, ov vo~rj(ras
Lv viroffTrivri eKacrra. Cf. also iv. 3, 18 (385).



THE PLOTINIAN SYSTEM 51

tion. The cause and justification of the soul s
pursuit of knowledge can only be found in the fact
that truth exists. Did it not exist she would not
and could not discover it. As guarantee, then, of
the relevancy of her thinking, there must exist a
higher principle in which the ideal object of her
thought finds expression. This is Mind or i/os,
contemplative Reason intuitive of truth.

Such is the road by which Plotinus reaches the
world of Platonic Ideas. Once there we find them
little changed since Plato s time. In them the con
fused variety of the sensible world is reduced to
order and rationality in a harmoniously interrelated
system of universals. This system forms a KOO-/AOS
vo^ro?, an intelligible universe, in which as the Reality
underlying the phenomenal order, the demand of
reason for unity and consistency finds a final satis
faction.

Not only, however, does reason require that its
ultimate object shall be self-consistent, but that it
shall be apprehended without the mediation of dis
cursive thought. Reasoning about or towards it is of
value only as leading to a final and sufficient state
of contemplation of it. Our higher principle must
also satisfy this craving for immediate union of
subject with object. This Plotinus accomplishes by
a doctrine reminiscent of the Aristotelian teaching
of the identity of the intellect and the intelligible-
The world of Platonic Ideas becomes to all intents
and purposes the Aristotelian God ; that is, an



52 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

absolute Reason such as it is the aim of every finite
reason to become, whose single immutable act of
thought once and for all determines and embodies
truth. Such a Reason would think the rational
constitution of the world ; but that constitution
would be no other than its own self. For the
essence of reason is to think truth. The content
of its thought, that is, from itself, is truth. Apart
from the truth which it thinks it is as empty and
narrow as consciousness without content. " Unless
thought be something added to its essence, all that
it thinks, it thinks* from itself ; all that it has, it
has from itself. But if it thinks from and out of
itself, it is itself the object of its thought." 1 That
is, self-realized reason thinks itself as an intelligible
order in experience ; it will think itself as such,
because such are the categories imposed upon it
by its own nature. As reason means in any finite
experience merely the existence of an intelligible
structure therein, so we might say that the Aristo
telian God and the i/ovs of Plotinus are but the
expression of the fact that the completely intelli
gible (i.e. the truth towards which the finite mind
aspires) exists, and contains within itself the con
ditions of its own existence. " In Mind," exclaims
Plotinus, "are all things immortal, every mind,
every god, every soul, eternally. Eternally, I



1 v. 9, 5 (558 A) [vol. ii. p. 252, 11. 4-7]. d 5e
rb <j>poviv $x l > e TL V0f t> no-p avTov /oe?, /cat et n #x et > 7
e%et. et 5c Trap avrou /cat e O.VTOV voei, <IVTQS effriv a voei.



THE PLOTINIAN SYSTEM 53

say, for why should it in its happy state seek
change ? And into what could it change, seeing
that it has all things of its own self? Nay more,
being perfect, it seeks to be no greater. Hence
all things which share in its existence are perfect,
to the end that it may be perfect in every respect,
possessed of nothing which is not so, and of nothing
which is not the object of its thought.

" But it thinks as one not in search, but in
possession. Nor is its blessedness acquired from
without ; rather is Mind eternally all things, the
true eternity of which time encircling the soul is
an image time which leaves the old things behind
and lays hold of new. For now one thing, now
another revolves about the soul, now Socrates, now
a horse, always some single thing. Mind, on the
other hand, is all things. It contains all things at
rest within itself; it alone has real existence; for
it the present is eternal, and there is nothing future,
since the future is already present to it ; nor is
there anything that is past. Nothing, I say, is
past, but in that they truly exist all things remain
at rest in it from eternity as though content with
themselves as they are. Each of them is Mind and
real existence, and the sum of them is all Mind and
all real existence." l

1 v. 1, 4 (485. A) [vol. ii. p. 165, 1. 20 et seq.]. -rravra yap
h avry ra dBdvara Trepte xei, vovv irdvTa, debv iravra, $VXT]V Trdcrav,
ecrrura dei. T L yap frrei /j.eTaj3d\\fiv eS tyw v > ""o* <>e fJtereXdciv
irdvra Trap avr< tyw? > a ^ o^e ati&iv ^ret reXetoraros &v. 5to
Kai rd Trap avTLp Trdvra reXeia, iva Travrr] 77 reXeios ovdev efxwj 6 TI



54 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

We have now reached the limit of the unity that
can be introduced into experience by reason, that is,
the perfect coherence of all its parts immediately
and synoptically perceived. But the logical unity
of a self-consistent system grasped "all together,"
as it were, in a single " eternal " movement or act
of thought, with which the demands of reason would
be satisfied, proves insufficient to pacify the mystic
spirit. He demands an object distilled clear of all
variety and multiplicity, a subject which is conscious
of nothing but such an object. On the level of
reason there are still many universals, however
harmoniously they may cohere, and logically imply
one another s existence, and a duality of subject
and object in thought s reflection upon its own
thinking.

So it is that we find Plotinus rejecting the
suggestion that vous can be regarded as the first
principle. "Why," he asks, "is Mind not the
creator? Because," he replies, "the activity of
Mind is thought, and thought, beholding the in
telligible and turning towards it and deriving, as



fjiT] TOLOVTOV, ov8ev [5 ] ?x wv & avT$ o fJ.Ti voel voel de ov
dXX x wv - /cct T0 I^K&piov avT< OVK dTTLKTrjTOv, dXX iv cu wiu
Trdvra., /cat 6 OVTWS aiwv, bv ^i/uetTcu XP OVOS Tepi0^wj i/ i xV TO, ^v
Traptets, rot s 5e e7rt/3a\Awi . /cat yap dXXa /cat aXXa a5 -rrepl ^t XW
Trore yap Sw/cpar^s, Trore 5^ linros fv TI del rdov &VTUV 6 de vovs
iravra. e xet odi> ev o.vr<^ wavra eorwra tv rcjj avrif, nai eart
fj,6vov, /cat TO earns del, KO! ovda/aov TO /-teXXoi/ ^art 7ap /cat
rore ovde TO Trape\7}\v66s ov yap TL e/cet Trape\rj\vdej>, dXX
dei are rd ai)rd OVTOL olov dyaTr&VTa eavTa ourajs exovTa.
de aurwv vovs /cat ov effTt, /cat TO ffv/^irav Trds vovs /cat



THE PLOTINIAN SYSTEM 55

it were, its fulfilment from it, is indeterminate in
itself, even as sight is, but is determined by the
intelligible. . . . Hence it is not simple, but plural,
displaying a composite though intelligible nature,
and beholding many things." l

The first principle, however, must be " simple and
different from anything that comes after it. It
must be absolute, and pure from the things that
proceed from it, and yet at the same time capable
of being present in things in some other way.
It must also be essentially one, that is, it must
not be primarily something else and one only
secondarily. . . . For were it not simple, free from
all arrangement and composition, and essentially
one, it would not be a first principle. Moreover,
because it is simple, it is self-sufficient, and the first
of all things. For what is not first stands in need
of what is prior to it, and what is not simple stands
in need of the simple factors within it, so that it
may be composed of them." 2 It is evident that our

1 v. 4, 2 (517) [vol. ii. p. 204, 1. 8 et seq.]. did ri d ov vovs ;
STL vov evfyyeid 4cm vbycris voycris 5e rb VOTJTOV bpGJaa /cat irpbs
TOVTO e7rt<rrpa0eicra /cat d?r e/cetVou olov aTTOTeXeiov/xej/Tj doptoTOS pev
aurfj &<rirep 8\j/is, bpifofjulvri 5e virb TOV vorjTov. dib /cat eip-rjrai e/c
Trjs dopiffTOv dvddos Kal TOV eros rd e iS-rj /cat ot dpidftoi TOVTO yap
6 vovs. 5i6 ovx aTrXoOs, dAXa TroXXd, crvvdeaiv TC e^aiviov, VOT}TT}V
H^vTot, /cat TroXXd bpCov rfdy. Cf. v. 6 passim.

2 v. 4, 1 (516) [vol. ii. p. 202, 1. 23 et seq.]. Set ^v ydp TC
irpb TrdvTuv elvai dirXovv TOVTO /cat irdvTwv ^Tepov T&V /xer avTo, e<f>
eavTov 8i>, ov fj.efj.iy^vov rot? d,7r avTov, /cat ird\ii> eTepov Tpoirov rots
AXXots irapelvai dvvd/mevov, oi> 8vTM ev, oi>x erepov 6v, elra lv, Kad
ov \f/ev8os /cat TO tv clvai, ov /J.T] \6yos wde eirurT-fiM, o ST) /cat
^7re /ceii/a Xe^erat eti ai ovvias et ydp /xr; aTrXoO? ^arat ffv/j,(3d<rews
w irdcrTjs /cat <rvi>6e<reus /cat OVTUS eV, OVK dv dpxv efy aOra^/ce-



56 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

experience can furnish no predicate or category
suitable to the description of such a principle, or
hint of the character of the state of consciousness
which can be aware of it. We may appeal to
experience only for examples of what it is not,
rejecting each new suggestion as irrelevant. 1 It is
"not a thing, but prior to everything," for inas
much as " it brings all things into being, it cannot
be one of them." It is " of no quality or quantity ;
it is not mind or soul, in motion or at rest, in space
or in time"; but it is the absolutely uniform, or
rather the absolutely formless, since it is prior to
all form, prior to motion, prior to rest. The term
"Being" is also inapplicable to it, since "Being has,
as it were, the form of Being." 5 That is, Being is



re TO; a7rXoOz> elvai Kal irpurov airdvTUv TO yap /JL
evdees TOV Trpb avTOV, TO Te yinj cnr\ovv T&V ev airro; air\u>v deo/mevov,
tv 77 e eKeivwv.

1 v. 3, 14 (511) [vol. ii. p. 19T, 1. 19]. Kal yap \eyouev, 8 //,??
fffriv o de eaTiv, ov \e~youev.

2 All the above quotations are from vi. 9, 3 (760) [vol. ii.
p. 512]. ovde vovs TO LVVV, dXXa Trpb vov T\ yap r&v OVTUV effTlv
6 vovs K.dvo oe oti TI, d\\a Trpb e/cd<rroy, ovde 6v Kal yap TO ov
olov /J^op(f)r]V TIIV TOV OVTOS ?X ei > &IM>p<f>OV 5e tKeivo Kal ^op<prjs
yevvijTLKT] yap ij TOV evbs (pv<ris odo~a T&V TTO.VTWV ovSev eo"Ti

ovre o$v rl ovTe iroibv ovTe iroabv oijrt vovs o#re ^vx~fj ovde
Kivov/Acvov ovd ad eerrctis, OVK ev TOTT^, OVK ev xpovy, dAXa TO Kad
avTO /Jt-ovoeLdes, fj,a\\ov de aveioeov Trpb eidovs ov iravTbs, irpb KLvrjcrews,
irpb (rrdcrews raura yap Trepl TO ov, a TroXXa avTO Troie?. dia ri ovv,
el /-IT? KivovfJ-evov, ovx ea-rws; 6 rt Trepl u,ev TO ov TOVTUV daTepov ^
d[j.(f)OTepa dvdyKr) TO Te eaTus <rrd(rei ecrrcbs /cat ov TavTov Trj crrd(ret
axrre ffv^rjaeTai avTip Kal OVKCTI aTrXovv /^evei. dwel Kal TO a friov
\eyeiv ov KaTtjyopetv <TTI o-v/m.j3e^-r)K6s TL aury, dXX 7)fuv, OTL exoftev
TL Trap 1 avTov eneivov OVTOS ev avT<. del de [j.r)de TO eKelvo, /ATjde TO
TOVTO \eyeiv d/cpt/3(Ss \eyovTa, dXX r//xas olov e^wBev wepideovTas TO.



THE PLOTINIAN SYSTEM 57

something, and even in its greatest abstraction still
displays a duality of subject and predicate. Nor
can we properly say of the One that it is good. At
least, goodness does not pertain to it as a predicate,
for then the Good would be independent of it, and it
would be dependent on the Good for its goodness.
If anything, it is not good, but the Good itself, or
better still it is super-good, a good not in relation
to itself, which is in need of nothing, but the Good
in relation to other things which derive their good
ness from it, as far as they are able. 1 Beautiful,
also, it is not, " for all beauty is subsequent to it, and
derived from it, as all daylight is from the sun." -
Again, it cannot be said to think, because thinking
is a process involving a distinction between subject
and object, and in the One there is no such dis
tinction. The One is not self-conscious. 3 More
over, if it thinks, ignorance will be prior to thought,
and thought will be for it, as it were, a means of
knowing itself. But it is absolutely self-sufficient,
is in closer and surer possession of itself than any
thought could put it. 4 However, we must not
suppose that because jt cannot be said to know
itself, it is therefore ignorant of itself. It tran-



O.VTUV ep^vevetv ede\eLi> irad-q ore fj.tr eyyvs, ore 5e
TCUS trepi avrb aTroptats.

1 vi. 9, 6 (764) [vol. ii. pp. 516-517]. Cf. v. 3, 11 (508).

2 vi. 9, 4 (761). trav ykp Ka\&v vo-repov CKeivov /cat Trap

tiffirep TTOLV (pus fJiedtj/^epivov wap i]\iov.

3 v. 3, 13 (511) [vol. ii. pp. 196-197]. Cf. iii. 9, 9 (358-359).

4 v. 6, 4 (536) [vol. ii. p. 225].



58 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

scends altogether the distinction between ignorance
and knowledge. Ignorance implies a duality of
subject and object. One thing is ignorant of
another. I am ignorant of myself. But that in
which there is no duality which is absolutely alone
can neither know nor be ignorant. 1

Even the term " One " we must use with careful
reservations. The first principle is not one as " this
one," or " that one." 5 It is not one in a mathe
matical sense, i.e. one as the first of a series, or
as the monad and point are the one reached by
division of the many. 3 It is not one in any sense
in which oneness can be predicated of anything
else, nor is its oneness a predicate of itself. It is
not something else primarily, and only secondarily
one. 4 In a word, it is only in a negative sense as
a denial of plurality, and by analogy, that we apply
the term. 5

The state of consciousness in which we are aware
of the One is correspondingly ineffable. We can
have no idea of it except by experiencing it our
selves. It is beyond words written or spoken.
" We speak and write of it, however, that we may
send our spirits towards it, and rouse them from
the contemplation of mere concepts to the vision of
it, as we might show a man the way to something

1 vi. 9, 6 (765 A) [vol. ii. p. 516].

2 vi. 9, 3 (761 A) [vol. ii. p. 512].

3 vi. 9, 5 (763) [vol. ii. p. 515].

4 vi. 9, 5 (763) [vol. ii. pp. 514-515].

5 vi. 9, 5 (763) [vol. ii. pp. 514-515]. Cf. v. 3, 13 (510).



THE PLOTINIAN SYSTEM 59

he was eager to see." l To reach the state of ecstasy,
the soul must become concentrated and receptive.
She must be far more formless even than Matter, " if
there is to be nothing within her to hinder her from
being filled and illumined with the primal nature.
She must free herself from all outer things, and turn
to what is altogether within. She must have no
inclination towards, nay no knowledge of, outer
things. Rather must she pass beyond consciousness
of them all, first with respect to her own condition,
and then with respect to the intelligible exist
ences. She must lose consciousness, too, of her
self, and attain to the vision of God, and become
one with him." 2 This vision and he who has
it are as far beyond the rational level of con
sciousness as is God beyond Truth and Being.
Consciousness has become absolutely simple. One
can indeed scarcely talk longer of a " vision " or of
" seeing." For seeing involves a duality of seer and
seen ; whereas in communion with God there is no

1 vi. 9, 4 (761) [vol. ii. p. 513, 11. 2-8]. deb ov8e prjTov ovSe
ypairrov (pT]cri,v. dXXa \eyo/j.ev /cat ypdQo/j.ei ire^irovTes els airro
/cat dveyelpovres e /c r(av \bywv em rr)f 6eav uvirep odbv deiKvvvres T
n 6ed<ra(rdcu povXa/jLevy. Cf. v. 5, 4 (522) et seq.

* vi. 9, 7 (765) [vol. ii. p. 578, 11. 4-14]. dXX uairep irepi
TT?S i!X?7S \eyerai, cos dpa airoiov elvai Sel Trdi>TUi>, et /xeXXet 5cxe0-0at

TOVS TTO.VTWV TVTTOVS, OVTW KOL 7TO\V /LtttXXoj aVtlSfOV T7]V "^W^ty ylvfffdo.1,

el jtteXXet wBiv e/uLTrodiov eyKa9ri/j.evov tveadai irpbs 7r\r]puariv /cat
e XXafj.^iv avTrj TTJS 0&rea;s r?}s Trpwrrys. ei roOro, iravruv T&V ^w
a<pe[j.evov del eiri(rTpa(f>rjvaL TT/>OS TO et<rw irdvTr], /xrj irpbs n T&V ^w
/ce/cXiV0at, dXXa dyvoriffavra ra irdvTa ical irpb rov fj.ev TTJ diadeaet,
TOTC Se /cat rots etdcffiv, dyvorjffavTa Se /cat O.VTQV ev TTJ 6eg. eKflvov
yevea-dat. /cd/cetVy ffvyyet>6fj.evov /cat t/ca^cDs olov o^tX^trai Ta iJKeii> dyyc\-
Xoj/ra, et SiWiro, /cat dtXXy TT}V e /cet avvov<ria.v.



60 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

distinction between seer and seen. " It is a bold
thing to say, but in the vision a man neither
sees, nor if he sees distinguishes what he sees from
himself, nor fancies that there are two. On the
contrary it is by becoming, as it were, another
than himself, and by neither being himself nor
belonging to himself, that he attains to the vision.
And, having once reached it, he is one with it, as
having made the centres of two circles to coincide.
For the centres when they coincide become one, and
when the circles are separated there are two centres
again. . . . Now since in the vision there were not
two, but the seer was made one with the seen, and
this not as with something merely seen, but as with
something actually made one with himself, a man
who had been united with God might, if he re
membered, have in him some image of the divine.
He himself was One, with no distinctions within him
self, with respect either to himself or other things.
There was no movement within him, no desire,
no passion . . . not even any reason or thought.
Nay, himself was not even present to himself, if one
may speak thus. Rather, as one rapt and entranced,
he attained to perfect calm and motionless solitude
in his own being, neither falling away on any side,
nor turning about himself; but, wholly at rest, he
was as though he had become immutability itself.
Nor had he a thought for beauty, for he had passed
beyond the Beautiful, even beyond the band of
virtues. . . . Perhaps then it was not vision but



THE PLOTINIAN SYSTEM 61

some other kind of seeing, ecstasy and simplification
and self-surrender. . . . " l

In fine, the mind s search for the Godhead must
meet at every point with the baffling answer given
by the sage Yajanavlkya in the Hindoo story. In
all attempts to define Brahma, Neti, neti, "It is
not thus," is the reply which meets each new effort.
The Plotinian God is in the mystic s phrase the
"silence"; the final stillness beyond all the sound

1 vi. 9, 10-11 (769 c-770 E) [vol. ii. p. 522, 1. 31-p. 524,

1. 4], TO e 6(p6fr, eiirep 5e? duo ravra \tyetv, TO re bp&v Kal TO
bp&[j,evov, dXXd AITJ eV d7t0u? ToAjUTipos fj.ev b \6yos rore ,ue> o#re
6p$ cure diaKpivei 6 bp&v ovd 0aj>TdfeTat dvo, d\X olov dXXos
yevbpevos Kal OVK atrrds ovd avrov o~WT\et titeT, /cd/cetVou yei>6/j.evos
eV CO-TLV wo-irep KtvTptg KtvTpov o-vvd\{/as - /cat yap evTavda (rvve\66i>Ta
$v O~TI, TQTe [5e] duo, OT&V %a;pts. ourco /cat ^yWeZs vvv \yofj.ev ere/sop.
Sib /cat ovfffppaGTOv TO Bea/ua. TTWS yap av airayyel\ei rts ws
eTepov OVK ioijjv e/cetVo, ore e^earo frepov, dXXa v irpbs eavTov ; 11.
TOVTO 8rj 6e\ov dr)\ovv TO TU>V /j.v<TTr)pi(i}v T&vde eTriTay/Aa, TO
/J.T] K<f>peiv els fj,r) /jLefAvrj/J.frovs, ws OUK K(j)Opov ^Kelvo ov aireiTre
ot]\ovv Trpbs d\\ov Tb deiov, 6 ry yttrj /cat avTcfi idetv euTux^rai. ^?ret
Toivvv ovo OVK 3)t>, dXX li/ ty auTos b t 5u;^ irpbs Tb eupafj-evov, ws av
/AT] ewpa/j,{i>oi>, dXX yvwiJt-evov, 8s cytveTO ore e/cetVy epiyvvTO d
/U./UU>$TO, ?x L av 7ra P > ectury tKelvov dubva. fy 5e v /cat auros
diacpopav tv awry oude/Miav irpbs eavTbv ^x^" ^ re f ara SXXa ov
yap TI eKivetTO Trap avT<f, ov 6vfj.6s, OVK 7n6v/j.ia &\\ov Traprjv OLVT^
avafiefiyKOTi, dXX ovde \6yos ov8 ns yoTjats ov8 6 Xws ai)ros, et Set
/cat rouro X^etv * dXX &o~7rep apirao del i r) Ivdovcnaffas ywxfj eV
^pr/fj.({3 /carafrrdcrei yeyfryTai dr/je^et riy a^rou ovcria oi)5a//,oO aTro-
K\lvuv ovd irepi avTbv <rTpe<p6[j,evos, eo-rcbs iravT-r) Kal olov o-rdcrts
ovde TWV /caXcDv, dXXa /cai r6 /caXo^ -^77 virepd^uv, virep-
^i rwi dpercDi xop6v, (aairep rts et s r6 ei crw roO dS^Toi
ei? Toviricru /caraXtTrcbj/ rd e l ry i/ay d7aX/xara, a e\66vTi
TOV ddvTov ira\iv ylveTan irp&Ta ^erd TO eVSov deajj-a Kal TJ\V e/ce?
ffvvovo~ia,v Trpos oi)/c aya\/ma ovd et /c6Va, dXX aJr6 d 77 yLveTai
devTepa ded/maTa. Tb d i a-ws ^i ou 6eau.a, dXXa dXXos T/JOTTOS rou
t Se?^, e /coTacris /cat aTrXaxris /cat e7ri So(ris airrou /cal ^0e(rts 7r/)6s d
/cat crrdcrt? /cat Treptfo^crts Trpos e(papu,oyriv, eitrep rts TO eV T



62 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

and fury of the world of particular things. But
the silence and stillness are positive, are more
than absence of noise and change, though we are
able only to describe them as such. In spite of the
absolute irrelevance of all finite standards of perfec
tion and reality to the divine essence, and the
complete annihilation of everything finite, deter
minate, and intelligible, which experience of it
would involve, that essence is so absolutely real and
perfect, and the vision of it so final and satisfactory,
that though from our point of view they are ineffable
except in negative terms, to him who had attained
them, "our so real world with all its stars and
milky ways is likewise nothing.""



CHAPTER II

METAPHYSICAL EVIL

FOR the ordinary mystic the natural corollary ot
such a proposition concerning the nature of God
is an out-and-out doctrine of metaphysical evil.
And since the mere fact of a world at all as
separate and individual, as itself and not God, is
prima facie evil, the problem of Evil becomes the
problem of existence. The question is not, how comes
it that the world is imperfect ? but how comes it,
given our premises, that there is a world ? The
nature of the divine perfection would seem logically
to preclude any divine causation or creation at all.
In a system such as Schopenhauer s, for example, it
is hard to see how the Will denied can properly
be said to be the cause of the Will affirmed. Or
again, I think one may fairly question whether in
the Vedanta doctrine, the Atman in its true self
hood which is identical with Brahma, can be made
more than the nominal cause of the illusion of
the finite world by which it is haunted. Reality
is not the creator of its own obscuration. The veil
of Maya materializes, as it were, from without.

63



64 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

The result in most such systems is that, so far
as the point is raised at all, the origin of the
world is left unexplained. All that we can say is
that it just happens, or comes, or grows, and let the
matter rest at that, ignoring the dualism latent
in the question. I can give no better example of
this inconclusiveness than a passage from a modern
mystic, a disciple of Schopenhauer, descriptive of
the origin of the universe.

"Now there was formed," he says "not at any
time but before all eternity, to-day and for ever,
like an inexplicable clouding of the clearness of the
heavens, in the pure, painless, and will-less bliss of
denial, a morbid propensity, a sinful bent : the
affirmation of the will to life. In it and with it
is given the myriad host of all the sins and woes of
which this immeasurable world is the revealer." ]

But even if we admit, as Deussen does, that the
origin of the finite is inexplicable, we are by no
means clear of dualism. We may not know where
the finite comes from, but the finite in its finitude
still remains something essentially different from
the infinite which it clouds and obscures. It is
simply there, a datum or condition of experience
which is confessedly irreducible to the real, over
whose surface it is spread like a veil.

Again, admitting, as does Philo, an explicit
dualism, and attributing the existence of the finite
to a principle of finitude over against God, the
1 Deussen, Elements of Metaphysics, 171.



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 65

mystic has still to face a difficulty. For him, the
universe is a disease from which Reality suffers.
The eternal silence of the divine is broken from
without into the moments of our noisy years. The
whole process of creation, as we usually conceive it,
is reversed. The principle of finitude and imper
fection becomes the active agent, the infinite and
the perfect, the passive substratum. Instead of God
ordering Matter, Matter, as it were, disorders God.

Philo overcomes this difficulty by practically
accepting the inversion of the ordinary point of view.
God orders Matter, to be sure, but it is the existence
of Matter which rouses him to activity. Confronted
from all eternity with what is not himself, he does
what he can to overcome the discrepancy. His
perfection in relation to this " Other " becomes
active and bounteous good. Out of the unbroken
peace of his supreme isolation and ineffableness, he
issues literally another being, a Logos an ideal
world, an active, creative, sustaining and providential
power. But this aspect of godhead, derivative and
subordinate as it is, represents not a natural and
essential, but an accidental expression of the divine
nature ; a part, if you will, forced on it from with
out by the unhappy exigencies of the situation.
Were there no Matter there would be no Logos, no
Providence, no world ; nothing but the perfect and
unbroken peace. 1

Plotinus, however, must deal with these difficulties

1 Cf. p. 38, note -3.

F



66 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

in another way. The intention of his system is from
beginning to end monistic. His task then involves
the defence of a double thesis. Against Philo and
the majority of mystics, he must argue how God,
from no secondary consideration, such as a material
principle, or by no inexplicable clouding of his deity,
but of himself, by all the exigencies and out of
the depths of his essential perfection was bound to
create a world. That is, he must show how God
naturally would generate the universe. And against
the non-mystic dualist like Aristotle he must
demonstrate how he could-, how God can be not
only the final, but the true efficient and material
cause of everything that is.

The key to the first question he believes himself
to have found in the explanation of Timaeus to
. AyaObs rjv dyaOio Sc ovSeis Trepl ovStvbs
eyyiyi/ercu </>#ovos. " God was good, and ill
the good there can never arise jealousy of any
thing." l " How, then," he goes on in continuance
of an argument for the simplicity of the One, already
quoted, "how, then, do things proceed from the
first principle ? If the primal be perfect, and the
most perfect of all things, and its power be funda
mental, it must be the most powerful of all things
that are, and other powers must imitate it as far
as they can. Now, whenever anything comes to
perfection we see that it procreates, that it cannot
endure to remain as it is by itself, and so creates
1 Plato, Timaeus, 29 E.



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 67

another being. This is true not only of things
which possess conscious purpose, but also of things
which procreate without conscious purpose. Indeed,
even inanimate objects throw off some part of
themselves as far as they are able. Thus fire warms
and snow chills, and drugs have their appropriate
effects upon other things, and all things imitate, as
far as they can, the first principles whence they
came; for thus they strive after eternal life and
goodness. How then should the most perfect and
primal Good stay shut up within itself as though
grudging of itself or impotent, itself the potentiality
of all things ? How could it then be the first
principle ? Something then must be begotten of
it if any of the other existences which are derived
from it are to exist. . . ." l

The creation of the world is due then to the I
active nature of perfection. The Good is super
abundant, overflows, 2 and must overflow till every

1 v. 4, 1 (517) [vol. ii. p. 203, 1. 15 et *#/.]. Cf. iv. 8, 6,
v. 1, 6 (487) [vol. ii. p. 168, 1. 30 et seq.]. TTWS oiV diro TOV
Trpwrou el T\ebv effTt TO irp&TOv, Kal iravrtjov reAeurraroj , Kal
Stiva/j.is T] Trp&TT], 5e? irdvTUv T&V OVTUV dwaTwrarov elvai, Kal ras
a\\a$ 8vvdfj.LS, Kad oaov ovvavrai. fju Celadon eKetvo, OTI 5 av rdov
(LXXwv els TfXeiuffiv ir}, 6pw/m,ev yevvuv Kal OVK dve-^bfjievov t eavrou
fj^veiv, d\\ erepov TTOIOVV ov /ULOVOV 6, TI av Trpoaipe<ni> exTJ, d\\a Kal
o cra (fivet, avev irpoaipecrews, Kal ra &\f/vxa 8e i^eradidovra eavruv,
Kad offov dvvarai. olov rb irvp 0p/j.aivei, Kal ^x et "h X L< ^ V - Kai
ra (pdp/uaKa 8 els a\\o epyd^erai, olov aura, Trdvra rr\v &pxn v
Kara 8tivafJi.iv dTrofJ.ifJ.otifj.eva, els d iSioTrjTd re Kal dyadorrjTa. TTWS
o$v TO Te\ewTaTov Kal r6 irpQtTOv dyadbv ev avTip ffTaitj, wtrirep
(fidovyjcrav eavTov T) d8vvaT7Jaav 9 f) iravTwv Stiva/j.is ; TTWS 5 av en dpx.^1
eirj ; Set Sr) TI /cat d?r avTOv yeveff6ai, etVep &rrat TL Kal TV a\\<j}v
Trap avTov ye vTrocrravTuv. 2 v. 2, 1 (494) [vol. ii. p. 176].



68 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

possibility of good and every possible kind of per
fection is realized. 1 To this point of the grades of
perfection we shall return later. At present we
must point out that it is necessary to exclude care
fully any idea of conscious purpose from the creative
process. God does not will the world into being,
it does not exist in response to any aim or purpose
of his. He does not even know that it exists.
For him, as for the mystic spirit in its moment of
final victory, the universe " with all its suns and
milky ways is nothing." Did he will to create it,
and were he conscious of it, he would be no longer
either the One or the Good. He would be, and here
Plotinus agrees with Aristotle, a moved mover.
The term " generation," indeed, is hardly apposite,
and Plotinus employs it with the warning that we
must rid it of all suggestion of generation in time.
What is generated by the One is generated without
movement of the One. And " since the ,Qne.j;emams
unmoved, if there be anything that comes after it,
this second existence must come into being without
any assent, or will, or motion of any sort on
the part of the One. How, then, is this accom
plished, and what are we to think of that process
which goes on about the abiding One? We are
to think of it as a radiance proceeding indeed from
the One, but from the One abiding therein un
changed, just as the bright light which courses
round the sun is perpetually generated from it,
i iv. 8, 6 (474) [vol. ii. p. 150].



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 69

though the sun itself changes not at all. Indeed, all
things that exist necessarily give out from their
own essence, while they last, a property attached to
themselves, which proceeds from their potentiality
within, and spreads about them to that which is
outside an image, as it were, of the archetypes
from which it sprang. Fire dispenses heat from
itself, and snow does not merely retain its cold
within itself. But the best evidences of this are
sweet-smelling substances. For as long as they exist
there is something which proceeds out of and spreads
round about them, and everything that is near at
hand shares in the enjoyment of these derived
existences." l

The above passage is of great importance, not
only as regards our own problem, but for the under
standing of the Leitmotiv of the whole Plotinian
system. It contains what we may call the analogy^
nf pypanafjnv^ an analogy to which Plotmus appeals
again and again, now in one, now in another connec
tion. The figure, indeed, lies at the basis of his whole

1 v. 1, 6 (487) [vol. ii. p. 168, 1. 15 et seq.]. del ovv aKLvrjTov
SVTOS, ei TL oevTepov [ACT avro, ov irpo(rvevffa.vTOS ovoe j3ov\T]dei>Tos
ovoe 6 Xws KLVtjdevTos inroa TTJi ai, avro. TTUS odv ; /cat ri del voijcrai
irepl e/cetVo (Aevov ; ireplXa^Lv avrov jj.ev, % avTOv 8e [JLevovTOS,
olov Tj\iov rb irepl OLVTOV Xa^irpbv <p&s Trepideov, e^ O.VTOV del
yevvw/mevov /j-evovros. /cat TTOLVTO. TO. 6t>ra. e ws fj.evet e /f rrjs avrdov
ovffias avayKdiav rriv irepl avra irpbs TO ^u avruv fK rrjs TrapovffrjS
SuvdyCiecoj 8i8d}ffiv avT&v e^rjpr^fji.ei rjv viroffraaiv, eiKova ovffav olov
apxeTiJirbji &v ffe 0f, Trvp jj.ev TT]V Trap avrov 6ep/J.6TTjTa /cat xtw*
OVK eteu fjibvov TO ^v^pbv /car^x //dXto-ra de o<ra evuSTj papTvpe i
ews yap effTi, Trpoeio~l TL e avT&v irepl ai)rd, &v dwoXavei
6 TL



70 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

system. Upon it, and with constant reference to
it, is built up the imposing edifice of the theory of
emanation which is the essence of the Plotinian
metaphysics. We are, indeed, dealing here with
one of the great analogies of philosophy. Were
one writing a book on the philosophic significance
and use of similes, I am not sure but that one
would have to count this first, both in point of its
aptness, and of its central place and controlling
function in thought. Certainly there is none in
the history of Greek philosophy that can compare
with it in its magnificence and its attraction,
unless it be the Kivei ok e/ow/^voi/ of Aristotle,
which by likening God s relation to the world to
that of the beloved to the lover, solved so many
riddles to the Stagirite s satisfaction. And there
is none equal to it in downright cleverness, except
perhaps that tour de force in the Timaeus, where
Plato by laying out empty space geometrically and
then combining the plane figures into solids, suc
ceeded in educing a solid world out of sheer empti
ness. Perhaps, too, there is none more false, and,
because of its dominance, more mischievous in its
falsity. To the point of its falsity we shall have
occasion to return later. Suffice it to say for the
present that by his employment of it Plotinus
believes that he has overcome the principal, or
at least the preliminary, difficulty in the way of
deriving the Many from the One ; the problem
of preserving the integrity and absolute character



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 71

of the One in spite of and in the midst of the
process.

Granted, however, that there has been established
the possibility of an emanation from the One with
out any disturbance or diminution of its essence,
there yet remain two questions to be answered. In
the first place we may ask how the emanation is to
be logically distinguished from the essence of the
One, since the emanation can only be an emanation
of the essence ; in the second place how the emana
tion, in itself homogeneous, can of and by itself
become diversified.

The first difficulty Plotinus answers by dis
tinguishing two kinds of "acts" or "operations"
(Ive/oyeiat). There is indeed the Aristotelian " act,"
the operation of being what one is; but there is
also another sort of "act," the expression, as it
were, of one s self in another. Or to put it
biologically, we might say there is an "act" of
reproduction of one s self as well as the " act " of
self-preservation. Plotinus harks back to his
favourite simile for an example. "Take fire for
example," he says. "There we find both the heat
which constitutes its essence, and the heat which
emanates from it while it is engaged in the activity
natural to its essence, that is, in continuing to be
fire." l That is, heat is in the fire, is the essence and

i V. 4, 2 (518) [vol. ii. p. 205, 11. 8-11]. olov K al tori rov Trvpbs
i] fj.fr Tis eori o-v/u-TT^povo-a TT]v ovffiav 6ep/J,oTri$, T? (

frepyovvTOS tKfivov TT> av^vrov rrj ovffia [evepyeia
TrDp. oOrco 5r) K &Kt. Cf. v. 3, 7 (503) ; 15 (512).



a
tew tv



72 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

" operation " of fire, and at the same time goes forth
from it. We perhaps might turn to Christian
theology, and point to that eternal generation of
the Son by the Father, "God of God, Light of
Light, very God of very God," in which the Father,
preserving none the less the essential "operation"
of his proper hypostasis, engenders the hypostasis
of the Son.

By thus reverting to its fundamental analogy,
the Plotinian analogy meets the second difficulty
connected with the derivation of the Many from
the One. But there is yet the third to be reckoned
with. How can the Many be conceived as develop
ing within the perfect simplicity of the primitive
emanation ? How can the absolutely homogeneous
be the cause and substance of its own variegation ?
In dealing with this crucial point Plotinus is not
unnaturally hesitant and obscure, and we can be no
more than tentative in our interpretation. But
Plotinus s meaning, it seems, is somewhat as follows :
The One is indeed nothing, i.e. no thing, since it
transcends all things, but, as the existence of
existence proves, it contains within itself the
possibility of all things. In it " all things are not
as yet, but shall be," l not indeed in point of time,
since the generation of the world is eternal, but in
point of logical priority. From this point of view,

1 V. 2, 1 (494) [vol. ii. p. 176, 1. 3]. To tv ird^ra K ai ovoe eV
dpxn yo-P TTO.VTUV ov Travra d\\ e/cet ^s iravra e/cet yap olov
dvedpafj,e fj.a\\ov de OVTTU Zariv, dXX carat.



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 73

as itself the possibility of a rational universe, the
One may be called latently rational or intelligible.
Now the emanation from the One at the moment
of its issue from the One (remembering that we
employ temporal terms only by way of imperfect
analogy), is as yet undetermined. But at the
moment of its issue, which is also the moment of
its separation, the fact of its separation enables it
and causes it, as something different from the One,
to turn to the One and regard it. In other words,
the One emerges from itn trfinFimiflrnce of the
distinction between subject and object, and becomes
self-conscious.

But what is this self of which it is conscious?
It cannot know itself as One, since the One as such
is beyond the antithesis of "I"" and "Me," and
unattainable by any process properly described as
knowledge. To know itself as One it would have
to cease knowing itself, if I may put it paradoxically.
The object of its knowledge must be what we de
facto find is the ideal object of any perfect know
ledge. The One can know itself only as the truth
the archetypal or intelligible world of which qua
One it yet affords the possibility. That is, all that
it can know of itself in turning back to behold itself
is the possible world which it is. 1 But this know
ledge of itself is conditioned by the antithesis of
an alter. The One s knowledge of itself as the

1 All this interpretation is based on v. 1, 6-7 (487-488)
[vol. ii. pp. 168-169]. Cf. v. 3, 15 (512-513).



74 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

archetypal world of truth involves, and is dependent
upon, the knowledge that it has lost its unity. It
is now the Not-One, the Many over against the
One. But it recognizes that qua One it is the
source and justification of itself qua the Many, that
is, qua the archetypal world. "In its thought of
itself it thinks itself accidentally. For it is in
looking to the Good (i.e. the One) that it thinks
itself. 11 1 Or, in modern phrase, we might say
that the subject recognizes itself and the object as
derived from and dependent upon a higher unity
in which both are transcended. In Plotinus s own
words, "the One is the potentiality of all things.
The things of which the One is the potentiality,
^Thought, separated as it were from that potentiality,
| now beholds. Otherwise it could not be Mind.
At that moment it gains consciousness, as it were,
from itself of the nature of its own potentiality
of its power of generating by itself its own
essence, and of determining its own being by
means of the power received by it from the One.
It perceives, too, that its essence is, so to speak, a
part of that which belongs to and is derived from
the One, and that it is strengthened and brought
to the fulness of being by and out of the One. It
sees, too, that to itself from the One, as to the
divisible from the indivisible, have come life and

1 v. 6, 5 (537) [vol. ii. p. 22(>, 1. 20]. /ecu yap av ev ry vorj<rei
avTou Kara <rvfj.j3e(3 / r)Kbs avrb voel ?rp6s yap TO dyaObv fiXetrov avrb
voei cvepyovv yap av eavrb voet.






METAPHYSICAL EVIL 75

thought and all things, precisely because the One
itself is none of these things." l

The knowledge, however, that it is no longer
the One, but the possible universe opposed to and
derived from it, actualizes at the same moment
that possibility. The One knows that qua One it
may be, but that qua "may be," it actually is the
world in question. Qua One it is all things in
potentia, qua Potentiality it is suddenly and by
the mere recognition of that qua-uess the whole
universe of things in actu. The intelligible world
is, at the moment it thinks itself; it thinks itself
at the first instant it is possible for it to do so.
That possibility has from all eternity been implied
in the essence of the One. Thus the One becomes at
once Being and Thought in the unity of an intellect
which is its own subject and its own object. 2

An inspection of the archetypal world at this
point leads us to a further discovery in the shape
of a deduction of the categories. 3 Mind in the first



1 v. 1, 7 (488) [vol. ii. p. 169, 1. 27 et seq.]. d\\a TO fr
TrdvTtov. &v o$v effTi 5vva.fJ.is, raDra diro TTJS 8vvdfM(i)S olov

71 vorjcris Kadopa. T) OVK av fy vovs. ewei /cat irap avrov <?x ei tf^r)
olov ffvvaiffdt]ffi.v TTJS Suvd/meus, OTL di/varac ovaiav avrbs yevvav di

Tov /cat opifciv TO elvai avT$ ry Trap CKC IVOV 8vvdfj.fi, /cat OTL olov
fj.epos v TL TUIV ene ivov /cat e^ e/cetVou rj ova-la /cat puvvvTai Trap e/cetVoi
Kal reXetoGrat ets oixrlav Trap ^Kelvov /cat ^ eneivov. bpa 8e aury

eWev olov jue/xoraJ ff d/xeptcrroi; /cat TO rjv /cat TO voelv Kal TrdvTa,
OTI eKeivo [Arjdev T&V TTOLVTUV.

2 v. 2, 1 (494). Cf. v. 3, 10 (506) et seq.

- For a brief deduction vide v. 1, 4 (485) [vol. ii. p. 166] ;
for a more elaborate, vide vi. 2, 6 (600) et seq. [vol. ii. p. 306],
19 (611) et seq. [vol. ii. p. 320].



76 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

place has real existence it must think itself as being.
Did it not exist it could not think. "Being" is
then the first category. The second we should
naturally expect to be correlated intelligence or
Thought. But such is not the case. The categories
are forms or conditions of Thought, and Thought is
not a condition or form of itself. Thought is Being
thinking itself, the self-knowledge, as it were, of
the categories. But now the act of intellect in
which Thought and Being are united displays two
marked characteristics. On the one hand, we can
distinguish between Thought and Being, on the
other, we say that the two are somehow one. But
to say that any two are one presupposes as its con
dition the categories of difference and identity.

But Being is, Being is living, sustaining, and
preserving itself out of its own inner vitality. It
exists in actu, tvcpyciy. This vitality and activity,
however, by which Being persists in being, involves
motion. Motion, however, is not an accident or an
attribute of Being, it is its essence and is inseparable
from it in thought. We cannot think of Being,
save as existing in the full kinetic significance of
the participial construction. Motion then activity,
actuality will be our fourth category.

The motion, however, involved in Being s mere
being, is precisely what keeps it what it is, unaltered
in its nature, i.e. is precisely what keeps it at rest.
Indeed, rest or stability is what first strikes us asj
the condition of all being, and it is only on second



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 77

glance that we see how keeping at rest involves
activity and motion.

An analysis of the " thought " aspect of i/ovs re
veals the same categories. Thought thinks itself
as existing, as being. Its thought involves activity
and motion. That is, Thought is thinking, is in
ultimate analysis not a noun, but a verb. But by
thinking, Thought constitutes and bounds itself, is
what it is, persists as itself, in a word keeps itself
stable, unalterable, and immobile. 1

We have then the five prime categories Being,
Identity, Difference, Movement, and Rest. From
these five all the other so-called categories, and
genera, and species proceed by a process of logical
deduction. Thus number is immediately implied
in the multiplicity of the intelligible content. Be
holding the continuity of its act of thought, the
mind draws thence the idea of magnitude and
quantity, and from the inexhaustibility of its
power, that of infinity. Contemplating the beauty
and perfection of its existence, it has the notion of
quality. Difference and identity are in the same
way the bases of similarity and dissimilarity, equality
and inequality, and the like. And thus, petal by
petal, the whole intelligible world of truth blows
into full flower. 2

In deriving Soul from Mind, Plotinus resorts

1 This account is based on the text, vi. 2, 6-8 (600-602) [vol.
ii. p. 306 et seq.].

2 vi. 2, 21 (613 A et seq.) [vol. ii. pp. 322-323].



78 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

to the same analogies and employs the same
arguments as he used in explaining the emanation
of Mind from the One. Since by the existence
of the intelligible the possibilities of existence
are not exhausted, it too must perforce overflow. 1
Like the One, it has its two operations or "acts,"
an essential operation by which it is what it is, and
an emanatory act by which it reproduces itself. This
overflow or emanation from itself is i/mxy or Soul.

The reproduction of itself in ^v\i] is both general
and particular. Each form or archetype gives forth
a particular soul or a Aoyos o-Tre^pxTt/cos, and the
intelligible world in which the archetypes are or
ganized, as we remember, on the analogy of logical
inclusion and implication, projects itself in a World-
Soul that includes the ^ux<u and the Aoyoi OTTC/OPXTIKOI,
i.e. the Ideas as formative forces, after the same
figurative fashion.

By Soul or i/o^y? we are not to understand
Soul in our use of the word as a self-conscious
principle. This point is discussed at length by
Plotinus, and the conclusion is that it is Mind
which is the principle of self-consciousness in us.
The proper operations of the soul are sensation and
the synthesis of sensation by discursive thought.
Discursive thought, indeed, knows itself, but knows
itself as an unfulfilled activity, dependent upon and

1 iv. 8, 3 (472 A) [vol. ii. p. 147, 1. 1 et seq.}. STL ^ olbv
re 7)v arr]va.i TO. Travra ev T$ vo-r)T$, dwa^vov <?0e?7S /cat &\\ov
Adrrovos fj-tv, dvayKalov 5e elvai, e foep /cat TO irpb avrov.






