A HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY A HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY BY SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA, M.A., Ph.D. (Cal. et Cantab.), D.Litt. (Hon.) (Rome) F.R.S.L., I.E.S. VOLUME III CAMBRIDGE AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1952 PUBLISHED BY THE SYNDICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS London Office : Bentley House, N.w. I American Branch: New York Agents for Canada, India, and Pakistan: Macmillan First published 1940 Reprinted 1952 MAY 2 3 19g? First Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge Reprinted by offset-litho by Percy Lund Humphries & Co. Ltd. To the HON. SRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU who went through great sufferings and hardships all his life in the cause of the liberation of his countrymen, and who is still labouring with almost superhuman effort for the unification of the subcontinent of India, and who is working with steady devotion and faith for the establishment of peace at home and among the nations of the world, the foremost Indian who is piloting the pro gress of the country through troubled waters in the most hazardous period of India s history, this work is most respectfully dedicated as a tribute of personal gratefulness PREFACE The second volume of this work was published as long ago as 1932. Among the many reasons which delayed the publication of this volume, one must count the excessive administrative and teaching work with which the writer is saddled; his continued illness ; the regrettable failure of one eye through strenuous work, which often makes him depend on the assistance of others; and the long distance between the place of publication and Calcutta. The manuscript of the fourth volume is happily ready. In writing the present volume the author has taken great trouble to secure manuscripts which would present a connected account of the development of theistic philosophy in the South. The texts that have been published are but few in number and the entire story cannot be told without constant reference to rare manuscripts from which alone the data can be collected. So far, no work has been written which could throw any light on the discovery and inter pretation of a connected history of Vaisnava thought. It would have been well if the Tamil and Telegu works could have been fruitfully utilized in tracing the history of Vaisnavism, not only as it appeared in Sanskrit but also as it appeared in the vernaculars of the South. But the author limited himself as far as possible to Sanskrit data. This limitation was necessary for three reasons : first, the author was not master of the various vernaculars of South India ; secondly, the inclusion and utilization of such data would have made the present book greatly exceed its intended scope; and thirdly, the inclusion of the data from the vernacular literature would not have contributed materially to the philosophical pro blems underlying the theistic speculations dealt with in this work. Looked at from the strictly philosophical point of view, some of the materials of the present book may be regarded as somewhat out of place. But, both in the present volume and the volume that will follow it, it will be impossible to ignore the religious pathology that is associated with the devotional philosophy which is so predomi nant in the South and which so much influenced the minds of the people not only in the Middle Ages but also in the recent past and is even now the most important element of Indian religions. viii Preface Philosophy in India includes not only morality but religion also. The most characteristic feature of religion is emotion or sentiment associated with a system of beliefs, and as such in the treatment of the dominant schools of philosophy that originated in South India one cannot help emphasizing the important pathological developments of the sentiment of devotion. The writer hopes, therefore, that he may be excused both by those who would not look for any emphasis on the aspect of bhakti or religious senti ment and also by those who demand an over-emphasis on the emotional aspect which forms the essence of the Vaisnava religion. He has tried to steer a middle course in the interest of philosophy, which, however, in the schools of thought treated herein is so intimately interwoven with religious sentiment. The writer has probably exceeded the scope of his treatment in dealing with the Arvars, whose writings are in Tamil, but there also he felt that without referring to the nature of the devotional philo sophy of the Arvars the treatment of the philosophy of Ramanuja and his followers would be historically defective. But though the original materials for a study of the Arvars are in Tamil, yet fortunately Sanskrit translations of these writings either in manu script or in published form are available, on which are almost wholly based the accounts given here of these Tamil writers. The treatment of the Pancaratra literature offered some dif ficulty, as most of these works are still unpublished; but fortunately a large volume of this literature was secured by the present writer in manuscript. Excepting Schrader s work, nothing of any im portance has been written on the Pancaratra School. Though there are translations of the bhdsya of Ramanuja, there has been no treatment of his philosophy as a whole in relation to other great philosophers of his School. Practically nothing has appeared re garding the philosophy of the great thinkers of the Ramanuja School, such as Verikata, Meghanadari and others, most of whose works are still unpublished. Nothing has also been written re garding Vijnanabhiksu s philosophy, and though Nimbarka s bhdsya has been translated, no systematic account has yet appeared of Nimbarka in relation to his followers. The writer had thus to de pend almost wholly on a very large mass of published and unpub lished manuscript literature in his interpretation and chronological investigations, which are largely based upon internal evidence; Preface ix though, of course, he has always tried to utilize whatever articles and papers appeared on the subject. The subjects treated are vast and it is for the scholarly reader to judge whether any success has been attained in spite of the imperfections which may have crept in. Though the monotheistic speculations and the importance of the doctrine of devotion can be traced even to some of the Rg-veda hymns and the earlier religious literature such as the Gltd and the Mahabharata and the Visnupurana, yet it is in the traditional songs of the Arvars and the later South Indian philosophical writers, be ginning from Yamuna and Ramanuja, that we find a special em phasis on our emotional relation with God. This emotional relation of devotion or bhakti differentiated itself in many forms in the ex periences and the writings of various Vaisnava authors and saints. It is mainly to the study of these forms as associated with their philosophical perspectives that the present and the succeeding volumes have been devoted. From this point of view, the present and the fourth volumes may be regarded as the philosophy of theism in India, and this will be partly continued in the treat ment of Saiva and Sakta theism of various forms. The fourth volume will deal with the philosophy of Madhva and his followers in their bitter relation with the monistic thought of Sahkara and his followers. It will also deal with the theistic philosophy of the Bhagavatapurana and the theistic philosophy of Vallabha and the followers of Sri Caitanya. Among the theistic philosophers the fol lowers of Madhva, Jayatlrtha and Vyasatirtha occupied a great place as subtle thinkers and dialecticians. In the fifth volume, apart from the different schools of Saiva and Sakta thinkers, the Tantras, the philosophy, of grammar, of Hindu Aesthetics, and of Hindu Law will be dealt with. It is thus expected that with the completion of the fifth volume the writer will have completed his survey of Hindu thought so far as it appeared in the Sanskrit language and thus finish what was begun more than twenty years ago. A chapter on the Cdrvdka materialists has been added as an appendix, since their treatment in the first volume was practically neglected. The writer has a deep debt of gratitude to discharge to Dr F. W. Thomas the late Boden Professor of Sanskrit at Oxford, and a highly esteemed friend of his who, in spite of his various activities, x Preface pressure of work and old age, has been a true jndnabandhu to the author, helping him with the manuscript and the proofs, and offering him valuable suggestions as regards orthography, punctuation and idiomatic usage. Without this continued assistance the imperfections of the present work would have been much more numerous. The author is specially grateful to his wife, Dr Mrs Surama Dasgupta, Sastri, M.A., Ph.D. (Cal. et Cantab.) for the continued assistance that he received from her in the writing of this book and also in reading a large mass of manu scripts for the preparation of the work. Considering the author s great handicap in having only one sound eye it would have been impossible for him to complete the book without this assistance. He is also grateful to Dr Satindra Kumar Mukherjee, M.A., Ph.D., for the help that he received from him from time to time. SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA June 1939 CONTENTS CHAPTER XV THE BHASKARA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 1 Date of Bhaskara i 2 Bhaskara and iaarikara ......... 3 3 The Philosophy of Bhaskara s Bhdsya ...... 6 CHAPTER XVI THE PANCARATRA 1 Antiquity of the Pancaratra . . . . . . . .12 2 The Position of the Pancaratra Literature . . . . .14 3 The Paiicaratra Literature . . . . . . . .21 4 Philosophy of the Jaydkhya and other Samhitds .... 24 5 Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd ...... 34 CHAPTER XVII THE ARVARS 1 The Chronology of the Arvars ........ 63 2 The Philosophy of the Arvars ........ 69 3 Arvars and Srl-vaisnavas on certain points of controversy in religious dogmas ............ 85 CHAPTER XVIII AN HISTORICAL AND LITERARY SURVEY OF THE VISTSTADVAITA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT 1 The Aragiyas from Nathamuni to Ramanuja ..... 94 2 Ramanuja ........... 100 3 The Precursors of the Visis^advaita Philosophy and the contem poraries and pupils of Ramanuja . . . . . . .105 4 Ramanuja Literature . . . . . . . . .114 5 The Influence of the Ajfvars on the followers of Ramanuja . .134 CHAPTER XIX THE PHILOSOPHY OF YAMUNACARYA 1 Yamuna s doctrine of Soul contrasted with those of others . .139 2 God and the World 152 3 God according to Ramanuja, Vehkatanatha and Lokacarya . . 155 4 Visisjadvaita doctrine of Soul according to Ramanuja and Veh- katanatha . . . . . . . , . . .159 5 Acit or Primeval Matter: the Prakrti and its modifications . .162 xii Contents CHAPTER XX PHILOSOPHY OF THE RAMANUJA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT PAGE 1 arikara and Ramanuja on the nature of Reality as qualified or un qualified . . . . . . . . . . . .165 2 Refutation of Sarikara s avidya 175 3 Ramanuja s theory of Illusion All knowledge is Real . . .179 4 Failure of theistic proofs . . . . . . . . .189 5 Bhaskara and Ramanuja . . . . . . . . .192 6 Ontological position of Ramanuja s Philosophy . . . 195 7 Venkatanatha s treatment of Pramdna . . . . . .201 8 Verikatanatha s treatment of Doubt ....... 207 9 Error and Doubt according to Verikatanatha . . . . .210 10 Perception in the light of elucidation by the later members of the Ramanuja School 220 11 Venkatanatha s treatment of Inference ...... 225 12 Epistemology of the Ramanuja School according to Meghanadari and others 235 13 The Doctrine of Self-validity of Knowledge ..... 247 14 The Ontological categories of the Ramanuja School according to Veiikatanatha . . . . . . . . . . -251 (a) Substance .251 (b) Criticism of the Samkhya Inference for Establishing the Existence of Prakrti ........... 256 (c) Refutation of the Atomic Theory of Nydya in relation to Whole and Part 262 (d) Criticism of the Samkhya Theory of Sat-kdrya-vdda . . . 265 (e) Refutation of the Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness . . 268 (/) Refutation of the Carvaka criticism against the Doctrine of Causality ........... 276 (g) The Nature of the Senses according to Venkatanatha . . . 280 (h) The Nature of dkdsa according to Venkatanatha . . . 282 (i) Nature of Time according to Vehkatanatha .... 284 (j) The Nature of Soul according to Vehkatanatha .... 286 (K) The Nature of Emancipation according to Vehkatanatha . . 292 15 God in the Ramanuja School ........ 296 1 6 Dialectical criticism against the Sankara School .... 304 17 Meghanadari 346 1 8 Vatsya Varada ........... 349 19 Raman ujacarya II alias Vadi-Hamsa-Navamvuda .... 352 20 Ramanujadasa alias MahacSrya . . . . . . .361 21 Prapatti Doctrine as expounded in Srlvacana-bhufana of Lokacarya and Saumya Jamatr Muni s Commentary on it .... 374 22 Kasturl-Rarigacarya 381 23 isaila SVinivasa ........... 384 24 Rahgacarya ........... 395 Contents xiii CHAPTER XXI THE NIMBARKA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY PAGE 1 Teachers and Pupils of the Nimbarka School 399 2 A General Idea of Nimbarka s Philosophy 404 3 Controversy with the Monists by Madhava Mukunda . . .416 (a) The Main Thesis and the Ultimate End in Advaita Vedanta are untenable ........... 416 (b) Refutation of the Sarikara Theory of Illusion in its various Aspects 422 (c) Refutation of the Jsarikarite View of Ajndna .... 424 4 The Pramdrias according to Madhava Mukunda .... 426 5 Criticism of the views of Ramanuja and Bhaskara .... 429 6 The Reality of the World 435 7 Vanamali Misra .......... 440 CHAPTER XXII THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIJNANA BHIKSU 1 A General Idea of Vijnana Bhiku s Philosophy. .... 445 2 The Brahman and the World according to Vijnana-mrta-bhasya . 454 3 The Individual .......... 460 4 Brahma-Experience and Experience ...... 465 5 Self-Luminosity and Ignorance ....... 468 6 Relation of Samkhya and Vedanta according to Bhiksu . . . 471 7 Maya and Pradhana . 476 8 Bhiksu s criticism of the Samkhya and Yoga ..... 479 9 Isvara-gltd, its Philosophy as expounded by Vijnana Bhiksu . . 482 CHAPTER XXIII PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATIONS OF SOME OF THE SELECTED PURANAS 1 Visnu Purdna ........... 497 2 Vdyu Purdna ........... 502 3 Mdrkandeya Purdna . . . . . . . . .506 4 Ndradlya Purdna .......... 507 5 Kurma Purdna .......... 509 APPENDIX TO VOLUME I The Lokdyata, Ndstika and Cdrvdka ..... 512-550 INDEX 551 CHAPTER XV THE BHASKARA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY Date of Bhaskara. UDAYANA, in his Nydya-kusumdnjali, speaks of Bhaskara as a commentator on the Vedanta in accordance with the traditions of the tridanda school of Vedanta and as holding the view that Brahman suffers evolutionary changes 1 . Bhattojl Dlksita also, in his Tattva-viveka-tlkd-vivarana, speaks of Bhatta Bhaskara as holding the doctrine of difference and non-difference (bheddbheddf . It is certain, however, that he flourished after Saiikara, for, though he does not mention him by name, yet the way in which he refers to him makes it almost certain that he wrote his commentary with the express purpose of refuting some of the cardinal doctrines of Sarikara s commentary on the Brahma-sutra. Thus, at the very be ginning of his commentary, he says that it aims at refuting those who, hiding the real sense of the sutra, have only expressed their own opinions, and in other places also he speaks in very strong terms against the commentator who holds the mdyd doctrine and is a Buddhist in his views 3 . But, though he was opposed to Sarikara, it was only so far as Sahkara had introduced the mdyd doctrine, and only so far as he thought the world had sprung forth not as a real modification of Brahman, but only through mdyd. For 1 Tridanda means "three sticks." According to Manu it was customary among some Brahmins to use one stick, and among others, three sticks. Pandita Vindhyesvari Prasada Dvivedin, in his Sanskrit introduction to Bhaskara s commentary on the Brahma-sutra, says that the Vaisnava commen tators on the Brahma-siitra prior to Ramanuja, Tahka, Guhadeva, Bharuci and Yamunacarya, the teacher of Ramanuja, were all tridandins. Such a statement is indeed very interesting, but unfortunately he does not give us the authority from which he drew this information. 2 " Bhattabhdskaras tu bhedd-bheda-veddnta-siddhdnta-vddl" ; Bhattojl Dik- sita s Veddnta-tattva-tikd-vivarana, as quoted by Pandita Vindhyesvari Prasada in his Introduction to Bhaskara s commentary. sutrd-bhiprdya-samvrtyd svdbhiprdyd-prakdsandt vydkhydtam yair idam sdstram vyakhyeyam tan-nivrttaye. Bhaskara s Commentary, p. i. Also "ye tu bauddha-matdvalambino mdyd-vddinas te pi anena nydyena sutra- kdrenai va nirastdh." Ibid. n. 2. 29. In another place ^ahkara is referred to as explaining views which were really propounded by the Mahayana Buddhists vigltam vicchinna-mulam mdhdydnika- bauddha-gdthitam mdyd-vddam vydvarnayanto lokdn vydmohayanti. Ibid. i. 4. 25. 2 The Btidskara School of Philosophy [CH. both Sarikara and Bhaskara would agree in holding that the Brahman was both the material cause and the instrumental cause (updddna and nimitta) Sarikara would maintain that this was so only because there was no other real category which existed; but he would strongly urge, as has been explained before, that mdyd, the category of the indefinite and the unreal, was associated with Brahman in such a transformation, and that, though the Brahman was sub stantially the same identical entity as the world, yet the world as it appears was a mdyd transformation with Brahman inside as the kernel of truth. But Bhaskara maintained that there was no mdyd, and that it was the Brahman which, by its own powers, underwent a real modification; and, as the Pancaratras also held the same doctrine in so far as they believed that Vasudeva was both the material and the instrumental cause of the world, he was in agree ment with the Bhagavatas, and he says that he does not find any thing to be refuted in the Paricaratra doctrine 1 . But he differs from them in regard to their doctrine of the individual souls having been produced from Brahman 2 . Again, though one cannot assert anything very positively, it is possible that Bhaskara himself belonged to that particular sect of Brahmins who used three sticks as their Brahminic insignia in preference to one stick, used more generally by other Brahmins; and so his explanation of the Veddnta-sutra may rightly be taken as the view of the tridandi Brahmins. For in discussing the point that fitness for Brahma-knowledge does not mean the giving up of the religious stages of life (dsrama), with their customs and rituals, he speaks of the maintenance of three sticks as being enjoined by the Vedas 15 . Madhavacarya, in his Sankara-vijaya, speaks of a meeting of Saiikara with Bhatta Bhaskara, but it is difficult to say how far this statement is reliable 4 . From the fact that Bhaskara refuted Sarikara and was himself referred to by Udayana, it is certain that he flourished some time between the eighth and the tenth centuries. Pandita Vindhyesvarl Prasada refers to a copper-plate found by the 1 Vasudeva eva iipadcina-karanam jagato nimitta- kdranam ceti te many ante. . tad etat sarvam sruti-prasiddham eva tasman natra nirdkaraniyam pusydmah. Bhdskara-bhdsya, II. 2. 41. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. in. 4. 26, p. 208; see also Pandita Vindhyesvari s Introduction. * Sankara-vijaya, xv. 80. xv] Bhdskara and Sankara 3 late Dr Bhawdajl in the Maratha country, near Nasik, in which it is stated that one Bhaskara Bhatta of the lineage (gotra) of Sandilya, son of Kavicakravarti Trivikrama, who was given the title of Vidyapati, was the sixth ancestor of Bhaskaracarya of Sandilya lineage, the astronomer and writer of the Siddhanta-siromani ; and he maintains that this senior Vidyapati Bhaskara Bhatta was the commentator on the Brahma-sutra 1 . But, though this may be possible, yet we have no evidence that it is certain; for, apart from the similarity of names 2 , it is not definitely known whether this Vidyapati Bhaskara Bhatta ever wrote any commentary on the Brahma-sutra. All that we can say, therefore, with any degree ot definiteness, is that Bhaskara flourished at some period between the middle of the eighth century and the middle of the tenth century, and most probably in the ninth century, since he does not know Ramanuja 3 . Bhaskara and Sankara. There is a text of the Chdndogya Upanisad, vi. i. i, which is treated from two different points of view by Sarikara and Bhaskara in connection with the interpretation of Brahma-sutra, n. i. 14* . Sankara s interpretation of this, as Vacaspati explains it, is that, when clay is known, all clay-materials are known, not because the clay-materials are really clay, for they are indeed different. But, if so, how can we, by knowing one, know the other? Because the clay- materials do not really exist; they are all, and so indeed are all that pass as modifications (vikdra), but mere expressions of speech (vdcdrambhanam), mere names (ndmdheyarn) having no real 1 Pandita Vindhyesvarl Prasada s Introduction. 2 We hear of several Bhaskaras in Sanskrit literature, such as Lokabhaskara, ^rantabhaskara, Haribhaskara, Bhadantabhaskara, Bhaskaramisra, Bhaskara- sastri, Bhaskaradlksita, Bhattabhaskara, Pandita Bhaskaracarya, Bhat{abhas- karamisra, Trikandamandana, Laugaksibhaskara, Sandilyabhaskara, Vatsa- bhaskara, Bhaskaradeva, Bhaskaranrsimha, Bhaskararanya, Bhaskaranandanatha, Bhaskarasena. 3 He makes very scanty references to other writers. He speaks of ^andilya as a great author of the Bhagavata school. He refers to the four classes of Mahesvaras, Pasupata, Saiva, Kapalika and Kathaka-siddhantin, and their principal work Pancddhyayi-sastra ; he also refers to the Pancardtrikas, with whom he is often largely in agreement. * tad-ananyatvam arambhana-sabdadibhyah. Brahma-sutra, n. i. 14. yathd saumya ekena mrt-pinden asarvam mrnmayam vijndtam syddvdcdram- bhanam vikdro ndmadheyam mrttike ty eva satyam (Ch. VI. i. i). 4 The Bhdskara School of Philosophy [CH. entities or objects to which they refer, having in fact no existence at all 1 . Bhaskara says that the passage means that clay alone is real, and the purport of speech depends on two things, the objects and the facts implied and the names which imply them. The effects (kdrya) are indeed the basis of all our practical behaviour and conduct, in volving the objects and facts implied and the expressions and names which imply them. How can the cause and effect be identical? The answer to this is that it is true that it is to the effects that our speech applies and that these make all practical behaviour possible, but the effects are in reality but stages of manifestation, modification and existence of the cause itself. So, from the point of view that the effects come and go, appear and disappear, whereas the cause re mains permanently the same, as the ground of all its real manifesta tions, it is said that the cause alone is true the clay alone is true. The effect, therefore, is only a state of the cause, and is hence both identical with it and different from it 2 . The effect, the name (ndma- dheya), is real, and the scriptures also assert this 3 . Bhaskara argues against Sankara as follows: the arguments that the upholder of mayd (mdydvddiri) could adduce against those who believed in the reality of the many, the world, might be adduced against him also, in so far as he believes in monism (advaita). A person who hears the scriptures and philosophizes is at first under the veil of ignorance (avidya)\ and, if on account of this ignorance his knowledge of duality was false, his knowledge of monism might equally for the same reason be considered as false. All Brahma-knowledge is false, because it is knowledge, like the knowledge of the world. It is argued that, just as from the false knowledge of a dream and of letters there can be true acquisition 1 Bhamati, Brahma-sutra, n. i. 14. Rahu is a demon which is merely a living head with no body, its sole body being its head ; but still %ve use, for convenience of language, the expression " Rahu s head " (Rahoh sirah) ; similarly clay alone is real, and what we call clay-materials, jugs, plates, etc., are mere expressions of speech having no real objects or entities to which they can apply they simply do not exist at all but are mere vikalpa; vdcd kevalam drabhyate vikdra-jdtam na tu tattvato sti yato ndmadheya-ntdtram etat;. . .yathd rahoh sirah. . . sabda-jfidnd - nupdtl vastu-sitnyo vikalpa iti; lathd cd vastutayd anrtam vikdra-jdtam. 2 vdg-indriyasya ubhayam drambhanam vikdro ndmadheyam . . . ubhayam dlambya vdg-vyavahdrah pravartate ghatena udakam dhare ti mrnmayam ity asya idam vyakhydnam . . . kdranam eva kdryd-tmand ghatavad avatisthate. . .kdrana- syd vasthd-mdtram kdryam vyatiriktd vyatiriktam sukti-rajatavad dgamdpdya- dharmitvdc ca anrtam anityam iti ca vyapadisyate. Bhdskara-bhdsya, n. i. 14. 3 atha ndma-dheyam satyasya satyamiti, etc. Ibid. xv] Bhdskara and Sankara 5 of good and evil or of certain meanings, so from the false knowledge of words and their meanings, as involved in the knowledge of monistic texts of the Upanisads, there may arise right knowledge. But such an argument is based on false analogy. When from certain kinds of dreams someone judges that good or evil will come to him, it is not from nothing that he judges, since he judges from particular dream experiences; and these dream experiences are facts having particular characters and features; they are not mere nothing, like the hare s horn; no one can judge of anything from the hare s horn. The letters also have certain shapes and forms and are definitely by common consent and agreement associated with particular sounds ; it is well known that different letters in different countries may be used to denote one kind of sound. Again, if from a mistake some one experiences fear and dies, it is not from nothing or from some thing false that he dies ; for he had a real fear, and the fear was the cause of death and was roused by the memory of a real thing, and the only unreality about it was that the thing was not present there at that time. So no example could be given to show that from false knowledge, or falsehood as such, there could come right knowledge or the truth. Again, how can the scriptures demonstrate the false hood of the world? If all auditory knowledge were false, all lan guage would be false, and even the scriptural texts would be non existent. Further, what is this "avidyd" if it cannot be described? How can one make anyone understand it? What nonsense it is to say that that which manifests itself as all the visible and tangible world of practical conduct and behaviour cannot itself be described 1 . If it is beginningless, it must be eternal, and there can be no liberation. It cannot be both existent and non-existent; for that would be contradictory. It cannot be mere negation; for, being non-existent, it could not bring bondage. If it brings bondage, it must be an entity, and that means a dual existence with Brahman. So the proposition of the upholder of mdyd is false. What is true, however, is that, just as milk gets curdled, so it is God Himself who by His own will and knowledge and omnipotence transforms Himself into this world. There is no inconsistency in God s transforming Himself into the w r orld, though He is partless ; 1 yasydh kdryam idam krtsnam vyavahdrdya kalpate nirvaktum sd na sakye ti vacanam vacandr-thakam. Bhdskara-bhdsya. 6 The Bhdskara School of Philosophy [CH. for He can do so by various kinds of powers, modifying them ac cording to His own will. He possesses two powers; by one He has become the world of enjoyables (bhogya-sakti), and by the other the individual souls, the enjoyers (bhoktr); but in spite of this modifica tion of Himself He remains unchanged in His own purity; for it is by the manifestation and modification of His powers that the modi fication of the world as the enjoyable and the enjoyer takes place. It is just as the sun sends out his rays and collects them back into himself, but yet remains in himself the same 1 . The Philosophy of Bhaskara s Bhasya. From what has been said above it is clear that according to Bhaskara the world of matter and the selves consists only in real* modifications or transformations (parindma) of Brahman s own nature through His diverse powers. This naturally brings in the question whether the world and the souls are different from Brahman or identical with him. Bhaskara s answer to such a question is that "difference" (bheda) has in it the characteristic of identity (abheda- dharmas ca} the waves are different from the sea, but are also identical with it. The waves are manifestations of the sea s own powers, and so the same identical sea appears to be different when viewed with reference to the manifestations of its powers, though it is in reality identical with its powers. So the same identical fire is different in its powers as it burns or illuminates. So all that is one is also many, and the one is neither absolute identity nor absolute difference 2 . The individual souls are in reality not different from God; they are but His parts, as the sparks of fire are the parts of fire; but it is the peculiarity of these parts of God, the souls, that though one with Him, they have been under the influence of ignorance, desires and deeds from beginningless time 3 . Just as the dkdsa, which is all the same everywhere; and yet the dkdsa inside a vessel or a house is not just the same dkdsa as the boundless space, but may in some 1 Bhdskara-bhdsya, n. i. 2J, also I. 4. 25. 2 abheda-dharmas ca bhedo yathd mahodadher abhedah sa eva tarangddy- dtmand I artamdno bheda ity ucyate, na hi tarangd-dayah pdsdnd-disu drsyante tasyaiva tdh saktayah sakti-saktimatos ca ananyatvam anyatvam ca-palaksyate yathd gner dahana-prakdsand-di-saktayah. . . . tasmdt sarvam ekd-nekd-tmakam nd tyantam abhinnam bhinnam vd. Ibid. II. i. 18. 3 Ibid. i. 4. 21. xv] The Philosophy of Bhaskara s Bhdsya 7 sense be regarded as a part of it ; or just as the same air is seen to serve different life-functions, as the five prdnas, so the individual souls also may in some sense be regarded as parts of God. It is just and proper that the scriptures should command the individual souls to seek knowledge so as to attain liberation; for it is the desire for the highest soul (paramdtmari) or God or Brahman that is the cause of liberation, and it is the desire for objects of the world that is the cause of bondage 1 . This soul, in so far as it exists in association with ignorance, desires and deeds, is atomic in nature; and, just as a drop of sandal paste may perfume all the place about it, so does the atomic soul, remaining in one place, animate the whole body. It is by nature endowed with consciousness, and it is only with reference to the knowledge of other objects that it has to depend on the pre sence of those objects 2 . Its seat is in the heart, and through the skin of the heart it is in touch with the whole body. But, though in a state of bondage, under the influence of ignorance, etc., it is atomic, yet it is not ultimately atomic in nature ; for it is one with Brahman. Under the influence of buddhi, ahamkdra, the five senses and the five vdyus it undergoes the cycle of rebirths. But though this atomic form and the association with the buddhi, etc., is not essential to the nature of the soul, yet so long as such a relation exists, the agency of the soul is in every sense real ; but the ultimate source of this agency is God Himself; for it is God who makes us perform all actions, and He makes us perform good actions, and it is He who, remaining within us, controls all our actions. In all stages of life a man must perform the deeds enjoined by the scriptures, and he cannot rise at any stage so high that he is beyond the sphere of the duties of work imposed on him by the scriptures 3 . It is not true, as Sahkara says, that those who are fit to 1 rdgo hi paramdtma-visayo yah sa mukti-hetuh visaya-visayo yah sa bandha- hetuh. Bhdskara-bhdsya. 2 Ibid. II. 3. 18, 22, 23. 3 Bhdskara-bhdsya, I. i. i. In holding the view that the Brahma-sutra is in a sense continuous with the Mimdmsd-sutra, which the former must follow for it is after the performance of the ritualistic duties that the knowledge of Brahman can arise, and the latter therefore cannot in any stage dispense with the need for the former and that the Brahma-sutras are not intended for any superior and different class of persons, Bhaskara seems to have followed Upa- varsa or Upavarsacarya, to whose commentary on the Mimdmsd-sutra he refers and whom he calls the founder of the school (sdstra-sampraddya-pravartakd). Ibid. i. i. i, and n. 2. 2J. See also I. i. 4: dtma-jndnd-dhikrtasya karmabhir vind apavargd-nupapatter jndnena karma samucclyate. 8 The Bhdskara School of Philosophy [CH. have the highest knowledge are beyond the duties of life and courses of ritualistic and other actions enjoined by the scriptures, or that those for whom these are intended are not fit to have the highest knowledge; in other words, the statement of Sarikara that there cannot be any combination (samuccayd) of knowledge (jndna) and necessary ritualistic duties of life (karma) is false. Bhaskara admits that pure karma (ritualistic duties) cannot lead us to the highest perception of the truth, the Brahman ; yet knowledge (jiidnd) com bined with the regular duties, i.e. jndna-samuccita-karma, can lead us to our highest good, the realization of Brahman. That it is our duty to attain the knowledge of Brahman is also to be accepted, by reason of the injunction of the scriptures; for that also is one of the imperative duties imposed on us by the scriptures a ridhi the self is to be known (dtmd vd are drastavyah, etc.). It is therefore not true, as Sarikara asserted, that what the ritualistic and other duties imposed on us by the scriptures can do for us is only to make us fit for the study of Vedanta by purifying us and making us as far as possible sinless; Bhaskara urges that performance of the duties imposed on us by the scriptures is as necessary as the attainment of knowledge for our final liberation. Bhaskara draws a distinction between cognition (jndna) and consciousness (caitanya), more particularly, self-consciousness (dtma-caitanya). Cognition with him means the knowledge of ob jective things, and this is a direct experience (anubhava) arising out of the contact of the sense organ, manas, and the object, the presence of light and the internal action of the memory and the sub-conscious impressions (samskdra). Cognition is not an active operation by itself, but is rather the result of the active operation of the senses in association with other accessories, such that whenever there is a collocation of those accessories involving the operation of the senses there is cognition 1 . Bhaskara is therefore positively against the con tention of Kumarila that knowledge is an entity which is not directly perceived but only inferred as the agent which induces the in tellectual operation, but which is not directly known by itself. If an unperceived entity is to be inferred to explain the cause of the per- 1 jfidna-kriyd-kalpandydm pramdnd-bhdvdt. . . .dlokendriya-manah-samskdresu hi satsu samvedanam utpadyate iti tad-abhdve notpadyate, yadi punar aparam jndnam kalpyate tasydpy anyat tasydpy any ad ity anavasthd; na ca jndna- kriydnumdne lingam as ti, samvedanam iti cen na,agrhlta-sambandhatvdt. Blidskara- bhdsva, 1. 1 i. xv] The Philosophy of Bhdskarcfs Bhdsya 9 ceived intellectual operation, then another entity might be inferred as the cause of that unperceived entity, and another to explain that and so on, and we have a vicious infinite (anavastha). Moreover, no unperceived entity can be inferred as the cause of the perceived intellectual operation ; for, if it is unperceived, then its relation with intellectual operation is also unperceived, and how can there be any inference at all? Thus, cognition is what we directly experience (anubhavd) and there is no unperceived entity which causes it, but it is the direct result of the joint operation of many accessories. This objective cognition is entirely different from the subjective consciousness or self-consciousness; for the latter is eternal and always present, whereas the former is only occasioned by the col locating circumstances. It is easy to see that Bhaskara has a very distinct epistemological position, which, though similar to Nyaya so far as the objective cognition is concerned, is yet different there from on account of his admission of the ever-present self-con sciousness of the soul. It is at the same time different from the Sahkarite epistemology, for objective cognition is considered by him not as mere limitation of self-consciousness, but as entirely different therefrom 1 . It may also be noted that, unlike Dhar- marajadhvarindra, the writer of the Sanskrit epistemological work, Veddnta-paribhdsd, Bhaskara considers manas as a sense-organ 2 . On the subject of the self-validity of knowledge Bhaskara thinks that the knowledge of truth is always self-valid (svatah-pramdna), whereas the knowledge of the false is always attested from outside (paratah pramdna) 3 . As has already been said, Bhaskara does not think that libera tion can be attained through knowledge alone ; the duties imposed by the scriptures must always be done along with our attempts to know Brahman ; for there is no contradiction or opposition between knowledge and performance of the duties enjoined by the scriptures. There will be no liberation if the duties are forsaken 4 . The state of salvation is one in which there is a continuous and unbroken con sciousness of happiness 5 . A liberated soul may associate or not associate itself with any body or sense as it likes 6 . It is as omniscient, 1 kecid dhuh dtmd pramdydm indriya-dvdropddhi-nirgama-visayesu vartate . . . tad idam asamyag darsanam;. . . dlokendriyddibhyo jndnam utpadyamdnam . . . cdnyad iti yuktam. Bhdskara-bhdfya. 2 Ibid. 11.4. 17. * Ibid. i. 4. 21. * Ibid. in. 4. 26. 6 Ibid. iv. 4. 8. 6 Ibid. iv. 4. 12. io The Bhaskara School of Philosophy [CH. omnipotent and as one with all souls as God Himself 1 . The attach ment (raga) to Brahman, which is said to be an essential condition for attaining liberation, is further defined to be worship (samdrd- dhand) or devotion (bhakti}, while bhakti is said to be attendance on God by meditation (dhydnddind paricaryd}. Bhakti is conceived, not as any feeling, affection or love of God, as in later Vaisnava literature, but as dhydna or meditation 2 . A question may arise as to what, if Brahman has transformed Himself into the world, is meant by meditation on Brahman? Does it mean that we are to meditate on the world? To this Bhaskara s answer is that Brahman is not exhausted by His transformation into the world, and that what is really meant by Brahman s being transformed into the world is that the nature of the world is spiritual. The world is a spiritual mani festation and a spiritual transformation, and what passes as matter is in reality spiritual. Apart from Brahman as manifested in the world, the Brahman with diverse forms, there is also the formless Brahman (nisprapanca brahman], the Brahman which is transcen dent and beyond its own immanent forms, and it is this Brahman which is to be worshipped. The world with its diverse forms also will, in the end, return to its spiritual source, the formless Brahman, and nothing of it will be left as the remainder. The material world is dissolved in the spirit and lost therein, just as a lump of salt is lost in water 3 . This transcendent Brahman that is to be worshipped is of the nature of pure being and intelligence (sal-laksana and bodha-laksana)*. He is also infinite and unlimited. But, though He is thus characterized as being, intelligence, and infinite, yet these terms do not refer to three distinct entities; they are the qualities of Brahman, the substance, and, like all qualities, they cannot remain different from their substance ; for neither can any substance remain without its qualities, nor can any qualities remain without their sub stance. A substance does not become different by virtue of its qualities 5 . Bhaskara denies the possibility of liberation during lifetime (jtvan-mukti); for so long as the body remains as a result of the 1 muktahkarana-tmanampraptahtadvadmasarva-jnahsarva-saktih.Bliaskara- bhasya, iv. 4. 7. 2 Ibid. in. 2. 24. 3 Ibid. II. 2. 1 1, 13, 17. * Ibid. ill. 2. 23. 8 na dharma-dharmi-bhedena svarupa-bheda iti; na hi guna-rahitam drarvam asti na dravya-rahito gunah. Ibid. in. 2. 23. xv] The Philosophy of Bhaskarcfs Bhdsya n previous karmas, the duties assigned to the particular stage of life (asramd) to which the man belongs have to be performed; but his difference from the ordinary man is that, while the ordinary man thinks himself to be the agent or the doer of all actions, the wise man never thinks himself to be so. If a man could attain liberation during lifetime, then he might even know the minds of other people. Whether in mukti one becomes absolutely relationless (nihsam- bandhah), or whether one becomes omniscient and omnipotent (as Bhaskara himself urges), it is not possible for one to attain mukti during one s lifetime, so it is certain that so long as a man lives he must perform his duties and try to comprehend the nature of God and attend on Him through meditation, since these only can lead to liberation after death 1 . 1 Bhdskara-bhdsya, in. 4. 26. CHAPTER XVI THE PANCARATRA. Antiquity of the Pancaratra. THE Pancaratra doctrines are indeed very old and are associated with the purusa-sukta of the Rg-veda, which is, as it were, the foun dation stone of all future Yaisnava philosophy. It is said in the Sata-patha Brdhmana that Narayana, the great being, wishing to transcend all other beings and becoming one with them all, saw the form of sacrifice known as pancaratra, and by performing that sacrifice attained his purpose 1 . It is probable that the epithets "puruso ha ndrdyanah" became transformed in later times into the two rsis Nara and Narayana. The passage also implies that Narayana was probably a human being who became a transcending divinity by performing the Pancaratra sacrifice. In the later literature Narayana became the highest divinity. Thus Verikata SudhI wrote a Siddhdnta-ralnarali in about 19,000 lines to prove by a reference to scriptural texts that Narayana is the highest god and that all other gods, Siva, Brahma, Visnu, etc., are subordinate to him 2 . The word Brahman in the Upanisads is also supposed in the fourth or the last chapter of the Siddhdnta-ratndvali to refer to Narayana. In the Mahdbhdrata (Sdnti-parvan, 334th chapter) we hear of Nara and Narayana themselves worshipping the unchanging Brahman which is the self in all beings ; and yet Narayana is there spoken of as being the greatest of all. In the succeeding chapter it is said that there was a king who was entirely devoted to Narayana, and who worshipped him according to the sdtvata rites 3 . He was so devoted to Narayana that he considered all that belonged to him, riches, kingdom, etc., as belonging to Narayana. He harboured in his house great saints versed in the Pancaratra system. When under the patronage of this king great saints performed sacrifices, they were unable to have a vision of the great Lord Narayana, and Brhaspati became angry. 1 Sata-patha Brdhmana xm. 6. i. 2 The Siddhdnta-ratndvali exists only as a MS. which has not yet been published. 3 We have an old Pancardtra-samhita called the Sdtvata-samhitd, the con tents of which will presently be described. CH. xvi] Antiquity of the Pancaratra 13 Other sages then related the story that, though after long penance they could not perceive God, there was a message from Heaven that the great Narayana was visible only to the inhabitants of Sveta-dvlpa, who were devoid of sense-organs, did not require any food, and were infused with a monotheistic devotion. The saints were dazzled by the radiant beauty of these beings, and could not see them. They then began to practise asceticism and, as a result, these holy beings became perceivable to them. These beings adored the ultimate deity by mental japa (muttering God s name in mind) and made offerings to God. Then there was again a message from Heaven that, since the saints had perceived the beings of Sveta- dvlpa, they should feel satisfied with that and return home because the great God could not be perceived except through all-absorbing devotion. Narada also is said to have seen from a great distance Sveta-dvlpa and its extraordinary inhabitants. Narada then went to Sveta-dvlpa and had a vision of Narayana, whom he adored. Narayana said to him that Vasudeva was the highest changeless God, from whom came out Saiikarsana, the lord of all life; from him came Pradyumna/ called manas, and from Pradyumna came Aniruddha, the Ego. From Aniruddha came Brahma, who created the universe. After the pralaya, Sarikarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are successively created from Vasudeva. There are some Upanisads which are generally known as Vaisnava Upanisads, and of much later origin than the older Pancaratra texts. To this group of Upanisads belong the Avyakto- panisadorA^ yakta-nrsimhopanisad, with a commentary of Upanisad- brahmayogin, the pupil of Vasudevendra, Kali-santaranopanisad, Krsnopanisad, Garudopanisad, Gopdlatdpaim Upanisad, Gopdlottara- tdpanl Upanisad, Tdrdsdropanisad, Tripdd-vibhuti-mahdndrdyana Upanisad, Dattdtreyopanisad, Ndrdyanopanisad, Nrsimha-tdpinl Upanisad, Nrsimhottara-tdpinl Upanisad, Rdmatdpini Upanisad, Rdmottarottara-tdpini Upanisad, Rdma-rahasya Upanisad, Vdsudevo- panisad, with the commentaries of Upanisad-brahmayogin. But these Upanisads are mostly full of inessential descriptions, ritual istic practices and the muttering of particular mantras. They have very little connection with the Pancaratra texts and their contents. Some of them like the Nrsimha-tdpinl, Gopdlatdpanl, etc. have been utilized in the Gaudlya school of Vaisnavism. 14 The Pancaratra [CH. The Position of the Pancaratra Literature. Yamuna, in his Agama-prdmdnya, discusses the position of the Paricaratras as follows. It is said that any instruction conveyed through language can be valid either by itself or through the strength of the validity of some other proofs. No instruction of any ordinary person can be valid by itself. The special ritualistic pro cesses associated with the Pancaratra cannot be known by percep tion or by inference. Only God, whose powers of perception ex tend to all objects of the world and which are without any limita tion, can instil the special injunctions of the Pancaratra. The opponents, however, hold that a perception which has all things within its sphere can hardly be called perception. Moreover, the fact that some things may be bigger than other things does not prove that anything which is liable to be greater and less could necessarily be conceived to extend to a limitless extent 1 . Even if it be conceived that there is a person whose perception is limitless, there is nothing to suggest that he should be able to instruct in fallibly about the rituals, such as those enjoined in the Pancaratra. There are also no dgamas which prescribe the Pancaratra rites. It cannot be ascertained whether the authors of the Pancaratra works based them on the teachings of the Vedas or gave their own views and passed them on as being founded on the Vedas. If it is argued that the fact that the Pancaratra, like other texts of Smrti of Manu, etc., exist proves that they must have a common origin in the Vedas, that is contradicted by the fact that the Pancaratra doctrines are repudiated in the smrti texts founded on the Vedas. If it is said that those who follow the Pancaratra rites are as good Brahmins as other Brahmins, and follow the Vedic rites, the opponents assert that this is not so, since the Paricaratrins may have all the external marks and appearance of Brahmins, but yet they are not so re garded in society. At a social dinner the Brahmins do not sit in the same line with the Bhdgavatas or the followers of the Pancaratra. 1 atha ekasmin satisaye kenapyanyena niratisayena bhavitavyarn iti dhosrit samana-jdtlyena nyena nir-atisaya-dasdm adhirudhena bhavitavyarn iti : no. tdvad agrimah kalpah kalpyate nupalambhatah na hi dr$tam saravddi vyomeva prapta-vaibhavam. Agama-pramanya, p. 3. xvi] Position of the Pancaratra Literature 15 The very word sdtvata indicates a lower caste 1 , and the words bhdgavata and sdtvata are interchangeable. It is said that a sdtvata of the pancama caste who by the king s order worships in temples is called a bhdgavata. As a means of livelihood the satvatas worship images and live upon offerings for initiation and those made to temple gods; they do not perform the Vedic duties, and have no relationship with the Brahmins, and so they cannot be regarded as Brahmins. It is also said that even by the sight of a man who takes to worship as a means of livelihood one is polluted and should be purified by proper purificatory ceremonies. The Pancaratra texts are adopted by the degraded satvatas or the bhagavatas, and these must therefore be regarded as invalid and non-Vedic. Moreover, if this literature were founded on the Vedas, there would be no meaning in their recommendation of special kinds of rituals. It is for this reason that Badarayana also refutes the philosophical theory of the Pancaratra in the Brahma-sutra. It may, however, be urged that, though the Pancaratra injunc tions may not tally with the injunctions of Brahminic Smrti litera ture, yet such contradictions are not important, as both are based upon the Vedic texts. Since the validity of the Brahminic Smrti also is based upon the Vedas, the Pancaratra has no more necessity to reconcile its injunctions with that than they have to reconcile themselves with the Pancaratra. The question arises as to whether the Vedas are the utterances of a person or not. The argument in favour of production by a person is that, since the Vedas are a piece of literary composition, they must have been uttered by a person. The divine person who directly perceives the sources of merit or demerit enjoins the same through his grace by composing the Vedas for the benefit of human beings. It is admitted, even by the Mlmamsakas, that all worldly affairs are consequent upon the influence of merit and demerit. So the divine being who has created the world knows directly the sources of merit and demerit. The world cannot be produced directly through the effects of our deeds, and it has to be admitted that there must be some being who utilizes the effects of our deeds, producing the world in consonance with them. All the scriptural 1 Thus Manu says : vais ydt tu jdyate vrdtydt sudhanvdcdrya eva ca bhdru$as ca nijanghas ca maitra-sdtvata eva ca. Agama-prdmdnya, p. 8. 1 6 The Pancaratra [CH. texts also support the admission of such an omnipotent and omni scient God. It is this God who, on the one hand, created the Vedas, directing the people to the performance of such actions as lead them to mundane and heavenly happiness, and on the other hand created the Pancaratra literature for the attainment of the highest bliss by the worship of God and the realization of His nature. There are some who deny the legitimate inference of a creator from the crea tion, and regard the Vedas as an eternally existent composition, uncreated by any divine being. Even in such a view the reason why the Vedas and the consonant Smrtis are regarded as valid attests also the validity of the Pancaratra literature. But, as a matter of fact, from the Vedas themselves we can know the supreme being as their composer. The supreme God referred to in the Upanisads is none other than Vdsudeva, and it is He who is the composer of the Pancaratra. Further, arguments are adduced to show that the ob ject of the Vedas is not only to command us to do certain actions or to prohibit us from doing certain other actions, but also to describe the nature of the ultimate reality as the divine person. The validity of the Pancaratra has therefore to be admitted, as it claims for its source the divine person Narayana or Vasudeva. Yamuna then refers to many texts from the Vardha, Linga and Matsya Puranas and from the Manu-samhitd and other smrti texts. In his Purusa- ninnaya also, Yamuna elaborately discusses the scriptural argu ments by which he tries to show that the highest divine person re ferred to in the Upanisads and the Puranas is Narayana. This divine being cannot be the Siva of the Saivas, because the three classes of the Saivas, the Kapalikas, Kalamukhas and Pasupatas, all prescribe courses of conduct contradictory to one another, and it is impossible that they should be recommended by the scriptural texts. Their ritualistic rites also are manifestly non-Vedic. The view that they are all derived from Rudra does not prove that it is the same Rudra who is referred to in the Vedic texts. The Rudra referred to by them may be an entirely different person. He refers also to the various Puranas which decry the Saivas. Against the argument that, if the Pancaratra doctrines were in consonance with the Vedas, then one would certainly have discovered the relevant Vedic texts from which they were derived, Yamuna says that the Pancaratra texts were produced by God for the benefit of devotees who were impatient of following elaborate details described in the xvi] Position of the Pancaratra Literature 17 Vedic literature. It is therefore quite intelligible that the relevant Vedic texts supporting the Paficaratra texts should not be discovered. Again, when it is said that Sandilya turned to the doctrine of bhakti because he found nothing in the four Vedas suitable for the attainment of his desired end, this should not be interpreted as implying a lowering of the Vedas; for it simply means that the desired end as recommended in the Paficaratras is different from that prescribed in the Vedas. The fact that Pafi caratras recommend special ritual ceremonies in addition to the Vedic ones does not imply that they are non- Vedic; for, unless it is proved that the Paficaratras are non- Vedic, it cannot be proved that the additional ceremonies are non-Vedic without implying argu ment in a circle. It is also wrong to suppose that the Pancaratra ceremonies are really antagonistic to all Vedic ceremonies. It is also wrong to suppose that Badarayana refuted the Pancaratra doctrines; for, had he done so, he would not have recommended them in the Mahdbhdrata. The view of the Paficaratras admitting the four vyuhas should not be interpreted as the admission of many gods ; for these are manifestations of Vasudeva, the one divine person. A proper interpretation of Badarayana s Brahma-sutras would also show that they are in support of the Paficaratras and not against them. Even the most respected persons of society follow all the Pancaratra instructions in connection with all rituals relating to image-worship. The arguments of the opponents that the Bhaga- vatas are not Brahmins are all fallacious, since the Bhagavatas have the same marks of Brahmahood as all Brahmins. The fact that Manu describes the pancama caste as sdtvata does not prove that all sdtvatas are pancamas. Moreover, the interpretation of the word sdtvata as pancama by the opponents would be contradictory to many scriptural texts, where sdtvatas are praised. That some sdtvatas live by image-building or temple-building and such other works relating to the temple does not imply that this is the duty of all the Bhagavatas. Thus Yamuna, in his Agama-prdmdnya and Kdsmlrdgama-prdmdnya, tried to prove that the Paficaratras are as valid as the Vedas, since they are derived from the same source, viz. the divine Person, Ndrdyana 1 . 