METAPHYSICAL EVIL 79

realized in the Mind. Adequate self-knowledge is
sub specie aeternitatis. 1

In a word, the relations between Soul, with her
operation of discursive thought, and Mind seem to
be the exact analogues of those between Mind and
the One. Mind in issuing from the One turns
toward it, and by that return constitutes itself
an archetypal world the not-One; a world which
though other than the One is yet derived from it,
and by its desire to return to its origin is held in
that state of perfect identity of subject and object
in which the ideal of contemplative thought is for
ever realized. In like manner the Soul, turning
towards the Mind whence she flows and striving
to regain that state of complete self-consciousness
which is her source, is thereby confirmed in her proper
nature. This is her essential "operation" or "act." 5

Perhaps the word most descriptive of her essence
is life. 3 She is the principle of vitality and activity
in all things : the Aristotelian </>i!o-6s, we might
almost say, of all things, by which things become
what they are, exercise their proper functions, and
are conformed to their proper ends. She creates
and sustains all life and nature, " breathing life into
all things nourished by earth or sea, all the dwellers
in the air, all the divine stars of heaven. Yea, the
sun and this great firmament of heaven she hath set
in order, and herself maketh them to revolve in due

1 For all this vide v. 3, 1-4 (496-500) [vol. ii. pp. 178-183],
2 v. 1, 3 (484) [vol. ii. p. 165]. 3 iv. 7, 11 (465) [vol. ii. p. 139],



80 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

courses. . . . And the heaven moved in eternal
motion under the wise guidance of Soul, becomes
a living and a blessed being and acquires due honour
when once Soul has come to dwell within it ; but
before the coming of Soul it was but a dead body,
mere earth and water. . . . And though the heaven
is manifold, and different in different places, it is
one by virtue of her power, and it is through her
that this ordered universe is a god. . . ." l

1 v. 1, 2 (482-483) [vol. ii. p. 162, 11. 18-p. 163, 1. 31]. (2)

ivQv^e ujQd) TO LVVV irp&rov eKeivo iracra ^vx^, u>s avrr] fj.ev fya
Troir)<re wavra efjurvev<ra<ra avrois far}v, a re 777 rpe<pei a re 6d\a<r<ra
a re ev depi a re ev ovpav$ acrrpa deia, avrr] oe r/\iov, avrr] de rbv
u*eyav rovrov ovpavbv, Kal avrr) eKOfffJiriaev, avrr) de ev rd|et Trepidyei
(pvo~LS ovffa erepa &v KOfffJ.e t /cat &v KLvel /cat d ^v Trotet- /cat
dvayKr] elvai Tifjuurfpav, yLyvofJLevwv [fj.ei>] TOVTUV /cat
OTO.V avra \j/vx^l d-rroXetTry T) xopVYtL ^", afar) 5e oticra del
dTroXeiTreij/ eavrrjv. rts 5^ [6] rpoTros rrjs x^ TY^ T v ?l v % v Te r( ?
ffVfjLTravri ev re rots e/cdcrrots, &5e Xoyi^effdu. crKOTreiadti) 8r] rr\v
/j.eyd\-rjv ^VXTI" &\\tj ^v^n ov cr/xt/cpd ata rou ffKoirelv yevou^rj
dTra\\aye i<ra dirdr-rj^ /cat rCiv yeyoyrevKoruv ras aXXay V^XV r fl
Karaardaei. rjffvxov $e avrr) eara fj.7] i^ovov TO TrepiKei/j.ei OJ (rcD/xa
Kal 6 rov crc6^taros K\v5ui>, dXXd /cat irav rb 7repiex ov ^ff^X ^ ^ v 7^>
ijcrvxos de dd\a<r<ra /cat dr/p /cat avrbs ovpavbs (d/j.dvuv). voeirw de
irdvrodev ets avrbv ecrr&ra ^vx^v e^wdev olov elapeovaav /cat el<rx v -
delffav /cat Trdvrodev eltTiovffav /cat elffXa/^Trovcrav olov crKoreivbv
vetpos i]\iov ^SoXat ^amVacrat Xd/x,7retj/ Trotovai xpftroetS^ o\f/iv oLoovaat,
ovrco rot Kal \jjvxy t\dovcra ets <rcD/za oupavov ^5co/ce /j.ei> far}v, ^5w/ce
5e ddavacriav, ijyeipe 8e Kelpevov. o Se Kivr]6ei<s Klvqvw didiov virb
^VXW tfMf>p6vus dyouarjs faov ev8ai/u.ov eyevero, e^x* T diai>
ovpavbs ^VXTJS et crot/ctcrfleiVi?? &v irpb ^VXT}* vufJ-a veKpbv, yyj Kal vdup,
/j.a\\ov de <r/c6ros v\-rjs Kal /J.TJ ov Kal "6 <rrvyeovcrii> ol 0eot," <f>r}o-i rts.
yevoLTO 5 at> (pavepwrepa avrrjs Kal eva.pyeo~repa r\ duvafus Kal r/ (pvffLS,
et rts evravda diavorjdei-rj, OTTCOS 7repte%et /cat a^et rats aur^s f3ov\r}-
(recri rbv ovpavbv. -rravrl /j.ev yap r<$ [AeyeOei rovr^, 8<ros earlv,
eowKev eavTTjv Kal irav didarrj/^a /cat fj^ya Kal fUKpbv e \j/vx<>>Ta-<- d\\ov
fjiev aXX?? /cet/xeVou rov (rw/Ltaros /cat rov fjiev wdi, rov Se w5t 6j>ros, /cat
rwi/ /Jiev e evavrias, TLOV de a\\rjv dirdprrjatv d-rr d\\rj\<i}i>
dXX oi>x 7? tyvxn OVTWS, ovde pepei. eaur^s e/cdart^



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 81

In a word, Soul is Nature in that eulogistic
sense in which we sometimes use the term, as when
we speak of "mother" Nature, suggesting not the
mere body of natural phenomena, but a sympathetic
spirit and tendency incarnate within it. 1 Or, to
change the figure, we might say that the soul is
applied science, reason no longer theoretic, but em
ployed in creating according to its own precepts.
This is indeed precisely Plotinus s notion. The Soul,
he tells us, is the word, the expression, the image
of vovs. She is i/ous expressing itself in a sensible
medium. 2 ^PV^ however, is even more obviously
inconclusive than i/ovs. She expresses as it were a
relation in which vovs stands, is vovs exercised with
an eye not to itself, but to further possibilities
of being, including indeed the possibility of this
exercise itself. But the possession of vision is
useless, and the exercise of it futile, if it be of
mere blankness. A relation that is a relation to
nothing is without meaning. The emanation of
^V^TI is irrelevant without a terminus ad quern. De
facto, too, the possibilities of being are not ex
hausted by her procession. Both " mother " Nature



W irot.fi, dXXa wdfra fp rrj 6\y, Kal Trdpeori iraaa
r<$ yevvf}<ra.vTi. irarpl b^oLov^vrj Kal Kara TO v Kal Kara
rb irdvTTj. Kal 7ro\i)s &v 6 otipavbs Kal ctXXos &\\ri ev ivri rfj Taurrjs
Svvdfj.fL Kal 6e6s Icrri dia ravrriv 6 KOCT/UOS 6 5e.

1 At the same time, Plotinus seems to distinguish between
Nature even taken in this sense, and the World-Soul. She is
secondary, an offspring of the World-Soul, \l/vxft ofoa, yfrvijua.
^VXTJS irportpas dwarurepov fycrrjs, iii. 8, 4 (345) [vol. i. p. 335,
1. 7] ; cf. iii. 8, 2 (344) fvol. i. p. 334, 1. 343].
a v. 1, 3 (484) [vol. ii. p. 165].

G



82 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

and ourselves have bodies as well as souls. The
corporeal world exists.

So it is that ^x 7 / must also overflow, and by an
emanation from herself constitute the phenomenal
world. 1 Besides her essential "act" or operation
she must have a reproductive " act " by virtue of
which the World-Soul radiates about herself the
physical universe, and each individual soul and Adyos
cnrepiJiaTLKos their particular body within that universe.

To revert now to the problem in hand. We
have seen that emanation is a continuous and
homogeneous process of the same complexion
throughout. For the same reasons, in the same
manner, and by the same devices as vous proceeds
from the One, ^v^i] proceeds from vovs and the
corporeal world from fox*!- There are no breaks
within it, no jumps, apparently no opportunity for
freak or accident or for violent alteration in its
value and significance such as the incidence of Evil
involves. But yet Evil exists, as Plotinus confesses.
How explain the fact ?

From all that we know of mystic sentiment, we

1 iv. 8, 2 (470) [vol. ii. p. 145, 11. 3-17]. Cf. v. 2, 1-2
(494). diTTr) yap eTri/u,c\eia Travrbs, rod IJLV Kadb\ov /ceXei^crei KOCT-
/j.ovaa dTTpdy^ovi ^TTicrracrtp /3a<rtAi/cr?, TOV d KadeKaara ij8r) avTovpyy
TiVL iroL~fjffL <rvva(J>7J rrj Trpbs TO irpaTTOfievov TO wpaTTOv TOV Trparro-
ptvov r?7S tpijcreus dvaTrt/j.ir\affa. TT)S 8e Oeias ij/vxys TOVTOV TOV Tpbirov
TOV ovpavov a-jravTO, dioiKeiv del \eyofj.frr)s, virepexovfftjs /j.ev T
tiva/j.iv 5e T^V eV^dr^ et s TO ftffu Tr/m.7rovarr)s, atTiav /j,^v
OVK &v TI \eyoiTo ex eii T v T V i /v X^l v T v TTO-VTOS iv "xe ipovi
i, ij re fax?) OVK aTrea-rep^rai TOV KO.TOL (frvtnv didiov
TOVT J exovffa Kal eov<ra del, o ^ oUv re Trapd (frvaiv avTrj eivai
owep SirjveK&s avTrj dd virapxet. ov-rroTe dp^d^evov . Cf. iii. 9, 3 (357).



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 83

should expect to see both physical and moral evil
referred to an ultimate metaphysical evil. Logically
for Plotinus, Evil should occur at the beginning of
the emanatory process. The purest overflow from
the One, he should say, being other than the One,
cannot but be an evil and imperfect thing. Xovs
is the first parent in the sin of whose mere existence
all Being fell. Its plurality and activity are the
prototypes of all division, conflict, and becoming.
The process, then, is birth-marked with Evil. What
wonder that as it develops the mark grows angry
and inflamed !

Had Plotinus said this, his theodicy would have
been simpler, more logical, and less great : a
brilliant variation, by virtue of its splendid attempt
to solve the initial difficulty, on the mystic theme.
As it is, some tendency to say it persists throughout,
and to some extent confuses his thought. But
whether it was due to his heritage from Aristotle
and the Stoics, or to a sentimental love of nature,
or to the practical optimism of one who was after
all a very level-headed and prosperous business man,
the direction of his teaching is unmistakably against
a doctrine of metaphysical evil. Evil appears for
him, not in the first, but in the last stage of
emanation, in connection with the radiation from
^X 7 ? f the corporeal world, however difficult it may
be to explain its occurrence at that point.

As regards the freedom from evil of vow, and of
1 } so ^ ar as ner cosmic significance is concerned,



84 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

we have both circumstantial and direct evidence.
It is unnecessary to dwell here upon the Plotinian
panegyrics of vovs. Its beauty, its perfection, its
essential divinity are constantly celebrated by him. 1
It is the express image of the Most High, a great
God, the Second God, an unspeakable beauty sent
before the face of the One, and mediating between
it and the World-Soul, the throne of the One, a
prince of the blood-royal. 2 These and a host of other
epithets applied to it by Plotinus are all incom
patible with any attribution to it of imperfection.

But besides the panegyrics we find a direct
exclusion of archetypes of evil things from the
intelligible world, suggested doubtless by Plato s
query in the Parmenides whether or no such mean
things as hair, mud, or dirt are to be dignified with
ideal prototypes. 3 " Touching," he says, " the ques
tion whether there are also Ideas of things arising
from putrefaction or of disagreeable things, and
also of filth and mud, it must be said that every
thing which Mind brings with it from the first
principle is excellent, and that therein Ideas such as
we have mentioned are not to be found. . . ." 4

The immunity of the World-Soul, and indeed of
the individual soul, so long as she moves in her own

1 Cf. v. 9, 3 (556-557) ; v. 1, 4 (4*5).

2 Cf. v. 5, 3 (522). s Parmenideg, 130 c.

4 v. 9, 14 (565) [vol. ii. p. 259, 1. 21 et seq.]. ircpi 5e TUV CK
ff-fl^ew Kol T&V xaXeTruil , et nane? eldos, Kal d pvirov /ecu TrrjXov,
\KTOV, ws, oaa KO/u.ieTai vous CITTO TOV Trpurov, wavra dptara tv
oh ov ravra.



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 85

sphere, is no less clearly emphasized. The celebra
tions of fax* ] are lavish. 1 She, too, is naturally good,
happy, and divine, 2 " akin to the divine nature and
to the eternal," 3 displaying in her unclouded essence
all the virtues and perfections. " The Soul, as she plays
about the Mind, ga/es upon it and contemplating what
is within it, sees God through it. And this is the
blessed and sorrowless life of the gods, and there is
no evil there, and had it been there it would not have
been evil." 4 It is only in her relations to body, or,
more strictly, since conjunction with the body is not
necessarily vitiating, in a particular relation to a
particular body, that Evil occurs. " There are two
reasons why the communing of the soul with the
body brings difficulties. The first is that it hinders
thought, the second, that it fills the soul with
pleasures and desires and pains. . . ." 5 This trouble,
however, arises only in the case of individual souls.
The World-Soul is free from it. Her body, which is
the universe, is obedient to her command, and

1 Cf. passage already quoted, v. 1, 2 (482-483) [vol. ii.
p. 162, 1. 18]. a v. 1, 3 (484) [vol. ii. p. 164].

3 IV. 7, 10 (464) [vol. ii. p. 137, 11. 13-14]. 10. OTI de rr, eeiorepq.
<f)vaL o-vyyevTjs i] if vx h Kal rf} didiy, S^Xoi/ p,ev Trote? Kal TO JU.T] cru/j.a



4 i. 8, 2 (73) [vol. i. p. 100, 1. 26 et #/.]. ?? Se QwOev ire pi TOVTOV
Xopeuovcra ^VXTJ trpbs O.VTOV (3\tirov(ra /ecu TO etVo; avrov dew^vrj rbv
6ebv di avrov /SXeTret. /cat oSros 6eQiv d.7rr)/J.wi> KO.L /tia/cctptos /3t os Kal
TO KO.KOV ov8au.ov tvTavOa /ecu ei evTavda eaTrj, KaKoi> ovdev &v ty, d\\a
irp&TCi Kal deijTepa TayaOa Kal Tp iTa..

r> iv. 8, 2 (471) [vol. ii. p. 145, 1. 21 et xeq.]. ovo yap OVTUV oC
a SvcrxepaiveTai r\ i^i X^s irpos ado/maTa Kocvuvia, OTI TC ffjurboLOv Trpbs
raj j OT^creis yiyveTai, Kal OTI i]8ovwv Kal &iri8v[JU,&v Kal \vir&v
criv avTyv.



86 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

impedes in no wise her essential operations. " But
though it be said that the divine Soul in this wise
for ever rules the whole heaven, transcending it with
her better part and sending her lowest power into
this world of ours, yet no one can blame God for
that he has set the World-Soul in something worse
than herself. The Soul indeed is not deprived of
her natural function ; that she holds from eternity
and will hold for ever, nor can it in any wise be
contrary to her nature. . . . So it is that she can
never experience any fear about a body of this kind,
nor will any concern for it sway her and drag her
down from the blessed vision of higher things;
rather is she ever in the presence of heavenly things,
though at the same time she orders this whole
universe by an easy exercise of power." ]

Finally, we may appeal to the passage in the



1 iv. 8, 2 (470) [vol. ii. p. 145, 1. 8 et seq.]. TTJS de delas
TOVTOV TOV Tpbirov rbv ovpavbv diravTa dioiKelv del Xeyo/^evrjs, virep-
exova"r]S fJ.ev T( xpeiTTOvi, dvvafj.iv de TTJV ea^drrju els TO efcrco ire/nirovaris,
aiTiav fjiev 6 6ebs OVK dv en XeyotTo fyeiv T v T V V^xV T0 ^ 7rctI/TOS &
Xelpovi ireiroL-riKevai, 77 re \^VX.TI OVK direo-TeprjTai TOV Kara <j>vcriv 4i-
cu.8iov TOUT e xoucra /cat 6^oi <ra del, 5 /J.TJ olov re irapd ^vaiv avrrj elvan
oTrep StTjz/e/cws avrrj del VTrdpxei oijirore dp^dfj-evov. rds re rwv dffTepdJV
\f/i>xds TOV avrbv rpoirov irpbs TO orcD/uct ~xe<- v Ae^wv, &(nrep TO irav
ei>TWr](TL yap /cat TQVTUV TO. o-w/xaTa els TCLS TTJS i/ i/X^s irepupopds
dTTOcrw^ot B.V /cat rr\v irepl TOVTOVS Trpeirovffa.v ev5ai/j,oi>iai>. 8uo ydp
OVTUV di d SucrxepatVeTai 77 ^VXTJS irpos ffu/j.aTa Koivuvia, OTL re
efji.ir6di.ov irpbs TO.S voyaeis yiyverat, /cat OTL i]Sovuv /cat eiridv/juwv /cai
\virwv iri/j.ir\ria ij> avTrjv, ovdeTepov TOVTUV av yevoiTO i/ fxi?) tf TLS W
els TO et crw dv TOV crw^-aToy, ^rjoe TIVOS tffTi, ^.rjde eKeivov eyeveTO, dXX
tKelvo a.vTf)s, ean Te TOIOVTOV, olov p.t ]Te TWOS delffdai, fj-r/Te TLVL
e\\eiireit> wffTe fj.rjde TT^V ^vxw ( iriOvfuun irifAirXacrdai ?} (pofiwv.
ovdev yap deivbv fJ.r]iroTe irepl <ru/j.aTOS irpoffdoKriarj TOLOVTOV, OVTC Tts
dtrxoXta veveiv irotovcra /cdrw d7ra7et Trjs KpeiTTOvos /cat yua/ca/ot as deas,
dXX ecrnv det irpbs ^KCIVOLS dirpdy^ovt. Swd/^a r65e TO irdv



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 87

Ennead concerning the origin of Evil, in which
Plotinus groups the One, vovs, and ^x^i together as
a kind of Trinity, holy and free from all taint of
imperfection. What, he asks, is the Good ? " It is
that upon which all things depend, which all things
desire ; for it is the source of their being and they
stand in need of it. For itself, it is in want of
naught, self-sufficient, lacking nothing; it is the
measure and limit of all things, giving from out
of itself Mind and Being and Soul and Life and
the activity that belongs to Mind. And till one
reaches it, all things are beautiful ; but itself is
super-beautiful and higher than the best. . . . Mind
is its first activity and first essence, though the
Good abides within itself. Mind exercises its
activity about it, living round it as it were. But
the Soul, as it moves about the Mind, gazes upon it,
and contemplating what is within it, sees God
through it. And this is the blessed and sorrowless
life of the gods, and there is no Evil there. Had it I
been there it would not be evil. But there are primary \
and secondary and tertiary Goods, and all are around
the King of all, and he is the cause of all good
things, and all are due to him. And the secondary
Goods are around the second (hypostasis) and the
tertiary around the third. If such be the nature of
real existence and of what transcends real existence,
there can be no Evil in either. For both are good." 1

1 i. 8, 2 (72-73) [vol. i. pp. 100-101, 1. 6J. Cf. also ii. <>, 13
(212) [vol. i. p. 203, 1. 5et seq.]. 2. vvv 5e \eyeadw, TIS TJTOV dyadov



88 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

There can be no question of the import of these
passages. It is certainly to exclude Evil from the
first two stages of emanation. But this is apparently
to disavow metaphysical evil. For it amounts to
saying that there are different kinds of perfection,
one proper to the One, another to voijs, a third to
I/ UX^/, and that none is to be blamed for not being
the other. We shall indeed find the same argument
presently used to justify the nature of the physical
universe. This has, it will be said, a native perfec
tion which it perfectly exemplifies, and is not to be

(fivais, Kad offov Tots wapovffL \6yois 7rpocrr]Ki. ean oe TOUTO, els 6
irdvTa dvrjpTyTai /cat oi5 irdvTa TOL ovra efaeTai dp^jiv exovTa at/To
KaKeivov deopeva TO 6" zvrlv dvevdees, iKavov eairry, /mydevos oebiievov,
peTpov irdvTwv Kal -rrepas, 56v e avTov vovv /cat ovaiav /cat ^vxw Kal
faty /cat ?rept vovv tvepyeiav. /cat ^.e%pt /nev TOVTOV /caXa -jravra
auros re yap i/Trep/caXos /cat eir^Keiva r&v dpicrTuv fiaaiXevuv eV r$>
vorjrif, vov fKeivov &VTOS ov Kara vovv, ov oirjdeiTj av rts /cara rous
Trap TjfMv \eyo/j.evovs vovs elvai ro<)s e/c Trpordcrewj cv/mTrXr}-
povfj,vovs /cat T&V \eyofj.eva)v crvvievat. 8vva/m.vovs \oyiofj.evovs re
/cat TOV dKo\ovdov de&piav Troiovfj-evovs /cat e^ aKo\ov6ias rd
ovra Oeu/j-evovs us wporepov OVK exovras, dAXa xevovs eri wpiv
^.adelv 6vra$, /carrot vovs ovras. ov drj ^/cetj/os 6 vovs rotoOros, dXX
^%et Trd^ra /cat efcrri irdvra /cat avveariv avritj <rvvuv /cat e%et irdvra
OVK e xwv. ov yap d\\a, 6 de aXXos ovd %wptj eKacrrov rQ>v ev
avT(p 6\ov re yap ecrnv %KOffTpv /cat Travraxy Trav /cat ov (rvyK^-
Xvrai, dXXd av %copis. TO yovv /m.era\afji^dvov oi>x ofj.ov iravruv, dXX
6 rou dvvarai u,era\a^dvei. /cat ecrrt wpwrrj evepyeia e/cetVou /cat
TrpwTT? ovaia eKeivov ftfrovros ev eavri^ evepyei /mevroi irepl eKeivov
olov Trepi eKelvov $Cbv. i) 5e efadev irepl TOVTOV -%opevovaa ^v^n Trpds
avrov jSX^Tro^cra /cat TO et<ra> avTov Qew/jLevr] TOV 6e6v 5t avTov ^3X^7ret.
Kal OVTOS dewv dTrrj/jaov /cat /xa/cdptos j3ios /cat TO KaKov ovda/j,ov evravOa
/cat el evTavda ZffTi), KaKov ovdev dv TJV, dXXd TrpwTa /cat dfVTepa
Tdyadd /cat TptVa. [/cat] ?rept TOV irdvTWV jSaatXea irdvTa effTL, Kal
CKetvo aiTiov irdvTWv Ka\uv, Kal irdvTa effTiv eKelvov, Kal devTepov
ire pi TO. devTepa /cat TpiTov irepl TO. TptVa. 3. et 8r) TOiavTa ecrTi ra
ov Ta /cat TO eireKeiva TUV OVTUV, OVK av ev ToTs ov<n rb /ca/c6v eveirj,
ov8 ev Tip eireKfiva TUV OVTWV dyadd yap



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 89

condemned as imperfect for not being other than
it is.

But even supposing that Plotinus were unre
servedly committed to this point of view, which, as
we shall see later, he is not, the matter would not be
so straightforward as it appears at first sight. On
the contrary he has involved himself in a perplexity
which besets every attempt to conceive of perfection as
an expanded, multiple, and complex state of existence.
Between the different factors of such a state it is im
possible not to make comparisons of higher and lower.
There must be, as Plotinus admits, and as we are
bound on the face of things to admit, a hierarchy
of perfections. The perfection of the planVit "seems
only common sense to say, is not so perfect as that of
the beast, nor that of the beast as that of the man, nor
that of the man as that of the angel, nor any of these
as that of God. Yet all are perfections. This is
the Aristotelian doctrine, and Plotinus is consciously
a good Peripatetic when he speaks of Mind as a
secondary good, and of Soul as a tertiary.

But it may be asked, Is not this admission of
grades of perfection suicidal ? Is it not foredoomed
by a fatal implication that all except the highest
grade are really degrees of imperfection? The
question is pertinent. We are on the verge of
discovering the great self-contradiction which in
the end must invalidate the Plotinian theodicy.
Let us pause and consider it.

Reflection upon the uses of the term u perfection "



90 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

in philosophical discussion quickly discloses two very
different senses in which the term may be employed.
These senses we may designate broadly as the
" mechanical " or " naturalistic," and the " moral. 11 1
Mechanical perfection has reference to the explic-
ability of events, and answers to the satisfaction
we take in accounting for things by natural causes.
" Moral " perfection, as the term is employed here,
is estimated by the bearing events have upon our
interest in finding our world not only intelligible,
but also satisfactory in every respect, KaAov Ka.ya.06v.
That these two kinds of perfection need not coincide
is obvious. It is no harder to discover the natural
causes of moral evil than it is of moral good ; and
the interest in understanding the world is as satisfied
with the one discovery as with the other. Object
ively considered, the world regarded as a mechanism
is perfect as it stands. It accounts for all its events
and parts, and all things and types and occurrences
are equally good expressions of its workings.

Since the mechanical conception of nature gives
every fact equal and sufficient reason for existence,
there can be no comparison in point of mechanical
perfection. " Better and worse, 11 " higher and lower, 11
are oppositions which seem significant only in relation
to a standard set by moral ideals, and based, what
ever its cosmic validity, on the ethical and aesthetic
interests of mankind.

1 I use "moral" here to cover the " aesthetic " as well as
the strictly ethical interests. Strictly speaking there are as
many kinds of perfection as there are satisfactions.



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 91

But we must not be too hasty in our dichotomy.
A third kind of perfection is quick to press its claims,
denouncing the very establishment of our first
dilemma as a bit of arrogance and anthropomorphism.
I mean the perfection which we accord to things
according as they realize their proper natures. Thus
we talk of a prize dog or a fine horse, or even of the
perfect fit of a suit of clothes. Such perfection can
hardly be said to be estimated by the naturalistic
standard, since the mongrel or the hack or the misfit
can be just as well explained as the " higher "
example of the type ; but again it cannot be called,
apparently, a " moral " perfection, since judged by
moral standards it appears deficient. The horse or
dog, however perfect after their kind, are "lower"
animals ; the suit of clothes, however fine the stuff
and smart the cut of it, is not so high up in the
hierarchy of being as the meanest protoplasm. Still
we do not deem it appropriate to reproach the suit of
clothes with not being a protoplasm, or the horse or
dog with not being a man. Fault-finding is justified
only if they be not all that a suit or horse or dog
may be within the limits of their respective natures
and relatively to standards which are apparently
of their own setting. We seem then to have found
something which is really perfect and imperfect at
the same time ; a standard which can be regarded as
a final measure of perfection within its own sphere,
and yet as wanting in perfection relatively to some
ultimate standard of perfection in general.



92 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

We must scrutinize this claim all the more closely,
as it is with this point in mind that Plotinus writes.
And careful scrutiny will, I think, disallow the
pretence of this species of excellence to assured and
independent existence, and reveal beneath it a some
what subtle confusion of our original factors of
natural (or mechanical) and moral perfection.

This confusion is seen in the first place in our im
position upon Nature of even the type, to say nothing
of the so-called perfect type, as a natural standard
for the estimation of individuals. If the object
be inanimate, such a standard is set not by Nature,
but by us. Its perfection after its kind means, not
an intrinsic quality or condition, but a relation to
our interests and sensibilities. When for example
we talk of "perfect" weather, we are reading
into Nature a sympathy with human preferences, or
at least are thinking of her as striving to embody a
certain form and as measuring success or failure
according as she more or less attains her end. But
Nature mechanically considered is inveterately
individualistic. She is an order of particular facts,
each of which is to be explained by its own particular
antecedents and not by any striving towards any type.

In the case of animate objects the relativity of
standards is even more apparent. We have now to
deal with a possible purpose and intrinsic character
in the object, to which our notion of what the object
ought to be may well be not only foreign, but hostile.
Thus the thoroughbred to which we award the blue



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 93

ribbon may for all we know be worshipping at the
fetlocks of some plodder in the dray, and the award
of prizes at the dog-show may inspire many an
anxious canine theodicy labouring to justify the
ways of man to dogs.

Indeed, it takes very little reflection to breed these
doubts to which we have just given utterance. How,
we are very soon driven to ask as we look out over
the world, are we to know a thing from its entelechy
or perfection, to distinguish between what a thing is
and what it ought, or is intended, to be ? Of an inner
intention on its part we can know nothing, even if the
attribution of such an intention did not imply falling
into the very confusion we are anxious to avoid, and
from its appearance we might well think it to be self-
realized at every moment in its career. Taken at
any instant it exhibits a certain structure and exhibits
that structure perfectly. It can never be surprised
as other than a faithful and flawless copy of what it
is. To take any one of its moments and make it a
standard for all the rest, or to take any one thing
and make it a pattern for the others which resemble
it, is to stretch Nature with open violence upon the
Procrustean bed of human whims.

Our supposed third kind of perfection, then,
involves at the outset a covert introduction of final
causes into Nature and resolves itself readily into a
confusion of natural and moral perfection. A similar
confusion vitiates the attempt to arrange different
kinds of perfection qua perfections in a hierarchy



94 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

according as they approach our ideal of perfection in
the abstract. We say glibly enough, to be sure,
that the perfect horse is not so perfect a being as
the perfect man, nor the perfect man as God. But
that is simply to say that the perfect horse and the
perfect man are perfect examples of imperfect sorts
of beings. Equine and human excellence fall short
of the standard or type of perfection in general, just
as the individual man or horse falls short of his
proper type. That is, equine and human perfections
are imperfect perfections are imperfections. Or
conversely one might argue that if it be logical
to say that human perfection is perfect, but not so
perfect as the divine, it must also be logical to say
of any individual human being that he is a perfect
man, but at the same time not so perfect a man as
some one else. But the latter statement would seem
to be absurd.

The upshot of the discussion is this : that
perfection is superlative, that things either do or
do not live up to the standard which it sets, and
that of things which fulfil its requirements there is
no comparison in point of value. There may be
indeed different kinds of perfection, but of imperfec
tion only are there degrees.

In a world, then, perfect in all respects, we could
find no basis for making any distinction between
things as better and worse. Each being in such a
world would be perfect after its kind, satisfied and
at rest in its own nature, without jealousy of the



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 95

perfection proper to other beings. No individual
would be superior or inferior to another. Each
would merely be different from its neighbours. It
would be itself and content to be itself. To any
Dante who should ask of it,

Ma dimmi : voi che siete qui felici,
Desiderate voi piu alto loco . . . ?

it would reply in Piccarda s words, and with
Piccarda s smile,

Frate, la nostra volonta quieta
Virtu di carita, die fa volerne
Sol quel ch avemo, e d altro non ci asseta.

In a word, all difference in value would from the
point of view of a perfect universe be turned into
simple distinctions in fact. Each part of such a
world would feel as Dante felt in Piccarda s answer,

Chiaro mi fu allor com ogni dove
In cielo e Paradiso. . . .

But only an exile like himself could have added,

. . . e si la grazia
Del sommo ben d un modo non vi piove. 1

Still, not to equivocate is fraught with such
startling implications for theology, that clear
thinking seems to be avoided if only ad majorem
gloriam Dei. Otherwise the kingdom of God turns
out to be of this world only, and in Paradise,
hitherto set apart as his special realm, God is
forced to abdicate his throne and take his place as
a simple member without special prerogative in a
1 Paradiso, iii. 11. 64-90.



..



96 THE PROBLEM OF(EVIL IN PLOTINUS

republic of perfected substances, between which in
their estimation of themselves and of one another
there can be no question of better or worse.

Consider again, for a moment, the consequences
of a world in which all things are -perfect after their
kind. Each will be self-realized and self-satisfied, sure
that no place or experience could be happier than
its own. Otherwise it would have to consider its
perfection to be not so* perfect as perfection might
be. But a perfection, which is not so perfect as it
might be, is a self-contradiction.

All perfection, then, is bound to consider itself,
qua perfection, absolute. A perfect being indeed
may recognize beings other than himself, and kinds
of perfection other than his own, but he cannot
regard them as better or worse than his without
thereby destroying the significance of his own ex
cellence. To say, for instance, that I am perfect,
but not so perfect as God, is to talk nonsense. I
have not attained the primary condition of perfect
happiness till I can say that none is happier than I.
Piccarda by right should have found Dante s question
about a " piu alto loco," a "higher place," unintel
ligible ; for in the language of heaven there are no
comparatives or superlatives.

Hence for the soul of anything that is truly in
Paradise, God cannot be a higher, but merely another
being. There, indeed, the angels of all things do
continually behold his face, but as the face of a
fellow, one of themselves. All things will be gods



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 97

in their own and one another s eyes. Gods in their
own eyes they will be, because each can find nothing
more perfectly divine than itself : gods in one
another s, and that without hierarchy of divinity,
because there can be no comparison in point of
value between the components of a truly beatific
vision, each one of which will have its proper and
incomparable beauty. In Paradise there will be of
necessity none but polytheists.

This conclusion, however, is more startling than
alarming. It has no sting if only it be grasped
firmly. For the struggling and aspiring imperfect
soul the existence of God- means, indeed, the exist
ence, ideal or actual, of an unattained perfection
in which the will will find its peace. But for the
perfected spirit it means no more, for no more is
possible, than that perfection is at length realized,
and that the will is wholly satisfied in an experience
which it is content to take at its face value, without
comparison between its components or moments.
To the perfected spirit God will mean not another
person, but just the fact that it itself is now the
kind of person it is, with the experience it has. He
is not a person, but a " state " in both senses of the
word. God is Heaven.

It need not surprise us, however, to find ghosts
of these difficulties haunting the question of grades
of perfection throughout ancient philosophy. Thus,
Plato is confronted with the naturalistic difficulty
(a difficulty, be it said, never settled for him) in the



98 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

famous passage in the Parmemdes already mentioned,
where Socrates is in doubt whether to attribute
Ideas to mean and disagreeable things or not. And
it is ultimately the same difficulty which besets him
in his attempt to arrange the Ideas in a hierarchy
culminating in the Idea of the Good, forgetful, as
we might say, that the Good is not a substance, but
a relation between substances, and that its Idea is
not a hypostasis extraneous and superior to the
other Ideas, but merely expresses their perfection
and divinity in one another s sight.

In like manner Aristotle s doctrine of the rela
tivity of Form and Matter, in which every object
except God is twofold, Form in relation to its
sources, Matter in relation to its further development,
has all the implications of naturalism. For every
object at every moment of its career may be said to
be in full possession of an entelechy of one sort or
another. Aristotle avoids naturalism indeed only by
assuming a rigid ladder of Forms up and down which
Matter is continually climbing, the top and bottom
of which are arbitrarily determined by reference to
human interests and ideals. Nature is supposed to
concur in our judgment of her parts and processes
as more or less perfect and to estimate their value
by the same standards as we employ. Thus the
horse is supposed to be in her eyes as well as in ours
more perfect than the tree, the man more perfect
than the horse. Aristotle, however, seems to have
vaguely realized his confusion of natural with moral



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 99

perfection, and to have vacillated in consequence.
It is difficult, for example, as regards the relation
of God to the world, to say whether the world is
conceived as ever striving to transcend its own
nature and become God, or as seeking merely to
enact its proper mundane perfection with the same
completeness with which he is divine. The truth is,
I think, that Aristotle is trying to conceive it as both.
Like Plato, he wishes to take with one eye the human,
with the other the cosmic point of view. He tries
naturalistically to make of the Forms the entelechies
or absolute perfections of their particulars, and yet
to arrange these different perfections in a graded
order of moral excellence. There is, of course, no
harm in this so long as one recognizes that one is
using the term " perfection " in two quite different
senses. But this is just what Aristotle overlooks.
He employs the term uni vocally.

It is not surprising to find Plotinus involved in
the same difficulties, considering his Platonic and
Aristotelian heritage. How near his argument is in
places to naturalism we shall have very shortly to
consider. Of his treatment of grades of perfection
and metaphysical evil we may say that he, too,
takes with one eye the inside, with the other the
outside point of view. In the passages just quoted
there can be no doubt of his inclination to admit
the existence of different kinds of perfection. Nous
is good and perfect after its kind, faxi] is the
same. Neither is to be considered as in any way



100 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

evil, because it is itself and not the One. This
point has been amply illustrated. But on the
other hand he does not perceive, nor can he admit
the logical implication, that different kinds of per
fection cannot be compared in point of perfection
without equivocation. There cannot be the slightest
doubt that he considered Mind, if perfect, of a less
degree of perfection than the One, and in the same
way Soul less excellent than Mind. It is not true
that " in this Trinity none is afore or after other,
none is greater or less than other," but " the glory
equal." Their majesty may be co-eternal and their
generation and procession from all time, yet Mind is
a second good, and Soul a third, not only in point
of derivation, but of goodness. 1 Goodness apper
tains to them only adjectivally. The essential,
primal, and original Good is God, and God alone.
This point also is fully brought out in the sketch
we have given of the nature and method of the
process of emanation.

1 Cf. ii. 9, 13 (212) [vol. i. p. 202, 1. 29-p. 203, 1. 14].
et 5e avdpwTroi rl^bv TI wap a\\a <pa, TroXXy /j.a\\ov raOra ov
rvpavviSos eW/ca ev T< iravrl OVTO., d\\d KQU^OV /cat rd^iv irap^-^ovTo..
a oe \eyerai yiveadai Trap avr&v cr?7/x,eta vo/mifeiv T!JOV eVo/zeVaw elvai,
yiveffdaL de TO. yivo/Aeva diacfiopa /ecu TI^CUS ov y&.p olov re fy ravra
Trepl e/cao TOi S ffv/JL^atveii /cat KaipoTs yev^ewv /cat r67rois ir\ei<TTov
dcpeaTrjKoo t. xal diadeffefft i/ u^wv. /cat OVK aTrai.Tr)Toi> TTO\LV dyadotis
irdvras, ov5 on /JI.TJ TOVTO dvvarov, / u^yU,0e(T^at Trpoxetpws [irpocrrjKfi]
TrdXiv d^LOvai pyStv diafitpeiv ravra e /cetj/wv, TO re Kaicbv fj.r)
&\\o TL r) rb v8e(rTepoi> ets <f>p6vr)ffiv /cai PXarrov dyadbv /cat del
rb (T/juKpdTepov olov et rts TTJV <^>{xnv /ca/c6v X^70i, on
effTi, /cat TO aladrjTtKov, OTL fj,7) \6yos. el d furi, /cd/cet TO, /ca/ccb
elvcu /cat yap e/cet



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 101

But the contradiction with Plotinus goes even
deeper. Once embarked on this current of thought
it seems scarcely possible to attribute either to vovs
or foxy even a proper perfection. Leaving the moral
point of view out of the question, naturalistically
and by their own confession they are not self-satisfied
hypostases. They themselves feel themselves to be
imperfect, quite apart from any judgment we may
pass upon them. The end of psychic activity turns
out to be not the preservation, but the transcendence
of its proper characteristics. In like manner the
ultimate goal of intellectual vision is not the con
templation and conservation of truth, but a passing
beyond it to ecstatic consciousness of the One.
There only is truly beatific vision enjoyed. 1 From
this point of view the whole universe instead of finding
its essential function in the realization and illustra
tion of all possible forms and degrees of existence,
would seem to do this only accidentally in a ceaseless,
and as ceaselessly frustrated, attempt in which its
proper operation consists, to transcend and annihilate
itself by absorption into deity. To reconcile state
ments and implications like these with the epithets
like OVK IvSees, " not lacking," reActov, u perfect, 1
and #e?ov, " divine, 11 which he is constantly using not
only of vov<$ and i/^x 7 /? but of the universe as well,
is impossible.

1 Cf. vi. 9, 3-4 (7(JO-762) [vol. ii. p. 512, 1. 23] ; cf. i. 6, 7
(55). 4. yiverac 5e i] airopia, /xd\t<rra, on ^de /car eirLffT^^v 77
fftveffis CKeivov /j.r)de /card vbrjffLv, ticnrep ra a\\a voi]Ta, d\\a Kara
irapovcriav eirio T rjfj.Tjs Kpeirrova.



102 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

The confusion involved is indeed extraordinary.
It is not merely a straightforward contradiction of
the moral and the mechanical points of view, but of
these cross-eyed. For Mind and Soul behold them
selves as both perfect and imperfect with both eyes,
but the two eyes are never focussed so as to agree.
If they see themselves naturalistically as perfect after
their kind, they are kept from the just fruits of that
vision by the moral point of view which declares
their perfections to be relatively imperfect. If with
the moral eye they perceive and desire to transcend
their relatively imperfect state, the naturalistic eye
at once shows them their essential and proper ex
cellence. Each point of view, in a word, may take
either point of view, provided only it contradicts the
other, and thereby stultifies itself.

We have then to leave the question of meta
physical evil in the Plotinian theodicy unsettled.
We can only say of it that we find a pair of counter-
influences at work. On the one hand there is a
strong inclination, inherited perhaps from the Stoics,
to admit the principle of a variety of perfections and
to justify things as excellent after their kind. On
the other hand there is not only the same attempt
that we find in Plato and Aristotle to compare
different kinds of excellence in point of excellence,
but also a decided mystic tendency to deny all kinds
of excellence save one, and to regard all other kinds
as mere grades of imperfection in comparison with it.
These tendencies are contradictory, and no result can



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 103

be expected from their conflict. Now one, now the
other is uppermost in his mind, now both present
themselves with equal strength. The result is that not
only as regards the question of metaphysical evil is
he undetermined and self-contradictory, but through
out his treatment of our problem we shall find
solutions proffered of widely different antecedents
and of contrary interests and implications.

We pass now to a series of arguments of consider
able affinity to what we have called the " naturalistic
point of view," and probably not unconnected
historically with a very similiar reasoning on the
part of the Stoics. From this point of view, as we
have seen, we are to admit varieties or kinds of per
fection, no one of which is to be blamed because it
is itself and not another. The use to which this
thought might be put in a theodicy is plain. If our
opponent impugned the goodness and power of the
Creator on the ground that he had created an im
perfect world, which was but a poor and deficient
copy of his thought, we might reply that we could not
expect the world to be the same as God, nor the copy
identical with the original. All that we can justly
demand for it, or from the divine goodness, is that the
created shall be perfect with the perfection appropriate
to itself. And this, we might perhaps add, is the case.
At any rate this is the thesis which Plotinus
opposes to the Gnostics, to refute their allegation
that the world is evil and its Creator bad. The
point at issue, indeed, concerned him more deeply



104 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

than we might at first suppose. In spite of his
opposition to the Gnostics his system had much in
common with their doctrine. Their tenets might
almost be called a fantastic version of all that was
mystic in his own thought. Out of the depths of a
superintelligible, superessential, and superexistential
God there proceeds a Ao yos or vovs which develops
itself into a kind of intelligible world in the shape of
a Pleroma of Aeons. One of the lowest of these
Aeons, Sophia, actuated like Eve, by a roA/m or
audacity, conceives the desire to know the unknowable
God, and becomes thereby involved in discontent
and passion. This passion receives a semi-separate
hypostasis, called Achamoth, or the lesser Sophia.
The passible nature and the discontent of Sophia-
Achamoth exclude her from the world of Aeons,
which is apparently self-sufficient and self-satisfied,
and she finds herself in the Kenoma or Void, symbol
of her dissatisfaction, and substratum of Matter.
The divine power, however, takes pity upon her.
Jesus or Christ, an Aeon in whom the perfections of
all the others are combined, descends to her, and
awakens within her a memory of the Pleroma.
There takes place within her an eVio-T/^ towards
the Aeons, and she now seeks to make their images
visible in the darkness of the Kenoma. She becomes
creative, brings forth the Demiurge, and through
him forms the material world. But the desire for
and the necessity of creation are not expressive of
her proper essence, but result from the fall due to






METAPHYSICAL EVIL 105

her audacity and her discontent with herself. Her
formative activity, then, is a mark not of a perfection
within herself, but of a want and imperfection, and
what she forms is, in Platonic terms, twice removed
from Truth and Being, the image of an image, the
shadow of a dream.

Below the world of Aeons, then, we may dis
tinguish three grades of Being, Sophia- Achamoth,
the Demiurge, and Matter. This tripartite division
is reflected in the universe in a trinity of worlds,
celestial, planetary, and terrestrial, and in mankind
in a trinity of principles, spirit, soul, and body.
According as one or another principle is predominant,
men are " pneumatic," " psychic," or " hylic." The
moral life consists in an abjuration of all things of
the world, and in development of the " pneumatic "
principle. In the end, the redeemed will be trans
ported to a new world, called the Paradigm, and the
present universe, of which Achamoth has repented,
will be consumed by fire and annihilated. 1

Strip this of its fantastic wording and we seem to
be on familiar Plotinian ground. Between the Gods
of the two systems there is no essential difference;
and the Gnostic Pleroma is, for our purposes at least,
the same as the Plotinian vos. The lapse of Sophia
into Sophia-Achamoth is parallel to the emanatory

1 Cf.Boui\let,LesEnnradesdePlolin,i.pA99etseq. Schmidt,
(Jber Plotins Ntellung zum Gnostlcismns, etc., p. 36 in Texte
und Untersuchungen zur Oeschichte des altchristlichen Litteratur,
Gebhardt und Harnack, vol. v. Vacherot, op. cit. bk. ii. c-h. 1,
vol. i. p. 20J et seq. The above resume is of the system of
Valentinus.



106 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS



operation of vous from which ^v\ij proceeds, her
7TL(TTiJO(j)yj to that backward look to vovs by which
j/^X?7 is confirmed and determined in her essence and
guided in her operations, and the birth of the
Demiurge to that emanatory act of ^i>x i which
creates the world. So, too, the Plotinian man is
body, soul, and intellect : and the end of the moral
life is to rise stage by stage to a re-absorption in the
One, a process which involves for the redeemed soul
the annihilation of its universe. We are, in fine, in
a Plotinian wonderland where everything we meet is
a satire on the Plotinian system. And the sting is
keenest, perhaps, in that beneath its grotesqueness the
satire is more logical than the thought it caricatures.
For whatever the vagaries of Gnosticism, its
mysticism was not cross-eyed and could look one
almost squarely in the face. To have been perfectly
logical, it is true, the incidence of Evil should have
taken place at the first stage of the process of
emanation, when the Divine Silence was broken and
the Pleroma emerged. Moreover, the account of the
passion and fall of Sophia is full of wild and contra
dictory rumours. Still the implications of a theory
in which Being issues from a higher, superexistential
source, and lapses from one degree to another of
fulness, till at length it is spent and lost in nothing
ness, are on the whole honestly faced. Below
the Pleroma, at any rate, the true implication of
degrees of perfection is realized ; that is, that the
expression is merely a euphemism for degrees of



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 107

imperfection. And again, the Gnostics rightly laid
stress on the discontented and provisional nature
of the activities hypostasized in foxy and Sophia-
Achamoth : a nature to whose essential characteristics
Plotinus himself could not be altogether blinded in
spite of his endeavour to save its excellence by a
misapplication to it of the principle of varieties of
perfection. Sophia- Achamoth, despite her name, is
a more consistent hypostasis than fox 1 ]- Finally,
the Gnostics were logical in their vituperation of the
world. The universe was for them the last respite of
Being, the last glimmer of the divine light, before
all died away in Not-being and darkness. Its exist
ence was a metaphysical evil, the result of a lapse
from perfection. The sooner it was repented of
and destroyed, and anything saved from the wreck
translated to happier realms, the better.

This should have been Plotinus s attitude also.
But as we have remarked before, a natural optimism
and a heritage of healthy Hellenism and Stoic philo
sophy kept him from this easy and logical conclusion.
So far as we may judge, he loved Nature and human
life with the love not merely of an energetic and
versatile man of many interests and activities, but with
something of that religious reverence for the universal
whole which actuated Zeno and Marcus Aurelius and
Seneca, and of that regard for living as the finest of
all arts which we find in the older Greeks. Logic
or no logic, it was temperamentally impossible for
him to feel that Nature was essentially vile, the



108 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

body necessarily foul, and human life under corporeal
conditions absolutely and unavoidably evil.

He had, then, to summon every argument to his
aid to support his conviction. More was at stake
than the defence of a world one loved against
calumniation. The possibility of conceiving the
process of emanation as anything but a process of
degeneration was the broad and vital issue. More
especially he had to protect the integrity and per
fection of ^x i against the dangers incidental to her
outer resemblance to the abandoned Sophia. To
this end three things were necessary. He had in the
first place to show that the procession of ^v^ from
vovs could not be regarded as in any way a fall. In
the second place he must needs demonstrate that
the operation by which fax/] creates the world is not
accidental, but essential, and that her proper perfec
tion is not disturbed or her nature impaired thereby.
And finally he had to show that the world so created
was of sufficient excellence not to impede her opera
tions or contaminate her nature by its contact and
commerce with her. The first two of these points
we may leave till we come to the discussion of the
broader issue defined above. The third is that which
must engage our attention now. To establish it,
what more natural, as has been said, than to appeal
to the old principle already used to Plotinus s
satisfaction, and to declare that the universe in its
wholeness is perfect after its kind ?

"He who finds fault with the nature of the



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 109

universe does not know what he does, nor whither
his arrogance is leading him. The reason is that
men know not the successive orders of Being, first,
second, third, and so on eternally, till the last be
reached. . . . We must not ask that all animate
beings shall be [equally] good, nor thoughtlessly
complain because this is impossible. For that is to
reiterate the demand that there shall be no differ
ence between the sensible and intelligible worlds,
and that Evil is to be regarded as identical with
that which is lacking in wisdom and is a lesser good
and ever tends towards the lower degree of per
fection which is like calling Nature evil because
she is not perception, and the faculty of perception
evil because it is not reasoning, in which case we
should be forced to say that Evil exists even in the
intelligible realm. For even there Soul is less perfect
than Mind, Mind than the One." 1 Again, "we

1 ii. 9, 13 (211-212) [vol. i. p. 202, 1. 10-p. 203, 1. 14].
13. 6 apa fj.efj.<p6fj.evos rfj rov /cocr/tou <pv<rei OVK olSev 6 TL Trotet, ovd OTTCK
rb Opdaos aiVoO TOVTO x w P e - TOVTO 5^, OTL OVK ftrao-t rd^iv e(pei)s
7rpct>rwj> /cat oevTepuv /cat rplrtav /cat del /ue%pt T&V eVxarwi , /cat ws ov
\oibop-rjTeov TOIS ^etpoert r&v Trp&Tuv, dXXd Trpaws ffvyxwprjTeov rrj
irdvTuv <f)tiffei avrbv dtovra irpbs ra irpwra Travadfteitov TT)S r/jayyStas
rCiv <f)o[3epwi>, ws oto^rat, ev TCUS TOV KO(T/J.OV cr^atpats, at 87] iravra
,uet\txa re^xovffiv avrols rl yap (pofiepbv ?x ova l{ o-vrat, ws <po^ov<n
TO^S direipovs \6ycov /cat TreTratSei /zej ^s dvijKoovs /cat e/n/ui.e\ovs yvtiiffeii}? ;
ov ydp, ei irvpiva. ra crw/xara avT&v, 00j8e?(r^at 8ei av /t/xer pw? ?r/)6s TO
Trdv /cat irpbs TTJV yijv exovra, eis de rds ^vx^s O.VT&V fiKeireiv, als /cat
aurot Srjirovdev d^iovai rt/itot etj at. /catrot /cai ra (rci^uara avr&v
/meyedei /cat /cdXXet diafiepovra an/Air pdrrovra /cat ffvvevepyovvra ro?s
/card (pv<nv yiyvo/m.evois, a OVK av ov ycvoiro irore eVr av y rd TrptDra,
avfJLirXypovvTa, oe TO irdv /cat fj,eyd\a p^pr/ ovra rov Travros. ei de
avOpw-rroi rl^ibv n Trap aXXa faa, TroXXy fj.d\\ov ravra ov rvpavvidos
& T( TravTi ovra., dXXd nbfffjiov /cat Ta|ti wapexovra, d de



110 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

must not admit that this universe has been ill created
simply because it contains many unpleasant things.
We shall be ascribing to it a degree of dignity greater
than its conditions demand if we ask that it shall be
the same as the intelligible world, rather than an
image of it. And what fairer image of it could there
have been ? " l " No one can rightly blame the con
stitution of the universe, which displays pre-eminently
the greatness of the intelligible nature. For if the
universe has come into existence endowed not with an
inarticulate life (like that of the smaller parts, which
are generated within it continually, day and night,
from the fulness of its own life), but gifted on the con
trary with a continuous, clear, full, and omnipresent
life, in which a fathomless wisdom is displayed, how
can it be denied that it is a clear and beautiful image
of the gods in their intelligible world ? That, being
a copy, it is not the original, is but natural, for
otherwise it would no longer be a copy. But that it
is an unfaithful copy is false, for nothing has been

X^yerat yiveadai Trap aurwv ffr)/j.ia vofj.ietv T&V tcro^vuv elvai,
yiveadai. 8 TO. yiv6fj.eva didtfiopa /cat TIT^CUS ov yap olov re Tjv ravra
irepl eKdffTovs <Tv/j.paivii> /cat /ecu/sens yeveaeuv /cat rbirois TrXeto-roj
dfpecrrrjKoaL /cat diadecreai if/vx&V xai OVK diraLTrjTeov TTO\LV dya6otis
TrdvTas, ov8 OTL /AT] TOVTO dwarov, yU^u.0ecr#at 7rpo%et pws [Trpocny/cei]
TrctXtJ dtoD<n fj.rjdei dia(f>epeii> ravra e/cetVcoj , TO re K&KOV /j.r) vo/J.ieiv
&\\o TI ?) TO i>5e{(TTpov eis (f)povr)ffLv KO.I ^\aTTOv dyadov /cat ctet ?r/)6s T&

(TlMKOOTepOV Olov L TIS TTf]V (f)V(TiV KOLKOV \tyOl, OTL /UiT] at o^T/CUS ffTL, /Cat

TO alcrOrjTiKov, 6 rt /XTJ \6yos. ei d /JL-TJ, /cd/ce? ra /ca/ca dvayKacrdrjcrovTai
\yei.v elvai. /cat yap ^/ce? ^vx^l X e ?P ot> v v Ka -i oSros a\\ov e\aTTov.
1 ii. 9, 4 (202 D) [vol. i. p. 188, 11. 20-23]. ovde TO /ca/cwj
yeyovevai Tovde TOV KOCT/LLOV doTeov ry TroXXa eivai v avrtp 8va"x. e PV
TOVTO yap d^iajyua fj.el^ov ICTTL TrepiTiQevTuv avT<^ } ei d^ioOcrt TOV avTov
elvai. T( VOIJT^, dXXd /urj eiKova e/cetVou. T) TIS dv eyfreTO a\\7) /caXXtwj*
et/ccbv






METAPHYSICAL EVIL 111

omitted of which it was possible to have a beautiful
image in the realm of nature. It was necessary that
the copy should not be the result of thought and
contrivance; for the Intelligible could not be the last
degree of Being. Its activity had to be twofold :
part within itself and part acting upon something else.
So it was necessary that there should be something
after it. Only the most impotent of things is such
that it gives nothing of itself to what is below it. ...
" If, then, there is no other world superior in grade
to this, what is this world ? If, on the other hand,
there must of necessity be such a [superior] world,
and there is yet no other in existence than this, it
must be this world which preserves the copy of the
Intelligible. 1 ... A man must indeed be indolent
and apathetic if, seeing all the beautiful things in
the sensible world, the complete symmetry, this great

1 ii. 9, 8 (206 n-206 E) [vol. i. p. 194, 1. 7 et seq.]. eVet ovde
TOV iravrbs TT]v dtoiKfjo iv bpd&s av TLS; fj.efj.tjsai.To irpwTOv fj.ev evbeiKvv-
l*.evr}v TTJS VO-TITTJS (pvaeus TO /meyedos. el yap ourws els TO ifiv TrapeXij-
\vdev, us fj.r] faty ddidp6pUTOi> e xeiv oirola TO. tryxt/cporepa T&V ev
avT$, a Ty TroXXf? fafj rf/ ev ai>T$ del vvKTwp /ecu fj.e6 rjfjiepav yevvaTat.
d\X effTL avvexw Ka ^ ^apyr]3 KCU TroXXTj KO! -jravTaxov ^WT/ voQiav
dfjir)x avot ^deLKvv/j.evr], TTCUS OVK Q.V TIS &ya\/jia evapyks /cat Ka\bt> T&V
voyT&v dedov eiVot ; et 5e fJUftotifJievov /mr) icnv (Kelvo, avTO TOVTO /caret
<t>vaiv ^x ei v y&P ^" C^"] ^ TL fu/J-ot/Jievov. TO de dvopoi
\{/evdos ov8et> yap TrapaXAetTrrat &v olbv re fy KaX^v einova
Zxew. dvayKcuov /JLCV yap fy elvai OVK e /c Scavoias /cat
rb fdfirifia ov yap olbv re ty foxarov TO VOTJTOV elvai. elvai yap
avTOv evtpyeiav ^5et diTTrjv, rr\v jj^ev ev eavT(, TT]V oe els a\\o. toei
ovv elvai n /*er ai)r6 eKeivov ydp /J.OVQV ovoev <TTIV en Trpos TO /cdra>,
6 T&V irdvTWv ddwaTUTaTov effTL. dvva/j.is de dav/u-acrTT] e /cet ^et"
wo-re /cat eipydffaTO. el /mev STJ a\\os Kbfffjt.os [OVK] eVrt TOVTOV
Aftebuv, rts ouros; et 5e dvdyKTj elvai. ctXXos be OVK effTiv, OVTOS
b TO fj.i/j.t]p,a airovufav



112 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

ordered whole, and the form that is apparent in the
stars, distant though they are, he lays not these
things to heart, nor reverences them for what they
are and whence they spring. Such a man has
neither pondered upon the sensible world, nor known
the supersensible." 1

The same point also is brought out in the first of
the two books on Providence. 2 We should not
expect the sensible world to be the intelligible world.
" Suppose, for example, we were contemplating man,
the sensible object, in his most beautiful form, we
would not surely demand that he should be the same
as the archetypal man in the intelligible world. On
the contrary we should accept it gladly of the
Creator that he had endowed man, for all that he
was embodied in flesh and sinew and bone, with
reason, so that he beautified even these carnal
things and made it possible for Reason to pass over
into Matter." 3 In like manner we must look upon
our physical world, " not seeking among the things
which are second in rank, those which are first. . . ."" 4

1 ii. 9, 16 (215 E-F) [vol. i. p. 208, 1. 9 et seq.}. dXX 6 tfv ISuv
/cdXXos eV Trpoff&iry eS fj,fUfii)fJi&ov 0eperat e/ce?, dpybs de rts O#TWS
&TTCU rrjv yv(j}fj.7}v /cat et s ovdev &\\o Kivrj(reTai, ware bpdov av^iravra
fiev TCL tv aiff0i]T$ K&XX-rj, a-vfj-Traaav de av^erplav /cat TTJV /j.eyd\7)i>
evra^iav ravTt]v /cat TO ^<f>ai.v6^.evov ev rot s aVrpots elSos /cat Trbppwdev
od<ru> OVK evrevdev ei>6v[j,r]6r](TTai, /cat o~e/3as avrbv \afj.(3dvei, ota d0
oi wv ; OVK dpa cure raCra Karevorjaev, o$re tKeiva, eldev.

2 iii. 2, 3.

3 iii. 2, 7 (260) [vol. i. p. 234, 1. 17 et seq.}. olov, et rts ^ovcoTret
TOV avdpuiTOv TOV a.lffB fjTbv oVrts /caXXtcrros, OVK av b^irov T< iv via
dvdpuirij} r)La<re rbv avrbv efrat, dXX tueivo dirodedexQai- rov TTOI^TOU,
et 0/j.ws 4v o-ap^i Kal vevpois /cat oa-r^ots OVTO. /careXa/Se r<$ Xo7y, ucrre
/cat raOra /caXXwat /cat TOV \6yov Svvrj67Jvat eiraveKdflv rrj v\r).

4 iii. 2, 7.



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 113

"The intelligible world is purely conceptual and
there could be no other that was purely conceptual.
Anything else that has come into being must be
lower than the intelligible world, and not conceptual ;
and yet not purely material, for that is without
order ; rather is it a mixture of both. . . .

"... We cannot then rightly find fault with
this universe of ours either on the score that it is
not beautiful, or that it is not the best of corporeal
things. Nor can we blame the Cause of its existence.
For in the first place it exists as the result of
necessity : not as the outcome of deliberate reasoning,
but of a more excellent nature procreating in
accordance with its nature something resembling
itself. Secondly, even if deliberate reasoning were the
creator, it would not be ashamed of its creation. For
it would have made a whole in all respects beautiful,
self-sufficient, and pleasing to itself, displaying
similar fitness in its parts, both the greater and the
lesser. . . . Since what has been made is the world in
its entirety, we might, as we contemplated it, hear it
say : God made me, and I am come from him,
perfectly fashioned out of all living beings, sufficing
and sufficient unto myself, in want of nothing. For
all things plants and living creatures and the natures
of all created things, and many gods, and hosts of
spirits and good souls and men blest with virtue
all are in me. It is not as though earth were decked
with all plants and living beings of every kind, and
the power of Soul reached even to the sea, whilst all



114 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

the air, and the upper air, and the whole firmament
of heaven were without Soul, but there, in the
celestial spheres, do all good souls dwell. They give
life to the stars, and to the well-ordered eternal
revolution of the heaven which circles ever joyfully
in the same course in imitation of Mind ; for beyond
that it seeks nothing. Whatever is in me desires
the Good, and each thing attains it so far as in it
lies. The whole heaven depends upon it, and all my
soul, and the gods that are in my parts, and all
living creatures and plants, and even that which
seems inanimate. . . . " l

1 iii. 2, 2 (256) [vol. i. p. 228, 1. 27 et seq.]. >6 ptv yap vo-rjTbs
libvov \6yos, Kal OVK av yevoiTO aXXos fj,6vov \6yos et 5^ TL eyeveTo
ctXXo, eoei. e\aTTOv eKetvov Kal /X.TJ \6yov, /u.7)5 aiS V\TJV elvai aKoa/nov
yap fj.iKTOv apa. Kal eis a aev X^yei v\rj Kal \6yos, odev 8e apxerai
\pv~XT] ^0fO"rcDcra T<$ /j.e/j.iy/j.ei ^}, ty ou KaKoiradeiv Set vo/mifciv paara
dioiKOvcrav rode TO irav rrj olov irapovaia. 3. /cat OVK av TLS et/corws
ovde Toting /j^/Ji^aiTO cos ov /caXy ?) r&v /j-era trw//,aros OVK dpiVry, ovd
a5 rbv a irLOv TOV elvai avry amdo-atro irp&rov pen e" avayKT)*
avrov Kal OVK e/c \oyio~fjiov yevo/meirov, dXXd 0ucrews a^elvovo^
Kara (ftvffiv O/JLOLOV eavry PtreiTa ovd el \oyio~fj,6s efy 6
lvxyvelTai rf TroiydfrTi 6\ov yap TL ^Troiycre 7rdyKa\ov
Kal avTapKes Kal <pi\ov avTi^ Kal rots fj.epe<n rots avTov TO?S re Kvpua-
T^pois Kal rols l\dTTOffiv wj avTijj Trpo(T(f)bpoi.s. 6 TO LVVV e /c T&V fj.epu)v
TO 6\ov atrtWyaevos (^TOTTOS av efy Trjs atria s rd re yap uepTj Trpos
avTb TO o\ov dei aKOtre iv, ei fftifUJMava Kal apuoTTOVTa eKeivtp, TO re
o\ov ffKOTrov/J-evov fjij) Trpbs /Jieptj aVra fffuupa fiXtTreiv. TOVTO yap ov
TOV KOCTUOV aiTi(i)fj.evov, dXXd Tiva T&V avTov %wpis \aj36vTos, olov el
wavTbs fyov Tpi^a r) r&v %a/iai daKTV\ov dytteX^cras TOV TT&.VTO, av-
6pwrrov, SaifAOvtav TLVO. o fiiv, jSX^TTOt, TI VT] Ai a rd dXXa fya d0eis r6
\a^dvot, T) r6 & Xoj> yevos irapels, olov TO avdpuTrov,
eis fjieaov ayoi. eirel o$v r6 yevo/ji.evov 6 /cocr/ios effTiv 6
s, TOVTOV dewp&v Tax av aKovcrais Trap avTov, ws ep,e Trerroi rjKe
deos Kayu eKeWev yev6(J.rjv rAeios K TTO.VTUV fywv Kal waves f/j.avT<3
Kal airrapKys ovdevbs 8e6fJ.evos, on TrdvTa ev CfJ-ol Kal (pvTa Kal faa Kal
r&v yevvrjTwv (fivcris Kal deal TroXXot /cai daiuovwv drjuoi



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 115

Finally, in discussing the descent of the soul into
the body, the perfection of the universe is main
tained in direct argument for the excellence of ^v^-i].
We must inquire, says Plotinus, " what we are to
postulate with regard to the nature of the universe
in which the soul dwells whether her in-dwelling
be voluntary, forced, or brought about in some other
way. Also what are we to say of its creator (the
World-Soul) ? Does she act without deviation ... or
does she perhaps act like our souls, which must needs
direct bodies worse than themselves and sink deep
into them if they are to rule them ? For each separate
body is scattered and borne awa y to its own place,
whereas in the universe all things lie naturally in
their proper places. Again, these bodies of ours,
since many accidents befall them from without, need
much troublesome forethought ; they are ever hard
pressed by want and in their difficulties need all
kinds of help. But the body of the universe,
perfect, self-sufficient, independent, and suffering
nothing contrary to its nature, needs, so to speak, but
a brief word of command; and its state is ever in



KO.I \fsvxai dyadai Kai avOpwiroi apery ev5ai/j.oi>es. ov yap 5rj 777 uei>
0uro?s re Tracrt /cat ftjots TravrodaTTOis Kai
dvi>a/J.is, drjp 5e Tras Kai aid^p Kai ovpavbs
ajjioipos, d\A e/cet ^f%at dyadai waff at, acrrpot? T)V StSoOcrcu /cat ry
ovpavov Kai cuSi y 7repi0opa vov //.t/uiycrei KVK.\I>) (pepofj-ei/rj e/j.-
repl ravrbv aei ov8v yap ^w ^rfrei. iravra ra ev /j.oi
cfiierai ^v TOV dyadov, rvyxdvei. 8e Kara dvvafMiv T-TJV eavrwv e/cacrra
e^Tjpr^rat 70,^ Tras /j,ei> ovpavbs fKeivov, irdffa 5 4fj.r) tyvxrt xai oi eV
fj.epe(ni> ^/xois Qeoi, Kai rd fwa 5e -rravra Kai ra 0ird Kai et TL &\^i xov



116 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

accordance with the natural wish of the Soul, having
neither desires nor sufferings." l

But the position thus set forth was capable of
further extension and reinforcement. The argument
could be developed from within as well as applied
from without. The perfection which it was possible
to predicate of the universe en bloc, could be
predicated of it regarded as a collection of genera
and species. Not only was the universe perfect after
its kind, but every kind of thing within the universe
could be regarded as possessing its peculiar and
appropriate excellence. Each genus then would be
justified in its existence, and none could with
propriety be blamed because it was not other than
it was. It would be as unfair and irrelevant, for
instance, to find fault with man because he was not
an angel, or with a plant because it was not an
animal, as to reproach the universe with being
mundane and not psychic or intelligible.

1 iv. 8, 2 (4TO) [vol. ii. P . 144, 1. 9 et seq.]. 2. &are ^v
ffvppalvci Trepl TT)S 7)/j,eTepa.s ^vx^s Trap avrov [j.a0eTv ^r}T^aa<nv
avdyicqs e<f>dirTea9ai /cat irepl if/vxfy 6 Aws frrTJfftu, TTWS Trore
<rwfj.ari irtyvice, Kal Trepl KOCTJUOV (pvaeus olbv riva dec avrbv
ev y \//VXTI tvdiaiTarai [emr] eKOvaa ei re avayKavdeiaa. ei re rts
TpoTros /cat irepl TroirjTov de et re 6p6us e ire . . . ws ^re/oat \//vxal
oi5a-at t o-ws, As ^5et trw/mra 5tot/coi5(ras %etpa; 5t avrwv dau TroXi) dvvat,
etirep fyeXKov KpaT-qaeiv, ffKeSaffd^vros f^ev &v eKaarov K al Trpfc rov
oiKelov TOTTOV (f)epo^evovev de ry rravrl TTOLVTCL ev ot/cety KO.TOL (pixnv
/cetrat TroAA^s de /cat 6%Ac65oi;s Trpovolas Seo/mevuv, are TTO\\UV rCov
aXKorpiuv ai rots TrpoaTrnrTovrwv dei re evdeig. avvexop.evwv /cat Trdffrjs
j3ofjdeLas ws ev TroAAf; 5i;crxepeta deofAevuv. TO de reXeiov re dv /cat
iKavbv /cat aOrapKes /cat ovdev e^ov avra) irapa fybaiv fipaxfos olov
/ceAe^cr/xaros Setrat /cat cos TreQvite \f/vx^i e"0e\eiv, ra^rrj /cat det fyei
otire e -rriOv/uias t xovtra ovre ird<rx<>v<ra..



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 117

This is the line pursued by Plotinus. His
universe continues the eloquent defence of itself
quoted above as follows : " Some of the things
within me seem to share only in existence, some in
life, some in sensation, while others have already
reason, and others again life in its completeness.
For one cannot make equality from unequal things,
as that the finger should see. Sight we rather ask
of the eye, and of the finger something else, namely,
that it should be a finger, I suppose, and have its
proper nature." 1

But Plotinus is not content merely to be on the
defensive. Not only will he hold his own position
and maintain the excellence of the world in the face
of all, Gnostic or otherwise, who dare to attack it,
but he carries the war into the enemy s country as
well, turning the Gnostics 1 arms against themselves,
and using the reductio ad absurdnm to their dis
comfiture.

"Is it not absurd that the Gnostics, who have
bodies and desires and pains and passions like other
men, should, instead of disparaging their own power,
maintain their ability to comprehend the intelligible
world, and yet deny that the sun possesses a power
less subject to passion, more orderly and more free
from change than their own, and that it has an

1 iii. 2, 3 (257 n et seq.) [vol. i. p. 230, 1. 11 et seq.}. Cf.
also iii. 3, 3 (272) [vol. i. p. 253, 1. (> et xeq.]. Kaira pev rovelvat
/j.Tex iV doKei JAOVOV, TO, de rov r)v, ra de /ui,a\\oi> ev rw aiff0aveff9ai,
ra de -rjdf] \6yov %ei, ra de iravav {wf]v. ou yap ra icra diraire tv del
TOIS /AT? iVois ovde yap daKrvXwv TO fiXeireiv a\\a 6((>da\/j.ui> rovro,
5aKTi/\ov de aXXo, TO efrcu oZ/u daKru\i{3 Kal rb avrov tyeiv.



118 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

intelligence higher than that which we possess we,
new-born creatures who encounter so many obstacles
on our march towards truth ? Is it not astonishing
that they should proclaim their own souls immortal
and divine, however vile the man, and yet deny that
the whole heaven and its stars, composed as they are
of purer and finer elements, share in an immortal
soul ? And this, though they see in the heavens
just that order and form and structure of the lack of
which here on earth they are always complaining !
What they imply is that the immortal soul has
deliberately chosen to take the worse place for
herself, and to abandon the better to the mortal
soul." 1

Do they deny that the world is directed by
providence ? No, they admit that God exercises
some care over us men. " Why, then, should he be
careless of the universe in which men dwell ? Is it
because he has not the leisure to look after it?
Then it is not right that he should see to what is

1 ii. 9, 5 (202 F) [vol. i. p. 188, 1. 30 et seq.]. 5. dXX [&\oyov]
O.VTOVS (j.ev crufj-a fyovTas, olov &xpvffUf avdpuwoi, /cat Tri6v/j.ias xai
XuTras /cat 6/370,5 TT]v Trap airroZs dvva/uuv JJLT] drt/ud"etj>, dXX e(pdTTTeadai
TOV vorjTOv \yeiv ^etVat, /JLTJ elf at 5 v r/Xt y TavTtjs diradeuTepaLV fv
raei /j.S.\\ov /cat OVK v aXXotcicret /u,a\\ov odcrav, ovde (ppbyrj
afj,eivova rnjidov r&v cLpri yevofJ^vtav /cat 5td roaovrwv Kui\vofdvuv rQ/v
diraT&vTwv tiri TT\V d\r)6eiav e\6eiv ovdt rr/v yue^ avrdov
dddvarov Kal delav \eyeiv /cat rrjv rdv 0auXordrw^ avdpioiruv, TOV
5^ ovpavbv Trdvra /cat rd ^/cet dVrpa fj.rj rijs ddavdrov KCKOivu
eK TroAXy Ka.\\i6v<i}v /cat KaBapurepuv ovra, opw^ra? ^/ccl /x.ei/ TO
/j.vov /cat ei (r%77/u,oj /cat \JTO.KTOV /cat /xaXttrra TTJV evTavda irepl yrjv
dra^tav O.VTOVS aiTiu/uiti ovs wcrTrep r?7S ddavaTOV fivxTJs TOV
TOTTOV eTrtTT/Ses eXo/j-tvys, Trapaxupyjcrai 5^ TOV /SeXrtoj os TTJ



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 119

lower than it. If he looks after men, why should
he not look beyond them to the world in which
they are ? But if he does not look beyond them so
that he need not look after the world, then he does
not even look after men. Men, they may say, have
no need of him. But the world needs him, and knows
its own constitution, and the men who are in it,
and how they are in it, and their condition there." 1

Again, "the Gnostics say that God takes fore
thought for them alone. Did he then care for
them only in the higher world, or does his provid
ence also extend to this ? In the former case, how
did the Gnostics come here ? In the latter, why are
they here still, and how is it that God himself is
not here ? For how else will he know that they
are here, or that being here they have not forgotten
him nor become evil ? Again, if he knows those
who have not become evil, he must also know those
who have, in order to distinguish the one from the
other. But in that case he will have to be present
in some way among all men, and throughout this
universe. Hence the universe must also have a
share in him. . . ." 5

1 ii. 9, 9 (208 n) [vol. i. p. 197, 1. 27 et seq.]. dr tiri robots
v(Ji.u>v irpovod 6 deos, TOV d Kocrfj-ov TTOLVTOS iv o5 /cat avrol dca rl d/*eXet;
el fj.v ydp, STL ov o-%oX7j avry -rrpos O.VTOV /SXeTretJ ovde 0e/us atfry,
Trpos TO Kara; KO! Trpbs avrovs fiXt-rruv 5td ri oik w /3Xe7ret /ecu TT/JOS
TOV KOfffJ-ov d /SXeVet ev u> eicrcv ; el de /my a>, IW /J.T] TOV KQff^ov
(j>opa, ovSe avTOvs /3Xe 7ret. dXX ovdtv otovTat, O.VTOV dXX 6 /c6<r/ios
5e?rat /cat olSe TTJJ/ Ta%iv O.VTOV /cat oi ev OLVT<$ OTTWS iv aury /cat OTTWS

Kfl

~ ii. 9 (215 A) [vol. i. p. 207, 1. 3 et seq.]. \eyov<n yap O.VTUV
irpovoeiv a5 /J.OVQV. woTepa 8 c/cet yevopevuv r\ /cat v66.8e OVTWV ; ei



120 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

The final absurdity is this. " The Gnostics scorn
this creation and this earth of ours, and say that
a new earth has been created for them to which
they will depart ; this, they say, is the universe in
intelligible form. But what is their object in
getting to a world which is a mere pattern of this
world which they hate? Also, where does this
pattern come from? (For they say that it was
after the creator of the pattern universe had stooped
to this world of ours.) If indeed he was anxious
to make another world besides the intelligible world
he already possessed (though one may well ask what
was the need of it), either he must have made
it before or after he made this world. And if he
made it before, for what purpose did he make it ?
That the souls might be kept safe in it, perhaps.
How was it, then, that they were not safe?
Thus he created it in vain. If, on the other
hand, he created it after this world, taking it from
this world, and stripping the form of this world
from its matter, what good did it do? For the
experience which the experienced souls had had
was sufficient to keep them safe. Again, if the
Gnostics merely mean that the form of the world



tfv yap e/ce-Z, TTU)S j\d ov ; d 3i 6i>dd5e, TTWS ft- t d

ov K al air6s taw Made; ^dev yap yvdxrerai, 8n eialv Made;

TTU,* 01, Sn &0A8e fores ot K eire\a8ovro avrov K al eyevovro

W ycrcfawc rote rf yevotfvovs KCIKOVS, Kal rote
yivwoKec, i va 8uucpl*i Air t K d vu > v avrovs. iraw o
rat Amu <? T$ K 6a^ T $te t 6 <m s 6 rp^or fore K al ^0^ avrov

KOCTfJlOS.



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 121

is to be found in souls, what is there novel in that
teaching? . . ." 1

Moreover, given the Gnostic premises, what good
was there in the soul s creating a world at all ? " It
is absurd to suppose that she did it for her own
renown as though adopting the methods of an
earthly sculptor. Again, if she created in thought,
but it was not in her nature to create, although
the creative power was there, how could she have
created this world ? And when will she destroy it ?
If she has repented, why does she delay ? If she
has not yet repented, she never will, since she has
grown used to it and is more kindly disposed to
it through the lapse of time." 2

Again, the Gnostics condemning the world whole
sale say that "they are not moved by its beauty,

1 ii. 9, 5 (203) [vol. i. p. 189, 1. 23 et seq.]. dXX ov n/uwi/re?
TavTyv TTJV drjfj.Lovpyiav ov8 Trjv8e TT\V yfjv Kaiv^v O.VTO IS (fiacri yrjv
yeyovevai, els rjv 5rj evTevdev air e\evcrov TOLL TOVTO de \byov elvai
KO(TfJ.ov. KaiTOi T L del ai/Tols yevecrdaL ev irapadeiy/maTi K6ff/J,ov ) ov
/jUffovcri ; irbdev de TO Trapddeiy/jia TOVTO; TOVTO yap /car avTovs
vevevKOTOs fjdfj jrpbs TO. Trjde TOV TO irapddeiy[j.a IT eiroLTi KOTOS, el fj.ev
odv ev ai/Tif) ry TroufiffavTt. 7ro\\7j (ppoi>Tis TOV KOff^ov yuera TOV Koa/nov
TOV voyjTbv ov e^et d\\ov TTOLTJcrai Ka iTOi T L eoa; [TJ rrpb TOV /coayxou
Tovde eiroitiaev r) ywerd TOV KoafAov]. /cat et /mev irpb TOV Kbffjj-ov, iva
TI; iva (pv\d^(jovTcn al i//u%at. TTWS oftv OVK ((>v\a!~a.vTO, WffTe fj.aTr]v
eyeveTo; el 5 /tterd TOV KOCT^OV K TOV KOCT/J-OV \af3uv airo<rv\ri<ras TT)S
vXrjs TO eldos, ijpKei i] Treipa rats irecpadeiaais \i/i>%cus Trpbs TO (j)V\d-
&ffda.L. d 5e ei> rats / ^xats Aa/3etV d&ovtri TOV Koa/m-ov TO eldos, T L TO

KCLLVOV TOV \6yOV /

2 ii. 9, 4 (202) [vol. i. p. 188, 1. 8 et seq.]. yeXoiov yap TO tVa
rt/xyro, Kal /j.eTa<pep6vTwv dirb TWV dydX/uLaTOTroi&v TH> evTavQa.
eirel /cat el dtavoia eTrotet /cat //,TJ ev Trj (puaet. ^v TO iroieiv /cat ij Svvafj.LS
i) Troiovffa fy, TrtDs av Koa/u-ov Tov8e eiroirjcre ; TTOTC de /cat (pdepet
Q.VTOV ; el yap fj-eTeyvti}, T L civa/m^vei; el d O^ TTW, OVK

ZTI TJd-rj eidia-^evr} /cat r XP V V Trpoa-^tXecrrepa



THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

and that they see no difference between ugly and
beautiful physical bodies. But in that case it will
make no difference to them whether they see ugly or
beautiful conduct, or have ugly or beautiful thoughts
or visions. Nay, it will be all the same whether or
no they see God himself. For things here derive
their existence from first principles. If earthly
things are not beautiful, then neither are heavenly." l
In like manner, in a world absolutely bad, all
distinction between virtue and vice will be impos
sible. " Least of all," says Plotinus, " can we afford
to ignore the effect of their words upon the souls
of those who listen to them, and are persuaded to
despise the world and all that is in it. For there
are two sets of doctrines relating to the attainment
of the End, the one which lays down the pleasure of
the body as the End, the other which chooses out
the beautiful and virtue ; and the longing for these
has its beginning and its end in God but the nature
of this desire we must discuss elsewhere. Epicurus,
who does away with Providence, bids us pursue what
is left, pleasure and enjoyment. But with even
greater insolence the Gnostic teaching, by upbraid
ing the Lord of Providence and Providence itself,
and by dishonouring both all earthly laws and the
virtue collected from the beginning of time, makes

1 ii. 9, 17 (216) [vol. i. p. 20J), 1. H et seq.]. M apa avrol
(f)aiv /U,TJ KiveicrOai, fj.tjoe diatpopws aiV%pd /cat /caXct opav crwyuara
dXX oiJrcos ovde cuVx/ra /cat /caXd TTiT7]dVfj.aTa ovdt /caXd ^a^/wara
ovSe Oeupias roivvv ovde dtbv Toivvv. /cat yap dta TO, -irpura ravra.
L oftv fj. f] raura, ovde e



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 123

of virtuous wisdom a laughing-stock (so that nothing
earthly may be regarded as beautiful) and destroys
it, together with the goodness innate in moral char
acters, perfected from reason and discipline. In a
word, the Gnostics do away with everything through
which a man might become virtuous. Hence for them
nothing is left but pleasure, and selfishness, and dis
regard for other men, and the principle of expediency,
unless perchance some one of them is by virtue of his
own nature superior to such doctrines. For to them
none of the virtues of which we have spoken are
beautiful, but now one thing, now another, accord
ing to the object of their pursuits. And although
those who have known the higher things should
strive hence towards them, yet they should first seek
to set right the affairs of earth, since they have come
hither from the divine nature. . . . The saying
Look to God brings no practical result unless it
teach how one is to look to him. For, one may
say, what is to prevent one s looking toward him,
without abstaining from any pleasure or controlling
desires, merely keeping in mind the word God, but
fettered by every passion and seeking to expel none ?
It is rather virtue progressing towards the End, and
springing up in the soul as a result of wisdom, which
shows us God. But without true virtue, the word
6 God is a mere name." l

1 ii. 9, 15(213) [vol. i. p. 205, 1. 3 etseq.]. 15. eVetvo d fj.d\iffTa
dei ^77 \av&dyiv rj/mj, ri Trore Trotovffiv oi \6yoi OVTOL ei s ras ^iX&S TWV



6.KOVOVTWV /cat TOV KOfffJi-ov Kal T&V ev avTip Kara.(f>pove
dvalv yap OVG&V aipeffewv TOV rvx^f TOV reXouj, fjnas fJ.ev TT)S



THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

Finally, Plotinus rebukes the Gnostic hatred of
the body and the senses ; at the same time refuting
their charge that his doctrine attaches one to the
flesh. In a charming passage, almost Franciscan in
its sentiment, he points out the difference between
himself and the Gnostic. " Suppose," he says, " two
men dwell together in the same beautiful house.
One of them decries its arrangement and blames
its builder, yet continues to dwell in it. The other,



rrjv TOU vu/jLaTos reXos Ti6e/j.evr)s, ere/sets de TTJS TO Ka\bv Kal T^V
dpeT7]v aipov[j.ei>r)s, ols Kal e/c deov Kal els debv dvrjpTrjTaL i) 6pets TTU>S
de, ev &\\OLS Oewp-rjTeov 6 /j.ev ETrt/coi pos TTJV TrpbvoLav avaip&v TTJV
rfdov^v Kal TO TJdeffBaL, o-rrep fy \OLTTOV, TOVTO diuKeLV Tra/m/ceXeuercu
6 de X67os oCros ert veavLK&Tepov rbv TTJS Trpovoias Kvpiov Kal avTTjv TTJV
jrpbvoiav /j.ffj,\l/dfjLevos Kal irdvTas vo/Jiovs TOVS evTavda drt/xdcras Kal rr]i>
dpeTTjv T7]v ^K iravTos TOU xpovou dvijvp7]/^fr]V TO Te awtypovfiv TOVTO
ev ytXwTi de /j.evos, Lva fj,r)8fv Ka\6i> evTavda 5?j oQdeiy vTrdpxov, dvei\e
TO ffbxftpovfiv Kal rr\v iv rots ij6effi.v ffjufivroit dLKCuoavvrfv Trjv reXetoi;-
e"K \6~yov Kal daKTjcrews Kal 6Xws KaO d cnrovdaios avdpuTros av
&ffTe avTols KaTa\ei7Ta0ai TT)V Tjdovrjv Kal TO irepl avTobs Kal
TO ou Kowbv Trpos &\\ovs dvOpuTTOVs Kal TO TTJS %p6ias [ibvov, ei ju.r) TIS
Trj (pvaeL TTJ avTOv Kpeirrcw e if] TWV \6yuv TOVTWV TOVTWV ydp ovdev
avTols Ka\oi>, dXXa dXXo rt, o Trore fJiTadni)^ov<n. /catroi ^XPW T0 ^ s
fjd-rj eyvuKOTas evTtvdev diuKetv, di&KovTas de irp&Ta KaTOpdovv raCra
eK 6fia.s 0uo"ea;s iJKOvTas ^Keivrjs ydp TTJS (pvcrecos Ka\6v eiralew [r^s]
TT]v i]dovr]v TOV (Tco^aaTos d,rt/x,a^"oucr?7S. ols Se dpeTTJs yu,7? /neTeaTiv, OVK
ai> elev TO Traponrav KivrjdevTes Trpos Kflva. fj.apTvpei de ai/Tols Kal
Tode TO /m. ijdei a \byov Trepl dpeTrjs TreTrot^cr^at, e/cXeXot7r^ai 5e iravTd-

TTCKTl TOV Ttepl TOVTiOV \6yOV, Kal /J,7)Te Tl iffTIV LTrelv /ULTjTe TTOffa fJ.r]T

ova Tede&pTjTai TroXXa /cat KoXd rots T&V TraXcuwi \6yois, /J.TJT ei; &v
TrepieffTai Kal /CTTjcrerat, /uTjre ws #e/ra7reuerat ^vxv /J- rjTe ws KaBaipeTai.
ou ydp 8rj TO elTrelv "jSXeVe Trpos debv " Trpovpyov TL epydfcTai, edv /my
Kal TTWS /3Xe ^ei didd^y. TL ydp Ktt}\veL, CLTTOL TLS ar, f3\eireLV Kal
/uids dwexfO daL Tjdovrjs, rj aKpaTTJ 6vju.ov elvo.L /m.e fj.fr] /me vov /J-ev o
TOV debs, crvvexo/mevov de diracrL irddecrL, fj.r)dev de avT&v
i^aLpelv ; dpeT-r] /uiev o$v els Te\os TrpoLovaa Kal ev if/vxg
fj.eTa (ppovr/ffews debv deiKViiffLv avev 8e dpeTrjs d\rj0LVTjs debs \eyb/mevos
6vo/j,d eaTLit.



METAPHYSICAL EVIL

instead of finding fault, says that the builder has
made it with all possible skill, yet waits for the
time when he may leave it as needing it no longer.
The first man may believe himself the wiser and the
readier to leave because he has learned to say that
the walls are made of lifeless stone and timber, and
that the house as a whole falls far short of the true,
ideal house. If so, he does not realize that he differs
from his fellow-inmate only in his inability to bear
with what must needs be, since his attitude is not
really one of discontent, but comes from a secret
love for the beauty of the stones. We who have
bodies have to live in these houses provided us by
our good sister the Soul who has great power to
create without effort." l

This refutation of the Gnostics requires little
comment. The tolerance of the body, we may note,
stands in curious contrast not only to the vitupera
tions of the Gnostics, but to the general trend
of Neo - Platonic and Neo - Pythagorean thought.
Plutarch, Maximus, Numenius, Albinus, Hermes,

1 ii. 9, 18 (217 B) [vol. i. p. 210, 1. 20 et seq.]. TOVTO 5t Sfwiov
at eify, &<rirep av et duo olxov Ka\bv TOV O.VTOV OLKOVVTUV, TOV fj.ev
\f/eyovTOs TTJV KaTaaKevrjv /cat TOV TroLir/cravTa /cat fj.evouTos oi>x TITTOV
ev avTy, TOV de /AT] \{/eyovTos, dXXd TOV iroiricravTa rexj/i/cwrara Treironj-
Kevai Xe-yoiros, TOV de xpovov dva/mevovTos etos dv 77/07, ev a$ d,7raXXaerat,
o5 fj.r)K^Ti ot /coi; derjcroiTO, 6 de (ro^curepos etVat ot otro /cat eroi^orepos
eeX0eip, on oide \eyeiv e/c \i0wv dif/i/xwv TOI)S rotvofs /cat ^v\<jjv
ffvveffTavai /cat TroXXoO oelv Trjs dXrjdivijs ot/c77crecos, dyvo&v OTI T< /j,i)
<f>epeiv ra dvayKaia diafiepei, eiirep /cat /AT) Trotet raOra dvcrx P a ^" ul/
[dXX J dyairQiv yorvxy TO /cdXXos T&V \iduv. del de ju.eveti> fjiev ev oi /cots
(TcD/ia exovTas KO.TO.<J Kevaa 6 e?<riv virb ^VXTJS dde\<f>r)$ dyadrjs iro\\-r)i>
ovva^iv ets TO dij/Luovpyelv dirovus exovff rjs.



126 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

Trismegistus, and Philo were almost as vehement in
their denunciations. It should be remembered,
however, that this scorn with them, as with their
early Pythagorean and Orphic forbears, was largely
philosophic. Theoretically it is easy to say that
life is bad, and the body a loathsome dungeon.
Practically it is liveable enough, and its bars well
gilded. Nay the normal soul, like the canary-bird,
is happy in its cage.

This Hellenic appreciation of the bodily is indeed
inconsistent with a large part of Plotinus s thought,
just as we find it hard to reconcile Saint Francis s
joyfulness, his love of all creatures, and his tolerance
and even approval of all natural pleasures and goods
with much else in his life. The charm and the
greatness of both men lie perhaps in just this
inconsistency, in seraphic ardour and mystic ecstasy
athirst for the supernatural and consecrated by the
Beatific Vision and the Stigmata, tempered by and
tempering an innate fellowship and sympathy with
the life and beauty of phenomenal things, and a
responsiveness to their appeal. Both, taken to task,
give the same account of themselves. The world is
not God indeed, but it is God s. In proof Francis
points to it and says "Look," Plotinus points to
it and says " Think."

As regards the metaphysical reductio ad absurdum
of the Gnostic position, the self-contradictions ex
posed are patent enough. It is absurd for a man to
think himself better than his universe. It is insanity



METAPHYSICAL EVIL 127

in a God to create, or for a creature to expect salva
tion and satisfaction in the replica or paradigm of a
world which both he and its maker find so bad that
both are agreed it had better never have been made,
and would and will destroy it. Nor can either give
any reason for creating or inhabiting such a world
at all.

The practical and ethical nihilism of the argu
ment is no less obvious. Plotinus is but showing
the consequences of any consistent and absolute
pessimism. Not only would such a pessimism, he
is saying, destroy all canons of taste and morals,
finding all earthly things and ends alike worthless,
and all distinctions of value, ethical or aesthetic,
meaningless (which indeed was precisely the Gnostic
claim), but it would also leave equally without
ground or justification that mystic aspiration toward
the supercosmic upon which the Gnostics prided
themselves an aspiration which we are wont
generally to regard as fostered by and fostering a
scorn of the world.

Out of a strange and totally dark room no one
could ever see the hint of a way ; in truth it could
never occur (leaving previous experience out of
account) that a way existed or that there was light
outside to search for. There would have to be some
crack, some glimmer to indicate the existence and
the position of the door. In like manner in a world
wholly bad, in which all distinctions of right and
wrong, beautiful and ugly are without significance,



128 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

the Gnostic s desire and attempt to find an egress
are a mere blind man s groping. His world can give
him no suggestion of the manner in which he must
set about transcending it. Vice will be no less
likely a way than virtue, because virtue is no better
a way than vice.

The Gnostics then could not be true to them
selves without being false. They could not wholly
condemn the world if their desire to leave it behind
them was to have any value or promise. The door
out of the world had to open into the world. Moral
and aesthetic distinctions had to have some real
validity. Right and beauty had to be glimmers,
however faint, of the light beyond. The moral life
had to lie at least more in the direction of the path
of salvation than the immoral. Fair things must
needs be more worthy of esteem, or at any rate less
worthy of contempt, than foul. God might be
beyond all predicates, but beauty and goodness had
to be more akin to his nature than their opposites.

As a matter of fact few mystics have denied this.
They have had to admit some sort of ava/zv^crts or
homing instinct in the soul that recognized in the
goods and beauties of this world sign-posts to set
them on the upward and outward way. Sophia-
Achamoth herself modelled the world on a memory of
the Pleroma. And as a rule all mystic systems, how
ever rotten they may consider the world and however
illusory its goods, have made the practice of human
virtues and the contemplation of the nobler mundane






METAPHYSICAL EVIL 129

beauties the first step in the ascent to the Beatific
Vision. Plotinus himself is merely pointing out to
the Gnostics what would be the consequences of
their teaching, were they not better than their
doctrine.



CHAPTER III

PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL

WE have now completed what we may call the
second chapter of our essay. The problem of meta
physical evil is disposed of, or rather the difficulties
and unforeseen results of dealing with it are admir
ably exposed by Plotinus s attempt at disposing of
them. The nature of that attempt, self-contradictory
resultant as it is of the struggle of two irreconcilable
tendencies of thought, is sufficiently fresh in our
*-*memory to require no reviving. Suffice it to say
1 that Plotinus denies and affirms metaphysical evil at
I the same time, denying it by insisting on the possi-
Ibility of different kinds of perfection, affirming it by
declaring those kinds to be at the same time degrees.
|But whatever we may think, Plotinus found the two
ideas consonan.t. Welded together, they seemed to
him to furnish a powerful weapon against the
objection stated by him in the first treatise concern
ing Providence, and already quoted, which it was
the avowed intention of his theodicy to refute. To
the contention that the imperfection of the world is
sufficient ground for denying, as the Epicureans deny,

130



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 131

a moral and providential government of it, or for
assuming, as the Gnostics assume, that the creation
and creator are evil, Plotinus answers by denying the
accusation, and thereby makes the first point in his
theodicy. The world is not imperfect. It is, to be
sure, not so good as God, but it is perfect after its
kind.

This declaration, however, marks also the opening
of another chapter in his work, and in our discussion.
Plotinus has, in his own opinion, freed the universe
from invidious comparisons on the part of the
outside observer. Henceforth all external relations
may be ruled out as irrelevant. The world is
perfect of its sort, and all other possible sorts of
perfection we may ignore, so far at least as any
disparagement of mundane perfection is concerned.
But an internal problem remained. Judged without
reference to other possible worlds, this world as it
was had to make good its proper excellence. It
could not be blamed for not being something else, ^
but apparently it could be attacked on the score that
it was not true even to itself. Judged even by the/*
standards of its own making, it might well appear
imperfect. It is internally discordant. It does not
run smoothly. Its parts fall short even of their
proper excellences, and grind down and destroy one
another. There is suffering and imperfection. In
the world of human action there is sin. Such a
world would seem to be diseased in its own essence,
and to fail to embody even a mundane perfection.



THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

In fine, having made the Stoic assertion that the
universe is a perfect universe, Plotinus finds himself
faced by the Stoic problem. It need not surprise
us, then, to find in the two books concerning Provi
dence, a theodicy in many respects similar to, and
often .actually reminiscent of, that of Zeno and his
school. But at the same jtime this chapter of the
Plotinian theodicy differs -from that of the Stoics in
one important respect. ^It is not Plptinus s last means
of defence. It is rather a reconnoitre in force.

We shall do well in the discussion to follow if
we revert to the distinctions discussed in the intro
duction, and regard our problem under the three
heads of physical evil, moral evil, and the dis
proportion of reward to merit. These distinctions,
of course, cannot be regarded as absolutely rigid and
determinate. Many evidences of imperfection will
fall under more than one head, and it will be hard to
say under which they may be most appropriately
discussed. At the most our headings will be found
rough, but useful instruments for dealing more easily
with our subject.

It should be remarked at this point that Plotinus^s
view of the nature of physical evil is notably broad
and detached as compared with that taken by most
theodicies. Many apologists for the divine goodness
have an easy way of ignoring or of dismissing as
irrelevant to the question such physical evil as does
not immediately concern humanity. Of the general
incompatibility of the types produced by nature, of



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 133

the stultification of one thing by another, of the
battle-fields on which man does not fight and suffer,
and of the tooth and claw that are red, but not with
his blood, they take little practical account, though it
must be insisted that such phenomena, quite as much
as the fact of human suffering, form part of the
problem of physical evil. It goes without saying
that by thus evading part of the difficulty, one
seems more easily to circumvent it. Thus the Stoics,
by virtually limiting physical evil to the misfortunes
and sufferings of mankind, and by declaring that men
ought to be indifferent to outer events, were able to
solve the problem by refusing to consider it. There
was, they maintained, no such thing as physical evil,
though it is noteworthy that with a curious incon
sistency they at once proceeded to justify at some
length a factor whose existence they denied. //

In the same way Christianity has made its de
fence of the divine beneficence easier by a practical
limitation of the same sort. It is a natural and
apparently practicable method of absolving one s
gods from responsibility for Evil by assuming it
one s self, and were physical evil a matter of human
suffering alone, it might be satisfactorily explained
and the problem of Evil in general much simplified
by regarding it as the wages of sin. The fact of sin,
indeed, would still remain to challenge any attempt
at an unmitigated optimism, and we may doubt
whether Christianity with its doctrine of Adam s fall
and of inherited guilt has successfully disposed of the



134 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

difficulty. For, granting that a perfect man could
fall, would he ? Is not perfection at least just that
quality which, if tempted, would not fall ? Apart,
however, from this difficulty, and from the moral
obliquity of the doctrine of original sin, the fact of
physical evil in its larger aspect still remains un
explained. A perfect man might fall, and we,
through our consanguinity with our first parent,
might perhaps be involved in his sin with some show
of justice. But no theological ingenuity, it would
seem, could decently attribute the sufferings of un
related, unfree, irrational, and sinless animals to the
same cause. Yet animal as well as human suffering is
something which a theodicy must face. A God that
does not need to be freed of responsibility for the one
is scarcely worth freeing from blame for the other.

Plotinus, however, is alive to the importance of
the more general aspects of the question. Roughly
speaking, we may say that the problem presents itself
to him in a three- or perhaps a four-fold form. First,
there is the bare general fact of motion and change,
of generation and corruption. All things are in
Heracleitean flux. Everything perishes. Nothing en-
dures. Secondly, there is the failure of any particular
to attain its proper perfection. Nothing is its ideal
J^ self. Thirdly, there is an apparent conflict between
r~ the perfections or entelechies themselves. The ideas
or forms of different species seem incapable of being
realized together. It appears impossible, for example,
for the lion and the lamb to attain their respective



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 135

perfections in the same world. The species " lion "
being marked by the predicate " lamb-eating," would
seem to deprive the species "lamb" of any point
cFappui. Finally, there is the very real and obvious
conflict between particulars themselves of both the
same and different species. Thus two lions will fight
over the same lamb. Men are not only carnivorous,
but cannibal. The whole world is a battle-field on
which all sides are defeated. These four character
istics, then, of mundane existence will, quite apart
from the problem of moral evil, afford ample
material for a theodicy.

The first point, the general mutability and
transitoriness of all earthly things, Plotinus has
answered to all practical purposes, by assigning to
the universe ^perfection of its own. It is part of
terrestrial excellence to be ever in change and
motion. Generation and corruption we should
naturally expect in a phenomenal world, however
perfect of its kind it may be. Change is in itself no
evil. It is better that a thing should exist even
for a short time than not at all. 1 Moreover, if the
temporal world be not eternal, it is at least everlast
ing. Individuals pass, but the type persists. Thus
we find Plotinus continuing the world s eloquent
self-exordium which we have already quoted. " Be
not astonished," he says, if fire be extinguished
by water, and yet fire itself consume something
else. For fire itself was brought into existence
1 iii. 2, 15 (266 c) [vol. i. p. 243, 1. 28 et seq.].



136 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

by something other than itself, and as it was not
brought into existence by itself, so it is destroyed
by something else. Indeed, it came into existence
through another s destruction, and if this be the
case, destruction will bear no terrors for it ; in the
place of the fire destroyed there will be another
fire. In the incorporeal heaven each thing endures ;
in this heaven of ours the whole, together with
its honourable and ruling parts, lives for ever,
but individual souls change their bodies and are
born at different times in different forms. But as
often as she can the individual soul withdraws from
the process of generation into the company of the
World-Soul. )l -Bodies live by virtue of the type (each
individual body in accordance with the whole), if
indeed they are to derive their being, their life, and
their sustenance from within themselves. Life here
on earth involves motion, but life in the intelligible
world does not." 1 Finally, we have the phenomenon
of disease passed over with the remark that " things
which have bodies must needs fall sick." 2

1 iii. 2, 4 (257 E) [vol. i. p. 230, 1. 18 et seq.]. 4. irvp 5 el virb
vSaros fffievvvTat Kal erepov virb Trvpbs (pdelperai, /U.TJ Oavfjidarjs. teal
yap els rb elvai &X\o avrb tfyayev, ov5 axQev v<j> avrov vir &\\ov
e<f>ddprj, Kal %\6e 5 els rb elvai. inr &\\ov (pdopas, Kal i] <f>6opa Se avr$
ovSev &v, el OVTU, deivbv <pepoi, Kal avrl rov (pdapevros Trvpbs irvp &\\o.
fv i*ev yap [T<] dtrw^ciry ovpavQ eKavrov fj.evei, tv 5^ r(p5e ry ai/pavy
TTO.V fj.ev del ^77 Kal 8<ra ri/uia Kal Ktpia pep-q, al dt afjielpovvai \
o-ujyuara [a\\ore ev a\\y etdei ylyvovTai, Kal orav dt dvvrjrai,
yevevews crava \jsvxn f^fra rijs iraa^ earl ^vx^s. o-w^ara dt ft
eldos Kal Ka6 8\a eKatrra, eiirep Q avruv Kal $a e<rrai Kal

<rerai far) yap evravda Kivovfj.evri, enel 5t d/c/v^ros.