1 The Kdsmlrdgama is referred to in the Agama-prdmdnya, p. 85, as another work of Yamuna dealing more or less with the same subject as the Agama- prdmdnya, of which no MS. has been available to the present writer. 1 8 The Pancaratra [CH. From the tenth to the seventeenth century the Saivas and the Srlvaisnavas lived together in the south, where kings professing Saivism harassed the Srivaisnavas and maltreated their temple- gods, and kings professing Srlvaisnavism did the same to the Saivas and their temple-gods. It is therefore easy to imagine how the sectarian authors of the two schools were often anxious to repudiate one another. One of the most important and comprehensive of such works is the Siddhclnta-ratndTali, written by Yerikata Sudhl. Verikata Sudhl was the disciple of Veiikatanatha. He was the son of Srisaila Tatayarya, and was the brother of Sri Saila Srlnivasa. The Siddhanta-ratnavall is a work of four chapters, containing over 300,000 letters. He lived in the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries, and wrote at least two other works, Rahasya traya-stira and Siddhclnta-vaija vantl. Many treatises were written in which the Paricaratra doctrines were summarized. Of these Gopalasuri s Paticaratra-raksa- samgraha seems to be the most important. Gopalasiiri was the son of Krsnadesika and pupil of Vedantaramanuja, who was himself the pupil of Krsnadesika. His Pancaratra-raksd deals with the various kinds of rituals described in some of the most important Pancaratra works. It thus seems that the Pancaratra literature was by many writers not actually regarded as of Vedic origin, though among the Srlvaisnavas it was regarded as being as authoritative as the Vedas. It was regarded, along with the Samkhya and Yoga, as an accessory literature to the Vedas 1 . Yamuna also speaks of it as containing a brief summary of the teachings of the Yedas for the easy and im mediate use of those devotees who cannot afford to study the vast Vedic literature. The main subjects of the Pancaratra literature are directions regarding the constructions of temples and images, 1 Thus Verikatanatha, quoting Vyasa, says: idanimahn-piinisadam catur-reda-sam-anritam scimkhya-yoga-krtantfna punca-riitrd-nu-sabditam. Sesrara-Minitinisa, p. "19. Sometimes the Pancaratra is regarded as the root of the Yedas, and sometimes the Vedas are regarded as the root of the Pancaratrns. Thus Verikatanatha in the above context quotes a passage from Vyasa in which Pancaratra is regarded as the root of the Vedas "mahato ^ eda-^ rksasya nifthi-bhiito nmhcin ti\am." He quotes also another passage in which the Vedas are regarded as the root of the Pancaratras " srutimfilam idnm tantram prannlnd-kalfxi-sutrarat." In another passage he speaks of the Pancaratras as the alternative to the Vedas " alabhe reda-mantranum panca-rdtro-ditena I d." xvi] Position of the Pancaratra Literature 19 descriptions of the various rituals associated with image-worship, and the rituals, dealing elaborately with the duties of the Srl- vaisnavas and their religious practices, such as initiation, baptism, and the holding of religious marks. The practice of image-worship is manifestly non-Vedic, though there is ample evidence to show that it was current even in the sixth century B.C. It is difficult for us to say how this practice originated and which section of Indians was responsible for it. The conflict between the Vedic people and the image-worshippers seems to have been a long one; yet we know that even in the second century B.C. the Bhagavata cult was in a very living state, not only in South India, but also in Upper India. The testimony of the Besnagar Column shows how even Greeks were converted to the Bhagavata religion. The Mahdbhdrata also speaks of the sdtvata rites, according to which Visnu was wor shipped, and it also makes references to the Vyuha doctrine of the Pancaratras. In the Ndrdyanlya section it is suggested that the home of the Paficaratra worship is Sveta-dvlpa, from which it may have migrated to India; but efforts of scholars to determine the geographical position of Sveta-dvipa have so far failed. In the Purdnas and the smrti literature also the conflict with the various Brahminic authorities is manifest. Thus, in the Kurma purdna, chapter fifteen, it is said that the great sinners, the Pan caratrins, were produced as a result of killing cows in some other birth, that they are absolutely non-Vedic, and that the literatures of the Saktas, Saivas and the Pancaratras are for the delusion of mankind 1 . That Pancaratrins were a cursed people is also noticed in the Pardsara purdna 2 . They are also strongly denounced in the Vasistha-samhitd, the Sdmba-purdna and the Suta-samhitd as great sinners and as absolutely non-Vedic. Another cause of denounce ment was that the Pancaratrins initiated and admitted within their kdpalam gdrudam sdktam, bhairavam purva-pascimam, panca-rdtram, pdsupatam tathdnydni sahasrasah. Kurma-purdna, Ch. 15. (As quoted in the Tattva-kaustubha of Dlksita but in the printed edition of the B.J. series it occurs in the sixteenth chapter with slight variations.) The Skanda-purdna also says: pancardtre ca kdpdle, tathd kdlamukefipi ca. sdkte ca dihsitd yiiyam bhavela brdhmanddhamdh. dvitiyam pancardtre ca tantre bhdgavate tathd diksitds ca dvijd nityam bhaveyur garhitd hareh. (As quoted by Bhaftoji Dikita in his Tattva-kaustubha, MS. p. 4.) 20 The Pancardtra [CH. sect even women and Sudras. According to the Asvaldyana-smrti, no one but an outcast would therefore accept the marks recommended by the Pancaratras. In the fourth chapter of the Vrhan-ndradlya- purdna it is said that even for conversing with the Pancaratrins one would have to go to the Raurava hell. The same prohibition of conversing with the Pancaratrins is found in the Kurma-purana, and it is there held that they should not be invited on occasions of funeral ceremonies. Hemadri, quoting from the Vdyupurdna, says that, if a Brahman is converted into the Paricaratra religion, he thereby loses all his Vedic rites. The Linga-purdna also regards them as being excommunicated from all religion (sarva-dharma- vahiskrta). The Aditya and the Agni-purdnas are also extremely strong against those who associate themselves in any way with the Pancaratrins. The Visnu, Sdtdtapa, Hdrlta, Bodhdyana and the Yama samhitds also are equally strong against the Pancaratrins and those who associate with them in any way. The Pancaratrins, how ever, seem to be more conciliatory to the members of the orthodox Vedic sects. They therefore appear to be a minority sect, which had always to be on the defensive and did not dare revile the orthodox Vedic people. There are some Puranas, however, like the Mahd- bhdrata, Bhdgavata and the Visnu-purdna, which are strongly in favour of the Pancaratrins. It is curious, however, to notice that, while some sections of the Puranas approve of them, others are fanatically against them. The Puranas that are specially favourable to the Pancaratrins are the Visnu, Ndradlya, Bhdgavata, Gdruda, Padrna and Vardha, which are called the Sdttvika pur anas 1 . So among the smrtis, the Vdsistha, Hdrita, Vydsa, Pdrdsara and Kdsyapa are regarded as the best 2 . The Pramdna-samgraha takes up some of the most important doctrines of the Pancaratrins and tries to prove their authoritativeness by a reference to the above Puranas and smrtis, and also to the Mahdbhdrata, the Gltd, Visnudharmottara, Prdjdpatya-smrti, Itihdsasamuccaya, Harivamsa, Vrddha-manu, Sdndilya-smrti, and the Brahmdnda-purdna. 1 Thus the Pramana-samgraha says : raisnavam naradlyam ca tathd bhagavatam subliam garudam ca tathd pddmarn rdrdham subha-darsane sdttvikdni purdndni vijneydni ca fatprthak. 2 Ibid. p. 14. Tattva-kaustubha, MS. p. 13. xvi] Pancaratra Literature 21 The Pancaratra Literature. The Pancaratra literature is somewhat large and only a few works have been printed. The present writer, however, had the opportunity of collecting a large number of manuscripts, and an attempt will here be made to give a brief account of this literature, which, however, has no philosophical importance. One of the most important of these samhitds is the Sdtvata-samhitd. The Sdtvata is referred to in the Mahdbhdrata, the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, the Isvara-samhitd and other samhitds. In the Sdtvata-samhitd we find that the Lord (Bhagavdri) promulgates the Pancardtra-Sdstra at the request of Samkarsana on behalf of the sages 1 . It consists of twenty- five chapters which describe the forms of worshipping Narayana in all His four Vyuha manifestations (vibhava-devatd], dress and orna ments, other special kinds of worship, the installation of images and the like. The Isvara-samhitd says that the Ekdyana Veda, the source of all Vedas, originated with Vdsudeva and existed in the earliest age as the root of all the other Vedas, which were introduced at a later age and are therefore called the Vikdra-veda. When these Vikdra-vedas sprang up and people became more and more worldly- minded, Vasudeva withdrew the Ekdyana Veda and revealed it only to some selected persons, such as Sana, Sanatsujati, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanatkumara, Kapila and Sanatana, who were all called ekdntins. Other sages, Marici, Atri, Aiigirasa, Pulastya, Pulaha, Kratu, Vasistha and Svayambhuva, learnt this Ekdyana from Narayana, and on the basis of it the Pancaratra literature on the one hand was written, in verse, and the various Dharma-sdstras on the other hand were written by Manu and other my. The Pancaratra works, such as Sdtvata, Pauskara, and Jaydkhya and other similar texts, were written at the instance of Samkarsana in accordance with the fundamental tenets of the Ekdyana Veda, which was almost lost in the later stage. Sandilya also learnt the principles of the Ekdyana Veda from Samkarsana and taught them to the my. The contents of the Ekdyana Veda, as taught by Narayana, are called the Sdtvika- sdstra; those Sastras which are partly based on the Ekdyana Veda and partly due to the contribution of the sages themselves are called the Rdjasa-Sdstra\ those which are merely the contribution of 1 Published at Conjeeveram, 1902. 22 The Pancardtra [CH. human beings are called the Tdmasa Sdstra. The Rdjasa astro, is of two kinds, the Pancardtra and the Vaikhdnasa. Sdtvata, Pauskara and Jayakhya were probably the earliest Pancaratra works written by the sages, and of these again the Sdtvata is con sidered the best, as it consists of a dialogue between the Lord and Samkarsana. The Isvara-samhitd consists of twenty-four chapters, of which sixteen are devoted to ritualistic worship, one to the description of images, one to initiation, one to meditation, one to mantras, one to expiation, one to methods of self-control, and one to a description of the holiness of the Yadava hill 1 . The chapter on worship is interspersed with philosophical doctrines which form the basis of the Srlvaisnava philosophy and religion. The Hayaslrsa-samhitd consists of four parts; the first part, called the Pratisthd-kanda, consists of forty-two chapters; the second, the Samkarsana, of thirty-seven chapters; the third, the Linga, of twenty chapters; and the fourth, the Saura-kdnda, of forty-five chapters 2 . All the chapters deal with rituals concerning the installation of images of various minor gods, the methods of making images and various other kinds of rituals. The Visnu-tattva- samhitd consists of thirty-nine chapters, and deals entirely with rituals of image-worship, ablutions, the holding of Vaisnava marks, purificatory rites, etc. 2 The Parama-samhitd consists of thirty-one chapters, dealing mainly with a description of the process of crea tion, rituals of initiation, and other kinds of worship 3 . In the tenth chapter, however, it deals with yoga. In this chapter we hear of jndna-yoga and karma-yoga. Jndna-yoga is regarded as superior to karma-yoga, though it may co-exist therewith. Jndna-yoga means partly practical philosophy and the effort to control all sense- inclinations by that means. It also includes samddhi, or deep con centration, and the practice of prdndydma. The word yoga is here used in the sense of "joining or attaching oneself to." The man who practises yoga fixes his mind on God and by deep meditation detaches himself from all worldly bonds. The idea of karma-yoga does not appear to be very clear; but in all probability it means worship of Visnu. The Pardsara samhitd, which was also available 1 Published at Conjeeveram, 1921. 2 It has been available to the present writer only in MS. 3 This samhitd has also been available to the present writer only in MS. xvi] Pancardtra Literature 23 only in manuscript, consists of eight chapters dealing with the methods of muttering the name of God. The Padma-samhitd, consisting of thirty-one chapters, deals with various kinds of rituals and the chanting of mantras, offerings, religious festivities and the like 1 . The Paramesvara-samhitd, con sisting of fifteen chapters, deals with the meditation on mantras, sacrifices and methods of ritual and expiation 2 . The Pauskara- samhitd, which is one of the earliest, consists of forty-three chapters, and deals with various kinds of image-worship, funeral sacrifices and also with some philosophical topics 2 . It contains also a special chapter called Tattva-samkhydna, in which certain philosophical views are discussed. These, however, are not of any special im portance and may well be passed over. The Prakdsa-samhitd con sists of two parts. The first part is called Parama-tattva-nirnaya, and consists of fifteen chapters; the second, called Para-tattva- prakdsa, consists of twelve chapters only 2 . The Mahd-sanatkumdra- samhitd, consisting of four chapters and forty sections in all, deals entirely with rituals of worship 2 . It is a big work, containing ten thousand verses. Its four chapters are called Brahma-rdtra, Siva-rdtra, Indra-rdtra and Rsi-rdtra. The Aniruddha-samhitd- mahopanisad contains thirty-four chapters and deals entirely with descriptions of various rituals, methods of initiation, expiation, installation of images, the rules regarding the construction of images, etc. 2 The Kdsyapa-samhitd, consisting of twelve chapters, deals mainly with poisons and methods of remedy by incantations 2 . The Vihagendra-samhitd deals largely with meditation on mantras and sacrificial oblations and consists of twenty-four chapters. In the twelfth chapter it deals extensively with prdndydma, or breath- control, as a part of the process of worship 2 . The Sudarsana- samhitd consists of forty-one chapters and deals with meditation on mantras and expiation of sins. Agastya-samhitd consists of thirty- two chapters. The Vasistha contains twenty-four chapters, the Visvdmitra twenty-six chapters and the Visnu-samhitd thirty chap ters. They are all in manuscripts and deal more or less with the same subject, namely, ritualistic worship. The Visnu-samhitd is, however, very much under the influence of Samkhya and holds Purusa to be all-pervasive. It also invests Purusa with dynamic 1 It has been available to the present writer only in MS. 2 These works also were available to the present writer only in MS. 24 The Pancardtra [CH activity by reason of which the prakrti passes through evolutionary changes. The five powers of the five senses are regarded as the power of Visnu. The power of Visnu has both a gross and a tran scendental form. In its transcendental form it is power as con sciousness, power as world-force, power as cause, power by which consciousness grasps its objects and power as omniscience and omnipotence. These five powers in their transcendental forms con stitute the subtle body of God. In the thirtieth chapter the Visnu- samhitd deals with yoga and its six accessories (sad-anga-yoga), and shows how the yoga method can be applied for the attainment of devotion, and calls it Bhdgavata-yoga. It may be noticed that the description of human souls as all-pervasive is against the Srlvaisnava position. The astdnga yoga (yoga with eight accessories) is often recommended and was often practised by the early adherents of the Srlvaisnava faith, as has already been explained. The Mdrkandeya- samhitd consists of thirty-two chapters, speaks of 108 samhitds, and gives a list of ninety-one samhitds 1 . The Visvaksena-samhitd con sists of thirty-one chapters. It is a very old work and has often been utilized by Ramanuja, Saumya Jamatr muni and others. The Hiranya-garbha-samhitd consists of four chapters. Philosophy of the Jayakhya and other Samhitas. The Paficaratra literature is, indeed, vast, but it has been shown that most of this literature is full of ritualistic details and that there is very little of philosophy in it. The only samhitds (so far as they are available to us) which have some philosophical elements in them are the Jaydkhya-samhitd, Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, Visnu- samhitd, Vihagendra-samhitd, Parama-samhitd and Pauskara-samhitd\ of these the Ahirbudhnya and the Jayakhya are the most important. The Jaya starts with the view that merely by performance of the sacrifices, making of gifts, study of the Vedas, and expiatory penances, one cannot attain eternal Heaven or liberation from bondage. Until we can know the ultimate reality (para-tattva) which is all-pervasive, eternal, self-realized, pure consciousness, but which through its own will can take forms, there is no hope of salvation. This ultimate reality resides in our hearts and is in itself 1 These are also in MS. Schrader enumerates them in his Introduction to Pancardtra. xvi] Philosophy of the Jaydkhya and other Samhitas 25 devoid of any qualities (mr-guna), though it lies hidden by the qualities (guna-guhya) and is without any name (a-ndmaka). A number of sages approached Sandilya in the mountain of Gandhamadana with inquiry concerning the manner in which this ultimate reality may be known. Sandilya in reply said that this science was very secret and very ancient, and that it could be given only to true believers who were ardently devoted to their preceptors. It was originally given to Narada by Visnu. The Lord Visnu is the object of our approach, but He can be approached only through the scriptures (Sdstra) ; the Sdstra can be taught only by a teacher. The teacher therefore is the first and primary means to the attainment of the ultimate reality through the instructions of the scriptures. The Jaydkhya-samhitd then describes the three kinds of crea tion, of which the first is called Brahma-sarga, which is of a mytho logical character; it is stated that in the beginning Brahma was created by Visnu and that he, by his own egoism, polluted the creation which he made and that two demons, Madhu and Kaitabha, produced from two drops of sweat, stole away the Vedas and thus created great confusion. Visnu fought with them by His physical energies, but was unsuccessful. He then fought with them by His "mantra" energy and thus ultimately destroyed them. The second creation is that of the evolution of the Samkhya categories. It is said in the Jaydkhya-samhitd that in the pradhdna the three gunas exist together in mutual unity. Just as in a lamp the wick, the oil and the fire act together to form the unity of the lamp, so the three gunas also exist together and form the pradhdna. Though these gunas are separate, yet in the pradhdna they form an inseparable unity (bhinnam ekdtma-laksanam). These gunas, how ever, are separated out from this state of union, and in this order of separation sattva comes first, then rajas and then tamas. From the threefold unity of the gunas the buddhi-tattva is evolved, and from this are produced the three kinds of ahamkdra, prakdsdtmd, vikrtydtmd and bhutdtmd. From the first kind of ahamkdra, as taijasa or as prakds dtmd, the five cognitive senses and the manas are produced. From the second kind of ahamkdra the five conative senses are evolved. From the ahamkdra as bhutdtmd the five bhuta-yoni or sources of elements (otherwise called the five tan- mdtra) are produced, and from these are derived the five gross elements. The prakrti is unintelligent and material in nature, and 26 The Pancardtra [CH. so, as may well be expected, the evolution from prakrti is also material in nature. The natural question in this connection is: how can matter begin to produce other material entities? The answer given to this question is that, though both a paddy seed and a piece of rice are material by nature, yet there is productivity in the former, but not in the latter; so, though the prakrti and its evolutes are both material in nature, yet one is produced out of the other. The products of the unintelligent prakrti, being suffused with the glow of the self as pure consciousness, one with Brahman, appear as being endowed with consciousness 1 . Just as a piece of iron becomes endowed with magnetic powers, so the prakrti also becomes en dowed with intelligence through its association with the intelligent self in unity with Brahman. The question, however, arises how, since matter and intelligence are as different from each other as light from darkness, there can be any association between the unconscious prakrti and the pure intelligence. To this the reply is that the in dividual soul (jira) is a product of a beginningless association of vdsana with pure consciousness. For the removal of this vdsana a certain power emanates from Brahman and, impelled by His will, so works within the inner microcosm of man that the pure con sciousness in the jiva is ultimately freed from the vdsana through the destruction of his karma, and he becomes ultimately one with Brahman. The karma can bear fruits only when they are associated with their receptacle, the vdsana. The self, or the soul, is brought into association with the gunas by the energy of God, and it can thereby come to know its own vdsana, which are non-intelligent by nature and a product of theguna 2 . So long as the self is in associa tion with the covering of mdyd it experiences good and evil. The association of consciousness with matter is thus effected through the manifestation of a special energy of God by which the self is made to undergo the various experiences through its association with mdyd. As soon as the bond is broken, the self as pure con sciousness becomes one with Brahman. cid-rupam dtma-tattvam yad abhinnam brahmani sthitam tenaitac churitam bhdti acic cinmayavad dvija. Jayakhya-samhitd (MS.), in. 14. When this section was written the Jaydkhya-samhitd was not published. It has since been published in the Gaekwad s oriental series. mdydmaye dvijd-dhdre gund-dhdre tato jade saktyd samyojito hy dtmd vetty atmiyds ca vdsandh. Ibid. in. 24. xvi] Philosophy of the Jaydkhya and other Samhitds 27 The third creation is the pure creation (suddha-sarga), in which God, otherwise called Vasudeva, evolved from out of Himself three subsidiary agents, Acyuta, Satya and Purusa, which are in reality but one with Him and have no different existence. In His form as Purusa God behaves as the inner controller of all ordinary gods, whom He goads and leads to work. And it is in this form that God works in all human beings bound with the ties of vdsand, and directs them to such courses as may ultimately lead them to the cessation of their bondage. God is pure bliss and self-conscious in Himself. He is the highest and the ultimate reality beyond all, which is, however, self-existent and the support of all other things. He is beginning- less and infinite and cannot be designated either as existent or as non-existent (na sat tan ndsad ucyate). He is devoid of all gunas, but enjoys the various products of the gunas, and exists both inside and outside us. He is omniscient, all-perceiving, the Lord of all and all are in Him. He combines in Him all energies, and is spontaneous in Himself with all His activities. He pervades all things, but is yet called non-existent because He cannot be per ceived by the senses. But, just as the fragrance of flowers can be intuited directly, so God also can be intuited directly 1 . All things are included in His existence and He is not limited either in time or in space. Just as fire exists in a red-hot iron-ball as if it were one therewith, so does God pervade the whole world. Just as things that are imaged on a mirror may in one sense be said to be in it and in another sense to be outside it, so God is in one sense associated with all sensible qualities and in another sense is unassociated there with. God pervades all the conscious and the unconscious entities, just as the watery juice pervades the whole of the plant 2 . God can not be known by arguments or proof. His all-pervading existence is as unspeakable and undemonstrable as the existence of fire in wood and butter in milk. He is perceivable only through direct intuition. Just as logs of wood enter into the fire and are lost in it, just as rivers lose themselves in the ocean, so do the Yogins enter into the essence of God. In such circumstances there is difference between the rivers and the ocean into which they fall, yet the dif- 1 sva-samvedyam tu tad viddhi gandhah puspadiko yathd. Jaydkhya-samhitd, iv. 76. cetana-cetanah sarve bhiitdh sthdvara-jangamdh piiritdh paramesena rasenausadhayo yathd. Ibid. IV. 93. 28 The Pancaratra [CH. ference cannot be perceived 1 . There is thus both a difference be tween the waters of the rivers and the ocean and an absence of dif ference, even as between the devotees of God and God. The doctrine here preached is thus a theory of bheddbheda or unity-in difference. Brahman is here described as being identical with consciousness, and all objects of knowledge (jneya) are regarded as existing inside the mind 2 . The true knowledge is unassociated with any qualifica tions, and it can rise only through the process of Yogic practice by those who have learnt to be in union with God 3 . When through the grace of God one begins to realize that all the fruits of actions and all that one does are of the nature of the gunas of prakrti, there dawns the spiritual inquiry within one, as to one s own nature, and as to the nature of the essence of sorrow, and one approaches the true preceptor. When the devotee continues to think of the never-ending cycle of rebirths and the consequent miseries of such transitoriness and other afflictions associated with it, and also undergoes the various bodily disciplines as dictated by his Gurus, and is initiated into the "mantras, " his mind becomes disinclined to worldly joys and pure like the water in the autumn, or the sea without any ripple, or like a steady lamp unfluttered by the wind. When the pure consciousness dawns in the mind, all possible objects of knowledge, including the ultimate object of knowledge, arise in the mind, and the thought and the object be come held together as one, and gradually the Supreme knowledge and cessation that brings "Nirvana" are secured. All that is known is in reality one with the thought itself, though it may appear different therefrom. This ultimate state is indescribable through language. It can only be felt and realized intuitively without the application of logical faculty or of the sense-organs. It can be re ferred to only by means of images. It is transcendental by nature, ultimate and absolutely without any support. It is the mere being which reveals itself in the joy of the soul. Of the two ways of 1 sarit-samghad yathd toy am sampravistam maho-dadhau alaksyas co dake bhedah parasmin yogindm tathd. Jaydkhya-samhitd, IV. 123. 2 brahmd-bhinnarn vibhor jndnam srotum icchdmi tattvatah yena samprdpyate jneyarn antah-karana-samstliitam. Ibid. iv. i. 8 sarvo -pddhi-vinirmuktam jndnam ekdnta-nirmalam utpadyate hi yuktasya yogdbhydsdt kramena tat. Ibid. v. 2. xvi] Philosophy of the Jaydkhya and other Samhitds 29 Samddhi which proceed through absorptive emotions (bhdva-jd) and the way of the practice of mantras it is the latter that is the more efficacious. The practice of mantras removes all obstacles to self- realization produced by mdyd and its products. In describing the emanation of Acyuta, Satya and Purusa from Vasudeva, the Jaydkhya-samhitd holds that such an emanation occurs only naturally and not as a result of a purposive will; and the three entities, Acyuta, Satya and Purusa, which evolve out of Vasudeva, behave as one through mutual reflections, and in this subtle form they exist in the heart of men as the operative energy of God, gradually leading them to their ultimate destination of eman cipation and also to the enjoyment of experiences. The Jaydkhya-samhitd describes knowledge as two-fold, as sattdkhya (static) and as kriydkhya (dynamic). The kriydkhya- jndna involves the moral disciplines of yama and niyama, and it is by the continual habit and practice of the kriydkhya-jndna of yama and niyama that the sattdkhya-jndna, or wisdom, may attain its final fulfilment. The yama and the niyama here consist of the fol lowing virtues: purity, sacrifice, penance, study of the Vedas, absence of cruelty, and ever-present forgiveness, truthfulness, doing good to all creatures including one s enemies, respect for the pro perty of others, control of mind, disinclination of mind to all things of sensual enjoyment, bestowing gifts upon others according to one s own power, speaking true and kind words, constancy of mind to friends and enemies, straightforwardness, sincerity and merciful ness to all creatures. The equilibrium of the three gunas is called Avidyd, which may be regarded as the cause of attachment, an tipathy and other defects. Atman is the term used to denote the pure consciousness, as tinged with gunas, avidyd and mdyd. The position described above leads to the view that God emanates from Himself as His tripartite energy, which forms the inner microcosm of man. It is by virtue of this energy that the pure consciousness in man comes into association with his root-instincts and psychosis in general, by virtue of which the psychical elements, which are themselves unconscious and material, begin to behave as intelligent. It is by virtue of such an association that experience be comes possible. Ultimately, however, the same indwelling energy separates the conscious principle from the unconscious elements and thereby produces emancipation, in which the conscious element 30 The Paiicardtra [CH. of the individual becomes merged in Brahman. The association of the conscious element with the unconscious psychosis, which has evolved from prakrti, is not due to a false imaging of the one or the other, or to an illusion, but to the operative power of the indwelling energy of God, which exists in us. The individual, called also the Atman, is the product of this forced association. When the complex element is disassociated from the psychosis and the root-instincts, it becomes merged in Brahman, of which it is a part and with which it exists in a state of unity-in-difference. The difference between this view and that of the Samkhya is that, though it admits in general the Samkhya view of evolution of the categories from prakrti, yet it does not admit the theory of Purusa and the transcendental illusion of Purusa and prakrti, which is to be found in the classical Samkhya of Isvara krsna. There is no reference here to the teleo logy in prakrti which causes its evolution, or to the view that the prakrti is roused to activity by God or by Purusa. Prakrti is sup posed here to possess a natural productive power of evolving the categories from out of itself. The Jaydkhya-samhitd speaks of the devotee as a yogin and holds that there are two ways of arriving at the ultimate goal, one through absorptive trance, and the other through the practice of concentration on the mantras. In describing the process of Yoga, it holds that the yogin must be a man who has his senses within his absolute control and who is devoid of antipathy to all beings. Full of humility, he should take his seat in a lonely place and con tinue the practice of prdndydma for the control of mind. The three processes of prdndydma, viz. pratydhdra, dhydna, and dhdrand, are described. Then, Yoga is stated to be of three kinds, prdkrta, paurusa and aisvarya, the meaning of which is not very clear. It rnay, however, be the meditation on prakrti s ultimate principle, or on Purusa, or the Yoga, which is intended for the attainment of miraculous power. Four kinds of dsanas are described, namely, that of Paryamka, Kamala, Bhadra and Svastika. The ifogic posture is also described. The control of the mind, which again is regarded as the chief aim of yoga, may be of two kinds, namely, of those ten dencies of mind which are due to environments and of those that are constitutional to the mind. It is by increasing the sattva quality of the mind that it can be made to fix itself upon an object. In another classification we hear of three kinds of yoga, sakala xvi] Philosophy of the Jaydkhya and other Samhitds 31 niskala and Visnu, or sabda, vyoma and sa-vigraha. In the sakala or the sa-vigraha type of yoga the yogin concentrates his mind on the gross idol of the deity; and then gradually, as he becomes habi tuated, he concentrates his mind on the notion of a glowing circular disc; then on the dimension of a pea; then on the dimension of a horse-hair; then on a human hair of the head; then on the human hair of the body; and as a consequence of the perfection of this practice the path of the brahma-randhra opens up for him. In the niskala type of yoga the yogin meditates upon the ultimate reality, with the result that his own essence as Brahman is revealed to him. The third form consists in the meditation on the mantras, by which course also the ultimate reality is revealed to the yogin. Through the process of the yoga the yogin ultimately passes out by the channel of his brahma-randhra and leaves his body, after which he attains unity with the ultimate reality, Vasudeva 1 . In the fourth chapter of the Visnu-Samhitd (Manuscript) the three gunas are supposed to belong to Prakrti, which, with its evolutes, is called Ksetra, God being called Ksetrajna z . The prakrti and God exist together as it were in union 3 . The prakrti produces all existences and withdraws them within it in accordance with the direction or the superintendence of the Purusa 4 , though it seems to behave as an independent agent. Purusa is described as an all- pervading conscious principle. The Visnu-samhitd, after describing the three kinds of egoism as sdttvika, rdjasa and tdmasa, speaks of the rdjasa ahamkdra not only as evolving the conative senses but also as being the active principle directing all our cognitive and conative energies. As the cognitive energy, it behaves both as attention directed to sense- perception and also to reflection involving synthetic and analytic activities. The Visnu-samhitd speaks further of the five powers of God, by which the Lord, though absolutely qualityless in Himself, reveals Himself through all the sensible qualities. It is probably in this way that all the powers of prakrti exist in God, and it is in this 1 Jayakhya-samhita, Ch. 33. In Ch. 34 the process of yoga by which the yogin gradually approaches the stage of the final destruction of his body is described. 2 ksetrdkhyd prakrtir jneyd tad-vit ksetra-jna isvarah. Visnu-samhitd, iv. 3 ubhayam cedam atyantam abhinnam iva tisthati. Ibid. 4 tan-niyogdt svatantreva sute bhdvdn haraty apt. Ibid. 32 The Pancaratra [CH. sense that the ksetra or the prakrti is supposed to be abhinna, or one with God. These powers are (i) cic-chakti 1 , that is, power of consciousness, which is the unchangeable ground of all works. Second is His power as the enjoyer, or purusa. The third power is the causal power, manifested as the manifold universe. The fourth power is the power by which sense-objects are grasped and com prehended in knowledge. The fifth power is that which resolves knowledge into action. The sixth power is the power that reveals itself as the activity of thought and action 2 . It seems, therefore, that what has been described above as purusa, or enjoyer, is not a separate principle, but the power of God ; just as prakrti itself is not a separate principle, but a manifestation of the power of God. The process of Bhdgavata-yoga described in Visnu-samhitd con sists primarily of a system of bodily and moral control, involving control of the passions of greed, anger, etc., the habit of meditation in solitary places, the development of a spirit of dependence on God, and self-criticism. When, as a result of this, the mind be comes pure and disinclined to worldly things, there arises an in tellectual and moral apprehension of the distinction of what is bad and impure from what is good and pure, whence attachment, or bhakti, is produced. Through this attachment one becomes self- contented and loyal to one s highest goal and ultimately attains true knowledge. The process of prdndy dma, in which various kinds of meditations are prescribed, is also recommended for attainment of the ultimate union with God, which is a state of emancipation. The view here taken of bhakti, or devotion, shows that bhakti is used here in the simple sense of inclination to worship, and the means to the fruition of this worship is yoga. The so-called bhakti-school of the Bhagavatas was so much under the influence of the yoga-system that a bhakta was required to be a yogin, since bhakti by itself was not regarded as a sufficient means to the attainment of salvation. In the tenth chapter of the Parama-samhitd the process of yoga is described in a conversation between Brahma and Parama. It is said there that the knowledge attained by yoga is better than any other cic-chaktih sarva-kdrydbdih kutasthah paramesthy asau dvitiyd tasya yd saktih purufdkhyadi-vikriya vis vd -khyd vividha-bhdsd trtlyd karuna 1 -tmikd caturthJ visayam prdpya nivrtty-dkhyd tathd pur.ah. Visnu-samhitd. piirvd-jndna-kriyd-saktih sarvdkhyd tasya paficaml. Ibid. tasmdt sarva-prayatnena bhdkto yogi bhavct fadd. Ibid. Ch. 30. xvi] Philosophy of the Jaydkhya and other Samhitds 33 kind of knowledge. When deeds are performed without yoga wisdom, they can hardly bring about the desired fruition. Yoga means the peaceful union of the mind with any particular object 1 . When the mind is firmly fixed on the performance of the deed, it is called karma-yoga?. When the mind is unflinchingly fixed on knowledge, it is called jndna-yoga 3 . He, however, who clings to the Lord Visnu in both these ways attains ultimately supreme union with the highest Lord. Both the jndna-yoga and the karma-yoga, as the moral discipline of yama and niyama on the one hand and vairdgya (disinclination) and samddhi on the other, are ultimately supported in Brahman. It may be remembered that in the Gitd, karma-yoga means the performance of the scriptural caste-duties without any desire for their fruits. Here, however, the karma-yoga means yama and niyama, involving vrata, fasting (upavdsa) and gifts (ddna), and probably also some of the virtues of diverse kinds of self-control. The term vairdgya means the wisdom by which the senses are made to desist from their respective objects; and the term samddhi means the wisdom by which the mind stays unflinchingly in the Supreme Lord. When the senses are through vairdgya restrained from their respective objects, the mind has to be fixed firmly on the Supreme Lord, and this is called yoga. Through continual practice, as the vairdgya grows firm, the vdsands, or the root-instincts and desires, gradually fall off. It is advised that the yogin should not make any violent attempt at self-control, but should proceed slowly and gently, so that he may, through a long course of time, be able to bring his mind under complete control. He should take proper hygienic care of himself as regards food and other necessities for keeping the body sound and should choose a lonely place, free from all kinds of distractions, for his yoga practice. He should not on any account indulge in any kind of practice which may be painful to his body. He should further continue to think that he is dependent on God and that birth, existence and destruction are things which do not belong to him. In this way the pure bhakti will rise in his mind, yat karoti samddhdnam cittasya visaye kvacit anukulam a-samksobham samyoga iti kirtyate. Parama-samhita, Ch. 10 (MS.). yadi karmdni badhnanti cittam askhalitam naram karma-yogo bhavaty esah sarva-pdpa-prandsanah. Ibid, yadi tu jndna evdrthe cittam badhndti nirvyathah jndna-yogah sa vijneyah sarva-siddhi-karah subhah. Ibid. 34 The Pancardtra [CH. through which he will gradually be able to extract the root of at tachment. He should also train himself to think of the evils of alluring experiences which have not yet been enjoyed, and he should thus desist from attaching himself to such experiences. As regards the preference of karma-yoga to jndna-yoga and vice versa, the view maintained here is that there can be no rule as re gards the preference. There are some who are temperamentally fitted for karma-yoga and others for jndna-yoga. Those who are of a special calibre should unite both courses, karma-yoga Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhita. In the Ahirbudhnya-samhita Ahirbudhnya says that after under going a long course of penance he received from Samkarsana true knowledge and that this true knowledge was the science of Sudar- sana, which is the support of all things in the world 1 . The ultimate reality is the beginningless, endless and eternal reality, which is devoid of all names and forms, beyond all speech and mind, the omnipotent whole which is absolutely changeless. From this eternal and unchangeable reality there springs a spontaneous idea or desire (samkalpa). This Idea is not limited by time, space or substance. Brahman is of the nature of intuition, of pure and infinite bliss (nihsima-sukhdnubhava-laksana), and He resides every where and in all beings. He is like the waveless sea. He has none of the worldly qualities which we find in mundane things. He is absolutely self-realized and complete in Himself, and cannot be defined by any expressions such as "this" or "such." He is devoid of all that is evil or bad and the abode of all that is blissful and good. The Brahman is known by many names, such as " paramdtman" " dtman" "bhagavdn" "vdsudeva" "avyakta," "prakrti," "pra- dhdna," etc. When by true knowledge the virtues and sins ac cumulated during many lives are destroyed, when the root-instincts or tendencies called vdsand are torn asunder and the three gunas and their products cease to bind a person, he directly realizes the nature of Brahman or the absolute reality, which can neither be described sudarsana-svarupam tat procyamdnam may a srnu srute yatrd khilddhdre samsayds te na santi vai. Ahirbudhnya-samhita, in. 2. 5. xvi] Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd 35 nor defined by language as "this" or as "such." The Brahman in tuitively perceives all things and is the soul of all, and therefore, the past, present and the future have all vanished away from Him. Brahman does not exist therefore in time, as He is beyond time. Similarly He is beyond all primary and secondary qualities, and yet he possesses the six qualities. Of the qualities knowledge is re garded as the first and the foremost. It is spiritual and self-illumin ating; it enters into all things and reflects them, and is eternal. The essence of Brahman is pure consciousness, and yet He is regarded as possessing knowledge as a quality 1 . The power (sakti) of Brahman is regarded as that by which He has originated the world 2 . The spontaneous agency (kartrtva) of God is called His majesty (aisvaryd). His strength (bala) is that by virtue of which He is never fatigued in His untiring exertion. His energy (virya) is that by virtue of which, being the material cause of the world, He yet remains unchanged in Himself. His self-sufficiency (tejas) is that by virtue of which He creates the world by His own unaided efforts. These five qualities are, however, all regarded as qualities of know ledge, and knowledge alone is regarded as the essence of God. When such a Brahman, which is of the nature of knowledge and is endowed with all qualities, resolves Himself into the idea of splitting Himself into the many, it is called Sudarsana. The powers of all things are in themselves of an unspeakable nature and cannot exist separately (a-prthak-sthita) from the sub stances in which they inhere. They are the potential or subtle states of the substance itself, which are not perceived separately in themselves and cannot be defined as "this" or "not this" in any way, but can only be known from their effects 3 . So God has in Him the power (sakti} which exists as undifferentiated from Him, as the moonbeam from the moon. It is spontaneous, and the universe is but a manifestation of this power. It is called bliss (ananda), be- ajadam svd-tma-sarnbodhi nityam sarvd-vagdhanam jndnam ndma gunam prdhuh prathamam guna-cintakdh svarupam brahmanas tac ca gunas ca pariglyate. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, in. 2. 53. jagat-prakrti-bhdvo yah sd saktih pariklrtitd. Ibid. 2. 57. saktayah sarva-bhdvdndm acintyd a-prthak-sthitdh svarupe naiva drsyante drsyante kdryatas tu tdh suksmdvasthd hi sd tesdm sarva-bhdvd-nugdminl idantayd vidhdtum sd na niseddhum ca sakyate. Ibid. 2, 3. 3-2 36 The Pancardtra [CH. cause it does not depend on anything (nirapeksatayananda); it is eternal (nitya), because it is not limited in time; it is complete (purna), because it is not limited by any form; it manifests itself as the world and is therefore called Laksmi 1 . It contracts itself into the form of the world and is therefore called Kundalini\ and it is called Visnu-sakti because it is the supreme power of God. The power is in reality different from Brahman; but yet it appears as one therewith. With this power He is always engaged in an eternal act of creation, untired, unfatigued, and unaided by any other agent (satatarn kurvato jagat) 2 . The power of God manifests itself in two ways, as static entities such as avyakta, kdla and purusa and as activity. akti, or power of God as activity (krtyd), is spontaneous and of the nature of will and thought resulting in action 3 . This is also called samkalpa, or the Idea, which is irresistible in its move ment whereby it produces all material objects and spiritual entities, such as avyakta, kdla and purusa*. It is this power, which is other wise designated as laksmi or visnu-s akti, that impels the avyakta into the course of evolution, and the purusa to confront the products of prakrti and run through the experiences. When it withdraws these functions from these entities, there is pralaya or dissolution. It is by the force of this power that at the time of creation the prakrti as the composite of the three gunas is urged into creative evolution. The association of the purusa with the prakrti also is brought about by the same power. This Idea is vibratory by nature and assumes diverse forms, and thus by its various transformations produces various categories 5 . In the original state all the manifold world of creation was asleep, as it were, in an equilibrium in which all the qualities of God were completely suspended, like the sea when there are no waves ruffling its breast. This power, which exists in an absolutely static or suspended state, is pure vacuity or nothingness (s unyatva- rupini) ; for it has no manifestation of any kind. It is self-dependent 1 jagattayd laksyamdnd sd laksmlr iti giyate . Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, in. 9. 2 Ibid. II. 59. 3 svdtantrya-milla icchd-tmd preksd-rupah kriyd-phalah. Ibid. ill. 30. 4 unmeso yah susamkalpah sarvatrdvydhatah krtau avyakta-kdla-pum-rupdm cetandcetandtmikdm. Ibid. in. 30, 31. 5 so yam sudarsanam ndnia samkalpah spandand-tmakah vibhajya bahudhd rupam bhdve bhdve vatisthate. Ibid. in. 39. xvi] Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd 37 and no reason can be assigned as to why it suddenly changes itself from a potential to an actual state 1 . It is one and exists in identity with the Brahman, or the ultimate reality. It is this power which creates as its own transformation all categories pure and impure and all material forms as emanations from out of itself. It manifests itself as the kriyd, the virya, tejas and the bala of God, mere forms of its own expression and in all forms of duality as subject and object, as matter and consciousness, pure and impure, the enjoyer and the enjoyed, the experiencer and the experienced, and so on. When it moves in the progressive order, there is the evolutionary creation; and, when it moves in the inverse order, there is in volution. From a pair of two different functions of this power the dif-r ferent forms of pure creation come into being. Thus from know ledge (jndnd) and the capacity for unceasing work of never-ending creation (bald) we have the spiritual form of Sarnkarsana. From the function of spontaneous agency (aisvarya) and the unaffectedness in spite of change (virya) is generated the spiritual form of Prad- yumna ; and from the power that transforms itself into the world- forms (sakti) and the non-dependence on accessories (tejas) is pro duced the form as Aniruddha. These three spiritual forms are called vyuha (conglomeration) because each of them is the resultant of the conglomeration of a pair of gunas. Though the two gunas predominate in each vyuha, yet each vyuha possesses the six qualities (sad-guna) of the Lord ; for these are all but manifestations of Visnu 2 . Each of these forms existed for 1600 years before the next form emanated from it, and at the time of the involution also it took 1600 years for each lower form to pass into the higher form. Schrader, alluding to the Mahd-Sanatkumdra-Samhitd, says: "Vasudeva creates from His mind the white goddess Santi and to gether with her Samkarsana or Siva ; then from the left side of the latter is born the red goddess Sri, whose son is Pradyumna or Brahman; the latter, again, creates the yellow Sarasvati and to- tasya staimitya-rupd yd saktih sunyatva-rupinl svdtantrydd eva kasmdc cit kvacit sonmesam rcchati dtma-bhutd hi yd saktih parasya brahmano hareh. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, v. 3 and 4. vydpti-mdtram guno nmeso murtti-kdra iti tridhd cdtur-dtmya-sthitir visnor guna-vyatikaro-dbhavd. Ibid. v. 2 1 . 38 The Pancardtra [CH. gether with her Aniruddha or Purusottama, whose Sakti becomes the black Rati, who is the threefold Mdyd-kosa." 1 Schrader further draws attention to the fact that these couples are all outside the brahmdnda and are therefore different in nature from the mundane gods, such as Siva, etc. The vyiihas are regarded as ful filling three different functions, (i) the creation, maintenance and destruction of the world; (2) the protection of the mundane beings; and (3) lending assistance to those devotees who seek to attain the ultimate emancipation. Samkarsana exists as the deity superin tending all the individual souls and separates them from the prakrti 2 . The second spiritual form superintends the minds (manas) of all beings and gives specific instruction regarding all kinds of religious performances. He is also responsible for the creation of all human beings and from among them such beings as have from the beginning dedicated their all to God and become absolutely attached to Him 3 . As Aniruddha, he protects the world and leads men to the ultimate attainment of wisdom. He is also responsible for the creation of the world, which is an admixture of good and evil (misra-varga-srstim ca karoti) 4 . These three forms are in reality but one with Vasudeva. These avatdras are thus the pure avatdras of Visnu. In addition to these there are two other forms of manifestation, called dvesdvatdra and sdksdd-avatdra. The former is of two kinds, svarupdvesa (as in the case of avatdras like Parasurama, Rama, etc.) and sakty-dvesa (as the influx of certain special functions or powers of God, e.g. in the case of Brahma or Siva, who are on special occasions endowed with certain special powers of God). These secondary dvesdvatdras are by the will of God produced in the form of human beings, as Rama, Krsna, in the form of animals, as the Boar, the Fish and the Man-lion, or even as a tree (the crooked mango tree in the Dandaka forest). These forms are not the original transcendental forms of God, but manifest divine functions 1 Introduction to the Pancardtra by Schrader, p. 36. so yam samasta-jlvandm adhisthatrtaya sthitah samkarsanas tu deveso jagat srsti-mands taiah jlva-tattvam adhisthdya prakrtes tu vivicya tat. Quoted from Visvaksena-samhitd from Varavara s commentary on Lokacarya s Tattva-traya, p. 125. 3 See quotations from Visvaksena-samhitd in Tattva-traya, pp. 126, 127. 4 Ibtd. p. 128. xvi] Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd 39 through the will of God 1 . The primary forms (sdksdd-avatdra) of incarnation are derived directly from the part of the Lord just as a lamp is lighted from another, and they are thus of a transcendent and non-mundane nature. Those who seek to attain liberation should worship these transcendent forms, but not the others 2 . The Visvaksena-samhitd quoted in the Tattva-traya considers Brahman, Siva, Buddha, Vyasa, Arjuna, Pavaka and Kuvera as inspired per sons or dvesdvatdras who should not be worshipped by those who seek liberation. Another samhitd quoted there includes Rama, Atreya and Kapila in the list. Again, from each vyuha three subsidiary vyuhas are said to appear. Thus from Vasudeva we have, Kesava, Narayana, and Madh ava; from Samkarsana arise Govinda, Visnu and Mad- husudana; from Pradyumna arise Trivikrama, VamanaandSridhara, and from Aniruddha arise Hrslkesa, Padmanabha and Damodara. These are regarded as the deities superintending each month, representing the twelve suns in each of the rdsis. These gods are conceived for purposes of meditation. In addition to these, thirty- nine vibhava (manifesting) avatar as (incarnations) also are counted in the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd 3 . The objects for which these incarna tions are made are described by Varavara as, firstly, for giving com- 1 mad-icchayd hi gaunatvam manusyatvam ive cchayd . . .a-prdkrta-svd-sddhdr- ana-vigrahena saha ndgatam . . . gaunasya manusyati d-divad aprdkrta-divya- samsthdnam itara-jdtiyam krtvd avatdra-rupatvd-bhdvdt sva-rupena nd gatam iti siddham. Tattva-traya, p. 130. prddurbhdvds tu mukhyd ye mad-amsatvdd visesatah ajahat-svabhdvd vibhava divyd-prdkrta-vigrahdh dlpdd dlpd ivotpannd jagato raksandya te arcyd eva hi senesa samsrty-uttarandya te mukhyd updsydh senesa anarcydn itardn viduh. Ibid. p. 131. 