2 iii. 2, 5 (258 E) [vol. i. p. 232, 1. 16]. K al dvdyK-rj



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 137

Evidently this argument is also relevant to the
fourth point the conflict of particulars with one
another. Plotinus knew nothing of extinct or
disappearing species. Species, he saw, apparently
were not destroyed either by attacks upon them
from the outside, or by the inner friction of their
proper particulars. He could point out that both
the formal structure of the universe as a whole, and
the integrity of each special form in the system, were
no more affected by the conflict and reciprocal
destruction of the parts, than by the dissolution
incidental to the general process of " becoming."
So far as dying is concerned, it is no better to die
in one s bed than in one s boots. If death is no evil,
and inflicts no harm on the universe, the world is
none the worse, ceteris paribus, for violent than for
natural death. Indeed, from the world s point of
view, violent death is natural, only more subtly so.
The naturalism that lurks in the entire argument
is self-evident.

The next difficulty which concerns us is the seem
ing failure of the particular to attain its proper
entelechy. This is in truth a crucial point for
Plotinus. As he says himself, " the question is not
whether this thing is inferior to that, but whether it
is self-sufficing in its own nature." 1 Apparently we
must answer in the negative. Things fall short of
their ideal outlines. Not only am I not God or

1 iii. 3, 3 (273 A) [vol. i. p. 253, 1. 23 et seq.]. 5e? yd.p ot
fqretj , d ?\a.TTOi> #XXov, dXX et u>s



138 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

an angel or a horse or a tree, but I am not even a
perfect man. I am deficient in my proper human
nature. And a world in which such a discrepancy
between things and their perfections exists is an
imperfect world.

Plotinus^s reply is brilliant. It consists in a re-
application of the principle of varieties of perfec
tion, this time to justify not merely a world, or a
special aspect or type within that world, but every
individual member of a given species, in being what
it is and nothing else. He speaks as follows : "In
the case of each of the eternally created genera,
one cannot blame the creative Reason, unless one
demand that everything should have been made as
things uncreate but eternal, and that both in the
intelligible and the sensible worlds things should be
eternally the same. To ask this is to ask too much
good; it is to forget that the form given to each thing
is sufficient unto it. It is like complaining because
a man has no horns like a failure to see that it was
impossible that Reason should not extend over all
things, that it was necessary that the lesser should be
contained by the greater, and the part by the whole,
and that they could not be equal for then they would
not have been parts. In the intelligible world each
thing is all, but here on earth each thing is not all."

So far we have merely a restatement of the old
argument, though the last two sentences are pregnant
with future issue. But Plotinus goes farther, and this
is the novel and the important part of the passage.



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 139

"So, too, a man in so far as he, as a part, is an
individual, is not the whole man. But if anywhere
among the single parts we find something which is
not itself a part, it is this principle which makes of
them a whole. Now we ought not to ask that a
particular man, qua individual, should be perfect to
the highest pitch of virtue. For in that case he would
be no longer a part, but the whole. To be sure, the
whole is not jealous of an increase of beauty and
value in the part, since the greater value of the part
makes the whole more beautiful." 1

The sentences I have italicized contain the gist of
the argument. In them we get at last a compara
tively clear and definite view of the thought under
lying the whole Plotinian argument about the
possibility of varieties of perfection. It is, I think
we may safely say, to all practical purposes the same
as Leibnitz s principle of the identity of indiscernibles.

This, plainly, is the true inwardness of his plea for
the several perfections of vovs, ^x 7 ?? an d the universe.



1 iii. 2, 13 (265 B) [vol. i. p. 242, 1. 1 et seq. ; p. 476, 1. 10
et seq.]. e<j> eKdarov fj.ev ovv r&v yivofxevuv act yevuv otic eanv



rbv iroiovvra \6yov, el ris /J.TJ diot eKaarov ovrw yeyovevai
ws TO. ^77 yeyovbra, dtdia Se, ev re voyrois ev re a.l<rdr)Tois del
ret avrd ovra, TrpoaQ^KTiv air&v dyadov wXeiova, d\\ ov rb Sodtv
e/cd(TT(fj eTSoj aura/o/ces riyovnevos, olov T<de, on /JLT] /c^para, ov aKOTroti-
fj-evos, OTL dStivarov fy \6yov /UTJ OVK iri Trdvra \$?v, dXX 8ri ?5ei ev
ry fjifi^ovL ra eXdrTW Kal v T<$ 6\y TO. /*pr) Kai OVK taa Swarbv elvai
?l OVK &V fy ^prj. rb fj,v yap &v(j) irav Travra, TO S /cdra> ov iravTO.
%Ka.ffTov. Kal avdpWTTos 5rj Ka6 offov ptpos eKaaros ov Trds. d 5t TTOV
tv fj.tpeirl Ticrt Kal &\\o n, 8 ov fJ.tpos, TOVT<$ KaKeivo irav. b dy xad
^/caora % TOVTO OVK dTrcuTTjr^oy r^Xetos elvai els dpeTijs &Kpov -ijSr] yap
OVKCT av fdpos. ov /JLTJV ovSe r< 6 Xy rb pepos K0ff/j.r]6ev ets peifrova
dtav e(pe6vr)Tai Kal yap Ka\\iov rb 6 Xov Trotei Kovwdev d^/a pdfrvt.



140 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

We cannot expect of Mind that it should be in all
respects similar to the One, nor of Soul that it should
be completely like Mind, nor yet of the corporeal
universe that it should be the same as the World-
Soul. Were all exact replicas of one another, they
could not be distinguished from one another. The
mind, could it exist qua mind under those circum
stances, would have no possible criterion for telling
them apart, or for that matter, for separating them
in the first place. We could not even arrange them
as triplets or quadruplets, and then confuse them.
We could not say to them, " I know you are four
different entities, but I do not know which is which. "
For the mere separation of them involves space, and
space is precisely a mark of individuation of the
universe, which, were it an exact reproduction of the
intelligible world, it would not possess. To require,
then, that vov shall be a perfect copy of the One, or
the universe of ^v\tj 9 is not only practically, but
logically, to demand that vovs shall be the One, \[/vxrf
vos, and the cosmos \^v\ri ; in other words, it is to
annihilate all four principles as objects of rational
discourse, and to leave only the superunitary, super-
intelligible, superexistential, ineffable, and unindi-
viduated divine Nothingness.

The like holds true of the relation of particulars
to the form or type of the species to which they
belong. If I am to be I, and you you, neither of us
the other, and both of us men and not man, then we
must be unlike both each other and our type in



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 141

some respects. For did you and I both perfectly
embody the type, we should be indiscernible from it,
and hence from one another. There would be no
sufficient reason for distinguishing us or any perfectly
representative particular from it in the first place.
Even individuation and repetition in space would
be out of the question, for reasons already given.
Existence and relations in space are some of the
conditions which make the particular an imperfect
copy of the universal, which is in no one place ; and
hence ex hypothesi they must be absent in a really
complete exemplification. Here again, all possible
criteria for distinction and separation would be
lacking. Each type or species would be like the
Aristotelian God, " ev apa KCU Aoy<> K cu a/n<9/*w," a
particular concrete type, if I may so express it,
exemplified only in itself. Thus there would only be
one lion and one lamb in the world, and they would
be typical ; only one man, and he would be the only
instance of himself.

The argument, however, must seem to us largely
a tour de force, of little practical or metaphysical
significance. This is true so far as those of us
are concerned who have ceased to consecrate types
or to regard the universal as more than an
average, to be avoided as mediocre and not to be
sought as the sovereign good. But in a system
where the universal is not an average of facts, but
a standard of values, not a mere idea, but an ideal,
it is pregnant with significance. For Plotinus it



THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

proves a treacherous weapon. Its cogency is obvious.
If there are to be individual men at all they must be
different from the Platonic Idea of man, just as vovs
must be other than the One, ^vx l other than vovs.
But the Idea of man is also the entelechy or perfection
of man. Hence, if there are individual men, they
must by reason of their individuality fall short of
their ideal nature. We cannot, as Plotinus says,
"expect them qua individual men to be perfect to
the highest pitch of virtue." For the highest pitch
of virtue is found in the ideal humanity alone.

At this point Plotinus is in a quandary. He
has had in mind the notion of varieties of perfection,
and the analogy of the One, vovs, and ^ux4 or f the
various special entelechies or perfections within the
universe, and has argued along that line of thought.
By analogy, each particular will also have its
appropriate and individual nature. It will be as
irrelevant to blame me because I am not you,
as the human species because it is not angelic, or
Mind because it is not the One. But unfortunately
the actual application of the analogy reveals the
sudden paradox that the proper perfection of the
individual man consists, when all is said and done, in
failing to attain it.

The immediate cause of the difficulty is sufficiently
plain. The analogy is improper and breaks down.
One kind of perfection may be different from,
without being better or worse than, another. But a
thing cannot be other than perfect without being






PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL

imperfect. If it is the universal which is complete,
then particularity is a mark of deficiency.

But in another sense the analogy and its applica
tion are relevant. They would be sound enough if
kinds could be held to be at the same time grades of
perfection, and goods could be absolute from one point
of view, and members of a hierarchy from another.
Indeed for a reductio ad absurdum of his attempt
to hold both points of view simultaneously, Plotinus
could have devised no better illustration. He has
shown us in concrete and practical form how things
would work out if we could logically say of a thing
that it was at the same time perfect, but not so perfect
as something else. In that case I might be perfect,
although not so perfect as the Idea of man, just as
i/svxrf is perfect though her perfection is not so perfect
as that of her prototype in the intelligible world. I,
like ^x^5 could be justified for being no better than I
am by the plea that I am as good as can be expected
of me. I could no more be required to be perfect to
the highest pitch of virtue than could ^x 7 / be required
to be perfect with the perfection of vovs, or vovs with
that of the One ; for I should then be no longer I, but
the ideal archetype of my species, just as ^v^n would
then be vo?, and i/ovs the One. In other words, I
might be a good John Smith, but a bad man. I
might be perfect from one point of view, imperfect
from another. I might be perfect, but not so
perfect as I might be. Or, you and I could both
be perfect, but at the same time one of us could be



144 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

better than the other, and neither of us so excellent
as human excellence.

The absurdity is patent : also the impropriety
of the analogy. Yet, we must again insist that it is
no more absurd to say that, though I am perfect, my
individual perfection is not so perfect as the highest
pitch of human excellence (and it is this assumption
that underlies Plotinus s justification of the apparent
imperfection of the particular as compared with the
type), than that the perfect horse is not so perfect as
the perfect man, or the perfect man as the perfect
God.

This last statement may well seem the crowning
absurdity. Human, we repeat, is lower than angelic
perfection. It is scarcely necessary, I think, to
review the argument on the other side. Its point
consisted in showing that in a perfect world every
thing would be satisfied with itself and its experience,
and it would occur to nothing to compare itself with
other parts of its world, or one part with another as
better or worse. Only an outside observer could do
that, and would prove himself imperfect by his
ability to make the comparison.

The particular point, however, with which we
are concerned here, is that were such a comparison
possible, and could we logically say, as we persist in
saying, that a thing is perfect after its kind but that
its kind is not so perfect as some other, then we can
with equal right maintain that any individual being,
however deficient he may be in human excellence, is



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 145

perfect with a perfection of his own, though that
perfection is not so perfect as the perfection of
better men or as human perfection in general.
For to grade perfections is, as we have already
pointed out, to set up a universal, or idea, or type,
or standard of perfection which different kinds of
perfection embody to a different degree, precisely
as different particulars of the same species variously
approximate to the same form. What holds true of
the relations in the one case holds equally true of
them in the other. If a so-called kind of perfection
can be called perfect, and yet not most perfect (the
tautology is deliberate), then a thing can be called
perfect and yet fall short of its proper perfection.
In fine, Plotinus would seem to have exposed the
untenability of his own position, and to have demon
strated conclusively what he most wished to avoid,
to wit, that grades of perfection are merely euphemistic
terms for degrees of imperfection.

I have, as it may seem, insisted on this point
to undue and fruitless length. But it is important,
because it so clearly betrays the paradox which is
fundamental throughout the Plotinian theodicy.
The grounds for this particular and flagrant instance
we may naturally find in the conflict of the two
points of view. Unless Plotinus could justify the
existence of the individual qua individual, he was
committed to mysticism. Kinds of perfection must
inevitably be revealed in their true light as grades of
imperfection. If I am to be blamed for not being



146 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS



an ideal man, vovs and ^vyji and the world are
equally to be blamed for not being the One. But
this, as we have seen, Plotinus could not allow.

On the other hand, unless perfections could be
arranged in a hierarchy, he was committed to
naturalism. This is indeed the implication of his
argument as it stands. If I am never to be re
buked for not being other than myself, it can only
be on the ground that I am at every moment of
my existence a perfect example of myself: that is a
perfect natural fact. But this extreme tolerance,
again, was impossible.

A third alternative indeed offers itself. It
might well occur to us to solve the difficulty in
the following way. We might suppose that there
were Ideas not only of species, but of individuals.
It is no more to be expected, we might say, that all
perfect men, than that all perfect natures should
be identical. We do not demand of the equine en-
telechy that it should be the same as the human,
nor yet of the human that it should be the same as
the angelic. Why, then, should you and I, if we
attained our proper perfections, melt together in an
identity of indiscernibles ? Why should you and I
not have each our peculiar entelechies ? Then, in
truth, it could not be required of either of us that
we should be perfect to the height of virtue, in the
sense of each individual including in his own nature
the nature of all others. That I had not the
peculiar virtues of all other men would be nothing



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 147

against me. I could only be asked to be my ideal
self.

It is all the more astonishing that Plotinus did
not avail himself of this promising via media, as
he maintains the doctrine of Ideas of individuals,
and devotes a short book to discussing and proving
that the intelligible world contains not only the
type of man, but the entelechies of particular men
But it seems never to have occurred to him to apply
the doctrine to this special point. It would not, to
be sure, have rid him of the difficulty. His purpose
was to prove that the world actually embodied
perfection, and was, as it stood, a perfect world. A
discrepancy between the ideal and the actual he
could have tolerated no more than could the Stoics.

What defence of his position we find is con
tained in the last sentence of the passage quoted.
" To be sure, the whole is not envious of an increase
of beauty and value in the part, for the greater
value of the part makes the whole more beautiful. 1
Here Plotinus would seem to be to some extent
conscious of the anarchistic ethical implications of
his doctrine. If I cannot be expected to be as
virtuous as a man might be, there is no reason to
expect me to be more virtuous than I am. Good
or bad, I am enacting my proper self. It is ap
parently to guard against this implication, used
later, curiously enough, in justification of moral evil,
that the statement is made. Although, it declares,
we are justified in not being so virtuous as man



148 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

might be, we must strive to be more virtuous than
we are.

The argument has a modern ring. In fact,
Plotinus is here face to face with the same difficulty
as confronts the absolutist of to-day. The question
for both is this : How give any real significance and
dignity to moral aspiration and effort in a world
already in its essence complete and perfect ? For if
the world be already a completed fact, if it is and
ever has been grasped as a perfect whole sub specie
aeternitatis, what is the use of our trying to improve
it ? Whatever we do, we cannot make it better, or,
for that matter, worse. We cannot change its value
one whit in God s eyes, since that value was fixed
before time was. I cannot detract from the perfec
tion of the absolute by my vice, as I cannot add to it
by my virtue. For the Absolute is perfect. All our
activities, then, irrespective of their moral signifi
cance, are performed ad majorem or rather ad
maximam Dei gloriam.

Both systems, too, meet the difficulty in the same
way. Although the Absolute is perfect, it is better
that I should act as if it were not. Nay, it is part
of its perfection that I should regard it as imperfect.
That I seek to improve it is precisely one of the
reasons why it is incapable of improvement. Con
versely, if I were satisfied with it as I found it, it
would be really a most unsatisfactory affair. In like
manner Plotinus assures us that though we are really
justified in falling short of what human virtue can



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 149

be, we must not realize that fact. We must press
on towards the height of perfection, though we are
perfect as we are. If we took Plotinus at his word
that we are perfect, we should be imperfect. Though
the type be already in all ways excellent, we should
seek to add to that excellence by greater virtue in
ourselves.

Such statements, as it seems to me, are only saved
from complete absurdity by a latent naturalism. For
all practical purposes of thought and action, ethical
monism divorces the perfection of the universe from
the moral ideal. A natural perfection is indeed
neither made nor marred by the moral character
of our actions. It is equally expressed in, and
equally indifferent to, good and evil. On the other
hand, if the world be already perfect in the natural
istic sense of the word, it is not thereby rendered
incapable of moral improvement. If a morally evil
world may be a perfect natural fact, a morally good
world is none the less so. By thus distinguishing
between the uses of the term, it can be logically
held that the world is already as good as it can be,
but that our moral effort can make it much better,
or that although I as I am, and the human type as
it is, are perfect facts in a perfect system of facts, I
am not bound on a futile errand in seeking to adorn
myself with greater righteousness, and am even
benefiting mankind by my increase of virtue.

The error comes in seeking to amalgamate the
moral with the natural meaning, and to find the



150 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

ethical ideal embodied in Reality as it is. The
result is twofold. The ethical ideal is emptied of
its ideality, and ethical action is stultified. God is
degraded from a vision of what ought to be to a
fictitious justification of what is. And in a universe
completely expressive of his will, our efforts to make
anything better are only saved from blasphemy by
their irrationality and impotence.

As regards the third symptom of physical evil,
the conflict of entelechies or perfections among them
selves, I confess myself somewhat in doubt. It is
hard to see whether or no the point really occurred to
Plotinus. But there is a passage at the beginning of
the supplementary book on Providence, dealing with
the conflict of particulars, which suggests, if not
that he had the point in mind, at least a possible
method of dealing with it.

" Souls," he says, " and their works are harmoni
ously related, in that unity results from them even
though they be opposites. The reason for this is
that all things proceed from unity and come together
in unity by a natural necessity. So, though differ
ences and antitheses come into being, they are
nevertheless synthesized in a single system because of
their origin in the One. For just as particular
animals, say horses, are included in a single genus
although they war with each other and bite and
quarrel and rage in jealous anger, so other genera
are likewise units. This is true also of man.
Again, all these types can be reduced to unity



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 151

under the genus animal. 1 The non-animals too
can be arranged according to type, and, further,
all these types can be included in the one genus,
being, and then reduced still farther to the source
of being.

" Furthermore, take the source of being as a start
ing point, and descend by a process of analysis and
see how the One, by virtue of being prior to all things,
and at the same time comprehending them all in an
ordered unity, spreads itself out and is divided in
such wise that it is a multiple living being in which
each part does what is appropriate to its particular
nature, although it also has its place in the whole.
Thus fire burns, and the horse does what is appro
priate for a horse to do. Each man also does what
comes natural to him, and different men do different
things. And from their natures follow both their
works and their lives, whether good or evil." l

This argument would seem to find the logical
opposition of contraries symptomatic of evil, and to
endeavour to solve it in true Hegelian manner by
uniting thesis and antithesis in a higher synthesis.
It is, however, irrelevant. Subsumption is not
reconciliation. Logical consistency is no guarantee
of perfection. A perfect world, it is true, would have
to be an intelligible world, but an intelligible world is
not necessarily perfect. Let us suppose for the sake
of argument that a thoroughly logical and consistent
world could contain both a heaven and a hell. This
1 iii. 3, 1 (271 F) [vol. i. p. 251, 1. 22 et seq.].



152 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

is assumed by many. In fact God s final and perfect
world is largely held to be heaven and hell and nothing
more. But could a world which contained a hell be
properly called perfect ? Not, it seems to me, without
distorting the meaning of the term. To the perfect
all things must be perfect. But a heaven that was
conscious of the existence and significance of hell,
and still found its empyrean unclouded, would do
violence to all noble human sentiment. Its perfection
would be alien to every moral aspiration and ideal.
It would be the devil s heaven and no one else s. On
the other hand a hell that should be satisfied with
itself, or could by any persuasion be brought to see
itself as contributory to the perfection of the world
of which it formed a part, would not be hell. For
the essence of hell is to feel itself hopelessly deficient
in, and at variance with, the Good. Thus a logically
consistent world might, but a perfect world could
not, contain a hell. ^

We need not trespass upon eschatological fields,
however, to illustrate our point. Our own world is
an excellent example, We may, if we like, say that
our world is a logical and coherent system, dismissing
apparent irrationalities as points incompletely under
stood. But that assumption does not make the
world much more satisfactory from the point of view
of the total human purpose. We take, to be sure,
an interest in understanding the universe, and the
fulfilment of that interest would be a factor in human
perfection. But the interest is after all proximate



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 153

and not ultimate. We seek to understand our world
in order that we may live in it more securely and
happily ; though, on the other hand, since we are
rational creatures, we cannot, quite apart from the
results of such scientific comprehension, live perfectly
happily in a world which is not completely under
stood. We are, however, possessed of more than the
scientific and logical interest, and hence its satisfaction
need not imply that of the whole will. As matters
stand, it does not. The logical character of the
world would become synonymous with its perfection,
only if we became purely intellectual beings with no
other demand upon our world than that of logical self-
consistency. But the normal human being is not
contented with merely accounting for Evil. His
purpose is to be rid of it. And the perfect world
for him is not one in which sin and suffering have
been explained, but from which they have been
banished. On this score we may disallow the
Plotinian argument. And as it in no wise pacifies
the practical conflict of concepts, so it in no wise
palliates that actual conflict of particulars in the
world, to which we now turn.

"It is thus," Plotinus tells us, referring to the
argument just sketched and criticized, " that the case
stands with particulars regarded in themselves. But,""
he continues, " the interweaving of these particular
things which have come and are ever coming into
being might be a matter for consideration and per
plexity, seeing *hat the other animals devour one



154 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

another, and that men set upon one another, and
that there is continual warfare without cease or
respite. The difficulty is especially great, if it is
Reason that has brought about such a condition of
things and this condition is to be called good. For
it is no longer of any use for the defenders of this
doctrine to argue that things are as good as they can
be, that Matter is the reason for their inferiority, and
that Evil cannot be destroyed even were it advisable
that it should be ; that things are good as they are
and that the Matter present does not dominate them,
but was provided that things might be as they are,
or rather that itself might be what it is, by virtue of
Reason. Reason is the first principle, Reason is all
things ; all that has come into being in accordance
with Reason, and has been set in order by Reason
after its birth, must be in all respects rational.
What, then, is the necessity of this implacable war
among animals, and among men ? We reply : That
animals should devour one another is necessary, for
it is the mutual punishment exacted from living
beings who, even if they were not killed, could not
live for ever. If, then, at the time appointed
for their death they depart in such a way as
to benefit other creatures, why grudge it ? What
matters it if, when consumed, they are born as other
forms of life ? In the same way, on the stage, the
murdered actor changes his part, and taking another s
mask, again comes upon the scene, for he has not
been really dead at all. If death in this world be a



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 155

change of body, like the change of costume on the
stage, or even if it be a complete abandonment of
the body, as an actor who goes off the stage alto
gether and never comes back later to enact his part,
what is there terrible in such a transformation of living
beings into one another ? It is surely much better
than that they should never have come into being in
the beginning. In that case there would be in the
world no life at all and no ability to communicate it
to others. But, things being as they are, there is an
abundance of life in the universe which creates all
things and varies the fashion of their existences;
nor can it forbear to produce beautiful and comely
objects living playthings, as it were. 1 1

1 iii. 2, 15 (265 r) [vol. i. p. 242, 1. 30 et seq.]. 15. ret tfv
<&v e /cacrra avra <j) eavT&v Oewpo^^eva oiJrcos i) crv/j,Tr\oKr) d TJ
TOVTWV yevvrfd^vTUv /ecu del yevvu^vuiv %x L ^ v T V fVtcrTacrw /cat
diroplav Kara re TT\V d\\7j\o<payiav TU>V ctXAwf q>(s)i> Kal rets avBp&Truv
et s dXX^Xous eVttfeVets, /ecu on 7r6Xeyitos del Kal of> /u^Trore iravXav ov8
Xd/S?/, /cat ^.dXicrra et Xo7os ireTroirjKev ourws



e i, ws /caXws /card rb SVV&TOV ^%et [/cat] alrta v\-rj OVTUS ex^vrwv,
cos e"Xa,TT6j>cos ^X iv } Ka ^- ^ v Svvarov TO. /ca/cd diroX^crda.i, etVep ourws
( d KaXws OVTU, /cat oi>x h ^ 7rapeXt?oi}cra Kparel, dXXd
?, ivo. OVTU, fjt.a\\oi> 8e rj /cat avrrj atrt ct X67oy oi/rws. apx^
ofiv \6yos Kal TrdvTa \6yos /cat rd yivofieva /car ai/rcV /cat ffwrarro/JLeva
eirl rrj yv<ret irdvrus ourws. ris o$v i] TOV iro\fj.ov rou d/CT/piy/crou iv
fyots /cat v dvdp&rrois dvdyKr) ; T) d\\i]\o(j)aylai fitv d^ay/catai,
d//,ot^3ai tyuv oDcrat ov dwafj^vuv, ov8 et TIS /J.TJ KTivvtioi avrd, OVTW
fitveiv et s <xe. et 5e ev y XP^V ^ direXdelv oi/rcos aTreXt^eti e"5et, cus
ctXXots yev<r6ai, xpetav Trap avT&v, TI <pdoveiv ^5et / rt 5 et fipudevra
&\\a ^0i5ero / olov et eVi ffKrjvrjs r&v viroKpir&v 6 Trefavev/j.ti os
dXXa^d/xej os TO cr^^yLta di aXa^ibj TrdXt^ elcrloi &\\o TrpdcruTrov, dXX
ov r^dvrfKev dX^t^cDs oSros- et o$v Kal TO aTrodavew d\\ayri eVrt
crt6ywaros, wcrTre/o fodijTos ^/cet, >) Kal TravreXrjs dTroc^ecns crt6/iaros,
<*>cr7rep ^/cet ?|o5os ^/c TT^S cr/c^^s Traj reXrjs OVTTOTC et s vaTepov ird\iv
ff^oi Tos evayuviffaadai, r( av 8etv6i> ettj rj TotavTrj r&v tyuv ets &\\Tj\a



156 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

So much for Plotinus s treatment of the more
general indications of physical evil. As we pre
dicted, it shows evidence of a rather broader and
more generous view of the problem than do many
theodicies. It seems to some extent to get beyond
the violence done to human interests and feelings,
and to take note of possible cosmic damage. But at
the same time it is disappointing. It fails to touch
what is to us the crux of the question, namely, the
sufferings of other sentient creatures than ourselves.
Plotinus s answer, it is true, would probably have
been ready enough had the point been pressed upon
him. He would have used the same argument which
we habitually use to excuse animal suffering, and to
rob the spectacle of human pain of its sting. We
must not judge by appearances, he would say. As
children weep and wail for little cause, so human
evidences of pain certainly, and animal probably, are
out of all proportion to the real evil suffered. 1

We have now done, for the time being, with the
Plotinian discussion of the more general aspects of
physical evil. Its predominant tone is naturalistic,
or, it would perhaps be better to say, Stoic, if indeed
such a distinction implies any essential difference.
The warning, indeed, should be repeated that the
arguments we have followed do not represent



fj.eTa(3o\T] TroXi) fieXrluv o$aa TOV ^5^ rty ap^v avra yevtadcu ;
e/ceh/ws pkv yap ept)fj.la fw?}s /cat rijs tv #XXy ouV^s" d5 vva^La vvv 8k
TroXXTj o5(ra ev T<$ Travrl ^WTJ iravra Trotet /cat 7rot/cXXet & ry ^TJV Kal
oik dj^xerat ^ Troiovffa del /caXa, /cat eveidrj &VTO. Traiyvia.
1 iii. 2, 15 (267 B) [vol. i. p. 245 top].



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 157

Plotinus s final word. All of them, as well as what
Stoic reasonings we have yet to trace, are qualified
in the end in such a way as to avoid many of the
objections to the Stoic position.

We turn now to the immediate bearings of
physical evil upon human life. Here the first point
in the Plotinian refutation which we note, is
thoroughly Stoic in character. It is tantamount
to the Stoic denial that physical evil exists, at any
rate so far as the wise and virtuous are concerned.
Using an analogy already employed by Chrysippus
and Marcus Aurelius, and in words which the
great Emperor might have written himself, he
writes : " We must regard murders and all manners
of death and the wastings and sackings of cities
as we should regard them upon the stage of a
theatre ; that is, we must look upon them all as a
change of form and a shifting of scenes, as tears and
lamentations merely acted. For in the world as on
the stage, in every event of life, it is not the inner
soul, but the outer shadow of man that laments and
weeps and plays its many parts, with the whole earth
for stage, and the scenes laid in many places. For
such emotions belong to the man who knows only
how to live the lower and the outward life, and is
ignorant that in his tears and his seriousness alike
he is but playing. Only the serious man must be
serious in serious things; the other man is a mere
trifler. They who have no conception of real serious
ness take trifles seriously, and are triflers themselves.



158 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

If a [serious] man join in their trifling and share their
experience, let him reflect that he has fallen into a
children s game, and laid aside his true role. Even
if Socrates plays, it is the outer Socrates that does
so. One must also remember that one should not
take weeping and tears as witnesses to the existence
of evil, since children also weep and wail over what
is not evil." l

If we analyse this description of 6 o-TrovScuos, the
" serious " or " moral " man, and connect it with the
rest of Plotinus s teaching, we shall find the old
conflict between the Stoic arid the mystic tendencies
of his thought latent within it. Yet, at the same
time, nothing could better illustrate both the points
of similarity of the two types and the identity of
the metaphysical implications of the two systems, as
far as practical effects upon conduct are concerned.
Both the true Stoic and the true mystic are agreed

1 iii. 2, 15 (266 end) [vol. i. p. 244, 1. 14 et seq.]. &<nrep de
tiri TUV Qearpuv rais o-Krjvais, ovru XPV Kal roi>s (p6vovs Beacrdai Kal
Trdvras Qavarovs Kal Tro\ewv dXwcrets Kal apTrayds, /jieTa6e<riS Travra
Kal /ierao-x^yuar/creis Kal dpfyuv Kal ol/muyuv viroKplaeu. Kal yap
evravda eirl TUV ev T /3ty fKavTuv ou% i] evSov ^VXTI, d\\ f i] w
avdp&irov ffKta Kal ot/^wfet Kal odtiperai Kal travra TTOICI tv ffKfjvrf ry
6X77 7^ 7roXXa%ou <TKr]i>as iro^ffa^iv^v. rotaura yap fyya avdpuirov
ra Kara Kal ra ^w /j.6va STJV ei 56ros Kal tv daKpvocs Kal a-Trovdalois 6n
Traifav tariv yyvoyKbros, fnovij) yap ry (nrovSaty (nrovdaffTtov tv
<nrov5alois Tots pyois, 6 d a\\os avOpuTros iralyviov. (nrovdd^eTat
8 Kal ra iratyvia TOLS (Tirovddfeiv oi)/c et 56crt Kal aurots o8<rt, Traiyviois.
el 84 ris (rv/j.Tratfav ai;rois [o-?roi;5atos] ra roiavra irddoi, taru irapa-
ireo-uv Traiduv Traidiy, rb irepl avrbv airodt^evos irptxru-jrov. el Se dy
Kal iralfri Sw/cpdr^s, Travel ry efa Sw/cpdrei. Set 5^ KaKeivo
evQvuetffdai, tbs ov del re/c^pta rov KaKa elvai rb SaKptieiv Kal dprjvetv
TL6e<r6ai, 6 ri drj Kal TrcuSes ^?ri ov KaKois Kal daKpvovai Kal odvpovrai.



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 159

that the ordinary standard of mundane values is
false. Both have a profound sense of the vanity of
life. Both teach that the conditions of virtue and
proper human excellence are independent of outer
events, and that therefore human happiness is in
different to them. Both believe that the true good
is attainable only by a process of curtailment and
concentration in which the individual withdraws
from the world and from all human ties to live more
intensely within himself.

But the one differs profoundly from the other in
the quality of the equanimity with which he bears
the assault of outer events. The Stoic regards them
as having an equal right with himself to be, and to
be what they are as he is what he is, and as
possessing an intrinsic perfection of their own no
less appropriate and necessary to the perfection of
the world -system than is his proper nature. The
mystic, on the other hand, regards them with the
indifference which their essential worthlessness and
unreality deserve. The mystic, in short, finds that the
world is wholly evil, the Stoic that it is entirely good.
The one would deny, mortify, and purge it out of
existence ; the other submits, acquiesces, even cheer
fully accepts it. The one seeks his final happiness
in a radical and drastic reform of his experience, the
other in rendering himself insensible to his experience
as it is. The one seeks within himself to make true
what he finds to be good, the other to make good
what he finds to be true.



160 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

In the Plotinian " seriousness " are combined the
essential features of both these attitudes. Had one
asked Plotinus his opinion of this stage- world upon
which we are called to play a part, he would have
replied like the Stoics that it is a perfect world. The
scenery, the setting, the other actors, the lines, the
gestures, are perfect after their several kinds, and
equally appropriate to the nature of the play. More,
the play is not a farce, but a serious and rational
affair. Regarded in its entirety, it has all the marks
of an intelligible whole, embodying as it does a
rational plan and idea. That is, the Stoic vision sub
specie aeternitatis has its metaphysical counterpart
in the Plotinian vovs.

But the " serious man " would have qualified his
statement in mystic fashion. This world is perfect
as a world, but its perfection is an inferior kind of
perfection. No possible attitude towards it can
bring final happiness. It is only by excluding it
from vision of any sort, sub specie aeternitatis no less
than temporis, and by passing into another altogether
new and ineffable sphere of experience, that the
sovereign good of human life can be found.

But with both the mystic and the Stoic he would
agree in regarding the world of daily human activities
as something in which his real inner self is not impli
cated. There is nothing there that vitally concerns
it ; nothing which can increase its excellence or its
happiness ; nothing which can mar or take from it
its proper good. Practically such a theory had to



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 161

make concession to facts, just as the Stoics had to
relax their indifference to outer events, and admit
that some external conditions were preferable to
others, and just as the mystic has to make the
practice of ordinary morality a preliminary step
towards the enjoyment of the Beatific Vision. But
theoretically the two attitudes were full of danger,
and of their danger Plotinus was aware.

Curiously enough, different as the attitudes of
the mystic and the Stoic would seem, the peril they
involved was precisely the same. By denying the
relevancy of outer actions to the inner self, both
logically encouraged an antinomianism in practice
subversive of all morals. And to this practical sub
version their metaphysical theories gave an equal
and an identical sanction. For an unmitigated
optimism with regard to our world is no less
paralysing to moral action than unmitigated
pessimism. Indeed, absolute optimism is, in all
except name, absolute pessimism. A world, I mean,
which is absolutely good is as incapable of im
provement as if it were absolutely evil : and moral
life has real value only in a world where there is
real room for improvement.

Indeed it is more optimistic to act on the belief
that the world is wholly evil than that it is wholly good.
Both theories encourage an equally apathetic and
negative attitude towards outer events, but pessimistic
mysticism leaves a hope where absolute optimism
leaves none. The mystic by retiring within himself



M



162 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

may find something better than the world, the
optimist nothing. The mystic may be as hopefully
rebellious as the optimist must be hopelessly resigned.
Like the Stoic, the unmitigated optimist must find
all things good. They are good in the sight of the
Absolute or of God. Since the world cannot be
bettered, it is folly to try to reform it, or even to
dream of anything better ; and the height of folly is
to hope, like the mystic, to escape from it altogether
by forcing the dream to come true within one s self.

In a mechanical world, too, there is real room for
improvement. Its metaphysical reality is calculable,
and though a rigid natural system, may be manipu
lated to further our interests. There is no pre
sumption in saying of such a world that we have
made it better, for its only values are those which
it has for us, and it holds no opinions of itself that
conflict with the judgments we pass upon it.

But to endow the universe with a quasi-human
moral perfection, with a self-satisfaction as it were,
assimilating to itself the evil and the foul, as well as
the fair and good, is to make a Frankenstein s monster
of the mechanism. It is merely, one might say, to
present naturalism under the form of a monstrous
and unworthy myth, allegorizing the irrelevance to
natural perfection of good as well as evil, as a kind
of organic absorption by natural perfection of evil
as well as good. Had we to act upon the assumption
of such a cosmic consecration of Evil, action would be
invalidated. The universe would not be indifferent



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 163

to Evil, but morally no worse, perhaps even better
for our sins and imperfections. Moral distinctions
would lose all moral sanction, since good and evil
would be regarded not as deriving their validity from
the human interests to which they were relative, but
from the Absolute, and yet in the Absolute they
would be travestied, and transformed, and confounded
past all possibility of distinguishing between them.

To act morally, then, is to act as if no such thing
as the Absolute of ethical monism existed. If one
still hold to it theoretically, it is by a sort of see
ing through one s self and unconsciously taking one s
stand upon the real sanction of action which it
conceals. The myth is transparent to practical
if not to theoretic reason, and is found to
imply beneath the allegorical form in which it is
presented no more than the ordinary innocent
naturalism. An Absolute to whose perfection evil
and imperfection are necessary is quite as irrelevant
to the moral ideal as a mechanical world which is
indifferent to them. The one is merely a melo
dramatic masking of the other.

In short, however we may gloss over the fact
with romantic phrases, it is practically a naturalistic
perfection (a perfection, that is, which we always
treat as naturalistic) which we attribute to the
Absolute. We deal with it precisely as we deal with
a mechanical excellence. We neglect its bearing
upon moral conduct. If we extol it at one moment
in a mood of pious ecstasy, we recant at the next



164 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

by acting as if we did not believe what we said,
nay, by having so to act as if we would prove our
piety.

I have put in modern terms what seem to me to
be the dangers latent in the Stoic and mystic
positions ; dangers, I must insist, which are also
involved in all modern systems of ethical monism.
The case might be summed up in terms of Plotinus s
dramatic simile, as follows : As the outer life of
man is a mere role, an affectation as it were,
which neither expresses nor reacts upon his real
inner self, so the whole world of appearance
becomes a mere affectation of the Absolute, the
distinctions and values of which have no ultimate
significance in Reality. The sphere of practical
moral aspirations and ideas is merely "make believe"
for the inner selves both of man and of the world.
The actor may be equally unaffected by all the
vicissitudes of his roles, as the dramatist by the
different parts in the play. He may be like the
naturalistic world, which is dispassionately neutral
towards all its events. Or on the other hand,
player and playwright may be profoundly and
passionately interested in all the lines and all the
roles alike, enacting or creating the villain, the
crime, and the suffering with the same zest as the
hero, the saint, virtue, and happiness, and getting
a positive and perfect satisfaction from the play as
a whole, which they call the true happiness of their
real selves. In the same way does the Absolute of



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 165

ethical monism find our evil as potent a factor in its
perfection as our good, passionately interested in
both, positively satisfied in both, yet drawing there
from a satisfaction in the whole result which includes,
but yet is more than, its satisfaction in either factor
alone.

The difficulty with this is that the practical
relation of inner and outer, appearance and reality,
has been reversed. If the validity of moral distinc
tions holds good only of the play or of appearance,
then, so far as the moral life is concerned, it is the
play which is in earnest, and the appearance which
is to all practical purposes the real thing. The
player s part is his moral self, and the nature of that
part is the only index we have to his moral character.
As he delights in the noble lines, and despises the
mean in his part, so is he a noble or a mean character
and man. But if the value of the drama be un
affected by the morality of the persons that figure
in it, that value is non-moral ; if it be the greater
for their vileness, it is immoral.

Plotinus is aware of the perils of his analogy.
" If I am right," he goes on from the last quotation,
"how can there still be vice in the world? And
where shall we find injustice? And where sin?
How is it possible to commit unjust or sinful acts if
everything which has been created is fair and good ?
How could people be miserable if they did not sin or
act unjustly ? And how can we distinguish between
what is in accordance with and what is contrary to



166 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

nature if all that is done is in accordance with
nature ? How, finally, can there be any such thing
as impiety towards the Divine Being, when [creator
and] creature are what they are? It is as though
a poet should make an actor in his play rail and
inveigh against the author of the play himself." l

And again, " By saying that there is no Evil at
all in the universe, we perforce do away with the
good as well, and deny that there is any desirable
end to be attained ; hence we must also deny desire
and repulsion and even thought itself. We desire
the good, and are repelled by the evil, but thought
and judgment have to do with good and evil, and
themselves come under the category of the goods." 5

The answer which Plotinus makes to this objec
tion involves a development in his theodicy for
which we are not yet ready. For the present we
have to turn back and pursue the problem of physical
evil in another of its aspects. Evidently Plotinus

1 iii. 2, 16 (267 B-C) [vol. i. p. 245, 1. 4 et seq.}. 16. dXX et
/caXws TavTa Xeyerat, TTCOS av en TrovrjpLa ; TTOV 5 d5i/a a ; a^apria
8 TTOV ; TrcDs yap eari /caXcDs yt-vo^evuv airdvTUV d5i/cetV ?} a/j.apTaveiv
TOI>S TTOLOvvras ; KaKodai/j,oves d TrtDs, el ^77 a/j-aprdvoLev /*??5 dSt/cotei/ ;
TrcDs S TO, /j.ev Kara (pv<ru>, ra d Trapa <J)V(ri.i>, ^<ro/J,fv elvai TWV yivo-
fj^vwv, airavTWV T&V Spw^vuv Kara tybGiv ovrwv ; TrcDs 5 av /cat 7rp6s
rb delov afftfieid ns efy TOLOIJTOV 6vros TOV [TTOIOVVTOS /cat rou] iroiov-
IJ.evov ; olov et rts v 5pd/u,art \oidopou ^evov TTOLTJTTJS viroKpiTT]i> Trot^aatro
/cat /cararpexo^ra TOV TTOITJTOV TOV dpa/maTOS.

a i. 8, 15 (82 A-B) [vol. i. p. 114, 1. 21 et seq.]. Kanbv 5k et ns
\eyoi TO Trapatrav ev rots oSo"t firj elvai, avdyKt] aury /cat TO dyadbv
dvaipeiv /cat ^5^ 6peKTbv wSev elvai ^ Toivvv ^8 ope&v /i7?5 a5
eKK\WLV nf)$ vbrjcnv i] yap ope^ts a7a0oO, r) 8 ?/c/cXta"ts KaKOV, TJ 6t
v6r)(rts /cat i] <f>povr)<ns dyadov eaTL /cat /ca/coO, /cat avTrj 2v rt T&V
dyadwv.



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 167

could not allow his denial of the reality of physical
evil to apply to the wicked as well as to the just.
Such a denial would nullify any pretence at a moral
government of the world. Sin could not really be
punished, since the instrument of its punishment,
and hence the punishment itself, would not exist
qua evil, and therefore qua punitive. The fires by
which we are supposed to be purged of our dross
would be all light and no heat.

There was also no real contradiction involved in
asserting the existence of Evil for the sinner, and
denying it for the saint. The sinner s sinfulness
consists in his sensitiveness to earthly goods, and
this involves a like sensitiveness to earthly ills, The
saint, indifferent to the one, is out of reach of the
other. Thus the moral government of the world is
not in any way invalidated. Those who are in
sensible to the means employed by the divine justice
are those who stand in no need of correction. On
the other hand, those who deserve chastisement and
correction are de facto sensitive to misfortune and
suffering. The sinner can only harden himself against
the wages of his sin by ceasing to be a sinner ; the
virtuous man can only render himself sensitive to the
means of punishment by making himself liable to
their application. In Plotinus s own words, " poverty
and sickness are nothing to good men, and useful in
the case of evil men." l

1 iii. 2 (258 G) [vol. i. p. 232, 1. 14 et seq.]. -rrevlai 8t Kal v6<roi
rots IAV ayadou ovdev, rots 5 Kai<ols <Tv/j.<f>opa.



168 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

Indeed, looked at in one way, physical evil can
with propriety be said not to exist in the case of the
sinner. That is, it is not evil that it should exist
for the sinner. Given a world in which sin exists,
it is better that it should be followed by physical
evil than not. This is Plotinus s position. Upon
wrong-doing " punishment follows, and it is not
unjust that the sinner should suffer according to his
character. Nor is it to be demanded that they
should be happy who have done nothing worthy of
happiness. The good alone are happy." l

The connection between physical and moral evil,
justified as it is by the moral sentiment that such
a connection should exist, is developed by Plotinus
at some length. In the first place evil-doers are
punished here on earth, both by a deterioration of
character and by suffering. " The first punishment
is that sinners are wolves and wretches ; the second,
that they get what it is advantageous for such men
to suffer. For it is not possible that the wicked
should escape by dying, but their former deeds always
bear logical and natural consequences, according as
they have been good or evil."" 2

1 iii. 2, 3 (258 E) [vol. i. p. 232, 1. 3 et seq.]. eirerai ye ^v
dticr) Kal OVK adtKov roi6vde yevopevov d/c6\ou0a irdffx^f Ty diadtaei,
ovS d-jraLT-riTeov TOIJTOIS rb evdaipoveiv VTrdpxeiv, oh (JLT] etpyaarai

&%ia. 61 5 dyaOol fj,6voi e&dal/j.oi>e$.
iii. 2, 8 (261 E-F) [vol. i. p. 236, 1. 24 et seq.]. rols de raCra

7rpc6r?7 pev dlKr) rb Xikocs elvai Kal KaKodaLfMotnv
elra aurots Kal /cetrai & TraQeiv xP e & v T fc roiotrovs ov yap
tvravQa KaKOts yevofj-tvois airodaveiv, dXXa rots del TrpOTtpois
6 <ra Kara \6yov Kal Qfoiv, x fi pu TOIS X ei P ffi > ro s 5 ^ Apelvoffi rd



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 169

Thus Plotinus also seems to see that for any
complete and satisfactory demonstration of a moral
government of the world, more room is needed than
this world affords. In a single life no complete
and satisfactory connection can be established
between desert and fortune. It is just for this
reason that the apportionment of reward and merit
forms part of the problem of Evil. I do not mean,
however, that the inadequacy of a single life for a
full display of the divine justice is necessarily the
only or even the chief ground of Plotinus^s theory of
immortality. Immortality is implicated in his system
in many other ways. But on whatever grounds it is
established, one of its chief uses lies in the help it
affords toward a solution of the difficulty in question.

"We must not reject the teaching which tells us
not to look always to the present, but also to past
and future epochs, and to see how with respect to
them also merit is justly rewarded. We shall see, for
instance, how former masters are changed to slaves if
they have been bad masters, and how such a change
profits them ; how they who have used their money
ill become poor, and how to good men poverty is not
profitless; how they who have slain unjustly are
themselves slain, and how this is a crime on the
part of the murderer, yet a just punishment for the
victim ; and how, finally, he who is to suffer is
brought into contact with him who is ready to
perform what it is right that the other should under
go. Let no one believe that a man is a slave or



170 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

taken prisoner by chance, or that he suffers bodily
injury for no reason. On the contrary, he once did
what now he suffers. He who killed his mother,
becomes a woman and is killed by his child, and he
who has violated a woman will become a woman in
order to be violated. From this is derived the holy
name Adrasteia, for this disposition of things is in
truth not to be escaped ; truly it is justice and
wondrous wisdom." l

There is nothing that need detain us long in this
passage. The sense is obvious enough. We are
dealing with a theory of transmigration and of
Karma or moral causality of a common enough type.
We have been born before, we shall be t)orn again.
We are what we are, suffer what we do, because of
what we have been and performed in past existences,
and again shall reap the fruits of past and present
combined in our next reincarnation. In this cycle
of birth and death we are bound fast till we shall

1 iii. 2, 13 (264 c) [vol. i. p. 240, 1. 24 et seq.]. Cf. iii. 3, 5
(274 F) [vol. i. p. 256, 1. 13 et seq.]. iv. 8, 5 (473 C-D) [vol. i.
p. 148, 1. 30 et seq.]. 13. eird ovS tKelvov dwo^rfov rbv \6yov,
os ov Trpbs TO Trapbv eKaarore <pt)<n pxt-jreiv, d\\d Trpos rds irpbvdev
7rept65ous /ecu ad rb ^\\ov, ware tKeWev rdrreiv rrjv d^lav Kal /zercm-
Qivo.i K decnror&v r&v irpbvdev 8ov\ovs TTOIOVVTCL, el ty&ovro Aca/cot
5ecr7r6rcu, Kal 6n <njfj,<f>opoi> avTots OVTOJ, Kal el /ca/ctDs ^p-t]ffa.vro TrAoi/ry
Tr^T/ras, /cat [on] dyadois OVK a<rvfMJ>opoi> irtv-rjcnv elvai, Kal <povev-
(raz/ras dkws <}>oi>ev6r)vai dSkws fi^v r$ Troi^ffavTi, avrf 5^ 5i/caiws
r Tra66vTi, Kal rbv Trei(r6fj.evov crwayayelv et j TO avro T( eTrirydeib}
7roiTJ<rai, a Tradeiv txpfy eKtivov. JULTJ yap drj Kara ffwrvx^v 5ov\ov
/j.r)d aixfJ-dXwTOv ws ri>xe fj.rjd vppKrdfjvai ets (rw/xa eiKrj, dXXa fy
Trore raOra Troi^tras, a vvv ten iracrxuv Kal fJurjTtpa rts dj/eXwv virb
Traidbs dvaipeOrjaeTai yevd/j-evos yvvf], Kal (Siaffafj-evos yvvawa [yvvy]
Zerai, iva fiiac-dy. Wev Kal 6eta (pr/fJirj Adpaareia atiTrj yap 97
Stdra^is AS/jdcrreta 6^rws Kal QVTUS A//CT; /cai <ro0ia



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 171

have purified ourselves sufficiently to transcend it in
ineffable union with the One. Plotinus, also, would
appear to believe in purgatorial states of punishment
between lives for such souls as are especially vicious.
Retribution for the sins committed in the body, he
tells us, is ordinarily " to fall into other bodies and
rise again after no long time according to righteous
judgment. That this judgment is according to
divine law is made plain by the word judgment.
But the immoderate kinds of evil demand a heavier
punishment administered by avenging daemons." 1
But there is no insistence upon the horrors of hell
like that which we find, for example, in Plutarch.