3 Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, p. 46. According to the Visvaksena-samhitd all the avatdras have come straight from Aniruddha or through other avatdras. Thus Brahman comes from Aniruddha and from him Mahesvara; Hayas lrsa comes from Matsya, a manifestation of Krsna. According to the Padma-tantra, Matsya, Kurma and Varaha come from Vasudeva, Nrsimha, Vamana, Jsrirama, and Parasurama from Samkarsana, Balarama from Pradyumna and Krsna and Kalki from Aniruddha (Padma-tantra, I. 2. 31, etc.). But according to the Laksml- tantra (11. 55) all the vibhavas come from Aniruddha. There is another kind of avatdra, called arcdvatdra. The image of Krsna, Nrsimha, etc., when duly conse crated according to the Vaisnava rites, becomes possessed with the power of Visnu and attains powers and influences which can be experienced by the devotee (Visvaksena-samhitd, quoted in Tattva-traya). In the aspect in which Aniruddha controls all beings as their inner controller, he is regarded as the antarydmy- avatdra. There are thus four kinds of avatdras, vibhava, dvesa, area and antary- dmin. The thirty-nine vibhava avatdras are Padmanabha, Dhruva, Ananta, 40 The Pancardtra [CH. panionship in mundane forms to those saints who cannot live with out it, and this is the interpretation of the word paritrdna (protec tion) in the Gltd; secondly, for destroying those who are opposed to the saints; thirdly, for establishing the Vedic religion, the essence of which is devotion to God 1 . In the form as antarydmin, or the inner controller, the Lord resides in us as the inner controller of the self, and it is through His impulsion that we commit evil deeds and go to Hell or perform good deeds and go to Heaven. Thus we cannot in any way escape fsaktyatman, Madhusudana, VidySdhideva, Kapila, Visvarupa, Vihahgama, Krodatman, Vadavavaktra, Dharma, Vaglsvara, Ekarnavasayin, Kamathesvara, Varaha, Narasimha, Piyusaharana, ^rlpati, Kantatman, Rahujit, Kalanemighna, Parijatahara, Lokanatha, Kantatman, Dattatreya, Nyagrodhasayin, Ekasrhgatanu, Vamanadeva, Trivikrama, Nara, Narayana, Hari, Krsna, Parasurama, Rama, Vedavid, Kalkin, Patalasayana. They are of the nature of tejas and are objects of worship and meditation in their specific forms, as described in the Satvata- samhitd (xn), or in the Ahirbudhya-samhitd (LXVI). In the Narayanlya section of the Mahabharata Vihahgama or Hamsa, Kamathesvara or Kurma, Ekasrhgatanu or Matsya, Varaha, Nrsimha, Vamana, Parasurarna, Rama, Vedavid and Kalkin are mentioned as the ten avataras. The avatdra Krodatman, Lokanatha and Kantatman are sometimes spoken of as Yajna Varaha, Manu Vaivasvata and Kama respectively. The latter is sometimes spoken of probably as Dhanvantari (see Schrader s Pancaraira, p. 45). The twenty-three avataras spoken of in the Bhdgavata-purdna (i. 3) are all included in the above list. It is, however, doubtful whether Vaglsvara is the same as Hayaslrsa, and Kantatman as Sanaka or Narada, as Schrader says. The vibhava-avatdras mentioned in Rupa s Laghu-bhdgavatd- mrta are mostly included in the above list, though some names appear in slightly different form. Following the Brahma- samhitd, Rupa, however, regards Krsna as the real form (svayam-rupa) of God. According to him, being one with God, He may have His manifestations in diverse forms. This is called avatdra as ekdtma-rupa. This ekdtma-rupa-avatdra may again be of two kinds, sva-vildsa and svd-msa. When the avatdra is of the same nature as the Lord in powers and other qualities, He is called a svdmsd-vatdra. Thus, Vasudeva is called a sva- vildsa-avatdra. But when the avatdra has inferior powers, He is called a svd-msa- avatdra. Samkarsana, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, Matsya, Kurma, etc., are thus called svd-mia-avatdra. When God, however, infuses one only with parts of His qualities, he is called an dvesa-avatdra. Narada, Sanaka, etc., are called dvesa- avatdras. The manifestation of the Lord in the above forms for the good of the world is called avatdra. purvo-kta-visva-kdryd-rthdm a-purvd iva cet svayam dvdra-ntarena vd vih-syur avataras tadd smrtdh Laghu-bhdgavatdmrta, p. 22. The amsdvatdra is sometimes called purusdvatdra, while the manifestation of special qualities as in Brahma, Visnu, i5iva, etc., is called gundvatdras. The vibhavdvatdras are generally regarded as tlldvatdras ; vide also Sdtvata-samhitd, Ch. ix (77-84) and Ch. xn. 1 Tattva-traya, p. 138. The word sddhu is here defined as "nirmatsardh mat-samdsrayane pravrttdh man-ndma-karma-svarupdndm vdn-manasd-gocaratayd mad-dars anena vind dtma-dhdrana-posanddikam alabhamdndh ksana-mdtra-kdlam kalpa-sahasram manvdndh prasithila-sarva-gdtrd bhaveyuh." xvi] Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd 41 from this inner controller. In another of His forms He stays within our heart as the object of our meditation 1 . Again, when certain images are made of earth, stone, or metals, and they are properly installed with proper ceremonials, these are inspired with the pre sence of God and with His special powers. These are called arcdvatdras, or image-incarnations, for purposes of worship by which all desirable ends may be achieved. There are thus five kinds of existence for the Lord: firstly as his absolute state (para), secondly as vyuha, thirdly as vibhavdvatdra (primary and secondary), fourthly as antarydmin, and fifthly as arcdvatdra 2 . In the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd we hear also that by the power of sudarsana, or the divine Idea (by the activity of which the vyuha forms are produced), a divine location is produced which is of the nature of knowledge and bliss radiant with its (sudarsana s) glow. All the experiences that are enjoyed here are blissful in their nature, and the denizens of this transcendent spiritual world who ex perience them are also blissful in their nature, and their bodies are constituted of knowledge and bliss 3 . The denizens of this world are souls emancipated in the last cycle. They remain attached, how ever, to the form of the deity to which they were attached in the mundane life 4 . The Lord in the highest form is always associated with His power (Sakti) Laksmi or Sri 5 . In the Tattva-traya and its com mentary by Varavara we hear of three consort deities, Laksmi, Bhumi and Nlla. Schrader points out that these deities are identified (in the Vihagendra-samhitd and in the Sltd-upanisad) with will (icchd), action (Kriyd), and the direct manifesting power (sdksdt-sakti). In the Sltd-upanisad, to which Schrader refers, Sitd is described as the Mahalaksmi which exists in the three forms, icchd, jndna and kriyd. Slta is there regarded as the power which exists different from, and as one with, the supreme Lord, consti tuting within herself all the conscious and unconscious entities of the universe. It exists also in three forms as Laksmi, Bhumi and 1 Tattva-traya, 139, 140. 2 See quotation from Visvaksena-samhita quoted in Tattva-traya, p. 122. suddhd piirvoditd srstir yd sd vyuhd-di-bhedini sudarsand-khydt samkalpat tasya eva prabho-jjvald. jnandnandamayl stydnd desa-bhdvam vrajaty uta sa desah paramam vyoma nirmalam purusdt par am, etc. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, vi. 21-22. 4 Ibid. vi. 29. 8 Ibid. vi. 25. 42 The Pancaratra [CH. Nlla, as benediction, power, and as the Sun, the Moon and Fire. The third form is responsible for the development of all kinds of vegetation and all temporal determinations 1 . In the sixth chapter of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd the inter mediate creation is described. It is said there that the power of God as the supreme ego is at once one and different from Him. The Lord cannot exist without His power nor can the power exist with out Him. These two are regarded as the ultimate cause of the world. The manifestations that are revealed as the vyuhas and the vibhavas are regarded as pure, for through their meditations the yogins attain their desired end 2 . From the vyiiha and the vibhava proceed the impure creation (suddhetara-srsti} z . Power is of two kinds, i.e. power as activity, and power as determinants of being or existence (bhuti-sakti). This bhuti-sakti may be regarded as a moving Idea (samkalpamayi murti}. The process of activity inherent in it may be regarded as manifesting itself in the form of ideas or concepts actualizing themselves as modes of reality. The impure creation is of a threefold nature as purusa, guna and kola (time). Purusa is re garded as a unity or colony of pairs of males and females of the four castes, and these four pairs emanate from the mouth, breast, thighs and legs of Pradyumna. From the forehead, eyebrows, and ears of Pradyumna also emanate the subtle causal state of time and the gunas (suksma-kdla-gund-vasthd). After the emanation of these entities the work of their growth and development was left to Aniruddha, who by the fervour of his Yoga evolved the original element of time in its twofold form as kdla and niyati. He also evolved the original energy as guna into the three forms of sattva, 1 Certain peculiar interpretations of the icchd-sakti, kriyd-sakti and sdksdt- sakti are to be found in the Sltd-upanifad. The Sdtvata-samhitd (ix. 85) describes twelve other energies such as laksmih, pustir, day a nidrd, ksamd, kdntis sarasvatl, dhrtir maitrl ratis tustir matir dvddasaml smrtd. See also Schrader s Introduction to Pancaratra, p. 55. The theory of these energies is associated with the avatdra theory. 2 Schrader, on the evidence of Padma-tantra, says that god as para or ulti mate is sometimes identified with and sometimes distinguished from the ryfiha Vasudeva. The para Vasudeva becomes tyiiha Vasudeva with His one half and remains as Narayana, the creator of the primeval water (mdyd). Pancaratra, P- 53- bhutih suddhetard visnoh puruso dvi-caturmayah sa manunam samdhdro brahma-k$attrddi-bhedindm. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, VI. 8-9. xvi] Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd 43 rajas and tamas in succession, i.e. the original primeval energy as guna (called sometimes prakrti in cognate literature) was first evolved into sattva guna ; from it evolved the rajas, and from the rajas evolved the tamas. This original undeveloped guna produced from Pradyumna (which, in other words, may be termed prakrti) receives impregnation from the fervour of Aniruddha, and thereby evolves itself first into sattva, then into rajas, and then into tamas. This doctrine can therefore be regarded as sat-kdrya-vdda only in a limited sense ; for without this further impregnation from the fervour of Aniruddha, it could not by itself have produced the different gunas of sattva, rajas and tamas 1 . Aniruddha, however, was directed by Pradyumna not only to develop the unconscious power (sakti) but also the purusa which exists as it were inside that power, which shows itself as niyati (destiny) and kdla (time). From the unconscious power as destiny and time evolves first the sattva and from it the rajas and from the rajas the tamas. According to the Visvaksena-samhita, Aniruddha created Brahma and Brahma created all the men and women of the four castes 2 . Buddhi evolves from tamas and from that ahamkdra and from that evolve the five tan-mdtras, and also the eleven senses. From the five tan-mdtras the five gross elements are produced, and from these, all things, which are the modifications of the gross elements. The word purusa is used here in a special sense, and not in the ordinary Samkhya sense. Purusa here signifies a colony of selves, like cells in a honeycomb 3 . These selves are associated with the beginningless vdsands or root-impressions. They are but the special 1 antahstha-purusdm saktim tarn dddya sva-murti-gdm samvardhayati yogena hy anirudhah sva-tejasd. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, vi. 14. 2 The Visvaksena-samhitd criticizes in this connection the Vedic people, who did not believe in the monotheistic God but depended on the Vedic sacrificial rituals and work for the attainment of Heaven and ultimately fell down to the course of mundane life (samsdrd) : trayl-mdrgesu nisndtdh phala-vdde ramanti te devddln eva manvdnd na ca mam menirc param tamah-prdyds tv ime kecin mama ninddm prakurvate samldpam kurvate vyagram veda-vddesu nisthitdh mam na jdnanti mohena mayi bhakti-pardnmukhdh svargd-disu ramanty ete avasdne patanti te. Tattva-traya, p. 128. sarvdtmandm samastir yd koso madhu-krtdm iva. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, vi. 33. 44 The Pancardtra [CH. manifestations (bhuti-bheddh) of God and are in themselves omni scient; hut they are permeated by avidyd (ignorance) and the afflictions which are involved in its very nature, through the power of God acting in consonance with His thought-movement 1 . These selves thus rendered impure and finite are called jivas, and it is they who thus suffer bondage and strive for salvation, which they after wards attain. The purusa, being made up of these selves (jivas], which are impure, is also partly impure, and is therefore regarded as both pure and impure (suddhy-asuddhimaya, \\. 34). This purusa contains within it the germs of all human beings, which are called manus. They are in themselves untouched by afflictions (klesa) and the root-impression (dsaya), and are omniscient and impregnated through and through by God. Their association with avidyd through the will of God is therefore external. The germ of the caste-distinction and distinction as male and female is regarded as primordial and transcendent (compare purusa-sukta), and the dis tinction is said to exist even in these manus which are said to be divided in four pairs. The avidyd imitates the spiritual movement of thought, and through it the individual selves, though pure in themselves, are besmeared with the impurities of root-impressions. These selves remain in the stage of conglomeration or association through the desire of Visnu, the Lord, and this stage is called purusa (purusa-pada) 2 . They are made to appear and disappear from the nature of God. Being a manifestation of His own nature, they are uncreated, eternally existing, entities which are the parts of the very existence (bhuty-amsah] of God. Through the impulse or motivation of the thought-activity of God, an energy (sakti] is generated from Aniruddha. Moved again by the desire of God, the aforesaid manus descend into this energy and remain there as a developing foetus (tisthanti kalallbhutdh, vi. 45). The energy of Visnu is of a twofold nature, as dynamic activity (kriydkhya) and as determining being (bhuti], the latter being the result of the former 3 . This dynamic activity is different atmano bhuti-bhedds te san a-jndh sarvato-mukhah bhagavac-chakti-mayaivam manda-tirrddl-bhdvayd tat-tat-snd(irsano-nniesa-nimesd-nukrtd-tmand sarvato vidyayS viddhah klesamayd rasikrtdh. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, vi. 35, 36. risnnh sarnkalpa-rfipena sthitvdsmin pauruse f>ade. Ibid. vi. 41. kriyakhyo yo yam unmesuh sa bhuti-parirartakah. Ibid. vi. 29. xvi] Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhita 45 from God, the possessor of this energy. It is designated variously Laksmi and desire (samkalpa) or free will (svdtantrya-mula icchdtmd}. This will operates as an intellectual visualization (pteksd-rupdh kriyd-phalah), which again produces the other manifestations of God as avyakta, kdla and purusa. At the time of each creation He associates the avyakta with the evolutionary tendencies, the kdla with its operative movement (kalana) and the purusa with all kinds of experiences. At the time of dissolution these powers are with drawn. In the foetus-like condition of the manus in the energy (sakti) of God there exist the entities ofguna and kdla. Through the opera tion of the supreme energy or will of God ( Visnu-samkalpa-coditah) there springs up from time-energy (kdla-sakti) the subtle Destiny (niyati), which represents the universal ordering element (sarva- niydmakah). The time andguna exist in the womb of the sakti. The conception of this sakti is thus different from that of prakrti of the Samkhya-Patanjala in that the gunas are the only root-elements, and time is conceived as somehow included in the operation of the gunas. As the niyati is produced from the time-energy, the manus descend into this category. Later on there springs from niyati, time (kdla} through the will of God, and then the manus descend again into this category 1 . It has already been said that the kdla energy and guna are co-existing elements in the primordial sakti of God. Now this MW0-potential manifests itself in a course of gradual emergence through time. As the saitva-guna first manifests itself through time, the manus descend into that category and later on, with the emergence of rajas from sattva and of tamas from rajas, they descend into the rajas and the tamas. The emergence of rajas from sattva and of tamas from rajas is due to the operation of the will-activity of God (visnu-samkalpa-coditdt). Though the will- dynamic of Visnu is both immanent and transcendent throughout the process of succeeding emergents, yet Visnu is regarded as specially presiding over sattva, Brahma over rajas, and Rudra over tamas. Tamas is regarded as heavy (guru], agglutinative (vistam- 1 In describing the process of dissolution it is said that at one stage the uni verse exists only as time (kdla). The energy manifested in time (kala-gata- saktih) is called kdla, and it is this energy that moves all things or behaves as the transformer of all things (asesa-prakdlirii). Ahirbudhnya-samhita, iv. 48. Time is described also as the agent that breaks up all things, just as the violence of a river breaks its banks: Kalayaty akhilam kdlyam nadl-kulam yathd rayah. Ibid. vi. 51. 46 The Pancardtra [CH. bhana), delusive (mohand) and statical (apravrttimat); rajas is always moving and sorrowful; sattva is described as light, trans parent and devoid of impurities or defects and pleasurable 1 . With the development of the three gunas through the will of God, a part of these gunas attains sameness of character, and this part is the unity of the three gunas (traigunya), the equilibrium of gunas (guna- sdmya), ignorance (avidyd), nature (svabhdva), cause (yoni), the unchangeable (aksara), the causeless (ayoni), and the cause as guna (guna-yoni)-. This participation in equal proportions (anyundnatirikta) of the gunas in a state of equilibrium (guna-sdmya), which is essentially of the nature of tamas (tamomaya), is called the root (mula) and the prakrti by the Samkhyists, and the manus descending into that category by gradual stages are known by the names conglomeration (samasti), purusa, the cause (yoni), and the unchangeable (kutastha). The category of time, which is the transforming activity of the world (jagatah samprakalanam), associates and dissociates the purusa and the prakrti for the production of the effects. The thought power of God, however, works through the tripartite union of time, prakrti and the manus, behaving as the material cause, like a lump of clay, and produces all the categories beginning with mahat to the gross elements of earth, water, etc. Like water or clay, the prakrti is the evolutionary or material cause, the purusa is the unchangeable category that contributes to the causal operation merely by its con tiguity 3 . The category of time is the internal dynamic pervading the prakrti and the purusa. The trinity of prakrti, purusa and kdla is the basis for the development of all the succeeding categories. In this 1 sattvam tatra laghu si ace hum guna-rupam andmayam. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, vi. 52; tad etat pracalam duhkham rajah sasvat pravrttimat. Ibid. vi. 57; guru vistambhanam sasvan mohanam cdprarrttimat. Ibid. vi. 60. sudarsanamayenai va samkalpend tra rai harch codyamdne pi srsty-arthani purnam guna-yugam tadd amsatah sdmyam dydti visnu-samkalpa-coditam. Ibid. vi. 6162. The passage is somewhat obscure, in so far as it is difficult to understand how the gunas become partially (amsatah) similar. The idea probably is that, when the gunas are moved forward for creative purposes, some parts of these gunas fail to show their distinctive features, and show themselves as similar to one another. In this stage the specific characters of only these evolving gunas are annulled, and they appear as one with tamas. The proportion of sattva that appears to be similar to tamas is also the proportion in which tamas becomes similar to rajas, payo-mrd-ddivat tatra prakrtih parindmint pumdn aparindml san sannidhdnena kdiunam kdlah pacati tattve dve prakrtirn purusam ca ha. Ibid. vn. 5, 6. xvi] Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd 47 trinity prakrti is the evolutionary cause that undergoes the trans formation, purusa, though unmoved in itself, is that which by its very presence gives the occasion for the transformation, and time is the inner dynamic that behaves as the inner synthetic or struc tural cause. But these causes in themselves are not sufficient to produce the development of the trinity. The trinity is moved to de velop on the evolutionary line by the spiritual activity of God. Purusa is regarded as the adhisthdna-kdrana, kdla as the principle of inner activity, and the spiritual activity of God as the transcendent and immanent agent in which the causal trinity finds its funda mental active principle. As the first stage of such a development there emerges the category of mahat, which is called by different names, e.g. vidyd, gauh, yavanl, brdhml, vadhu, vrddhi, mati, madhu, akhydti, is vara, and prajnd. According to the prominence of tamas, sattva and rajas, the category of mahat is known by three different names, kdla, buddhi and prdna, in accordance with the moments in which there are special manifestations of tamas, sattva and rajas 1 . Gross time as moments, instants or the like, the in- telligizing activity of thought (buddhi) and the volitional activity (prdna) may also be regarded as the tripartite distinction of mahat 2 . There seems to be a tacit implication here that the activity implied in both thought and volition is schematized, as it were, through time. The unity of thought and volition is effected through the element of time ; for time has been regarded as the kalana-kdrana, or the structural cause. The sattva side of the mahat manifests itself as virtue (dharma), knowledge (jndna), disinclination (vairdgya), and all mental powers (ais varya). The opposite of these is associated with that moment of mahat which is associated with the manifesta tion of tamas. With the evolution of the mahat the manus descend into it. From the mahat and in the mahat there spring the senses by which the objects are perceived as existent or non-existent 3 . Again, from and in the mahat there springs the ahamkdra through the influence 1 kdlo buddhis tathd prdna iti tredhd sa glyate tamah-sattva-rajo-bheddt tat-tad-unmesa-sanjnayd. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, vn. 9. kdlas truti-lavddy dtmd buddhir adhyavasdyinl prdnah prayatandkdra ity eta mahato bhiddh. Ibid. vn. n. bodhanam ndma vaidyam tadindriyam tesu jdyate yendrthdn adhyavasyeyuh sad-asat-pravibhdginah. Ibid. vn. 14. 48 The Pancardtra [CH. of the spiritual energy of God 1 . This ahamkdra is also called by the names of abhimdna, prajdpati, abhimantd and boddhd. The aham kdra is of three kinds, vaikdrika, taijasa and bhutddi, in accordance with the predominance of sattva, rajas or tamas. The ahamkdra manifests itself as will, anger, greed, mind (manas), and desire (trsd}. When the ahamkdra is produced, the manus descend into it. From ahamkdra there is then produced the organ of thinking (cintandtmakam indriyam] of the manus called manas. It is at this stage that the manus first become thinking entities. From the tamas side of ahamkdra as bhiitddi there is produced the s abda-tan-mdtra, from which the dkdsa is produced. Akdsa is associated with the quality of sabda and gives room for all things. Akdsa is thus to be regarded as unoccupied space, which is supposed to be associated with the quality of sound 2 . With the emergence of dkdsa the manus descend into that category. From the vaikdrika ahamkdra there spring the organs of hearing and of speech 3 . The manus at this stage become associated with these senses. Then from the bhutddi, by the spiritual desire of God, the touch-potential is produced, and from this is produced the air (vdyu). By the spiritual desire of God the sense-organ of touch and the active organ of the hand are pro duced from the vaikdrika ahamkdra. At this stage the manus be come associated with these two receptive and active senses. From the bhutddi there is then produced the light-heat potential from which is produced the gross light-heat. Again, from the vaikdrika ahamkdra the visual organ and the active organ of the feet are pro duced, and the manus are associated with them. From the bhutddi the taste-potential is produced, and from it is produced water. Further, from the vaikdrika ahamkdra there is produced the taste- organ and the sex-organ, and the manus are associated with them. From the bhutddi there is produced the odour-potential and from it the earth. Also, from the vaikdrika ahamkdra there arises the cognitive sense of smelling and the active sense of secretion. The manus at this stage descend into this category through the spiritual creative desire of God 4 . 1 vidyayd u dare tatrahamkrtir ndma jdyate. Ahirbudhnya-samhita, vn. 15. - sabdai -ka-punam dkdsam avakdsapraddyi ca. Ibid. vii. 22. 3 tadd vatRdrikdt punah srotrarn vdg iti vijndna-karme-ndriya-yugam mune. Ibid. vn. 23-24. 4 Ibid. vn. 39, 40. xvi] Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd 49 The process of development herein sketched shows that one active sense and one cognitive sense arise together with the develop ment of each category of matter, and with the final development of all the categories of matter there develop all the ten senses (cog nitive and conative) in pairs. In the chapter on the gradual dissolu tion of the categories we see that with the dissolution of each cate gory of matter a pair of senses also is dissolved. The implication of this seems to be that there is at each stage a co-operation of the material categories and the cognitive and conative senses. The selves descend into the different categories as they develop in the pro gressive order of evolution, and the implication of this probability is that the selves, having been associated from the beginning with the evolution of the categories, may easily associate themselves with the senses and the object of the senses. When all the categories of matter and the ten senses are developed, there are produced the function of imagination, energy of will (samrambhd), and the five pranas from manas, ahamkdra and buddhi; and through their de velopment are produced all the elements that may co-operate to gether to form the concrete personality 1 . The order followed in the process of development in evolution was maintained in an inverse manner at the time of dissolution. The above-mentioned manus produce in their wives many children, who are called mdnavas. They in their turn produce many other children who are called the new mdnavas, or the new men, in all the four castes. Those among them who perform their work for a hundred years with true discriminative knowledge enter into the supreme person of Hari. Those, however, who perform their karmas with motives of reaping their effects pass through rebirths in consonance with their actions. As has been said before, the manus may be regarded as the individuated forms of the original kutastha purusa. All ihejivas are thus but parts of Visnu s own self-realizing being (bhuty-amsd). Now the prakrti, which is also called vidyd, samkalpas caiva samrambhah prdndh pancavidhds tathd manaso hamkrter buddher jdyante purvam eva tu evarn sampurna-sarvangdh prdndpdnddi-samyutdh sarve-ndriya-yutds tatra dehino manavo mune. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, vn. 42, 43. Thus from bhutddi, acting in association with taijasa ahamkdra, are produced successively the five tan-mdtras of sabda, sparsa, rUpa, rasa zndgandha, from each of which in the same order are produced the five bhutas of dkdsa, vdyu, tejas, ap and prthivl. Again, from the associated work of taijasa and vaikdrika ahamkdra there are produced the five cognitive and conative senses. 50 The Pancaratra [CH. and which at the time of the creative process showers itself as rain and produces the food-grains, and which at the beginning of the dissolution shows itself as a drying force, begins to manifest itself as showering clouds and produces the food-grains. By consuming the food thus produced by nature men fall from their original state of perfect knowledge (jndna-bhramsam prapadyante). At such a stage the original manus produce the scriptures for the guidance of those men who have fallen from their original omniscience. Thence men can only attain their highest goal by following the guidance of the scriptures 1 . It thus appears that the power of Visnu as consciousness, bliss and action splits itself into twofold form as the realizing activity and the object, called respectively the bhdvaka and the bhdvya. The former is the thought-activity of the Lord and the latter is that part of Him which manifests itself as the object of this activity. This leads to the pure and the impure crea tion. The kiitastha purusa of the four manus stands intermediate between the pure and the impure creation 2 . There is nothing what soever outside the sphere of the Sudarsana sakti of the Lord. On the central question of the relation of God with thejivas the general view of the Pancaratra, as well as that of the Ahirbudhnya, seems to be that at the time of dissolution they return to God and remain in a potential form in Him, but again separate out at the time of the new creation. At the time of emancipation, however, they enter into God, never to come out of Him. But though they enter into Him, they do not become one with Him, but have an independent existence in Him or enter into the abode of Visnu, the Vaikuntha, which is often regarded as identical with Him. This is probably a state of what is found in many places described as the salokya-mukti. In the fourteenth chapter of the Ahirbudhnya- samhitd mukti is described as the attainment of Godhood (bhaga- vatta-mayi mukti, or vaisnavam tad viset padanif. The means by tat^ tu vaidyam payah prdsya sarve mdnava-manavdh jndna-bhramsam prapadyante sarva-jndh svata eva te. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, vn. 61, 62. Compare this with the Jewish Christian doctrine of the fall of man, as suggested by Schrader s introduction to the Pancaratra, p. 78. amsayoh puruso madhye yah sthitah sa catur-yugah suddhe-tara-mayam viddhi kutastham tarn mahd-mune. Ibid. vn. 70. Compare the view of the Gaudlya school, which regards the jlva as the tatasthd sakti of God, which is between the antarangd and the vahirangd sakti. 3 Ibid. xiv. 3, 4 and 41. xvi] Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd 51 which mukti can be attained is said to be a virtuous course of action without seeking any selfish ends 1 . Thejivas are described as begin- ningless, infinite, and as pure consciousness and bliss, and as being largely of the nature of God (bhagavanmaya)\ but still they are described as owing their existence to the spiritual energy of God (bhagavad-bhdvitdh sadd) 2 . This idea is further clarified when it is said that side by side with the bhdvya and the bhdvaka powers of God we have a third power called the pum-sakti, of which we hear in the Gttdas Ksetrajna-sakti and in the Gaudiya school as tatastha sakti 3 . Apart from the three powers of God as creation, mainte nance and destruction, He has a fourth and a fifth power called favour (anugrahd) and disfavour (nigraha). The Lord is, of course, self-realized and has no unachieved end, and has absolutely unim peachable independence; but still in His playful activity He acts like a king just as He wishes 4 . This idea of krldd is repeated in the Gaudiya school as Hid. All these activities of His are but the dif ferent manifestations of His thought-activity called sudarsana. In His own playful activity as disfavour He covers up the natural con dition of the jiva, so that in place of His infinitude, he appears as atomic, in place of His omnipotence, he can do but little, in place of His omniscience, He becomes largely ignorant and possesses but little knowledge. These are the three impurities and the three types of bondage. Through this covering activity thejiva is afflicted with ignorance, egoism, attachment, antipathy, etc. Being afflicted by ignorance and the passions, and being goaded by the tendency to wards achieving the desirable and avoiding the undesirable, He performs actions leading to beneficial and harmful results. He thus undergoes the cycle of birth and rebirth, and is infested with dif ferent kinds of root-instincts (vdsand}. It is through the power of this bondage and its requirements that the powers of creation, maintenance and destruction are roused and made active to arrange for rewards and punishments in accordance with the karmas of the jlvas. As proceeding from the very playful nature of God, which precedes time (kdla), and is beginningless, the bondage also is said to be beginningless. The above description of bondage as happening sadhanam tasya ca prokto dharmo nirabhisandhikah. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, xiv, 4. 2 Ibid. 3 pum-saktih kdlamayy anyd pumdn so yam udiritah. Ibid. xiv. ro. sarvair an-anuyojyam tat svdtantryam divyam isituh avdpta-visva-kdmo pi krldate rdjavad vast. Ibid. xiv. 13. 4-2 52 The Pancaratra [CH. at some time through a process of fall from original nature is by way of analysis of the situation. Through the power of God as anugraha, or grace, God stops the course of karma for a jiva on whose con dition of sorrow and suffering He happens to take pity. With the cessation of the good and bad deeds and their beneficent and harm ful results through the grace of God the jiva looks forward to emancipation and is moved by a feeling of disinclination and begins to have discriminative knowledge. He then turns to scriptures and to teachers^ follows the course of action dictated by Samkhya and Yoga, and attains the Vedantic knowledge, finally to enter the ultimate abode of Visnu. Laksmi is regarded as the ultimate eternal power of Visnu, and she is also called by the names Gauri, Sarasvati and Dhenu. It is this supreme power that manifests itself as Samkarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Thus, these separate powers are observable only when they manifest themselves, but even when they do not mani fest themselves they exist in God as His great supreme power Laksmi. It is this Laksmi that is called Brahma, Visnu, or Siva. The vyakti, avyakti, purusa and kdla or samkhya and yoga are all represented in the Laksmi. Laksmi is the ultimate supreme power into which all the others resolve themselves. As distinct from the other manifested powers it is often called the fifth power. The emancipated person enters into this Laksmi, which is regarded as the highest abode of Visnu (par am dhdma or paramam padam), or the highest Brahman. This power (sakti) is also regarded as having an inner feeling of bliss; and yet it is of the nature of bliss, and is designated as the bhdva form of Visnu and also as the ujjvala (shining). This sakti is also regarded as discharging the five func tions (panca-krtya-kari) of creation, maintenance, destruction, grace and disfavour mentioned above. Brahman, as associated with this s akti, is called the highest Visnu as distinguished from the lower Visnu, the god of maintenance. This sakti is always in a state of internal agitation though it may not be observed as such from outward appearance. This internal agitation and movement are so subtle that they may appear to be in a state of absolute calmness like that of the ocean 1 . Thus sakti is also called the mdyd of Visnu 2 . sadd pratdyamdnd pi suksmair bhdvairalaksanaih. nirvydpdreva sd bhdti staimityam iva co dadheh. tayai vo pahitam Brahma nirvikalpam niranjanam. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, LI. 49. mdyd scarya-karatvena panca-krtya-kari sadd. Ibid. LI. 58. xvi] Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd 53 It is a part of this power that transforms itself as the bhdvya and the bhdvaka sakti, of which the latter is also known by the name sudarsana. The bhdvya shows itself as the world, and its objective import is the world. The thought-activity by which the concept shows itself in the ideal and in the objective world as thought and its significance, the object, is the epitome of the power of Sudarsana. When all the ex ternal movement of the objective is ideally grasped in the word, we have also in it the manifestation of the power of Sudarsana, or the supreme thought-activity of God. All the causality of the objective world is but a mode of the manifestation of the Sudarsana power. Thus not only all the movements of the external world of nature and the movement implied in speech, but the subjective-objective movement by which the world is held together in thought and in speech are the manifestation of the Sudarsana power. All expressions or manifestations are either in the way of qualities or actions, and both are manifestations of the Sudarsana power of God. Our words can signify only these two ways of being. For this reason they refer only to the Sudarsana, which is attributive to God, but cannot ex press the nature of God. Words, therefore, cannot reveal the nature of God. The word may hold the universe within it as its mystic symbol and may represent within it all its energies, but, in any case, though it may engulf within it the whole universe and secure the merging of the universe in itself and can identify itself with God, "such identification can only be with the Sudarsana power of God, and the entrance into God, or the realization of Him through the word or thought, can only be through the Sudarsana power, which is a part of Laksml. Thus unity with God can only mean union with Sudarsana, or entrance into Laksml 1 . Adoration (namah) means the spontaneous acceptance of the highest Lord as the master on the part of a man who has achieved it through a wise enlightenment 2 . Superiority (jydydn) consists of greatness of qualities and existence in earlier time 3 . God alone is superior, and everything else is inferior. The relation between the latter and the former is that the latter exists for the former or is dependent on the former. This relation is called (sesa-sesitd). The 1 Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, LI. 6978. preksdvatah pravrttir yd prahvl-bhdvd-tmikd svatah uikrstam param uddisya tan namah pariglyate. Ibid. Lll. z. kdlatu gunatas caiva prakarso yatra tisthati sabdas tarn mukhyayd vrttyd jydydn ity avalambate. Ibid. LII. 4. 54 The Pancardtra [CH. relation between the two is that one should be the adorer and the other the adored (nantr-nantavya-bhdva). True adoration is when such an adoration proceeds naturally as a result of such a relation, without any other motive or end of any kind the only idea being that God is supremely superior to me and I am absolutely inferior to Him 1 . This process of adoration not only takes the adorer to God, but also brings God to him. The presence of any motive of any kind spoils the effectuation of the adoration. This adoration is the first part of the process of prapatti, or seeking the protection of God 2 . Now on account of the presence of beginningless root- impressions (vdsand), and of natural insignificance of power and association with impurity, man s power of knowledge or wisdom becomes obstructed; and when a man becomes fully conscious of such weakness, he acquires the quality of kdrpanya or lowliness. A feeling or consciousness of one s independence obstructs this quality of lowliness. The great faith that the supreme God is always merciful is called the quality of maha-visvdsa. The idea that God is neutral and bestows His gifts only in proportion to one s deeds obstructs this quality. The idea that, since He is all-merciful and all-powerful, He would certainly protect us, produces the quality of faith in God s protective power. The notion that God, being qualityless, is indifferent to any appeal for protection obstructs this quality. Acceptance of the Lord as the supreme master whose commands should on no account be disobeyed produces the quality of docility (prdtikulya-vivarjand). Service of God in a manner not prescribed in the scriptures obstructs this quality. The strong re solve of the mind to work in accordance with God s wishes, with the full conviction that the sentient and the non-sentient of the world are but parts of His nature, produces the quality of sub mission. An inimical disposition towards the beings of the world obstructs this quality. A true adoration (namah) to God must be associated with all the aforesaid qualities. True adoration must carry with it the conviction that the sense of possession that we have in all things, due to beginningless instinctive passions and desires, is all false, and the adorer should feel that he has neither inde pendence nor anything that he may call his own. "My body, my upadhi-rahitena yam yena bhavena cetanah namati jyayase tasmai tad vd namanam ucyate. Ahirbudhnya-samhita, LII. 9. phalepsa tad-virodhinl. Ibid. LII. 15. xvi] Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd 55 riches, my relations do not belong to me, they all belong to God"; such is the conviction that should generate the spirit with which the adoration should be offered. The adorer should feel that the process of adoration is the only way through which he can obtain his highest realization, by offering himself to God and by drawing God to himself at the same time. The purpose of adoration is thus the supreme self-abnegation and self-offering to God, leaving no thing for oneself. The world comes out of God and yet exists in a relation of inherence, so that He is both the agent and the material cause of the world, and the adorer must always be fully conscious of the greatness of God in all its aspects. The above doctrine of prapatti, or nydsa, or sarand-gati, as the means of winning God s grace, has also been described in Chapter xxvii and it virtually means the qualities just described 1 , sarand-gati is here defined as prayer for God s help in association with the con viction of one s being merged in sin and guilt, together with a belief in one s absolute helplessness and a sense of being totally lost with out the protecting grace of God 2 . The person who takes to the path of this prapatti achieves the fruits of all tapas, sacrifices, pilgrimages and gifts, and attains salvation easily without resorting to any other methods 3 . It is further said that on the part of the devotee following the path of prapatti all that is necessary is to stick firmly to the attitude of absolute dependence on God, associated with a sense of absolute helplessness. He has no efforts to make other than to keep himself in the prayerful spirit; all the rest is done by God. Prapatti is thus a updya-jndna and not a updya; for it is a mental attitude and does not presuppose any action. It is like a boat on which the passenger merely sits, while it is the business of the boatman to do the rest 4 . sodhd hi veda-viduso vadanty enam mahd-mune dnukulyasya samkalpah prdtikulyasya varjanam raksisyatl ti visvdso goptrva-varanam tathd. dtma-niksepa-kdrpanye sad-vidhd sarand-gatih. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, xxxvn. 27, 28. aham asmy aparddhdndm dlayo kincano gatih tram evo pdyabhuto me bhave ti prdrthand-matih. sarandgatir ity-ukid sd deve smin prayujyatdm. Ibid, xxxvn. 30, 31. * Ibid, xxxvn. 34 and 35. 4 atra ndvV ti drstdntdd updya-jndnam eva tu narena krtyam anyat tu ndvikasye va taddhareh. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd. 5 6 The Pancardtra [CH. Describing the process of pure creation, it is said that at the time ofpralaya all effects are reduced to a dormant state, and there is no movement of any kind. All the six qualities of the Lord, namely jndna, sakti, bala, aisvarya, vlrya and tejas described above, are in a state of absolute calmness like the sky without a puff of air in it 1 . This assemblage of powers in a state of calmness is LaksmI, which exists as it were like the very void. From its own spontaneity it seems to wish to burst forth and turn itself into active opera tions. This power of God, though differentiated from Him, may be regarded as being His very nature. It is only when it thus comes out in active forms that it can be recognized as power, or sakti. When embedded in the potential form, it is indistinguish able from the Lord Himself. These gunas of God should not, however, be confused with the gunas of prakrti, which evolve at a much lower stage in the course of the process of impure creation. As regards the vyuhas, it is said that Samkarsana carries in him the whole universe, as if it were a spot at the parting of the hairs (tilakalaka). The universe as it exists in Samkarsana is still in an unmanifested form. He is the support of the universe (asesa- bhuvana-dhara) 2 . The manus, time and prakrti came out of Prad- yumna 3 . It is through the influence of Pradyumna that men are actuated to perform their work in accordance with the sdstras*. Aniruddha, also called Maha-visnu, is the god of power and energy, and it is through his efforts that the creation and the maintenance of the world are possible. It is he who makes the world grow 5 . It is through him that the world lives without fear and ultimate salvation is possible. According to Saiikara s account Samkarsana stands for the individual soul, Pradyumna for manas and Aniruddha for the Ego (aharnkardf. Such a view is rather rare in the existing Pafica- ratra literature. In the Visvaksena-samhitd, as quoted in the Tattva-traya, it is said that Samkarsana acts as the superintendent purna-stimita-sdd-gunyam asamlrd-mvaro-pamam. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, v. 3. 2 All the sdstras are said to have been produced by Samkarsana, and it is in him that they disappear at the time of pralaya. Ahirbudhnya, LV. 16. 3 Ibid. vi. 9-12. 4 Ibid. LV. 18. Pradyumna is also called Vira. 5 There are, however, many conflicting views about these functions of the different vyuhas. See Laksmi-tantra, iv. 1 1-20, also Visvaksena-samhitd, as quoted in the Tattva-traya. * Veddnta-sutra, n. 2. 42, S~arikara s commentary. xvi] Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd 57 of the souls, and Pradyumna is described as manomaya or the mind, but nothing is said about Aniruddha. In the Laksmt-tantra, vi. 9-14, it is said that Samkarsana was like the soul, buddhi and manas and Vasudeva, the playful creative activity. In the Visvaksena- samhitd Aniruddha is regarded as the creator of the misra-varga (pure-impure creation, such as niyati), etc., and Samkarsana is re garded as the being who separated the principle of life from nature and became Pradyumna. But in the Ahirbudhnya the difference between the purusa and prakrti starts in the Pradyumna stage, and not in the Samkarsana stage, and Aniruddha is regarded in the Ahirbudhnya as the superintendent of the sattva and therethrough of all that come from it and the manus 1 . According to the Ahir budhnya LaksmI is described as the power of God, but according to Uttara-ndrdyana we have LaksmI and Bhumi, and according to the Tattva-traya LaksmI, Bhumi and Nlla. In the Vihagendra- samhttd, n. 8, these three are regarded as icchd, kriyd and sdksdt- sakti of the Devi. In the Sitd-upanisad also we have the same in terpretation, and this is also associated there with Vaikhdnasa tradition. The Vihagendra speaks of the eight saktis of Sudarsana, kirtt, sri, vijayd y sraddhd, smrti, medhd, dhrti and ksamd, and in the Sdtrata-samhitd (ix. 85) we hear of the twelve saktis emanating from the Srivatsa of Visnu: these are laksmi, pusti, day a, nidrd, ksamd, kdnti, sarasvati, dhrti, maitrl, rati, tusti and mati. The Pancaratra is based partly on the Vedic and partly on the Tantric system 2 . It therefore believes in the esoteric nature of the mantras. It has already been said that the world has come into being from the Sudarsana power; so all the natural, physical and other kinds of energies and powers of all things in the world are but manifestation of the Sudarsana. The power of the Sudarsana also manifests itself in the form of all living beings and of all that is inanimate, of the course of bondage and also of emancipation. Whatever is able to produce is to be regarded as the manifestation of Sudarsana 3 . The mantras are also regarded as the energy of 1 Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, vi. 57. veda-tantramayo-dbhuta-ndnd-prasavasdlini. Ibid. vi. 9. sudarsandhvayd devi sarva-krtya-karl vibhoh tan-mayam viddhi samarthyam sarvam sarva-paddrthajam dharmasydrthasya kdmasya mukter bandha-trayasya ca yad yat sva-kdrya-sdmarthyarn tat-tat-saudarsanam vapuh. Ibid. xvi. 4 and 6. 58 The Pancardtra [CH. Visnu as pure consciousness 1 . The first manifestation of this power, like a long-drawn sound of a bell, is called ndda, and it can only be perceived by the great yogins. The next stage, like a bubble on the ocean, is called bindu, which is the identity of a name and the ob jective power denoted by it. The next stage is the evolution of the objective power (ndmy-nda\a), which is also called Sabda-brahman . Thus, with the evolution of every alphabetic sound there is also the evolution of the objective power of which it is the counterpart. Ahirbudhnya then goes on to explain the evolution of the different vowel and consonant sounds from the bindu-power. By fourteen efforts there come the fourteen vowels emanating through the dancing of the serpent power (Kundall-sakti] of Visnu 2 . By its two fold subtle power it behaves as the cause of creation and destruction. This power rises in the original locus (muld-dhdrd) and, when it comes to the stage of the navel, it is called fxisvanti and is perceived by the yogins. It then proceeds to the lotus of the heart and then passes through the throat as the audible sound. The energy of the vowel sounds passes through the susumnd nddl. In this way the different consonant sounds are regarded as the prototypes of dif ferent manifestations of world-energy, and these again are regarded as the symbols of different kinds of gods or superintendents of energy 3 . An assemblage of some of these alphabets in different orders and groups, called also the lotus or the wheel (cakra\ would stand for the assemblage of different types of complex powers. The meditation and worship of these cakras would thus be expected to bring the objective powers typified by them under control. The different gods are thus associated with the different cakras of mantras; and by far the largest portion of the Pancaratra literature is dedicated to the description of the rituals associated with these, the building of corresponding images, and the temples for these subsidiary deities. The meditation of these mantras is also regarded as playing diverse protective functions. In consonance with the ordinary method of the Tantric works saksad nsnofi kriyu-saktih suddha-samvinmyl para. Ahirbudhnya-samltitd, xvi. 10. This ktiyd-sakti is also called samarthya or yuf>a or f>ara>nesth\\i or mahdtcjas or mdya-yoga. Ibid. xvi. 32. natl ra kundatl-saktir iidy-i visitor rijrmbhate. Ibid. xvi. 55. visnu-saktimaya rarna visnu-satnkalpa-jrmbhitdh adhisthitd yathd bharnis tathii tan me nistimaya. Ibid. xvn. 3. xvi] Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd 59 the Ahirbudhnya describes the nervous system of the body. The root (kdndd) of all the nerves is said to be at about nine inches above the penis. It is an egg-shaped place four inches in length and breadth and made up of fat, flesh, bone and blood. Just two inches below the penis and about two inches from the anus we have a place which is called the middle of the body (sarlra-madhya), or simply the middle (madhya). It is like a quadrilateral figure, which is also called the dgneya-mandala. The place of the root of the nddls is also called the navel-wheel (ndbhi-cakra}, which has twelve spokes. Round the ndbhi-cakra there exists the serpent (kundali) with eight mouths, stopping the aperture called brahma-randhra of the susumnd by its body 1 . In the centre of the cakra there are the two nddls called the alambusa and susumnd. On the different sides of the susumnd there are the following nddls: Kuhu, Varuna, Yasasvinl, Pingald, Pusd, Payasvinl, Sarasvati, Sankhinl, Gdndhdrl, Ida, Hasti-jihvd, Visvodard. But there are on the whole 72,000 nddls in the body. Of these, Ida, Pingald and susumnd are the most impor tant. Of these, again, susumnd, which goes to the centre of the brain, is the most important. As a spider remains inside the meshes of its thread, so the soul, as associated with prdna or life-force, exists in side this navel- wheel. The susumnd has five openings, of which four carry blood, while the central aperture is closed by the body of the Kundali. Other nddls are shorter in size and are connected with the different parts of the body. The Ida and the Pingald are regarded as being like the sun and the moon of the body. There are ten vdyus, or bio-motor forces of the body, called prdna, apdna, samdna, uddna, tydna, ndga, kurma, krkara, deva- datta and dhananjaya. The prdna vdyu remains in the navel-wheel, but it manifests itself in the regions of the heart, mouth and the nose. The apdna vdyu works in the anus, penis, thighs, the legs, the belly, the testes, the lumbar region, the intestines, and in fact per forms the functions of all the lower region. The vydna exists be tween the eyes and the ears, the toes, nose, throat and the spine. The uddna works in the hands and the samdna through the body as a whole, probably discharging the general circulation 2 . The func- 1 Ahirbudhnya-samhita, xxxn. n. This is indeed different from the descrip tion found in the Sdkta Tantras, according to which the Kundali exists in the place down below described as the sarlra-madhya. 