One or two further points may be noted in pass
ing. In the first place there is what I will call
the practice by the universe of a strict economy in
vice. The world is so organized that the crimes of
the wicked are not haphazard and wasted, but are
impressed into the service of the divine justice.
The victims of such crimes are not innocent, but
deserve the violence to which they fall a prey. The
murderer murders one who deserves to be killed,
the thief robs one who is justly robbed of his gains.

At the same time in the qualification aSi/cws /*ci/
TW 7TOLY)(ravTi, avrw Se StKauus TW TraOovri, Plotinus

1 iv. 8, 5 (473 C-D) [vol. ii. p. 149, 1. 7 et seq.}. ds <rc6/xara
&\\a dvvai /ecu edrrov [eavadvvaL~\ <fc Kplffeus TTJS /car d^lav 5 By fleecy
>6/J,ei>ov 5ta rou TTJS Kpiveus 6v6 j uaros drj\ovrat r6 d r?)s /ca/ctas
eT5os /xe^oj/os Kal rrjs S//CTJS I^IOJTCU tiriffraffiq. rivvvptvuv



2 iii. 2, 13 (264 D) [vol. i. p. 240, 1. 32 et seq.}.



172 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

avoids the objection that the criminal is justified
since crime turns out to be just punishment. If
Clytemnestra shall seek to exculpate herself, on the
plea that she is merely a passive instrument in the
hands of the curse of the house of Atreus visiting
vengeance upon Agamemnon for the sacrifice of
Iphigeneia, Plotinus will reply with the chorus
that though the curse may have assisted at her
deed, yet " who will witness that thou art guiltless
of this crime?" 1 It may indeed have been right
that Agamemnon should pay the penalty he did
for his act, but Clytemnestra was none the less
guilty. Her deed, though becoming part of the
cycle of the avenging "A-ny, was still the evidence
of a sinful character. Nay, even supposing the
divine justice directly to have inspired the deed,
it could have effected its purpose only through the
depravity of a nature open to evil suggestion.
Clytemnestra could only become an accomplice in
the workings of the curse by virtue of her evil
propensities, for which she is responsible, and from
which she cannot be excused ; so in general in the
case of any crime. Though the victim has rendered
himself liable to it, and his suffering is a just retribu
tion, the act is none the less conceived in sin by the
agent, and justly exposes him to a similar penalty,
and so on ad infinitum.

Secondly, we must not lose sight of the fact that
though Plotinus does not develop the subject at any
1 Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 1497-1512.



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 173

length, he does point out that punishment is not
merely vindictive, but remedial. 1 We are punished
for our sins, indeed, but by our punishment we are
purified from them. It is advantageous for us that
we should suffer.

In the third place we may note how the existence
of this law of Karma is made by Plotinus a new
proof for the perfection of the world and of its
providential government. The long passage from
Plotinus last quoted is followed by a few sentences
developing the argument from design as a witness to
the divine goodness; and then is concluded as
follows : " That which changes does not change
nor assume other forms at random, but rather so
as to accord with beauty and as befits the work of
divine powers. Everything divine works according
to its nature, and its nature is what its essence makes
it, and it is its essence which brings into action
whatever is beautiful and just in its powers. For if
beauty and justice are not in its essence, where else
can they be ? "

There is, of course, a logical circle involved. The
moral government of the world necessitates the
assumption of the law of Karma. Karma thus
assumed is then used to prove that there is a moral

1 iv. 4, 45 (440) [vol. ii. p. 101, 1. 15].

2 iii. 2, 13 (265) [vol. i. p. 271, 1. 21 et seq.]. /tercm tferat rolvvv
ra (U.erari^uej a OVK eiKrj /^eraTtd^eva ovd a\\a (r%?7/iara \a/m^dvovTa,
aAV cos Ka\6v, Kal ws Trp^TTOi. ai> dwa/JLeat Qeiais troieiv. iroiei yap
jrav r6 deiov tus we^vKe ir<f)VKe 5 Kara TTJV avrov ovffiav oixria de
afirov, ^ rb KO\OV iv rats frepyeiais avTov Kal TO oiKaiov <rvveK(pepci.
el yap e fj.T] K e? raura TTOU av etrj ;



174 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

government of the world. But the circle is harm-

v less since both members are proved otherwise as well.

Finally, we must remark that Plotinus faces and

tries to solve a difficulty of considerable importance

connected with the eschatology of the question.

I Given each soul as having its proper determining

I and individualizing Idea or Form laid up in the

/ immutable archetypal world of vov<$ ; given, moreover,

each soul as essentially indifferent to and unaffected

by outer events and actions, both of its own and

of others, how can it change in such a way as the

doctrine of Karma and transmigration demands ?

How can it change at all ?

To follow Plotinus in his treatment of this
difficulty will involve to some extent anticipation of
further discussion, notably that of the part played by
Matter in his system. Novs, he tells us, is not present
in animals at all, and unequally so in different men.
It is only present in such natures as are conformable
to it. The natures that are more conformable to
it are obviously the good natures. That is, the
good natures are those that most nearly realize
their own Ideas, and rise into the intelligible world.
Conversely, evil or imperfection will be a deficiency
in the principle of vow. In animals, which are
purely natural beings, this deficiency is merely a
normal imperfection of their natures. But in man,
who is conscious of a rational vocation, this defect
is a vice.

The change, then, for better or worse involved in



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 175

moral action and expressed by fortune and character
in this world and the next, will be a change in the
amount of vovs present. 1 But for this to vary,
another principle must be present. "Whether our
constitution is such that we fall, as it were, into a
turbulent sea of passion, or whether our desires gain
the mastery, the cause of this must be attributed to
the substratum that lies within us. At first sight it
will seem as if this lay not so much in (seminal)
Reason as in Matter, and as if Matter and not
Reason were supreme, and the substratum, after
receiving its Form, came after it. But it is rather
Reason and what has come into being out of
and in accordance with Reason that is the original
substratum. Hence Matter will not be supreme,
and Form merely secondary. One might then refer
a character of any sort to a former life, as though
Reason had become feeble when compared with
the prior Reason which produced it, just as the
soul, after growing faint, may shine forth brightly
in a subsequent life. We must also remark that
(seminal) Reason contains within itself the principle
of Matter, which it will work up for itself, having
fashioned it in accordance with itself, or having
found it consonant to itself. Thus the seminal
reason of an ox is found only in the matter of an
ox. Hence, [Plato] says, the soul may enter into
other animals, and may be altered and its reason

1 This discussion is founded on iii. 3, 4 (273 D) [vol. i,
p. 254, 1. 15



176 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

changed, so that a soul which was once a man may
become an ox. Wherefore there is justly an inferior
seminal reason/* ]

This, it must be admitted, is very obscure. But
may we not elucidate it somewhat as follows ? Take
the Idea of a man with a view to determining its
content. Man is not a disembodied spirit or a pure
reason, but a rational animal with body, passions,
and parts. The Idea then of him, as every Idea
represented in the phenomenal world, must contain
some account of or reference to the sensible or
phenomenal character of its object. His intelligible
character is the intelligible character of a thing of
sense. This reference of the Idea to the phenomenal
characteristics of its particular, this " spiritual body "
as we may call it, is "the form of the matter" included
within the intelligible form, " which it will work up
for itself, having fashioned it according to itself, or
having found it consonant to itself." That is, " the

1 iii. 3, 4 (274 B) [vol. i. p. 255, 1. 12 etseq.]. efre yap i) avaro.-
ffis TOLavTtj, us olov eis 6o\epbv e / u/3dXXeii , etre ^7ri#i /u cu KpaTOVfftv,
opus dvdyKT] \yeiv fv T< vTroKei^v^ TO atnov elvat. d\\d irp&rov
lAtv 56ei OVK^TL tv T$ \6y(f), dXXd ftaXXov tv rfj v\rj, Kai ij v\i), ovx
6 \6yos KparriffeL, elra TO viroKei^evov ws TreTT\affTai. r) rb viroKeifj-evov
r fl apxH ^0705 ^art KCLI rb K TOV \6yov yevd/mevov KCLI 6v KO.T&. rbv
\6yov ware oi>x "h v\y /fpariycret, elra i) TrXdats. Kal rb roi6v5e elvai
iri TT]V Trporepav ^LOTTJV [d^] dvdyoi rts, olov yivo^vov ex T&V irpo-
repuv d/mvdpou ws Trpbs rbv trpb avrov TOV \6yov olov ^i X^
yevo/mev^, vvrepov ot Kal e/cXd/i^et. /cat 6 X67os 5e
/fa TOV ^-oyov av tv air< TT)S vXrjs, TfV avr< pyd<reTai
Kad avrbv rrjv V\TJV TI a^i^wvov eup&v. ov yap 6 TOV /3oos
r &\\T)s r) /3o6s (JX^s odev Kal ei s ra a\\a fyd <f>t]ffi.v eta-
i olov a\\ys T^S ^VXTJS yevofj-tvys Kal Tepoiu6evTo$ TOV
\6yov, iva ytvrjTai ^vx?) jSoos, ^ irpoTepov rp avOpwTros wtrre /card.
LKIJV 6



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 177

form of matter" is to all intents and purposes the
seminal reason.

But his sensuous side man shares with the animals.
He has animal functions and desires. The Idea, then,
of his animal self will bear a close affinity to animal
entelechies. Again, his empirical character is subject
not merely to the passage of time, but to alterations
in moral significance determined by the quality of the
life he leads. And these alterations in moral signifi
cance will be reflected in the "spiritual body" of
empirical tendencies and characteristics.

This " body " of tendencies as well as the intellig
ible character or form survives death, and forms the
nucleus for the accretion of a new incarnate existence.
It will naturally gather about itself " the matter it
finds consonant to itself." If the empirical character
has been a passably pure medium for the display
of the individual entelechy, its concept will gather
about it the material for a good man and a noble
life. If this chance is improved, the next life will
be still better, and so on, till finally the empirical
character becomes absolutely transparent. Then by
the identity of indiscernibles it becomes fused with
the Idea of the individual. But that Idea has existed
only as the Idea of an individual. Its absorption of
its particular involves its own annihilation and
absorption into the One.

On the other hand, an evil life may so influence
the " Idea of matter " as to make it the nucleus for
an evil character in the next existence. Accord-

N



178 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

ing as one or another passion is indulged or exalted,
the Idea may even be so changed as to find its
significance best expressed in the form of some
animal entelechy in whom the passion is typified.
The glutton may become a pig, the cheat a fox, for
instance.

But at the same time the intelligible character,
the Idea which is struggling to find expression,
remains the same. We say, for example, of a man
that he is a fox, or a pig, or an ox, meaning not that
his essential character qua man is changed, but
merely that his empirical self has so departed from
its proper entelechy that it would be better expressed
in other than human form. Plotinus is really
making metaphysics of our metaphors.

This interpretation I put forward tentatively. It
does not at all free the original passage from latent
difficulties as regards the doctrine of Matter, and the
old puzzle of grades of perfection. But as it stands
it might serve Plotinus s immediate purpose. Change,
Plotinus might point out, is a matter of ~the
empirical character ; but so is reincarnation, and so
is moral life. Very likely he would have used the
same illustration we employed. A man is a man,
even if he has become so bestial that the body of a
pig would be the most suitable expression of his
proclivities.

Having armed himself with the Stoic doctrine
that physical evil does not exist for the good man,
and with the theories of Karma and transmigration,



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 179

Plotinus was in a position to deal with the apparently
unjust apportionment of reward and merit in this
world. But his treatment of the problem is confused.
His beginning is straightforward enough. " It is
rightly said as regards the injustice involved when
the good receive an evil, the evil a good portion, that
nothing is evil for the good man, nothing good for
the evil." A wider question is concerned, however.
The discrimination of the universe is at stake.
" But why," Plotinus continues, " should that which
is contrary to nature happen to the good, and that
which is in accordance with nature to the evil ?
How can it be right that things should be thus
allotted?" Plotinus replies by reiterating the first
point. u If that which is in accordance with nature
brings no addition to the happiness of the good man,
and what is contrary to nature detracts nothing from
the evil in evil men, what difference does it make
which way things are apportioned? It is no more
than if the evil man had a beautiful, the good man
an ugly body.

" But if that were the case," it may be objected,
" what is proper, reasonable, and just, which do not
at present prevail, would prevail and that would be
the work of an excellent providence. But, indeed,
that the wicked should be masters and lords of
cities, and that the virtuous should be slaves would
be in any case an unfitting thing, even supposing
such mastery or slavery contributed nothing to the
attainment of good or evil. As it is, a wicked



180 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

ruler can do the most lawless things. And the
wicked can prevail in wars, and commit all kinds of
shameful acts when they take captives. All such
things raise doubts as to how they can happen if
there be a Providence." l

We should now expect Plotinus to bring Karma
and reincarnation to bear upon the problem. He
might have pointed out that the apparent lack of
discrimination by Nature is in reality a memory of
the past lives of individuals. If things contrary to
nature happen to the good man it is because he has
sinned in past existences. By being good, by utiliz
ing them as occasions for a display of fortitude and
virtue, he can take away their sting and turn them
to his advantage and improvement. The success of
the sinner it would have been harder to justify. But
Plotinus could have pointed again to the retribution
which was to overtake him in a future incarnation.

He reverts, however, to the argument for kinds

1 iii. 2, 6 (259 D) [vol. i. p. 233, 1. 14 et seq.]. 6. TO de Trap
dlav, OTO.V dyaOol /ca/cd ^;aj<ri, 0aOXot 5e Ta fravria, TO fjv \eyeiv ws
oudev KaKov T< dyaQtg ov8 a? T<^ <pav\i[} dya66v opd&s fj^ev \eyeTai
dXXd 5td TL TO. /mev Trapa <pvcnv TOirry, TO, d /card <pv<rii> T< TrovrjpQ ;
TrcDs yap KaXbv veuew ourws ; dXX el TO Kara <f>v(nv ov Trote? irpoffd-fi-
K.t]v Trpbs TO evdai/Aove ii , ov8 a5 TO Trapd <pv<nv d<f)aipet TOV Kaxov TOV
tv <}>av\ois, r( 5ta0^/oet TO oirra>s ^ OUTWS / tbffTrep ov8 t el 6 JJL^V /caXos
TO ffwjma, 6 Se atV%p6s. dXXd TO Trpeirov /cat [TO] dpaXoyoi /cat TO /caT
a^tav tKeivws av Tjv, 6 vvv OVK eaTi irpovoias de dpl<rTr]s eKelvo ty.
Kal fj.r)i> /cat TO oeairoTas elvai /cat apxovTas T&V ir&Kewv TOVS /ca/cous,
TOI)S 5^ ^7rtet/ce?s SouXous elvat, ov TrpeirovTa fy, ovd el Trpo<r6rjKt)i>
/J.r] (f>epei etj d^a^oO /cat /ca/coO KTrjcriv. KatTOi Kal TO, dvojuu!)-
av 7rpdt;eiev apx^v irovr]pbs /cat KpaTovai d ev TroX^ots oi
/cat iravTola ai<rxpa Spuffiv alx/J-aXwTOVs XajSo^Tes. ?rdvTa yap
aTropeiv irotet, O TTWJ trpovolas



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 181

of perfection. We must not expect of the material
world the perfection of the intelligible prototype,
just as we should not expect of the handsomest of
particular men the perfection of the beau ideal of
humanity. 1 Moreover, the rest of the world is so
admirable an exponent of Providence that we had
better take its ruling for granted in this particular
case. 2 Again, man, even the best of men, is a
deficient creature. If the just suffer, it is through the
fault of their weakness. " Those who by evil-doing
have nearly become irrational animals and wild
beasts, drag the moderately good with them, and
do them violence. These latter are better than
their oppressors, but they are overcome by their
inferiors in so far as they are themselves deficient ;
for they are not themselves good, and have not
prepared themselves for suffering. . . , 3 Some are
unarmed, but it is the armed who rule, whence it
befits not God himself to fight in defence of unwar-
like men. For the law says that they shall come
safely out of war who have acquitted themselves
like men, not those who merely pray. Nor is it
fitting that those who pray should gather in the
harvest, but those who till the earth ; nor that they
should be healthy who give no care to their health.

1 iii. 2, 7 (260 A-C) [vol. i. p. 234, 1. 17 et seq.}.

2 iii. 2, 7 (260 E-261 B) [vol. i. p. 235, 1. 9 et seq.].

3 iii. 2, 8 (261 C-D) [vol. i. p. 236, 1. 8 et seq. ]. oi dr) /ca/cw(9^res
ei s TO 6771)5 fyuv aKbywv Kal dtjpLuv lvai e\Kovat roi)s [j-eaovs K.a.1
Ptafrvrat oi de fieXriovs ptv etVt r&v fii.aofj.vuv, Kparowrai ye fj.T]v
virb T&V %eip6j w rj etcri %e/50i;s /cat avrol /cat owe elaiv dyaOol ovde

aurovs fJ.T] Tra.6elv.



182 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

One cannot complain if the wicked gather more
harvest than is right for them, if it is they who till
the ground entirely, or better than others. More
over it is ridiculous for a man to perform all the
other acts of life according to his own caprice
(especially if his actions are not pleasing to the gods),
and then expect to be saved by the gods, though he
has done none of the things by means of which the
gods bid men be saved. Verily, he were better dead
than living thus, as the laws of the universe would
not have him live. If all things were reversed and
peace were kept in the midst of all follies and evils,
then Providence might truly be called careless in suffer
ing the worst to prevail. The wicked rule through
lack of courage in the ruled. This is just ; but that
Providence should act recklessly would not be so." l

This is the extent of Plotinus s explicit treatment
of the problem of the discrepancy between reward
and merit. It needs, I think, no further elucidation.

1 iii. 2, 8 (261 G-262 c) [vol. i. p. 237, 1. 2 et seq.]. vw fe ol
i, o! 5 o7r\icr6i>Tes KparovcrLV. v6a ov 6ebv dei virtp T&V
avrbv /id%ecr0cu <rweadai yap K TroX^uwv (frycrl dfiv 6
v8piofj.frovs } dXX OVK e&xpfi&ovs ov8 yap
evxoutvovs, dXXct, 7175 ^TriyweXof/x^oi S, ovd ye vyiaiveiv
vyieias eTrtyLteXou/x^ovs * ov8 ayavaKreiv del, el TCHS 0auXots
yivoivro Kapwol T) 6 Xa?s avrols yeupyovffiv T) &jj.(.vov. eTreira ye\olov

TO, fJL^V &\\a TTOLVTO. TCt KO.TO. T&V f3lOl> yV^/JL^ TTf O.VTUV Trp&TTI.V, K&V

H.T] rai/TT; TrpaTTtoaiv, 77 Oeols 0^Xa, aw^eadaL de p.bvov Trapa de&v
ov5 ravra TroL^aavTas, di, &v KeXetiovcriv avrovs ol deol awfeaQai. Kal
Toivvv oi 6dvaroi aOrots (3e\rtov$ 7) rb OVTWS ^cuvras eli>ai, STTCOS ^v
avrovs OVK edeXovaiv ol ev T$ Travri v6fj,oi &<rre rcDc tvavrluv ytyvo-
fjL^vcoi , elprivris tv avolais /cat KaKiaLS Tracrcus (fivXaTTO/J.fr rjs, d^ueXcDs civ
^cr%e TO, TT)S Trpovolas ewffrjs xparelv OVTWS ra %ef/>w. &p-%ov<n 5 ol
Kaxoi apxo^vuv avavbpla TOVTO yap SiKaiov, Kal OVK



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 183

Its scantiness as regards what would seem to us the
important points is disappointing, while it lingers
at length over minor issues. But taken in connec
tion with the development of the doctrine of Karma
and reincarnation it gives us a sufficiently broad hint
of Plotinus s mind as regards the question.

There is, however, a point, perhaps somewhat
irrelevant, which we may be permitted to raise in
passing. It would be interesting to know whether
in his attack on the doctrine of passive resistance,
Plotinus has the Christians in mind. Are they the
little weaklings who, to use a Plotinian illustration,
are beaten by the bigger and stronger bad boys, and
robbed of their food and fine clothes, and, adds
Plotinus, justly so suffer, "since they, though
exercise-grounds are provided for them, by their
sloth and their soft, luxurious life suffer themselves,
fatted sheep that they are, to fall a prey to wolves " ? 1
Their habit or theory of turning the other cheek
might have drawn such a comparison from one bred
in the other tradition. A somewhat similar passage
may also have reference to the Christian doctrine of
salvation. "That the wicked should expect others
to be their saviours at the sacrifice of themselves is
no fitting prayer for them to make. Nor is it to be
expected that the gods should lay aside their own
lives and rule the details of such men s lives, nor

1 iii. 2, 8 (261 E) [vol. i. p. 236, 1. 21 et seq.]. d airoSeSeiy-
yvfJLva.ffi<j}v avrois ol d vw dpytas KO.I rov ^v /xaXa/cws /ecu
us irepie?8oi> eauroi)s apvas KO.Tairia.vdtvTa,$ \VKUV apirayas tlvai ;



184 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

that good men, who are living a life that is other
and better than that of human dominion, should
devote themselves to the ruling of wicked men. For
these latter have never seen to it that the good were
rulers of others a necessary condition to being
themselves cared for by the good but they look
with jealous eyes upon any who happen to be good
by nature. . . / l The point, however, is open only
to conjecture.

We may now regard the questions of physical evil
and of the discrepancy between reward and merit as
settled for the time being. Suffering is the wages
of sin, and the universe, assuming transmigration
and Karma, may be held to be in the long run a
just paymaster. But the judicial analogy on which
the argument rests fails to clear up the entire
problem. If we stop to reflect we find that we are
explaining away Evil by referring it to a system or
concept which on analysis turns out to be both in
trinsically deficient and, in the very possibility of its
existence, a sign that things are not as they should
be. For, supplemented by whatever hypothesis we
please, human justice and its cosmic counterfeit in
a providential government of the world cannot be

1 iii. 2, 9 (262 D-E) [vol. i. p. 238, 1. 1 et seq.}. K a. K oto ot
yei/ofj.ti>ovs d&ovv &\\ovs O.VTUV aurrjpas etvai eavrote irpoeptvovs ov
BefUTov evxty iroiov^vuv ov rolvvv ovde deovs OLVT&V apxeiv rd Kade-
/ccKrra d^^ras TOV eavTuv fiiov ovoe ye roi)s tivdpas TOVS dya6ovs, &\\ov
plov #Was TOV dpxrj* dvOpWTrLv^ Afidvu, rotrovs avruv dpxovTas
elvai tirei ovd afoot brfJxM)(hiffdvirQTC, oTrwsdpxovTes dyadol yfroivTo
TUV &\\w, Swus avrol elff firifj,\o^efoi, dXXa <t>8ovov<riv, tdv rts
dyados Trap avrov <f>vr)Tou.



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 185

made wholly effective. To be perfect, the penalty
should follow immediately upon the crime. The
deed should bear no fruits to the evil-doer save the
appropriate suffering. There should be no interval
of peace, no prosperity, no success and domination.
Were justice what we would have it, every criminal
would be caught red-handed. That this is not
the case is due to no deflection in its principle, but
to obstacles which block the accomplishment of its
requirements.

The same is true of the divine justice. Our
failure is part of its failure. Its discrimination ex
hypothesi is keener, its knowledge of men s hearts
more perfect, its means more effective than our own,
and yet it displays the same deficiencies. It does
not fall upon the sinner at the moment of his crime ;
it delays and meantime he prospers. It can only
preserve for us that purity of intention which our
ideal of justice demands of it on the assumption that
its tardiness also is due to obstacles that hinder its
workings; that is, by regarding its manifestations
not as the proof of a perfect, but as the symptom of
an imperfect, world.

Supposing, however, that the workings of justice
were perfect, the mere existence of justice would
betray a defect in the universe. Justice is a relative,
not an absolute perfection. It is an expedient
forced upon men by the failure of their world to
conform to their purpose. It can be no more or no
less for God. God has to be just because there is



186 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

sin in the world. It is better that in such a world
sin should be punished than not, but it would be
still better that there should be no sin at all. To
talk of the divine justice is to justify God s ways,
only if we qualify it by the statement that those
ways are not as he would have them, but are forced
upon him by circumstances which he cannot control.

Moral evil remains unexplained and unmitigated
to challenge the Plotinian theodicy. How is its
existence to be reconciled with the goodness of God ?
We have seen what is the most obvious reply to this
question, a reply as ancient as Homer and Hesiod
in the annals of Greek thought, and as old as Adam
in the record of the world s. It is to assume the
responsibility oneself to declare man the reason for
his own misdoing. But the thought is philosophic
ally uncritical if it takes no account of its
implicit assumptions and their problematic character.
Rationally to entertain it one must first have
considered and settled the difficult point of the
freedom of the will.

The problem of determinism was as insistent in
the Plotinian as it was in the Stoic philosophy.
The trend of both systems was thoroughly deter
ministic. For the Stoic, Fate, Providence, Destiny
were synonymous terms, and in the flawless chain
of things in a single system of interdependent links
every object seemed rigidly bound. The same is
true of Plotinus s teaching. The primitive emanation
from the One is no act of volition, but an event



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 187

conditioned by an inner necessity of its nature of
which the One qua One is not even aware. The
necessity that determined the existence of the world
also determines its essence. Nos is what it is
because it is what the One could bring forth, "^x 7 ?
is established in her nature by her connection with
vovs. The structure of the universe is due to the
interaction of the seminal reasons. All in all, the
cosmic process, like the growth of a plant, is the
mere unfolding of possibilities contained within the
seed and determined by it.

On any one level of being the same determinism
is displayed. Novs is a closed, rigid system of Ideas
that logically imply one another. By the same
rigid implication the place and nature of each
individual soul is determined in and by the World-
Soul. So, too, the phenomenal world is held
together and directed by a Providence innocent
apparently of no event. " Do you say that Provid
ence does not extend to earth ? " Plotinus asks a
propos of the existence and success of vicious action.
"The fact that other things come into being by
Reason is a proof that it extends to earth. Animals
and plants share in reason and soul and life. But it
may be said that though it extends to earth it does
not rule there. Since, however, the universe is a
single living being, that would be like saying that
the head and face of a man are made by Nature and
Reason, which has the power to rule, but the rest by
other causes, chance or necessity, and so, owing to this



188 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

or to the impotence of Nature, are inferior. But it is
neither pious nor reverent to find fault with creation
on the ground that all is not well with such things." 1

A universe so constituted apparently excluded
the possibility of free will. Yet if God was to be
justified, his providence had to be relieved of
responsibility for human sin. Otherwise both
providence and sin lost all moral character and
significance. The one became, instead of a teleo-
logical principle, a mere natural law equally expressed
in all events without regard to their ethical
character ; the other instead of a misdirection of the
will, one manifestation thereof as appropriate as any
other.

This difficulty was seen by Plotinus. On the one
hand to preserve its own intrinsic character Provi
dence had to be such that something was left for us
to do. Else it had nothing to work upon, nothing
to correct, no teleological function, and on the
other hand " if men are involuntarily wicked and the
wicked have no free will, then one should blame
neither the evil-doers nor those who suffer evil, as
suffering through their own fault. If it be necessary

1 iii. 2, 9 (262 c) [vol. i. p. 237, 1. 22 et seq.]. &p otiv, on /J.TJ
dXXa r&v ctXXwi yi.vofj.evwv \6yi*> /j-aprvpiov TOVTO



K l yup v a Ka -i <j>VTa Kal \6you

dXXa (pddvovffa ov /cpare?. dXXa q>ov cv6s
rov iravrbs O/J.OLOV av yevoLro, el TLS Ke<pa\T)v /JLCV dvQp&Trov /cat
VTTO (pvcreus /cat X67on yiyveadai. \eyoi /cparouvros, rb 8
\onrbv dXXats avadei-t) atrtats, rjy^ais ?} avdyKcus, /cat 0aOXa did TOVTO
7) 5t ddvvafjilav <pv<rb)s yeyovfrai. d\\ oi/ re ocriov o^re ei)cre/3es
fj,T] /caXws raOra x iv /c



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 189

that evil men be produced either by the movement
of the heavens or by some principle of which such
production is a consequence, then their existence is
according to nature. But if Reason itself be
responsible, how can such a state of affairs not be
unjust? Perhaps it may be said, 11 he continues,
apparently with the famous Platonic dictum in
mind, " that the wicked act without willing it,
since sin is involuntary. This, however, does not
remove the fact that they themselves act of them
selves, and in so acting sin, and would not have
sinned at all if they were not the agents." l

In this last sentence we have the gist of an
argument developed at some length by the Stoics.
Its intention is to detach the notions of responsibility,
praise, blame, and so on, from that of freedom. A
man can be morally responsible for his act and yet
not free. For what a man does is his act, whether
or not he can act differently. As his deed, he is
immediately responsible for it, and his merit or
demerit depends not upon his freedom to act or not
to act, but upon the character of what he does. 2

1 iii. 2, 10 (263 B) [vol. i. p. 239, 1. 4 et seq.]. 10. dXX el

av6p(*}irOl &KOVT6S elfft KOLKol Kal TOiOVTOl Ol)% 6K6vTeS, 0$T O.V TtS T0l)j

ddiKovvras ai riacrcuTo, otfre TOI)J irdff x.ovTa^ cus oV aurous raOra
irdffxovTas. el d drj Kal dvdyKrj OVTW /ca/coi)s ylveffdat eifre inrb TTJS
(fiopds ci re TT)S dpx^s didovarjs TO aLK&Xovdov tvrevdev, <f>vffiK&S oisrus.
el de drj 6 \6yos auros eanv 6 Troi.G)v, TrcDy OVK &8tKa oOrwr/ d\Xa rb
fj.ev &KOVTes } tin a/j.apria aKovcriov TOVTO d OVK avaipel TO ai)Toi)j
TOI>S irpdrrovTas Trap avruv elvai, dXX 6Vi auToi iroiovai, 5ia TOUTO Kal
atrol dfJ.apTavovffiv r) ovd civ 6 Xws TJ/j-aprov JJLT] avrol ol iroiovvres
es.

2 Alexander, Defato, 34.



190 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

We praise and reward the automaton that runs
well and does the right things ; we blame and punish
that which is out of order and does wrong, especially
if punishment has a deterrent and exemplary effect.

This argument naturally suggests its converse.
The act is free if it is my act. My freedom means
not that I could have acted differently, given all the
circumstances, but that I must include myself among
the circumstances from which the resultant act
necessarily proceeds. I am an active centre having a
proper nature, not a mere passive transmitter of
external forces. To reaction the reagent contributes.
This view was pressed by the Stoics. Plotinus also
dwells upon it. Necessity is not mere outer necessity.
" The motion of the heavens is not such as to leave
nothing in our power. 11 1 In that case we should be
mere puppets in their hands, should never express
anything but the will of God. The truth is that
"men are principles. They move toward the
beautiful of their own nature, and this is a free and
unconditioned principle. 1 2 They are living beings
who "having unconditioned motion of themselves,
incline now to the better, now to the worse. 11 3

For Plotinus s final word, however, we had best

1 iii. 2, 10 (263 c) [vol. i. p. 239, 1. 16]. rb te r^ <j>opas ov X
&ffTC /jwjdtv ^0 ijfuv elvai.

2 iii. 2, 10 (263 D) [vol. i. p. 239, 1. 23 et seq.]. dpxal 5t K al
&v0pwiroi. Kivouvrai yovv irpfc ra AcaXot olicely. Qfoei Kal



3 iii. 2, 4 (258 D) [vol. i. p. 231, 1. 26]. -ra 8t Si avra

avre^ova-Loy fya parrot &v OT ptv irpbs TO. fteXriu, br dt irpbs
TO.



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 191

consult the- Ennead On Destiny. 1 There the
problem of freedom and determinism is taken up for
itself, and not, as in the passages we have been
discussing, as auxiliary to a theodicy. The Ennead
opens with a distinction between things which have
and which have not causes in the ordinary sense of
the word. The eternal stands outside the causal
nexus, but everything that " becomes " has a cause.
In the natural world we can admit no chance or
spontaneous action. " We must reject that which
has no cause, admitting neither vain deflections 2 nor
any sudden motion of the body which arises without
any pre-existent cause, nor yet any random impulse
of the soul without motive to excite it to do what
it has not done before." Could the soul, Plotinus
continues in a very modern manner, act without
sufficient reason she would be the slave of even
greater necessity, " through not belonging to herself
and being the victim of unwilled and uncaused
motions. Either what is willed, be it an outer or
an inner object, or what is desired, moves her. If
nothing desirable move her, then she would not be
moved at all." 3

1 iii. 1. 2 Referring to the Epicureans.

3 iii. 1, 1 (228 C-D) [vol. i. p. 215, 1. 17 et seq.]. TO d dvatnov
ov TrapadeKTeov, ovre irapeyKXiffecn Kevals xtopav didovTO. cure Kivrjcrei
ffWudiTW TTJ %ai(f)}>r]s, T) ovdevbs Trporjy^aa/nevov vireffT-rj, otfre i/ vx^s
bp/j,rj e^Tr\-f]KT^ fjiTjdevbs KLvfivavTOS avTT]V eis rb TL 7rpScu &v irpbrepov
OVK tTroLei. ?} avT$ ye TOVT^ ftcifav &v rts %oi atrrTjv dvdyKrj T(f
/i?/ avTTJs dvai, fapevdai d ras TOtai^ras <f>opas d^ovXr/Tovy re Kal
dvairlovs o&cras. T) yap TO fiov^Tov TOVTO dt $ eu % daw ^ r6
TTidv/ji,r]Tbi> eKivrjffev 1j, ei woev opeKTOv eKlvrjaev, ovo &v



192 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

After examples of final and natural causation
in connection with this point the treatise goes on
to consider various theories of causation. These
are roughly grouped as five, atomistic, hylozistic,
astrologistic, Heracleitean, and Stoic. To the
Atomists Plotinus makes three objections. In the
first place a fortuitous concourse of atoms by its
very fortuitousness would render the category of
causation inappropriate to it. It makes pure
accident of what any theory of causation must
regard as essential, i.e. the connected, reliable,
and predictable character of events. In the second
place, consciousness cannot be reduced to or deduced
from atomic combinations. Thirdly, it destroys
true freedom. The doctrine of the hylozoists
Plotinus regards as open to the same objections. 1

Against the Stoic and Heracleitean doctrines it is
urged that the very rigidity of their determinism
really destroys the significance of the causal nexus.
It is not one part that is the cause of another, but
the whole qua whole which determines the position
of each and every part. But the whole in deter
mining its parts is but determining itself. The whole
is self-caused. And each part qua part of the whole
is also self-caused. That is, it is not to be explained
by any one part, or any complex of preceding parts,
but merely by its place in the system as a whole,
in other words, by itself. The transitive character
of causation is arrested, its flow is frozen, its links
1 iii. 1, 3 (230 A-F) [vol. i. pp. 217-218].



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 193

are snapped, and we are left with a mere mosaic-like
sequence or aggregate, each piece of which is held
in position not by the other pieces, but by a common
foundation to which all are fastened. 1

Furthermore, the parts become mere modes or
manifestations of the whole. The individualities of
the many are lost. We are no longer ourselves. Our
deeds and thoughts are not ours, but belong to the
one thinker who directs us, just as we direct our
members. 2 In such a system freedom of the will is
a mere name and mockery. Our volitions are of a
class with the instincts of animals, the impulses of
madmen, nay with the tendencies of natural objects. 3
In that case the whole becomes the true author of
our evil deeds. We must then work out some sort
of theory in which each may retain his individuality
and be responsible for his own character, be it good
or bad. 3

Plotinus next turns to the explanation of the
astrologers by which our characters and deeds are
referred to the influence of the stars. This theory
beneath its fanciful garb concealed the main features
of the ordinary notion of causation. It preserved
the transitive character of the nexus, with its im
plication of the dependence of part upon part. The
interdependence of all things Plotinus admits. It
needs, however, a word of qualification. Stoicism
has suppressed the transitive nature of causation,

1 iii. 1, 4 (231 c) [vol. i. p. 219, 1. 31 et seq.].

2 iii. 1, 7 (233 c) [vol. i. p. 223, 1. 4 et seq.].
3 iii. 1, 4 (231 c) [vol. i. p. 219, 1. 27 et seq.].



194 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

disconnected part from part, and attached the parts
to the nature of the whole and finally absorbed them
in it. But an unmitigated transit! veness in causa
tion is no less destructive to the individual. Nothing
but the flux and the transitiveness remains. All the
points of arrest are dissolved. If the world was before
frozen stiff, it is now absolutely liquefied. It is a
mass of connections with nothing to be connected.

The accidental astrologistic features of this theory
of causation Plotinus quickly refutes. To say that
the stars are the causes of earthly events is like
saying that the omen is the cause of what it fore
tells. Again, if these are causes, how are we to
deal with the other apparent causes of our characters
and careers, like heredity and environment ? Finally,
the old difficulty of the problem of Evil appears.
How can the stars which are gods and good forecast
for us evil fates ? Or how can their revolutions
change their characters in such wise that they are
now beneficent, now malignant in their workings ? l

Against the transitive character of causation j
Plotinus reasserts the right of the individual. To j
make the stars responsible for our thoughts and
actions is to make the stars like ourselves, and our
selves not like "men whose works are of and from 3
their own natures," 2 but like stocks and stones. We,
no less than they, or any outside force that infringes

1 iii. 1, 5 (232 B-233 c) [vol. i. p. 221, 1. 10 et seq.]. Cf. iv. 4, -,
31 (425).

2 iii. 1, 5 (231) [vol. i. p. 220, 1. 25 et seq.] dXX OV.K av

Trap avruv Kal e/c rrjs avruv 0wrews tfpyov.



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 195

upon us, have our proper nature and activities. We
are not phantoms, but facts, not mere effects, but
causes. 1

The working out of the themes thus introduced
is short. The clue to freedom is found in the
individual and independent character of the soul.
Among the forces of which a man s deed is the
resultant we must count the soul as one. "The soul
as another principle must be introduced amongst the
things that are. I speak not merely of the World-
Soul, but with her of the individual soul, as no small
factor in the woof of all things. She does not, like
other things, come into being from seeds, but is a
primary cause. Apart from the body, she is mistress
of herself, free, and independent of cosmic causation.
But when joined with the body she is no longer
mistress of herself in all respects, since she becomes
part of an order together with other things. The
chances which surround her and among which she has
fallen, bring many things to pass in such wise that in
part her actions are determined by them, in part she
rules them and directs them whither she will. . . .

" If the soul, transformed by outer influences,
commits actions or feels impulses in obedience, as it
were, to a blind motion, she cannot be called free
either in act or disposition. Nor can she be so called
when in self-degradation she does not follow impulses
that are in all respects right and authoritative. Only
when the soul has reason pure and purged of passion

1 iii. 1, 5 (231 F et seq.} [vol. i. p. 220, 1. 20 et seq.].



196 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

to guide her impulses, can the impulse be called our
own and free. And that deed only can be called
ours which came from nowhere save from within our
selves, from the pure soul, from a first principle that
guides and rules, that errs not through ignorance, and
yields not to the strength of desires desires which
at their coming lead and drag us down, and suffer
not our deeds to be our own free actions, but only
expressions of our passions." l

This passage might be recast almost in the very



1 iii. 1, 8 (223 E-234) [vol. i. p. 224, 1. 2 et seq.]. V^xV 8*1 del
ovcrav aXXyv eTreicrfpepovras els rd 6vra, ov fjiovov TTJV rov iravrbs,
dXXd Kal rr/v etcdarov fj.erd ravTijs, wj dpxfy v CffUKp&s ovffrjs,
TrX^/cetv rd Trdvra, ov yiyvo/mtvris Kal avrrjs, &cnrp rd a\\a, K
ffirepu-druv, dXXd irpwrovpyov alrtas oiV^s. &vev /JLCV ovv (rw/mros
ovaa Kvpiwrdrrj re avrfjs Kal t\ev6epa /cat /co<r/xt/c^s atrias ^w * ^e%-
deicra, de et s crtD^a OVK^TL irdvra Kvpla, us CLV fj,e8 crepwv ra%^e?cra.
ri;%ai 5^ TCL KVK\(J} TrdvTQ,, ols (rvvtirevev e\6ovcra els /j.e croi , ra
TroXXa ^7070^, &<rre rd fj^v Troieiv did raOra, rd de Kparovcav avrrjv
raura STTTJ e^Aet ^7etv. irXei a; de /cparet T] dpetvuv, eXdrrw 5^ -rj
17 7ap /cpdcret <r(iyitar6s rt e vdidovo a e Tridv/j.e iv ^ 6pyie<rdai
T) Trevlais Taireivrj i) TrXoi^rots x_avvo3 T) dvvd/j.e<ri Tvpavvos.
-i] de Kal ev rots airrots roi5rots dvT^ax^) "h 070^7; TT\V tptivw, Kal
r)\\oiu(rei> avrd [j.d\\oi> TJ 7)\\oiu6r], ajtrre TO, (tev erepotwcrat, rots de
cri;7%wp^(rat JJL^ /tterd /cd/c?79. 9. dvayKala /u,ev odv ravra, 6Va irpo-
aipeaei Kal Tir^ats Kpadevra yiverai. TL ydp ai> eri Kal &\\o et-rj ;
de \ij(pBevrwv TUIV airlwv Trdvra. Trdvrus yivcrai ev rots
de Kal ef rt e /c TTJS 0opas crii TeXetTat. orav (j.ev ofiv dXXota;-
Belffa Trapd T&V e^w ^VXT] sparry rt /cat 6p/Jia olov rv(f>\rj rr] (popq,
Xpu/Aevrj, oi %i cKOixriov rr]v Trpa^iv ovde rty didOeatv Xe/creov /cat
orav avrri Trap avrrjs xeipwv odcra OVK opdals Travraxov oi)5e yye/uLO-
vovcrais rat s op/m.a is y xpwfj.evt]. \6yov Se orav i]ye/j.6va Kadapbv Kal
diradri rbv oiKelov e"xovaa op/aq,, ravrrjv /ndvrjv rriv 6pfJ.T]v (fiareov elvai
6<j> rffuv Kal eKotiaLoVy Kal rovro elvai rb 7)/J,erepov epyov, o HT] aXXodev
?j\6ev, dXX e"i>dodev ano Kadapas rrjs tf/vxys, &TT dpxys Trpwrys
rjyov/Jifrris Kal /cfpt as, dXX ov ir\dvr)V e dyvolas iraOovcrrjS f) rjrrav K
fiias iridvtJ.iG)v, at 7r/>o<reX0ou<rai dyovai Kal ^X/cou<rt /cat ou/c^rt epya.
e&criv elvai, dXXa iradrf^ara trap 1 T)[JI.UV.



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 197

words, though not wholly perhaps in the thought,
of Kant without any loss of fidelity to the sense of
the original. Man, we might say, is a dual being
living in a dual world. On the one hand he is
a creature of sense implicated in the phenomenal
order. On the other he is a rational principle, the
member of a noumenal or intelligible world. So far
as he is a creature of desire he is subject to the
causal sequence from which no phenomenon is
exempt. But though the position of phenomena in
the phenomenal order is absolutely determined by
their relations to antecedent and consequent, their
existence and nature is not wholly explained by this
determination. Each phenomenon is also the mani
festation of a thing-in-itself or Idea or seminal reason,
which ultimately determines it to be what it is, just
as the organic union of these Ideas or Dinge-an-sich
in an intelligible world constitutes the essence of the
whole phenomenal order. This " epi-determination "
of the phenomenon by its thing-in-itself, is a relation
indescribable in terms of causation. In man we
find it practically displayed as freedom of the will.
The noumenal or intelligible character is seen as a
rational will set over against the appetites and
impulses of our phenomenal nature. This will is,
or should be, independent of these appetites and
impulses, and finds its motive and its law for action
within itself. When the rational will acts in accord
ance with the dictates of its own nature it is free,
when it follows the incitements of sense it is implicat-



198 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

ing itself in the causal nexus of the phenomenal
order, and making of itself merely a link determined
by its antecedents in the chain. That is, man is
free so long as he acts like the rational being he
essentially is, and not like the creature of irrational
impulse which he is, as it were, by accident. 1 Freedom
is the autonomy or self-legislation of the will.

As in Kant again, it is to the dual nature of
man that sin is due. Either character taken by
itself is incapable of wrong -doing. Beasts cannot
sin ; neither can gods. " Were man simple, and by
simple I mean a mere generated product with his acts
and passions determined by a single principle, there
would be no cause for blaming him, any more than
the other animals. But as it is, the evil man alone
is in ill-repute and justly so. For he is not merely a
product of generation, but he possesses another free
principle. . . ." - But this free and rational principle,
as we have seen, cannot sin so long as it acts in
accordance with its own nature. Sin, then, has its
occasion in a lack of compliance on the part of
the desires with the rational will, strong enough in
the case of the evil deed to overpower the will and
prescribe action in its place. And this compliance,
reluctant and slight though it may be at first,
becomes with each repetition more easy till finally
the bad habit is formed and the evil propensity
becomes dominant. 3

1 iii. 1, 8 (234 A-B) [vol. i. p. 224, 1. 14 et seq.].

2 iii. 3, 4.

3 iii. 2, 4 (258 D) [vol. i. p. 231, 1. 30 et seq.].



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 199

At this juncture, however, Plotinus was like to
be hoist with his own petard. Providence might
indeed to the cursory glance seem acquitted of
complicity with Evil. But did not the evidence
in its favour at the same time deprive it of any
hand in the good ? The will is the source of its
own determinations to good or ill. Providence has
no more to do with the one than with the other.
It is not for the saints to cry " non nobis, non nobis"
but for God to say " non milii^ non mihi."

Plotinus sees his danger. "Is it not absurd,"
he asks, " to introduce souls, some as workers of
evil, others as workers of good ? Do we not take
from Reason responsibility for good, in removing
evil from its sphere ? " The answer he gives at the
time is an appeal to the dramatic analogy, in an
extensive development of which he is at the moment
occupied. " What is there to prevent the deeds of
actors, be they good or evil, from forming parts of
the World-Reason, just as they do of the plot in
a play, so that its influence is exercised upon each
individual actor in proportion as the drama is the
more perfect and wholly depends upon it ? But for
what purpose should the World-Reason do evil ? "

1 iii. 2, 18 (271 A-B) [vol. i. p. 251, 1. 1 et seq.]. el oVv &TOTTOS
ij elffaywyrj T&V if/vx&v, at drj TOL irovrjpd, at 5e ra xP"n ffTa epyaaovTai
a.Tro(rTepr]<TOfJiei> yap TOV \byov Kal TUV xpriffT&v a^aipovvTes avTOv
ra Trovf]pa rt KwXtfei Kal TCL rCiv viroKpir&v tpya pepy TrotetV, &ffirep
TOV 5pd/taros teei, OVTW /cat rov tv T$ iravrl \6yov, Kal tvravda Kal
TO KaAws Kai Tb tvavTiov, tivre els titaffTov TUV i}iroKpi.Twv oi rw trap
avTov TOV \6yov, 6Vy reAei6re/)Oi> TOVTO Tb dpa/J.a Kal iravra irap avTOv ;
a\\a TO KaKbv iroiTJffat. iva Tt ;



200 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

Plotinus makes his meaning more clear in a long
passage, with a synopsis of which I will content
myself. What is pleasing to the gods, he says, is
a consequence of Providence, since Providence means
the expression of the divine in the world. That is,
the good deed is interconnected with, but is not
done by Providence. Its source is man or any other
object you please, but in so far as it is good it becomes
part of the providential plan or order. Evil is an
effect necessitated by a cause indeed, but by a cause
not implicated in the providential order, but found
in ourselves, arid expressing not the divine purpose,
but our lack of conformity to it. Providence over
comes Evil, however, healing its breaches and turning
it to good, just as the healthy body heals a wound
or an injury and brings the part again into harmony
with the organism. 1

As a recapitulation we may take the following.
" The deed of the intemperate man is done neither
by nor according to Providence, while the deed of
the temperate man, though it be not done by
Providence (for it is done by the man), is yej^done
according to Providence." 2

In a word, Plotinus distinguishes between things
done by Providence (vn-b Trpovoias) and according to
Providence (/caret Trpovomv). God s will, if I may use

1 iii. 3, 5 (275 C-E) [vol. i. p. 257, 1. 1 et seq.].

2 iii. 3, 5 (275 r) [vol. i. p. 258, 1. 1 et seq.}. K al 7ra/>A tf v rov



d.KO\d<rTOV rb TrpOL^v otre viro -rrpovolas otfre /card irpdvoiav, rb
virb TOV <r6<ppovos Zpyov o$x virb Trpovolas p.h, 8n VTT O.VTOV, Kara
irphvoiav 5.



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL

the expression in connection with Plotinus, is not
the source of our will, but provides merely the
standard. The will determines itself. Its dignity,
however, does not lie in the mere fact of self-
determination, but in the direction which that
determination takes. It finds its good and acquires
its value by conforming itself to the divine standard.
Were there no Providence, no teleological and rational
order in the world, the character of the determina
tions of the will would be metaphysically indifferent
(though significant enough from the purely human
point of view), and its deeds mere explosions of
natural forces. The will of God, then, by providing
the conditions under which alone the will s choice of
the good has cosmic significance, is a true coefficient
in the good deed ; while at the same time since it
does not in any way determine the will in its choice,
it is not an accomplice in evil.

But we avoid this difficulty only to meet with
other and more serious objections. Who, we may
ask, or what is really responsible for sin in such a
theory.? Is it my animal nature ? But my animal
nature is part of the causal sequence. Then my sin
is determined by antecedent events and I am not to
blame. More briefly we might say, if I am not free
when I sin (as Plotinus and Kant say I am not), then
I am not responsible.

Suppose, however, that I am free when I sin.
That implies a self-determined acquiescence in the
lower impulse on the part of the natural will. But



202 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

the will cannot determine itself to other than the
good. When it wills the bad it is not acting
according to its ow r n nature, but under the com
pulsion of the sensible impulse. Apparently, then,
I am responsible in neither case.

Finally, if neither my animal nature, nor my intel
ligible character per se, is capable of sin, it is difficult
to see how their conjunction should make sin possible.

These difficulties Plotinus shares in common with
Kant, and explains them as little. But he also is
beset with others of a metaphysical character, which
Kant has shirked. Kant left the noumenal order in
that happy vagueness which characterizes the smile
without the Cheshire cat in Alice in Wonderland.
One had the practical certainty that it concealed
God, Freedom, and Immortality, and was forbidden
and saved the trouble of conceiving their features.
For Plotinus, however, the cat declined to disappear,
and he had to prove that it smiled. Thus the
freedom of the will was not established by merely
withdrawing its province from the phenomenal order.
It is still not outside Providence and the universal
Reason. 1 " Although I am master of my choice of
this or that, still the choice has its place in the
order of the universe, since your character is not
adventitious to the universe, but you are reckoned
in it as a definite individual." 2 This, however,

1 iii. 3, 4 (273 E) [vol. i. p. 254, 1. 21].

2 iii. 3, 3 (272 D-E) [vol. i. p. 253, 1. 4 et seq.}. 3. K al yap
el y<j) fctf/HOS TOV rctSe \ffdcu 77 rdde, ciXXd aiptffet. crwr^Ta/crcu, on
p.}) ^Treiffodiov TO ffbv Tip Travri, dXX I f)pi6/j.7j<ra.i 6 roi6<r5e. :



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 203

brings up the question a question which Kant
also had to face 1 who is responsible for my in
telligible self ? " Are we to refer the cause of the
moral character of the individual to the creator,
if there be one, or to the creature itself ? "

Plotinus s reply is unsatisfactory. He appeals
again to the utterly irrelevant theory of varieties of
perfection. The real point at issue is not touched.
For him the important thing is that "God is no
more to be blamed for what we are, than for what
plants are. We do not blame him because they
have not the faculty of perception, or because other
animals are not as. men." * And he adds, we are not
to be blamed either for our natures, apparently on the
ground that we are but human, and that of humanity
not even its proper virtue can be demanded.

The argument is beside the point. The parti
cular question with which it is designed to deal is
left without an answer. So, also, in the last resort
is the general question of freedom and determinism.
To disengage the will from the causal nexus of
phenomena is merely to assert its freedom from
phenomenal determination. But that freedom had
still to be reconciled with the necessity of the

1 Cf. Kant, Critique ofPract. Reason, Abbott s Trans, p. 194.

2 iii. 3, 3 (272 E) [vol. i. p. 253, 1. 7 et seq.}. dXAa w60i> 6



o, & 6 \6yos f^ret, r6 ptv, ei eiri TOV
et TIS tarLv, aveveytteiv dei TOI TTOLOV TOV v rots tfdecriv e/cd0Tov TTJV
airiav, 77 e-Trl rb yev6/u.voi> avrb, rj 6 Xws OVK alnareov, &<nrep ov5 tirl
s, 6Vt /UT? atV^dferat, 17 irl fy&v ruv dXXwv, 6 ri /u,i] cl?s
TQ-VTOV yap TOVTO T< ia ri tivOpuTroi ovx 6 ?rep
Beat.



204 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

emanatory process. Of this problem Plotinus offers
no solution. There were, indeed, two possible
methods of dealing with the question. He might
have maintained that the necessity which directs
the radiation of Being from the One is merely
an emphatic equivalent for saying that Being is
what it is. This is the world we actually find ;
the world is necessarily what we find it. If
this world contains free wills, then it is necessary
that there should be freedom. Or he might have
explicitly limited to the phenomenal order the
antithesis between freedom and necessity, and the
universe of discourse in which, the ^terms were
significant. In that case the process of emanation
from the One would have been neither free nor
determined. The two categories would have been
mere symbols, the best expression we had at our
command to describe the indescribable, applicable
only by a philosophic licence, and with philosophic
reservations. He might, moreover, have dispensed
with the aid of mysticism in defending his position.
On the merely phenomenal level, he might have said,
the antinomy is not conclusive. We now oppose
freedom to necessity because the will is discordant
both with itself and with other wills. In a world
where every volition expressed the complete will,
and that so as to accord with the self-expression
of all other wills, E folio fora non fare a suo
senno, the antithesis would have no practical signi
ficance to the perfected will. To talk of freedom and



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 205

necessity would be meaningless jargon. The words
would stand for nothing in its universe. Its volitions
would be all their own raisons d etre. It could not
occur to it to ask itself why it acted as it did. The
question, that is, would have no value for it. For in
a perfect world it would make not the slightest differ
ence whether it acted as if it were free or determined.

There is something to be said for endeavouring to
interpret the Plotinian position in the light of this
thought. The primitive emanation from the One
is not a free act since the One is not aware of it.
It is not a determined act because nothing determines
the One to it. It is neither free nor determined
in the ordinary use of the terms. So too vovs gives
off ^vx^, and foxy the world, because it must indeed,
but because it must in the same sense as the free
spirit in Paradise must will the good. 1 Whether we
call the process free or determined is of no practical
significance as yet. It only becomes so when in the
phenomenal world the Idea or seminal reason finds
itself confronted with a medium recalcitrant to its
self-expression. Then so far as its acts express its
rational nature and purpose, it calls them free; so
far as they are distorted by this recalcitrancy it calls
them not free.

Still, this is a digression. We can only accept as
we find it the Plotinian inconclusiveness as regards
this deeper aspect of the question. The problem we
must leave with him unsolved, and pass on.
1 Cf. iv. 3, 13 (382 E).



206 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

We come now to a series of arguments which try
to find a positive place for Evil in a perfect universe.
Needless to say they are as applicable to the exist
ence of physical, as to moral evil. First, we note an
argument already touched upon a few lines back.
" In every creature," we are informed, " the upper
parts, as the face and head, are more beautiful than
the middle and lower parts. Now men are in
the middle and lower parts of the universe, whilst
above are the heavens, and the gods that dwell
therein. . . . We wonder at the wickedness among
men, because we think man is the important
thing in the universe, and that none is wiser than
he. But man s place is midway between god and
brute; and he inclines towards both. Some men
are like the one, some like the other, but most lie
between." l

In a word, because man is only man he cannot
reasonably be expected to be a good man. This
argument is no more than an application to moral
evil of that clever justification of the particular s
failure to embody its proper ideals, which we have
already discussed at some length. Once more we

1 iii. 2, 8 (261 B-C) [vol. i. p. 235, 1. 29 et seq.]. 8. vavTb*
677 fyov TCL /nev avu, irpoffwirov Kal K<f>a\7), /caXX/w, TO, 5e /mfoa Kal
Kdrw OVK foa avdpuwoi. 5e ev fj.^^ Kal /cdrw, avu d ovpavbs Kal oi
iv avT< 6eoi Kal rb irXeiffTov TOV Koa/j.ov 6eol Kal ovpavbs Trds /ci5/cXy,
777 5 ota K&rpov Kal ws eV TL r&v avrpuv. Oav/j-d^erai 5 eV dvdp&irois
adiKia, ort avOpwirov d^iovaiv v rip Travrl TO TI[JUOJ> elvai a?s ovdevbs
OVTOS (ro(f)i>}T^pov. TO 5e /cetrai v ^atp 0e>i> Kal drjpiuv Kal peirei
eir afjL<pw Kal 6/xoiou^rat ot pev ry er^py, ot 5e ry crept?, oi de
v elaiv, ot TroXXot.



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 207

may remark the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine
which holds that various kinds can be graded as
different degrees of perfection.

There follow a number of arguments of more
decidedly Stoic complexion. In the first place, we
find the familiar contention that though the parts
may seem imperfect taken by themselves, yet in con
junction with one another they form a perfect whole. 1
Though different, each has its proper function which
is necessary to the well-being, and therefore con
tributes to the perfection of the whole. The universe
is like an organism " in which although the feet do
one thing, the eyes another, the understanding
another, and the mind yet another, unity arises from
them all," 2 and " from all the tones, all the passions,
and all the energies, there comes, as it were, the one
tone of the living being, one life and existence." 3
We are reminded of the dictum of Chrysippus :
" The world is a perfect body, but the parts of the
world are not perfect since they exist relatively to
the whole and are not self-subsistent." 4

Secondly, we may note an attempt to illustrate



1 Hi. 2, 3 (256 F-G) [vol. i. p. 229, 1. 12 et seq.].

2 iii. 3, 5 (275 B) [vol. i. p. 256, 1. 27 et seq.].

3 iii. 3, 5 (275 A) [vol. i. p. 256, 1. 23 et seq.]. 2, 3. K ai 5^
l ovruffl Tr\-r]yvra OVTWS <j>dy%a.TO ra (puvyevTa, ra 5e crtwTTfl

Kal lave irai. ra aKO\ov6a, Kal K r&v Qdbyyuv airdvTUv Kal
IK T&V Tra9r)/jLar(ji}v Kal frepyiifA&T<av fila, TOV fyov olov (fxavrj Kal far)
Kal jSi os. Kal yap Kal ra fjidpia 5td0opa 6vra Kal Siatyopov TT]V evtpyeiav
fyovra a\\o yap iroiovcn Trades, 6(f)0a\fj.ol 3 a\\o, didvoia 5 a\\o
Kal vovs &\\o. v 5 K iravTWv /cat irpbvoia pla.

4 Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantlbus, 44. 6.



208 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

this point in the case of wickedness. Not only is
good produced by it accidentally, as when healthy
children and perhaps good men are born of adultery
or rape, or finer cities rise on the ashes of those
sacked by evil-doers, 1 but its vicious character itself
has its function and place in the economy of the whole.
The passage follows one in which we have already
seen how Plotinus, like Seneca, 2 justifies misfortune
on the ground of its disciplinary and corrective, as
well as its retributive character. "Vice," he says,
" works to the advantage of the whole in that it
furnishes an example for justice and produces much
that is serviceable. It stirs men up and rouses the
mind and the understanding by confronting them
with evil ways. It makes men learn how great and
good is virtue when contrasted with the evils which
are the lot of the wicked." 3

But Plotinus will not let the argument go at this.
He develops and expands it, interweaving with it the
notion of the interdependence of opposites and
illustrating both with various analogies. In this
development he is by no means consistent, but is
continually qualifying what he says. It will be
better, however, for us to ignore for the present these



1 iii. 2, 18 (270 G) [vol. i. p. 250, 1. 27 et seq.}.

2 Cf. Seneca s treatise, De Providentia.

3 iii. 2, 5 (259 A-B) [vol. i. p. 232, 1. 26 et seq.]. T] de icada
elpydcraro TL xpyw-P-w ei s T & o\ov Trapddeiy/ma di/cys yevo/mevrj /cat TroAXa
e 0,10-775 xp?7<n/*a Trapa<rxov>tvn- KO.I yap typyyoporas eirol-rjae KOLI
vow fcai (r6ve<riv eyeipei Trovyplas 65ots avTi.TOLTTOfj.evwv, Kal pavdaveiv
(5 Trpte? qlov a.ya.9bv apery irapadfoei KOLK&V &v ol Trovrjpol t^ouo i.



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 209

self-corrections, picking out and stringing together
such passages as are homogeneous and support a
single thesis. We can then return and make use of
the qualifications as a natural transition to another
chapter of our essay.

The thesis which for the present we are to illustrate
and discuss is this : the rationality and perfection
of the world may, nay must, include what we call
evil, both physical and moral.

" The seminal reason/ begins Plotinus, vacillat
ing once more, as we note, between kinds and grades
of perfection, " brings all these things to pass in the
course of its rule, and wills them to be what they
are, making so-called evils accordant with Reason. It
does not will that all things should be good [i.e. of
one kind or degree of good], any more than an artist
would make an animal all eye. So Reason does not
make all things gods, but some it makes gods, others
daemons, a second nature, then men, and then
animals in due order. This it does not from jealousy,
but because there is within Reason itself variety of
intelligibles. We, on the other hand, are like those
who know nothing about the art of painting, and
find fault because the colours are not everywhere
beautiful, though the painter has given to each part
of the picture the colour appropriate to it. Or
again we are like those who find fault with a play
because the characters in it are not all heroes, but
some slaves, and rustics, and rough-speaking fellows.
But here, too, the play would not be beautiful



210 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

if one were to remove the meaner characters and the
parts they play." l

The dramatic, or perhaps we should say, the
aesthetic analogy, since other than purely dramatic
versions of it are introduced, is worked out at great
length ; at such great length indeed that we cannot
follow it in translation, but must be content with
considerable abbreviation and synopsis. Although
the parts of the world are hostile to one another,
yet they are one, just as the play is one whose plot
involves the hostility of many of its characters.
Better still, the world is like the musical harmony
which is composed of different and opposing tones.
Just as the existence of the harmony is conditioned
by the difference and opposition of its elements, so if
Reason were not a manifold though plurality implies
opposition it would not be Reason. 2 How much
more sharply will these differences be accentuated on
the phenomenal plane in the physical world !

Let us now apply the analogy to the specific case
of sin. The opposition between good and evil is

1 iii. 2, 11 (263 E-264 A) [vol. i. p. 239, 1. 28 et seq.]. 11. dXX
6 \6yos ravra Trdvra iroiei &pxwv Kal oirro> jSotfXerai Kal TO, \ey6jj.eva
/ca/cd avrbs Kara \byov iroiei ov /3ouX6yu.ej>os iravra dyada elvcu, wffTrep
at> e i TIJ re^xyir^ ov irdvra ra iv r($ <($ 60#aX / uoi)s TTOIOI* ourws
o05 6 \6yos -rravra 0eoi)s dpydfrro, dXXa ra /u.ev Oeofc, T& 5 Sa.tfJ.ovas,
devrtpav <pv<nv, elra dvOpwirovs Kal fya ^0e^s, ov (p66vip, dXXa \6y<{)
voepav &XOVTI. 7/^ieTs 5^, &<rirep ol aireipoL ypafanijs T^V^
, tl)j o^ /caXd TO, xpciyuara iravraxov, o de apa TO. Trpo<rf}KOvra
e/fdaTa; r67ry r) et rts Spa-fta /x^0otro, 6 rt fj.7] Travres
tv avrf, dXXa Kal ot /c^r?;? Kal rts aypOLKOs Kal (J)av\(i)S (f>6eyy6-
TO d ov Ka\6v <rTtv, ef TIS TOVS ~)(elpo\n 4%\oi t Kal IK TOVTUV



2 iii. 2, 16 (268 A-E) [vol. i. p. 246, 1. 10 et seq.].



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL

like the strophe and the antistrophe of the chorus.
Both contribute to the beauty of the dance. Does
one object that then sinners are not really wicked ?
Certainly they are. The explanation involves
a qualification into which we cannot now enter,
but given the fact of sin, the sinner is given his
appropriate place in the dance, or role in the play.
In the playwright s work the actor is assigned his
lines heroic or villainous according to his tempera
ment ; in the world-drama the soul is one of the
players, and receives a part from the poet consonant
with her nature. This nature she has before the
play begins. If her voice and form are beautiful she
enhances the piece, if they are ugly they may dis
please, but they do not detract from the perfection
of the plot and the general conception of the drama.
At the same time the playwright is right in rebuk
ing the poor actor and in assigning to him inferior
parts which are better fitted to his abilities. It is
the souFs fault if she does not choose or if she is not
fitted to enact a virtuous part. And it is with
equal justice that the man who chooses and lives
up to the noble role is promoted and rewarded. 1

In this wise sinners are harmonized with the
World -Reason. For, as is meet, everything is
harmonious to the part it receives, as each single
string of a lyre is stretched in its proper and fitting
place with reference both to the tone of the instru
ment and to its own strength. The world, then, is
1 iii. 2, 17 (268 E-269 o) [vol. i. p. 247, 1. 6 et seq.].



THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

perfect if everything has its place in it. Indeed,
Tartarus and outer darkness have their function in
it, and it is well that their tone in the universal
harmony should be deep and harsh.

Again, just as in a shepherd s pipe there is not
merely one note, but several, both stronger and
weaker, yet all contributory to the sound of the
whole, so there are different places in the universe,
better and worse, filled by souls of different degrees
of virtue which by their very differences enhance the
perfection of the whole. What to them is evil is good
for the whole, what to them is contrary to nature is
for it natural. They are none the less inferior, but
their inferiority does not vitiate the goodness of the
universe. After all, the ignominy of the hangman
does not make a well-governed state the worse. He
has his use. 1

Finally, the interdependence of contraries is ex
plicitly proclaimed. " As some things are better,
so some things must be worse. For how, where
there is to be variety, can there be anything that is
worse without something that is better, or anything
that is better without something that is worse ?
One must not, then, blame what is worse in the
better, but be contented with the better in that it
has given of itself to the worse. They who demand
that the worse should be abolished altogether in the
universe, abolish Providence itself. If there is to
be no evil, against what shall Providence provide?

1 iii. 2, 17 (269 G-275 &) [vol. i. p. 249, 1. 9 et seq.].



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 213

Certainly not for itself nor for that which is better." l
In other words, Plotinus agrees with the author of
the Epistle to the Romans that " where sin abounded
grace did much more abound."

These arguments are familiar enough. Amplified
and improved they are still the heavy artillery
of ethical monism. Were they all or even the
main portion of Plotinus s battery we might stop
to direct our fire against them, and silence them if
possible. But it is scarcely worth while to attack
what is for him a secondary battery, and so trained
at that, that it threatens himself more than his
critics. For every one of the passages which we
have discussed is contradicted or at least qualified
by others in such a way as to remove him for the
present from the ranks of the ethical monists.

The nature of the qualification made by Plotinus
was hinted at above, when in discussing his attempt
to explain the possibility of transmigration we noted
references to a material principle other than, and
in some measure opposed to, the activity of the
soul. Let us now take Plotinus s self-corrections
in this respect, as we took the other arguments, one
by one.

First, we may note a qualification of the argu-

1 iii. 3, 7 (276 G) [vol. i. p. 259, 1. 24 et seq.]. 4. K al 6n 5 TO,
/SeArtw, /ecu rd x^pu- ^el irus av en? TL x e ^P ov & iroXveidet pJr]
oWos jSeXrtoj/os, ?) TrcDs rb {$\TLOV fj.rj x i P ov s , & ffr
ov & T fieXriovi, dXAd dirodeKTeois TO fit\Tiov, STL
x e L P vl 6 Xws de ot avatpelv dtoiWes TO %e?/)op ev

irpbvoLav avr-qv. TWOS yap GTQ.(. ; ov yap drj our^s oi>5



THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

ment that the universe is better for being so ordered
as to punish sinners. "Evil-doers are punished by
being corrupted in their souls through evil activities,
and by being assigned to an inferior position in the
world. For nothing can ever escape the lot assigned
to it by the law of the universe." But Plotinus warns
us. " Order does not exist because of disorder, nor
justice because of injustice in the sense, as a man
may think, of existing for the sake of being created
and made manifest by the worse qualities. On the
contrary, order and justice are the result of an order
coming from above. Disorder exists because there
is order and on account of law and reason, and
lawlessness and irrationality exist because there is
Reason, not because the better produces the worse,
but because that which ought to receive the better
is not able to receive it either through its own
nature, or by chance, and because there are other
things to prevent it." 1

In fine we have here an admission that Evil
does not contribute anything to the law and pro
portion and order of the universe. It rather exists
as a residuum of lawlessness and disorder, due to

1 iii. 2, 4 (258 A-C) [vol. i. p. 231, 1. 11 et seq.}. t<rx<>v<n W
ddiKovvres 5t/cas KaKvvbutvol re rcus \j/vxais frepyeiau /cadets rarrb^evoi
re els rbirov x^pova ov yap /AijTrore ^K<f>{ryg M&kv ro %0ej> fr rif
rov Travrbs vbpy. fort d ov 5ia rrjv dra^Lav rdts ovde 5ta rrjv avofiLav
vbfjios, &s TLS oterai, iW ytvoiro tKeiva Sia ra x e V w /ca tl/a <M J/otTO >
dXXd 5ta TT]V Taiv c-rraKTbv ofitraf Koi #rt rct^is dra^ia Kal 5td TOV
v6/J.ov Kal rbv \6yov, Kal Sri XOYOS Trapavo/j-ia Kal avoia ov T&V /3eX-
Tiovuv ra X e ^P ( " } 7re7r otr/K6rwj , dXXa TOV S^ecr^ai deo^vwv ra
<f>v<ret rrj eavr&v r) avvrvxia Kal Ku\vaei d\\wv dt%a<rda<. ov



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL

the fact that because of a recalcitrancy in things,
law and order cannot gain full ascendancy.

In the same way Plotinus qualifies his argument
that Evil is used for the best in the economy of the
world, in that vice, for example, serves as a stimulus
to virtue, and as a contrast by which its goodness is
heightened. " But," the correction runs, " Evil does
not exist for the purpose of enhancing the Good by
contrast. As I have said, I mean only that when
it occurs Reason employs it to serve its needs. It is
a sign of the greatest power to be able to turn Evil
to good account, and when formless things come
into being to be able to apply them to the service
of other forms. Generally speaking, Evil must be
defined as a lack of good. There must necessarily
be a lack of good in this world, since the Good exists
here as in an alien world. This other medium in
which the Good exists, being different from the Good,
is responsible for the lack of good, for this other
medium is not good. Evil cannot be destroyed
because, when judged by the nature of the Good, one
thing is inferior to another, and other things, though
they take the cause of their being from the Good,
are different from it, and are rendered imperfect by
their distance from it." l

The first part of the passage merely repeats the

1 iii. 2, 5 (259 B-D) [vol. i. p. 232, 1. 32 et seq.]. Kal ov yeyove
ra KO.KCL dia ravTa, a\\a STL XPV TaL Kal a^rcus els Stoi>, tirelirep
4yti>eTO, etprjrat. TOVTO dt Swd^ews ^eyiar^, /caXws Kal rots KO.KOIS
dwaffdat, Kal rots d/x6/)0ots yevo^voLs els erfyas /xop0as
iKavrjv dvai. tfXws 5 rb KaKbv t\\ei\f/u> rov dyaOov dtrtov



216 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

assertion that evil does not make good better, and
that the Good makes the best of the evil it finds
opposed to it. In the latter half, Plotinus has
apparently the Platonic dictum in the Theaetetus in
mind, and interprets it in the light of his emanation
theory, turning for the moment what he elsewhere
regards as grades of perfection into grades of im
perfection. Incidentally, he once more betrays the
fundamental contradiction of his system, briefly and
to the point.

He executes precisely the same volte -face in
another passage dealing with the whole question of
kinds of perfection. God is not to be blamed, he
insists, because I am a man and not an angel or a
god. "It is not fitting that all things should be
equal. Has Reason then measured things out with
the intention that they should not be equal ? By
no means. It was in accordance with nature that
this should be so." Then follows an enumeration of
the degrees of emanation, ending finally with the
physical world whose parts "are not souls, but
weakenings of souls already fading in the process of
emanation. For the seminal reason of an animal,
even though it be animate, is a different soul from
that from which it proceeded. And this seminal
reason becomes weaker as it hastens on into Matter.



dl e\\eiif/w elvai evravda dyaSov, on ev &\\<#. TO odv d\\o,
tv (f tan TO dyad6v, frepov dyaffov bv Troiei rty \\i\f>t.i> TOVTO yap
OVK dyadbv fy. dib ovdt airoXtffQai. TO. KCtKa, OTL TC dXXa aXXw
eXdrrw Trpos ayadov (f>6(nv eTepd re &\\a TOV dyadov TTJV aiTiav r??s
ev \a[36vTa, TotaCra



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 217

And what it produces is still more feeble. See then
how far the creature is removed from original
perfection ! And still it is wonderful ! But because
that which is created has a certain nature, what is
prior to it need not have the same nature, for that
which is prior to it is better than anything created,
and without blemish. We should wonder rather
that it has given something of itself to the world
and has left such traces of itself. If it has given

o

more of itself than created things could receive, it
is still more to be approved. Hence, though we
cast the blame upon created men the munificence of
Providence is still the greater." 1

We return now to the consideration earlier
deferred of the Plotinian method of dealing with the
objection that if the moral life be merely a play by
which the inner essence of the soul is unaffected, all
real distinction of moral values, such as good and

1 iii. 3, 3 (273) [vol. i. p. 253, 1. 24 et seq.}. ov yap irdvra
iff a. efSei. ftp ovv /merprjcravTos avrov Trpoaiptffet rov j^r) oelv irdvra foa;
ou5a/zw? dXX o#ra> /caret, (pv<rw eZ%e yevfodai. d/c6Xou#os yap euros
6 X67os ^vxy dXXfl, d/c6Xoi#os d ^u%r; avrrj v< } vovs 5 ov rovriav TI
%v, dXXd irdvra ra d irdvra TroAXd TroXXa 5e ovra Kal ov ravra ra
IJikv TrpcDra, ra d devrepa, ra 5 ^(pe^rfs Kal TTJ a^ia fyeXXev elvai.
Kal roivvv Kal ra yevo/meva <j?a ov ^f%at /AOVOV, dXXd \l/vx&>v Aarrcu-
(rets, CHOI e^LTrjXuv r}ori irpoiovruv, 6 yap rov fyov \6yos, K&V /j.\j/vxos
77, ertpa ^i^X 7 ?, ou/c tKeivrj, d<j> fjs 6 \6yos, Kal 6 ffv^Tras ouros t\drruv
Si) ylverai aTrevdwv et s v\r]i> Kal rb yevbfjievov ^ auroO tvdetvrepov.
(TKOirei. 5i] offov dfp^a T rjKe rb yevbpevov Kal 6 /ia;s (rrl davpa. ov
roivvv, et roiovrov rb yevb^evov, Kal rb irpb avrov roiovrov (rri yap
iravrbs Kpetrrov rov yevofitvov Kal e^w at rtas Kal fj.a\\ov dav/mdcrai,
on ob)K ri fAe6 avrb Kal ra t"xyt] avrov roiavra. el o ori Kal
ir\ov ZdwKev r) ocrov ^oucrt /crTjcracr^ai, ^rt u.a\\ov dirodeKrtov axrre
Kivovvevew rty alriav tiri rovs yevou,evovs ifrai, rb d rrjs irpovolas



218 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

evil, natural and unnatural, will be destroyed. In
Plotinus s treatment of this point the idea of a
limitation to the workings of Providence is further
developed. The objection, he says, demands that we
look more closely at the nature of the Aoyos or seminal
reason. "This is not unmixed Mind or absolute
Mind, nor even pure Soul either. But it depends
upon and is a sort of radiation from both Mind and
Soul from Soul that is, determined by Mind which
generate this seminal reason as a life having reason
latent in it (r)o-v X ii\ But all life, even evil life,
is activity. . . . Whatever has this activity present
within it, and participates in it in any way, is at
once rationalized, that is to say is given form, since
the activity peculiar to life is capable of giving form,
and its motion is formative. Its activity then is
like that of an artist, like the motions of a dancer,
for instance. The dancer himself is a good type of
the artistic life, in as much as his art moves him and
moves him to be what he is in life. . . . Since then
this reason proceeds from the one Mind and the one
life and from each in its fulness, it is neither one
life nor one mind, nor either in its fulness, nor does
it give itself to its objects in its entirety and com
pleteness. But opposing one part to another and
creating each part with something lacking, it in
itself involves and produces war and conflict. Thus,
as a whole it is one, though it is not Unity." ]

Next, Plotinus adduces the dramatic .-analogy,

1 iii. 2, 16 (267 n-268) [vol. i. p. 245, 1. 18 etseq.].* t<rri rolvw

oSros OVK SucpaTos voOs ou5 ctiWous ovdt ye ^vx^ Kadapas rb 76/05,



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 219

and likens the oneness of the universe to that of a
drama, or of a musical chord, in a passage which we
have already examined. This passage is then quali
fied in the following manner. " If good men form
some parts of the world and evil men other parts,
and the evil men form a greater part than the good,
it is like a drama in which the author in part arranges
scenes for the actors, and in part employs the actors
themselves as he finds them. He does not himself
create the protagonist, nor yet the second player
nor the third, but gives to each his appropriate lines,
and in doing so assigns to him the part which befits
him. . . . Prior to the play the actors were what they
were, and gave themselves to the play as they were." *
Finally, in another book in the first Ennead, to
a consideration of which we shall shortly turn, the



7jpTr)fj.evos de fKelvrjs Kal olov ^/cXa/ii/ ts ^ afjupolv, vov /cat \f/vx?js /ecu
i/vxys Kara vovv diaKeifJitvris yevvrjo-avTwv TOV \6yov TOVTOV faty \byov
Tiva i]<rvxij exovffav. TraVci Se far/ evpyei.a, Kal 77 (pav\ij evepyei.a
8e oi>x cos TO irvp evepyei, dXX 77 tvtpyeia avrrjs, KCLV fj.7) o.la9t]a(^ TIS
irapfj, Klvtjcris ns OVK et /q/. oTs yovv &v Trap?? Kal /tiera,o-%7/ OTTWCTOW
OTIOVV, evdtis \e\6yurai, TOVTO 8t tari. /Lte/x6p0WTat, a>s TTJS tvepyeias
rrjs /caret TTJV faty /JLOp<f>ovv 8vvafj.j>ir)s Kal Kivotiarjs OVTWS, cos p.op(f>ovi>.
i) Toivvv frtpyeia avrrjs Texvt-Krj, tiairep av 6 6pxovfJ.evos Kivovju.ei>os e trj
6 yap 6jO%7/<rT77s T^Q OVTU rexvi-Krj ^"cofj ^ot/cev ai)r6s Kal ij r^x vr l avrbv
KLvei Kal oft KiveT, tos TTJS 07775 avrijs Toiatrr)? TTWS 0^0-779. ravra
^v otiv dpricrdw TOV o iav Set Kal rty rjVTtvow ^tirrjv rjyetffQai eve/ca.
iJKUv Toivvv oCros 6 \67os K vov ei>bs Kal WTJS /nias ir\ifipovs 6i>Tos
OVK ZffTiv O{JT fay fJita OVT vovs TIJ els otfre eKacrTaxov
ovde 5i5oi)r eavrbv ols oLoucnv 6\ov re /cat irdvTa. dvTidels d
d\X?7\ots TO. fJ.tp r) Kal Troir]ffas vdea TroX^/wof /cat /idxTjs (rvaTaffiv Kal
ytveviv dpyacraTO Kal OVTUS iar\v els Tras, el /J.T] v ely.

1 iii. 2, 17 (268 G) [vol. i. p. 247, 1. 24 et seq.}. dXX el TO
ai/TOV aya06s avr/p, TO de &\\o Trovr)p6s, Kal ir\elb} pepy 6
s, too-Tre/) iv dpa.fj.aa-i ra /J.ev rdrrei aurots 6 TTOIT/TTJS, rot? 5^



220 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

interdependence of contraries is reviewed and ex
plained with a fresh addition to its significance.
Plotinus is interpreting Plato s saying in the
Theaetetus, that Evil necessarily exists in the world
and can never pass away. Plato has defined flight
from Evil not as a literal flight from the world, but
as a just and upright life led in the world. It is
objected that if every one were good, then Evil would
cease. Impossible, is the answer, Evil exists neces
sarily since there must be an opposite to the Good.

Plotinus raises objections. Vice is an opposite
not of the Good, but of virtue which is a good in
that it helps us to overcome Matter. But to the
Good which is without quality, there can be no
opposite. How then can Evil be said to be necessary
as an opposite to the Good? It is true that contraries
exist, as for example sickness and health, but the
existence of one is not indispensable to that of the
other. Again, how can there be an opposite to
essence and the super-essential ? Let us answer by
asking what such an essence would be. Evidently it
would be the non-essential, and the non-good. If
the particulars that are comprised under these two
genera are all opposed, the genera themselves will be

Xp??Tat o3<r> rfdrj ov ykp avrbs TrpUTayuvLffryv ovd deuTepov ovdt
rpLrov Trotet, dXXd didotis e/cdcrry roi)s TrpocrfiKovTas \6yovs TJd-r] dirt-
dojKev e/cdary ets 6 Terd^ai 8^ov oi/roj rot /cat &TTI rd-rros eKaara} 6
IJL^V r(p ayadb), 6 5e raj /ca/cy Trptirwv. e/cdrepos odv /card, (pv<nv /cat
/card \6yov els eKarepov /cat rbv irpeTrovra. X.wpel rbv TOTTOV %wj>, SP
et Xero. eZra (pOtyyerai /cat Trotet 6 ^v d<re/3etj \6yovs /cat tpya
), 6 5 TO, tvavria, ^aav yap /cat irpb rov dpa/maras TOLOVTOL oi
res eavroi)s



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL 221

opposed and even more opposed than the particulars.
For opposed particulars fall within the same species,
or the same genera, and have some common
characteristics. How much more opposed will things
like good and evil be, whose contrarieties can be
reconciled in no summum genus ! Rather do they
represent ultimate and opposed genera. For to
being and not-being, truth and falsehood, no logical
common substratum can be found.

Good, then, may have an opposite of this kind.
But does Evil exist necessarily ? Yes, in the sense
that there must be Matter in the universe. Without
Matter the universe could not exist. The world is a
mixture of vovs and avdyKrj. And the necessity for
this contrary principle may be explained as follows :
" Since the Good is not alone, through progression,
or if one prefers, through continual descent and
departure from it, there must necessarily arise a last
thing, that is, something after which nothing more
can be produced. This last is Evil. It is necessary
that there should be something after the first, hence
comes this last. 1 This is Matter which has nothing
left of the first in it. It is in this sense that Evil
is necessary." J

In the light of these passages new aspects of the

1 For all this ending with the quotation, see i. 8, 6
(75 G-77 E) [vol. i. p. 104, 1. 29 et seq.]. eirel yap ov /J.OVQV rb dyadov,
dvdyKT] ry ^/c/3d<rei rrj Trap 1 avrov, $, et OVTO) TLS 6\oi \tyew, rfj del
i>7ro/3d(rei Kal aTrocrTdffei, rb &r%aroi , Kal ped 6 OVK fy TI yevtaOat
OTLOVV, TOVTO eli>ai rb KOLK^V. dvdyKTjs 5e dvai rb pera rb Trpurov,
&<rre Kal rb ^(rxaroj/ TOVTO 5 r\ v\rj /j.i)5ci> ert tx ov(ra UVTOV. Kal
i) dvdyKij TOV /ca/cou.



222 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

Plotinian theodicy are opened up. From Stoic
monism we seem to be passing over to the conven
tional Neo-Platonic dualism. Evil now appears not
as a positive factor absolutely contributive to the
nature of perfection, but as a principle by which the
realization of perfection in and by the universe is
curtailed. It not only differentiates kinds of per
fection and arranges them in a hierarchy (remark
the old confusion once more), but it prevents any
particular sort of excellence from being completely
exemplified. It is the opposite of the Good,
and contrary to it beyond any hope of synthesis
with it in a higher unity. The two can find no
common universal, no genus broad enough to include
them both.

Seen under these new conditions the world is still
the best possible world, but in a different sense.
It is the best possible world not absolutely, but
relatively the best, that is, which the power of the
Good can produce in the face of the limitations
under which it works. Our admiration of the world
must not be cooled by the presence of Evil nor our
faith in Providence shaken. Rather must we admire
creation and Creator alike for having done so well
under the circumstances.

Dualism has got a bad name among us. Philo
sophically it controverts ethical, and (owing to a
confusion of the senses of the term perfection) is
supposed to controvert naturalistic, monism. Theo
logically it denies the omnipotence of God. Yet



PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL

it is, after all, the assumption by which every man
lives, and in which many religious souls find their
inspiration, if only they could see the logical implica
tions of their devotional attitude. This fact is
forced upon us in every exhortation of the preacher
and reformer. The world can be bettered, must be
bettered. Conditions as they are are not ideal. So
cries the moralist, and on this faith the moral man
lives. Or, expressed in theistic terms, it is in a
sense of co-operation with a higher power toward
a common end that the moral life receives its con
secration and customary piety its call and support.
But one cannot co-operate with omnipotence or aid
in establishing a perfection already promulgated by
fiat. It would be only a labouring God working
against real obstacles towards an end as yet un-
attained whom our acts and lives could help, or by
whom, in any intelligible sense of the word, we could
be helped.

We act then towards God and with God as if his
power were restricted, and we could be of some use
to him in helping bring in his kingdom, whatever
the letter of our creed may imply to the contrary,
and however alert we may be in defending it from
attack. That alertness indeed is not without its
justification. The religious consciousness needs and
assumes in its God power enough to carry the evolu
tion of reality through to a happy consummation.
Belief in God rests ultimately on the need of
vindicating the assertion and pursuit of the Ideal



THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

in the face of discouraging conditions and of assuring
its ultimate success. For the efficient discharge of
this function we must believe his power to be
sufficient, and to postulate his omnipotence is to
express this belief by a hyperbole. But the asser
tion overreaches itself and defeats its own end. To
say that God is almighty is merely a grandiloquent
way of saying that the universe is acceptable to
itself as it stands. And that assertion, as we have
seen, is to attribute to God a perfection in which
we take no interest, and to which we can only con
form by a repression of natural aspirations and a
renunciation of legitimate goods. It is, in fine, to
destroy the whole function of God as a warrant and
support of the moral life.

So much, in passing, for dualism. Whatever the
merits of the question may be, its appearance as
part of the Plotinian theodicy leads us to reopen
the entire question Trepl TOV riva KOU TroBev TO, Ka/<a,
and to ask ourselves again, as Plotinus asks himself
in the eighth book of the first Ennead, what and
whence is Evil ? To do so is to begin a new chapter
in our study.



CHAPTER IV

MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL

To the opening paragraphs of the eighth book of
the first Ennead we have already had occasion to
refer. We remember how they start with the
question of what the nature of Evil may be, and, to
facilitate an answer, turn to the consideration of the
nature of its opposite, the Good. In the case of
this discussion, Evil is excluded from the spheres of
and isvri ; it is banished, as in Plato, from



the whole realm of Being. 1

Evil, then, if it is evil, must be sought in the jj
realm of Not-being, " as some form of Not-being, 1
and as having to do with things that are mingled
with Not-being, or in some way sharing in it."
Plotinus, however, hastens to define his meaning
more sharply.

Evil is Not-being, but not in the absolute sense
of the word. Its not-being does not mean that it

1 i. 8, 1 (72 A-73 c) [vol. i. p. 99, 1. 6 et seq.].

2 i. 8, 3 (73 c) [vol. i. p. 101, 1. 7 et seq.] AetTrercu rolvvv,
efaep tffriv, tv rots M ofoiv elvai olov cldos TL TOV w OVTOS di>
KCLL irepl TL TUV fifuy(dvtai> T$ (JLTJ &VTL T) birwcovv KOivuvoforwv re?

fJiT] 6t>Tl.

225 Q



226 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

does not exist, but that its existence is other than
that of pure Being. At first sight this would seem
merely a complex way of stating that evil is other
than good. This in a sense is true, but the state
ment is the outcome of much philosophic discussion.
Plotinus is seeing one of the ghosts by which ancient
philosophy was haunted, the question of the exist
ence of Not-being. Its outlines had been vaguely
descried by the Eleatics. It had taken more definite
shape in the Atomists 1 assertion of the existence
of the Void. It had been raised by Plato in the
Sophist, and it may be fairly said to have appeared
to Aristotle, who attempted to exorcize it with
the Trpurr) vXr/. And it proved a useful spectre to
invoke in behalf of Neo - Pythagorean and Neo-
Platonic dualism.

The Plotinian qualification bears some resem
blance to Plato s answer to the question as given in
the Sophist. 1 There the existence of Not-being is
shown to mean the existence of not-being-this, or
not-being-that. The not-beautiful is, but it is not
beautiful. Mr) 6V becomes eVe^ooi/, the principle of
differentiation between various classes of things, all of
which, though they exclude one another, participate
equally in Being.

This, however, is not altogether Plotinus s thought,

so far as Evil is concerned. Evil exists, indeed, and

its Not -being is to be explained as "not -being"

relatively to the Good. But this "not-being" is

1 Sophist^ 237-59.



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 227

more than a mere logical negative. It has a meta
physical significance as well. For the Good is the
source and entirety of Being. Not to be the Good,
then, means not to be Being. And in proportion as
a thing is removed from the Good, in that proportion
it lacks Being. Everything, so far as it is, is good.
Evil, one might say paradoxically, as far as it is, is
good. The paradox would be explained by Plotinus
by the statement that the fact of the existence of Evil
is conditioned by the source of all existence, but its
value is due to the degree to which the Good,
diminished and spent, has died away in the evil part.
We are not, to be sure, really rid of the paradox,
but to that we shall return later.

It is perhaps to emphasize this difference, and
apparently with the examples given by Plato in the
Sophist of rest and motion, that Plotinus goes on
to say that Evil is not "Not-being" in the sense
in which rest and motion are Not-being. Motion,
Plotinus had elsewhere defined as transition from
potentiality to actuality, and had designated its
existence as accidental. 1 But Evil, as we shall see,
cannot be described as merely a property or accident ;
nor could it be regarded as potential Being or as
incidental to the passage from potentiality to
actuality. That would have been to reverse the
whole process of emanation. Evil is due to a dis
tinction in values, founded not upon a progress from

1 vi. 22, 3 (638 A) [vol. ii. p. 354, 1. 17 et seq.]. Cf. ii. 6
(129 A-B) [vol. i. p. 172, 1. 4 et seq.].



228 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

lower to higher, but upon a degeneration of the
higher into the lower.

This thought stands out in sharp contrast to
that of Aristotle. In both systems, indeed, the
relatively actual and higher is prior logically and
metaphysically to the relatively lower and potential.
But the direction of the world-process in one system
is opposed to that of the other. For Aristotle it is
essentially an ascent, a progression, a realization by
Matter of higher and higher forms and more and
more actuality. Plotinus, to be sure, keeps the
" upward-way " in his doctrine of the return of ^vyri
to the One ; but this upward way is inner and
mystic ; a process of salvation in which the process
of creation is revoked. Creation is not aspiration
towards the One, but emanation from it, in which
Being and actuality undergo a regressive diminution.

To return now to the text. Evil must be re
garded as an image of Being, or rather of Not-being.
This image we find present in the sensible world
and its properties, or in something essential or
accidental to it and them. We may picture it as
a sort of Alpha-privative of form, determination,
and self-sufficiency. This character of want and
insufficiency is not an attribute of the evil principle,
but is its essence and being. Nor is Evil merely a
property or attribute. It also exists in and for
itself, like the Good. Just as we may distinguish
two kinds of good, the Good xaO ain-o, and the
goodness of things which participate in the Good,



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 229

so we may discriminate between what we may call
adjectival and substantival Evil, evil as a quality
and attribute of objects, and Evil as a principle or
substance by which the property is imparted.
Substantival and adjectival Evil are also termed
respectively Trpurov KO.KOV or primal, and Sevrepov
KO.KOV or secondary Evil. 1

" That which underlies structures and forms and
shapes and measures and bounds, and is embellished
with order not its own, which has nothing good of
itself, and is, as it were, a shadowy image in com
parison with real existence, and is the essence of
evil (if there can be an essence of evil) such might
reasoning find to be primal and absolute Evil."
Bodies are evil secondarily, not absolutely. Evil
inheres in them as the result of their participation
in Matter. Hence their nature is such that it has
no true form, is bereft of life, full of internal strife,
disordered in its own motion, a hindrance to the
soul and the soul s activities, and in constant
Heracleitean flux. 2 Evil, then, we might say, is an
essential property of the corporeal.

" Of ^vxij, however, Evil is but an accidental
property. The soul is not evil in herself, nor are
all souls evil. By reason, however, of her union
with the body, and of the vegetative and sensitive
power involved therein, she is liable to the solicita
tions of the senses and passions, and by giving way



1 i. 8, 3 (73 E-74 B) [vol. i. p. 101, 1. 13
2 i. 8, 3 (74 A) [vol. i. p. 102, 1. 10 e



et seq. ].



230 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

to these becomes soiled and corrupted by the evil
principle. As long, however, as she does not heed
these solicitations, she remains innocent and un-
defiled. 1 The perfected and intellectually inclined
soul is ever pure, and removed from Matter and all
indeterminateness and lack of measure and Evil ; nor
does she see or come near them. She remains pure,
determined wholly by Mind. But if she does not
remain thus, and goes out from herself, then by
reason of not being determined by the perfect and
the primal, she becomes, in proportion as she lacks
them, the shadow of her perfect self. She is filled
with indeterminateness and sees darkness, and
already has hold of Matter, seeing, as it were, what
she does not see, just as we also speak of seeing
darkness." 2

The point is further developed. We are not the
principles of Evil. We do not produce it. It is
prior to us. " The evil which lays hold of men lays
hold of them without their willing it. Indeed,
there is a flight from evils existing in the soul, open
for those who are able to flee. Not all, however,
are able." 3 It follows that vice is not absolute Evil,
nor even an essential property of the soul, since it
is not present in all men, and where it is present,
can be overcome and driven out.

We may object, however, that external and

1 i. 8, 4 (74) [vol. i. p. 102, 1. 18 et seq.}.

2 i. 8, 4 (74. 9) [vol. i. p. 103, 1. 12 et seq.}.

3 i. 8, 5 (75 E) [vol. i. p. 104, 1. 21 et seq.}.






MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL

physical evils, such as disease and poverty, seem
incapable of being comprehended within the defini
tion. But, answers Plotinus, sickness may be
described as deficiency or superfluity, and hence as
a lack of order and determination in the body, ugli
ness is a lack of determination of Matter by Form,
poverty is a lack of the necessities of corporeal
life. 1 The negative definition of Evil covers them.

Metaphorically, then, we may define Evil in re
lation to the soul as " seeing darkness." This, which
metaphysically speaking is only secondary, is psycho
logically primal Evil, and the darkness itself, which
in the order of the universe is primal is, relative to
the contaminated essence of the soul, only secondary. 2



1 i. 8, 5 (75 D) [vol. i. p. 104, 1. 14 et

2 i. 8, 85 (15 B) [vol. i. p. 103, 1. 22 et seq,]. The foregoing
quotations and discussions are taken from the passage appended.

Set ovv etVat TL Kal aireipov Kad avrb Kal avdSeov ad avrb /cat rd aXXa
TO, irpbvdev, d rty TOV KO.KOV e xapa/CT^ptfe <f> V( n- v , KC " ^ TL ^ er ^ K ^
TOiovTov, r) [jiefjuyiJLej>oi> e^et TOVTO T) p\irov irpos avTO eVrt TOIOVTOV

i) TTOlTJTiKOV CO-Tl TOiOVTOV. TT]V 5^ l)1TOKei.^V1]V (J^r\^G,<Sl KO.I cfteffl KO.I

poppals /cat fdrpois /cat irtpaai /cat &\\orpt(f KOVW KOff^ov^vnv, fj-rjdev

Trap avTTJs ayadbv exovcav, et SwXo?/ 5e cos irpbs ra 8vra, /ca/coi) 5e

ovffiav, ef rts /cat Swarat /ca/coO oi-crta elvai, ra^v avevplffxei 6

\6yos KaKbv elvat irp&rov /cat Ka8 avrb KaKov. 4.