2 Ibid. xxxn. 33-37. These locations and functions are different from what we find in the Ayur-Veda or the Sdkta Tantras. 60 The Pancaratra [CH. tion of the prdna is to discharge the work of respiration ; that of the vydna, to discharge the work of turning about towards a thing or away from it. The function of the uddna is to raise or lower the body, that of the samdna, to feed and develop it. The function of eructation or vomiting is performed by the ndga z dyu, and devadatta produces sleep and so on. These nddis are to be purified by inhaling air by the idd for as long as is required to count from i to 16. This breath is to be held long enough to count from i to 32, and in the interval some forms of meditation are to be carried on. Then the yogin should inhale air in the same manner through thepingald and hold that also in the same way. He should then exhale the breath through the Ida. He should practise this for three months thrice a day, three times on each occasion, and thus his nddis will be purified and he will be able to concentrate his mind on the vdyus all over his body. In the pro cess of the prdndydma he should inhale air through the Ida long enough to count from i to 16. Then the breath is to be retained as long as possible, and the specific mantra is to be meditated upon; and then the breath is to be exhaled out by the pingald for the time necessary to count from i to 16. Again, he has to inhale through the Pingald, retain the breath and exhale through the Ida. Gradually the period of retention of the breath called kumbhaka is to be increased. He has to practise the prdndydma sixteen times in course of the day. This is called the process of prdndydma. As a result of this, he may enter the stage of samddhi, by which he may attain all sorts of miraculous powers, just as one may by the meditation of the wheel of mantras. But before one begins the purification of the nddis described above one should practise the various postures (dsanas) of which cakra, padma, kurma, mayura, kukkuta, lira, swastika, bhadra, siniha, mukta andgomukha are described the Ahirbudhnya. The practice of these postures contributes to the good health of the yogins. But these physical practices are of no avail unless one turns to the spiritual side of yoga. Yoga is defined as the union of the lower and the higher soul 1 . Two ways for the attainment of the highest reality are described in the Ahirbudhnya one is that of self-offering or self-abnegation (dtma-samarpana or hrd-ydga] through the medita tion on the highest in the form of some of His powers, as this samyogo yoga ity ukto jivdtm-parama-tmannh. Ahirbudhnya-samhita, xxxi. 15. xvi] Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd 61 and that specific deity, by the practice of the mantras ; and the other is that of the yoga 1 . Ahirbudhnya, however, concentrates its teachings on the former, and mentions the latter in only one of its chapters. There are two types of soul, one within the influence of the prakrti and the other beyond it. The union with the highest is possible through karma and yoga. Karma is again of two kinds, that which is prompted by desires (pravartaka] and that which is prompted by cessation of desires (nivartaka}. Of these only the latter can lead to emancipation, while the former leads to the attain ment of the fruits of desires. The highest soul is described as the subtle (suksma), all-pervading (sarva-ga), maintaining all (sarva- bhrt), pure consciousness (jndna-rupa), without beginning and end (anddy-ananta), changeless (a-vikarin), devoid of all cognitive or conative senses, devoid of names and class-notions, without colour and quality, yet knowing all and pervading all, self-luminous and yet approachable through intuitive wisdom, and the protector of all 2 . The yoga by which a union of our lower souls with this highest reality can be effected has the well-known eight accessories, yama, niyama, dsana, prdndydma y pratydhdra, dhdrana, dhydna and samddhi. Of these, yama is said to consist of beneficial and yet truthful utterance (satya}, suffering at the sufferings of all beings (dayd), remaining fixed in one s path of duty even in the face of dangers (dhrti), inclination of all the senses to adhere to the path of right conduct (sauca), absence of lust (brahma-caryd), remaining un ruffled even when there is a real cause of anger or excitement (ksamd), uniformity of thoughts, deeds and words (drjava), taking of unprohibited food (mitdhdra), absence of greed for the property of others (asteyd), cessation from doing injury to others by word, deed or thought (ahtnisd) 3 . Niyama is described as listening to Vedantic texts (siddhanta-sravana), gifts of things duly earned to proper persons (ddna), faith in scriptural duties (mati), worship of Visnu through devotion (isvara-piljana), natural contentment with 1 yad vd bhagavate tasmai svakiydtma-samarpanam visista-daivatdya 1 smai cakra-rupdya mantratah viyuktam prakrteh suddham dadydd dtma-havih svayam. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, xxx. 4, 5. 2 Ibid. xxxi. 7-10. 3 Ibid. 18-23. The list here given is different from that of Patanjali, who counts ahimsd, satya, asteya, brahma-carya and aparigraha as yamas. See Yoga- siltra, II. 30. 62 The Pancardtra [CH. xvi whatever one may have (santosa), asceticism (tapah), faith in the ultimate truth being attainable only through the Vedas (dstikya), shame in committing prohibited actions (hrt), muttering of mantras (japa), acceptance of the path dictated by the good teacher (vratd) l . Though the Yoga is here described as the union of the lower and the higher soul, the author of the Ahirbudhnya was aware of the yogdnusdsana of Patanjali and his doctrine of Yoga as the repression of mental states (citta-vrtti-nirodhaf. The Ahirbudhnya defines pramd as the definite knowledge of a thing as it really exists (yathdrthd-vadhdranam), and the means by which it is attained is called pramdna. That which is sought to be discovered by the pramdnas as being beneficial to man is called pramdndrtha. This is of two kinds, that which is supremely and ab solutely beneficial, and that which indirectly leads thereto, and as such is called hita and sddhana. Oneness with God, which is supremely blissful, is what is called supremely beneficial (hita). Two ways that lead to it are those of dharma andjndna. This know ledge is of two kinds, as direct intuition (sdksdtkdra) and as indirect or inferential (paroksa). Dharma is the cause of knowledge, and is of two kinds, one which leads directly, and the other indirectly, to worship of God. Self-offering or self-abnegation with reference to God is called indirect dharma, while the way in which the Yogin directly realizes God is called the direct dharma, such as is taught in the Pancaratra literature, called the sdtvata-sdsana. By the Samkhya path one can have only the indirect knowledge of God, but through Yoga and Vedanta one can have a direct intuition of God. Emancipation (moksa) is as much an object of attainment through efforts (sddhya) as dharma, artha and kdma, though the last three are also mutually helpful to one another 3 . 1 Ahirbudhnya-samJnta, pp. 23-30. This list is also different from that of Patanjali, who counts sauca, santosa, tapah, svadhyaya and Isvara-pranidhdna only as niyamas. See Yoga-sutra, n. 32. 2 Ibid. xin. 27, 28. 3 Ibid. xin. CHAPTER XVII THE ARVARS. The Chronology of the Arvars. IN the Bhdgavata-purdna, xi. 5. 38-40, it is said that the great devotees of Visnu will appear in the south on the banks of Tamra- parnl, Krtamala (Vaigai), PayasvinI (Palar), Kaveri and Mahanadi (Periyar) 1 . It is interesting to note that the Arvars, Namm -arvar and Madhura-kaviy-arvar, were born in the Tamraparm country, Periy-arvar and his adopted daughter Andal in the Krtamala, Poygaiy-arvar, Bhutatt -arvar, Pey-arvar and Tiru-marisai Piran in the PayasvinI, Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar, Tiru-pan-arvar and Tiru- mangaiy-arvar in the Kaveri, and Periy-arvar and Kula-sekhara Perumal in the Mahanada countries. In the Bhdgavata-mdhdtmya we find a parable in which Bhakti is described as a distressed woman who was born in the Dravida country, had attained her womanhood in the Carnatik and Maharastra, and had travelled in great misery through Guzerat and North India with her two sons Jndna and Vairdgya to Brindaban, and that owing to the hard conditions through which she had to pass her two sons had died. This shows that at least according to the traditions of the Bhdgavata-purdna Southern India was regarded as a great stronghold of the Bhakti cult. The Arvars are the most ancient Vaisnava saints of the south, of whom Saroyogin or Poygaiy-arvar, Putayogin or Bhutatt -arvar, Mahadyogin or Pey-arvar, and Bhaktisara or Tiru-marisai Piran are the earliest; Namm -arvar or Sathakopa, Madhura-kaviy-arvar, Kula-sekhara Perumal, Visnucittan (or Periy-arvar) and Goda (Andal) came after them and Bhaktanghrirenu (Tondar-adi-podiy- arvar), Yogivaha (Tiru-pan-arvar) and Parakala (Tiru-mahgaiy- 1 This implies that the Bhdgavata-purdna in its present form was probably written after the Arvars had flourished. The verse here referred to has been quoted by Venkatanatha in his Rahasya-traya-sdra. The Prapannd-mrta (Ch. 77) however refers to three other Vaisnava saints who preceded the Arvars. They were (i) Kasarayogin, born in KancI, (ii) Bhutayoglndra, born in Mallipura, (iii) Bhranta-yoglndra called also Mahat and Maharya who was the incarnation of Visvaksena. It was these sages who advised the five samskdras of Vaisnavism (tdpah paundras tathd nama mantro ydgas ca pancamah). They preached the emotional Vaisnavism in which Bhakti is realized as maddening intoxication associated with tears, etc. They described their feelings of ecstasy in three works, comprising three hundred verses written in Tamil. They were also known by the names of Madhava, Dasarya and Saroyogin. 64 The Arvars [CH. arvar) were the last to come. The traditional date ascribed to the earliest Arvar is 4203 B.C., and the date of the latest Arvar is 2706 B.C. 1 , though modern researches on the subject bring down their dates to a period not earlier than the seventh or the eighth century A.D. Traditional information about the Arvars can be had from the different " Guru-parampard " works. According to the Guru-par ampar a, Bhutan-, Poygaiy- and Pey-arvars were incarna tions of Visnu s Gadd, Sankha and Nandaka, and so also Kadan- mallai and Mayilai, while Tiru-marisai Piran was regarded as the incarnation of the cakra (wheel) of Visnu. Namm -arvar was in carnation of Visvaksena and Kula-sekhara Peru-mal of the Kaus- tubha of Visnu. So Periy-arvar, Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar and Tiru- mangaiy-arvar were respectively incarnations of Garuda, Vanamdld and Sdrriga of Visnu. The last Arvar was Tiru-paii-arvar. Andal, the adopted daughter of Periy-arvar, and Madhura-kaviy-arvar, the disciple of Namm -arvar, were also regarded as Arvars. They came from all parts of the Madras Presidency. Of these seven were Brahmins, one was a Ksattriya, two were sudras and one was of the low Panar caste. The Guru-par ampar as give incidents of the lives of the Arvars and also fanciful dates B.C. when they are said to have flourished. Apart from the Guru-par ampar as there are also mono graphs on individual Arvars, of which the following are the most important: (i) Divya-suri-carita by Garuda- vahana Pandita, who was a contemporary of Ramanuja; (2) Guru-parampard-prabhdvam of Pinb -aragiya Peru-mal Jlyar, based on the Divya-suri-carita and written in mani-pravdla style, i.e. a mixture of Sanskrit and Tamil; (3) Periya-tiru-mudiy-adaivu of Anbillai Kandadai-yappan, written in Tamil; (4) Upadesa-ratna-mdlai of Manavala Ma-muni, written in Tamil, contains the list of Arvars; (5) Yatindra-pravana- prabhdvam of Pillai Lokacaryar. The other source of information regarding the Arvars is the well-known collection of the works of Arvars known as Ndl-ayira-divya-prabandham. Among these are the commentaries on the Divya-prabandham and the Tiru-vdy-mori of Namm -arvar. In addition to these we have the epigraphical evidence in inscriptions scattered over the Madras Presidency 2 . 1 Early History of Vaisnavism in South India, by S. K. Aiyangar, pp. 4-13; also Sir R. G. Bhandarkar s Vaisnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Sects, pp. 68, 69. 8 Sir Subrahmanya Ayyar Lectures, by the late T. A. Gopi-natha Rau, 1923. xvi i] The Chronology of the Arvars 65 Manavala Ma-muni, in his Yatindra-pravana-prabhavam, says that the earliest of the Arvars, Pey-arvar, Bhutatt -arvar, Poygaiy- arvar, and Tiru-marisai Piran, flourished at the time of the Pallavas, who came to KancI about the fourth century A.D. Again, Professor Dubreuil says that Mamallai, the native town of Bhutatt -arvar, did not exist before Narasimhavarman I, who founded the city by the middle of the seventh century. Further, Tiru-marigaiy-arvar praised the Vaisnava temple of KancI built by Paramesvarvarman II. It seems, therefore, that the Arvars flourished in the eighth century A.D., which was the period of a great Vaisnava movement in the Cola and the Pandya countries, and also of the Advaitic movement of Sarikara 1 . According to the traditional accounts, Namm -arvar was the son of Kari, holding a high post under the Pandyas, and himself bore the names of Karimaran, Parankusa and Sathakopa, that his disciple was Madhura-kaviy-arvar, and that he was born at Tirukkurgur. Two stone inscriptions have been found in Madura of which one is dated at Kali 3871, in the reign of King Parantaka, whose uttara-mantrin was the son of Mara, who was also known as Madhura-kaviy-arvar. The other is dated in the reign of Maran- jadaiyan. The Kali year 3871 corresponds to A.D. 770. This was about the year when Parantaka Pandya ascended the throne. His father Pararikusa died about the year A.D. 770. Mararikari con tinued as uttara-mantrin. Namm -arvar s name Karimaran shows that Kari the uttara-mantrin was his father. This is quite in accor dance with the accounts found in Guru-par ampar a. These and many other evidences collected by Gopi-natha Rau show that Namm -arvar and Madhura-kaviy-arvar flourished at the end of the eighth century A.D. or in the first half of the ninth century. Kula- sekhara Peru-mal also flourished probably about the first half of the ninth century. Periy-arvar and his adopted daughter Andal were probably contemporaries of Srivallabhadeva, who flourished about the middle of the ninth century A.D. Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar was a contemporary of Tiru-marigaiy-arvar and Tiru-pan-arvar. Tiru- marigaiy-arvar referred to the war drum of Pallavamalla, who reigned between A.D. 717 and A.D. 779, and these Arvars could not have flourished before that time. But Tiru-marigaiy-arvar, in his praise 1 Sir Subrahmanya Ayyar Lectures, by the late T. A. Gopi-natha R3u, 1923, p. 17. D in 5 66 The Arvars [CH. of Visnu at KancI, refers to Vairamegha Pallava, who probably flourished in the ninth century. It may therefore be supposed that Tiru-mangaiy lived about that time. According to Mr S. K. Aiyangar the last of the Arvars flourished in the earlier half of the eighth century A.D. 1 Sir R. G. Bhandarkar holds that Kula- sekhara Peru-mal flourished about the middle of the twelfth century. He was a king of Travancore and in his Mukunda-mdla he quotes a verse from the Bhdgavata-purdna (xi. 2. 36). On the basis of the inscriptional evidence that Permadi of the Senda dynasty, who flourished between 1138-1150, conquered Kula- sekharanka, and identifying Kula-sekhara Peru-mal with Kula- sekharaiika, Bhandarkar comes to the conclusion that Kula-sekhara Peru-mal lived in the middle of the twelfth century A.D. , though, as we have already seen, Mr Rau attempts to place him in the first half of the ninth century. He, however, doe s not take any notice of the views of Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, who further thinks that the earliest Arvars flourished about the fifth or the sixth century A.D. and that the order of the priority of the Arvars as found in the Guru- parampard lists is not reliable. One of the main points of criticism used by Aiyangar against Bhandarkar is the latter s identification of Kula-sekhara Peru-mal with Kula-sekharaiika. The works of the Arvars were written in Tamil, and those that survive were collected in their present form in Ramanuja s time or in the time of Natha- muni ; this collection, containing 4000 hymns, is called Ndl-dyira- divya-prabandham. But at least one part of it was composed by Kuruttalvan or Kuruttama, who was a prominent disciple of Ramanuja, and in a passage thereof a reference is made to Ramanuja also 2 . The order of the Arvars given in this work is somewhat different from that given in the Guru-parampard referred to above, and it does not contain the name of Namm -arvar, who is treated separately. Again, Pillan, the disciple and apostolic successor of Ramanuja, who commented on the Tiru-vdy-mori of Namm - arvar, gives in a verse all the names of the Arvars, omitting only 1 Indian Antiquary, Vol. xxxv, pp. 228, etc. 2 This part is called Ratnanuja-nurrundddi. The order of the Arvars given here is as follows : Poygaiy-arvar, Bhutatt -arvar, Pcy-arvar, Tiru-pan-arvar, _Tiru- marisai Piran, Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar, Kula-sekhara, Periy-arvar, AndaJ, Tiru-mangaiy-arvar. Vehkatanatha, however, in his Prabandha-saram records the Arvars in the following order: Poygaiy-arvar, Bhutatt -arvar, Pfiy-arvar, Tiru-rnarisai Piran, Namm -arvar, Madhura-kaviy-arvar, Kula-sekhara, Periy- arvar, Andal, Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar, Tiru-pan-arvar, Tiru-mangaiy-arvar. xvi i] The Chronology of the Arvar s 67 Andal 1 . Thus it appears that Kula-sekhara was accepted as an Arvar in Ramanuja s time. In V enkatanatha s (fourteenth-century) list, contained in one of his Tamil Prabandhams, all the Arvars excepting Andal and Madhura-kaviy-arvar are mentioned. The Prabandham contains also a succession list of teachers according to the Vadakalai sect, beginning with Ramanuja 2 . Kula-sekhara, in his Mukunda-mdld, says that he was the ruler of Ko!li (Uraiyur, the Cola capital), Kudal (Madura) and Korigu. Being a native of Travancore (Vanjikulam), he became the ruler of the Pandya and Cola capitals, Madura and Uraiyur. After A.D. 900, when the Cola king Parantaka became supreme and the Cola capital was at Tanjore instead of at Uraiyur, the ascendency of the Travan core country (Kerala) over the Cola and the Pandya kingdoms would have been impossible. It could only have happened either before the rise of the great Pallava dynasty with Narasimhavarman I (A.D. 600) or after the fall of that dynasty with Nandivarman (A.D. 800). If Tiru-mahgaiy-arvar, the contemporary of Vairamegha, be accepted as the last Arvar, then Kula-sekhara must be placed in the sixth century A.D. But Gopi-natha Rau interprets a passage of Kula- sekhara as alluding to the defeat and death of a Pallava king at his hands. He identifies this king with the Pallava king Dantivarman, about A.D. 825, and is of the opinion that he flourished in the first half of the ninth century A.D. In any case Bhandarkar s identifica tion of Kula-sekhara with Kula-sekhararika (A.D. 1150) is very im probable, as an inscription dated A.D. 1088 makes a provision for the recital of Kula-sekhara s " Tettarumtiral." 3 Aiyangar further states that in several editions of the Mukunda-mdld the quotation from the Bhdgavata-purdna referred to by Bhandarkar cannot be traced. We may thus definitely reject the view of Bhandarkar that Kula-sekhara flourished in the middle of the twelfth century A.D. There is a great controversy among the South Indian historians and epigraphists not only about the chronological order of the 1 Bhutam Saras ca Mahad-anvaya-Bhattanatha- $rl-Bhaktisdra-Kulasekhara-Yogivdhdn Bhaktdnghrirenu-Parakdla-Yatlndramisrdn $rl-mat-Pardnkusa-munim pranato smi nityam. Verse quoted from Aiyangar s Early History of Vaisnavism. 2 Ramanuja s preceptor was Periya Nambi, then come Alavandar, Manakkal Nambi, Uyyakkondar, Nathamuni, Sathakopa, Visvaksena (Senai Nathan), Mahalaksmi and Visnu. Aiyangar, Early History of Vaisnavism, p. 21. 3 Ibid. p. 33. 5-2 68 The Arvars [CH. different Arvars, but also regarding the dates of the first and the last, and of those who came between them. Thus, while Aiyangar wished to place the first four Arvars about the second century A.D., Gopi-natha Rau regards them as having flourished in the middle of the seventh century A.D. 1 Again, Namm -arvar is placed by Aiyangar in the middle of the sixth century, while Gopi-natha Rau would place him during the first half of the ninth century. While Aiyangar would close the history of the Arvars by the middle of the seventh century, Gopi-natha Rau would place Kula-sekhara in A.D. 825, Periy-arvar in about the same date or a few years later, and Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar, Tiru-maiigaiy-arvar and Tiru-pan- arvar (contemporaries) about A.D. 830. From comparing the various matters of controversy, the details of which cannot well be de scribed here, I feel it wise to follow Gopi-natha Rau, and am in clined to think that the order of the Arvars, except so far as the first group of four is concerned, is not a chronological one, as many of them were close contemporaries, and their history is within a period of only 200 years, from the middle of the seventh century to the middle of the ninth century. The word Arvar means one who has a deep intuitive knowledge of God and one who is immersed in the contemplation of Him. The works of the Arvars are full of intense and devoted love for Visnu. This love is the foundation of the later systematic doctrine of prapatti. The difference between the Arvars and the Aragiyas, of whom we shall speak later on, is that, while the former had realized Brahman and had personal enjoyment of His grace, the latter were learned propounders who elaborated the philosophy contained in the works of the Arvars. Poygaiy, Bhutatt and Pey composed the three sections of one hundred stanzas each of Tiru-vantddi 2 . Tiru- marisai Piran spent much of his life in Triplicane, Conjeevaram and Kumbakonam. His hymns are the Nan-mukham Tiru-vantddi, containing ninety-six stanzas, and Tiru-chanda-vruttam. Namm - arvar was born of a Sudra family at Kurukur, now Alvartirunagari in the Tinnevelly district. He was the most voluminous writer 1 These are Pey-arvar, Bhutatt -arvar, Poygaiy-arvar and Tiru-marisai Piran, the first three being known as Mudal-arvars among the Srivaisnavas. 2 As a specimen of Tiru-vantddi one may quote the following passage: "With love as lamp-bowl, desire as oil, mind melting with bliss as wick, with melting soul I have kindled the bright light of wisdom in the learned Tamil which I have_wrought for Narayana." Bhutam, quotation from Hooper s Hymns of the Alvars, p. 12, n. xvn] The Philosophy of the Arvars 69 among the Arvars and a great mass of his poetry is preserved in the Ndl-dyira-divya-prabandham. His works are the Tiru-vruttam, containing one hundred stanzas, Tiru-vdsiriyam, containing seven stanzas, the Periya tiru-vantddi of eighty-seven stanzas, and the Tiru-vdy-mort, containing 1 102 stanzas. Namm -arvar s whole life was given to meditation. His disciple Madhura-kavi considers him an incarnation of Visnu. Kula-sekhara was a great devotee of Rama. His chief work is the Peru-mdl-tiru-mori. Periy-arvar, known as Visnucitta, was born at Sribittiputtur. His chief works are Tiru- palV-dndu and Tiru-mori. Andal, adopted daughter of Periy-arvar, was passionately devoted to Krsna and considered herself as one of the Gopis, seeking for union with Krsna. She was married to the God Rahganatha of Srirahgam. Her chief works are Tiru-pdvai and Nacchiydr. Tirumori Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar was born at Mandajigudi. He was once under the seduction of a courtesan called DevadevI, but was saved by the grace of Rahganatha. His chief works are Tiru-mdlai, and the Tiru-palliy-eruchi. Tiru-pan- arvar was brought up by a low-caste childless panar. His chief work was Amalan-ddibirdn in ten stanzas. Tiru-mahgaiy was born in the thief-caste. His chief works are Periya-tiru-mori, Tiru- kurun-ddndakam, Tiru-nedun-ddndakam, Tiru-verugiitt-irukkai, Siriya-tiru-madal and Periya-tiru-madal. Tiru-mahgaiy was driven to brigandage, and gained his divine wisdom through the grace of Rahganatha. The Ndl-dyira-divya-prabandham, which contains the works of the Arvars, is regarded in the Tamil country as the most sacred book and is placed side by side with the Vedas. It is carried in procession into the temple, when verses from it are recited and they are recited also on special occasions of marriage, death, etc. Verses from it are also sung and recited in the hall in front of the temple, and it is used in the rituals along with Vedic mantras. The Philosophy of the Arvars. As the hymns of the Arvars have only a literary and devotional form, it is difficult to utilize them for philosophical purposes. As an illustration of the general subject-matter of their works, I shall try to give .a brief summary of the main contents of Namm -arvar s (Sathakopa) work, following Abhiramavaracarya s Dramidopanisat- tdtparya 1 . The feeling of devotion to God felt by Sathakopa 1 MS. from Government Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras. yo The Arvdrs [CH. could not be contained within him, and, thus overflowing, was ex pressed in verses which soothed all sufferers; this shows that his affection for suffering humanity was even greater than that of their own parents. Sathakopa s main ideal was to subdue our so-called manhood by reference to God (purusottama), the greatest of all beings, and to regard all beings as but women dependent on Him; and so it was that Sathakopa conceived himself as a woman longing for her lover and entirely dependent on him. In the first of his four works he prayed for the cessation of rebirth ; in the second he described his experiences of God s great and noble qualities; in the third he expressed his longings to enjoy God ; and in the fourth he described how all his experiences of God s communion with him fell far short of his great longings. In the first ten stanzas of his first centum he is infused with a spirit of service (ddsya) to God and describes his experiences of God s essential qualities. In the next ten stanzas he describes the mercy of God and recommends every one to give up attachment to all other things, which are of a trifling and temporary nature. Then he prays to God for his incarnation on earth with LaksmI, His consort, and pays adoration to Him. He continues with a description of his mental agonies in not attaining com munion with God, confessing his own guilt to Him. He then em braces God and realizes that all his failings are his own fault. He explains that the spirit of service (ddsya) does not depend for its manifestation and realization on any elaborate rituals involving articles of worship, but on one s own zeal. What is necessary is true devotion (bhakti). Such a devotion, he says, must proceed through an intense enjoyment of the nature of the noble qualities of God, so that the devotee may feel that there is nothing in anything else that is greater than them. With a yielding heart he says that God accepts the service of those who, instead of employing all the various means of subduing a crooked enemy, adopt only the means of friendliness to them 1 . God is pleased with those who are disposed to realize the sincerity of their own spirit, and it is through this that they can realize God in themselves. God s favour does not depend on any thing but His own grace, manifesting itself in an all-embracing devotion. He says, in the second sataka, that the devotee, having, kautilyavatsu karana-tritaye pi jantusv dtmlyam eva karana-tritayaika-rupyam sandarsya tdnapi harih sva-vaslkarotlty dcasta sdndra-karuno munir astamena. Dramidopanisat-tdtparya. MS. xvn] The Philosophy of the Arvdrs 71 on the one hand, felt the great and noble qualities of God, and yet being attached to other things, is pierced through with pangs of sorrow in not realizing God in communion, and feels a bond of sympathy with all humanity sharing the same grief. Through the stories of God related in the Puranas, e.g. in the Bhdgavata, Sathakopa feels the association of God which removes his sorrow and so increases his contact with God. He then describes how the great saints of the past had within their heart of hearts enjoyed an immersion in the ocean of God s bliss, which is the depository of all blissful emotion; and he goes on to express his longings for the enjoyment of that bliss. Through his longings for Him there arose in Sathakopa great grief of separation, devoid of any interest in furthering unworthy ends; he communicated to Him his great sorrow at his incapacity to realize Him, and in so doing he lost consciousness through in tensity of grief. As a result God Krsna appeared before him, and he describes accordingly the joy of the vision of God. But he fears to lose God, who is too mighty for him, and takes refuge in his great attachment to Him. Next he says that they only realize God who have a sense of possession in Him. He describes God s noble qualities, and shows that the realization of the proximity of God is much more desirable than the attainment of emancipation. He says that the true definition of moksa is to attain the position of God s servant 1 . In the beginning of the third centum he describes the beauty of God. Then he bemoans the fact that, on account of the limitations of his senses and his mind, he is unable to enjoy the fullness of His beauty. Next he describes the infinitude of God s glory and his own spirit of service to Him. Then he envisages the whole world and the words that denote the things of the world as being the body of God 2 . Then he expresses the pleasure and bliss he feels in the service of God, and says that even those who cannot come into contact with God in His own essence can find solace in directing their minds to His image and to the stories of Krsna related in the ntoksddaram sphutam aveksya munir mukunde moksam praddtum sadrksa-phalam pravrtte dtme-stam asya pada-kinkarataika-rupam moksd-khya-vastu navame nirandyi tena. Dramidopani$at-tdtparya. MS. sarvam jagat samavalokya vibhos sariram tad-vdcinas ca sakaldn apt sabda-rdsin tarn bhuta-bhautika-mukhdn kathayan padarthdn ddsyam cakdra vacasaiva munis caturthe. Ibid. 72 The Arvdrs [CH. Puranas. He then absorbs himself in the grief of his separation from God and hopes that by arresting all the inner senses he may see God with his own eyes. He also regrets the condition of other men who are wasting their time in devotion to gods other than Krsna. He goes on to describe the vision of God and his great joy therein. In the fourth centum he describes the transitoriness of all things considered as enjoyable, and the absolute superiority of the bliss of pleasing God. He goes on to explain how, through cessation of all inclination to other things and the increase of longing for God in a timeless and spaceless manner, and through the pangs of separation in not realizing Him constantly, he considers himself as a woman, and through the pangs of love loses his consciousness 1 . Then he describes how Hari is pleased with his amour and satisfies his longings by making Him enjoyable through the actions of mind, words and body by His blissful embraces 2 . Next he shows how, when he attempted to realize Krsna by his spiritual zeal, Krsna vanished from his sight and he was then once more filled with the grief of separation. Again he receives a vision of God and feels with joy His overwhelming superiority. He further describes how his vision of God was like a dream, and how, when the dream ceased, he lost consciousness. To fill up the emptiness of these occasional separations, he sorrowfully chanted the name of God, and earnestly prayed to Him. He wept for Him and felt that without Him every thing was nothing. Yet at intervals he could not help feeling deep sympathy for erring humanity which had turned its mind away from God. According to him the real bondage consists in the pre ference man gives to things other than God. When one can feel God as all-in-all, every bond is loosened. In the fifth centum he feels that God s grace alone can save man. He again describes himself as the wife of God, constantly longing for His embrace. In his grief and lamentation and his anxiety to meet God, he was overcome by a swoon which, like the night, dimmed all his senses. At the end of this state he saw the orna- tam purusa-rtham itard-rtha-rucer nivrttyd sdndra-sprhah samaya-desa-viduragam ca ipsuh sued tad-an-avdpti-bhuvd dvitlye strl-bhdvandm samadhigamya munir mumoha. Dramidopanisat-tdtparya. MS. prltdh param harir amusya tadd svabhdvdd etan-mano-vacana-deha-krta-kriydbhih srak-candana-pramukha-sarva-vidha-svabhogyah samsliftavdn idam uvdca munis trflye. Ibid. xvn] The Philosophy of the Arvdrs 73 ments of God, but could not see Him directly, and was thus filled both with grief and happiness. As a relief from the pangs of separa tion he found enjoyment in identifying himself in his mind with God and in imitating His ways, thinking that the world was created by him 1 . In a number of verses (seventy or eighty) he describes how he was attached to the image of the God Krsna at Kumbha- konam and how he suffered through God s apathy towards him in not satisfying him, His lover, with embraces and other tokens of love, and how he became angry with His indifference to his amorous approaches and was ultimately appeased by God, who satisfied him with loving embraces and the like. Thus God, who was divine lord of the universe, felt sympathy and love for him and appeased his sorrows in the fashion of a human lover 2 . He describes his great bliss in receiving the embrace of God. Through this rapturous divine love and divine embrace he lost all mundane interest in life. In the ninth centum the sage, finding he could not look at the ordinary things of life, nor easily gain satisfaction in the divine presence of God in the whole world, fixed his mind on His trans cendental form (aprdkrta-vapuh) and became full of wailing and lamentation as a means of direct access to it. A great part of this centum is devoted to laments due to his feeling of separation from God. He describes how through constant lamentation and brood ing he received the vision of God, but was unhappy because he could not touch Him ; and how later on God took human form in response to his prayers and made him forget his sufferings 3 . In many other verses he again describes the emotions of his distress at his separation and temporary union with God; how he sent messages to God through birds ; how he felt miserable because He delayed to meet him; how he expected to meet Him at appointed times, and how his future actions in Heaven should be repeated in sokam ca tarn pari-jihlrsur ivakhildndm sargd-di-kartur anukdra-rasena saureh tasya pravrttir akhild racitd maye ti tad-bhdva-bhdvita-mand munir aha sasthe. Dramidopanhat-tdtparya. MS. kopam mama pranaya-jam prasamayya krsna svd-dhlnatdm dtanute ti sa-vismayah sah svyldm viruddha-jagad-dkrtitdm ca tena sandarsitdm anubabhuva munis trtlye. Ibid, sangam nivarttya mama samsrti-mandale mam samsthdpayan katham asl ty anucoditena dscaryya-loka-tanutdm api darsayitvd vismdritah kila sucam harind stame sau. Ibid. 74 The Arvar s [CH. earth and how his behaviour to God was like that of the Gopis, full of ardent love and eagerness. In the concluding verses, however, he says that the real vision of God can come only to a deeply devoted mind and not to external eyes. Hooper gives some interesting translations from the Tiru- vruttam of Namm -arvar, a few of which may be quoted here to illustrate the nature of his songs of love for God 1 : Long may she love, this girl with luring locks, Who loves the feet that heavenly ones adore, The feet of Kannan, dark as rainy clouds: Her red eyes all abrim with tears of grief, Like darting Kayal fish in a deep pool 2 . Hot in this village now doth blow the breeze Whose nature coolness is. Hath he, this once, The rain-cloud hued, his sceptre turned aside To steal the love-glow from my lady, lorn For tulasl, with wide eyes raining tears? 3 In separation from the lord the Arvar finds delight in looking at darkness, which resembles Krsna s colour: Thou, fair as Kannan s heaven, when he s away What ages long it is! He here, a span! Whether friends stay for many days, or go, We grieve. Yet, be this spreading darkness blest In spite of many a cunning trick it has 4 . What will befall my girl with bracelets fair, With tearful eyes like gleaming Kayal big, Who wanders with a secret pain at heart For blooms of tulasl fresh from the Bird s Lord Who with that hill protected flocks in storm? 5 The Arvar then laments and pleads with swans and herons to take his message: The flying swans and herons I did beg, Cringing: "Forget not, ye, who first arrive, If ye behold my heart with Kannan there Oh, speak of me and ask it Sir not yet Hast thou returned to her? And is it right? " 1 Hymns of the Alvars, by J. S. M. Hooper, pp. 61-88. 2 The maid who is represented as speaking here stands for Arvar s disciple, and the lady in love is the mistress, and Kannan is Krsna, the Lord. This is also a speech from the maid, and tulasl stands for Krsna. The time of separation is felt to be too long, and the time of union is felt to be too short. 8 Lamentation of the mother for the girl, the Arvar. xvii] The Philosophy of the Arvdrs 75 The Arvar then laments that the clouds will not take his mes sage. He speaks of the resemblance between the clouds and the Lord: Tell me, ye clouds, how have ye won the means That we are thus like TirumaTs blest form ? Bearing good water for protecting life, Ye range through all the sky. Such penance, sure, As makes your bodies ache, has won this grace ! The friend speaks of the callousness of the lord : E en in this age-long time of so-called night When men must grope, he pities not that she Stands in her deep immitigable grief. . . . The jungle traversed by the fawn-eyed girl With fragile waist, whom sinful I brought forth After long praise of Kannan s lotus feet. . . . The Arvar sees a likeness of his lord in the blue water-lily, and sees the lord s form everywhere: All places, shining like great lotus pools On a blue mountain broad, to me are but The beauties of his eye the lord of earth Girt by the roaring sea, heaven s lord, the lord Of other good souls, black-hued lord and mine! The Arvar speaks of the greatness of the lord : Sages with wisdom won by virtuous toil Assert "His colour, glorious beauty, name, His form are such and such." But all their toil Has measured not the greatness of my lord : Their wisdom s light is but a wretched lamp. The foster-mother pities the mistress unable to endure the length of the night : This child of sinful me, with well-formed teeth, Round breasts and rosy mouth, keeps saying, "These Fair nights eternal are as my desire For tulasl!". . . Again the foster-mother pities the girl as too young for such ardent love : Breasts not yet full, and short her tresses soft; Skirt loose about the waist ; with prattling tongue And innocent eyes.. . . 76 The Arvdrs [CH. Again the lord replies to a friend s criticism of his infatuation for his mistress: Those lilies red, which are the life of me The eyes of her who s like the heaven of him.. . . The mistress is unable to endure the darkness and is yet further vexed by the appearance of the moon : Oh, let the crescent moon which cleaves the dark Encompassing of night, cleave me as well ! Ah, does it issue forth in brightness now, That happy bloom may come to desolate me Who only long for flowers of tulasi ? The mistress s friend despairs at the sight of her languishing : . . . Ah ! as she sobs and lisps The cloud-hued s names, I know not if she ll live Or if her frame and spirit mild must pass ! Again in Kula-sekhara s Tirumal-Tiru-mori, C. 5: Though red fire comes itself and makes fierce heat, The lotus red blooms not Save for the fierce-rayed one Who in the lofty heavens has his seat. Vitruvakodu s Lord, Thou wilt not remove My woe, my heart melts not save at Thy boundless love.. . . With gathered waters all the streams ashine Must spread abroad and run And enter the deep sea And cannot stand outside. So refuge mine, Save in the shining bliss of entering Thee, is none, Vitruvakodu s Lord, thick cloud-hued, virtuous one! 1 Again from the same book 2 : No kinship with the world have I Which takes for true the life that is not true. "For thee alone my passion burns," I cry, "Rahgan, my Lord!" No kinship with this world have I With throngs of maidens slim of waist: With joy and love I rise for one alone, and cry "Rahgan, my Lord!" 1 Hooper, op. tit. p. 48. 2 Ibid. p. 44. xvi i] The Philosophy of the Arvdrs 77 Again in the Tiru-pdvai, a well-known section of the Ndl-dyira- divya-prabandham, the poetess Andal conceives herself as a GopI, requesting her friends to go with her to wake the sleeping Krsna, After the cows we to the jungle go And eat there cowherds knowing nought are we, And yet how great the boon we have, that thou Wast born among us ! Thou who lackest nought, Govinda, kinship that we have with thee Here in this place can never cease ! If through Our love we call thee baby names, in grace Do not be wroth, for we like children we Know nought O Lord, wilt thou not grant to us The drum we ask? Ah, Elorembavay! 1 Again Periy-arvar conceives himself as Yasoda and describes the infant Krsna as lying in the dust and calling for the moon ! (1) He rolls round in the dust, so that the jewel on his brow keeps swinging, and his waist-bells tinkle ! Oh, look at my son Govinda s play, big Moon, if thou hast eyes in thy face and then, be gone! (2) My little one, precious to me as nectar, my blessing, is calling thee, pointing, pointing, with his little hands! O big Moon, if thou wishest to play with this little black one, hide not thyself in the clouds, but come rejoicing! 2 Again, Tiru-mahgaiy says: Or ever age creep on us, and we need The staff s support ; ere we are double bent With eyes fix d on the ground in front, and feet That totter, sitting down to rest, all spent : We would worship Vadari Home of him who mightily Suck d his feigned mother s breast Till she died, ogress confest. Again Andal says: Daughter of Nandagopal, who is like A lusty elephant, who fleeth not, With shoulders strong: Nappinnai, thou with hair Diffusing fragrance, open thou the door! Come see how everywhere the cocks are crowing, And in the mathavi bower the Kuyil sweet Repeats its song. Thou with a ball in hand, Come, gaily open, with thy lotus hands And tinkling bangles fair, that we may sing Thy cousin s name ! Ah, Elorembavay! 1 Hooper, op. cit. p. 57. Ibid. p. 37. 78 The Arvdrs [CH. Thou who art strong to make them brave in fight, Going before the three and thirty gods, Awake from out thy sleep ! Thou who art just, Thou who art mighty, thou, O faultless one, Who burnest up thy foes, awake from sleep ! O Lady Nappinnai, with tender breasts Like unto little cups, with lips of red And slender waist, Lakshmi, awake from sleep! Proffer thy bridegroom fans and mirrors now, And let us bathe! Ah, Elorembavay \ l In describing the essential feature of the devotion of an Arvar like Namm -arvar, called also Pararikusa or Sathakopa, Govinda- charyar, the author of The Divine Wisdom of the Drdvida Saints and The Holy Lives of the Azhvdrs, says that according to Namm -arvar, when one is overcome by bhakti-exuhation and self-surrendering devotion to God he easily attains truth 2 . Namm -arvar said that God s grace is the only means of securing our salvation, and no effort is required on our part but to surrender ourselves to Him. In the following words Namm -arvar says that God is constantly trying to woo us to love Him: Blissful Lord, heard I; anon my eyes in floods did run, Oh what is this? I asked. What marvel this? the Perfect one, Through friendly days and nights, elects with me to e er remain, To union wooing me, His own to make; nor let me "lone." Namm -arvar again writes that God s freedom is fettered by His mercy. Thus he says : " O mercy, thou hast deprived God of the freedom of His just will. Safe under the winds of mercy, no more can God Himself even of His will tear Himself away from me; for, if He can do so, I shall still exclaim, I am Victor, for He must pur chase the freedom of His will by denying to Himself mercy." Illustrating the position, he refers to the case of a devout lady who clasped the feet of the Lord in Varadaraja s shrine at KaricI and said: "God I have now clasped thy feet firmly; try if thou canst, spurn me and shake thyself off from me." Namm -arvar used the term Tuvalil or Ninru kumirume, a Tamil expression of love, which has been interpreted as signifying a continuous whirling emotion of love boring deeper and deeper, but never scattering and passing away. This circling and boring of 1 Hooper, op. cit. p. 55. 2 Bhagavad-vishayam, Bk. I, p. 571, as quoted in Govindacharyar s Divine Wisdom of the Drdvida Saints. xvn] The Philosophy of the Arvdrs 79 love in the heart is mute, silent and incapable of expression ; like the cow, whose teats filled with milk tingle, cannot withal express by mouth her painful longing to reach her calf who is tethered away from her. Thus, true love of God is perpetual and ever growing 1 . The difference between the love of Namm -arvar and of Tiru- mangaiy-arvar is said to have been described by Yamuna, as re ported in the Bhagavad-vishayam, as of two different kinds. Tiru- marigaiy-arvar s love expresses the experience of a constant com panionship with God in a state of delirious, rapturous reciprocation of ravishing love. He was immersed in the fathomless depth of love, and was in the greatest danger of becoming unconscious and falling into a stupor like one under the influence of a narcotic. Namm - arvar, however, was in a state of urgent pursuit after God. He was thus overcome with a sense of loneliness and unconscious of his individual self. He was not utterly intoxicated. The energy flowing from a mind full and strong with the ardent expectation of meeting his bridegroom and beloved companion still sustained him and kept him alive 2 . This state is described in Tiru-vdy-mori in the following Day and night she knows not sleep, In floods of tears her eyes do swim. Lotus-like eyes ! She weeps and reels, Ah ! how without thee can I bear ; She pants and feels all earth for Him. This love of God is often described as having three stages: recollection, trance and rallying. The first means the reminiscence of all the past ravishment of soul vouchsafed by God. The second means fainting and desolation at such reminiscences and a con sciousness of the present absence of such ravishing enjoyments. The third is a sudden lucidity whilst in the state of trance, which being of a delirious nature may often lead to death through the rapid introduction of death-coma 3 . The Arvars were not given to any philosophical speculation but only to ecstatic experiences of the emotion of love for God ; yet we sometimes find passages in Namm -arvar s works wherein he re veals his experience of the nature of soul. Thus he says: "It is not possible to give a description of that wonderful entity, the soul 1 Divine Wisdom of the Drdvida Saints, pp. 127-128. 2 See the Bhagavad-vishayam, Bk. vi, p. 2865 ; also Divine Wisdom, pp. 130, 131- 3 Bhagavad-vishayam, Bk. vn, p. 3194; also Divine Wisdom, p. 151. So The Arvars [CH. (atma) the soul which is eternal, and is essentially characterized by intelligence (jiidnd) the soul which the Lord has condescended to exhibit to me as His mode, or I related to Him as the predicate is to the subject, or attribute is to substance (or consonants to the vowel A) the soul, the nature of which is beyond the compre hension of even the enlightened the soul, which cannot be classed under any category as this or that the soul whose apperception by the strenuous mental effort called yoga (psychic meditation) is even then not comparable to such perception or direct proof as arises from the senses conveying knowledge of the external world the soul (as revealed to me by my Lord) transcending all other categories of things, which could be grouped as body or as the senses, or as the vital spirit (prdna), or as the mind (manas), or as the will (buddhi), being destitute of the modifications and corruptions to which all these are subject; the soul, which is very subtle and distinct from any of these; neither coming under the description good, nor bad. The soul is, briefly, an entity which does not fall under the cognizance of sense-knowledge 1 ." Soul is here described as a pure subtle essence unassociated with impurities of any kind and not knowable in the manner in which all ordinary things are known. Such philosophical descriptions or discussions concerning the nature of reality, or an investigation into the logical or epistemological position of the religion preached by them, are not within the scope and province of the Arvars. They sang songs in an inspired manner and often believed that they themselves had no hand in their composition, but that it was God who spoke through them. These songs were often sung to the accompaniment of cymbals, and the intoxicating melody of the music was peculiar to the Arvars and entirely different from the traditional music then current in South India. A study of the works of the Arvars, which were collected together by the disciples of Ramanuja at his special request, and from which Ramanuja him self drew much inspiration and food for his system of thought, reveals an intimate knowledge of the Puranic legends of Krsna, as found in the Visnu-purdna and the Bhdgavata 2 . There is at least one passage, already referred to, which may well be interpreted as 1 Divine Wisdom, p. 169; also Tiru-vdy-mofi, vm. 5-8. 2 Sir R. G. Bhandarkar notes that the Arvar Kula-sCkhara, in his work Mukunda-mdld, quotes a passage from the Bhdgavata-pitrdna (xi. z. 36) (The xvn] The Philosophy of the Arvars 81 alluding to Radha (Nappinnai), who is described as the consort of Krsna. The Arvars refer to the legends of Krsna s early life in Brindavan and many of them play the role either of YoSoda, the friends of Krsna, or of the Gopls. The spiritual love which finds expression in their songs is sometimes an earnest appeal of direct longing for union with Krsna, or an expression of the pangs of separation, or a feeling of satisfaction, and enjoyment from union with Krsna in a direct manner or sometimes through an emotional identification with the legendary personages associated with Krsna s life. Even in the Bhdgavata-purdna (xi, xn) we hear of devotional intoxication through intense emotion, but we do not hear of any devotees identifying themselves with the legendary personages associated with the life of Krsna and expressing their sentiment of love as proceeding out of such imaginary identification. We hear of the Gopl s love for Krsna, but we do not hear of any person identifying himself with GopI and expressing his sorrow of separa tion. In the Visnu-purdna, Bhdgavata-purdna and the Hartvamsa, the legendary love tales are only episodes in the life of Krsna. But they do not make their devotees who identified themselves with the legendary lovers of Krsna realize their devotion through such an imaginary identification. All that is therein expressed is that the legendary life of Krsna would intensify the devotion of those who were already attached to Him. But the idea that the legend of Krsna should have so much influence on the devotees as to infuse them with the characteristic spirits of the legendary personages in such a manner as to transform their lives after their pattern is probably a new thing in the history of devotional development in any religion. It is also probably absent in the cults of other de votional faiths of India. With the Arvars we notice for the first time the coming into prominence of an idea which achieved its culmina tion in the lives and literature of the devotees of the Gaudiya school of Bengal, and particularly in the life of Caitanya, which will be dealt with in the fourth volume of the present work. The trans- Vaisnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems, p. 70). This has been challenged by S. K. Aiyangar, in his Early History of Vaisnavism in South India, who says that this passage is absent from all the three editions (a Kannada, a Grantha, and a Devanagarl Edition) which were accessible to him (p. 28). It is further sug gested there that the allusion in the passage is doubtful, because it generally occurs at the end of most South Indian books by way of an apology for the faults committed at the time of the recitation of holy verses or the performance of religious observances. 82 The Arvdrs [CH. fusion of the spirits of the legendary personages in the life-history of Krsna naturally involved the transfusion of their special emo tional attitudes towards Krsna into the devotees, who were thus led to imagine themselves as being one with those legendary person alities and to pass through the emotional history of those persons as conceived through imagination. It is for this reason that we find that, when this spirit was emphasized in the Gaudlya school and the analysis of erotic emotions made by the rhetorical school of thinkers from the tenth to the fourteenth century received recogni tion, the Gaudlya Vaisnavas accepted the emotional analysis of the advancing stages of love and regarded them as indicating the stages in the development of the sentiment of devotion. As is well illustrated in Rupa Gosvaml s Ujjvala-mla-mani, the transition from ordinary devotion to deep amorous sentiment, as represented in the legendary lives of Gopls and Radha, was secured by sympa thetic imitation akin to the sympathetic interest displayed in the appreciation of dramatic actions. The thinkers of the rhetorical school declare that a spectator of a dramatic action has his emotions aroused in such a manner that in their excess the individual limita tions of time and space and the history of individual experiences which constitute his ordinary personality vanish for the time being. The disappearance of the ordinary individual personality and the overflow of emotion in one direction identify the person in an imaginary manner not only with the actors who display the emotion of the stage, but also with the actual personalities of those dramatic figures whose emotions are represented or imitated on the stage. A devotee, may, by over-brooding, rouse himself through auto intoxication to such an emotional stage that upon the slightest sug gestion he may transport himself to the imaginary sphere of a GopI or Radha, and may continue to feel all the earnest affections that the most excited and passionate lover may ever feel. It seems fairly certain that the Arvars were the earliest devotees who moved forward in the direction of such emotional transforma tion. Thus King Kula-sekhara, who was an Arvar and devotee of Rama, used to listen rapturously to the Rdmayana being recited to him. As he listened he became so excited that, when he heard of Rama s venturing forth against Ravana, his demon opponent, he used to give orders to mobilize his whole army to march forward towards Lanka as an ally of Rama. xvn] The Philosophy of the Arvars 83 The devotional songs of the Arvars show an intense familiarity with the various parts of the legendary life of Krsna. The emotions that stirred them were primarily of the types of parental affection (as of a mother to her son), of friends and companions, servants to their masters, sons to their father and creator, as also that of a female lover to her beloved. In the case of some Arvars, as that of Namm - arvar and Tiru-mangaiy-arvar, the last-mentioned type assumes an overwhelming importance. In the spiritual experiences of these Arvars we find a passionate yearning after God, the Lord and Lover ; and in the expressions of their love we may trace most of the pathological symptoms of amorous longings which have been so intensely emphasized in the writings of the Vaisnavas of the Gaudlya school. In the case of the latter, the human analogy in volving description of the bodily charms of the female lover is often carried too far. In the case of the Arvars, however, the emphasis is mostly on the transcendant beauty and charm of God, and on the ardent longings of the devotee who plays the part of a female lover, for Krsna, the God. The ardent longing is sometimes expressed in terms of the pitiable pathological symptoms due to love-sickness, sometimes by sending messengers, spending the whole night in expectation of the Lord, and sometimes in the expressions of ravishing joy felt by the seemingly actual embrace of the Lord. We hear also of the reciprocation of love on the part of the Lord, who is described as being infatuated with the beauty and charms of the beloved, the Arvar. In the course of these expressions, the per sonages in the legendary account of Krsna s life are freely intro duced, and references are made to the glorious episodes of His life, as showing points that heighten the love of the lady-lover, the Arvar. The rapturous passions are like a whirlpool that eddies through the very eternity of the individual soul, and expresses itself sometimes in the pangs of separation and sometimes in the exhilara tion of union. The Arvar, in his ecstatic delight, visualizes God everywhere, and in the very profundity of his attainment pines for more. He also experiences states of supreme intoxication, when he becomes semi-conscious, or unconscious with occasional breaks into the consciousness of a yearning. But, though yearning after God is often delineated on the analogy of sex-love, this analogy is seldom carried to excess by studied attempts at following all the pathological symptoms of erotic love. It therefore represents a very 6-2 84 The Arvars [CH. chaste form of the expressions of divine love in terms of human love. The Arvars were probably the pioneers in showing how love for God may be on terms of tender equality, softening down to the rapturous emotion of conjugal love. The Saivism of South India flourished more or less at the same time. The hymns of the Saivas are full of deep and noble sentiments of devotion which can hardly be excelled in any literature; but their main emphasis is on the majesty and the greatness of God and the feeling of submission, self- abnegation and self-surrender to God. The spirit of self-surrender and a feeling of clinging to God as one s all is equally dominant among the Arvars; but among them it melts down into the sweet ness of passionate love. The Saiva hymns are indeed pregnant with the divine fire of devotion, but more in the spirit of submissive service. Thus, Manikka-vachakar, in his Tiru-vdcha kam, speaking of Siva, says 1 : And am I not Thy slave? and did st Thou not make me Thine own, I pray? All those Thy servants have approached Thy Foot ; this body full of sin I may not quit, and see Thy face Thou Lord of Qiva-world ! I fear, And see not how to gain the sight! Ml false am I; false is my heart; and false my love; yet, if he weep, May not Thy sinful servant Thee, Thou Soul s Ambrosial sweetness, gain ? Lord of all honied gladness pure, in grace unto Thy servant teach The way that he may come to Thee ! There was no love in me towards Thy Foot, O Half of Her with beauteous fragrant locks ! By magic power that stones to mellow fruit converts, Thou mad st me lover of Thy Feet. Our Lord, Thy tender love no limit knows. Whatever sways me now, whate er my deed, Thou can st even yet Thy Foot again to me display and save, O Spotless Heavenly One ! The devotee also felt the sweetness of God s love and the fact that it is through Divine Grace that one can be attracted towards Him and can love Him: 1 Pope s translation of the Tim vacha-kani, p. 77. xvn] Arvdrs controversy with Sri-vaisnavas 85 Honey from any flower sip not, though small as tiniest grain of millet seed ! Whene er we think of Him, whene er we see, whene er of Him our lips converse, Then sweetest rapture s honey ever flows, till all our frame in bliss dissolves! To Him alone, the mystic Dancer, go ; and breathe His praise, thou humming-bee! Arvars and Sri-vaisnavas on certain points of controversy in religious dogmas. The Aragiyas Nathamuni, Yamuna, Ramanuja and their ad herents largely followed the inspirational teachings of the Arvars, yet there were some differences of opinion among them regarding some of the cardinal points of religious faith. These have been collected in separate treatises, of which two may be regarded as most important. One of them is called Astddasa-rahasydrtha- vivarana, by Ramanuja himself, and the other is called Astadasa- bheda-nirnaya 1 . Verikatanatha and others also wrote important treatises on the subject. Some of these points of difference may be enumerated below. The first point is regarding the grace of God (svdmi-krpd). It is suggested by the Arvars that the grace of God is spontaneous and does not depend on any effort or merit on the part of the devotee. If God had to depend on anything else for the exercise of His divine prerogative grace, it would be limited to that extent. Others, however, say that God s grace depends on the virtuous actions of the devotees. If that were not so, all people would in time be emancipated, and there would be no need of any effort on their part. If it was supposed that God in His own spontaneity extended His grace to some in preference to others, He would have to be regarded as partial. It is therefore to be admitted that, though God is free in extending His mercy, yet in practice He extends it only as a reward to the virtuous or meritorious actions of the devotee. God, though all-merciful and free to extend His mercy to all without effort on their part, does not actually do so except on the occasion of the meritorious actions of His devotees. The extension of God s mercy is thus both without cause (nirhetuka) and with cause (sahetuka) 2 . 1 Both these are MSS. 2 krpa-sva-riipato nir-hetukah, raksana-samaye cetajia-krta-sukrtena sa-hetuko bhutvd rak$ati. (Astadasa-bheda-nirnaya, MS. p. 2.) 86 The Arvars [CH. Here the latter view is that of Ramanuja and his followers. It must, however, be pointed out in this connection that the so-called dif ferences between the Arvars and the Ramanujists on the cardinal points of religious faith are a discovery of later research, when the writings of the Arvars had developed a huge commentary literature and Ramanuja s own writings had inspired many scholars to make commentaries on his works or to write independent treatises elucidating his doctrines. The later scholars who compared the results of the Arvar and the Ramanuja literatures came to the con clusion that there are some differences of view between the two regarding the cardinal faith of religion. This marks a sharp anti thesis between the Arvaric Teiigalai school and the Vadagalai school, of which latter Verikata was the leader. These differences are briefly narrated in the Astddasa-bheda-nirnaya. The cardinal faith of religion according to Ramanuja has been narrated in the Astddasa-rahasydrtha-vivarana. The main principle of religious approach to God is self-surrender or prapatti. Prapatti is defined as a state of prayerfulness of mind to God, associated with the deep conviction that He alone is the saviour, and that there is no way of attaining His grace except by such self-surrender 1 . The devotee is extremely loyal to Narayana and prays to Him and no one else, and all his prayers are actuated by deep affection and no other motive. The virtue of prapatti involves within it universal charity, sym pathy and friendliness even to the most determined enemy 2 . Such a devotee feels that the Lord (svdmi), being the very nature of his own self, is to be depended on under all circumstances. This is called the state of supreme resignation (nirbharatva) in all one s affairs 3 . The feeling of the devotee that none of the assigned scriptural duties can be helpful to him in attaining the highest goal an-anya-sddhye svdbhiste mahd-visvdsa-purvakam tad-eko pdyatd ydcnd prapattih sarand-gatih. Astddasa-rahasydrtha-vivarana, p. 3. Ramanuja, in his Gadya-trayam, says that such a state of prayerfulness of mind is also associated with confessions of one s sins and shortcomings and derelictions, and with a feeling that the devotee is a helpless servant of God extremely anxious to get himself saved by the grace of the Saviour. See the Gadya-trayam, Sarand-gati-gadyam, pp. 5254. 2 This is technically known as Prapatti-naisthikam (Astddasa.-rahasydrtha- vivarana, pp. 3-7). Cf. the parables of the pigeon and the monkey in the above section. 3 The interpretation is forced out of the conception of the word "svamin," which etymologically involves the word " svam" meaning "one s own." xvn] Arvdrs controversy with Sri-vaisnavas 87 is technically called " updya-sitnyatd," i.e. the realization of the use- lessness of all other means. The devotee always smiles at all the calamities that may befall him. Considering himself to be a servant of God, he cheerfully bears all the miseries that may be inflicted on him by God s own people. This is technically called "pdra- tantrya," or supreme subordination. The devotee conceives his soul as a spiritual essence which has no independence by itself and is in every respect dependent on God and exists for God 1 . The Vaisnavas are often called ekantins, and have sometimes been wrongly con sidered as monotheists ; but the quality of ekdntitva is the definite characteristic of self-surrender and clinging to God in an unshaken manner the fullest trustfulness in Him under all adverse circum stances. The devotee s mind is always exhilarated with the divine presence of the Lord who animates all his senses his inclinations, emotions and experiences. The fullness with which he realizes God in all his own activities and thoughts, and in everything else in the universe, naturally transports him to a sphere of being in which all mundane passions antipathy, greed, jealousy, hatred become impossible. With the divine presence of God he becomes infused with the spirit of friendship and charity towards all beings on earth 2 . The devotee has to take proper initiation from the preceptor, to whom he must confess all that is in his mind, and by abnegating all that is in him to his preceptor, he finds an easy way to conceive himself as the servant of Visnu 3 . He must also have a philosophical conception of the entirely dependent relation of the human soul and all the universe to God 4 . Such a conception naturally involves realization of the presence of God in all our sense activities, which 1 jndna-mayo hi dtmd seso hi paramd-tmanah iti jndnd-nandamayo jndnd- nanda-gunakah son sva-rupam bhagavad-adhinam sa tad-artham eva tisthatl ti jndtvd vatisthate iti y ad etat tad-a-prdkrtatvam. Astddasa-rahasydrtha-vivaranam, p. n. 2 This virtue is technically called nitya-rangitva. 3 The five samskdras that a paramaikdntin must pass through are as follows : tapdh paundras tathd ndma mantro ydgas ca pancamah ami te panca samskdrdh paramaikdnti-hetavah. Ibid. p. 15. 4 This is technically called sambandha-jndnitvam. The conception that every thing exists for God is technically called sesa-bhutatvam. Ibid. p. 18. This naturally implies that the devotee must work and feel himself a servant of God and of His chosen men. The service to humanity and to God then naturally follow from the philosophical conception of the dependence of the human souls, and of the universe, on God as a part of Him and to be controlled by Him in every way. This is again technically called sesa-vrtti-paratva. Ibid. pp. 19-20, 88 The Arvars [CH. presence in its fullness must easily lead to the complete control of all our senses. Through the realization of God s presence in them, the devotees play the part of moral heroes, far above the influences of the temptation of the senses 1 . The normal religious duties, as prescribed in the Vedas and the smrtis, are only for the lower order of the people; those who are given entirely to God with the right spirit of devotion need not follow the ordinary code of duties which is generally binding for all. Such a person is released by the spon taneous grace of God, and without performing any of the scriptural duties enjoys the fruits of all 2 . He is always conscious of his own faults, but takes no notice of the faults of others, to which he behaves almost as a blind man; he is always infused with the consciousness that all his actions are under the complete sway of the Lord. He has no enjoyment for himself, for he always feels that it is the Lord who would enjoy Himself through all his senses 3 . In the Astddasa-bheda-nirnaya it is said that according to the Arvars, since emancipation means the discovery of a lost soul to God or the unlimited servitude of God, emancipation is for the interest of God and not of the devotee. The service of the servant is for the servitude of God alone. It has therefore no personal interest for the devotee 4 . According to the Aragiyas, however, emancipation, though primarily for the interest of the Lord, is also 1 This is technically called the nitya-suratva. jndna-nistho virakto vd mad-bhakto hy a-napeksakah sa lingdn dsramdn tyaktvd cared a-vidhi-gocarah ity evam isana-traya-vinirmuktas san bhagavan-nir-hetuka-katdksa eva mokso-pdyah iti tisthati khalu so dhikdrl sakala-dharmdndm avasyo bhavati. Astadasa-rahasydrtha-vivarana, p. 23 This spirit of following God, leaving all other scriptural duties, is technically called a-vidhi-gocaratva. In another section of this work Rarnanuja describes moksa or salvation as the conviction that the nature of God transcends, in bliss, power and knowledge, all other conceivable things of this or any other universe. A desire to cling to God as a true means of salvation is technically called mumuk- futva. The doctrine of a-vidhi-gocaratva herein described seems to be in conflict with Ramanuja s view on the subject explained in the bhdsya as interpreted by his many followers. This may indicate that his views underwent some change, and these are probably his earlier views when he was under the influence of the Arvars. s This is technically called pard-kdsatva (Ibid. pp. 23-24). The attitude of worshipping the image as the visible manifestation of God is technically called updya-svariipa-jMna. The cessation of attachment to all mundane things and the flowing superabundance of love towards God, and the feeling that God is the supreme abode of life, is technically called dtmd-rdmatva. 4 phalam moksa-riipam, tad bhagavata eva na svdrtham yathd pranasta-drsta- dravya-ldbho dravyavata eva na dravyasya; tathd moksa-phalam ca svdmina eva xvn] Arvdrs controversy with Sri-vaisnavas 89 at the same time for the interest of the devotee, because of the in tense delight he enjoys by being a servant of God. The illustration of lost objects discovered by the master does not hold good, because human beings are conscious entities who suffer immeasurable sor row which is removed by realizing themselves as servants of God. Though the devotee abnegates all the fruits of his actions in a self- surrender, yet he enjoys his position in the servitude of God and also the bliss of the realization of Brahman. Thus, those who take the path of knowledge (updsaka) attain Brahma knowledge and the servitude of God, and those who take the path of self-surrender (prapatti} also attain Brahma knowledge and the servitude of God. In the state of salvation (mukti) there is no difference of realization corresponding to the variation of paths which the seekers after God may take 1 . Again, in the Arvar school of thought, besides the four ways of scriptural duties, philosophic wisdom, devotion to God and devotion to teachers, there was a fifth way, viz. that of intense self- surrender to God, i.e. prapatti. But the Aragiyas thought that apart from prapatti there was only one other way of approaching God, namely devotion, bhakti-yoga. Ramanuja and his followers main tain that karma-yoga and jndna-yoga only help to purify the mind, as a preparation for bhakti-yoga. The devotion to the preceptor is regarded only as a form of prapatti; so there are only two ways of approach to God, viz. bhakti-yoga and prapatti 2 . Further, Sri occupies an important position in SrI-vaisnavism. But as there are only three categories in the Sri-vaisnava system, a question may naturally arise regarding the position of Sri in the threefold categories of cit, acit and paramesvara. On this point the view of the older school, as described in Ramya-jamatr muni s Tattva-dipa, is that Sri is to be identified with human souls and is therefore to be regarded as atomic in nature 3 . Others, however, think that Sri is as all-pervasive as Visnu. Filial affection (vdtsalyd) na muktasya; yad vd phalam kainkaryam tat para-rtham era no. svd-rtham; para-tantra-dasd-krtam kainkaryam sva-tantra-svamy-artham eva. Astddasa- bheda-nirnaya, p. 2. 1 Ibid. p. 3. 2 atah prapatti-vyatirikto bhakti-yoga eka eve ti. Ibid. p. 4. 8 Ibid. In the next section it is urged that, according to some, Ndrayana and not Sn is the only agent who removes our sins, but others hold that sins may be removed also by Sri in a remote manner, or, because $rl is identical with Ndrayana ; as the fragrance is with the flower, she has also a hand in removing the sins. Ibid. p. 5. laksmyd updyatvam bhagavata iva sdksdt abhyupagantavyam. Ibid. 9 The Arvdrs [CH. for God is interpreted by the older schools as involving an attitude in which the faults of the beloved devotee are points of endearment to Him 1 . In the later view, however, filial affection is supposed to involve an indifference or a positive blindness towards the faults of the devotee. God s mercy is interpreted by the older school as meaning God s affliction or suffering in noticing that of others. Later schools, however, interpret it as an active sympathy on His part, as manifested in His desire to remove the sufferings of others on account of His inability to bear such miseries 2 . Prapatti, otherwise called nydsa, is defined by the older school as a mere passivity on the part of the Lord in accepting those who seek Him or as a mental state on the part of the seeker in which he is conscious of himself only as a spirit; but such a consciousness is unassociated with any other complex feeling, of egoism and the like, which invests one with so-called individuality. It may also mean the mental state in which the seeker conceives himself as a subsidiary accessory to God as his ultimate end, to Whom he must cling unburdened by any idea of scriptural duties 3 ; or he may concen trate himself absolutely on the supreme interest and delight that he feels in the idea that God is the sole end of his being. Such a person naturally cannot be entitled without self-contradiction to any scriptural duty. Just as a guilty wife may return to her husband, and may passively lie in a state of surrender to him and resign her self, so the seeker may be conscious of his own true position with reference to God leading to a passive state of surrender 4 . Others think that it involves five elements: (i) that God is the only saviour; 1 yaihd kdmukah kdmmyd malinyam bho<*yatayd svlkaroti tathd bhagavdn dsrita-dosam svlkaroti itare tu vdtsalyam ndma dosddarsitvam. Astddasa-bheda- nirnaya, p. 6. It is further suggested that, if a devotee takes the path of prapatti, he has not to suffer for his faults as much as others would have to suffer. 2 The first alternative is defined as para-duhkha-duhkhitvam dayd. The second alternative is svdrtha-nirapeksa-para-duhkha-sahisniitd dayd; sa ca tan nirdkaranecchd. In the first alternative dayd is a painful emotion; in. the second it is a state of desire, stirred up by a feeling of repugnance, which is midway be tween feeling and volition. Ibid. p. 6. 3 prapattir ndma a-nivdrana-mdtram a-cid-vydvrtti-matram vd a-vidheyam sesatva-jfidna-mdtram vd para-sesatai-ka-rati-rupa-parisuddha-ydthdtmya-jndna- mdtrani vd. Ibid. p. 6. According to some, any of these conditions would define prapatti " ato prati- sedhddy-anyatamai va iti kecit kathayanti." Ibid. 4 atyanta-para-tantrasya virodhatvena anusthdnd-nupapattch, pratyuta anustatur dnarthakyamuktam Srivacana-bhusana, dram anya-parayd bhdryayd kaddcid bhartr-sakdsam dgatayd mam anglkuru iti vdkyavat cetana-krta-prapattir iti. Ibid. p. 6. xvn] Arvdrs controversy with Sn-vaisnavas 91 (ii) that He is the only end to be attained ; (iii) that He alone is the supreme object of our desires; (iv) that we absolutely surrender and resign ourselves to Him 1 ; and (v) supreme prayerfulness all associated with absolute trustfulness in Him. There are some who define the prapanna, or seeker of God, as one who has read the Arvar literature of prabandhas (adhlta- prabandhahprapannah). Others, however, think that the mere study of the prabandhas cannot invest a man with the qualities of prapatti. They think that he alone is entitled to the path of prapatti who can not afford to adopt the dilatory courses of karma-yoga, jndna-yoga and bhakti-yoga, and therefore does not think much of these courses. Again, the older school thinks that the person who adopts the path of prapatti should give up all scriptural duties and duties assigned to the different stages of life (dsrama); for it is well evi denced in the Gitd text that one should give up all one s religious duties and surrender oneself to God. Others, again, think that the scriptural duties are to be performed even by those who have taken the path of prapatti. Further, the older school thinks that the path of knowledge is naturally against the path of prapatti ; for prapatti implies the negation of all knowledge, excepting one s self-sur rendering association with God. The paths of duties and of know ledge assume an egoism which contradicts prapatti. Others, how ever, think that even active self-surrender to God implies an ele ment of egoism, and it is therefore wrong to suppose that the paths of duties and of knowledge are reconcilable with prapatti on ac count of its association with an element of egoism. The so-called egoism is but a reference to our own nature as self, and not to aharikdra, an evolute 2 . Again, some think that even a man who has 1 In the second alternative it is denned as follows : an-anya-sddhye svd-bhlste mahd-visvdsa-purvakam tad-eko -pdyatd ydcnd prapattis sarand-gatih. These are the five angas of prapatti, otherwise called niksepa, tydga, nydsa or sarand-gati (Astddasa-bheda-nirnaya, pp. 6, 7). The difference between the first and second alternative is that, according to the former, prapatti is a state of mind limited to the consciousness of its true nature in relation to God ; on the part of God also it indicates merely a passive toleration of the seekers nocking unto Him (a-nivdrana-mdtram) . In the second alternative, however, prapatti is defined as positive self-surrendering activity on the part of the seekers and unconditional protection to them all on the part of God. It is, therefore, that on the first alternative the consciousness of one s own true nature is defined in three ways, any one of which would be regarded on that alternative as a sufficient definition of prapatti. The first one is merely in the cognitive state, while the second involves an additional element of voluntary effort. 2 Ibid. pp. 8, 9. 92 The Arvdrs [en. adopted the path of prapatti may perform the current scriptural duties only with a view to not lending any support to a reference to their cases as pretexts for neglect of normal duties by the un enlightened and the ignorant, i.e. those that have adopted the path of prapatti should also perform their duties for the purpose of loka-samgraha. Others, however, think that the scriptural duties, being the commandments of God, should be performed for the satisfaction of God (bhagavat-prity-artham), even by those who have taken the path of prapatti. Otherwise they would have to suffer punishment for that. The accessories of prapatti are counted as follows: (i) A positive mental attitude to keep oneself always in consonance with the Lord s will (dnukulyasya samkalpah] ; (ii) a negative mental attitude (prdtikulyasya varjanam), as opposing anything that may be con ceived as against His will; (iii) a supreme trustfulness that the Lord will protect the devotee (raksisyatlti visvdsah); (iv) prayer to Him as a protector (goptrtva-varanam}; (v) complete self-surrender (dtma-niksepah) ; (vi) a sense of complete poverty and helplessness (karpanyam). The older school thinks that the man who adopts the path of prapatti has no desires to fulfil, and thus he may adopt any of these accessories which may be possible for him according to the conditions and inclinations of his mind. Others, however, think that even those who follow the path of prapatti are not absolutely free from any desire, since they wish to feel themselves the eternal servants of God. Though they do not crave for the fulfilment of any other kind of need, it is obligatory upon them to perform all the six accessories of prapatti described above. The older school thinks that God is the only cause of emancipa tion and that the adoption of the path of prapatti is not so; the later school, however, thinks that prapatti is also recognized as the cause of salvation in a secondary manner, since it is only through prapatti that God extends His grace to His devotees 1 . Again, the older schools think that there is no necessity for expiation (prdyascitta) for those who adopt the path of prapatti; for with them God s grace is sufficient to remove all sins. The later schools, however, think that, if the follower of the path of prapatti is physically fit to per form the courses of expiation, then it is obligatory on him. Accord ing to the older school a man possessing the eight kinds of devo- 1 Astddasa-bheda-nirnaya, p. 10. xvn] Arvdrs controversy with Sri-vaisnavas 93 tion (bhakti), even if he be a mleccha, is preferred to a Brahman and may be revered as such. According to the later schools, however, a devotee of a lower caste may be shown proper respect, but he cannot be revered as a Brahman. Again, on the subject of the possibility of pervasion of the atomic individual souls by God, the older schools are of opinion that God by His infinite power may enter into the atomic individuals ; the later schools, however, think that such a pervasion must be of an external nature, i.e. from out side. It is not possible for God to penetrate into individual souls 1 . As regards Kaivalya the older schools say that it means only self- apperception. He who attains this state attains the highest stage of eternity or immortality. The later school, however, thinks that he who has merely this self-apperception cannot attain immortality through that means only ; for this self-apperception may not neces sarily mean a true revelation of his nature with reference to God. He can realize that only as he passes through higher spheres and ultimately reaches Vaikuntha the abode of God, where he is accepted as the servant of the Lord. It is such a state that can be regarded as eternal 2 . 1 Aftddasa-bheda-nirnaya, p. 12. The view is supported by a reference to Varadacarya s Adhikarana-cintdmani. 2 The eighteen points of dispute as herein explained have been collected in the Astddasa-bheda-nirnaya, according to the ancients in a verse quoted from them as follows : bhedah svdmi-krpd-phald-nya-gatisu srl-vydpty-updyatvayos tad-vdtsalya-dayd-nirukti-vacasornydse ca tat kartari dharma-tydga-virodhayos sva-vihite nydsd-nga-hetutvayoh prdyascitta-vidhau tadlya-bhajane nuvydpti-kaivalyayoh. Ibid. p. i. CHAPTER XVIII AN HISTORICAL AND LITERARY SURVEY OF THE VlSlSTA-DVAITA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT The Aragiyas from Nathamuni to Ramanuja. A. GOVINDACHARYAR has written a book, The Holy Lives of the Azhvdrs, based upon a number of old works 1 . The writings of the Arvars may be sub-divided generally into three rahasyas (or mystical accounts) called Tiru-mantra-churukku, Dvaya-churukku, Carama-sloka-churukku. These three rahasyas have also been dealt with in later times by very prominent persons, such as Veiikatanatha, Raghavacarya and others. Some account of these, in the manner of these later writers, will be briefly given in the proper place, since the scope of this work does not permit us to go into the details of the lives of the Arvars. The hagiologists make a distinction between the Arvars and the Aragiyas in this, that, while the former were only inspired men, the latter had their in spirations modified by learning and scholarship. The list of Aragiyas begins with Nathamuni. There is some difficulty in fixing his age. The Guru-par ampar a, the Divya-suri-carita and the Pra panndmrta, are of opinion that he was in direct contact with Namm -arvar, otherwise called Sathakopa, or Karimaran, or rather with his disciple Madhura-kaviy-arvar. Thus, the Prapanndmrta says that Nathamuni was born in the village called Viranarayana, near the Cola country. His father s name was Isvara Bhatta, and his son was Isvaramuni 2 . He went on a long pilgrimage, in the course of which he visited the northern countries, including Mathura, Vrndavana and Haridvara, and also Bengal and Purl. After returning to his own place he found that some of the 1 (i) Diiyawsuri-carita (aa earlier \%ork than the Prapanndmrta, which often alludes to it) by Garuda-vahana Pandita, contemporary and disciple of Rama nuja; (2) Prapanndmrta, by Ananta-suri, disciple of i^aila-rangesa guru; (3) Prabandha-sara, by Veiikatanatha; (4) Upadesa-ratna-mdlai by Ramyajamatr- maha-muni, otherwise called Varavara-muni or Periya-jiyar or Manavala Ala- muni; (5) Guru-parampara-prabhavam by Pinb -aragiya Peru-mal Jiyar; anil (6) Pazhanadai-vilakkan. 2 It is said that he belonged to the lineage of athakopa or Satha-marsana. His other name was ri-raiiga-natha. (See introduction to Catuh-sloki, Ananda Press, Madras, p. 3.) CH. xvin] The Aragiyas from Ndthamuni to Rdmdnuja 95 Srivaisnavas, who came from the Western countries to the temple of Rajagopala, recited there ten verses by Karimara. Nathamuni, who heard those hymns, realized that they were parts of a much bigger work and decided to collect them. He went to Kumbhakona, and under the inspiration of God proceeded to the city of Kuraka, on the banks of Tamraparni, and there met Madhura-kaviy-arvar, the disciple of Namm -arvar, and asked him if the hymns of Namm - arvar were available. Madhura-kaviy-arvar told him that after composing a big book of hymns in Tamil and instructing Madhura- kaviy-arvar the same, Namm -arvar had attained salvation. The work could not, therefore, obtain currency among the people. The people of the locality had the misconception that the study of the work would be detrimental to the Vedic religion. So they threw it into the river Tamraparni. Only one page of the book, containing ten verses, was picked up by a man who appreciated the verses and recited them. Thus only these ten verses have been saved. Natha muni recited twelve thousand times a verse composed by Madhura- kaviy-arvar in adoration of Namm -arvar, and, as a result of that, Namm -arvar revealed the purport of the whole work to him. But when Nathamuni wanted to know all the verses in detail he was advised to approach an artisan of the place who was inspired by Namm -arvar to reveal all the verses to him. So Nathamuni re ceived the entire work of Namm -arvar from the artisan. He then gave it to his pupil Pundarlkaksa, and Pundarlkaksa gave it to his disciple Rama Misra, and Rama Misra gave it to Yamuna, and Yamuna gave it to Gosthlpurna, and Gosthipurna gave it to his daughter Devaki Sri. Nathamuni brought the hymns together, and, through his two nephews, Melaiyagattarvar and Kilaiyagattarvar, set them to music in the Vedic manner; from that time forward these hymns were sung in the temples and were regarded as the Tamil Veda 1 . The oldest Guru-par ampar a and Divya-suri-carita, however, say that Nathamuni obtained the works of Namm -arvar directly from him. The later Srivaisnavas found that the above statements did not very well suit the traditional antiquity of the Arvars, and held that Madhura-kaviy-arvar was not the direct disciple of Namm -arvar and that Nathamuni attained the high age of three hundred years. But, if, as we found before, Namm - arvar s date be fixed in the ninth century, no such supposition 1 Prapanndmrta, Chs. 106 and 107. 96 The Visistd-dvaita School [CH. becomes necessary. Gopmatha Rau refers also to a Sanskrit in scription in the middle of the tenth century, in which it is stated that the author of the verses was a disciple of Srinatha. If this Srinatha is the same as Nathamuni, then the computation of Nathamuni s date as falling in the tenth century is quite correct. He had eleven disciples, of whom Pundarikaksa, Karukanatha and Srlkrsna Laksmlnatha were the most prominent. He wrote three works, Nydya-tattva, Purusa-ninnaya and Yoga-rahasya 1 . Natha muni is also described as a great yogin who practised the yoga of eight accessories (astdnga-yoga) 2 . The Prapanndmrta says that he died by entering into yoga in the city of Agariga (probably Gangaikondasodapuram). Gopl-natha, however, thinks that he could not have died in that city, for it was not founded by Rajen- dracola, otherwise called Gaiigaikondasola, before 1024, which must be later than the date of Nathamuni. Nathamuni lived probably in the reign of Parantaka Cola I, and died before or in the reign of Parantaka Cola II, i.e. he lived eighty or ninety years in the middle of the tenth century. He had made an extensive tour in Northern India as far as Mathura and Badari-natha and also to Dvaraka and Purl. Srikrsna Laksmlnatha, disciple of Nathamuni, wrote an extensive work on the doctrine of prapatti. He was born at a place called Krsnamarigala. He was well-versed in the Vedas, and was a specialist in Vedanta and also a great devotee, who con stantly employed himself in chanting the name of Visnu (ndma- sankirtana-ratah). He used often to go about naked and live on food that was thrown to him. The hagiologists say that he entered into the image of the temple and became one with God. Punda- 1 The Nydya-tattva is referred to by Verikatanatha in his Nydya-parisuddhi (p. 13) as a work in which Gautama s Nydya-sutras were criticized and refuted: bhagavan-ndtha-munibhir nydya-tattva-samdhvayd avadhiryd ksapddddln nyabandhi nydya-paddkatih Nydya-parisuddhi, p. 13. 2 The practice of astdnga-yoga was not a new thing with Nathamuni. In giving an account of Tiru-marisai Piran, also called Bhaktisara, the Prapannd mrta says that he first became attached to the god Siva and wrote many Tamil works on Saiva doctrines; but later on the saint Maharya initiated him into Vaisnavism and taught him astdnga-yoga, through which he realized the great truths of Vaisnavism. He then wrote many works in Tamil on Vaisnavism. Bhakti-sara also wrote a scholarly work, refuting the views of other opponents, which is known as Tattvdrtha-sdra. Bhakti-sara also used to practise astdnga- yoga and was learned in all the branches of Indian philosophy. Bhakti-sara had a disciple named Kanikrsna, who wrote many extremely poetical verses or hymns in adoration of Visnu. Kula-sgkhara Peru-mal is also said to have practised yoga. xvm] The Aragiyas from Nathamuni to Rdmdnuja 97 rlkaksa Uyyakondar is supposed to have very much influenced the character of Kurukanatha, who in the end entered into yoga and died. Rama Misra was born in the city of Saugandhakulya, in a Brahmin family, and was a pupil of Pundarlkaksa. The name of Pundarikaksa s wife was Andal. Pundarlkaksa asked Rama Misra (Manakkal-lambej) to teach Yamuna all that he was taught. Yamuna, however, was not born during the life of Puridarlkaksa, and Pundarlkaksa only prophesied his birth in accordance with the old prophecy of Nathamuni. Rama Misra had four disciples, excluding Yamuna, of whom Laksmi was the most prominent 1 . He used to stay in Srlrarigam and expound the doctrines of the Vedanta. Yamunacarya, otherwise called Alavandar, son of Isvaramuni and grandson of Nathamuni, was born probably in A.D. 918 and is said to have died in A.D. 1038. He learned the Vedas from Rama Misra, and was reputed to be a great debater 14 . Becoming a king, he was duly married and had two sons named Vararahga and Sottha- purna. He lived happily for a long time, enjoying his riches, and took no notice of Rama Misra. But Rama Misra with some difficulty obtained access to him and availed himself of the opportunity to teach him the Bhagavad-gtta, which aroused the spirit of detach ment in him, and he followed Rama Misra to Srirarigam and, re nouncing everything, became a great devotee 3 . One of the last 1 (i) Taivattuk-k-arasu-Nambi ; (2) Gomathattut-tiruvinnagar-appan ; (3) Sirup-pullur-udaya-Pillai ; (4) Vangi-puratt-acchi. (See The Life of Rdmdnuja, by Govindacharyar, p. 14.) 2 The Prapannamrta relates a story of Yamuna s debating power at the age of twelve. The king of the place had a priest of the name of Akkaialvan, who was a great debater. Yamuna challenged him and defeated him in an open debate held in the court of the king. He was given half the kingdom as a reward. He seems to have been very arrogant in his earlier days, if the wording of his challenge found in the Prapannamrta can be believed. The words of challenge run as follows : a saildd adri-kanyd-carana-kisalaya-nydsa-dhanyopakanthdd d rakso-riita-sitd-mukha-kamala-samulldsa-hetos ca setoh d ca prdcya-pratlcya-ksiti-dhara-yuga tadarkacandrdvatamsdn mimdmsd-sdstra-yugma-srama-rimala-mand mrgyatdm mddrso nyah Ch . HI. 3 A story is told in the Prapannamrta that, when Yamuna became a king and inaccessible to him, Rama Misra was concerned how he could carry out the com mands of his teachers and initiate Yamuna to the path of devotion. He got in touch with Yamuna s cook, and for six months presented some green vegetables (aiarka-saha) which Yamuna very much liked. When, after the six months, the king asked how the rare vegetables found their way into the kitchen, Rama Misra stayed away for four days praying to Raiiganatha, the deity, to tell him how he could approach Yamuna. In the meanwhile the king missed the green vegetables and asked his cook to present Rama Misra when next he should come to the kitchen. Rama Misra was thus presented to Yamuna. 98 The Visistd-dvaita School [CH. instructions of Rama Misra was to direct him to go to Kurukanatha (Kurugai-kkaval-appan) and learn from him the astdnga-yoga, which had been left with him (Kurukd) by Nathamuni for Yamuna. Yamuna had many disciples, of whom twenty-one are regarded as prominent. Of these disciples, Mahapurna belonged to the Bharadvaja^o^ra, and had a son named Pundarlkaksa and a daughter named Attutayi. Another disciple, called Srisailapurna, was known also by the name Tatacarya 1 . Another of his disciples, Gosthipurna, was born in the Pandya country, where also, in the city of Srima- dhura, was born another of Yamuna s disciples, Maladhara. In the city of Maraner in the Pandya country was born another disciple, Maraner Nambi, a stidra by caste; a further disciple, Kanclpurna, who was also of the sudra caste, was born in the city of Punamalll. Yamuna used to invest all his disciples with the five Vaisnava samskdras, and he also converted the Cola king and queen to the same faith and made over the kingdom he had hitherto enjoyed to the service of the deity Raiiganatha of Srlraiigam. Srisailapurna, or Bhuri brisailapurna, or Mahapurna had two sons, two sisters and two daughters. The elder sister, KantimatI, was married to Kesava Yajvan, also called Asuri Kesava, Ramanuja s father, and the second sister, DyutimatI, was married to Kanalaksa Bhatta, and a son was born to them called Govinda. Kuresa, who was long in association with Ramanuja, was born of Ananta Bhatta and MahadevI, and this Kuresa was the father of Anantacarya, writer of the Prapanndmrta 2 . Das*arathi was born of Ananta Dlksita, of Vadhula^ctfra, and Laksml. Dasarathi had a son called Kandadanatha, who was also called Ramanujadasa. They are all associates of Ramanuja, who had seventy-four prominent disciples. Yamuna was very fond of Namm -arvar s works, the doctrines of which were often explained to the people. Yamuna wrote six works: (i) Stotra-ratnam, in adoration to the deity Varada; (ii) Catuh-slokt; (iii) Agama-prdmdnya; (iv) Siddhi-traya\ (v) Gitdrtha- samgraha; (vi) Maha-purusa-nirnaya*. Of these the Siddhi-traya is the most important, and the section on Yamuna in this volume has been based almost entirely on it. The Agama-prdmdnya is a work in which he tries to establish the high antiquity and undisputed 1 Prapanndmrta, Ch. 113, p. 440. Ibid. Ch. 150, p. 450. Anantacarya, called also Ananta Suri, was the pupil of Sailarangesa-guru. He reveres also Ramyajamatr-maha-muni. See Verikatanatha s introduction to the Gltartha-samgraha-raksa. xvm] The Aragiyas from Ndthamuni to Rdmdnuja 99 authority of the Pancaratra literature, which is supposed to be the canon of the Srlvaisnavas. The Stotra-ratnam, Catuh-slokl and Gitdrtha-samgraha were all commented upon by various persons, but the most important of the commentaries is that of Venkatanatha 1 . The Stotra-ratnam consists of sixty-five verses in which Yamuna de scribes the beauty of the Lord Krsna, as set forth in the Puranas, and confesses to Him the deep affliction of all his sins and guilt, frailties and vices, and asks for forgiveness of them. He also describes the greatness of the Lord as transcendent and surpassing the greatness of all other deities, as the supreme controller and upholder of the universe. He narrates his own complete surrender to Him and en tire dependence on His mercy. If the mercy and grace of the Lord be so great, there is none so deserving of mercy in his wretchedness as a sinner. If the sinner is not saved, the mercy of the Lord be comes meaningless. The Lord requires the sinner in order to realize Himself as the all-merciful. Yamuna further describes how his mind, forsaking everything else, is deeply attracted to the Lord; and the sense of his supreme helplessness and absolute abnegation 2 . The devotee cannot bear any delay in his communion with God, and is extremely impatient to meet Him; it is galling to him that God should heap happiness after happiness on him and thus keep him away. The fundamental burden of the hymns is an expression of the doctrine of prapatti\ this has been very clearly brought out in the commentary of Venkatanatha. It is said that it was after reading these hymns that Ramanuja became so deeply attracted to Yamuna. The Catuh-slokl consists of only four verses in praise of Sri or Laksmi 3 . In the Gitdrtha-samgraha Yamuna says that the means to the 1 The commentary on the Catuh-slokl by Verikatanatha is called Rahasya- raksd, and the commentary on the Stotra-ratnam goes also by the same name. The commentary on the Gitdrtha-samgraha, by Venkatanatha, is called Gitdrtha- samgraha-raksd. 2 Two specimen verses may be quoted from the Stotra-ratnam : na dharma-nistho smi na cd tma-vedi na bhaktimdms tvac-carana-ravinde a-kincano nd nva-gatis saranya tvat-pdda-mulam saranam prapadye. ,$/. 22. na ninditam karma tad asti loke sahasraso yan na mayd vyadhdyi so ham vipdkd-vasare mukunda kranddmi sampraty a-gatis tavdgre. iSl. 23. 3 Verikatanatha, in his commentary on the Catuh-slokl, discusses the position of LaksmI according to the Vaisnava tradition. LaksmI is regarded as a being 7-2 ioo The Visistd-dvaita School [CH. attainment of the ultimate goal of life is devotion, which is pro duced as a result of the performance of scriptural duties and the emergence of self-knowledge 1 . According to Yamuna, yoga in the Gitd means bhakti-yoga. So the ultimate object of the Gltd is the propounding of the supreme importance of bhakti (devotion) as the ultimate object, which requires as a precedent condition the per formance of the scriptural duties and the dawning of the true spiritual nature of the self as entirely dependent on God. It is related in the Prapanndmrta that Yamuna was anxious to meet Ramanuja, but died immediately before Ramanuja came to meet him. So Ramanuja could only render the last homage to his dead body. Ramanuja 2 . It has already been said that Mahapurna (Nambi), disciple of Yamuna, had two sisters, Kantimati and DyutimatI, of whom the former was married to Kesava Yajvan or Asuri Kesava of Bhutapurl and the latter to Kamalaksa Bhatta. Ramanuja (I lay a Perumal), son of Kesava Yajvan, was born in A.D. 1017. He re ceived his training, together with his mother s sister s son Govinda Bhatta, from Yadavaprakasa, a teacher of Vedanta of great reputa tion. The details of Yadavaprakasa s views are not known, but it is very probable that he was a monist 3 . Before going to study with different from Narayana, but always associated with Him. He thus tries to refute all the views that suppose Laksmi to be a part of Narayana. Laksmi should also not be identified with mdyd. She is also conceived as existing in intimate associa tion with Narayana and, like a mother, exerting helpful influence to bring the devotees into the sphere of the grace of the Lord. Thus Laksmi is conceived to have a separate personality of her own, though that personality is merged, as it were, in the personality of Narayana and all His efforts, and all her efforts are in consonance with the efforts of Narayana (paraspard-nnkulatayd sarvatra sdma- rasyani). On the controversial point whether Laksmi is to be considered A jn-a and therefore atomic in nature, the problem how she can then be all-pervasive, and the view that she is a part of Narayana, Verikatanatha says that Laksmi is neither Jiva nor Narayana, but a separate person having her being entirely de pendent on God. Her relation to Narayana can be understood on the analogy of the relation of the rays to the sun or the fragrance to the flower. sva-dharma-jndna-vairdgya-sddhya-bhakty-eka-gocarah ndrdyanah param brahma gltd-sdstre samuJitah Gftdrtha-samgrahu, verse i. 2 Most of the details of Ramanuja s life are collected from the account given in the Prapanndmrta by Anantacarya, a junior contemporary of Ramanuja. Yadava held that Brahman, though by its nature possessing infinite quali ties, yet transforms itself into all types of living beings and also into all kinds of inanimate things. Its true nature is understood when it is realized that it is one XVHI] Rdmdnuja 101 Yadavaprakasa, Ramanuja was married at the age of sixteen, by his father, who died shortly afterwards. His teacher Yadavaprakasa lived in Kancl. So Ramanuja left Bhutapurl his native place with his family and went to Kancl. In the early days of his association with Yadavaprakasa, it is said that Yadavaprakasa became annoyed with him, because he had cured the daughter of a certain chief of the place from possession by a spirit, which his teacher Yadavaprakasa had failed to do. Shortly after this there was a difference of opinion between Yadava and Ramanuja on the interpretation of certain Upanisad texts, which Yadava interpreted in the monistic manner, but Ramanuja on the principle of modified dualism. Yadava be came very much annoyed with Ramanuja and arranged a plot, according to which Ramanuja was to be thrown into the Ganges while on a pilgrimage to Allahabad. Govinda divulged the plot to Ramanuja, who was thus able to wander away from the com pany and retire to Kancl, after suffering much trouble on the way. While at Kancl he became associated with a devout person of the siidra caste, called KancTpurna. Later Ramanuja was reconciled to his teacher and studied with him. When Yamuna once came to Kancl he saw Ramanuja at a distance among the students of Yadava marching in procession, but had no further contact with him, and from that time forward was greatly anxious to have Ramanuja as one of his pupils. Ramanuja again fell out with his teacher on the meaning of the text kapydsam pundarlkam (Chdn- dogya, p. 167). As a result of this quarrel, Ramanuja was driven out by Yadava. Thenceforth he became attached to the worship of Narayana on Hastisaila in Kancl, w r here he first heard the chanting of the Stotra-ratnam of Yamuna by Mahapurna, his maternal uncle and pupil of Yamuna. From Mahapurna Ramanuja learnt much of Yamuna and started for Srlrarigam with him. But before he could reach Srlrangam Yamuna died. It is said that after his death three fingers of Yamuna were found to be twisted and Ramanuja thought that this signified three unfulfilled desires: (i) to convert the people to the prapatti doctrine of Vaisnavism, making them well versed in in spite of its transformation into diverse forms of animate and inanimate entities anye punar aikyavabodha-ydthatmyam varnayantah svabhavika-niratisaya- parimitodara-guna-sagaram brahmaiva sura-nara-tiryak-sthavara-nuraki-svargy- apavargi-caitanyaika-svabhdvam sva-bhdvato vilaksanam avilaksanam ca viyad- ddi-ndnd-vidhd-mala-rupa-parinama-spadam ceti pratyavatisthante. Ramanuja, Vedartha-samgraha, p. 15, printed at the Medical Hall Press, 1894. 102 The Visistd-dvaita School [CH. the works of the Arvars ; (2) to write a commentary to the Brahma- sutra according to the Srlvaisnava school; (3) to write many works on Srivaisnavism. Ramanuja, therefore, agreed to execute all these three wishes 1 . He returned to KancI and became attached to Kancipurna, the disciple of Yamuna, as his teacher. Later he set out for Srlraiigam and on the way was met by Mahapurna, who was going to Kanci to bring him to Srlraiigam. He was then initiated by Mahapurna (the dcdrya), according to the fivefold Vaisnava rites (panca-samskdrd). Ramanuja, being annoyed with his wife s discourteous treatment with Mahapurna s wife, and also with people who came to beg alms, sent her by a ruse to her father s house, and renounced domestic life when he was about 30 or 32 years of age. After establishing himself as a sannyasin, his teaching in the Sastras began with Dasarathi, son of his sister 2 , and Kuranatha, son of Anantabhatta. Yadavaprakasa also became a disciple of Ramanuja 3 . Eventually Ramanuja left for Srlraiigam and dedicated himself to the worship of Rarigesa. He learnt certain esoteric doctrines and mantras from Gosthipurna who had been initiated into them by his teacher. Later on Ramanuja defeated in discussion a Sarikarite named Yajnamurti, who later became his disciple and wrote two works in Tamil called Jndna-sdra and Prameya-sdra*. He now had a number of well reputed disciples such as Bhaktagrama-purna, Marudha-grama-purna, Anantarya, Vara- dacarya and Yajnesa. Ramanuja first wrote his Gadya-traya. He then proceeded to the Sarada-matha with Kuresa, otherwise called Srivatsarika Misra or Kuruttalvan, procured the manuscript of the Bodhdyana-vrtti, and started towards Srirarigarn. The keepers of the temple, however, finding the book missing, ran after him and 1 Prapanndmrta, ix, p. 26. The interpretation of this passage by Govinda- carya and Ghosa seems to me to be erroneous ; for there is no reference to Sathakopa here. Kuresa, or S->rivatsahka Misra, had two sons; one of them was baptized by Ramanuja as Parasara Bhattarya and the other as Ramadesika. Ramanuja s maternal cousin, Govinda, had a younger brother, called Bala Govinda, and his son was baptized as Parahkusa-purnarya. 2 The name of Dasarathi s father is Anantadiksita. * His baptismal name was Govindadasa. After his conversion he wrote a book entitled Yati-dharma-samuccaya. This Govindadasa must be distinguished from Govinda, son of the aunt of Ramanuja, who had been converted to aivism by Yadavaprakasa and was reconverted to Srivaisnavism by his maternal uncle Snsailapurna, pupil of Yamuna. Govinda had married, but became so attached to Ramanuja that he renounced the world, ^risailapurna wrote a commentary on the Sahasra-glti. Ramanuja had another disciple in Pundarikaksa, Mahapurna s son. 4 His baptismal names were Devarat and Devamannatha. xvm] Rdmdnuja 103 took it away. Fortunately, however, Kuresa had read the book during the several nights on the way, had remembered its purport and so was able to repeat it. Ramanuja thus dictated his com mentary of Sri-bha$ya, which was written down by Kuresa 1 . He also wrote Veddnta-dipa, Veddnta-sdra and Veddrtha-samgraha. The Sri-bhdsya was written probably after Ramanuja had made ex tensive tours to Tirukkovalur, Tirupati, Tirupputkuli, Kumbha- konam, Alagarkoil, Tiruppullani, Arvar-Tirunagari, Tirukkurun- gudi, Tiruvanparisaram, Tiruvattar, Tiruvanandapuram, Tiru- vallikeni, Tirunirmalai, Madhurantakam and Tiruvaigundipuram 2 . Later on he made extensive tours in Northern India to Ajmir, Mathura, Brindavan, Ayodhya and Badarl, defeating many heretics. He also went to Benares and Purl and at the latter place established a matha. He forcibly tried to introduce the Pancaratra rites into the temple of Jagannatha, but failed. According to the Rdmd- nujdrya-divya-charitai, the Sri-bhasya was completed in 1077 saka or A.D. 1155, though two-thirds of the work were finished before the Cola persecution began. But this date must be a mistake; for Ramanuja died in 1059 saka or A.D. 1 137 3 . The eyes of Mahapurna (Periyalnambi) and Kuresa were put out by the Cola king Kolutt- unga I, probably in the year 1078-1079, and this must be the date when Ramanuja was forced to take refuge in the Hoysala country. It was in A.D. 1117, on the death of Koluttunga I, that Ramanuja again returned to Srirarigam, where he met Kuresa and finished the Sri-bhdsya*. In a Madhva work called Chaldri-smrti it is said that in 1049 saka, that is A.D. 1127, it was already an established work 5 . It is therefore very probable that the Sri-bhdsya was completed be tween A.D. 1117 and 1127. Gopl-natha Rau thinks that it was com pleted in A.D. 1125. Ramanuja fled in the garb of an ordinary householder from 1 Ramanuja had asked Kuresa to check him if he were not correctly repre senting the Bodhayana-vrtti, and in one place at least there was a difference of opinion and Ramanuja was in the wrong. 