Qfois, Ka6b<rov /uerexet uXT/s, KaKbv av df] ?x ei f^ v

TL OVK aXrjdivbv ^T^p^rai re fcoijs (pOeipei re a\\r)\a

Trap avrwv drd/cry ^Trodtd re if/vxw Trpos rty avrTJs tvepyeiav

re ovaiav del peovra, \f/vx*l 8e Ka8 cavrty ^v ov /ca/cT? ov8 aS

Trao-a /ca/c^. aXXd ris r, Ka^ ; ottv, frffi, dov\uffaptvii ^v $

7re0u/ce /ca/cta ^vxys tyyiveffdai, ws TOV d\6yov TTJS

etdovs TO /ca/coj/ dexoptvov, d^tTpiav /cat uTrep/SoXV Kal

&v Kal d/coXacrta /cat SetXia /cat rj aXXrj \l/vxv ^a/ct a, aKotffta

56^as i/ euSets e^TrotoOj/ra /ca/ca re voplfriv Kal dyadd a Qetyet. re /cat

5ic6/cet. dXXa rt TO TreTrot^/cos TTJJ/ /ca/ct aj/ ra^i/ /cat TTWS ets

^/cet^i/ /cat alriav dfd^ets ; -i? Trpwroi fttv OVK tw v\r]S oi)5e /ca0



THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

The theory as thus outlined runs counter in all
its implications to that doctrine of the possibility
of varieties of perfection upon which Plotinus so
strongly insists. Kinds of perfection have to become
grades of imperfection, progressively increasing as
the light of Being dies through shade after shade of
obscurity into the absolute darkness. They can be
viewed in no other way. Whether or no Plotinus
is conscious of his contradiction of himself, he will
not allow it to exist. He warns us, in fact, against
the logical conclusion of what he has said. Evil
does not consist in deficiency of any sort whatever,
but in universal deficiency ; deficiency in all respects
(IAActY w rrj TravrcXci). " For," he explains, " what
is slightly deficient in the Good is not evil, since it
can also be perfect relatively to its own nature.
But whenever a thing is altogether deficient, as
Matter is, such deficiency is essential Evil, and has



T] TOiatiTTj. fj./MKTai o$v dfj,Tpia Kal a/moipos ft Sous TOV
Kal ets /neTpov ayovTOS a&fjLOLTi yap eyK^KpaTai tiXyv

g-rreiTa. d /cat TO \oyibiievov el /SXaTrroiro, bpdv
Kal rots Trddecn /cat r< ^7ri(7/coret<r0at rrj vXy /cat irpos v\rjv
Kal 6 Xws ov -jrpos ovalav, d\Xa irpos ytveaiv opav, fy apx^ ^ V\T)<S
oiirws o&ra KO.KTJ cos /cat r6 fijirw tv avrrj, jj.bvov Se j3\tyai> et
dvawifj-TrXdvai /ca/cou eavrfy. d/^otpos yap Tra^reXcDs oCaa dyadov Kal
o-r^Tyo-ts TOVTOV Kal d/cparos ^XXet^ts Qofi.oi.ol eavrrj -jrav o TL ai>
avrijs Trpoffd^rai. bwuvovv. ij ^ v ode reXe/a /cat -rrpbs vovv vetowa
\f/vx^l del Kadapd Kal v\ijv d-jrtaTpa-rrTai Kal TO dbpiffrov airav
Kal TO d^fTpov Kal KaKbv ouTe bpa OVTC TreXd^ef KaBapd odv fj^vei
6pi<rdel<ra ry Traz/reXcDs. 17 de ^ pelvaffa. roOro, dXX e avTrjs
7rpoe\6ovffa T ^ reXety /x^Se Trpwry olov tvda\/j.a tKelvrjs T$
fXXet>/iart Kadbffov evtXiircv dopto-rt as Tr^fipudelffa. cr/coros o pa /cat
2%et r/5rj vXrjv pXtnovaa ety 6 fj.rj /3Xe?rct, ws Xey6/J.0a bpdv Kal TO

(TKOTOS.



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 233

no share in the Good." l It may be that Plotinus
means to include in general deficiency, the deficiency
of a thing not only as compared with other kinds of
things, but with respect to its proper perfection as
well. Or it may be that we have here another
attempt to reconcile kinds with grades of perfection
by insisting that there is a point in deficiency at
which it becomes evil ; namely, when a thing is
wanting " not only in the nature of something else,
but in its own nature as well. 1

There follows upon the passages we have been
examining the discussion already noted of Plato^s
assertion in the Theaetetus of the necessity of Evil as
a contrary to the Good. Then Plotinus summarizes
the argument, so far as it has gone, as follows :
" That which is in essence unmeasured is primal
Evil; that which becomes unmeasured, whether
through similarity or participation, is, by virtue of
what has befallen it, secondary Evil. Thus darkness
is primary, and that which is darkened is secondary
Evil. Vice, being ignorance and lack of measure
with respect to the soul, is secondary Evil, and not
absolute Evil ; just as virtue is not the primal Good,

1 i. 8, 5 (75 B) [vol. i. p. 103, 1. 26 et seq.}. 5. dXV ei 77
tfXXeti/ ts TOV dyaOov atria TOV bpav /ecu avve ivai T< crKoret, TO KOLKOV
eir) av ev rfj AXeti/ et Trj if/vxfj Kal irp&TOV oevTepov d &TTCU TO
tncoros Kal rj 0wm TOV KOLKOV OVK^TI ev Trj v\rj, dXXct /cat irpo TTJS
ti\rjs. TJ OVK iv Trj oiruffovv AXei^et, dXX iv T-Q iravTeXei Tb
KOLKQV TO yovv e\\ei7rov 6\iyoi> TOV ayaftou ov KaKbv, BuvaTai yap
Kal T^\eiov elvai us irpbs fyvaw TT\V auTou. dXX OTO.V
eXXeiTTfl, 8wep e<rriv i] v\rj, TOVTO TO
ftoipav.



234 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

but good because it resembles and participates in
the primal Good. " l

The rest of the book is devoted to a rebuttal of
various possible objections. In the first place, it
may be said that vice is not due to Matter, but to
a disposition of the body or modification of Matter
like heat or cold or bitterness or emptiness or
fulness ; in a word, to a form of some sort. But
even supposing this hypothesis to be true, the cause
of the evil disposition is still to be found in Matter.
A form or quality imposed upon Matter and working
upon it cannot produce without it what it produces
in connection with it. Thus the form of an axe can
be nothing without iron. Again, the form united
with Matter is not what it would be by itself. By
its union with Matter it is corrupted, and filled with
a nature contrary to itself and to the Good, and is
dominated and altered by it. Evil, then, is not a
modification of Matter by Form, but a modification
of Form by Matter. It may lie in a disposition of the
body, but the disposition is evil only in so far as it
represents a partial disintegration of form and
measure into formlessness and lack of measure, due
to the material admixture.

Apply this directly to the problem of sin and it
means that Matter is the cause of evil-doing. It is

1 i. 8, 8 (78 B) [vol. i. p. 109, 1. 3 et seq.]. eVrw drj Trpcircos
/AV TO &fj.Tpov KCLKOV, TO 5 ev dfj,eTpiq, yev6fj.evov ?} o/zotwaet ?) /xera-



/ecu Trpwrws p.kv TO
<r/c6roj, TO 5 ^aKOTLfffJi^vov devT^pws cocraimos. /ca/da BTJ dyvoia o$<ra
Kal d/meTpia irepi ifwxfiv Sefrepws Kaxbv Kal OVK avTOKaKOv ovd
yap dpeTrj irp&Tov dyadov, clXX 6 rt w/xoiwrat r/ ^iere/X7?0e aOroO.



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 235

useless to argue that one should overcome Matter.
The spirit that is tainted by Matter cannot over
come. Our disposition, as we know, is affected by
bodily changes and states. The only thing to do is
to flee the bodily and material altogether. Thus
only can we overcome Evil.

The objection here treated is discussed in its
more metaphysical aspects in the book on Matter.
There it appears as denial of the possibility that
the substratum of things may stand for a common
quality in all the material elements. Plotinus asks
four questions in reply : First, what is this quality ?
How shall we describe or define it ? Second, how
can a quality be a substratum, or, in other words,
how can an adjective be a substantive ? Third, how
can quality, which has no matter or extension, be
perceived in what will also have no extension ?
Finally, how can this quality, if it be describable,
be called Matter ?

On the other hand,, if, like the substratum of
definitions, it cannot be defined, it will not be a
quality, but the Matter of which we are in search.

Secondly, the important point arises how 7 Matter
or Evil can be an object of knowledge. Virtue we
know quite properly through the instrumentality
of the intellect, since the highest faculties of
the mind have in virtue an object akin to and at
one with themselves. In recognizing the Good in
the world, reason is but finding itself. But how can
the intellect whose thought is Being, think or know



THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

what is relatively "Not-being" and know it precisely
in its deficient character.

The possibility of such knowledge with respect
to adjectival Evil is first discussed. The conclusion
is that we know the badness of a thing as a
departure from a standard set by what we consider
the proper form and entelechy of the thing in
question. The object offers enough that is positive,
enough traces of form for us to infer what Idea is
seeking expression there, and hence for us to be
aware that this Idea is but imperfectly embodied.
" We see in part only, but we infer the nature of
what is absent from what is present, flmt i s? the
absent is really present formally or ideally, though it
fails to appear in the particular instance of the form.
In the same way, we succeed in making vice an object
of discourse, leaving at the same time its deficiency
in the sphere of the indeterminate and undefined.
For example, if we see Matter wearing, as it were,
an ugly mask because Reason has not sufficiently
mastered it to hide its ugliness, we represent Matter
to ourselves as ugly through its lack of form." l

Here, however, our knowledge of the indeter
minate rests upon a co-ordinate knowledge of the
determinate. We know the partial lack of form
through its partial presence which gives thought a
point (Fappui. But how are we to know what is
absolutely without form and incapable of determina
tion qua itself, if knowledge means determination ?
1 i. 8, 9 (78 G) [vol. i. p. 109, 1. 19 et seq.].



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 237

So far as we know Matter, it is no longer Matter
that we know. It is Matter determined and defined
by our thought, by some form, and subsumed by
it under some concept.

This difficulty had been met by Aristotle with
the assertion that Matter in itself is unknowable. 1
Form alone is a possible object of discourse. 2
Plotinus, however, is under the spell of Plato^s voOos
Aoytcr/ios, or "spurious concept." 3 To illustrate
what he means, Plotinus takes refuge in an analogy.
We know Evil and Matter, as we see darkness which
is absence of light, the only medium of seeing. NOTJS
becomes another vovs, a sort of unreason, giving up
its own nature in order to see what is opposite
to that nature. 4



1 Aristotle, Met. Z 10, 1036 a 8.



2 Id., ib. Z 10, 1035 a 1-9.

3 Plato, Timaeus 52 A-B.

4 i. 8, 9 (79 A) [vol. i. p. 109, 1. 25 et seq.]. This discussion
with the quotation on the previous page is based on the text
appended, rivi ofiv lyvwpiffa^ev raOra ; Kal trp&TOV KO.KIO.V rivi ;
dpeTTjv ph yap v$ avTif Kal <j>povri(rei avTTjv yap yvwptfa /ca/ctaz/ d
TrcDs ; T) uffirep KOLVOVL TO bpdbv /cat ^77, oura> /cat TO ^ 6vapfj.6ov Ty
dpeTy ; /SXeTrovres o$i> afob f) ^T] fiXeirovTes, TT]V Kadav \eyco ; ^ TTJV
pfr iravrekr) Kaicldv ov f3\tirovTes, /cat yap aireipov a<f>aipfoet oDv TO
/j.rj5afj,ov TOVTO rty S M TravTeXij ry ^XXe^Treii/ roury. pepos o$i>
opuvTes T$ irapbvTL fj^pei TO airbv \afJ.pdvovTes, 6 eari (ilv 4v T$ 6\y
et Set, ^/cet 5e aireaTiv, OVTW Kaidav \tyofjiei> ev dopiffTy Tb tffrepi)ft&ov
KaTa\nr6vTes. /cat 677 ^TTI r?}s I/XTJS olov aiffxpov TL irp6ff<inrov Id6vr& ov
KpaTri<ravTos ev avT$ TOV \6yov, &<TT Kpvfat TO TTJS v\t)s alam
(fiavTatfpeOa- ry TOV eidovs t\\et\f/i. 5 de Mdapfj etdovs

TTWS ; t) Tb irapd-irav d^aipovvTes trav elSos, $ fJ.7) TOVTO irdpeffTi,
elvat \j\riv, d/J,op<f)lav /cat avTol iv Tjfuv Xa/36ires tv T$ irdv eldos
et ^XXofiev vXyv 6edffaa9an.. oib /cat vovs a"XXos OVTOS, ov
s, roX/iTjcras ioeiv rd py avTOV.



238 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

In another passage in the book on Matter, he
seeks to explain his meaning. How will you con
ceive of that which is without quality ? he demands.
What will our thought or rational impression of it
be like ? It will be indeterminateness, is the reply.
" For if like is known by like, then the indeterminate
will be known by the indeterminate. There might
indeed be a definite concept of the indeterminate,
but the impression or intuition of the indeterminate
would be indeterminate." That is, I can define a
concept by saying that it is the concept of the in
definable. Such a concept cannot properly be
called knowledge, since it says nothing of its object
save that it is unknowable. Nor can it properly be
called ignorance, since it is, as it were, conscious of
its ignorance. That I cannot define is itself a defini
tion. That I cannot know is itself an act of
knowledge. Plotinus is insistent that the intuition
of indeterminateness is not blank ignorance or
absence of impression. It is, he says, reverting to
the analogy of "seeing darkness," as positive an
impression as that which the absence of light makes
upon the eye. We are aware of blackness which we
A define as absence of colour, light, and form.

To think, then, of "Not-being" is indeed to
think of nothing. But to think of nothing is not
to cease to think. The thought of nothing is the
result of abstracting all form and determinateness
from an object and dwelling upon the formlessness
which is left after one has thought away every mark



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 239

and attribute. Such thought Plotinus can describe
only in the words of Plato as a bastard concept or
presentation, not knowledge, but composed of the
"Other "and the false.

At the same time, it is difficult for the soul to
maintain this impression of indeterminateness. By
her very definition of it as indefinable, she gives it,
as we have seen, a spurious determinateness. Her
essential operation is formative. As soon as she
touches Matter, she gives it structure and determina
tion ; she thinks it under the form of material
objects. " She is pained by the indeterminate as by
a fear of being outside reality, and cannot bear to
remain long in Not-being." :

1 ii. 4, 10 (164 D) [vol. i. p. 158, 1. 7, p. 159, 1. 11]. rl o$v

voycrci) d/J.eyedes ev v\rj ; rl 5^ vorjtreis airoiov birwffovv ; /cat rts 17
v6r)<ris Kal Trjs dtavotas i) eTn^o\-fj ; r) aoptffTia el yap ry o^ot y TO
6/JiOiov, Kal T doplo-Ttp TO dopicrTOv. \6yos /J,ev ovv yevotTO av -rrepl
TOV dopiffTOV upHTfjifros, T] oe irpos avrb ^TrijSoX?? ddpicrros. el 5
ZttaffTov \6y(j} Kal vorjcrei yivu<TKTai frravOa d 6 /mev \6yos \tyei,
a drj \tyei -rrepl avrijs, r? d ^ovKo^vt] elvai v6rj(ns ov v6tj(ns, d\X
olov avoLa /AoXXov vbdov av dt] TO 0dj/ra(r/ua avrys Kal ov yvf}<riov,
K dartpov OVK aXydovs Kal /nera TOV dartpov \6yov o~vyK.ei.iJ.tvov.
Kal rd%a els TOVTO fiXeiruv 6 HXdruv voftip \oyio~/J.q> el-rre XTJTTTTJ^ elvai.
TI S ovv i] dopicrTia TTJS \^v)(ri<s ; apa TravTe\7]s ayvoia <is dirovo~La ; f)
ev /cara0d<ret nvl rb dopLcrrov, Kal olov 6(p6a\/j.y rb cr/coros v\t] oi>
iravrbs dopdrov %pc6yU,aros, ourcos odv Kal ^vx^ d<pe\ov(ra ova dirl
rots atffdrjTo is olov 0tDs TO \onrov ovKen fyovcra 6pi<rai b^oiovrai rfj
o\l/ei T?7 iv GKOTii- TOLVTOV TTOJS yivo/J.evr) TOTC r<$ o olov bpa. ap odv
dpq, ; r) OUTWS ws dtrxTll^oavvtjv Kal ws a^poiav Kal cos dXa/XTr^s /cat
irpoaeTL oe cos OVK e-%ov peyedos el de pr}, eldoiroirjo-ei ^drj. orav
ovv fj.7j8ev vofj, ov ravrb TOVTO irepl ^vyj\ v Tddos ; T) ov, dXX OTav p.ev
/jujdev [voy], \eyei /j-ydev, fj.d\\ov de 7rd<r%et ovdev OTav oe Trjv v\ijv,
OUTW Trd^et ?rd^os olov TVTTOV TOV d/uop^ov eirei Kal OTav TO. /nefj.op-
(pu/jieva Kal TOL ^e^eyedvo-^eva vorj, ws auvdeTa voei ws yap /cexpw-
a/jieva Kal 6 Xws TTCTrotw/x^a. Tb 6\ov odv voei Kal TO avvd^w Kal
h i) voya^ f) -r) atffd-rjff^ TU>V eirbvTUV, dfj-vdpd 8e 17 TOU



240 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

So much for the difficulties connected with the
possibility of conceiving the indeterminate. Another
travels hard on their heels. How can that which is
without determination or quality be called evil?
This difficulty goes back to Aristotle. It is not
perhaps fair to say that he shirked it, but we do
him little injustice if we say that it was ignored by
him. Certainly it never received any adequate
treatment at his hands. And not only is it implicit
throughout his doctrine of Tr/oom) v\^ but he involves
himself in it almost deliberately, as it would seem,
in a very interesting passage in the Metaphysics.
" That the actuality," it runs, " is better and of
more value than the potentiality which strives after
it, is clear from what has been said. For in the
case of things said to be potential, the same thing
is capable of opposite determination. For example,
what is called the potentiality of being well, is at
the same time the same as the potentiality of being
ill. To be well and to be ill have the same potenti
ality ; similarly to be at rest and to be in motion,
and to build and to demolish a house; and in the
case of the house to be built and to be demolished.
The potentiality of opposite determinations, then,

viroKeL^vov, rov dfj,6p(f)ov ov yap eldos. 8 odv ev r< 6 Xy /cat
ffvvderui \afji^dvL fj.era r&v tirbvruv dvaXvaaffa e/cetVa /cat xwpt cracra,
6 /caraXeiTret 6 \6yos, rovro voel d^uSpcos dfJivdpov /cat
ffKoreivbv /cat voe t ov i>oov<ra. /cat tireidr) OVK ^eivev ovd avrr} 77
#/jtop0os, dXX v TOIS Trpdy/j-acriv tern fjie^op^w^vrj, /cat r/
^7TJ3a\ rb eldos rCiv Trpay/J-dTuv avrrf dXyovva T$ doptVry,
rov e^(j} TWV ovr<j)v elvan /cat oi)/c dvexoyu& Tj kv T< /AT) OVTL
ecrrdvat.



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL

can exist at the same time, but the opposites cannot
exist at the same time. Nor can the actualities
exist together, as, for example, to be well and to be
ill. Hence, one of these must needs be the Good,
but the potentiality is equally the capacity of both
or neither. The actuality then is better. But it
also follows that in the case of Evil, the completed
fact and actuality would be worse than the potenti
ality. For the potentiality is one and the same
capacity for both opposites. Clearly, then, there is
no Evil except evil facts. For Evil is subsequent in
nature to potentiality. Nor would there be in things
primal and eternal, either any evil thing or error,
or anything corruptible, for corruption also pertains
to evil things." l

Of the sense of this, there can be no question.
Good and Evil are alike phenomenal, the substratum
of the evavrtWts is neither. But if Matter be
absolutely passive and indifferent, then not only
does it fail to explain the fact of Evil at all, but it
renders the fact an inexplicable surd. For since
Form is the source of energy and direction in the
Aristotelian system, and since energy and direction
are always for the Good, Matter must be affected
only by that energy and directed only toward the
entelechy, and hence must completely embody the
end in question. Allowing such a thing as a bare
possibility of opposite determinations, that possi
bility could never be more than bare, and could

1 Aristotle, Met. Q 9, 1051 a 4-21.

R



THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

never vitiate, as in fact it does vitiate, the potenti
ality of the Good. Allowing that Matter could go
wrong, it would not, so entirely would it be, accord
ing to its logical concept, submitted to the attraction
of the End and the Good.

Two considerations, however, will help us in
dealing with this difficulty. In the first place, we
must remember that this mutability and indifference
of Matter is applicable only in the last resort to the
TT/XOTT) vX-rj. But Tr/own) vXy is little more than a
hypothesis attenuated to the extreme of abstraction,
and saved from being pure Not-being only by its
possibility of becoming something. Master, in so far
as we can predicate anything about it, is to some
extent determinate. We are quite as justified in
saying OVK CCTTL vX.7] 9 as OVK e crrt KO.KOV Trapa TO, Tr/oay/zara.
In so far as it is predicable and determinate, that
determination is qua Matter always evil. In any
object, what we mean by its Matter beyond the fact
of its individual and corporeal existence is the
imperfect character of that existence. In so far, then,
as Matter stands for a value as well as a fact, that
value is always evil. To all intents and purposes,
that is, it is in itself evil.

This, however, is to postpone, not to settle the
difficulty. The crux of the question is how Matter,
being pure passivity and absolute acquiescence,
could do other than always and completely embody
the perfect Form. The answer could only be that
the passivity is not really pure, nor the acquiescence



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 243

absolute. In short, there is a self-contradiction
here in the Aristotelian system. Logically, perhaps,
Matter could be reduced to pure potentiality ; as a
matter of fact it could not. In its logical form it
would not work. Hence, while Aristotle talks of
Matter as indeterminate potentiality, he uses it even
in its most indefinite and primal sense as something
definitely characterized. The opposition of its
determinations could not be otherwise derived from
it. Out of the absolutely indeterminate, given even
the determining form, at the most one determina
tion, to and by the form, could arise and even the
possibility of deriving that one is doubtful.

The result is that even to the Aristotelian Trpam)
v\.rf a positive character must be implicitly attributed.
If final causation is to work, it seems as if
something more than mere acquiescence must be
ascribed to Matter. Upon an absolutely neutral
medium, the perfect might exert its charm in vain.
We are forced to posit in Matter a susceptibility
which is more than a capacity, and amounts to an
inherent affection for the Ideal. It must have, as
Aristotle actually does attribute to it, however
inconsistently, an ec^eo-ts or tendency toward the Good. 1
This affection or e</>eo-is it is which is the real efficient
cause of the motion of the universe. We may question
the success of the Aristotelian identification of the
efficient with the final cause. The efficient cause
would seem to lie not in the attraction exerted by

1 Phys. i. 9, 192 a 18.



244 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

the Ideal, but in the essential desire of Matter for the
Ideal. The distinction may indeed be purely logical
and the two, like Matter and Form, be united in
fact. Attraction and desire are in operation one
and the same thing. Still the bases of their opera
tions are different and their metaphysical principles
are distinct.

In the same way, if Matter is to be determined
to " privation " as well as to form, we must suppose
it to be possessed also of a very positive passivity.
Its phenomenal character as incompleteness in things
can only be attributed to some sort of real intracta
bility. Its power of not becoming, like its power of
becoming, must be a power exerted. But here also
we get into difficulties. What is to account for the
exertion of the power not to be, for the inclination,
that is, not to realize the Good ? Although the
everts of Matter for the Good may have to be con
ceived as a priori, innate, and not instilled by the
Good, its existence is yet correlative to, and bound
up with, the attraction of the Ideal. The contrary
inclination in Matter should imply the existence of
an anti-ideal. A positive cult of Evil, as well as of
the Good, would have to be attributed to Matter ;
and the mixed and incomplete character of the
world put down to the eternal hesitation of v\r)
between the attractions of God and the devil. Still,
even admitting this, the situation is little relieved.
Two equally positive tendencies toward Being and
Not-being would amount to the same thing as the



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 245

strictest neutrality towards both. The fate of
Buridan s ass, for example, would have been no less
pathetic had it been equally indifferent instead of
equally drawn to the two bales of hay. But if the
one tendency is stronger than the other, what is to
account for their inequality? If both are allowed
to exist, both have exactly the same reason for
existence, and therefore exactly the same strength.

Finally, though both tendencies must exist in
Matter to some extent actualized, it is at the same
time impossible to see how they can do so if the
constancy of the imperfection in the universe, or
even the existence of a mixed world of good and
evil, is to be explained. How can Matter have at
the same time an actual tendency towards becoming,
and an actual tendency towards not becoming, this
or that form? The unthinkableness of such a
condition is recognized by Aristotle himself in his
dictum that opposite determinations cannot exist at
the same time, though they may be deduced from a
common potentiality capable of becoming either one
or the other.

Such are some of the perplexities which lurked
in the Aristotelian conception of Matter as the
indeterminate subject of all determinations. They
might also seem to be involved in the Stoic assertion
that Matter is without quality and receives its form
from an active principle, Aoyos or Reason or God,
which permeates and animates it, 1 were it not for
1 Diog. Laert. vii. p. 134 ; Seneca, Ep. 65. 2.



246 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

the monistic assertion that its compliance with the
formative power is absolute and that its determinations
in spite of appearances are all perfectly good. There
was then considerable weight to the objection which
Plotinus had to consider. It was not, however, the
first appearance of the objection in outspoken form,
nor was Plotinus the first to attempt to deal with it.
It had challenged Plutarch, who had replied to it as
follows : " When we talk about Matter, we must not
go over to the opinions of some philosophers and say
that it must be thought of as a kind of inanimate
body, devoid of qualities, inert and inefficient of
itself. We call oil the matter of a perfume and
gold of a statue, though they are not in themselves
devoid of all quality, and the soul itself and the
thinking faculty of man we hand over to the reason
to be ordered and harmonized, calling them the
matter or material of knowledge and virtue. Some
have made out also that the mind is the place of the
ideas, and is, as it were, an impression from the seal
of the intelligible world ; and some again consider
that the seed of a woman [ovum in women] is not
the potentiality nor the source, but the matter and
the sustenance of generation. Thus, if we agree
with such views, we must conceive of this goddess
(Matter) as having a share of the primal God, and
as united to him by love of the goodness and
beauty which surround him. She is never opposed
to him ; but just as we say that a just and
law-abiding man is in love with justice, or that a



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 247

virtuous woman who has a husband with whom
she lives, desires him, so we must say that Matter
desires God, and is ever in his presence, and is filled
with the most powerful and purest parts of him." l

Matter, then, in and per se cannot be the cause
of imperfection. Its nature is not intractability,
but complete acquiescence in the attraction of the
divine. There must, Plutarch concludes, be a third
principle no less actual and fundamental than God,
but radically opposed to him. This principle he
believes he has found in the Evil Soul of Plato s
Laws. " Of those who attribute to Matter, rather
than to the soul, that necessity which is spoken
of in the Timaeus, and in discussing the Philebus
attribute to Matter also that lack of measure and
determination which has to do with the greater
and the less of defect and excess, we may ask how
they will dispose of the Platonic dictum that Matter
is eternally formless and un characterized, devoid of
all inherent quality and power, and like those
odourless oils which perfumers employ for colouring
purposes. It is impossible that what is in itself
devoid of quality, inactive, and indifferent, should
be assumed by Plato to be the cause and first
principle of Evil, or that he should call indetermin-
ateness base and evil-doing ; or again, that he should
describe it as necessity in constant revolt and
rebellion against God. For as to that which he
declares in the Politicus to reverse the motion of
1 De Is. et Osir. 58.



248 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

heaven, namely, necessity and innate desire, and as
to that disordered fusion of ancient Nature as it was
before it was developed into the present world
how came they actually to exist, if what underlay
them was Matter devoid of quality and of all causal
power, whilst the Creator was good and wished to
make all things like himself as far as lay within his
power? For there was no third principle beside
these two. Here, indeed, the Stoic difficulty over
takes us which introduces Evil from Not-being
without cause or generation on the ground that it
is not reasonable that either the good or the in
different should have provided either the substance
or the generation of Evil. But Plato did not fall into
the same error as these later philosophers; nor did
he overlook, as they did, this third principle and
force intermediate between God and Matter, and
maintain that most absurd of theories, namely,
that which declares the nature of evil things to have
crept in from some source or other accidentally and
of its own accord. ... On the contrary, he writes
as follows in the Politicus concerning the world. 1
From God the constructor, the world received all
that is good in it, but from a previous state came
elements of evil and unrighteousness, which first
of all passed thence into the world and were then
transmitted to animate things. And a little farther,
As time went on there was more and more for
getting and the old discord again held sway and
1 73 A.



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 249

there was danger lest the world should be dissolved
and fall again into a state of indetermination and
confusion (di/o/xoior^s). But confusion has nothing
to do with Matter, which is devoid of quality and
distinctions. Eudemus, however, like many others,
ignorantly chides Plato with having declared Matter,
which he calls repeatedly the mother and nurse of
things, to be the root and origin of Evil. It is true
that Plato calls Matter the mother and nurse, but
the cause of Evil he makes that force which moves
Matter and is distributed among bodies, a force
disordered and irrational, yet not inanimate. 1 l This
he often calls necessity, but in the Laws he calls
it quite openly the disorderly and evil-doing Soul, 2
. . . contrary and antagonistic to the Soul whose
works are good. 3

Numenius interprets Plato s statement in the
Laws somewhat differently. The Evil Soul is not a
principle extraneous to Matter and acting upon it,
but expresses rather a hylozoistic quality in Matter ;
a living and positive recalcitrancy in it to the
improving power of the Good. "Pythagoras and
the Stoics are agreed that Matter is formless and
without quality. But while Stoics say that it is
neither good nor evil, Pythagoras makes it evil.
In the former case, when asked, with reference to
some evil encountered on the way, whence evils

1 Plutarch, De animae procreat. in Timaeo, 6, 1014 E-7,
1015 E.

2 Id., ib. 6, 1014 B.

3 Id., ib. 7, 1015 F.



250 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

come, they plead that perversity is the cause of
evils. But they have not explained as yet where
perversity itself comes from, since according to
them there are two first principles of things
God and Matter. God is the highest and all-
excelling Good; Matter, as they think, is neither
good nor evil. But Pythagoras says . . . that
although Providence exists, evils also necessarily
exist because Matter exists and is of an evil quality.
But if the world be made of Matter, it is certain
that it is made of a nature already vicious." Hence
" Numenius praises Heracleitus for his reproof of
Homer for invoking death and destruction upon
the ills of life and for not realizing that he was
pleased to demand the annihilation of the world,
if Matter, which is the source of Evil, should be
abolished. Plato is also praised by Numenius
because he asserts that there are two World-Souls,
the one most beneficent, the other malignant and
evidently Matter. That whatever moves, however
slightly, by its own inner and proper motion, is
animate and possessed of a vegetative soul, is the law
of all beings which are truly moved. And this Soul,
indeed, is the author and master of that passible
part of the soul in which there is something corporeal
and mortal and like to the body, just as the rational
part of the soul has for author Reason and God." l
In Philo, the Aristotelian difficulty appears again,

1 Chalcidius, In Timaeum Platonis, 295 (Mullach, Fragmenta,
ii. p. 244, Ed. 1860). Cf. 297.



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL

complicated by an absence of even that discrimina
tion which we find in Aristotle between TT/OWT^ vXrj
and Matter plus a minimum of determination. Philo
confuses both senses, talking of Matter now as
absolutely without quality or determination, now
as possessed of a definite evil character. It is
" inanimate and immobile of itself, being moved and
ordered and animated by the (divine) intellect. 1 " 1 1
It is " without quality or form," 2 " discordant and
capable of dissolution, and furthermore corruptible
of itself, irregular and unequal." It is definable as
that which in itself is without formal determination,
and is therefore capable of becoming all things ; as
Not-being ; also as the empty and wanting, or as the
dark. 3 "God called Not-being into Being, order out
of disorder, the quantitative out of the unquantitative,
and likeness out of the unlike, and agreement and
harmony out of the unagreed and discordant, and
evenness out of the uneven, and light out of the dark
ness." 4 " For Matter was of itself dissolved, un
qualified, inanimate, full of otherness and want of
harmony and discordancy. But it received a change
or transformation into the opposite and best
conditions ; order, quality, likeness, sameness, accord,
harmony, and everything that belongs to the Ideal." 5

1 De mund. opif.

2 Quis rer. div. Her. 500 c (492). Cf. De mundi opif. 4 E
(5 M) ; De prof. 451 E (547) ; De somnis, 1114 B (665) ; Quis rer.
div. Her.\ 503 (495), 4 ; De prof. 479 (475 c).

3 Zeller, Phil, der Griech. in. ii. pp. 435-6.

4 De creat. princip. 728 (367 M).

5 De mundi opif. 5 A.



252 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

Self-contradictory as the position set forth in
these quotations is, if taken at its face value, and
little as Philo does towards further explanation of
this meaning, the paradox is not really so glaring
as it seems. The indeterminateness of Matter can
in a way be reconciled with its evil character in a
system as insistent upon metaphysical evil as is
Philo s. The world is necessarily evil because it is
not God, in whom alone the only kind of perfection
is embodied. And Matter as the principle of
individual ization and of cosmic existence, however
amenable it may be to the divine, and however
faithful a copy of the Ideal it may reproduce, is
evil in that it exists at all. It needs no malignant
outer force to explain its intractability. The force
which enables it to persist in its separate being
is sufficient for that.

We come now to Plotinus s reply to the problem.
"If Matter," he begins, "be without quality, how
can it be evil ? By its being without quality we
mean that it possesses of itself none of those qualities
which are received into it, and inhere in it as their
substratum ; but we do not mean that it has no nature
of its own. If then it have a certain nature, what is
to prevent this nature from being evil, though not
indeed evil in the qualitative sense ? For quality is
that by predicating which something else is qualified.
Quality, then, is an accident and a predicate. Matter,
however, is not a predicate, but the substratum with
which accidents are concerned. So because quality,



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 253

whose nature is to be an accident, is not attributed
to it, Matter is said to be without quality. If, there
fore, quality be itself without quality, how can Matter
which has not received qualities be called qualitative ?
We are right in saying that it is both without
quality, and also evil. For it is not called evil because
it has quality, but because it has not. Otherwise,
were it a form, although an evil one, it might still
have a nature not contrary to Form." l

But, it may be objected, is not Matter qualified
by just this lack of quality ? " What is to prevent
Matter, whose nature it is to participate in no other
quality, from being qualified by precisely this non-
participation, possessing as it does in any case a
certain peculiarity of its own, and differing from
other things by virtue of being deprived of them ? "

Plotinus s reply involves a discussion of the rela
tion between v\rj and o-rep^o-cs for which we are not



1 i. 8, 10 (79 c) [vol. i. p. 110, 1. 8 et seq.]. /cat ravra fj^v
ravrr]. aVotos 5e odara TrcDs /ca/c?? ,- ^ airoios \eyerai rig fArjdev e%eti>
ai>TT]v ^0 eavrrjs TOVTWV T&V TrotOTTjrcoj , as S^erat /cat [at] v avrrj
us viroKi[Ai>( <rovTai, ov JJ.TJV ourws, us /uLr/SefjiLav (fivcriv x eiv - ei ^
%et nva (fivcnv, ravTTjv rr\v (f>ixnv rt /cwXuet KCLKTIV elvai, ovx OVTOJ 5e
Kaxr]v, us TTOLOV ; eweidTj /cat r6 iroibv TOVTO ecrrt, Kad 8 erepov TTOLOV
\tyerai. <ri;^ i /3e/377/c6s ofiv rb Troibv /cat ev d"AAy i] 6 v\-r) OVK v
&\\({), dXXd rb viroKei[j.evoi> /cat TO av^e^TjKbs -rrepl avro. TOV o$v
Trotou TT]v (f)^i(nv cru/x/Se/S^/coTOS exovros ov Tu%oOcra aTroio? A^erat.
et Toivvv /cat i] Trotor^s avr-r) a?rotos, TTWS 17 0X77 ov 5e^a^vq TTOLOTT^TO,
TTOta dv \yoiTo ; opd&s &pa \tyerai /cat ^TTOIOS elvai /cat /ca/c?j ov
yap X^yerai /ca/c?; rep Trotor^ra e xetv, dXXa /j.a\\ov r$> iroi6Tr)Ta fj,rj
%X Ll ) t va pil V tvus KCLKTI eldos ofiffa, dXXa evavrLa. T$> etdei (fivcrLS.

2 ii. 4, 13 [vol. i. p. 62, 1. 4 et seq.]. rl ovv
&TTOIOV yui> elvcu ry T&V &\\wv fj.ijde/^ias TTJ avrrjs <pv<rei.

TOVT^ T /un) Sepias fj.T^x eiV iroiav elvac i5i6rr]Ta Travrus nva
/cat TUV a\\uv diafapovo-av, olov o-Ttprjalv riva



254 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

quite ready. But so much of it as is immediately
relevant is as follows : " The peculiar property of
Matter is not Form, for it consists in not being
qualified and not having any form. It is absurd to
call Matter qualified because it is without quality ;
that would be like saying that through its very lack of
magnitude it has magnitude. Its peculiar property
then is not other than, or predicated of, itself, but lies
rather in the relation it bears to other things, i.e. that
it is none of them. Other things, however, are not
merely other, but each is something, that is, each
has a form. But Matter might with propriety be
called merely an other, or perhaps other in the
plural, in order to emphasize its indeterminateness
and not define it, as one would by calling it other "*
in the singular." l

The nature of Plotinus s emendation of the
Aristotelian position must be plain. He agrees
with Aristotle that Matter as the substratum
of all determination is itself absolutely without
form and quality. But he disagrees with him in
the inference that Matter is therefore prior to good
and evil and of itself neither good nor evil. This
inference, as we have seen, Aristotle was unable to

1 ii. 4, 13 [vol. i. p. 162, 1. 32 et seq.]. f/ re ii6r?7s TTJS uXijs
ov /mopcpri TO yap IJLTJ TTOLOL clvai /ut-rjd eldos TL ^x etj/ &TOTTOV drj, OTL
fj. T} Troid, iroiOiv \~yeu> Kal ofJLOLOv Ty, 6 ri dfj-tyedes, avT< Totirtf}
/mtyedos tx iv - ZVTLV oftv 07 I &OTT/S avrijs of/K SAAo TL ?) oirep ZffTi,
Kal ov Trp6(TKeiTai i] t Stdr^s, a\\a /m.a\\ov ev <r%e(ret rrj Trpos ra a\\a,
6 n &\\o &VT&V. Kal ra ^v aXXa ov fjiovov a\\a, d\\a Kat TL eKatrrov
&s elSos, avrtj 5 TrpeTrdvTtas av X^otro [ibvov &X\o rd^a 8 a\\a,
iva /AT] ry ctXXo ej/i/ccDs bpi<rr)s, ctXXa ry dXXa rb ddpurrov e



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 255

justify, but had always to treat Matter as if it were
possessed of a positively evil character. In so doing
Plotinus would assert that Aristotle was right, and
right also in denying to Matter all quality and
determination. The latter s confusion lies in con
sidering the opposition between good and evil to
be an ordinary case of ej/ai/nWis between contrary
determinations. This is not true. Good and evil
are opposed as determinateness and indeterminate-
ness. To assert, as Aristotle does, that they represent
contrary formations of a neutral Matter is covertly to
ascribe the cause of Evil to Form, not Matter.

Plutarch then was right in his demand for a
positive malignant power as an explanation of Evil.
But this demand rested upon precisely the same
misunderstanding of the true nature of Matter and
of the opposition between good and evil as that of
Aristotle ; and, in the ascription to it of an e^eo-ts or
appetite for the Good, upon a greater misunderstand
ing. For Matter is without quality, as Aristotle says.

But this lack of quality does not imply lack
of significance in point of value. Matter is not,
because it is indeterminate, a substratum equally
indifferent and hence equally compliant to de
termination to good and ill. For all determination
is good. To speak of determination to the bad is
a contradiction in terms. All the properties and
qualities that inhere in and give structure to Matter
are lent to it by the seminal reasons, the outgoing
and formative powers of the archetypal and perfect



256 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

world. Quality, then, qua quality is good. Its
origin forbids it to be otherwise. The difference
between qualities, the opposition between different
determinations, the li/avrtWts of "this" and "not-
this-but-that " are purely logical and involve no
comparison in point of moral value. They ex
press merely the multiple, but harmonious content
of the intelligible world.

It is only when I oppose to a thing its blank
negation, to wit, a mere " not-this," without any
specification of a "that," that I am opposing evil
to good. To say that I am no kind of an angel,
but a man, is merely to oppose one determination to
another in the sense of distinguishing one form of
being from another. It carries no reproach. But
to say simply that I am no kind of a man, is to
imply that I am deficient in a nature properly mine,
that I am not the man I am entitled to be by virtue
of my species.

The opposition, however, in the latter sense of
myself to not-myself, or of " this " to " not-this," is
not extrinsic, but intrinsic. It is not the opposition
of one determination to another, but of the blank
absence of a specific determination to its presence.
Such an opposition may indeed be described as an
evavTiWts, and as we know, Plotinus talks of Evil
as the opposite of the Good. But the opposition
implied in it is not the ordinary opposition of one
thing to another, not the failure of one thing to be
another signified by " not-this-but-that," not the



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 257

negation of one determination or quality by its
opposite, but its negation by an intrinsic lack of
its proper self. 1 Evil, in a word, is a case not of
erc/oov, but of fjiij.

In some such way, I take it, Plotinus would have
argued, had we gone to him with our perplexities.
But his argument, though a fair criticism and a
valid attempt at correction of the Aristotelian con
tradictions, is yet rather a sign than a solution of
the difficulties in question. For how, we may ask,
is it possible to ascribe "a certain nature," ^o-tv
rim, to that which is absolutely without quality
or determination ? How can that be said to exist
which is the mark or essence or substratum, not of
the merely relative non-existence, the " not-this-but-
that," implied by the Platonic ere/oov, but of the
absolute non-existence of a thing in relation to its
entelechy ? In fine, Plotinus has involved himself
in all the difficulties of the proposition that Not-
being exists.

Had he, indeed, been consistently mystic, he
might have escaped. For him in that case, *as for
Philo, the ere/jov of the Sophist would have been a
sufficient sign of imperfection. " Not-this-but-that,"
when opposed to God would have involved Evil by
the mere fact of its opposition. The not-divine,
however full of positive content it might be, could
not have been other than not-good. Matter as
the mere principle of the differentiation of the

1 ii. 4, 16 (169 D) [vol. i. p. 115, 1. 22 et seq.].

S



258 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

world from the Deity would have been necessarily
a principle of evil and its individuation of opposite
determinations within the world would have been
no more than a hierarchy of imperfections. So-
called grades of perfection would have appeared in
their true light.

Or again, the naturalist might have avoided the
pitfall. He, in Platonic fashion, might have re
duced p) ov to ere/001/, the absolute "not-this," to
the relative " not-this-but-that," and then, following
Plotinus, have declared all determinations good after
their kind, and "this" as good as "that." The
result would have been the familiar naturalistic
world.

But Plotinus, as we have had occasion to remark
so many times, tries to combine the two positions
and falls between two stools. On the one hand,
he treats different forms of being as different
kinds of perfection ; on the other, as various
degrees of imperfection. More concretely, every
thing that is, is determined, and determined in some
way or other at every moment of its existence,
and every determination is by and to the Good, yet
at the same time nothing at any moment of its
existence is determined as it should be. I, for
example, am what I am from instant to instant,
arid am completely that ; yet I am not perfect.
Again the lack of any particular determination is
treated both as the presence of some other deter
mination and as the absence of itself. That is,



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 259

negation is considered both as differentiation and
as absolute absence of being two points of view
perfectly compatible as long as one does not seek
to draw from them diametrically opposed meta
physical deductions, whose contradictions one de
clines to recognize because of the compatibility of
the original propositions.

Again, Not-being is not nothing and yet is not
anything. In so far as it is anything, it is positive,
not negative, Being, not Not-being. Hence it stands
for good, not evil. But if it is nothing, then what
it stands for and supports is nothing, and there is
no such thing as Evil. Plotinus, in fine, could
neither deny nor affirm the existence of the basis
of Evil without leaving Evil metaphysically baseless.
The possibility of holding a middle course was
doubtless suggested by the analogy of darkness,
which is the absence of sight and yet is seen. But
the Matter in which such a string of paradoxes
could harmoniously inhere could not be otherwise
than paradoxical.

To return now to the Plotinian argument. It
may be objected, he says, " that the nature opposite
to all Form is privation, and that privation always
inheres in something else and is not of itself an
hypostasis ; and hence, that if Evil lie in privation,
it will also inhere in what is deprived of Form and
so will not exist in and for itself. Let us apply
this argument to the soul. If Evil be privation,
vice will consist in a privation of good within the



260 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

soul and be not due to anything external. But " if
the privation be of some form that happens to be
present, and be a privation of good in the soul, then
the soul produces the evil within herself by virtue
of her own seminal reason, and has nothing good
about her; and in that case, though she is a soul,
no life." 1 In other words, vice in itself requires
an explanation. If it be a privation of the soul,
it is nothing external to the soul in nature, but
inherent in her essence, since the meaning of cn-cp^o-is
is that a thing lacks in and of itself the quality in
question. But this is to say, that the soul lacks in
and of herself the Good. But according to the
Plotinian doctrine, the Good is the source and
principle of life. Hence the soul will also in and
of herself lack life, and be soulless. This, however,
is a contradiction, for the essence of the soul is life.
It follows that the soul is not deprived of good by
her own nature, for her nature is good.

Still, may not Evil be a partial privation ? This,
replies Plotinus, also involves a contradiction. For
then, part of the soul will possess and part will
be deprived of the Good, and her experience will be
mixed. There will be no such thing as unmixed
and primal Evil in us. That is, the soul cannot
by virtue of the same essence be both good and
evil. 2

1 i. 8, 11 (p. 79) [vol. i. p. 110, 1. 26 et seq.]. See note below.

2 See continuation from reference just quoted. The dis
cussion and quotation are taken from the text appended. 11.
d\X 77 tvavrio. T$ fWei. Travrl $tf<m ffrtpTjcis crr^T/cris 5 cm tv



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 261

In the treatise on Matter, the relations of priva
tion to Matter are taken up in a more general way.
First there is a preface a propos of the objection
lately reviewed, that Matter would seem to be a
privation (crre/o^o-is) or lack, and that privation is
certainly a quality. The deprived, the argument
runs, is qualified by its deprivation. For example,
the blind man is qualified by his lack of sight. And
if any single privation qualifies its subject, how much
more will privation in all respects ?

But Plotinus answers : " This is really to turn
everything, even quantities and essences, into qualified
things or qualities. And if a thing be qualified,
quality is present in it. It is absurd, however, to
make a quality of what is other than quality and is



w avrrjs oi>x vTroo-Taffis ucrre TO KaKbv el ev (rrepijaet, ev
rig <TTeprj/j.vi{} etdovs TO KaKbv eVrat * wore Kad eavTO OVK eVrat.
ei o$v ev Trj ^vxii ^ffTai KaKbv, r\ ore/averts ev avTrj Tb KOLKOV /cat i] /co/ci a
&TTCU /cat ovbev e^w. eVet /cat #XXot \6yoi TT]V v\t]v 6Xwj a.va.ipflv
d^Louffiv, 01 oe ovd avTT}v KOLKOV eluai odtrav. ovdev o$v Set &\\odev
frTeiv TO KOLKOV, dXXa dtpevov tv \f/vxfj oi/ rw 6fo6ai airovaiav dyadov
elvcu. dXX et i) ffT^p-rjcris eTrt/SaXXo^ros cVrt Trape^at et 5ous Tii>6s, el
TOV dyadov (rrep^trts iv i/^xi?? TT] V 5e /ca/ctaf eV avTrj ?rotet
eairr?}s, ij ^vx^l ovoev &x ei dya&6v ov roivvv ou5e farjv
l\ftvxov dpa eVrai TJ / i X /> 7 etirep /nTjSe fcorji axrre ^vxv oGaa OVK
eVrat ^vxy- ^X ei &P a T V eaur^s Xo7y $<J)T]V ware ov ffTepijcnv ^x i
TT)v TOV dyaBov Trap avTrjs. dya8aei8es apa ^x ova a TL dyaBbv vov
T^POS /cat ov naKov Trap avTrjs OVK dpa ovde TT/XJTWS Kaxbv ovbe trt/jiijSc-
,3 Tj/cos TL avTrf r6 TT/OUJTWS /ca/cov, ort i^ride &ireo~Ttv avrijs TTO.V TO
dyadov. 12. rt ovv, et /AT? 7ravTe\TJ aTepr]<nv Xeyoi dyadov TTJV KaKiav
/cat TO KaKov TO ev ^vxfj, dXXa rtva <TTepr/<nv dyadov ; dXX et TOVTO,
TO fjiev e xoutra, TOV de eaTeprj/Jievrj, /uuKTrjv e et TT\V o!iaQif\a(.v /cat OVK
aKpaTov TO Kaitbv, /cat ovirw evprjTai. rd irp&TOv Kai &KpaTOV
Kal Tb fj,ev dyadov rfj \j/vxy carat, ev ovaia, ffv^e^Kb^ 5^ rt

KaKOV.



THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

not quality." l The thread of the argument is hard
to trace, but Plotinus s meaning seems to be :
If you say that o-Teprjo-is or privation is a quality,
then you might as well call quantities or essences
qualities too. It is certainly no more absurd. And
again, how can a thing be qualified by being un
qualified ? How can the absence of an attribute be
attributed to it ? But, the text proposes, we may
perhaps call what is other than qualified, qualified,
because what is " other " is thereby qualified. What
is it that is " other " ? is the reply. If it be " other
ness," then it is not a qualified thing, because quality
is not itself qualified. If it be merely "other," it is
not other in itself, but only by virtue of participation
in difference, and the same by participation in
sameness. In short, the difference of one thing from
another is not an attribute of either thing. It adds
nothing to, and in no way qualifies its essence.
Difference is a category not a quality, a statement of
the fact that there is a plurality of beings, not of
what these beings may be.