2 See Gopi-natha Rail s Lectures, p. 34, footnote. 3 See Ibid. 4 Rdmcinujarya-divya-charitai (a Tamil work), p. 243, quoted in Gopl- natha Rau s Lectures. kalau pravrtta-bauddha -di-matam ramanujam tathd sake hy eko-na-pancasad-adhikd-bde sahasrake nirdkartum mukhya-vdyuh san-mata-sthdpandya ca ekd-dasa-sate sake vimsaty-asta-yuge gate avattrnam madhva-gurum sadd vande mahd-gunam. Chaldri-smrti, quoted in Gopi-natha Rau s Lectures, p. 35. 104 The Visistd-dvaita School [OH. Srlrangam to Tondanur, to escape from the persecution of Kolutt- uriga I or Rajendracola, otherwise called Krmikantha, a Saiva king. He was successful in converting the Jain king Bittideva of the Hoysala country, who was renamed Visnuvardhanadeva after the Vaisnava fashion. Mr Rau says that this conversion took place some time before A.D. 1099 l . With the help of this king he con structed the temple Tirunarayanapperumal at Melukot (Yada- vadri), where Ramanuja lived for about twelve years 2 . According to the Rdmdnujdrya-divya-charitai Ramanuja lived for eleven years after his return to Srlrarigam (some time after the death of Kolutt- uiiga I in 1118) and died in A.D. 1137. He thus enjoyed an extra ordinary long life of one hundred and twenty years, which was spread over the reigns of three Cola kings, Koluttuiiga I (A.D. 1070- 1118), Vikrama Cola (A.D. 1118-1135), and Koluttuiiga II (A.D. 1 1 23-1 1 46) 3 . He had built many temples and mathas in his life time, and by converting the temple superintendent of Srirarigam got possession of the whole temple. Ramanuja s successor was Parasara Bhattarya, son of Kuresa, who wrote a commentary on the Sahasra-glti. Ramanuja had suc ceeded in securing a number of devoted scholars as his disciples, and they carried on his philosophy and forms of worship through the centuries. His religion was catholic, and, though he followed the rituals regarding initiation and worship, he admitted Jains and Buddhists, Sudras and even untouchables into his fold. He himself was the pupil of a Sudra and used to spend a long time after his bath in the hut of an untouchable friend of his. It is said that he ruled over 74 episcopal thrones, and counted among his followers 700 ascetics, 12,000 monks and 300 nuns (Ketti ammais). Many kings and rich men were among his disciples. Kuresa, Dasarathi, Nadadur Arvan and the Bhattara were dedicated to scholarly discourses. Yajnamurti performed the function of the priest ; one disciple was in charge of the kitchen; Vatapurna or Andhrapurna and Gofnatham Sitiyarvan were in charge of various kinds of personal service; Dhanurdasa was trea- 1 Mr Rice, however, says in the Mysore Gazetteer, vol. I, that the conversion took place in 1039 saka or A.D. 1117. But Rau points out that in the Epigraphia Carnatica we have inscriptions of Bittideva as early as saka 1023 (No. 34 Arsiker), which c^ll him Visnu-vardhana. 2 The general tradition is that Ramanuja kept away from ^rlrahgam for a total period of twelve years only ; but Rau holds that this period must be about twenty years, of which twelve years were spent in Yadavadri. 8 Sri Ramanujacarya, by S. K. Aiyangar, M.A. Natesan and Co., Madras. xvi 1 1] Rdmanuja 105 surer; Ammangi of boiled milk; Ukkal Arvan served meals; Ukkal- ammal fanned, and so on 1 . Ramanuja converted many Saivas to Vaisnavism, and in the conflict between the Saivas and the Vaisnavas in his time ; though he suffered much at the hands of the Cola king Krmikantha who was a Saiva, yet Krmikantha s successor became a Vaisnava and his disciple, and this to a great extent helped the cause of the spread of Srlvaisnavism. The sources from which the details of Ramanuja s life can be collected are as follows: ( i ) Divya-suri-charitai, written in Tamil by Garudavaha, a contemporary of Ramanuja; (2) Guru-par ampar d- prabhdvam, written in manipravdla in the early part of the four teenth century by Pinb -aragiya Peru-mal Jiyar; (3) Pillai Lokam- jlyar s Rdmdnujdrya-divya-charitai, written in Tamil; (4) Anbillai Kandadaiyappan s brief handbook of Arvars and Aragiyas called Periya-tiru-mudiy-adaiva, written in Tamil; (5) Prappanndmrta, by Anantacarya, a descendant of Andhrapurna, and pupil of Saila- raiigesa-guru ; (6) the commentaries on the Tiru-vdy-mori which contain many personal reminiscences of the Aragiyas; (7) other epigraphical records. The Precursors of the Vis istadvaita Philosophy and the contemporaries and pupils of Ramanuja. The bheddbheda interpretation of the Brahma-sutras is in all probability earlier than the monistic interpretation introduced by Sankara. The Bhagavad-gitd, which is regarded as the essence of the Upanisads, the older Purdnas, and the Pancardtra, dealt with in this volume, are more or less on the lines of bheddbheda. In fact the origin of this theory may be traced to the Purusa-sukta. Apart from this, Dramidacarya, as Yamuna says in his Siddhi- traya, explained the Brahma-sutra, and that it was further commented upon by Srlvatsahka Misra. Bodhayana, referred to by Ramanuja as Vrtti-kdra and by Sarikara as Upavarsa, wrote on the Brahma-sutras a very elaborate and extensive vrttt, which formed the basis of Ramanuja s bhdsya 2 . Anandagiri also refers 1 The Life of Ramanuja, by Govindacharyar, p. 218. 2 Verikatanatha in his Tattva-tlka says " Vrtti-kdrasya Bodhdyanasyai va hi Upavarsa iti sydn ndma." In his Sesvara-mlmdmsd, however, he refutes the view of Upavarsa, for in the Vaijtiyantl lexicon Krtakoti and Halabhuti are said to be names of Upavarsa. See also the second volume of the present work, p. 43 n. 106 The Vitista-dvaita School [CH. to Drdvida-bhdsya as being a commentary on the Chdndogy Upanisad, written in a simple style (rju-vivarand) previous to Saiikara s attempt. In the Samksepa-sdrlraka (ill. 217-27) a writer is referred. to as Atreya and Vdkya-kdra, and the com mentator Ramatlrtha identifies him with Brahmanandin. Rama- nuja, in his Veddrtha-samgraha, quotes a passage from the Vdkya- kdra and also its commentary by Dramidacarya 1 . While the Vdkya-kdra and Dramidacarya, referred to by Ramanuja, held that Brahman was qualified, the Dramidacarya who wrote a commentary on Brahmanandin s work was a monist and is probably the same person as the Dravidacarya referred to by Anandagiri in his com mentary on Sarikara s bhdsyopodghdta on the Chdndogya Upanisad. But the point is not so easily settled. Sarvajnatma muni, in his Samksepa-sdrlraka, refers to the Vdkya-kdra as a monist. It is apparent, however, from his remarks that this Vdkya-kdra devoted the greater part of his commentary to upholding the parindma view (akin to that of Bhaskara), and introduced the well known example of the sea and its waves with reference to the relation of Brahman to the world, and that it was only in the commentary on the sixth prapdthaka of the Chdndogya that he expounded a purely monistic view to the effect that the world was neither existent nor non-existent. Curiously enough, the passage referred to Sar vajnatma muni as proving decidedly the monistic conclusion of Atreya Vdkya-kdra, and his commentator the Dramidacarya is re ferred to by Ramanuja in his Veddrtha-samgraha, as being favour able to his own view. Ramanuja, however, does not cite him as Brahmanandin, but as Vdkya-kdra. The commentator of the Vdkya-kdra is referred to by Ramanuja also as Dramidacarya. But though Sarvajnatma muni also cites him as Vdkya-kdra, his com mentator, Ramatirtha, refers to him as Brahmanandin and the Vdkya-kdra s commentator as Dravidacarya, and interprets the term " Vdkya-kdra" merely as "author." Sarvajnatma muni, how- 1 Veddrtha-samgraha, p. 138. The Vdkya-kdra s passage is " yuktam tad- gunopcTsandd," and Dramidacarya s commentary on it is " yady-api sac-citto no. nirbhugna-daivatam guna-ganam manasanndhdvet tatha py antar-gundni era deva- tdm bhajata iti tatrd pi sa-gnnm va devoid prdpyata iti." The main idea of these passages is that, even if God he adored as a pure qualityless heing, when the final release comes it is by way of the realization of God as qualified. MM.S. Kuppusvami IsastrT, M.A., identifies Dramidacarya with Tiru- marisai Piran, who lived probably in the eighth century A.D. But the reasons adduced by him in support of his views are unconvincing. See Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1924, pp. 468-473. xvi 1 1] Ramanuja 1 07 ever, never refers to Brahmanandin by name. Since the passage quoted in the Samksepa-sdrlraka by Sarvajnatma muni agrees with that quoted by Ramanuja in his Veddrtha-samgraha, it is certain that the Vdkya-kdra referred to by Sarvajnatma muni and Rama nuja, and the Dramidacarya referred to by Sarvajnatma, Ramanuja and Anandagiri are one and the same person. It seems, therefore, that the Vdkya-kdra s style of writing, as well as that of his com mentator Dramidacarya, was such that, while the monists thought that it supported their view, the Srlvaisnavas also thought that it favoured them. From Sarvajnatma muni s statement we under stand that the Vdkya-kdra was also called ^treya, and that he de voted a large part of his work in propounding the bheddbheda view. Upavarsa is also referred to by Sankara as a reputed exponent of the Mlmamsa philosophy and the Brahma-sutra ; and as having been the author of one tantra on Mlmamsa and another on the Brahma- sutra*. Our conclusion, therefore, is that we have one Vdkya-kdra who wrote a commentary on the Chdndogya Upamsad, and that he had a commentator who wrote in a clear and simple style and who was known as Dramidacarya, though he wrote in Sanskrit and not in Tamil. If we believe in Ramatlrtha s identification, we may also believe that his name was Brahmanandin. But, whoever he may be, he was a very revered person in the old circle, as the epithet "bhaga- ^an"has been applied to him by Sarvajnatma muni. Regarding Upavarsa we may say that he also was a very revered person, since Sankara applies the epithet "bhagavat " to him, and quotes him as an ancient authority in his support. He seems to have flourished some time before Sabara Svamin, the great Mlmamsa commentator 2 . Anandagiri and Venkatanatha, in the fourteenth century, identify Upavarsa with the Vrtti-kdra, and Venkatanatha further identifies 1 ata eva ca bhagavato pavarsena prathame tantre dtmd-stitvd-bhidkdna- prasaktau sdrlrake vyaksydma ity uddhdrah krtah. Ssahkara s bhdsya on Brahma- sutra, in. 3. 53. Govindananda, in his Ratna-prabhd, identifies Upavarsa with the Vrtti-kdra. Anandagiri also agrees with this identification. In the Brahma-sutra-bhdsya, i. i. 19 and I. i. 22, Isaiikara refutes views which are referred to as being those of the Vrtti-kdra. What can be gathered of the Vrtti-kdra s views from the last two passages, which have been regarded by the commentator Govindananda as re ferring to the Vrtti-kdra, is that the world is a transformation of God. But we can never be certain that these views refuted by !ahkara were really held by the Vrtti-kdra, as we have no other authority on the point except Govindananda, a man of the thirteenth or fourteenth century. 2 Savara, in his bhdsya on the Mlmdmsa-sutra, i. i. 5, refers to Upavarsa with the epithet "bhagavdn" on the subject of sphota. io8 The Visistd-dvaita School [CH. him in a conjectural manner with Bodhayana. Even if Upavarsa was the Vrtti-kdra, it is doubtful whether he was Bodhayana. On this point we have only the conjectural statement of Venkatanatha referred to above. Sarikara, in his commentary on the Brahma- sutra, i. 3. 28, refers again to Upavarsa in support of his refutation of the sphota theory 1 . But this point is also indecisive, since neither Sarikara nor the Srlvaisnavas admit the sphota theory. There seems, however, to be little evidence. We are therefore not in a position to say anything about Upavarsa, the Vrtti-kdra and Bodhayana 2 . If the testimony of the Prapanndmrta is to be trusted, Bodhay ana s Vrtti on the Brahma-sutra must have been a very elaborate work, and Dramidacarya s work on the Brahma-sutra must have been a very brief one. This was the reason why Ramanuja attempted to write a commentary which should be neither too brief nor too elaborate. Now we have in MS. a small work called Brahma-sutrdrha- samgraha by Sathakopa, and we do not know whether this is the Dramida commentary referred to in the Prapanndmrta. Yamuna, in his Siddhi-traya, refers to a bhdsya-kdra and qualifies him as " parimita-gambhira-bhdsind? which signifies that it was a brief treatise pregnant with deep sense. He further says that this bhdsya was elaborated by Srlvatsarika-Misra. The views of these two writers were probably consonant with the views of the Srlvaisnava school. But Yamuna mentions the name of Tarika, Bhartr-prapanca, Bhartrmitra, Bhartrhari, Brahmadatta, Sarikara and Bhaskara. An account of Bhartrprapanca s interpretation of the Brahma-sutra has been given in the second volume of the present work. An account of Bhaskara s view has been given in the present volume. Nothing is definitely known about the interpretations of Tarika, Bhartrmitra, Bhartrhari and Brahmadatta, except that they were against the views of the Srlvaisnavas. Ramanuja, in his bhdsya on the Brahma-stitra, says that Bod hayana wrote a very elaborate work on the Brahma-sutra and that 1 varna eva tu sabddh id bhagavan upavarsah. Sarikara s commentary on the Brahma-sutra, I. 3. 28. Deussen s remark that the entire discussion of sphota is derived from Upavarsa is quite unfounded. According to Kathd-sarit-sdgara Upavarsa was the teacher of Panini. 2 Savara, also, in his commentary on the 5th sutra of the Mimdmsa-sutra, I. 1.5, refers to a Vrtti-kara, a Mimamsa writer prior to Savara. The fact that in the bhdsya on the same sutra Savara refers to bhagavan Upavarsa by name makes it very probable that the Vrtti-kdra and Upavarsa were not the same person. xvi 1 1] Rdmdnuja 109 this was summarized very briefly by the older teachers. He says, further, that in making his bhdsya he has closely followed the in terpretation of the Sutra, as made by Bodhayana 1 . Ramanuja also owes a great debt of gratitude to Yamuna s Siddht-traya, though he does not distinctly mention it in his bhdsya. It is said that Yamuna had a large number of disciples. Of these, however, Mahapurna, Gosthipurna, Maladhara, Kancipurna, Srlsailapurna, also called Tatacarya (Ramanuja s maternal uncle), and Sriranganatha- gayaka were the most important. Srlsailapurna s son Govinda, the cousin and fellow-student of Ramanuja with Yadavaprakasa, be came later in life a disciple of Ramanuja 2 . Of the seventy-four prominent disciples of Ramanuja, Pranatartihara of Atreya gotra, Kuresa or Srlvatsahka Misra, Dasarathi, Andhrapurna or Vata- purna, Varadavisnu, Yatisekhara-bharata, Yadava-prakasa or Govinda and Yajnamurti are the most important 3 . Of these Dasarathi of Vadhula gotra and Varadavisnu or Varadavisnu Misra were the sister s sons of Ramanuja. Varadavisnu was better known as Vatsya Varadaguru. Kuresa or Srivatsarika Misra had a son by Andal, called Parasara Bhattarya, who defeated the Vedantin Madhavadasa and afterwards became the successor of Ramanuja 4 . Parasara Bhattarya had a son called Madhya Pratoli Bhattarya or Madhya-vlthi Bhattarya. Kuresa had another son named Pad- manetra; Padmanetra s son was called Kurukesvara 5 . Kurukes- vara s son was Pundarikaksa, and his son was Srmivasa. Srlnivasa had a son Nrsimharya. They belonged to the Srlsaila lineage, pro bably from the name of Bhuri Sri Sailapurna, Kuresa s father. Nrsimharya had a son called Ramanuja. Ramanuja had two sons, 1 Sudarsana Suri, in his commentary on the bhdsya called the Sruta-prakdsika, explains the word " purvdcdrya" in Ramanuja s bhdsya as Dramida-bhdsya- kdrddayah. On the phrase bodhdyana-matd nusdrena sutrd-ksdrdni vydkhydyante, he says "wa tu svo-tpreksitamatd-ntarena sutrd-ksardni sutra-padanam prakrti- pratyaya-vibhdgd-nugunam vaddmah na tu svot-preksitd-rthesu siltrdni yathd- kathafi cit dyotayitavydni." 2 It is interesting to note that Yamuna s son Vararaiiga later on gave in struction to Ramanuja and had his younger brother Sottanambi initiated as a disciple of Ramanuja. Vararaiiga had no son. He had set the Sahasra-glti to music. PraparmQmrta, 23. 45. 3 Raja Gopalacariyar also mentions the name of Tirukurugaipiran Pillai as a prominent disciple of Ramanuja. He wrote a commentary on Namm arvar s Tiru-rdymori. 4 Kuresa had another son named ri Rama Pillai or Vyasa Bhatt^r. 5 It is rather common in South India to give one s son the name of his grandfather. no The Visistd-dvaita School [CH. Nrsimharya and Rahgacarya, who lived probably in the fifteenth century. Ramanuja s disciple, Yajnamurti, was an exceedingly learned man. When Ramanuja accepted him as a disciple, he changed his name to Devarat or Devamannatha or Devaraja and had a separate matha established in Srlrarigam for him. Yajnamurti had written two very learned works in Tamil, called Jndna-sdra and Prameya-sdra. Ramanuja had four of his disciples, Bhaktagrama- purna, Marudha-grama-purna, Anantarya and Yajnesa, initiated into Yaisnavism by Yajnamurti 1 . Another pupil of Ramanuja, Tiruku- rugai-piran Pillai, wrote a commentary of Namm arvar s Tiru- vdy-mori. Pranatartihara Pillan, another pupil of Ramanuja, of Atreyagotra, had a son Ramanuja, a disciple of Nadadur Ammal of the lineage of Vatsya Varada 2 . This Ramanuja, alias Padmanabha, had a son called Sri Ramanuja Pillan, a disciple of Kidambi Rama nuja Pillan. This Padmanabha had a son called Ramanuja Pillan and a daughter Totaramba, who was married to Anantasuri, the father of Yerikatanatha. Ramanuja s other disciple and nephew, Das- arathi, of Vadhula golra, had a son called Ramanuja, who had a son called Todappa or Varanadrisa or Lokarya or Lokacarya. After Parasara Bhattarya the Vedanti Madhavadasa, called also Nanjiar, became his successor. Madhavadasa s successor was Nambilla or Namburi Varadarya or Lokacarya. He had two wives Andal and Sriranganayaki and a son called Ramanuja 3 . Nambilla s other name was Kalijit or Kalivairl. Now Varanadrlsa became a disciple of Nambilla or the senior Lokacarya. Yaranadrisa was known as Pillai Lokacarya. Namburi Varada had a pupil called Madhava. Varada had a son called Padmanabha who had a disciple called Rama- nujadasa. Ramanujadasa had a son called Devaraja, who had a son called Srisailanatha, and Srlsailanatha had a pupil called Saumya Jamatr muni or Ramyajamatr muni, also called Varavara muni or Yatlndrapravana or Manavalamahamuni or Periya-jiyar. It is said that he was the grandson of Kattur-aragiya-vanavalapillai. All these people were influenced by the Sahasra-glti-vydkhyd of Kuresa. Namburi Varadarya, otherwise called Kalijit, had two other pupils called Udak-pratoli-krsna, and Krsna-samahbhaya, also called Krsnapada. Krsnapada s son Lokacarya was a pupil of 1 See Prapannamrta, Ch. 26. 2 See Govindacharyar s Life of Ramanuja. 3 He wrote two works called Sara-rtha-samgraha and Rahasya-traya. Prapannamrta, 119/3. xvmj Rdmdnuja in Kalijit, and Krsnapada himself. Krsnapada s second son was Abhirama-Varadhlsa. Ramanuja s brother-in-law Devaraja, of Vatsya gotra, had a son called Varadavisnu Misra or Vatsya Varada, who was a pupil of Visnucitta, a pupil of Kuresa. This Vatsya Varada was a great writer on Vedantic subjects. Kuresa had a son called Sri Rama Pillai, or Vedavyasa Bhatta, who had a son called Vadivijaya, who wrote Ksamd-sodasi-stava. Vadivijaya had a son called Sudarsana Bhatta, who was a pupil of Vatsya Varada, a contemporary of Varadavisnu. Sudarsana Bhatta was the famous author of the Sruta-prakdsikd. The celebrated Annayacarya also was a pupil of Pillai Lokacarya, the pupil of Kalijit. Srlsaila Srlnivasa, or Srlsailanatha, was the son of Annayacarya. Ramyajamatr muni had a number of disciples, such as Ramanuja, Paravastu Prativadibhayahkara Annayacarya, Vana- mamalai-jiyar, Periya-jiyar, Koyilkandadaiannan, etc. 1 Of Ven- katanatha s pupils two are of most importance: his son Nainara- carya, otherwise called Kumara-Vedanta-desika, Varadanatha or Varadaguru, who wrote many Vedantic works, and Brahmatantra- jiyar. Parakaladasa and Srlrangacarya were probably pupils of Krsnapada, or Krsnasuri, the pupil of Kalijit or Namburi Vara- darya. Abhirama Varadhlsa was a pupil of Ramanuja, son of Saumya Jarnatr muni. The pontifical position of Srlvaisnavism was always occupied in succession by eminent men in different impor tant mathas or temples, and there arose many great preachers and teachers of Vedanta, some of whom wrote important works while others satisfied themselves with oral teachings. The works of some of these have come down to us, but others have been lost. It seems, however, that the Visistd-dvaita philosophy was not a source of perennial inspiration for the development of ever newer shades of thought, and that the logical and dialectical thinkers of this school were decidedly inferior to the prominent thinkers of the Saiikara and the Madhva school. There is hardly any one in the whole history of the development of the school of Ramanuja whose logical acuteness can be compared with that of Srlharsa or Citsukha, or with that of Jayatirtha or Vyasatlrtha. Veiikatanatha, Meghanadari or Ramanujacarya, called also Vadihamsa, were some of the most prominent writers of this school ; but even with them philosophic 1 The Tamil names of some of the disciples have been collected from the Life of Ramanujacarya by Govindacharyar. ii2 The Visistd-dvaita School [CH. criticism does not always reach the highest level. It was customary for the thinkers of the Sarikara and the Madhva schools in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to accept the concepts of the new School of Logic of Mithila and Bengal and introduce keen dialectical analysis and criticism. But for some reason or other this method was not adopted to any large extent by the thinkers of the Srlvaisnava school. Yet this was the principal way in which philosophical concepts developed in later times. In dealing with the names of teachers of the Ramanuja school, one Guru-par ampar a mentions the name of Paravadibhayaiikara, who was a pupil of Ramyajamatr muni and belonged to the Vatsya gotra. Prativadibhayarikara was the teacher of Sathakopa Yati. The treatise speaks also of another Ramyajamatr muni, son of Anantarya, grandson of Prativadibhayarikara and pupil of Srivehkatesa. It also mentions Vedantaguru* of the Vatsya gotra, a pupil of Ramyaj amatr muni and Varadarya; Sundaradesika, of the Vatsya gotra, son of Prativadibhayaiikara; Aparyatmamrtacarya, son of Srlverikata- guru and grandson of Prativadibhayaiikara. This Verikatacarya had a son called Prativadibhayaiikara. Ramyajamatr muni had a son called Srikrsna-desika. Purusottamarya, of the Vatsya gotra, was the son of Srlverikatacarya. Srlkrsna-desika had a son called Ramyajamatr muni, who had a son called Krsna Suri. Anantaguru had a son called Verikata-desika. Srlnivasaguru was pupil of Verikatarya and Vatsya Srinivasa, who had a son called Anantarya. It is unnecessary to continue with the list, as it is not very useful from the point of view of the development of the Srlvaisnava school of philosophy or literature. The fact that the names of earlier teachers are reverently passed on to many of those who succeeded them makes it difficult to differentiate them one from the other. But the history of the school is unimportant after the sixteenth or the early part of the seventeenth century, as it lost much of its force as an intellectual movement. In the days of the Arvars the Srlvais- nava movement was primarily a religious movement of mystic and intoxicating love of God and self-surrender to Him. In the days of Ramanuja it became intellectualized for some time, but it slowly relapsed into the religious position. As with Sarikara, and not as with Madhva, the emphasis of the school has always been on the interpretations of Vedic texts, and the intellectual appeal has always been subordinated to the appeal to the Upanisadic texts and their xvii i] Rdmanuja 113 interpretations. The chief opponents of the Ramanuja school were the Sarikarites, and we may read many works in which copious re ferences are made by writers of the Saiikara school who attempted to refute the principal points of the bhdsya of Ramanuja, both from the point of view of logical argument and from that of interpreta tions of the Upanisadic texts. But unfortunately, except in the case of a few later works of little value, no work of scholarly refutation of the views of Ramanuja by a Sankarite is available. The followers of Ramanuja also offered slight refutation of some of the doctrines of Bhaskara, Jadava-prakasa, and Madhva and the Saivas. But their efforts were directed mainly against Saiikara. It has already been noted that Ramanuja wrote a bhdsya on the Brahma-sutra, Vedartha-samgraha, Veddnta-sdra and Veddnta-dipa, a commentary on the Srimad-bhagavad-gitd, Gadya-traya, and Bhagavad-drddhana-krama 1 . According to traditional accounts, Ramanuja was born in A.D. 1017 and died in 1 137. The approximate dates of the chief events of his life have been worked out as follows : study with Yadavaprakasa, 1033; first entry into Srirarigam to see Yamuna, 1043; taking holy orders, 1049; flight to Mysore for fear of the Cola king s persecution, 1096; conversion of Bitti-deva, the Jain king of Mysore, the Hoysala country, 1098; installing the temple God at Melukot, uoo; stay in Melukot, up to 1116; return to Srlrarigam, 1 1 18 ; death, 1 137 2 . His nephew and disciple Dasarathi and his disciple Kurcsa were about fifteen or sixteen years junior to him 3 . Ramanuja s bhdsya, called also $ri-bhdsya, was com mented on by Sudarsana Suri. His work is called Sruta prakdsikd, and is regarded as the most important commentary on the $ri-bhdsya. 1 visnv arcd-krtam avanotsukojndnam srlgltd-vivarana-bhdsya-dipa-sdrdn tad gadya-trayam akrta prapanna-nityd-nusthdna-kramam apt yogi-rat pravandhdn. Divya-siiri-Caritai. Reference to the Vedartha-samgraha of Ramanuja is also found in the same v ork. i/v uktvd nigama-sikhd rtha-samgrahd-khyam bhinnas tdni krtim urarlkriyd-rtham asya. 2 Govindacharyar s Life of Ramanuja. Yamuna, according to the above view, would thus have died in 1042, corresponding with the first visit of Ramanuja to Srirarigam; but Gopi-natha Rau thinks that this event took place in 1038. The date of the Cola persecution is also regarded by Gopi-nathaRau as having occurred in 1078-79, which would correspond to Ramanuja s flight to Mysore; and his return to Srlrarigam must have taken place after 1117, the death of the Cola king Koluttuiiga. Thus there is some divergence between Govindacarya and Gopl- natha Rau regarding the date of Ramanuja s first visit to Srlrahgam and the date of his flight to Mysore. Gopl-natha Rau s views seem to be more authentic. 8 Apart from the Sahasra-gltt-bhdsya, Kuresa wrote a work called Kuresa- vijaya. D III 8 ii4 The Visistd-dvaita School [CH. Ramanuja Literature. As already noted, the principal commentary on Ramanuja s bhdsya, was the Sruta-prakdsikd by Sudarsana Suri. Even before this Sruta-prakasika was written, another commentary, called Sn- bhdsya-vivrti, was written by Rama-rnisra-desika, a disciple of Ramanuja, under his own direction. This work was written in six chapters and was not a commentary in the ordinary sense, but a study of the principal contents of Ramanuja s bhdsya. This Rama Misra was a different man from Rama Misra, the teacher of Yamuna. The Sruta-prakdsikd had a further study, entitled Bhdva-prakdsikd, by Viraraghavadasa. Criticisms of this work were replied to in a work called Bhdsya-prakdsikd-dusanoddhdra by Sathakopacarya, a writer of the sixteenth century. The Sruta-prakdsikd had another commentary, called Tiilikd, by Vadhula Srlnivasa, a writer who probably belonged to the fifteenth century. The contents of the Sruta-prakdsikd were summarized in a work called Sruta-prakdsikd- sdra-samgraha. The bhdsya of Ramanuja was further commented on in the Tattva-sdra, by Vatsya Varada, a nephew of Ramanuja. The name of the commentator s father was Devaraja, and his mother was Kamala, a sister of Ramanuja. He w r as a pupil of Srlvisnucitta, a disciple of Kuresa. This Tattva-sdra provoked a further criticism, called Ratna-sdrim, by Vlra-raghava-dasa, son of Vadhula Nara- simha-guru and pupil of Vadhula Varadaguru, son of Vadhula Vehkatacarya. He also himself wrote a commentary on the &rl- bhdsya, called Tdtparya-dlpikd. Vlra-raghava-dasa lived probably in the later half of the fourteenth or the beginning of the fifteenth century. Ramanuja s views were also collected together in a scholarly manner in a work called Naya-mukha-mdlikd, by Apyaya- diksita, who was born in the middle of the sixteenth century. Ramanuja s bhdsya is also dealt with by the famous Verikatanatha, in his work Tattva-tlka. The Sri-bhdsya had another commentary called Naya-prakds ikd, by Meghanadari, a contemporary of Ven- katanatha of the fourteenth century 1 . A further commentary is 1 Meghanadari s great work^ Naya-dyu-mani, has been treated in detail in a later section. He was the son of Atreyanatha and his mother s name was Adhvara- nayika. He had three brothers, Hastyadrinatha or Varanadrlsa, Varadarat, and Rama Misra. This Varanadrisa should not be confused with Dasarathi s grandson, who was of Vadhula %otra. Meghanadari s other works are Bhara-prabodha and Mumuk$u-paya-samgraha. xvm] Rdmdnuja Literature 115 called Mita-prakdsikd, by Parakala Yati, probably of the fifteenth century. Parakala Yati had a disciple called Rariga Ramanuja, who wrote a study of the Sri-bhdsya, called Mula-bhdva-prakdsikd. One Srinivasacarya also criticized the ri-bhdsya in Brahma-vidyd- kaumudi. It is difficult to guess which Srinivasa was the author of the work, there being so many Srmivasas among the teachers of the Ramanuja school. Campakesa, disciple of Venkatanatha, also dealt with the $rl-bhdsya. Suddhasattva Laksmanacarya also wrote on the $ri-bhdsya, a work entitled Guru-bhdva-prakdsikd which was based upon the Guru-tattva-prakdsikd of Campakesa. This work was in reality a commentary on the Sruta-prakdsikd. The author was the son of Suddhasattva Yoglndra. He descends from the line of Rama- nuja s mother s sister, in which there were born eighteen teachers of Vedanta; he was the pupil of Saumya Jamatr muni and flourished probably in the latter half of the sixteenth century. This Guru- bhdva-prakdsikd was commented on in the Guru-bhdva-prakdsikd- vydkhyd. Sudarsana Suri also seems to have written a commentary on the Sri-bhdsya, called Sruti-dipikd. Srlnivasa, the son of Tata- yarya and Laksml-devi, of Srisaila lineage and pupil of Annayarya and Kondinna Srlnivasa-dlksita, wrote another digest on the Sri- bhdsya, called Tattva-mdrtanda. He probably lived in the latter half of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century. The name of his grandfather was Anna -guru. He wrote Natva-darpana, Bheda-darpana, Siddhdnta-cintdmani, Sara-darpana, and Virodha- nirodha 1 . He is also known as Srlsaila Srlnivasa, and he wrote other books, e.g. Jijndsd-darpana, Naya-dyu-mani-dlpikd, and Naya-dyu-mani-samgraha. The Naya-dyu-mani of Naya-dyu-mani- dlpikd is not to be confused with the Naya-dyu-mani of Megha- nadari; for it is a summary in verse of Ramanuja s bhdsya with a commentary in prose. The Naya-dyu-mani-samgraha is a work in 1 In his Virodha-nirodha he makes reference to a Mukti-darpana (MS. p. 82), Jndna-ratna-darpana (MS. p. 87), and in his Bheda-darpana (MS. p. 96) he refers to his Guna-darpana. In his Virodha-nirodha he makes further reference to his other works, Advaita-vana-knthdra and Bheda-mani (MS. p. 37), to his Bheda-darpana (MS. p. 68), and to his Sara-darpana (MS. p. 66) and Tattva- martanda (MS. p. 87). His Sara-darpana gives the principal contents of Rama nuja s philosophy. In his Virodha-nirodha (MS. p. 37) he refers to a Virodha- bhanjana, by his elder brother Annayarya and to his own Siddhanta-cintdmani (MS. p. 12). In referring to his elder brother he says that his Virodha-nirodha is largely a rearrangement of the arguments adduced by him in his Virodha- bhanjana, some of which had been elaborated and others condensed and rearranged in his Virodha-nirodha. The Virodha-nirodha is thus admitted by the author to have been based materially on Virodha-bhanjana by Annayarya, his elder brother. u6 The Visistd-dvaita School [CH. prose on the bhdsya of Ramanuja, and the first four sutras intended to refute the criticisms made by his opponents. The Naya-dyu- mani-samgraha is a much smaller work than the Naya-dyu-mani, which is often referred to by the author for details. It makes constant reference to objections against Ramanuja without mentioning the name of the critic. In the Naya-dyu-mani the author has made detailed discussions which are summarized by him in this work-. Thus Srlnivasa wrote three works Naya-dyu-mani, Naya-dyu-mani-samgraha, and Naya-dyu-mani-dipikd. In his Siddhdnta-cintdmani Srinivasa tries mainly to uphold the theory that Brahman is the only cause of all creation, animate and in animate. In this work he tries to refute at every point the theory of Brahma-causality, as held by Sarikara. Again, Desikacarya wrote a commentary on the $ri-bhasya, called Prayoga-ratna-mdld. Narayanamuni wrote his Bhdva- pradipikd, and Purusottarna his Subodhinl also as commentaries on the rl-bhdsya. These writers probably lived some time about the seventeenth century. Vlra-raghava-dasaalso criticized the Sri-bhdsya in the Tdtparya-dlpikd. His name has already been mentioned in connection with his study, Rat.ia-sdrini, on Vatsya Varada s Tattva-sdra. Srlnivasa Tatacarya wrote his Laghu-prakdsikd, Srl- vatsarika Srlnivasa his $ri-bhdsya-sdrdrtha-samgraha, and Sathakopa hia Brahma-sutrdrtha-samgraha as commentaries on the $ri-bhdsya. These writers seem to have flourished late in the sixteenth century. Srivatsahka Srlnivasa s work was further summarized by Rariga- carya in his Srivatsa-siddhdnta-sdra. Appaya-dlksita, of the middle of the seventeenth century, wrote a commentary on the Brahma- sutras, called Naya-mukha-mdlikd, closely following the ideas of Ramanuja 2 . Rariga Ramanuja also wrote a commentary, called bhasyd-rnavam avatlrno vist irnam yad avadam Naya-dyumanau samksipya tat paroktlr viksipya karomi tosanam ridusdm. Naya-dyu-mani-samgraha, MS. The general method of treatment followed in the book is to indulge in long discussions in refutation of the views of opponents and to formulate, as con clusion, the positive contentions of the Visista-draita theory on the special points of interest. Thus at the end of a long discussion on the Brahma-sutra, I. i. 2, he says : raddhdntas tu na janmd dlnam visesanatve risesya-bhedti-prasangah, avirud- dhavisesandndm dsraya-bhedakatvdt na caivam risesanatva-racchedena na vydvar- takatva-bhangah tad-an-dsraya-jlvddi-vydvartakatvenaiva tad-asiddheh. (Naya- dyu-mani, MS. p. 126.) Laksmandrya-hrdaya nusarinl likhyate Naya-mdlikd. Naya-muhha-mdlikd, printed in Kumbakonam, 1915, p. 3. xvm] Rdmdnuja Literature 117 Sdriraka-sdstrdrtha-dipikd, on the Brahma-sutra, following the in terpretations of Ramanuja. His Miila-bhdva-prakdsikd, a com mentary on the Sri-bhagya, has already been referred to in this section. He wrote also a commentary on the Nydya-siddhdnjana of Verikatanatha, called Nydya-siddhdnjana-vydkhyd. He was a pupil of Parakala Yati and probably lived in the sixteenth century. He wrote also three other works, called Visaya-vdkya-dipikd, Chdnda- gyopanisad-bhdsya, and Rdmdnuja-siddhdnta-sdra. Ramanujadasa, called also Mahacarya, lived probably early in the fifteenth century, and was a pupil of Vadhula Srlnivasa. This Vadhula Srinivasa, author of the Adhikarana-sdrdrtha-dipikd, must be an earlier person than Srlnivasadasa, author of the Yatindra-mata-dipikd, who was a pupil of Mahacarya. Mahacarya wrote a work called Pdrdsarya- vijaya, which is a thesis on the general position of the Ramanuja Vedanta. He wrote also another work on the &rl-bhdsya called Brahma-sutra-bhdsyopanydsa. Mahacarya s other works are Brahma- vidyd-vijaya, Veddnta-vijaya, Rahasya-traya-mimdmsd, Rdmdnuja- carita-culuka, Astddasa-rahasydrtha-nirnaya, and Canda-mdruta, a commentary on the ata-du$anl of Verikatanatha. He should be distinguished from Ramanujacarya, called also Vadihamsambuvaha, uncle of Verikatanatha. There is a work called Srl-bhdsya-vdrttika, which, unlike most of those above, has already been printed; but the author does not mention his name in the book, which is composed in verse. Sena- natha, or Bhagavat Senapati Misra, who is an author of later date, wrote Sdrlraka-nydya-kaldpa. Vijaylndra Bhiksu was the author of Sdriraka-mimdmsd-vrtti) and Raghunatharya of Sdriraka-sdstra- samgati-sdra. Sundararaja-desika, an author of the sixteenth century, wrote a simple commentary on the Sri-bhdsya called Brahma-siitra-bhdsya-vydkhyd. Verikatacarya, probably an author of the sixteenth century, wrote Brahma-sutra-bhdsya-purva-paksa- samgraha-kdrikd in verse. This Verikatacarya was also known as "Prativadlbhakesari." He also composed Acdrya-pancdsat. Cam- pakesa, who has already been referred to, wrote a commentary on the $ri-bhdsya, called Sri-bhdsya-vydkhyd. Verikatanatharya wrote a work called $rl-bhdsya-sdra. Srlvatsarika Srlnivasacarya was the author of Sri-bhdsya-sdrdrtha-samgraha. Srlrarigacarya composed $ri-bhdsya-siddhdnta-sdra and Srlnivasacarya wrote a work called Srl-bhdsyopanydsa. There are two other commentaries, called u8 The Visista-dvaita School [CH. Brahma-sutra-bhdsya-samgraha-vivarana&n&Brahma-sutra-bhdsyd- rambha-prayoyana-samarthana; but the names of the authors are missing in the manuscripts. Verikatanatha, of the thirteenth century, wrote Adhikar ana-say avail, and Maiigacarya Srlnivasa, Adhikarana-sdrdrtha-dipikd. Varadarya or Varadanatha, son of Verikatanatha, wrote a commentary on the Adhikarana-sdrdvali called Adhikdra-dntdmani. There is another work on similar sub jects called Adhikarana-yukti-vildsa\ but, though the author offers an adoration to Srlnivasa, he does not mention his name and it is difficult to discover who this Srinivasa was. Jagannatha Yati wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sutra on the lines of Ramanuja s bhdsya, and it was called Brahma-sutra-dipikd. It will thus be seen that Ramanuja s bhdsya inspired many scholars and thinkers and a great literature sprang up on its basis. But it must be noted with regret that this huge critical literature on Ramanuja s bhdsya, is not in general of much philosophical importance. Ramanuja s Veddrtha-samgraha was commented on by Sudarsana Suri of the fourteenth century, in Tdtparya-dlpikd. He was the son of Yagvijaya, or Visvajaya, and pupil of Yatsya Yarada. In addition to his study of Ramanuja s bhdsya already referred to, he wrote a Sandhyd-vandana-bhdsya. Ramanuja s Veddnta-dipa (a brief commentary on the Brahma-sutra} was dealt with by Ahobila Rariganatha Yati, of the sixteenth cen tury. Ramanuja s Gadya-traya was criticized by Verikatanatha, and Sudarsanacarya also wrote a commentary; Krsnapada, a later author, also wrote another commentary. Ramanuja s commentary on the Gltd also was commented on by Yerikatanatha. The Veddnta- sdra was a brief commentary on the Brahma-sutra by Ramanuja himself, based on his Sri-bhdsya. Ramanujacarya, called also Yadihamsambuvahacarya of Atreya gotra, son of Padmanabha and maternal uncle of Verikatanatha, lived in the thirteenth or fourteenth century; he wrote an im portant work, called Naya-kulisa or Nydya-kulisa, which has been noticed before. He composed also Dtvya-suri-prabhdva-dlpikd, Sarva-darsana-siromani, and Moksa-siddhi, to which he himself re fers in his Nydya-kulisa 1 . It might seem that the Nydya-kulisa was one of the earliest logical or ontological treatises of the Visista-dvaita school; but we find that there were other treatises of this type 1 I have not been able to procure a MS. of the Moksa-siddhi, and, so far as I can guess, the book is probably lost. xvm] Ramanuja Literature 119 written during this period and even earlier than Ramanuja. Thus Nathamuni wrote a Nydya-tattva, in which he refuted the logical views of Gautama and founded a new system of Logic. Visnucitta, a junior contemporary of Ramanuja, wrote two works, Prameya- samgraha and Samgati-mdld, Varadavisnu Misra, who flourished probably in the latter half of the twelfth century, or the beginning of the thirteenth century, wrote a Mdna-ydthdtmya-nirnaya. Varada Narayana Bhattaraka, who flourished before Vehkatanatha, also wrote a Prajnd-paritrdna 1 . Parasara Bhattaraka, who also probably lived in the thirteenth century, wrote a Tattva-ratndkara 2 . These works have been referred to by Vehkatanatha in his Nydya- parisuddhi; but the manuscripts were not available to the present writer. Vatsya Varada s works have been mentioned in a separate section. Vehkatanatha, called also Vedanta-desika, Vedantacarya, and Kavitarkikasirnha, was one of the most towering figures of the school of Visistddvaita. He was born at Tupple in Kanjivaram in A.D. 1268. His father was Ananta Suri, his grandfather s name was Pundarikaksa, and he belonged to the Visvamitra gotra ; his mother was Totaramba, sister of Atreya Ramanuja, otherwise called Vadi- kalahamsambuvahacarya. He studied with his uncle Atreya Ramanuja, and it is said that he accompanied him to Vatsya Varadacarya s place, when he was five years old. The story goes that even at such an early age he showed so much precocity that it was predicted by Vatsya Varada that in time he would be a great pillar of strength for the Visistd-dvaita-vdda school and that he would repudiate all false systems of philosophy 3 . It appears that he also studied with Varadarya himself 4 . It is said that he used to live by uncha-vrtti, receiving alms in the streets, and spent all his life in 1 He is said to have written another work, called Nydya-sudarsana, men tioned in the introduction to the Tattva-muktd-kaldpa (Mysore, 1933). 2 He also wrote another work, called Bhagavad-guna-darpana. utpreksyate budha-janair upapatti-bhumnya ghantd hareh samajanista jaddtmanl ti pratisthdpita-veddntah pratiksipta-bahir-matah bhiiyds traividya-mdnyas tvam bhuri-kalydna-bhdjanam. It is said that he was blessed by Varadacarya in the aforesaid verse, in which he describes Verikatanatha as an incarnation of the bell of God. Vaisnavite Reformers of India, by T. Rajagopalachariar. srutvd rdmdnujdrydt sad-asad-api tatas tattva-muktd kaldpam vydtdnid venkateso varada-guru-krpd-lambhito-dddma-bhnmd. Tattva-muktd-kaldpa, si. 2. 120 The Visistd-dvaita School [CH. writing philosophical and religious works. In the samkalpa- suryodaya he says that at the time when he was writing that work he had finished the &ri-bhdsya for the thirtieth time. While he lived in KaricI and Srlrarigam, he had to work in the midst of various rival sects, and Pillai Lokacarya, who was very much senior to him in age and was the supporter of the Tehgalai school, against which Verikatanatha fought, wrote a verse praising him. Scholars are in general agreement mat Vehkatanatha died in 1369, though there is also a view that he died in 1371. He enjoyed a long life and spent much of his time in pilgrimage to various northern countries such as Vijayanagara, Mathura, Brindaban, Ayodhya, and Purl. The story of Vidyaranya s friendship with Verikatanatha may be true or false ; but we know that Vidyaranya was acouainted with the Tattva- rnuktd-kaldpa, and he quotes from it in his account of the Visistd- dvaita view in Sarva-dars ana-samgraha. When Verikatanatha was middle-aged, Sudarsana Suri, writer of the &ruta-prakds ikd, was already an old man, and it is said that he called Verikatanatha to Srlrarigam and handed over to him his commentary on the ri- bhdsya, so that it might get a greater publicity. Verikatanatha him self also wrote a commentary on the ri-bhdsya, called the Tattva- tikd. Though an extremely kind man of exemplary and saintly character, he had many enemies who tried to harass and insult him in countless ways. A great difference in interpretation of the nature of prapatti, or self-surrender to God, was manifested at this time in the writings of different Srivaisnava scholars. Two distinct sects were formed, based mainly on the different interpretation of the nature of prapatti, though there were minor differences of a ritualistic nature, such as the marks on the forehead, etc. Of these two sects, the leader of the Vadakalai was Verikatanatha, and that of the Terigalai was Pillai Lokacarya. Later on Saumya Jamatr muni became the accepted leader of the Terigalai school. Though the leaders them selves were actuated by a spirit of sympathy with one another, yet their followers made much of these little differences in their views and constantly quarrelled with one another, and it is a well known fact that these sectarian quarrels exist even now. It was during Verikatanatha s life that Malik Kafur, a general of Ala-ud-dln, invaded the Deccan in 1310. He easily conquered the countries of Warangal and Dvarasamudra and pushed to the extreme south, spreading devastation and plundering everywhere. xvm] Rdmdnuja Literature 121 In 1326 the Mahomedans invaded Srirarigam and pillaged the city and the temple. About 1351 the Hindu Kingdom in Vijay- anagar was established by King Bukka I. When the Mahomedans pillaged the temple of Srirarigam, the temple-keepers had fled away to Madura with the God Rariganatha, who was established in Tirupati and was worshipped there. Bukka s son Kampana began to make conquest in the south and eventually Gopana, a general of Kampana, succeeded in restoring Raiiganatha to Srlrarigam. This affair has been immortalized by a verse composed by Verikatanatha, which is still written on the walls of the temple of Srlrarigam, though certain authorities think that the verse was not by him, but is only attributed to him. This story is found in a Tamil work, called Kavilologu, and is also recorded in the Vadakalai Guru-parampard of the fifteenth century. During the general massacre at Srirahgam, Veiikatanatha hid himself among the dead bodies and fled ulti mately to Mysore. After having spent some years there he went to Coimbatore, and there he wrote his Abhiti-stava, in which he makes references to the invasion of the Mahomedans and the tragic con dition at Srirarigam. When he heard that by Gopana s endeavours Raiiganatha was restored to Sriraiigam he went there and wrote a verse applauding his efforts 1 . Veiikatanatha was a prolific writer on various subjects and also a gifted poet. In the field of poetry his most important works are the Yddavdbhyudaya, tfamsa-samdesa, Subhdsita-nlvi, and Sam- kalpa-suryodaya, an allegorical drama in ten acts. The Yddavd- bhyudaya was a work on the life of Krsna, which was commented upon by no less a person than Appaya-dlksita. The Subhdsita-nlvi , a didactic poem, was commented upon by Srlnivasa Suri of the 1 driyd riila-srnga-dyuti-racita-jagad-ranjandd anjand dres cencydm drddhya kan cit samayam atha nihatyod dhanuskdns tuluskdn laksnil-bhumydv ubhdbhydm saha nija-nagare sthdpayan rangandtham samyag-varydm saparydm punar akrta yaso-darpanam goppand-ryah. The verse appears in Epigraphica Indica, vol. VI, p. 330. This fact has also been recorded in Doddyacarya s Veddnta-desika-vaibhava- prakasikd and Yatlndra-pravana in the following verse : jitvd tuluskdn bhuvi goppanendro rangd-dhipam sthdpitavdn sva-dese ity evam dkarnya gnruh kavindro dhrstavad yas tarn aham prapadye. According to the commentary, the aforesaid Vaibhava-prakdsikd, Veii katanatha was born in 1269 and died in 1369. Goppanarya s reinstallation of Srirahganatha took place in 1371. 122 The Visista-dvaita School [CH. Srlsaila lineage, son of Verikatanatha. He lived in all probability in the fifteenth century. Verikatanatha s other poem was Hamsa- sandesa. In his Samkalpa-suryodaya he dramatically describes, after the pattern of the Prabodha-candro-daya, the troubles and difficulties of the human soul in attaining its final perfection. He wrote about thirty-two adoration hymns such as the Haya-griva-stotra, and Deia- ndyaka-pancdsdt and Pddukd-sahasra-ndma. He also wrote many devotional and ritualistic pieces, such as the Yajnopavita-pratisthd, Arddhana-krama, Hari-dina-tilaka, Vaisvadeva-kdrikd, Sri-panca- rdtra-raksd, Sac-caritra-raksd and Niksepa-raksa. He also col lected from various sources the verses regarding the doctrine of prapatti, and wrote the Nydsa-vimsati and a further work based on it, called the Nydsa-ttlaka, which was commented upon by his son Kumara-Vedanta-desika in a work called Nydsa-tilaka-vydkhyd. Due notice of his Pancaratra-raksd has been taken in the section on Pancardtra of the present volume. He wrote also a work called Silpdrtha-sdra, two works on medicine called Rasa-bhaumdmrta and Vrksa-bhaumdmrta, a Puranika geography called Bhu-gola-nirnaya, and a philosophical work called Tattva-muktd-kaldpu in verse with his own commentary on it called Sarvdrtha-siddhi, which have been noticed in some detail in the special section on Veiikatanatha. This work has two commentaries, calledAnanda-ddviniorAnanda-rallarl (in some manuscripts) or Nrsimha-rdjiya and Bhdra-prakdsa, of which the latter is of an annotative character. The commentary called Ananda-ddyinl was written by Vatsya Nrsimhadeva, son of Narasimha-sfiri, and Totaramba and Devaraja Siiri. Nrsimhadeva s maternal grandfather was Kausika-^rTbhasya-Srlnivasa, who was also his teacher. He had another teacher, named Appayacarya. This Devaraja Suri was probably the author of the Vimba-tattTa- prakdsikd and Caramopdya-tdtparya. Nrsimhadeva s other works were Para-tattva-dipikd, Bheda-dhikkara-nyakkdra, Mani-sdra- dhikkdra, Stddhdnta-mrnaya, a commentary on Vehkatanatha s Niksepa-raksd, called Nrsimha-rdjiya, and a commentary on the Sata-dusani. This Nrsimhadeva lived probably in the sixteenth century. The commentary called Bhdra-prakdsa was written by Navyarahgesa. He describes himself as a disciple of Kalijit; but this must have been a different Kalijit from the well-known Lokacarya; for the Bhdva-prakdsikd commentary, as it refers to the topics of the Ananda-ddyinl, is a later one. It must have been xvm] Rdmdnuja Literature 123 written late in the sixteenth or at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Verikatanatha also wrote the Nydya-parisuddhi, a compre hensive logical work of the Visistd-dvaita school. It was criticized by Srinivasadasa, son of Devarajacarya, who was a disciple of Verikatanatha. He may have been an uncle and teacher of Nrsimha- deva, author of the Ananda-ddyini. His commentary was called Nydya-sdra. The Nydya-parisuddhi had two other commentaries, Nikdsa, by Sathakopa Yati, a disciple of Ahovila and Nydya-pari- suddhi-vydkhyd, written by Krsnatatacarya. Verikatanatha wrote a work supplementary to the Nydya-pari suddhi, called Nydya-siddhd-fijana, the contents of which have been noted in the separate sections on Verikatanatha. He also wrote another work called Para-mata-bhanga, and a polemical work called Sata-dusanL The name Sata-dusani signifies that it -contains a hundred refutations; but actually, in the printed text available to me, I can trace only forty. The best-known commentary, by Rama- nujadasa, pupil of Vadhula Srinivasa, is called Canda-mdruta. All important discussions contained in the Sata-diisani, which are directed mainly against the Sarikara school, have been duly noticed in a different section. It had another commentary, by Nrsimharaja, which is also called Canda-mdruta, and another, by Srinivasacarya, called Sahasra-kiram. Verikatanatha, in addition to his Tattva-tlkd commentary on the &ri-bhdsya, wrote a summary of the general topics of the Sri- bhdsya discussion, called Adhikarana-sdrdvali, which was com mented upon by his son Kumara Vedantacarya or Varadanatha, in a work called Adhikarana-sdrdvali-vydkhyd or Adhikarana- cintdmani. He also wrote two small pamphlets, called Cakdra- samarthana and Adhikarana-darpana\ a commentary on the Isopanisat; one on Yamuna s Gitdrtha-samgraha, called Gltdrtha- samgraha-raksd, and a commentary on Ramanuja s Gitd-bhdsya, called Tdtparya-candrikd. He also criticized Ramanuja s Gadya- traya, in a work called Tdtparya-dlpikd, and wrote commentaries on Yamuna s Catuh-sloki and Stotra-ratndkara, which are called Rahasya-raksd. In addition he composed thirty-two works in the mani-pravdla style, some of which have been translated into Sanskrit. These works are Sampraddya-parisuddhi, Tattva-padavi, Rahasya-padavl, Tattva-navanltam, Rahasya-navamtarn, Tattva- 124 The Visistd-dvaita School [CH. mdtrkd, Rahasya-mdtrkd, Tattva-sandesa, Rahasya-sandesa, Raha- sya-sandesa-vivarana,Tattva-ratndvali,Tattva-ratndvali-samgraha, Rahasya-ratndvalt,Rahasya-ratndvali-hrdaya,Tattva-traya-culuka, Rahasya-traya-culuka, Sdra-dtpa, Rahasya-traya-sdra, Sdra-sdra, Abhaya-praddna-sdra, Tattva-sikhd-mani, Rahasya-sikhd-mani , Anjali-vaibhava, Pradhdnd-sataka, Upakdra-samgraha, Sdra- samgraha, Virodha-parihdra, Muni-vdhana-bhoga, Madhura-kavi- hrdaya, Parama-pdda-sopdna, Para-mata-bhanga, Hastigiri-mdhdt- mya, Dravidopanisat-sdra, Dravidopanisat-tdtparydvali and Nigama- parimala. The last three are works summarizing the instructions of the Arvars. He was the author of twenty-four poems in the Tamil language 1 . Yerikatanatha also wrote a small pamphlet called Vddi-traya- khandana, in which he tried to refute the views of Sarikara, Yadava- prakasa, and Bhaskara. Most of the arguments are directed against Sarikara, whereas the views of Yadavaprakasa and Bhaskara were but slightly touched. He also wrote two works on Mlmamsa, called Mtmamsa-pddukd and Sesvara-mimdmsd. In the last work Veri- katanatha tries to interpret the Mtmdmsd-sutra of Jaimini in a manner different from that of Sahara. His main intention was to interpret the Mimdmsd-sutra in such a manner that it might not be in conflict with the Brahma-sutra, but might be regarded as a com plementary accessory to the teachings of the Brahma-sutra. Thus, in interpreting the first sutra of Jaimini, he says that the injunction of reading the Vedas is satisfied with the mere study of the Vedas. The injunction does not include an enquiry into the meaning of the texts and a study of the Mlmamsa, which comes out of the natural desire for knowing the meanings of the texts and their applications. The study of the Mlmamsa may therefore be undertaken even after the final bath of the bruhma-cdrin. Thus, a man may, after finishing his obligatory studies as a brahma-cdrin in the house of his teacher, still continue to live there for the study of Mlmamsa, but the latter is no part of his obligatory duty. Again, in defining the nature of dharma, Verikatanatha says that dharrna is that which contributes to our good and is also in accordance with the injunctions 2 . Though The list of these Tamil works, which were not accessible to the present writer, has been collected from the introduction to the Mysore edition of the Tattva-mukta-kaldpa. CoJand-laksanatna-visesitam evdrthe sddhanatvam dharma-laksanam. Isvara- mlmamsci, p. 18. xvn i] Rdmdnuja Literature 125 the word dharma may be otherwise used by some persons, yet its accepted meaning, as defined above, remains unaltered. The instructions of the Smrtis, Purdnas, Pancardtras, Brahma- sutras, etc., are to be regarded as dharma, as being based upon the Vedas, which are their source. The validity of the nature of dharma cannot be determined by a reference to any other pramdna than the scriptural texts. In all matters of doubt and dispute the Mlmdmsd- sutra should be interpreted in such a manner that it does not come in conflict with the views of Badarayana, who was the teacher of Jaimini. Vehkatanatha s son was also a great writer on Vedanta. He was called Kumara Vedantacarya, Varadarya or Varadanatha or Varada Desikacarya or Varadaraja Suri or Varadanayaka Suri or Varada- guru. He wrote a Tattva-traya-culuka-samgraha, a work in Sanskrit prose, in which he summarizes the contents of the Tamil Tattva-traya-culuka of Verikatanatha, describing the fundamental Srivaisnava doctrines regarding soul, matter and God 1 . His other works are Vyavahdraika-satyatva-khandana, Prapatti-kdrikd, Rahasya-traya-culuka, Carama-guru-nirnaya, Phala-bheda-khan- dana, Arddhana-samgraha, Adhikarana-cintdmani, Nydsa-tilaka- vydkhyd, Rahasya-traya-sdrdrtha-samgraha. The last three works are commentaries on Verikatanatha s Adhikarana-sdrdvali, Nydsa- tilaka, and Rahasya-traya-sdra. Varadar> r a lived till the end of the fourteenth or the beginning of the fifteenth century. Meghanadari lived probably in the twelfth and the early thir teenth centuries. He was closely associated with his elder brother Rama Misra, a pupil of Ramanuja. He wrote a Naya-prakdsikd, a commentary on the $rt-bhdsya, Bhdva-prabodha, Mumuksu-pdya- samgraha, and Naya-dyu-mani. The last work is one of the most recondite works on the Visistd-dvaita school of thought, and its main contents have been noted in a separate section. He was the son of Atreyanatha and Adhvara-nayika. He had three brothers, Hastyadrinatha, Varadarat, and Rama Misra. Ramanujadasa or Mahacarya wrote a Brahma-sutra-bhdsyopa- nydsa, a commentary on the &ri-bhdsya. He wrote also a Pdrdsarya, in which he tried to show that the commentaries of Sarikara, Madhva and others were not in consonance with the Sutras of 1 It is also called cid-acid-esvara-tattva-nirupana, or Tattva-traya. The Visistd-dvaita School [CH. Badarayana. Some account of this will be found in the fourth volume of the present work. He also wrote a Rdmdnuja-carita- culuka, Rahasya-traya-mimdmsd-bhdsya, and Canda-mdruta, a learned commentary on the Sata-dusam of Verikatanatha. Sudar- sanaguru wrote a commentary on his Veddnta-vijaya, called Mangala-dlpikd. He wrote a big treatise called Veddnta-vijaya, which was divided into several more or less independent, though inter-related parts. The first part is Qurupasatti-vijaya, in which the methods of approaching the teacher are discussed. The manu script is fairly voluminous, containing 273 pages, and the modes of discussion are on the basis of Upanisadic texts. The second part is called Brahma-vidyd-vijaya (a MS. containing 221 pages), in which he tries to prove, on the basis of Upanisadic texts, that Brahman means Narayana and no other deity. The third part, called Sad- vidyd-vijaya, contains seven chapters and is philosophical and polemical in spirit. I have in a later section given an account of its principal contents. The last part is called Vijayolldsa (a MS. of 158 pages), in which he seeks to prove that the Upanisads refer to Narayana alone. I have not been able to trace the fourth part. Sudarsanaguru wrote a commentary on this Veddnta-vijaya. This Sudarsana is different from Sudarsanacarya. He wrote also an Advaita-vidyd-vijaya, a work in three chapters, based prin cipally on Upanisadic texts. The three chapters are Prapanca- mithydtva-bhanga, Jivesvaraikya-bhariga, and Akhanddrthatva- bhanga. He also composed another work, called Upanisad-mangala- dipikd, which was not accessible to the present writer. He describes himself sometimes as a pupil of Vadhula Srinivasa and sometimes as a pupil of his son Prajnanidhi. He lived probably in the fifteenth century. He was the disciple of Vadhula Srlnivasa, who wrote the Tulikd commentary on the Sruta-prakdsikd. Raiiga Ramanuja Muni lived probably in the fifteenth century. He was the disciple of Vatsya Anantarya, Tatayarya, and Parakala Yati or Kumbha-kona Tatayarya. He wrote a commentary on the Snbhdsya, called Mfda-bhdva-prakdsikd, and one on the Nydya- siddhdrijana, called Nydya-siddhdnjana-vydkhyd. He also wrote a Dramidopanisad-bhdsya, Visaya-vdkya-dlpikd,Rdmdnuja-siddhdnta- sdra, a commentary on the Chdndogyo-panisad, called Chandogyo- panisad-prakasikd, and one on the Brhad-dranyako-panisat-prakd- sikd. He wrote an independent commentary on the Brahma-sutra, xvm] Rdmdnuja Literature 127 called Sdriraka-Sdstrdrtha-dipikd. Aufrecht reports, in his Cata- logus Catalogorum, that he wrote also the following works (which, however, are not accessible to the present writer) : Upanisad-vdkya- vivarana, Upanisat-prakdsikd, Upanisad-bhdsya, Dravidopanisat- sdra-ratndvall-vydkhyd, Kathavally-upanisat-prakdsikd, Kausita- kopanisat-prakdsikd, Tatttiriyopanisat-prakdsikd, Prasnopanisat- prakdsikd, Mdndukyopanisat-prakdsikd, Mundakopanisat-prakdsikd, vetdmataropanisat-prakdsikd,$ruta-bhdva-prakdsikd,Guru-bhdva- prakdsikd 1 . Rahga Ramanuja s teacher, Parakala Yati, otherwise called Kumbha-kona Tatayarya, wrote the following works: Dravida- srutt-tattvdrtha-prakdsikd, Tiruppaldndu-vydkhyana, Tiruppalayai- vydkhydna, Kannmnun-strattdmbu-vydkhydna, Adhikdra-samgraha- vydkhyd. He wrote also a Vijaylndra-pardjaya in refutation of the Para-tattva-prakdsikd of Vijaymdra. Srinivasadasa, of the lineage of Madhava, son of Devarajacarya and a pupil of Vehkatanatha, wrote a Nydya-sdra, a commentary on the Nydya-parisuddhi, and also a commentary called Sata- dusam-vydkhyd-sahasra-kirani. It is possible that the Srinivasadasa who wrote the Visistd-dvaita-siddhdnta, Kaivaly-sata-dusam, Durupadesa-dhikkdra, Nydsa-vidyd-vijaya, Mukti-sabda-vicdra, Siddhy-updya-sudarsana, Sdra-niskarsa-tippanl and Vddddri-kulisa is the same as the author of the Nydya-sdra. He lived late in the fourteenth and in the fifteenth century. This Srinivasa must be distinguished from Srlsaila Srlnivasa, whose works have been treated in a separate section. Srisaila Srlnivasa also lived probably in the fifteenth century. We have another Srlnivasa, who wrote an Adhikarana-sdrdrtha- dlpikd. On some interpretations of the colophon he may probably be styled as Vadhula Srinivasa, in which case he would be the teacher of Mahacarya 2 . There is another Srlnivasa, who was the pupil of Mahacarya, alias Ramanujadasa, and son of Govindarya. He wrote a commentary on the Sruta-prakdsikd and also the Yatindra-mata-dipikd, or Yati- pati-mata-dlpikd. The author says that in writing this elementary treatise on the fundamental principle and doctrines of Srivais- 1 See Aufrecht s Catalogus Catalogorum, pp. 488-9. 2 On the other interpretation the adjective Vadhula-kula-tilaka applies to his teacher Samara-pungavdcdrya. This ^rlnivasa was known also as Mangacarya Srinivasa. 128 The Visista-dvaita School [CH. navism he collected his materials from a large number of ancient treatises. 1 The book Yatindra-mata-dipikd contains ten chapters. The first chapter enumerates the different categories, gives the definition of perception and shows how other sources of knowledge, such as memory, recognition, and non-perception, can all be included within this definition. It then gives a refutation of the various theories and establishes the theory of sat-khydti. It denies the claim of verbal cognition to be regarded as a case of perception, refutes the definition of indeterminate cognition, and does not admit the possibility of any inference regarding God. In the second chapter the writer defines "inference," classifies it and enumerates the rules regarding the validity of it and also gives a list of fallacies that may arise out of the violation of these rules. He includes analogy (upamiti) and proof by implication (arthdpatti] in the definition of inference and names the different modes of controversy. In the third chapter we get the definition of " verbal testimony." The authority of the scriptures is established, and an attempt has been made to show that all words convey the sense of Narayana the Lord. The fourth chapter is longer than all the others. The author here refutes the categories of the Nydya school of thought such as the universals, the relation of inherence, the causality of the atoms, and gives his own view about the genesis of the different categories, the mind-stuff, the body, the senses, the five primordial elements of earth, air, heat, water, sky, and so on. The fifth chapter gives an account of time and establishes its all- pervasive and eternal nature. The sixth chapter enumerates the eternal, transcendental attributes of pure sattva, which belongs both to isvara and jiva. The seventh chapter is more philosophical. It contains a de- 1 evam Drdvida-bhdsya Nyaya-tattva Siddhi- tray a Sri-bkdsya Dipa- sdra Veddrtha-samgraha Bhdsya-vivarana Samglta-mdld Sad-artha-sam- ksepa, bruta-prakasika Tattva-ratndkara Prajna-paritrdna Prameya-samgra- ha Nydya-kulisa Nydya-sudarsana Mdna-ydthdtmya-nirnaya Xydya-sara Tattva-dlpana Taitva-nirnaya Sarvdrtha-siddhi Nydya-parisuddhi Ny d- ya-siddhdnjana Paramata-bhanga Tattra-traya-culuka- Tattva-traya-niru- panaTattva-traya-pracanda-mdruta Veddnta-vijaya Pdrdsaryya-vijayd di- pOrvd cdrya-prabandhd-nusdrena jndtavydrthdn samgrhya bdlabodhdrtham Yutin- dra-mata-dipikd-khya-sartraka-paribhafdyam te pratipdditah. Yatlndra-mata- dlpikd, p. 101 . xvm] Rdmdnuja Literature 129 tailed discussion as to how knowledge may be both an attribute and a substance, so that it may be a quality of the self and also con stitute its essence. Attempts are here made to show that all mental states, including that of feeling, can be reduced to that of know ledge. Devotion and the attitude of self-surrender are discussed and the three courses, knowledge, action, and devotion, are elaborated. The writer also brings out the futility of the means of salvation prescribed by other systems of thought. In the eighth chapter the author enumerates the attributes com mon to bothjiva and tsvara, and deals at great length with the true nature of the individual self, refuting the theory of the Buddhists on this point. He gives also a description of the devotees and their twofold classification, and enumerates the attributes of the emancipated jivas. The ninth chapter is devoted to the definition of God, and establishes Him as the instrumental, material and the accessory cause of the world. It refutes the theory of mdyd of the monists (advaitins) and gives an account of the fivefold aspects of God such as vibhavas, avatdras, etc. The tenth chapter enumerates and de fines ten categories other than substance, such as the sattva, rajas, tamas, sabda, sparsa, and the relation of contact, etc. There was another Srlnivasadasa, of the Andan lineage, who was author of a Natva-tattva-paritrdna. He tried to prove that the word Narayana is not an ordinary compound word, but a special word which stands by itself indicative of the name of the highest God. There was yet another Srinivasa, called Srlnivasa Raghava- dasa and Canda-maruta, who wrote a Rdmanuja-siddhdnta- samgraha. This Srinivasa again must be distinguished from another Srlnivasa of the lineage of Sathamarsana, who wrote at least one work known .to the present writer, Ananda-tdr atomy a-khandana. In this small treatise he tries to refute, by a reference to scrip tural passages, the view that there are differences in the state of salvation. A few other Srlnivasas and their works are also known to the present writer, and it is possible that they flourished in the fifteenth or the sixteenth century. These are Srlvatsahka Misra, who wrote a small work called Sri-bhdsya-sdrdrtha-samgraha; Srinivasa Tatarya, who wrote Laghu-bhdva-prakdsikd\ Srlsaila Yogendra, The Visistd-dvaita School [CH. who wrote a work called Tydga-sabddrtha-tippam; Srlsaila Ragha- varya, grandson of Verikatanatha, who wrote a Veddnta-kaustubha; Srlsailadasa, son of Rarigadasa, who wrote Siddhdnta-samgraha; Sundararajadesika, author of Brahma-sutra-bhdsya-vydkhyd (an elementary commentary). These minor writers flourished probably in the sixteenth, seventeeth and eighteenth centuries. Srmivasa-dlksita, son of Srlsaila Srlnivasa Tatayarya, grandson of Annayanya, and a pupil of Acarya-dlksita, wrote a work called Virodha-varuthinl-pramdthim. This must be distinguished from the Virodha-v aruthini-pramdthim of Rarigacarya dealt with in a different section. Srlnivasa-sudhl also wrote Brahma-jiidna-nirdsa, which records the controversy which the author had with Tryambaka Pandita, a follower of Sarikara. It generally follows a line of argu ment adapted in the &ata-dusanl in refuting the monistic Vedanta of Sarikara. It is difficult to say whether the works Naya-mani- kalikd, Laksmandrya-siddhdnta-samgraha, and Ilari-guna-manimdla should be attributed to this author or to the Srlnivasa who wrote the Virodha-nirodha. Sudarsana Suri, who lived in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, of the lineage of Harita, son of Vagvijaya and pupil of Vatsya Varada, has been already mentioned. He wrote a treatise on the commentary of Ramanuja from whose works all succeeding writers drew their inspiration. The title of his commentary is Sruta-prakdsikd, which incorporates, often word for word, what he heard from his teacher Vatsya Varada 1 . He also wrote a Sandhyd- vandana-bhdsya, Veddnta-samgraha-tdtparya-dlpikd, a commentary on the Veddrtha-samgraha of Ramanuja, and another work, called Sruta-pradlpikd. He was often called Vedavyasa Bhattarya. This Sudarsana must be distinguished from Sudarsanaguru who wrote a commentary on the Veddnta-vijaya of Mahacarya. Sathakopa muni, who was a pupil of Sathari Suri and often known as Satha- kopa Yati, lived probably towards the end of the sixteenth century. He wrote the following works: Brahma-laksana-vdkydrtha- samgraha, Brahma-sabddrtha-vicdra, Vdkydrtha-samgraha, Brahma- sutrdrtha-samgraha, Brahma-laksana-vdkydrtha, Divya-prabandha and Bhdva-prakdsikd-dusanoddhdra. The last work is an attempt at gurubhyo rthah srutah sabdais tat-prayuktais ca yojitah saukarydya bubhutsunam samkalayya prakdsyate. Introductory verses to the Sruta-prakasikd. xvm] Ramdnuja Literature 131 refutation of the criticism of the Bhdva-prakdsikd, a commentary on ruta-prakdsikd, by Varada Visnu Suri. Ahobila Rariganatha Yati, who flourished at the beginning of the fifteenth century, wrote a Nydsa-vivrti, in which he deals with the topics of nydsa as expounded in Vehkatanatha s Nydsa-tilaka. Adivaraha Vedantacarya wrote a Nydya-ratndvalL Krsnatatacarya, who flourished in the fifteenth century and belonged to the Srisaila lineage, wrote a commentary on the Nydya-parisuddhi, called Nydya-parisuddhi-vydkhyd and some small treatises called Durdrtha- durtkarana, Brahma-sabddrtha-vicdra and Natva-candrikd. Krsna- pada-lokaguru, probably of the same century, wrote a Rahasya- traya-mlmdmsd-bhdsya, Divya-prabandha-vydkhyd, Catuh-sloki- vydkhyd, and a number of Tamil works. Campakesa, of the fifteenth century, wrote a Guru-tattva-prakdsikd, and a Veddnta-kantako- ddhdra. In the last work he tried to refute the criticisms of the SrI-bhasya 1 . He was a pupil of Vehkatanatha. Another Tatacarya, who was grandfather of Vehkatadhvari, the author of the Visva- gunddarsa, wrote a Tdtdcdrya-dina-caryd. He was the maternal uncle of Appaya-dlksita. Again, Desikacarya, who wrote the Prayoga-ratna-mdld as a commentary on the $ri-bhdsya, also wrote a book on the commentary on Vehkatanatha s Panyikd on the Taittirlyopanisat, which was called the " Asti-brahmeti-sruty-artha- vicdra." Doddayacarya, who lived probably in the fifteenth century, wrote a Parikara-vtjaya, often referred to in Mahacarya s works, and a life of Vehkatanatha, called Veddnta-desika-vaibhava- prakdsikd. Narayana muni wrote a Bhdva-pradipikd, Gitdrtha- samgraha, Gitd-sdra-raksd, Gltd-samgraha-vibhdga, Rahasya-traya- jivdtu. He was the son of Srisaila Tatayarya, grandson of Anantarya and pupil of Ramanujacarya, probably Mahacarya. He lived per haps late in the fifteenth century. Nrsimharaja, who wrote a com mentary on the Sata-dusani, called Sdta-dusam-vydkhyd, was probably the same person who wrote an Ananda-ddyinl on the Tattva-muktd-kaldpa. Nrsimhasuri, a much later writer, wrote a Sarira-bhdvddhikarana-vicdra and Tat-kratu-nydya-vicdra. Para- 1 iauddhasattvalaksanarya wrote a work called Gurn-bhava-prakdsikd as a commentary on the Sruta-prakdsikd, which he based upon the Guru-tattva- prakdsikdof Campakesa. He was the disciple of Ssuddhasattvacarya, son of Saurnya Jamatr muni. In his commentary he constantly refers to the Tulikd commentary of Vadhula ^rinivasa. He lived probably in the sixteenth century, and may have been a contemporary of Mahacarya. 9-2 132 The Visistd-dvaita School [CH. vastu Vedantacarya, son of Adivarahacarya, composed a Veddnta- kaustubha. Purusottama wrote a commentary on the $ri-bhdsya called SuboJhini, and Bhagavat Senapati Misra wrote a Sdriraka- nydya-kald. Pela Puradesika w rote a work called Tattva-bhdskara. It is divided into two parts, in the first of which he tries to ascertain the meaning of mdyd and elucidates the nature of God on the basis of Dravidian and Sanskrit texts. The second part is of a ritualistic nature. Raiigaraja, who lived probably in the sixteenth century, was the author of Advaita-vahiskdra. Ranganathacarya wrote an Astddasa-bheda-vicdra, Purusdrtha-ratndkara, Vivdddrtha-sam- graha, Kdryddhikarana-veda and Kdryddhikarana-tattva. The con tents of the last two works have been dealt with in a different section. He lived perhaps in the sixteenth century, and was a pupil of Saumya Jamatr muni. A Ramanuja called Vedanta Ramanuja wrote a Divya-suri-prabhdva-dlpikd and a Sarva-darsana-siromam. Ramanujadasabhiksu wrote Sauri-riija-carandravinda-sarand-gati- sdra, and Rama Subrahmanyasastrl Visnu-tattva-rahasya. These two writers flourished probably in the seventeenth or late in the sixteenth century. Atreya Varada wrote a Rahasva-traya-sdra-vydkhyd, a com mentary on Verikatanatha s Rahasya-traya-sdra. Varadadasa wrote Nydsa-vidyd-bhusana and Yadi Kesarl Misra the following: Adhydtma-cintd, Tattva-dipa-samgraha-kdrikd, Tattva-dipa and Rahasya-traya-kdrikd. These small works are of little value. Only the Tattva-dipa contains some philosophical materials inspired by the Sruta-prakdsikd of Sudarsana. Ylra-raghava-dasa, son of Vadhula Narasimha and pupil of \ adhula \ aradaguru, produced a commentary on the Srl-bhdsya, called Tdtparya-dipikd, and one on Vatsya Varada s Tattva-sdra, called Ratna-sdrim. Vehkata Sudhi wrote a voluminous work in four chapters, called Siddhdnta- ratndvali, in which he tried to prove that Narayana and not Siva is the supreme Lord and the cause of the world, and dealt with many sectarian doctrines which are of no philosophical value. He was the pupil of Venkatanatha and son of Tatacarya of Sathamarsana lineage. Some notice of the work will be taken in the section on Pancardtra. Venkatadasa, called also Vucci Yeiikatacarya, the third son of Annayarya, of Sathamarsana lineage, composed a work called Veddntakdrikdvali. YerikatadhvarT wrote a work called Yati- xvi 1 1] Rdmdnuja Literature 133 prativandana-khandana, Ayyanna wrote Vydsa-tdtparya-nirnaya and Annavayyahgacarya, Trmsa-prasno-ttara, Kesara-bhusana and $ri-tattva-darpana. Gopalatata wrote Satakoti-dusana-parihdra, Govindacarya Pramdna-sdra and Jagannatha Yati Brahma-sutra- dlpikd. Devanatha wrote Tattva-nirnaya, Dharmakuresa Rdmdnuja- nava-ratna-mdlikd, Nllameghatatacarya Nydsa-vidydrtha-vicdra, Rarigacarya Srivatsa-siddhdnta-sdra, Raghunathacarya Bula- sarasvati and Sangati-sdra. Raghavacarya wrote Rahasya-traya- sdra-samgraha, Ramanatha Yogi Sadd-cdra-bodha, Ramanuja Gdyatri-sata-dusani and Tirumalacarya of Bharadvaja lineage Nattvopapatti-bhanga. Armayarya, brother of Srisaila Srinivasa, wrote Saptati-ratna- mdlikd, Vyavahdrikatva-khandana-sdra, Mithydtva-khandana, Ac- dry a-vimsati, Ananda-tdratamya-khandana. Appaya-dlksita of the sixteenth century commented on the Brahma-sutra in accordance with the views of Ramanuja, in a work called Naya-mukha-mdlikd. Anantarya of the nineteenth century wrote a number of works of which the following have been published: N attva-tattva- vtbhusana, Satakoti-khandana, Nydya-bhdskara, Acdra-locana (a refutation of widow-remarriage), Sdstrdrambha-samarthana, Sam- dsa-vdda, Visayatd-vdda, Brahma-sakti-vdda, Sdstraikya-vdda, Moksa-kdranatd-vdda, Nirvisesa-pramdna-vyuddsa, Samvin-ndn- dtva-samarthana, Jndna-ydthdrthya-vdda, Brahma-laksana-vdda, Iksaty-adhikarana-vicdra, Pratijnd-vdda, Akdsddhtkarana-vtcdra, Sribhdsya-bhdvdnkura, Laghu-sdmdnddhikaranya-vdda, Guru-sdm- dnddhikaranya-vdda, <drira-vdda, Siddhdnta-siddhdnjana, Vidhi- sudhdkara, Sudarsana-sura-druma, Bheda-vdda, Tat-kratu-nydya- vicdra, Drsyatvd-numdna-nirdsa. These treatises are mostly short papers, though a few are more elaborate. The Nydya-bhdskara is a refutation of the Gauda-brahmdnandi commentary on the Advaita- siddhi, in refutation of the Nydydmrta-taranginl. It consists of twelve topics, and the refutations are mostly of a scholastic nature following the style of the new school of logic in Bengal which found fault with the definitions of their opponents. Some of the most im portant works of this writer have been referred to in the relevant places of this work. 134 The Visista-dvaita School [CH. The Influence of the Arvars on the followers of Ramanuja. We have already referred to the Divya-prabandhas, written by the Arvars in Tamil, which exerted a profound influence on all teachers of the Srlvaisnava school 1 . Kuresa (Tirukkurukaippiran Pillai) wrote a commentary of 6000 verses on a selection of Namm - arvar s one thousand verses called the Sahasra-giti. Parasara Bhattarya wrote a commentary of 9000 verses. Under the direc tions of Kalijit (Lokacarya) Abhaya-prada-raja wrote a commentary of 24,000 verses. Krsnapada, pupil of Kalijit, wrote another com mentary of 3600 verses. Saumya Jamatr muni wrote 12,000 verses interpreting the views of Namm -arvar. The commentaries of Abhaya-prada-raja on the Divya-prabandhas helped the later teachers to understand the esoteric doctrine of the later works. The commentaries on the Divya-prabandhas written by Saumyajamatr muni, the younger brother of Pillai Lokacarya, had already become rare in the time of Abhirama Varacarya, the translator of the Upadesa-ratna-mdld and the grandson of Saumya Jamatr muni. It is thus seen that Parasara Bhattarya, the successor of Rama nuja in the pontifical chair, and his successor VedantI Madhava, called also Nanjiyar, and his successor Namburi Varadaraja, called also Kalijit or Lokacarya I, and his successor Pillai Lokacarya, all wrote works dealing not so much with the interpretation of Rama- nuja s philosophy, as with the interpretation of devotion as dealt with in the Sahasra-giti and the Divya-prabandhas. Their writings are mostly in Tamil, only a few have been translated into Sanskrit, 1 These Divya-prabandhas are four thousand in number. Thus Poygaiy-arv ar wrote Mudal-tiru-vantddi of 100 stanzas ; Bhutatt -arvar, Irandam-tiru-vantddi of 100 stanzas; Pgy-arvar, Munrdm-tiru-vantddi of 100 stanzas; Tiru-mariai Piran, Ndn-mukam Tiru-vantadi and Tiru-chanda-vruttam of 96 and 120 stanzas respectively; Madhura-kaviy-arvar wrote Kanninun-siruttdmbu of 1 1 stanzas; Namm -arvar wrote Tiru-vruttam of 100 stanzas, Tiru-vdsirtyam, Periya- tiru-vantddi of 87 stanzas and Tiru-vdy-mori of 1102 verses; Kula-s ekhara Peru- mal wrote Perumdl-tirumoli of 105 stanzas, Periy-drvdr-tiruppaldndu and Periy- drvdr-tirumori of 12 and 461 stanzas, Andal, Tiruppdvai and Ndcchiydr-tirumoli of 30 and 143 stanzas; Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar, Tiru-palliy-eruchi and Tiru- mdlai of 10 and 45 stanzas respectively; Tiru-pan-arvar, Amalanddi-pirdn of 10 stanzas; Tiru-mahgaiy-arvar wrote Periya-tirumoli of 1084 verses, Tiru- kkurunddndakam of 20 stanzas, Tirunedunddndakam of 30 stanzas, Tiruvelukiir- tirukkai of i stanza, iriya-tirumadal of 77 stanzas and Periya-tirwnadal of 148 stanzas, thus making a total of 4000 verses in all. They are referred to in the Upadesd-ratna-mdld of Saumya Jamatr muni (junior) and in its introduction by M. T. Narasimhiengar. xvm] Arvdrs Influence on Rdmanujists 135 and in the present work notice is taken only of the Sanskrit works of these writers (mostly in the manuscript form) which have been available to the present writer. Both Pillai Lokacarya and Saumya Jamatr muni, called also Vadikesari, were sons of Krsnapada, but this Saumya Jamatr muni must be distinguished from a later Saumyajamatr muni, called also Yatindrapravanacarya, who was a much more distinguished man. Parasara Bhattarya was probably born before A.D. 1078 and he died in A.D. 1165. He was suc ceeded by VedantI Madhava or Nanjiyar, who was succeeded by Namburi Varadaraja or Lokacarya I. He was succeeded by Pillai Lokacarya, a contemporary of Verikatanatha, and Sruta-prakasika- carya or Sudarsana Suri. It was in his time that the Mahomedans attacked Srlrarigam. as has already been mentioned in connection with our account of Verikatanatha. The Mahomedans were ex pelled from Srlrarigam by Goppanarya, and the image of Rariga- natha was re-installed in A.D. 1293. It was at this time that the famous Saumya Jamatr muni (junior) was born. The senior Saumya Jamatr muni, younger brother of Pillai Lokacarya, called also Vadikesari, wrote some commentaries on the Divya-prabandhas, a work called Dtpa-prakdsa, and Piyaruli-ceyalare-rahasya. He is referred to by the junior Saumya Jamatr muni, called also Vara- vara muni, in his Upadesa-ratna-mdld, Tattva-traya-bhdsya and Srivacana-bhusana-vydkhya. We cannot be sure whether the Adhydtma-cintdmani, in which Vadhula Srlnivasa is adored as his teacher, was written by Saumya Jamatr muni. Mahacarya also de scribed himself as a pupil of Vadhula Srinivasa, and, if the senior Saumya Jamatr and Mahacarya were pupils of the same teacher, Mahacarya must have lived in the fourteenth century. If, however, the junior Saumya Jamatr wrote the Adhydtma-cintdmani, Maha carya will have to be placed at a later date. The present writer has been able to trace only three books in Sanskrit by Pillai Lokacarya: Tattva-traya, Tattva-sekhara, and Srivacana-bhusana 1 , The Tattva-traya is a very useful compendium of the Srivaisnava school of thought, in which the nature of the in animate (acit), the souls, God and their mutual relations are dealt 1 Some of his other works are Mumuksu-ppadi, Prameya-sekhara, Nava- rafna-mdld, Tani-pranava, Prapanna-paritrdna, Yddrcchika-ppadi, Dvayam, Artha-pancaka, Sdra-samgraha, Paranda-padi, Samsdra-sdmrdjyam, Sriyah-pati- ppadi, Caramam, Arcir-ddi, Nava-vidha-sambandha. Vide footnote in Tattva- sekhara, p. 70. 136 The Viiista-dvaita School [CH. with. There is an excellent commentary by Varavara muni. The Tattva-sekhara is a work in four chapters. The first chapter quotes scriptural evidences in support of the view that Narayana is the highest God and the ultimate cause; in the second chapter he de scribes the nature of self by reference to scriptural testimony. The same description of the nature of self is continued in the third chapter. In the fourth chapter he deals with the ultimate goal of all souls, self-surrender to God. He says that the ultimate summum bonum (purusdrtha) consists in the servitude (kainkarya) to God roused by love of Him (priti-kdrita), due to the knowledge of one s own nature and the nature of God in all His divine beauty, majesty, power and supreme excellence. Not all servitude is undesirable. We know in our ordinary experience that servitude through love is always pleasurable. In the ordinary idea of emancipation, a man emphasizes his own self and his own end. This is therefore inferior to the summum bonum in which he forgets his own self and regards the servitude of God as his ultimate end. Lokacarya then refutes the various other conceptions of the ultimate goal in other schools of philosophy. He also refutes the conception of the summum bonum as the realization of one s own nature with a sense of supreme subordination (para-tantratvena svd-nubhava-mdtram na puru- sdrthah). This is also technically called kaivalya in the Srivaisnava system. Our ultimate end is not cessation of pain, but enjoyment of bliss. Positive bliss is our final aim. It is held that in the emanci pation as described above the individual realizes himself in close association with God and enjoys supreme bliss thereby; but he can never be equal to Him. Bondage (bandha) is true and the removal of bondage is also true. Prapatti, or self-surrender to God, is regarded as a means to cessation of bondage. This prapatti may be direct (a-vyavahitd) and indirect (vyavahita). In the first case the self- surrender is complete and absolute and done once for all 1 . The in- 1 Prapatti is defined as follows : bhagaTad-djndtlvartana-ni^ rtti-bhaga^ ad-dn^lkQlva-sana-saktit^d-nusand^ldna- prabhrti-sahitah yacfid-garbho rijrmbha-rripa-jndna-risc$ah ; tatra jileydkdra Isvarasya nirapeksa-sddhanatvamjfidndkaro vyarasdyd-tmakatvam ; etac ca sdstrd- rthatvdt sahrt kartavyam. Tattva-sekhara, p. 64. Just as the Sahkarites hold that, once the knowledge regarding the unity of the individual with Brahman dawns through the realization of the meaning of such texts, there remains nothing to be done. So here also the complete self- surrender to God is the dawning of the nature of one s relation to God, and, when this is once accomplished, there is nothing else to be done. The rest remains w ith God in His adoption of the devotee as His own. xvm] Arvdrs Influence on Rdmdnujists 137 direct prapatti is the continual meditation on God through love of Him, along with the performance of the obligatory duties and the non-commission of prohibited actions. This is decidedly the lower stage; the more deserving ones naturally follow the first method. The main contents of Pillai Lokacarya s $rl-vacana-bhusana follow in a separate section in connection with the account of the commentary on it and sub-commentary by Saumya Jamatr muni (junior) and Raghuttama. The Srlvacana-bhusana consists of 484 small sentences longer than the Siltra-phrases, but often shorter than ordinary philosophical sentences. Lokacarya followed this style in his other works also, such as his Tattva-traya and Tattva-sekhara. Ramya-jamatr muni or Saumya Jamatr muni, called also Manavalama muni or Periya-jlyar, was the son of Tikalakkidandan- tirunavIrudaiyapiran-Tatar-annar, a disciple of Pillai Lokacarya and grandson of Kollikavaladasar, who was also a disciple of Pillai Lokacarya. He was born in the Tinnevelly district in A.D. 1370 and lived for seventy-three years, that is till A.D. 1443. He first obtained training from Srisailesa, called also Tiru-marai Arvar, in Tiru- vay-mori. One of the first works of his early youth was a poem called Yati-rdja-vimsati, in honour of Ramanuja, which is incorporated and published in Varavara muni s Dina-caryd. On account of his deep devotion for Ramanuja he was also known as Yatindra- pravana, and wrote a commentary on a short life of Ramanuja called Prapanna-sdvitrl or Rdmdnuja-nurandddi of Tiruvarangatt- amudandr. After completing his studies under Srisailesa he re mained at Srirarigam and studied the commentaries on the Divya- prabandhas, the Srivacana-bhusana and other Drdvida Veddnta works. In his study of the Divya-prabandhas and the Gltd-bhdsya he was helped by his father Tatar-annar. He also studied with Kidambi-Tirumalai-Nayinar, called also Krsnadesika, the Sri- bhdsya and Sruta-prakdsikd. He also studied the Acdrya-hrdaya with Annayacarya, called also Devarajaguru, of Yadavadri. He re nounced the world, became a sannydsin, and attached himself to the Pallava-matha at Srlrarigam, where he built a vydkhydna-mandapa, in which he used to deliver his religious lectures. He was very pro ficient in the Dravida Veddnta, produced many works in the mani- pravdla style (mixture of Sanskrit and Tamil), and had hundreds of followers. He had a son, called Ramanujarya, and a grandson, called Visnucitta. Of his pupils eight were very famous: Bhatta- 138 The Visista-dvaita School [CH. xvm natha, Srlnivasa-yati, Devarajaguru, Vadhula Varada Narayana- guru, Prativadibhayarikara, Ramanujaguru, Sutakhya, and Sri- vanacala Yoglndra. These eight disciples were great teachers of Veddnta 1 . He taught the Bhdsya to Rarigaraja. There were many ruling chiefs in South India who were his disciples. Among his works the following are noteworthy, Yati-rdja-vimsati, Gltd- tdtparya-dipa, a Sanskrit commentary on the Gtta, Sri-bhdsyd- ratha, Taittiriyo-panisad-bhdsya, Para-tattva-nirnaya. He wrote also commentaries on the Rahasya-traya, Tattva-traya and Srl- vacana-bhusana of Pillai Lokacarya and the Acdrya-hrdaya of the senior Saumya Jamatr muni, called also VadikesarT, brother of Pillai Lokacarya; commentaries on Priydlvar-tiru-mori, Jndna-sdra and Prameya-sdra of Devaraja, and the Sapta-gdthd of Viramsolai- ppillai; glosses on the authorities quoted in the Tattva-traya, Srivacana-bhusana, and commentaries on the Divya-prabandha called the Idu ; many Tamil verses, such as Tiruvaymon-nurundadi, Artti-prabandha, Tiruvdrddhana-krama, and many Sanskrit verses. He occupied a position like that of Ramanuja, and his images are worshipped in most Vaisnava temples in South India. Many works were written about him, e.g. Varavara-muni-dina- caryd, Varavara-muni-sataka, Varavara-muni-kdvya, Varavara- muni-campu, Yatlndra-pravana-prabhdva.Yatindra-pravana-bhadra- campu, etc. His Upadesa-ratna-mdld is recited by Srivaisnavas after the recital of the Divya-prabandha. In his Upadesa-ratna-mdld he gives an account of the early Arvars and the Aragiyas. It was trans lated into Sanskrit verse by his grandson Abhirama-varacarya, whose Astddasa-bheda-nirnaya has already been noted in the present work. He also wrote another book called Naksatra-mdlikd in praise of Sathakopa 2 . Though Mr Narasimhiengar says that a commentary on the Srivacana-bhusana was written by Saumya Jamatr muni (junior) in the manipravdla style, yet the manuscript of the commentary, with a sub-commentary on it by Raghuttama, which was available to the present writer, was a stupendous volume of about 750 pages, all written in Sanskrit. The main contents of this work will appear in a separate section. 1 See Prapannamrta, Ch. 122. 2 The present writer is indebted for some of his information regarding the works of Saumya Jamatr muni to M. T. Narasimhiengar s Introduction to the English translation of the Upadesa-ratna-mdld. CHAPTER XIX THE PHILOSOPHY OF YAMUNACARYA THOUGH in later days Bodhayana is regarded as the founder of the Vaisnava systems, yet, as his commentary on the Brahma-sutras is not now available, we may look upon Yamuna as being the earliest of the latter-day Vaisnava philosophers. We hear that many other people, such as Tahka, Dramida and Bharuchi, wrote in accordance with the teachings contained in the commentary of Bodhayana, en deavouring to refute the views of other systems of thought. Dramida wrote a Bhdsya which was elaborated by Srlvatsaiika Misra and is frequently referred to by Yamuna. The sage Vakula- bharana, called Sathakopacarya, also wrote an elaborate treatise in the Tamil language on the bhakti creed, but this also is hardly available now. Thus the history of modern Vaisnavism should, for all practical purposes, begin with Yamunacarya, who flourished during the latter part of the tenth and the earlier part of the eleventh century. Yamunacarya was said to be the preceptor of Mahapurna from whom the great Ramanuja had his initiation. So far as I am aware, Yamuna wrote four books, namely, Siddhi- traya, Agama-prdmdnya, Purusa-ninnaya, and Kdsmirdgama. Of these only the first two have been printed. Yamuna s doctrine of Soul contrasted with those of others. We have seen that from the Carvakas to the Vedantists there had been many schools of philosophy and each of them had its own theory of soul. We made but a scanty reference to Carvakism in the first volume, and we have generally omitted the discussions against Carvakism in which other systems usually indulged. The most im portant of the doctrines held by the Carvakas is that there is no self other than the body ; some of them, however, regarded the senses as the self, and others as Manas. They held that there were only four elements and that out of them life and consciousness sprang forth. Our notion of self also referred to the body, and there was no separate soul, apart from the body. The Carvaka literature 140 The Philosophy of Yamundcdrya [CH. has, however, vanished from India, and we can know only from references in other works that their original writings were also in the form of siitras 1 . Yamuna s philosophy was directly opposed to the doctrine of the Carvakas. It is best therefore that we should deal here with Yamuna s theory of soul in connection with the pretensions of the Carvakas. Yamuna takes his stand on the notion of self-conscious ness. He says that our preception " I know" distinctly points to the self as the subject, as distinguished from the perception of the body as "this is my body," which is closely akin to other objective per ceptions such as "this is a jug," "this is a piece of cloth." When I restrain my senses from external objects and concentrate myself on myself, I have still the notion of my self as "I," which arises in me without the least association of my hands or feet or any other parts of the body. The body as a whole cannot be said to be indicated by my perception, when none of the parts of the body shine forth in it. Even when I say "I am fat," "I am lean," the notion of "I" does not refer to the external fat or lean body, but to some mysterious entity within me with which the body is wrongly associated. We should not forget that we also say "this is my body" as we should say "this is my house," where the body is spoken of as being dif ferent from the self as any external object. But it may be objected that we also say "my self" (rnamdtmd}; but this is only a linguistic usage which expresses that difference, whereas the entity perceived is just the same and identical. The confusion which is felt in the fact that the notion of " I " refers to the body is due to this, that the self has no perceivable shape or form as have ordinary external ob jects (such as jug, cloth, etc.), by virtue of which they are dis tinguished from one another. Those who are not sufficiently dis criminating cannot rest content with the formless self, and conse quently confuse the soul with the body, more particularly because they find that corresponding to any and every desire of the soul there is a corresponding change of the body. They think that, since, corresponding to any mental change, such as new feeling, thought, or desire, there is a corresponding physical or physiological change of the body, there is no other soul different from the body. But, if 1 The first siitra of Brhaspati is atha tattvam rydkhydsydmah; the second is prithivy-ap-tejo-vdyur iti tattvdni and the third is tebhyas caitanyam kinvddi- bhyo mada-saktivat. xix] Yamuna s doctrine of Soul 141 we try to find out by a deeper self-introspection what we mean by " I," we find that it is an entity, as the subject, as the " I," as distinct from the objects which are not self and which are indicated as this or that. Had the notion "I know" referred to the body, the bodily parts would surely have been manifested in the notion, as external objects shine forth in all external perception as this or that. But it is not so ; on the contrary, by introspection I find that the self is an entity which is independent in itself, and all other things of the world are for the sake of my self; I am the enjoyer^ whereas every thing else is the object of my enjoyment; I am not for the sake of any body ; I am an end in myself and never a means for anything else (a-pardrthd). All combinations and collocations are for the sake of another, whom they serve ; the self is neither the result of any collocation nor does it exist for the sake of serving another. Moreover, consciousness cannot be regarded as being a product of the body. Consciousness cannot be thought to be like an in toxicating property, the product of the four elements ; for the com bination of the four elements cannot produce any and every sort of power. There is a limit to the effects that a certain cause can pro duce; in the production of the intoxicating property it is the atoms which happen to possess that property; intoxication is not to be compared with consciousness; nor has it any similarity to any physical effect; nor can it be thought that there are atoms in which the property of consciousness is generated. Had consciousness been the result of any chemical change, such as we find in the produc tion of the red colour by the combination of lime with catechu, there would have been particles of consciousness (caitanya) pro duced, and our consciousness would then have been the sum total of those particles of consciousness, as in the case of any material chemical product; the red colour produced by the combination of lime with catechu belongs to an object every particle of which is red; so, if consciousness had been a chemical product of the material of this body, there would have been generated some particles of consciousness, and thus there would have been per ceptions of many selves in accordance with each particle of con sciousness, and there would be no identity of consciousness and experience. Thus it must be admitted that consciousness belongs to an entity, the soul, which is different from the body. Nor can consciousness belong to the senses ; for, if it belonged 142 The Philosophy of Ydmundcdrya [CH. to each of the senses, then that which was perceived by one sense (e.g. the eye) could not be perceived by another sense (e.g. the touch), and there would not rise the consciousness "I touch that which I had seen before." If all the senses together produced conscious ness, then we could not perceive anything with one sense (e.g. the eye), nor could we have any consciousness, or the memory of the object of any particular sense after that sense was lost; when a man was blinded, he would lose all consciousness, or would never re member the objects which he had seen before with his eyes. Nor can the manas be regarded as atman ; for it is only an organ accepted as accounting for the fact that knowledge is produced in succession and not in simultaneity. If it is said that the manas may be regarded as being a separate organ by which it can know in succession, then practically the self, or atman, is admitted; the only difference being this, that the Carvakas call manas what we (Yamuna and his followers) call atman. The Vijndnavddin Buddhists held that knowledge, while self- manifesting, also manifested the objects and so knowledge should be regarded as the self (dtman). Against these Buddhists Yamuna held that, if any permanent seat of knowledge was not admitted, then the phenomenon of personal identity and recognition could not be explained by the transitory states of self-manifesting know ledge; if each knowledge came and passed, how could one identify one s present experiences w r ith the past, if there were only flowing states of knowledge and no persons? Since there was no perma nence, it could not be held that any knowledge persisted as an abiding factor on the basis of which the phenomenon of self- identity or recognition could be explained. Each knowledge being absent while others came, there was no chance of even an illusion of sameness on grounds of similarity. The doctrine of the Saiikara school, that there is one qualityless permanent pure consciousness, is regarded by Yamuna as being against all experience. Thus, consciousness is always felt as be longing to a person and as generated, sustained for a time, and then lost. At the time of deep sleep we all cease to possess knowledge, and this is demonstrated by our impression on waking that we have slept for so long, without consciousness. If the antahkarana, which the Advaitins regard as the substratum of the notion of "I," had been submerged during the sleep, then there could not have been xix] Yamuna s doctrine of Soul 143 on waking the notion that "I slept so long." Nobody has ever ex perienced any pure knowledge. Knowledge as such must belong to somebody. The Sarikarites say that the rise of knowledge means the identity of the knowledge with the objects at the time. But this is not so; for the truth of the knowledge of an object is always with reference to its limitations of time and space and not to the in trinsic quality of the thing or the knowledge. The assertion also that knowledge is permanent is without any foundation; for whenever any knowledge arises it always does so in time and under the limita tions of time. Nobody has ever experienced any knowledge divested of all forms. Knowledge must come to us either as perception or as inference, etc.; but there cannot be any knowledge which is absolutely devoid of any forms or modifications and absolutely qualityless. The Sankarites regard the self as pure consciousness or anubhuti, but it is apparent that the self is the agent of anubhuti, or the knower, and not knowledge or pure consciousness. Again, as in Buddhism, so in Sankarism, the question of recognition remains unsolved; for recognition or personal continuity of experience means that the knower existed in the past and is existing even now as when we say, "I have experienced this" but, if the self is pure consciousness only, then there cannot be any perceiver per sisting in the past as well as in the present, and the notion "I have experienced this" is not explained, but only discarded as being illusory. The consciousness of things, however, is never generated in us as " I am consciousness," but as " I have the consciousness of this"; if all forms were impure impositions on pure consciousness, then the changes would have taken place in the consciousness, and instead of the form "I have consciousness" the proper form of knowledge ought to have been "I am consciousness." The Sari- karites also hold that the notion of the knower is an illusory im position on the pure consciousness. If that be so, the consciousness itself may be regarded as an illusory imposition ; if it is said that the pure consciousness is not an imposition, since it lasts till the end the stage of emancipation then, since the result of right know ledge (tattva-jndnd) is this, that the self ceases to be a knower, false knowledge should be welcomed rather than such a right knowledge. The notion " I know" proves the self to be a knower and apart from a knower so manifested no pure consciousness can be experienced. The notion "I" at once distinguishes the knower from the body, 144 The Philosophy of Ydmunacarya [CH. the senses, the manas, or even the knowledge. Such a self is also called a sdksi (perceiver), as all objects are directly perceived by it. The Sdmkhya view is that it is the ahankdra or buddhi which may be regarded as the knower ; for these are but products ofprakrti, and thus non-intelligent in themselves. The light of pure consciousness cannot be regarded as falling on them and thereby making them knowers by the reflection of its light; for reflection can only happen with reference to visible objects. Sometimes it is held by the Sarikarites that true consciousness is permanent and unchangeable, that the ego (ahankdra) derives its manifestation from that and yet reveals that in association with itself, just as a mirror or the surface of water reflects the sun; and, when these limitations of ahankdra, etc., are merged during deep sleep, the self shines forth in its own natural light and bliss. This also is unintelligible ; for if the ahan kdra, etc., had all been manifested by the pure consciousness, how can they again in their turn manifest the consciousness itself? Actually it cannot be imagined what is the nature of that mani festation which pure consciousness is made to have by the ahan kdra, since all ordinary analogies fail. Ordinarily things are said to be manifested when obstructions which veil them are removed, or when a lamp destroys darkness, or when a mirror reflects an object; but none of these analogies is of any use in understanding how consciousness could be manifested by ahankdra. If, again, con sciousness requires something else to manifest it, then it ceases to be self-manifesting and becomes the same as other objects. It is said that the process of knowledge runs on by successive removals of ajndna from the consciousness. Ajndna (na-jndna not know ledge) may be understood as absence of knowledge or as the mo ment when some knowledge is going to rise, but such an ajndna cannot obstruct consciousness; the Sankarites hold, therefore, that there is an indefinable positive ajndna which forms the stuff of the world. But all this is sheer nonsense. That which manifests any thing cannot make that thing appear as a part of itself, or as its own manifestation. The ego, or ahankdra,. cannot also manifest another consciousness (which is different from it) in such a way that that consciousness shall appear as its own manifestation. So it has to be admitted that the self is not pure consciousness, but the self- conscious ego which appears in all our experience. The state of deep sleep (susupti) is often put forward as an example of pure xix] Yamuna s doctrine of Soul 145 consciousness being found unassociated with other limitations of ego, etc. But this is not possible, as we have already seen. More over, when the later experience of the waking moment testifies that "I did not know anything," it can well be urged that there was ho pure consciousness during deep sleep; but that the ego existed is proved by the fact that at the waking moment the perception which identifies the ego (ahankard) as the self, also testifies that the ego as the self had persisted during deep sleep. The self which shines forth in us as the ego therefore remains the same during deep sleep ; but it has no knowledge at that time. After rising from deep sleep we feel "I did not know anything, I did not know even myself." The Sarikarites assert the experience that during deep sleep there is no knowledge even of the ego. This, however, is hardly true ; for the perception "I did not know even myself" means that during deep sleep all the personal associations (e.g. as belonging to a par ticular family, as occupying a particular position, etc.) were absent, and not that the ego itself was absent. When the self is conscious of itself, there is the notion of the "I," as in "I am conscious of my self." During deep sleep also, when no other objects are mani fested, there is the self which is conscious of itself as the ego or the "I." If during emancipation there was no consciousness as the self, the ego, the "I," then it is the same almost as the absolute nihilism of the Buddhists. The sense of " I," the ego, is not a mere quality extraneously imposed on the self, but the very nature of the self. Even knowledge shines forth as a quality of this ego or "I," as when we say " I know it." It is the " I " who possesses the know ledge. Knowledge thus appears to be a quality of the "I." But no experience of ours ever demonstrates that "I" is a quality of pure knowledge. We say " I have this knowledge" and not that the know ledge has the "I." If there is no "I," no one who experiences, no subject who is existent during emancipation, who would strive to attain emancipation? If even the "I" is annihilated after emanci pation, who would care to take all the trouble, or suffer the religious restraints, etc., for such an undesirable state? If even "I" should cease to exist, why should I care for such a nihilistic state ? What am I to do with pure consciousness, when "I" ceases to exist? To say that "I" is such an object as "you" or "he" or "this" or "that," and that this "I" is illuminated by pure consciousness, is preposterously against all experience. The "I" manifests of itself 146 The Philosophy of Ydmunacdrya [CH. without the help of any other manifesting agency, now as well as during emancipation ; for the manifestation of the self has always the sole form of "I"; and, if during emancipation the self mani fests, it must do so as "I." From the sacred texts also we find that the emancipated sages, Vamadeva and Manu, thought of their own selves as the "I." Even God is not devoid of this notion of His personality as "I," as is attested by the Upanisad sayings, in which He declares: "I have created this world." The notion of "I" is false when it is identified with the body and other extraneous as sociations of birth, social rank, etc., and when it gives rise to pride and boastfulness. It is this kind of ahankdra which has been re garded as false in the scriptures. The notion " I," when it refers to the self, is, indeed, the most accurate notion that we can have. All our perceptions of pleasure and pain also are manifested as qualities of the " I," the self. The " I " manifests itself to itself and hence must be regarded as being of non-material stuff (ajada). The argument, that since the notion of "I" is taken along with know ledge (sahopalambha), knowledge alone exists, and that " I " is not dif ferent from it, may well be repudiated by turning the table and with the same argument declaring that " I " alone exists and that there is no knowledge. All persons experience that knowledge is felt to be as distinct from the "I," the knower, as the known object. To say that self is self-manifesting by nature is not the same thing as to say that the self is knowledge by nature; for the self is independent of knowledge; knowledge is produced as a result of the perceptual process involving sense-contact, etc.; the self is the knower, the "I," which knows things and thereby possesses knowledge. The "I," the knower, the self, manifests itself directly by self- consciousness ; and hence those who have attempted to demonstrate the self by inference have failed to do so. Thus, the Naiyayikas think