What, then, is the relation of privation to



1 ii. 4, 13 (167 c) [vol. i. p. 162, 1. 19 et seq.]. d o$v
TOVTWV irepi avrrjv, TTWS ou TTOIO, ; et de /cat 6Xws <7Tepr)<ris irepl avrrjv,
eVt /j,a\\oi>, ei 76 dr) /ecu crre pTjo is troibv TL. 6 de TOLVTO, \eyuv rt
aXXo if) TTOta /cat 7rot6T77ras Travra. troiei ; ware /cat ij TTOCTOT^S TTOLOT TJS
&v etr] Kai i] ov<ria de. el de TTOIOV, Trp&<reffTi TTOIOT^S. yeXotov de TO
erepov TOV TTOLOV /cat /XTJ TTOLOV TTOLQV iroieiv. ei de, on erepov, iroiov, ei
^ifv avToeTepbTys, ovd &s iroibv eVet ou5 r? TTOIOT^S Trotd et 5
erepoi /nbvov, oi>x eavrfj, dXX eTep6rTjrt erepov /cat rauror^rt TOLVTOV.
oi)5e STJ i] o-r^p^crts Trotdr^s ovde iroiov, dXX tpTj/uiia TroioTyros T) dtXXou,
ws T] a\f/o(f)ia i/^60ou ?) oroi^oOi &\\ov tipais y&p i] crr^^crts, TO Se
Trow fv /cara0aa-et.



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 263

Matter ? This is the question which we now attack.
Are they two concepts of one and the same sub
stratum ? If so, then the two concepts must re
ciprocally involve one another, or at least one of the
two must imply the other. Are they related as, for
example, snub and nose ? In that case, they will be
two. Or, are they related as fire and heat, where
the essence of heat involves reference to fire, but not
that of fire to heat? In that case, privation will
be a form of Matter, but not the substratum itself. 1

Or, are Matter and privation one substantially,
though logically distinguished, in the sense that
privation marks not a positive character of Matter,
but signifies negatively that absence of Being which
Matter is ? But if privation be Matter by virtue of
its negative character, its indetermination, and
indefiniteness, and lack of quality, that is, by the
identity of its concept with that of Matter, how
comes it that we ever distinguish its concept from
that of Matter? 2



1 ii. 4, 14 (168 A) [vol. i. p. 163, 1. 10

2 ii. 4, 14 (168 c) [vol. i. p. 163, 1. 29 et seq.}. The discussion
is based on the appended text. 15. -jrdXiv odv ftrriTeov, el Kara
0"i/A/3e/3?7/cds rb aireipov /cat TO aopiarov eV &\\rj (pvcrei /cat Trios <ru/x,/3e-
/3?7/cds /cat et a-rep^ais ffv/mpe^rjKev. el drj 6 cra ^ev dpi.dfj.oi /cat Xoyot
aTretptas e^co 6 pot yap /cat rdets /cat TO Teray^evov /cat rot s dXXots
Trapd TotiTwv, rdrret d raura ov TO TCTay/Jievov ovSe ra^ts, dXXa &\\o
TO TO.TTbiJ.evov Trapa TO T&TTOV, rdrret 8e rd irepas /cat opos /cat
X67os dvdyKtj r6 TaTTo^evov /cat bpitofj-evov TO tiireipov elvai.
Tarrerai 5e ^ v\-r) /cat 6 cra de /JLTJ v\rj T$ yuere%eti ?) vXrjs \6yov e^eiv
dvdyKrj Toivvv TTT\V ij\f}v TO aireipov elvai, 011% oi/rw 5^ aireipov, ws
/card crv/AjSe/S^/cos /cat T$ av/Ji^e^Kevai TO aireipov afar/. irp&TOv fj.ev
yap TO ffv^cuvbv ry Set Xo70i efrat r6 8e aireipov ov \6yos eiretTa
rivi QVTL Tb aireipov ffv/m^ffeTai ; irepaTi /cat TreirepOLff^ev^. dXX of)



264 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

We have now raised the question of the relation
of the indeterminate to Matter. Is it an attribute,
the attribute of indetermination inherent in another
subject than itself? " Numbers and seminal reasons
are determinate, and are principles of determination.
What is determined by them must be in itself un
determined. | But a thing s indeterminateness cannot
inhere in it as a property, since all properties are
determinations. They are, moreover, seminal reasons,
and the indeterminate cannot be a seminal reason.
For in what could the indeterminate inhere ? In the
determined ? But the determined is not a subject of

ireirepa.cru.evov ov8e irepas 77 11X77. /cat TO aireipov de irpoaeXdov T$
ireirepacrfj.evif} diroXei avTOv TTJV (pvaiv ov TO LVVV <r 17^/377 /cos rrj vXy
TO direipov avTr] TO LVVV TO direipov. eirel Kal ev TO?S vorjTois 77 vXrj
TO aireipov Kal efy av yevvr)6ev e/c Trjs TOU evbs direipias $ dvvdfj.eus
T) TOU del, OVK oflffrjs ev eKelv<g direipias dXXd TTOIOVVTOS. TTWS odv ^/ce?
/cat evTavda ; ^ diTTbv /cat TO tiireipov. /cat T L dia<pepeL ; ws dpx^-
TVTTOV /cat d5u\ov. e\a.TTbvws olv &Treipov TOVTO ; if) /uaXXoj 6Vy
yap e lSwXov irefavybs TO etj/at TO dXrjdes, /m.a\\ov ttireipov. ij yap
aTretpt a ev ry ^TTOV opiaQevn /j.a\\oi> TO yap ^TTOV ev
uaXXov ev T$ /ca/cy. TO ^/cet o$v juaXXov ov douiKbv TTWS aireipov,
dt evTav6a ^TTOV [6V], 6 cry ireQevye TO elvcu TO d\7)6es, et s de
KaTepptir) (pvcri.v, dXydeaTepus aweipov. TO ai/TO oftv TO aireipov /cat TO
direipy elvai ; r) oirov \6yos Kal v\r) &\\o eKaTepov, OTTOV de V\r) pbvov
?) Tat Toi XeKTeov f) 6 Xws, 8 /cat pe\Ttov, OVK dvai. evdaoe TO direipy
elvai. X6yos yap eaTai, os OVK <JTLV ev T$ direipy, IV 77 aireipov.
aireipov p.ev 5?? Trap avTrjs TTJV vXrjv XeKTeov dvTiTdei, Ty ?rp6s rbv
Xoyov. Kal yap, ticnrep b X6yos OVK dXXo TL &v ecrTi. \6yos, OVTU Kal
Tty \JXf]v dvTiTeTay/j.evr)v T^ Xo7^ KO.TO, r^v direipiav OVK dXXo TL
ovcrav XeKTeov aireipov. 16. dp ovv Kal eTep6T7)Ti TavTbv ; fj ov,
dXXd fj.opiy eTepbTTjTos dvTiTaTTOfj.evy irpbs Ta OVTO. Kvpius, & drj
Xoyoi. 5t6 /cat [TO] ^77 ov OVTUS TL ov Kal ffTep-fjcreL TavTOv, ei 77
aTep-rjais avTidecris Trpbs TO, ev Xoyif) ovTa. OV KOVV (pQaprjveTai 77
o-TepTjVLS irpocreXdovTos TOV ov VTeprjais ; ouSa^ws virodox^ yap
e^ews oi/x ^ts, dXXd ffTepycris, Kal irepaTos ov Tb ireirepao-fj.evov ovdt TO
irepas, dXXd TO aireipov Kad oaov d-rreLpov. TTWS otv OVK diroXel avTov



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 265

properties, since Matter is not determined. More
over, the indeterminate would destroy the nature of
the determined. The indeterminate, then, is not a
property of Matter, but its very self." l

But what is it that is indeterminate ? Are the
indeterminate (TO a^ipov] and " being indeterminate "
(TO a7rei/>o> etvai) the same ? They are not the same,
is the answer, when Reason as well as Matter is
involved. In the case of any fMng, we might say, we
can distinguish between its indeterminateness and
that which is indeterminate ; in other words, between
the reason or Aoyos which constitutes its essence, and
the blurring of that essence by the vagueness of
Matter. But where we are concerned with Matter
alone, the two are the same, or better still, one
cannot appropriately apply the phrase TO direip^
e?i/<u, " being indeterminate," at all. 2 When we talk



TTJV (pvaiv Trpoo-e\6bv TO irtpas Kal ravra ov /caret, <ri^e/3?7/c6s &VTOS
direipov ; ?) d ^v Kara rb iroabv aireipov, dvypei [av] vvv de oi>x
OVTWS, dXXd TovvavTiov <7u>^*ei avrb ev T< elVai o yap Tre<pvKev eis
evtpyeLav ttai Te\eiw<riv ayei, ucrirep TO ttcrirapTov, OTOLV aireipyTai
Kal OTO.V TO 6r/\v [e/c] TOV ttppevos nvy, OUK d-rr6\\vTai TO 6rj\v, dXXa
fj.a\\oi> dTjXvveTai TOVTO 6e ICTTLV o eart fj,a.\\ov yiveTat. &p o$v
Kal Kanbv i] V\T) ^eTaXa^dvovya dyadov ; $) did TOVTO, OTL ederjdr) ov
ydp elxe. /cat ydp d ^v dv Se^rat TLVOS, TO d ^XV> ^<roi> dv IVws
yivoiTo dyaOov Kal /ca/cou, et tcrd^ot TTWS CTT a^w o b dv (j.-r}oev exv
are v -rrevia 6v, judXXov 5e irevia ov, dvdyKT) KO.KOV dvai. ov ydp
TT\OVTOV Treft a TOVTO ovde tV^t/os, dXXd irevia ^ev (ppovrjo-ews, wevia
8 dpeTTJs Ka\\ovs } fj.opffiijs, e idovs, TTOIOV. TTWS odv ov 8vffei.des ; TTWS
5e o^ TrdvTT) alo~x_pbv ; TTWS de ov TrdvTT] K&KOV ; eKetvr) 8e 17 i/X?/ ij
^/cet 8v TO ydp jrpb avTijs ^Trexeiva OVTOS. evTavda de TO trpo avTrjs
ov. OVK ov &pa avTrj eTepov ov Trpos T< /caXy TOV &VTOS.

1 ii. 4, 15 (168 E) [vol. i. p. 164, 1. 12 et seq.}.

2 As we shall see in a moment, this does not apply to the
intelligible world.



266 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

of a thing "being indeterminate," we imply the
presence of a seminal reason which is rendered
indeterminate by Matter. But Matter is not un
determined by virtue of a seminal reason of in-
determinateness. It is undetermined in and of itself,
and its indeterminateness means opposition to and
absence of reason. Indeed "just as Reason is Reason
and nothing else, so Matter, which is opposed to
Reason and is nothing except indeterminateness,
must be called indeterminate." l

Is Matter the same as "otherness" or "difference"?
No, but it is the same as a part of difference,
difference from Reason and Being. In a, sense, then,
continues Plotinus, Not-being is something and is the
same as privation, if by privation we mean opposition
to Being, which is Being in so far as it is rational. 2

But how can a thing both be and be in a state of
privation ? Is this not to say that it both is and is
not ? This seems to be the meaning of the query,
" will not the privation be destroyed by the advent
of that of which it is the privation ? " Not at all,
is the reply. Privation is not a mode, but the
subject or receptacle of modes. It will not be
destroyed, but merely modified by its modifications.
In the same way the subject of determinations is
not the determined or determination itself, but the
undetermined qua undetermined. The object is not
modified by two opposite determinations at the

* ii. 4, 15 (169 c) [vol. i. p. 165, 1. 19 et seq.}.
2 ii. 4, 16 (169 D) [vol. i. p. 165, 1. 22 et seq.}.



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 267

same time, but its determinations, congruous in
themselves, are weakened or blurred by the stuff or
subject they modify. 1 This point has already been
discussed in considering Plotinus s treatment of the
Aristotelian paradox.

The objection, however, persists. Must not
determination and limitation destroy by their advent
the nature of the undetermined, which is not un
determined adjectively, but in itself? The trouble
is, answers Plotinus, that we are thinking of the
indeterminate as a quantity. Were it quantitatively
indeterminate, it would be destroyed. But it is
not quantitatively indeterminate. As it is, the
indeterminate is endowed with being, actuality, and
perfection by the advent of determination and
definition, as the unsowed field by seed, or as the
female nature by its union with the male. 2

Does Matter, then, remain evil when united with
the Good ? Certainly, for the reason that it needed
the Good and had it not. " But what needs and
has something else, stands half-way between good and
evil if it be impartial toward both. But what has
nothing, because it is in poverty or rather is poverty
itself, must needs be evil." 3

It cannot be said that we reach any very definite
conclusions regarding the nature of v\rj and o-rep/o-ts
in these passages. In a sense we are told, indeed,
that Not-being is the same as o-Te/D^crts, and

1 ii. 4, 16 (169 E) [vol. i. p. 165, 1. 26 e,t seq.].

2 ii. 4, 16 (69 E) [vol. i. p. 165, 1. 30 et seq.].

3 ii. 4, 16 (169 E) [vol. i. p. 166, 1. 8



268 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

certainly denotes that absence of form, determination,
and quality which is the essence, if we may use the
word, of Matter. Moreover, O-TC/^O-IS is not a state,
but the receptacle or substratum of a state. And yet
it is not the same as Matter. It is adjectival and
secondary. It is intrinsic, whereas vice is extrinsic.
Thus if vice were o-re/a^crts we should have to define
the infirm soul as an essence by nature bereft of the
Good. But on the other hand, o-re/^o-is is not a
form or a determination. The nature of a thing
cannot be defined by its lack of its nature.

I confess I am unable to make much sense of
these apparent contradictions. My interpretation
is no more than tentative. But I think Plotinus s
underlying thought is something as follows : Srep/o-ts
or privation is involved in the predication of any
kind of difference. Thus if I say I am not an angel,
but a man, my manhood implies a Jack in me of
angelic nature, and of all forms save the human. Such
a lack is in truth a kind of negative definition. It
tells me what I am not, but it implies that I am
something, and though it leaves that something
undetermined, it does not declare it indeterminate.
Still such definition is not true determination. To
tell what I am not is not to tell what I am.

But, on the other hand, the negation involved in
privation is so far without hint of that intrinsic
negation or absence in me of my proper nature, of
which vice is the symptom. It merely asserts my
lack of natures other than my own, a lack which does



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 269

not in any wise detract from my proper perfection.
The lack of my proper nature is due to Matter.
This lack may indeed be described in terms of
privation, as a privation in me of my entelechy, but
it is a more special case of privation.

Privation, then, is not-being, both in the sense
of not being one s self, and of not being another.
In both cases it is adjectival and secondary, and in
both an absence of determination. Hence in both
it stands not for a positive state of an object, but
for a condition subject to, or an aptitude for, further
determination. But in the one case that further
determination is the mere logical discovery of what
the object is meant to be, in the other the moral
task of seeing that it perfectly expresses its meaning.
These considerations I have found helpful in clearing
up the apparent paradoxes of the Plotinian argument.

So much for privation and its relations to Matter.
But another question arises as regards the nature of
vice. May not vice be an impediment in the soul ?
But in that case the cause of the impediment will
be absolute and primal Evil. Vice will not be the
cause of the impediment, for it is not absolute Evil,
just as virtue is not absolute Good. As we rise from
and by means of virtue to the absolute Good, so
from vice as a starting-point we descend to absolute
Evil, first by looking upon it, if one can speak of
seeing absolute Evil, and then by becoming evil
through participation in it. And yet though the
soul be fallen into evil and darkness, she cannot



270 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

become absolutely evil; she can only be more and
more tainted by a nature other and worse than
herself. She dies so far as she can die, and her
death is to be engrossed with the body, sunk in, and
filled with Matter. 1

Or shall we call vice a weakness of the soul?
But whence and what is this weakness ? Is it to be
likened to bodily indisposition, and traced to Matter
which is the cause of disease ? But the analogy will
not hold. Vice cannot be described as a sickness,
nor is the soul naturally material or subject to
material dispositions. Moreover, the soul is not
weak of herself. The soul that stands apart from
Matter, winged as it were and unhindered in her
operations, knows no weakness. Weakness, then, is
extraneous, due to contact with Matter. 2

But how does the soul, pure and strong in her
self, ever get into contact with Matter. How can
she fall? "If we get a clear and proper under
standing of the cause of her fall, then her weakness
which is the object of our investigation will be made
evident. There is Matter in things, and there is
also Soul, and there is, as it were, one place for
both. Matter is not in one place and Soul in
another, as if Matter s place were on earth, Soul s
in the air. Rather is there a place apart for the
soul, inasmuch as she is not in Matter, and this
means that she is not united with Matter, and this

1 i. 8, 13 (80 c) [vol. i. p. Ill, 1. 23 et seq.].

2 i. 8, 14 (80 G) [vol. i. p. 112, 1. 21 et seq.].



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL

that one simple thing cannot be made out of her
and Matter, and this again that she is not produced
in Matter as a form in a substratum. This is the
significance of saying that she is apart.

But the powers of the soul are many ; and she
has beginning, middle, and end. The Matter which is
there demands more room and is, as it were, trouble
some and wishes to gain an entrance. But the whole
place is holy, and there is nothing there which does
not partake of Soul. So in subjecting itself to Soul,
Matter is illumined, but is not able to grasp the
source of its illumination. The soul does not triumph
over its presence and uplift it in spite of its presence,
for the reason that she does not see it since it is evil.
On the contrary the admixture of Matter darkens
and weakens the illumination and the light from
Soul, providing as it does generation and the cause
whereby the soul enters into generation. For the
soul would not of herself have come to what was not
already present.

Such then is the fall of the soul to come in this
wise to Matter; she is weak, too, because all her
powers are not operative, hindered as they are by
Matter seizing the place which she possesses, and
causing her to shrink, as it were, and making what it
has stolen evil, until the soul is able to return to her
own again. Matter, then, is the cause of weakness
in the soul, and the cause of vice. It is antecedently
evil, and is indeed the primal Evil. Moreover, if the
soul when affected by Matter herself creates, and if



272 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

she communes with Matter, and becomes evil, it is
Matter which by its presence is the cause. She would
not have entered Matter, had she not, by her com
munion with it, undertaken the work of generation." 1
The passage needs but little comment. In the
first part Plotinus is apparently arguing against
Aristotle. Soul and Matter, or to put it in Aristo
telian language, Form and Matter have indeed the
same "place." They are not separated spatially,
Soul for instance in the heavens, Matter upon earth.
But on the other hand there is not the intimate
logical and substantial union between them that

1 i. 8, 14 (81 D) [vol. i. p. 113, 1. 16 et seq.]. TOV de Trrcu/^aros
TO a^TLOv ^vxy ffa<f>4ffTpov Xayii/Sdfoucrt /cai ws irpoo"f]Ki Xa/3e?> KO.TO.-
(paves &TTOU TO ^Tovu,evov. <TTIV ofiv tv rots ovffiv v\rj, tan 8e /cat
\f/vx?l, Kai olov TOTTOS els Tts. ov yap %wpis p.ev 6 rbiros Trj v\rj,
Xwpis 5 at5 6 TTJS ^VXTJS olov 6 (J.ev ev yr) Trj v\rj, 6 8 kv dtpi rrj ^vxy
dXX 6 r6?ros rrj if/vxy X^pis ry ^ tv v\y TOVTO 5 T$ /J.T] evudrjvai
rfj v\7] TOVTO de ry /ATJ 2v TL ^ CLVTTJS /cai v\fjs yeveedai TOVTO 5^ ry
/ATJ tv viroKi/jL^v(j} Trj (/A?? yevtadac /cat TOVTO ^O~TL TO xupk elvai. dvvd[j.eis
Se / I XTJS TroXXat /cat apx^" ^ a /^0"a /cat ^(rxara ^vx^l %X L ^^ ^^
jrapovcra Trpoo-atret /cat olov fi/oxXet /cai ets TO eiVw Trape\deiv ^Xet
Tras 5^ 6 %wpos lepbs /cai ovotv <TTIV, 6 d/jt,oip6v to~TL i/ ux^s. e\\d/j.-
Trerai ovv V7roj3d\\ovo~a eavTrjv /cai d<j> ov /JLV eXXd/iTrerat ov dvvaTai
Xa/Setv ov ydp dv^x erai aurrji ^/cetVo /catrot Trapoi o~av, 6 rt //.TJ 6/oa
5td KdK-rjv. TT)V 8 ZXXa/Ji^iv /cai r6 tKeWev 0tDs etr/corwo-e Trj yit^et
/cai dffdevh TreirolrjKe TTJV ytvecriv O.VTT] Trapao-xoOaa /cai TT]V aiTiav
TOV ets avTTjv t\delv ov ydp av ^X^e ry /AT? -rrapbvTL. /cai rouT6
^<TTt TTTtDyU-a Tr^s \j/vxTJs T"b ovTws \6elv els v\r)v , nctl dffOeve i, OTL Trao~ai
ai SvvdfJLCis ov irdpeiffLV ets evfyyeiav Ku>\vovo"ris v\rjs irapelvai. T$ Tbv
TOTTOV bv KCLTX I ttOrTj /caraXa/Seii /cat otov o~vcrireipadrjvai iroiijo ai
tKelvrjv, 8 5^ ZXafiev olov K\4\f/ao~a Troirjaai KO.KOV elvcu, ^cos &v Svv>]6r]
dva.8pa.fj.eiv. V\TJ Tolvvv /cai do~6evetas i/ i X^ at rt a /cai /ca/ctas ama.
irpbrepov dpa KaKTj avTy /cai irp&Tov /ca/c6^ * /cat 701/9 et ai)rr? r) ^vxv
Ty i>\y eyewrio-e Tra9ov<ra, /cai el tKOLvtivfiaev ai)rf; /cai eyeveTO /ca/c^,
^ CXi; atr/a irapovaa ov ydp av tyevtTO els avryv /J.T] Trj Trapovffla
Xa/3oO<7a.



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 273

Aristotle imagined. The finite form is separable
from, and exists independent of, its particular. The
soul is not the entelechy of the body, as Aristotle
said ; in Plotinian phrase, she is not united with
Matter, nor does she exist in it as a substratum.
Again, when Plotinus says that one "something"
is not produced out of Soul and Matter, we may
perhaps see a denial of the Aristotelian contention
that the individual, not the universal, the roSe n
composed of Form and Matter, and not the form
alone is the real thing. Plato had asserted that the
universal alone is real, and that the particular is
but a mutilated fragment, or copy, or shadow of
it. Plotinus cannot go quite so far because of his
provision of an intelligible basis for particular souls,
in his doctrine of Ideas of individuals. But it is
the particular soul or form which is the real thing,
the roSe rt, not its union with Matter and body in
a particular fleshly man. That union indeed is
rather a diminution of its reality, a blurring of its
definite and individual character by the principle
of indetermination. Men s souls are individual, we
might say, but their bodies are compounded of the
same clay.

The rest of the passage but amplifies the con
ception of Matter as a detraction from, rather than
an ingredient in, the real thing. Matter crowds the
soul, as it were. It weakens the soul s powers as
darkness does light. The soul fades into Matter.
In this her fall consists. Matter, then, is the cause

T



274 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

of the soul s fall, and of the vice and sin involved.
Were everything light, the soul s rays would not be
diminished and absorbed. She would not have to
illumine or create. Everything would be illuminated
and created, or rather there would be nothing but
illumination. Then nothing would be distinguish
able from the One. The One would be all in all.
Once more, Matter is the origin of Evil.

We may note in passing how with this ascription
of Evil to Matter as its cause, any other than a
nominal distinction between moral and physical evil
is abolished. Moral evil may be described in terms of
physical evil and vice versa with equal appropriate
ness. Thus on the one hand we may regard sin
as merely one case of the universal failure of all
mundane things to realize their entelechies a
failure due to the inadequacy of means to ends.
On the other hand we may regard that inadequacy
which is the summum genus of all physical evil as
involved in the great cosmic fall and fading of
^X 1 ? and Aoyos into the darkness and not -being
of Matter ; that is, as implicated in what we may
call the aggregate sin of all the particular souls and
seminal reasons. The truth is, that a common defini
tion is applicable to both. All evil, be it physical or
moral, may be described as a corruption or darkening
of the soul or seminal reason by Matter.

There remain one or two other aspects of Matter
to be considered ; Matter regarded as a physical
substratum, and Matter in the intelligible world.



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 275

In his discussion of the first point Plotinus follows
Aristotle. The necessity for such a substratum is
proved by the Peripatetic appeal to the phenomena
of change. Change is transformation. Qualities do
not alter their natures, but things their qualities.
There must then be something which passes from
one to the other. 1

What is this something? Plotinus proceeds to
criticize the answer given by the hylozoists and
atomists. Elements are determinations of Matter.
Such is his general criticism. In greater detail he
reviews Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Anaximander, and
Leucippus.

Apparently misinterpreting Empedocles, he says
that his elements show that they are not Matter
by the fact that they are corruptible. Empedocles,
as a matter of fact, had maintained their incorrupti
bility. Plotinus had better have argued that they
are specific, and therefore a composite of Matter and
Form. Against Anaxagoras he urges that vovs and
Being must be prior to "the mixture," TO /xty/xa.
For the mixture must exist, must have Being as a
substratum. If Being be mixed, then this "mixture"
again must have a common ground, and so on till
the simple be reached. Again if vovs be the creator,
what is the use of having its material already created ?
Novs is the principle that could and should impart
form to it. Of itself Matter should be formless.

Anaximander he criticizes on the ground that he
1 Cf. Aristotle, Met. A 2, 1069 b 3-9; 10, 1075 a 30-31.



276 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

means by the " indeterminate " a quantitative infinite
(TO aSiem?Tov). But a quantitative infinite cannot
exist either in itself or as an attribute of any being.
It cannot exist in itself, since the parts of such an
infinite are themselves infinite. That is, the part
would equal the whole. (One wonders what Plotinus
would have said of self-repetitive series, and Cantor s
mathematics of the infinite.) Nor could that of
which such an infinity was predicated be in itself
infinite, or simple, or Matter. Finally, the atoms
of Leucippus are not Matter, for there is no such
thing as an ultimate atom. There can be no end
to the division of the corporeal. Moreover, com
binations of atoms could never give rise to anything
but combinations of atoms. The continuous, sensible
world and the soul cannot be explained by it.

Plotinus concludes that the primal Matter, the
Matter which underlies all elements and determina
tions, must be without any qualities primary or
secondary. It has no colour, temperature, weight,
texture, structure, magnitude, or composition. All
such determinations, all determinations of every sort,
must be introduced into it from without. Else it
would be in part self-determined and positive. Had
it, for example, magnitude, it would have a structure
of its own, and would be not altogether plastic. All
determinations, those of quantity as well as those of
quality, are the work of seminal reasons.

If it be objected at this point that nothing can exist
that has not magnitude, Plotinus replies that nothing



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 277

incorporeal has magnitude, yet the incorporeal
exists. Matter is incorporeal in itself. Body and
magnitude are determinations acquired by participa
tion in Form. 1

The second and more important thing to note is
the distinction made by Plotinus between sensible
and intelligible Matter. It may be objected, he says,
that there is no such thing as intelligible Matter.
Matter is indeterminate, what is intelligible is
essentially determinate. The material object is
compound, composed of Matter and Form, the in
telligible, taken by itself, is apparently simple. Again,
we arrive at the conception of Matter from the
phenomenon of " becoming " ; but in the intelligible
world there is no change or alteration. Moreover,
where could such a Matter come from ? If it be
generated, it must have a principle of its own ; if
it be eternal, there is still a plurality of principles.
But in that case the plurality of worlds will be con
tingent in its existence ; that is, will be due to the
union of these principles, and each intelligible, like
each sensible object, will be composite and corporeal.
How then are we to deal with these difficulties ?

Plotinus begins with a denial of the assertion that
there is no indeterminateness in the intelligible world.
Nor, he adds, need we necessarily look askance at
indeterminateness as an indubitable sign of imperfec
tion. It depends upon the kind of indeterminateness.

1 For all this discussion see ii. 4, 6 et seq. (162 c et seq.}
[vol. i. p. 134, 1. 29



278 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS



Thus the soul is indeterminate relatively to vovs and
Reason, by which she is given form and value. But
this is not all. In the content of vovs itself we are
able to make a distinction between Matter and Form.
There are many Ideas, " and if the Ideas be many,
they must have something in common, and since
they differ from one another, each must also have
something peculiar to itself. This something peculiar
and differentiating is the form proper to each Idea.
But if there be Form, there is also something which
is formed, to which the principle of differentiation is
applied." 1 How now shall we describe intelligible
Matter ? To answer this we must ask what the Ideas
have in common. They all are, and all have unity.
Blank, simple Being, then, is the Matter or substratum
of all forms, and hence of the intelligible world.

Intelligible, however, is to be sharply distinguished
from sensible Matter. " The divine Matter in grasp
ing what determines it, gets a determinate and
intelligible life. But sensible Matter, even when it
becomes something determinate, is not even then
living or thinking, but a mere corpse adorned." In
other words, the intelligible Matter is completely
assimilated to Form. Forms do not fall short of
their true selves.

1 ii. 4, 4 (160) [vol. i. p. 152, 1. 2T et seq.]. b 5y \6yos ijfuv
virode/JievoLS TO vvv efrcu ra e ldr) 5^5ei/cTcu y&p tv aXAots Trpotru.
et oOv TroAXa TO, etdr), KOIVOV tfv TL tv aurots avdyxr) elvai Kai 5r) /cat
tStov, $ 5ta0<fpei #X\o #AXou. TOVTO STJ rb tStov /cat ij 5ta0o/>a

el 5t



i 6 T/ 5ta0opd.



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 279

Another point of contrast is that intelligible
Matter is a principle of eternal, and not of temporary,
individuations. Sensible objects "become," and
change into one another, but the intelligible world
with all its distinctions simply is what it is without
reference to any time.

Finally, intelligible Matter is closely connected
with the category of Difference. "The Difference
which is in the intelligible world for ever produces
Matter, for it is the source of Matter, being the
primal motion. Hence the primal motion is also
called difference, because difference and motion arise
together. The motion and the difference which
proceeds from the first principle are undetermined
and need the first principle for their determination.
They are determined when they turn back to it;
but before that both Matter and Difference are in
determinate and not yet good, and unlit as yet by
the first principle. For if light proceed from it, that
which receives the light cannot be said to possess it
eternally, since there was a time before it received
it, and possesses it as something alien, since the
light proceeds from another principle than itself.
So much by way of exposition, and perhaps more
than is due, of Matter in the intelligible world." l

1 Cf. ii. 4, 5 (162 B) [vol. i. p. 154, 1. 16 et seq.]. /cat yap 77
CTepoT-rjs ij tnei ad, / TT\V \i\f\v Trotet dpxn yap iJXfjs avrt], 77 Kivrjats
77 TrpuT-r) dib Kal avrrj CTC/JOTT?? tXeyero, OTL 6/j.ov et;t<pv(rav Kivrjffis
Kal erepoTTjs abpiarov 8 Kal 77 Kivyais /cat 77 eTepOTys 77 dirb TOV
irp&Tov, KOLKeivov Trpbs TO opLcrdTJvai deo/ueva opiferai 5t. orav TT/SOS
avrb e7ri<rrpa0f/ irpiv de aopiffTov /cat TO erepov /cat otiira) dya06v, d\\
titelvov. el yap irap e/cetVou TO 0a)s, TO



280 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

It seems at first sight impossible to reconcile this
treatment of Matter as coupled with Difference and
finding therein its apx^ with the statement but
a few paragraphs back that Form is the principle
of individuation, Matter the common element in
the Ideas. Doubtless there may be here a real
confusion in Plotinus s own thought. Yet the con
tradiction is not so serious as it appears. The
category of Difference may be regarded as the
source of intelligible Matter without any implication
thereby that Matter is necessarily the principle of
differentiation. Plotinus^s real meaning seems to be
that individuation in the intelligible as in s the sensible
world requires a substratum to be differentiated.
Only things in the same universe and referable to
some common summum genus (in this case " Being ")
can be compared with, or distinguished from, one
another. The category of Difference then necessitates
intelligible Matter. They are twin-born, as it were,
from the One, and receive from it alike their being
and their relations.

It should not surprise us, however, that we find
it necessary to posit such a principle as intelligible
Matter in vovs. The intelligible world is the arche
type of the sensible world. But to be really the
archetype of a composite world like our own, it too
must be composite. There must be in it that which



0tDs oi)/c e^ei a.\^6Lv6v, dXXa &\\o ov ^ et ^ e P r
Trap &\\ov. /cat Trepi fj,h TTJS v rots VO-TJTO LS CX^s TrXetw TUIV
Trapa.yv/j,i>wd^vTa



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 281

corresponds to the material substratum in the sensible
order. A cosmos means an ordering of Matter by
Form. Nor could Form exist without something to
receive it. 1 We must distinguish the Aristotelianism
of this passage from that denial already noted, that
the rdSe TL in the sensible world is the real thing, and
that the form cannot exist without sensible embodi
ment. Contradictory as the statements may seem
at first sight, the one is really a reinforcement of
the other. Having denied the dependence of Form
upon sensible embodiment for expression, Plotinus
now shows how each form contains within itself the
conditions of its own existence. It has, as it were,
besides its earthly body, a spiritual body.

The analogy between the sensible and the in
telligible world is further developed. Just as the
structure of the sensible world is an image, or
shadow, or outer semblance of the constitution of
the intelligible world, so sensible Matter is but a
shadow or image of the intelligible substratum.
Intelligible Matter is true essence. In vovs there is
no distinction between essence and existence. 2

Again, a propos of the indeterminateness of
Matter, and of intelligible Matter, its indetermin
ateness is conceived as begotten of the boundlessness
of the One, whether of its power or of its eternity.
The One is not indeterminate in itself, but creates
the indeterminate ; that is, the One is not indefinite,

1 ii. 4, 4 (161 A) [vol. i. p. 152, 1. 27 et seq.}.

2 ii. 4, 5 (161 E) [vol. i. p. 153, 1. 18 et seq.}.



282 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

but indefinable. The indefiniteness of intelligible
Matter is the shadow of its indefinability. Sensible
Matter, again, is a shadow of the intelligible. It is,
however, more indeterminate than the intelligible,
since it is further removed from the source of all
truth and goodness. 1 We may say, in fine, that as
sensible Matter is not-being in relation to the being
of the intelligible world, so intelligible Matter is
being in relation to the super-being of the One. 2
^ We are now in a position to review briefly such
aspects of the Plotinian theory of Matter as concern us.
With the history and forbears of this theory we need
**ot trouble ourselves. Suffice it to say that Plotinus
follows Plato and Aristotle with little innovation.
From Plato he takes his designation of Matter as
not-being, " other," indeterminate, receptacle of being
and determination ; from Aristotle his description of
it as without qualification or form, blank, potential,
that which can become all things and is itself no
ihing. It has indeed for him, as for them, its
function as the principle of the substantiality and
solidity of the physical world, but in his case, as in
theirs, its significance is more than cosmological. It
means not merely that there is a world, but what
the world is. It is a law or condition rather than
the stuff of things. It marks a relation which the
various parts of the world, including ourselves, bear
to one another, and summarizes their behaviour.

1 ii. 4, 15 (169 A) [vol. i. p. 164, 1. 29 et seq.].

2 ii. 4, 16 (170 B) [vol. i. p. 166, 1. 15 et seq.].



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 283

That for which it stands, in their relation and be
haviour, is a certain underbreeding in things, a lack
of character and manner, a failure to be true to their
true selves. Matter in a word might be described
as a conceptual symbol for the fact that in the world
the real is not ideal, and the ideal is not realized.

At the same time the Plotinian teaching modifies
in some respects the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle.
The fapov of Plato tends to revert to its original p)
6V. And the functions of Matter as the absolutely
unqualified and indeterminate substratum of all
oppositions, and as the principle and cause of Evil, left
unrelated and even antagonistic in the Aristotelian
system, are reconciled and related in an explanation
satisfactory at least to Plotinus.

But, in a way, the most instructive modification of
the older teaching touches Matter as a principle of
individuation. This function, so important in the
Platonic and Aristotelian treatment of Matter, is by
Plotinus almost entirely denied to it. In him Matter
is certainly not the principle of individuation in the
intelligible world. It is rather the principle of its
community and oneness, of that being and unity in
which the Ideas all share in spite of their variety.
The cause of their variety and individuality is to be
found in the category of Difference, a category which
says no more than that forms and particulars are
different, and the secret of this fact lies hid in the
bosom of the ineffable.

Again, sensible Matter cannot be called the



284 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

principle of individuation in the sensible world, so
far as human beings are concerned. Each individual
man has his own determining pattern laid up in
the heaven of the intelligible order. Of particular
things other than human it probably must be
regarded as the individuating cause, though largely
on negative rather than positive grounds. Plotinus
does not seem to extend the theory of Ideas of
individuals to other than rational souls, and nothing
else than the refraction of Matter can explain the
breaking of the seminal reason emanating from the
universal into the myriad particulars.

These modifications of Plato and Arktotle, how
ever, could not correct the fundamental contradiction
in their doctrine of Matter. They could only serve
clearly to expose what had been but latent and
obscure in them. The contradiction rested upon two
opposing tendencies of thought, namely the tendency
towards mysticism and that towards naturalism. In
the older systems neither of these tendencies was
conscious of more than itself. At any rate neither
had realized its essential hostility to the other.
It seemed as if they could be combined in the same
system. They lay down together like enemies in the
dark, unaware of each other s identity.

But in the history that intervened between Plato
and Plotinus, both had become self-conscious and
mature. The naturalistic tendency had fulfilled
itself in the naked mechanicalism of the Epicureans
and the draped naturalism of the Stoics. The



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 285

mystic tendency had found its expression in the pre-
Plotinian Neo-Platonism. Any system henceforth
that should combine them could not but be rent and
twisted by their conflict.

The results of this conflict we have had fre
quent occasion to note, even within the professedly
Stoic part of the Plotinian theodicy, in the constant
recurrence there of the confusion between degrees
of imperfection and kinds of perfection. We may
note it again in the maintenance, along with such
a theodicy, of a theory of intractable Matter, to all
intents and purposes dualistic. And now we find it
within that dualism itself confusing Plotinus s treat
ment of the material principle.

The confusion in question centres about the
functions of Matter as a principle of individuation
and as a principle of indeterminateness. In Plato and
Aristotle this confusion had been quite innocent, so
far as the phenomenal world was concerned. Matter
was the ground of the differentiation of particulars
from one another and from their appropriate Ideas
or Forms. Such differentiation quite properly carried
with it an implication of indeterminateness and im
perfection. The particular was imperfect by virtue
of its difference from its form, and as no two
particulars of the same species could differ from
one another without at the same time deviating
from their common standard, to be an individual
at all was necessarily to be imperfect. The result
was a correct theory of metaphysical evil so far



286 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

as sensible objects were concerned. For Plato the
particular was by virtue of its particularity a poor
copy of the Idea. For Aristotle the particular,
though real, was doomed to imperfection by that
imperfect assimilation of Form which made it
individual. Not to lose one s self in the Idea, not
to become purely typical and universal, was not to
realize one s perfection.

As regards, however, differences within the in
telligible, as for example between Ideas or Forms,
both Plato and Aristotle are silent. Such difference
is an ultimate datum, an axiom. On the one hand,
they could not deduce it, as did Plotinus, from a
higher unity ; though the rudiments of such de
duction may be discerned in the Platonic dependence
of the Ideas upon the Idea of the Good. But with
Plato the deduction is only rudimentary, and with
Aristotle uncertainty regarding the relation of the
other Forms to God leaves no room for it. On
the other hand, intelligible individuation could not
be ascribed to Matter. For Matter in the Platonic
system is precisely that which differentiates the
sensible from the intelligible world. And though
Aristotle speaks of an intelligible matter, 1 it had to
designate for him as for Plotinus not the principle
by which one form is distinguished from another,
but rather the common and connecting bond and
substratum, the summum genus of which all forms
may be regarded as species. 2 Ideas embody them-
1 Met. H 6, 1045 a, Z 11, 1036 b. 2 Met. H 2, 1043 a.



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 287

selves ; each in itself is its own and only particular,
w apa Kal Aoyw /cat dptOfjiio. If one had demanded a
reason for the plurality or individuation of the Ideas,
it could only have been found in another Idea. But
for this determining Idea yet another Idea would
have been necessary. Thus the principle of individua
tion of the intelligible world would have been at the
end of an infinite self-repetitive series of Forms.

The only method of avoiding such an inference
would have lain in boldly extending the material
principle both as a principle of individuation and
imperfection to the intelligible world, and regarding
the Ideas after the analogy of their particulars as
fragments, or aspects, or mutilations of some higher
unity behind them.

Both Plato and Aristotle, it is true, display a
tendency in this direction in the arrangement of
Ideas and Forms in hierarchies culminating in the
one case in the Idea of the Good, in the other in
the divine Mind. One step more and we should
have had the sole and only perfection of the
mystic vision divided and diminished, through every
possible grade of imperfection, till the limit and
minimum of being was reached. Though, even then,
the sudden transition from the intelligible to the
sensible level of existence would have broken the
otherwise orderly diminution, and perplexing ques
tions might have arisen whether sensible embodi
ments of superior Ideas were more or less perfect
than the Ideas of inferior particulars.



288 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

But this mystic tendency is not carried out in
either Plato or Aristotle. In both cases it is checked
by a " naturalistic " inclination to regard Forms and
Ideas as perfect after their kind, and not as mutilated
aspects of the one perfection. The difference, then,
could not be explained as the work of a distinctive
principle of diminution and diversification, but had
to be accepted as somehow involved in the nature
of the ideal itself.

These difficulties, latent in the Platonic and
Aristotelian systems, and only to be laid bare by
reflection, are so clearly exposed in Plotinus that
the most casual runner may read. The function
of differentiation was denied to Matter (except
inconsistently in the case of particulars other than
human), not from any perception of the difficulties
involved, but because such a denial was in line
with his naturalistic trend of thought. Individua-
tion from this point of view did not imply
imperfection. Imperfection lay only in a particular
kind of difference, the difference of a thing from its
entelechy or ideal self. One kind of thing is not
imperfect because it is not another, but because it
is other than its true nature, the standard of which
is fixed from all eternity in the intelligible world.
It is as the ground of such difference that the
Matter of sensible objects is the principle of im
perfection. Its " otherness " is not the mark of an
outward distinction, but of an inward formlessness.
But difference proper, the difference of one kind of



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 289

thing from another, or in the case of human beings
of one individual from another, is laid to the
category of Difference.

But Plotinus could not keep these two kinds of
difference apart even on the assumption of a pure
naturalism. The doctrine of Matter as the principle
of individuation of non-human particulars involved,
as we know, a fatal self-contradiction. For the qualita
tive difference of particulars from one another implied
a difference, on the part of one at least, from their
proper form or type, and such difference implied
imperfection. Yet why should it be worse for a
horse to be a particular than for a man ? In
dividuality in the latter case was justified and
consecrated in the intelligible world. Why not in
the former ? Or, in other words, if the category of
Difference accounts for my difference both from you
and from my horse, and also for my horse s differ
ence from you and from me, why should it not also
account for my horse s difference from yours ? Why
involve another principle ?

Plainly then, it would seem the logical thing that
Plotinus should refer the variety of particulars to the
category of Difference, rather than to Matter. Mattel-
would be the substratum in which individual differ
ences inhered ; but this variety of particulars would
reflect a similar variety in the intelligible order.

Yet it is only by not taking the obvious logical
step that Plotinus is saved from a nominalism of the
barest sort. With reference to the forms of partic-

u



290 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

ular men, we may well ask what their relation is to
the form of man in general, and are at a loss for an
intelligible answer. Are we to regard that relation
as one of ordinary subsumption like the inclusion of
species within a genus ? It would seem so. Yet in
that case Plotinus is condemned out of his own
mouth. According to his own confession it is
Form which is the principle of specific difference,
intelligible Matter the common ground in which
specific differences inhere. The universal man, then,
man in general, is merely the intelligible Matter for
the Ideas of particular men. The same will be true
of the relation of any universal to its > particulars.
The particular, not the universal, will be the formal
principle. The universal will be merely the subject
of which the individual form is predicated. But this
involves not only a complete reversion of the relation
of universal to particular, but a practical annihilation
of the universal. Each individual form is unique,
and, qua a single unique form, is but once embodied.
Inherence of such forms in a common substratum is
impossible. The universal will be a mere name,
accidentally and arbitrarily applied to several
individuals. Metaphysical significance it will have
none.

Furthermore, the outcome of such a nominalism
must have been naturalism. We remember the
Plotinian argument. Just as species cannot be
expected to be each other, or to have identical
perfections, so individuals within the same species



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 291

cannot be asked perfectly to embody the type.
Particular men are not to be blamed for not attain
ing to the acme of human excellence. Did they
attain to it, they would no longer be Tom, Dick,
and Harry, but avros 6 avfl/owTros. Their particular
forms then are quite as perfect as the type-form.

But which is the principle of individuation in this
case, the Idea of Difference, or Matter ? Evidently
the Idea, since here we are dealing with a dis
tinction of one form from another, and intelligible
Matter is the principle of community. But in that
case the Idea of Difference becomes the principle
upon which rest the differences of individuals from one
another, and from their type or common entelechy.
It usurps, in fine, the most "un-ideal" of all the
functions of Matter.

Still it may be argued that this is to neglect
particular forms, and their unique and proper per
fections. May we not, one will ask, suppose an
order of perfections, each unique and individual,
differentiated from each other by the category, yet
distinguished from their several particular embodi
ments, or, in other words, imperfectly expressed in
the phenomenal world, because of Matter ? But
where am I to find my criterion for judging whether
or not an individual is realizing its particular self
except in its relation to its species ? Am I a good
John Smith except in so far as I am a good man ?
On the other hand, if I have an absolutely particular
and unique function to perform, how can it be said



292 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

that I am not performing it whatever I may do ?
My function may well be to be what I am from
moment to moment. Ideals, no less than Ideas, are
the result of generalization.

But it is beside the point for us to re-open further
an argument already sufficiently thrashed out.
It is enough for us to have shown here that the
individuation founded by Plotinus .upon the category
of Difference could not consistently have been held
apart from that based by him upon Matter. To
pursue this line of thought to its logical conclusion
must have ended in a reference of all individuation
to the category. All ^ would have become erepoi/.
Nothing could fail of some one form of being except
in so far as it perfectly embodied some other. Were
I not this self, I should be that.

Thus Plotinus would have been brought face to
face with the fundamental contradiction of his
theodicy. The category of Difference must be re
sponsible either for all evil and imperfection or for
none. To choose one alternative led directly to
mysticism, to choose the other led no less directly
into naturalism. There was no via media.

But if regarded from one point of view the
category of Difference was logically bound to take
over from Matter just what made it the origin of
Evil, from another point of view Matter was quite as
bound to absorb the category. If in spite of the
Plotinian distinction between them, we find the
category covertly performing a function openly



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 293

charged to Matter, so do we equally find Matter
really responsible for what is made explicitly the
business of the category. It is Plotinus s intention,
as we know, that none of the differences due to the
category shall imply imperfection. All such shall
be attributed to Matter. But now what does the
category actually account for ? It accounts not
only for the individuation of Ideas within vovs and
of souls and seminal reasons within the World-Soul,
but also for the distinction of vov<s from the One,
and of $v\ri from vous. Nos and faxy are indeed
described as possessed each of its appropriate
excellence, and as in no wise to be blamed because
they are not each other or not the One. Hence so
far the category of Difference might be properly
invoked as their principle of individuation. But at
the same time, however much of a contradiction in
terms it may be, the perfection of vous is regarded
as not so perfect as that of the One, and the excellence
of ^XTI as not so excellent as that of vow. In other
and familiar words, kinds are also regarded as grades
of perfection.

What is to account for the graded character of
these perfections, that is, for the diminution in
point of excellence, which one kind of perfection
displays as compared with another ? Novs, though
perfect in itself, is imperfect compared with the One.
"^X 7 ?? though possessed of her proper excellence, is
lacking in excellence as compared with vovs. How
shall we explain this comparative imperfection ? By



294 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS

the category of Difference or by Matter? By
Matter, is the logical answer.

Yet Plotinus^s explanation, as far as he gives any,
is implicitly to refer it to the category. There is
no Evil in the supersensible world. Each hypostasis,
as a whole and in its parts, is perfectly itself. We
need then to seek no origin of Evil there, but only
a principle of variety in the Good. But at the same
time, the fatal comparison of goods in point of
goodness is found there too. And this comparison
could not but imply and rest upon a principle of
imperfection.

Plotinus, doubtless, would have answered us with
a reiteration of the proper perfections of vovs and
j/ vx^J, and an assertion that the fact that one kind
of perfection is not so perfect as another is quite
different from the fact that a thing is not so perfect
as its own nature entitles it to be. But the distinc
tion cannot be maintained. To say that one kind
of perfection is not so perfect as another signifies
not only the innocent positive difference of the one
from the other, but a certain lack in one or the
other, or perhaps in both, of perfection in the
abstract. A standard is covertly introduced by
which the perfections compared are differentiated
not only in point of kind, but of measure of excellence.
So to compare them is, as we have already shown,
really to " subsume " them under the standard set
by the most perfect perfection, as particulars under a
universal. As the particular more or less embodies



MATTER AS THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 295

its entelechy, so the more or less perfect kind of
perfection exemplifies to greater or less degree the
standard value. That value is one. Just because
it is a standard, it exists only in the highest degree.
It may indeed be diffused throughout a variegated
experience, and appears in many forms, distinguish
able in every way save in the point of their per
fection. But any distinction of one from an