that the self is proved as that in which qualities such as knowledge, desire, pleasure, pain, etc., inhere. But, even though by such an inference we may know that there is something in which the qualities inhere, it cannot be inferred therefrom that this thing is the self in us. Since nothing else is found in which knowledge, willing, etc., might inhere, it may as well be argued that knowledge, etc., are not qualities at all, or that there is no law that qualities must necessarily inhere in a thing. They are regarded asgunas (qualities) only by their technical definition; and the Naiyayikas can accept these xix] Yamuna s doctrine of Soul 147 asgunas, and on that ground infer that there must be some other entity, self (which is not testified by any other proof), as the basis in which the aforesaid gunas may inhere. It is hardly justifiable to accept a new substance, soul (which cannot be obtained by any other proof), simply on the ground that there must be some basis in which gunas must inhere; it is the maxim of the opponents that gunas must exist in some substance and that there are knowledge, willing, etc., which they are pleased to call gunas ; one cannot take further advantage in holding thereby that, since there is no other substance in which these so-called gunas (knowledge, willing, etc.) might inhere, the existence of some other substance as the self must be inferred. The Samkhyists also make the same mistake, when they hold that all the movements of this non-intelligent prakrti must be for the sake of the purusa, for whom the prakrti is working. The objec tion to such a view is this, that even though such entities for which the prakrti is working may be inferred, yet that cannot prove that those entities are not themselves also combinations of many things and objects requiring further superintendents for themselves; or that the purusas should be the same pure intelligence as they are required to be. Moreover, that alone can be the end of a certain combination of events or things, which can be in some way bene fited, moved or affected by those combinations. But the purusas, as the passive pure intelligence, cannot in any way be affected by the prakrti. How then can they be regarded as the end for which the prakrti works ? The mere illusion, the mere semblance on the part of the purusa of being affected or benefited cannot be regarded as a reality, so that by it the purposes of the movements of the prakrti might be realized. Moreover, these so-called affections, or illusions of affection, themselves belong to prakrti and not to the purusas ; for the purusas, as pure intelligences, are without the slightest touch of modifications of the gunas. All mental modifica tions are, according to the Samkhya, but modifications of the buddhi, which, being unintelligent, cannot be subject to illusion, error, 01 mistake. Moreover, no explanation can be found in the supposition that the reflection of the purusas falls upon the buddhi] for, as the purusa is not a visible object, it cannot be reflected in the buddhi. If it is said that there is no real reflection, but the buddhi becomes like the pure intelligence, the purusa, then that also is not possible ; for, if the buddhi is to become as qualityless as the purusas, then all 148 The Philosophy of Ydmundcdrya [CH. mental states have to be abrogated. If it is said that the buddhi does not become like pure intelligence, but as if it was as intelligent as the purusa, then that also is not possible; for purusa is according to the Sdmkhya pure intelligence, not intelligent. There is no in telligent knower in the Sdmkhya, and that is its trouble. If it is said that what is meant by the belief that purusa is the end of all guna- movements is simply this, that, though it is absolutely incapable of any change or transformation, yet by its very presence it sets the gunas in motion and is thus the end for which all theguna modifica tions take place, just as if the purusa were a king for whom the whole dominion works and fights. But since the purusa, unaffected by them, is only the seer of them all, this also is not possible ; for the analogy does not hold, since the king is really benefited by the movements of the people of his dominions but the purusa, which merely implies seeing, cannot be regarded as a seer. The nature of the self, as we have described it, is also attested by the verdict of the Upanisads. This self is directly revealed in its own notion as "I," and pleasure, pain, attachment, antipathy are but its states, which are also revealed along with the revelation of its own self as the " I." This self is not, however, perceived by any of the senses or even by the organ manas, as Kumarila supposed. For the question arises as to when, if the self is believed to be per ceived by the manas, that takes place? It cannot take place pre cisely at the moment when the knowledge of an object arises; for then the notions of the self and the objects, as they occur at the same moment, could not so appear that one (the self) was the cognizer or determiner, and the others (the objects) were the cog nized or the determined. If the knowledge of the objects and the self arose at two different moments as separate acts, it would be difficult to conceive how they could be related as cognizer and cognized. So it cannot be held that the self, though it always manifests itself to us in self-consciousness, could yet be perceived by any of the senses or the manas. Again, Kumarila held that knowledge was a new product, and that when, as a result of certain sense activities, knowledge or thejndna movement was generated in us, there was also produced an illumination (jndtatd or prdkatyd) in objects in association with the self, and that from such an illumination \\iejndna-kriydor know ledge movement could be inferred, and the self, as being the pos sessor of this knowledge, could be perceived by the manas. But such xix] Yamuna s doctrine of Soul 149 a theory that the self is conscious not by itself, but by an extraneous introduction of knowledge, is hardly acceptable; for no one im agines that there exists in him such a difference when he perceives a thing which he had not before that perception. Moreover, since the act of knowledge did not directly reveal the self, there might also be doubts as to whether the self knew things or not, and the self would not shine forth directly in all conscious experience, as it is found to do. Again, some hold that the self is known from the objective con sciousness and not directly by itself. It is easy to see that this can hardly be accepted as true; for how can objective consciousness, which refers to the objects, in any way produce the consciousness of the self? According to this view it is difficult to prove even the existence of knowledge; for this, since it is not self-manifested, requires something else to manifest it ; if it is thought that it is self- manifesting, then we should expect it to be manifested to all per sons and at all times. It may be said that, though knowledge is self-manifesting, yet it can be manifested only in connection with the person in whom it inheres, and not in connection with all per sons. If that be so, it really comes to this, that knowledge can be come manifested only through its connection with a someone who knows. If, in answer to this, it is said that knowledge does not re quire its connection with a person for its own existence, but only for its specific illumination as occurring with reference to a certain subject and object, then that cannot be proved. We could have accepted it if we had known any case in which pure consciousness or knowledge had been found apart from its specific references of subject and object. If it is still asserted that consciousness cannot be separated from its self-manifesting capacities, then it may also be pointed out that consciousness is never found separated from the person, the subject, or the knower who possesses it. Instead of conceding the self-manifesting power to the infinite number of states of consciousness, is it not better to say that the self-mani festation of consciousness proceeds from the self-conscious agent, the subject and determiner of all conscious experiences? Even if the states of consciousness had been admitted as self-manifesting, that would not explain how the self could be self-manifesting on that account. If, however, the self, the knower of all experiences, be admitted as self-manifesting, then the manifestation of the con- 150 The Philosophy of Yamundcdrya [CH. scious experiences becomes easily explained ; for the self is the per- ceiver of all experiences. All things require for their manifestation another category which does not belong to their class; but since also there is nothing on which the self can depend for its consciousness, it has to be admitted that the self is a self-manifesting intelligent entity. Thus the jug does not require for its manifestation another jug, but a light, which belongs to an altogether different class. The light also does not require for its manifestation another light, or the jug which it manifests, but the senses; the senses again depend on consciousness for the manifestation of their powers. Consciousness, in its turn, depends upon the self; without inhering in the self it cannot get itself manifested. The self, however, has nothing else to depend upon; its self-manifestation, therefore, does not depend on anything else. The states of consciousness have thus to be regarded as being states of the self, which by its connection with different objects manifests them as this or that consciousness. Knowledge of this or that object is thus but different states of consciousness, which itself again is a characteristic of the self. If consciousness had not been an inseparable quality or es sential characteristic of the self, then there might have been a time when the self could have been experienced as being devoid of con sciousness; a thing which is so related with another thing that it never exists without it must necessarily be an essential and in separable characteristic thereof. It cannot be said that this general ization does not hold, since we are conscious of our self in connec tion with the body, which is not an essential characteristic of the self; for the consciousness of the self as "I," or as "I know," is not necessarily connected with a reference to, or association with, the body. Again, it cannot be said that, if consciousness were an essential and inseparable characteristic of the self, then the states of unconsciousness in deep sleep and swoon could not be explained; for there is nothing to prove that there is no consciousness of the knowing self during those so-called stages of unconsciousness. We feel on waking that we had no consciousness at the time because we cease to have any memory of it. The reason therefore why states of unconsciousness are felt in the waking stage to be so is this, that we have no memory of those states. Memory is only possible when certain objects are apprehended and the impression of these ob- xixj Yamuna s doctrine of Soul 151 jects of consciousness is left in the mind, so that through them the object of memory may be remembered. During deep sleep no ob jects are perceived, and no impressions are left, and, as a result, we cease to have any memory of those states. The self then remains with its characteristic self-consciousness, but without the con sciousness of anything else. The self-conscious self does not leave any impression on the organs of the psychosis, the manas, etc., as they all then cease to act. It is easy to understand that no impres sion can be made upon the self; for, if it could and if impressions had been continually heaped on the self, then such a self could never manage to get rid of them and could never attain emancipa tion. Moreover, it is the characteristic of the phenomenon of memory that, when a perception has once been perceived, but is not being perceived continually, it can be remembered now, when those past impressions are revived by association of similar per ceptions. But the self-conscious self has always been the same and hence there cannot be any memory of it. The fact that on waking from deep sleep one feels that one has slept happily does not prove that there was actually any consciousness of happiness during deep sleep; it is only a happy organic feeling of the body resulting from sound sleep which is interpreted or rather spoken of as being the enjoyment of happiness during deep sleep. We say, " I am the same as I was yesterday," but it is not the self that is remembered, but the particular time association that forms the content of memory. Perception of objects is generated in us when consciousness comes in contact with the physical objects in association with this or that sense of perception. It is on that account that, though the self is always possessed of its self-consciousness, yet it is only when the consciousness of the self is in touch with an external object in association with a sense-organ that we get that particular sense- perception. This self is not all-pervading, but of an atomic size; when it comes in association with any particular sense, we acquire that particular sense-perception. This explains the fact that no two perceptions can be acquired simultaneously : where there is an ap pearance of simultaneity, there is only a succession of acquirement so rapid that changes cannot be noticed. Had the soul been all- pervading, we should have had the knowledge of all things at once, since the soul was in touch with all things. Thus it is proved that the self has consciousness as its essential characteristic ; knowledge 152 The Philosophy of Ydmundcdrya [CH. or consciousness is never produced in it, but when the obstructions are removed and the self comes into touch with the objects, the consciousness of these objects shines forth. God and the World. As we have already noted, the Mlmamsists do not admit the ex istence of Isvara. Their antitheistic arguments, which we have not considered, can be dealt with here in contrast to Yamuna s doc trine of Isvara. They say that an omniscient Isvara cannot be ad mitted, since such an assumption cannot be proved, and there are, indeed, many objections to the hypothesis. For how can such a perception of omniscience be acquired? Surely it cannot be ac quired by the ordinary means of perception; for ordinary per ception cannot give one the knowledge of all things present and past, before and far beyond the limits of one s senses. Also the per ception of Isvara generally ascribed to the Yogins cannot be ad mitted; for it is impossible that the Yogin should perceive past things and things beyond the limits of his senses, by means of his sense-organs. If mind (antahkarana) be such that it can perceive all sense-objects without the aid of the senses, then what is the use at all of the senses? Of course it is true that by great concentration one can perceive things more clearly and distinctly ; but no amount of concentration or any other process can enable a man to hear by the eye or to perceive things without the help of the senses. Omni science is therefore not possible, and we have not by our senses seen any such omniscient person as Isvara. His existence cannot be proved by inference; for, since He is beyond all perceptible things, there cannot be any reason (hetu] which we could perceive as being associated with Him and by reason of which we could make Him the subject of inference. It is urged by the Naiyayikas that this world, formed by collocation of parts, must be an effect in itself, and it is argued that, like all other effects, this also must have taken place under the superintendence of an intelligent person who had a direct experience of world materials. But this is not necessary; for it may very well be conceived that the atoms, etc., have all been collocated in their present form by the destinies of men (adrsta] according to the karma, of all the men in the world. The karmas of merit and demerit exist in us all, and they are moulding the world- xix] God and the World 153 process, though these cannot be perceived by us. The world may thus be regarded as a product of the karmas of men and not of Isvara, whom no one has ever perceived. Moreover, why should Isvara, who has no desire to satisfy, create this world? This world, with all the mountains, rivers and oceans, etc., cannot be regarded as an effect produced by any one. Yamuna follows the method of the Nydya and tries to prove that the world is an effect, and, as such, must have been produced by an intelligent person who had a direct knowledge of the materials. He also has a direct knowledge of the dharma (merit) and adharma (demerit) of men, in accordance with which He cre ates the whole world and establishes an order by which every man may have only such experiences as he deserves. He, by His mere desire, sets all the world in motion. He has no body, but still He carries on the functioning of His desire by His manas. He has to be admitted as a person of infinite knowledge and power; for other wise how could He create this world and establish its order? The Sarikarites had held that, when the Upanisads say that no thing exists but one Brahman, it means that Brahman alone exists and the world is false; but that is not the sense. It means simply that there is no other Isvara but Isvara, and that there is none else like Him. When the Upanisads declare that Brahman is all that we see and that He is the sole material of the world, it does not mean that everything else does not exist and that the qualityless Brahman is the only reality. If I say there is one sun, it does not mean that He has no rays ; if I say there are the seven oceans, it does not mean that the oceans have no ripples, etc. The only meaning that such passages can have is that the world has come out of Him, like sparks from fire, and that in Him the world finds its ultimate rest and support; from Him all things of the world the fire, the wind, the earth have drawn their powers and capacities, and without His power they would have been impotent to do anything. If, on the contrary, it is held that the whole world is false, then the whole experience has to be sacrificed, and, as the knowledge of Brahman also forms a part of this experience, that also has to be sacrificed as false. All the Vedanta dialectic employed to prove that the per ception of difference is false is of very little use to us ; for our ex perience shows that we perceive differences as well as relations. We perceive the blue colour, the lotus, and also that the lotus has 154 The Philosophy of Ydmunacdrya [CH. the blue colour; so the world and the individuals may also be con ceived in accordance with the teaching of the Upanisads as being inseparably related to Him. This meaning is, indeed, more legiti mate than the conception which would abolish all the world mani festation, and the personality of all individual persons, and would remain content only to indicate the identity of their pure in telligence with the pure intelligence of Brahman. There is not any pure, all-absorbing, qualityless intelligence, as the Sarikarites assert; for to each of us different and separate ideas are being directly manifested, e.g. our feelings of individual pleasures and pains. If there were only one intelligence, then everything should have shone forth simultaneously for all times. Again, this intelligence is said to be both Being (sat), intelligence (cit), and bliss (dnandd). If this tripartite form be accepted, it will naturally destroy the monistic doctrine which the Sankarites try to protect so zealously. If, how ever, they assert that these are not separate forms or qualities, but all three represent one identical truth, the Brahman, then that also is not possible; for how can bliss be the same as intelligence? Pleasure and intelligence are experienced by all of us to be entirely different. Thus, in whichever way we try to scrutinize the Saiikarite doctrines, we find that they are against all experiences and hardly stand the strain of a logical criticism. It has, therefore, to be ad mitted that our notions about the external world are correct and give us a true representation of the external world. The manifold world of infinite variety is therefore not merely an illusory ap pearance, but true, as attested by our sense-experience. Thus the ultimate conclusion of Yamuna s philosophy demon strates that there are, on the one side, the self-conscious souls, and, on the other, the omniscient and all powerful Isvara and the mani fold external world. These three categories are real. He hints in some places that the world may be regarded as being like sparks coming out of Isvara; but he does not elaborate this thought, and it is contradicted by other passages, in which Isvara is spoken of as the fashioner of the world system, in accordance with the Nyaya doctrine. From the manner in which he supports the Nyaya position with regard to the relation of Isvara and the world, both in the Siddhi-traya and in the Agama-prdmanya, it is almost certain that his own attitude did not differ much from the Nvdya attitude, which left the dualitv of the world and Isvara absolutelv unre- xix] God and the World 155 solved. It appears, therefore, that (so far as we can judge from his Siddhi-traya) Yamuna s main contribution consists in establishing the self-consciousness of the soul. The reality of the external world and the existence of Isvara had been accepted in previous systems also. Yamuna thus gives us hardly any new ideas about Isvara and His relation to the souls and the world. He does not make inquiry into the nature of the reality of the world, and rests content with proving that the world-appearance is not false, as the Sahkarites supposed. He says in one place that he does not believe in the ex istence of the partless atoms of the Naiyayikas. The smallest particle of matter is the trasarenu, the specks of dust that are found to move in the air when the sun s rays come in through a chink or hole. But he does not say anything more than this about the ultimate nature of the reality of the manifold world or how it has come to be what it is. He is also silent about the methods which a person should adopt for procuring his salvation, and the nature and character istics of that state. Yamuna, in his Agama-prdmdnya, tried to establish that the Panca-rdtra-samhitd had the same validity as the Vedas, since it was uttered by Isvara himself. Visnu, or Vasudeva, has been praised in the Purusa-sukta and in other places of the Vedas as the supreme Lord. The Pdsupata-tantra of the Saivas is never supported by the Vedas, and thus the validity of the Pdsupata-tantra cannot be com pared with that of the Pancardtra-samhitd. God according to Ramanuja, Venkatanatha and Lokacarya. Bhaskara had said that, though Isvara is possessed of all good qualities and is in Himself beyond all impurities, yet by His Sakti (power) He transformed Himself into this world, and, as all con ditions and limitations, all matter and phenomena are but His power, it is He who by His power appears as an ordinary soul and at last obtains emancipation as well. Ramanuja holds that on this view there is no essential form of Brahman which transcends the limits of all bonds, the power (Sakti) which manifests itself as all phenomena. Brahman, being always associated with the power which exists as the world-phenomena, becomes necessarily subject to all the defects of the phenomenal world. Moreover, when a Sakti, or power of Brahman, is admitted, how can Brahman be said 156 The Philosophy of Ydmundcdrya [CH. to suffer any transformation ? Even if the Sakti (power) be regarded as its transformation, even then it cannot be accepted that it (Brahman) should combine with its Sakti to undergo a worldly transformation. Another Vedantist (probably Yadavaprakasa, the Preceptor of Ramanuja in his early days) held that Brahman, in its own essence, transformed itself into the world; this theory also is open to the objection that the Brahman, being transformed into the world, be comes subject to all the impurities and defects of the world. Even if it is held that in one part it is transcendent and possesses in numerable good qualities and in another suffers from the impurities associated with its transformation into the world, then also that which is so impure in one part cannot have its impurity so counter balanced by the purity of its other half that it can be called Isvara. Ramanuja, therefore, holds that all the changes and transforma tions take place in the body of the Isvara and not in His essence. So Isvara, in His pure essence, is ever free from all impurities, and the possessor of all the best qualities, untouched by the phe nomenal disturbances with which His body alone is associated. The matter which forms the stuff of the external world is not what the Sdmkhya calls the guna substances, but simply the prakrti or the primeval causal entity, possessing diverse qualities which may be classified under three different types the sattva, the rajas and the tamas. This prakrti, however, in its fine essence, forms the body of Isvara and is moved into all its transformations by Isvara Himself. When He withholds prakrti from all its transformations and annuls all its movement, we have the state of pralaya, in which Isvara exists in the kdrana or causal state, holding within Him the prakrti in its subtle state as His body. Prakrti is a body as well as a mode (prakdra) of Isvara, and, when it is in a manifested condition, we have the state of creation. Prakrti undergoes its transformations into tan-mdtra, akarikdra, etc. ; but these are yet the subtle sub stance forming parts of Isvara & body. The transformations through which prakrti passes in the origination of tan-mdtra, ahankdra, etc., are not the results of the collocation of the guna reals, as we saw in the case of the Sdmkhya, but may be regarded as the passing of prakrti through different stages, each stage being marked out by the special character of the prakrti while passing through that stage. The word guna here has then its ordinary meaning of quality; and it is sup posed that the prakrti, as it is moved by Isvara, continues to ac- xix] Ramanuja, V enkatanatha and Lokdcarya on God 157 quire new qualities. The present state of the world also represents prakrti in a particular state wherein it has acquired the qualities which we note in the phenomenal world of ours. We have seen before that the existence of Isvara was inferred by Yamuna on Nyaya lines. But Ramanuja thinks that there is as much to be said in favour of the existence as against it. Thus he says that, even supposing that the hills, etc., are effects, it cannot be said that they were all created by one person; for even all jugs are not made by the same person ; Isvara may also be denied, after the Sdmkhya mode, and it may be imagined that in accordance with the Karma of men the world arose out of a combination of the original gunas. There is thus as much to be said against the ex istence of Isvara as in favour of it. Ramanuja holds that Isvara cannot be proved by inference, but is to be admitted on the authority of the sacred texts 1 . The Nyaya and Yoga, moreover, conceived Isvara to be only the nimitta-kdrana, or instrumental cause; but according to Ramanuja Isvara is all-pervading in all space and in all time. This all-pervasiveness of God does not mean that His reality is the only reality everywhere, or that He is identical with the world-reality, and all else is false. It means, as Sudar- sanacarya has said in his Sruta-prakdsikd on the Rdmdnuja-bhdsya, 2nd sutra, that there is no measure with which He may be limited by any spatial relation. Varada and Narayana, however, and Veiikatanatha, agree in interpreting all-pervasiveness as the ab sence of any limit to His good qualities (iyad-gunaka iti pariccheda- rahitatif. There is nothing else than Isvara s body, so by His body also he may be conceived as pervading the whole world. Thus, Isvara is not only nimitta-kdrana but also updddna-kdrana, or material cause as well. Vehkata establishes in some detail that the highest Isvara is called Narayana and His power, as presiding over matter and souls, is called Laksml. Isvara has His manas, and His eternal senses do not require any body or organs for their mani festation. Veiikata also mentions three modified forms of mani festation of Lord Vasudeva, namely Samkarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. This vyuha doctrine of the Pancardtra has been briefly discussed in Varavara s bhdsya on the Tattva-traya of Lokacarya. These three, Samkarsana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha, 1 See Ramanuja s Bhdsya, 3rd sutra. z See Nydya-siddhdnjana of Venkatanatha. 158 The Philosophy of Yamundcarya [CH. are said to be the three different forms of Vasudeva, by which He controls the individual souls (jiva), the manas and the external world. That form of activity by which thejivas were separated from the prakrti at the beginning of the creation is associated with a form of Isvara called Samkarsana. When this separating activity passes and dominates over men as their manas and ultimately brings them to the path of virtue and good, it is said to be associated with a form of Isvara called Pradyumna. Aniruddha is that form of Isvara by which the external world is generated and kept in order, and in which our experiences and attempts to attain right knowledge are fulfilled. These forms are not different Isvara, but are imagined according to the diversity of His function. Isvara s full existence is everywhere; He and His forms are identical. These forms are but manifestations of the power of Vasudeva and are therefore called Vibhava. Such manifestations of His power are also to be found in great religious heroes such as Vyasa, Arjuna, etc. Lokacarya, in describing Him further, says that in His real essence Isvara is not only omniscient, but this omniscience is also associated with com plete and eternal joy. His knowledge and powers do not suffer any variation or comparison, as they are always the very highest and the most inconceivable by any one else. He moves us all to action and fulfils our desires according to our karmas. He gives knowledge to those who are ignorant, power to those who are weak, pardon to those who are guilty, mercy to the sufferers, paternal affection and overlooking of guilt to those who are guilty, goodness to those who are wicked, sincerity to the crooked, and goodness of heart to those who are wicked at heart. He cannot bear to remain separated from those who do not want to be separated from Him, and puts Himself within easy reach of those who want to see Him. When he sees people afflicted, He has mercy on them and helps them. Thus all His qualities are for the sake of others and not for Himself. His affection for us is of a maternal nature, and out of this affection He neglects our defects and tries to help us towards the ideal of good. He has created this world in Himself, not in order to satisfy any wants but in a playful manner, as it were through mere spontaneity (lild). As in creation, so in keeping the created world in order, and in dissolution, His playful spontaneity upholds everything and brings about everything. Dissolution is as much of His play as creation. All this is created in Himself and out of Himself. xix] Soul according to Ramanuja and Venkatanatha 159 Visista-dvaita doctrine of Soul according to Ramanuja and Venkatanatha. The existence of souls as separate self-conscious entities, in contradistinction to the doctrines of other systems, had been established by Yamuna, as we have shown in some detail in our section on his doctrine of soul. The soul is atomic in its size, as we have already found stated by Yamuna. Barada, Visnu Misra and Venkatanatha held that in the ordinary phenomenal state its know ledge expands and contracts. At the time of emancipation it has its highest expansion in which it pervades the whole world. The cause of its contraction and expansion is its karma, which is also called avidyd. Ramanuja, in his Veddnta-dipa, indulged in the simile of the ray of a lamp in explaining the rise of knowledge in different parts of the body, despite the atomic soul being located in only one part. The soul exists in one part of the body and spreads out its knowledge over all other parts of the body, like the rays of a lamp. Ramanuja says that Isvara allows the individual self- conscious souls to perform whichever action they have a desire to attempt. Movement is possible only through the approval by Isvara of the desires of individual souls. The self-conscious souls desire things according to their own free will, and in this they are not hampered by Isvara ; Isvara always allows the individual souls to act, i.e. to move their limbs according to their desires. This is a sort of occasionalism, which holds that, in every action which I am performing, I am dependent on Isvara s will. I can move my limbs because He wishes it. Apart from this general law that Isvara is a supporter of all actions, there are some exceptions of particular favour and disfavour. To those who are particularly attached to Him He is more favourably disposed, and by His grace generates in them such desires that they adopt actions by which they may easily win Him. Into those who are particularly opposed to Him He imports such desires that they are led farther away from Him 1 . Isvara exists in us all as the inner controller. This inner controller is represented by our individual soul. This individual soul is free in all its desires, knowledge, and attempts 2 . This freedom of will, knowledge, etc., is given to us all by Isvara, and He also arranges that the movements in the material world may take place in ac- 1 See Varavara s commentary on the Tattva-traya. 2 See Ramanuja s Bhdsya, n. 3. 40, 41. 160 The Philosophy of Ydmunacdrya [CH. cordance with our desires. Thus He not only gives us freedom of will, but also helps the realization of that will in the external world, and ultimately grants good and evil fruits according to our good and evil deeds 1 . Thus Isvara s control over us does not rob us of our freedom of will. Even His favour and disfavour consist in the ful filment of a devotee s eager desire to be associated with Him, and His disfavour consists in fulfilling the desire of a confirmed sinner, leading him away into worldly pleasures farther from Him. The self is often called jndna, or consciousness, because of the fact that it is as self-revealing as consciousness 2 . It reveals all objects, when it comes in touch with them through its senses. The souls are, however, all held in Isvara. Ramanuja had spoken of the souls only as being the body of Isvara\ but Lokacarya and Varavara further hold that, as the external material objects exist for the sake of the souls, so the souls exist for the Isvara; as Man is the end for which the external objects of enjoyment exist, so Isvara is the end (sesa) for which Man exists as the object of His control and support (sesf). The self, though pure in itself, becomes associated with ignor ance and worldly desires through coming into touch with matter (acit). Avidyd, or ignorance, here means want of knowledge, mis application of characteristics, false knowledge, etc. This ignorance, or avidyd, which is the cause of many worldly desires and impure instincts, is generated by the association of the souls with matter; when this association is cut away, the self becomes divested of the avidyd and emancipated 3 . Ramanuja says in his Veddrtha-samgraha that Isvara grants emancipation from worldly bonds to a person, when he, after ac quiring true knowledge from the sdstras according to the instruc tion of good teachers, engages himself every day in self-control, penance, purity; practises forgivingness, sincerity, charity, non- injury; performs all the obligatory and ceremonial duties; refrains from prohibited actions, and afterwards surrenders himself com pletely to the Lord ; praises Him, continually thinks of Him, adores Him, counts His names, hears of His greatness and goodness, speaks of it, worships Him, and has all the darkness of his soul removed 1 See Ramanuja s Bhdsya, xi. 3. 40, 41. 2 See Ramanuja s Bhasya, n. in. 29, 30. 3 See Varavara s commentary on the Tattva-traya, Cit-prakarana. xix] Soul according to Ramdnuja and Venkatandtha 161 by His grace. The ordinary obligatory and ceremonial duties have to be performed ; all the highest ethical virtues have to be practised and a true knowledge attained from the sdstras. It is only when a man has thus qualified himself that he can ultimately attain emancipation from all worldly bonds by supreme self-surrender and bhakti to the Lord. Bhakti, or devotion, with Ramanuja means continual thinking of Him. Without it pure knowledge cannot give us emancipation. The special feature of bhakti is this, that by it a man loses all interest in everything else than that which is done for the sake of the dearest. Finally bhakti is not with Ramanuja feeling, but a special kind of knowledge (jndna-vis esa) which seeks to ignore everything that is not done for the sake of Isvara, the dearest to us all 1 . Verikatanatha says that the performance of karmas makes a man fit to inquire into true knowledge, and the acquirement of true knowledge makes a man fit to attain devotion, or bhakti. When a man is fit to inquire after true knowledge, he may give up the karmas. Bhakti is, according to Verikatanatha, the feeling of joy (priti) in the adorable, and not mere knowledge. Emancipation as sdyujya (sameness of quality) with Isvara is the result of such bhakti. In this state of sdyujya, the human soul participates in the qualities of omniscience, bliss, etc., of Isvara. The human soul cannot, of course, wholly participate with Isvara, and such of His qualities as the power of creating and controlling the world, or of granting emancipation to human souls, remain ever with Isvara alone. Human souls can participate only in His knowledge and bliss and can be as omniscient and as blissful as He. In this state of emancipation Man remains in an eternal and infinite blissful servi tude to Isvara. This servitude to Isvara is not painful in the least, like other services. When a man forgoes all his personal vanity and merges all his independence in His service, and considers himself as His servant whose only work is to serve Him, this is indeed the state of bright joy. Verikatanatha, however, further differentiates this Vaisnava emancipation, as the thinking of the Isvara as the most supreme, and thereby deriving infinite joy, from the other type of kaivalya, in which Man thinks of himself the Brahman and attains kaivalya. There also the association with avidyd and the world is indeed destroyed, and the man is reduced to oneness; but 1 See Vedartha-samgraha, p. 146. 1 62 The Philosophy of Ydmundcdrya [CH. this is hardly a desirable state, since there is not here the infinite joy which the Vaisnava emancipation can bring. Ramanuja has written of mukti as a state which a man can acquire when he is divested of all avidyd, and has the natural intuition of the Supreme Soul and his relations with Him. He had distinguished this state from that mukti in which a man is divested of all karmas and realizes himself in himself, as obstructing the qualities of Isvara from him. This kaivalya, or realization of one s own self as the highest, is thus distinctly a lower emancipation. It is not out of place to say that Veiikatanatha had pushed bhakti and the human goal of mukti distinctly further on to the side of feeling, by defining bhakti as a feeling of joy and mukti as servitude to Isvara. Acit or Primeval Matter: the Prakrti and its modifications. Proceeding to describe the nature of matter, Veiikatanatha tries to disprove the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of atoms. The smallest particle of matter is that which is visible in the sun s rays coming in through a chink or hole. The imagination of still finer particles, which may be called dyads or atoms, is not attested by experience ; for these cannot be perceived. They cannot be compared to the small invisible pollen of flowers which makes the air carrying it fragrant; for these small particles possess the quality of smell, whereas atoms are subtle particles which do not possess any per ceivable characteristic. Even inference cannot establish these atoms; for, if we suppose that particles when divided could be further divided until we could arrive at the limit of division, beyond which no division was possible, and that these subtlest particles could be called atoms, this would be impossible, for the atoms of Nyaya and Vaisesika are not only the smallest particles but they are considered to have a special kind of measure (pdrimandalya) as their characteristic, and this we have no data for inferring. If only the smallness is the criterion, we may better stop at the trasa-renu (the dust particles in the air). There are also other objec tions against the atomic theory, such as have been propounded by Sarikaracarya, that the partless atoms cannot come into touch with other atoms or form together into one whole, or that the pdriman dalya measure of the paramdnu should not generate a different kind of measure in the dyad (dvy-anuka), or that the dyad ought not to xix] Prakrti and its modifications 163 generate quite another kind of measure in the trasa-renu. The world cannot thus be accepted as due to the conglomeration of atoms or trasa-renus. Prakrti containing the three qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas has thus to be admitted as the primal matter. The state of it just preceding ahankdra and just following its state as prakrti (the state in which, all its three qualities being the same, there is no manifestation of any particular quality) is called mahat. The next state, which follows mahat and precedes the senses, is called ahankdra. The mahat and ahankdra are not subjective states of buddhi or ego, as some Samkhyists would think, but are two suc cessive cosmic stages of the prakrti, the primeval cosmic matter. The ahankdra is of three kinds, sdttvika, rdjasa and tdmasa. The senses are not products of elements, as the Vaisesika supposed, but represent the functional cognitional powers in association with the eye, nose, skin, etc. It is manas whose states are variously called imagination, determination, etc. Lokacarya describes prakrti as being of three kinds, namely (i) that which contains the purest sattva characters and forms the material of the abode of Isvara; (2) that which contains the threefold characters of sattva, rajas and tamas and forms the ordinary world for us. This is the field of Isvara s play. It is called prakrti because it produces all trans formations, avidyd because it is opposed to all true knowledge, and mdyd because it is the cause of all diverse creations. As we have mentioned before, the gunas of prakrti are its qualities, and not the Sdmkhya reals. Creation is produced by the rise of opposite quali ties in the prakrti. The tan-mdtras are those states of matter in which the specific elemental qualities are not manifested. The order of the genesis of the tan-mdtras is described by some as follows: first the bhutddi, from it sabda-tan-matra, and from that the dkdsa; again, from dkdsa comes sparsa-tan-mdtra (vibration-potential), followed by vdyu\ from vdyu comes the rupa-tan-mdtra (light- potential) and from that tejas (light and heat); from tejas comes rasa-tan-mdtra (taste-potential), and thence water; from water comes gandha-tan-mdtra (smell-potential), and from that earth. Other theories of the genesis of the bhutas are also described, but we omit them here, as they are not of much value. Varavara says that time is regarded as the prakrti without its sattva quality, but Venkata- natha speaks of time as existing in the nature of Isvara as a special form of His manifestation. Space (dik) is not an entity different 164 The Philosophy of Ydmundcdrya [CH. xix from dkdsa, which offers room for the movement of things. Akdsa is not a mere vacuity or non-occupiedness, but a positive entity. Thus it is seen that the indeterminate matter of prakrti, with its three qualities, passes through many stages and at last exhibits the phenomenal world, which produces happiness and misery in accordance with a man s destiny (adrsta} and good or bad deeds. The force of adrsta is not a separate entity, but the favour and dis favour of Isvara, which works in accordance with the good or bad deeds of men. CHAPTER XX PHILOSOPHY OF THE RAMlNUJA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT Sarikara and Ramanuja on the nature of Reality as qualified or unqualified. S ANKARA says that Brahman, as pure intelligence (cin-mdtram) entirely divested of any kind of forms, is the ultimate reality (paramdrtha), and that all differences of the knower, the known, and the diverse forms of cognition are all imposed on it and are false. Falsehood with him is an appearance which ceases to exist as soon as the reality is known, and this is caused by the defect (dosa), which hides the true nature of reality and manifests various forms. The defect which produces the false world appearance is ignorance or nescience (avidyd or mdyd\ which can neither be said to be existent nor non-existent (sad-asad-anirvacamyd), and this ceases (nivrtta) when the Brahman is known. It is, indeed, true that in our ordinary experience we perceive difference and multi plicity ; but this must be considered as faulty, because the faultless scriptures speak of the one truth as Brahman, and, though there are the other parts of the Vedas which impose on us the performance of the Vedic duties and therefore imply the existence of plurality, yet those texts which refer to the nature of Brahman as one must be considered to have greater validity; for they refer to the ultimate, whereas the Vedic injunctions are valid only with re ference to the world of appearance or only so long as the ultimate reality is not known. Again, the scriptures describe the Brahman as the reality, the pure consciousness, the infinite (satyam jndnam anantam brahmd) ; these are not qualities which belong to Brahman, but they are all identical in meaning, referring to the same difference- less identical entity, absolutely qualityless the Brahman. Ramanuja, in refuting the above position, takes up first the view of Saiikara that the Brahman as the ultimate reality is absolutely unqualified (nirvisesa). He says that those who assert that reality can be unqualified have really no means of proving it ; for all proofs are based on the assumption of some qualified character. This un- qualifiedness could not be directly experienced, as they believe; 1 66 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [CH. for there can be no experience without the assumption of some qualified character, since an experience, being my own unique ex perience, is necessarily qualified. Even if you tried to prove that one s own experience, which is really qualified in nature, is un qualified, you would have to pick up some special trait in it, in virtue of which you would maintain it was unqualified ; and by that very fact your attempt is defeated, for that special trait would make it qualified. Intelligence is itself self-revealing, and by it the knower knows all objects. It may also be shown that even during sleep, or swoon, the experience is not characterless. Even when the Brahman is said to be real, pure consciousness, and infinite, it means that these are the characters of Brahman and it is meaningless to say that they do not indicate some character. The scriptures cannot testify to the existence of any characterless reality; for they are a collection of words arranged in order and relation, and each word is a whole, comprising a stem and a suffix, and the scriptures there fore are by nature unable to yield any meaning which signifies any thing that is characterless. As regards perception, it is well esta blished that all determinate perception (sa-vikalpa-pratyaksa) mani fests an entity with its characters ; but even indeterminate percep tion (nirvikalpa-pratyaksd) manifests some character for its in- determinateness means only the exclusion of some particular character; and there can be no perception which is absolutely negative regarding the manifestation of characters. All experiences are embodied in a proposition "This is so" and thus involve the manifestation of some characters. When a thing is perceived for the first time, some specific characters are discerned ; but, when it is perceived again, the characters discerned before are revived in the mind, and by comparison the specific characters are properly assimilated. This is what we call determinate perception, involving the manifestation of common characters or class characters as dis tinguished from the perception of the first moment which is called indeterminate perception. But it does not mean that indeterminate perception is not the perception of some specific characters. In ference is based on perception and as such must necessarily reveal a thing with certain characteristics; and so not one of the three sources of our knowledge, perception, scriptures and inference, can reveal to us any entity devoid of characteristics. It is urged by Saiikara and his followers that perception refers xx] Sankara and Rdmanuja on Reality 167 to pure being and pure being alone (san-mdtra-grdhl) ; but this can never be true, since perception refers to class-characters and thus necessarily involves the notion of difference ; even at that one par ticular moment of perception it grasps all the essential character istic differences of a thing which distinguish it from all other ob jects. If perception had reference only to pure being, then why should it manifest to us that "here is a jug," "here is a piece of cloth"; and, if the characteristic differences of a thing are not grasped by perception, why are we not contented with a buffalo when we need a horse ? As pure being they are all the same, and it is being only which, it is urged, is revealed by perception. Memory would not then distinguish one from the other, and the cognition of one thing would suffice for the cognition of everything else. If any distinctive differences between one cognition and another is admitted, then that itself would baffle the contention of the cha racterlessness of perception. Moreover, the senses can grasp only their characteristic special feature, e.g. the eye, colour, the ear, sound, and so on, and not differencelessness. Again, Brahman is said to be of the nature of pure being, and, if the same pure being could be experienced by all the senses, then that would mean that Brahman itself is experienced by the senses. If this were so, the Brahman would be as changeable and destructible as any other objects experienced by the senses, and this no one would be willing to admit. So it has to be granted that perception reveals difference and not pure characterlessness. Again, it has been argued that, since the experience of a jug, etc., varies differently with different space and time, i.e. we per ceive here a jug, there a piece of cloth, and then again at another moment here a toy and there a horse, and we have not the one continuous experience of one entity in all space and time, these ob jects are false. But why should it be so? There is no contradiction in the fact that two objects remain at the same place at two different points of time, or that two objects remain at two different places at one and the same point of time. Thus there is nothing to prove that the objects we perceive are all false, and the objects are by nature pure being only. Again, it has been urged that experience or intuition (e.g. as in volved in perception) is self-revealing (svayam-prakdsa); but this is true only with reference to a perceiver at the particular time of 1 68 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [CH. his perception. No intuition is absolutely self-revealing. The experience of another man does not reveal anything to me, nor does a past experience of mine reveal anything to me now; for with reference to a past experience of mine I only say "I knew it so before," not "I know it now." It is also not true that no experience can be further experienced; for I can remember my own past experience or can be aware of it, as I can be aware of the awareness of other persons; and, if the fact that one awareness can be the object of another would make it cease from being an ex perience or intuition (samvid or anubhuti}, then there would be no anubhuti or experience at all. If a man could not be aware of the experiences of others, he could use no speech to express himself or understand the speech of other people, and all speech and lan guage would be useless. That jug, etc., are not regarded as intuition or experience is simply because their nature is altogether different therefrom and not because they can be objects of cognition or ex perience; for that would be no criterion at all. It is again urged that this intuition or experience (anubhuti or samvid} is never produced, since we do not know any stage when it was not in existence (prdg-abhdvddy-abhdvdd utpattir nirasyate}. It is also urged that any experience or awareness cannot reveal any state in which it did not exist; for how can a thing reveal its own absence, since it cannot exist at the time of its absence ? Ramanuja, in reply to such a contention on Sarikara s side, debates why it should be considered necessary that an experience should reveal only that which existed at the same time with it; for, had it been so, there would be no communication of the past and the future. It is only sense-knowledge which reveals the objects which are existing at the time when the senses are operating and the sense-knowledge is existing ; but this is not true with regard to all knowledge. Memory, inference, scriptures, and intuitive mystic cognition (yogi-pratyaksa) of sages can always communicate events which happened in the past or will happen in the future. Arguing in the same way, one could say that even in the case of the experience of ordinary objects such as jug, etc., it can be said that the perception which reveals their presence at any particular time does not reveal their existence at all times. That they are not so revealed means that the revelation of knowledge (samvid or anubhuti} is limited by time. If revelation of knowledge were not itself limited in time, then the objects re- xx] Sankara and Rdmdnuja on Reality 169 vealed by it would also not be limited in time, which would be the same thing as to say that these objects, such as jug, etc., are all eternal in nature ; but they are not. This sort of argument may also be applied to the revelation of knowledge in inference ; and it may well be argued that, since the objects must be of the same type as the knowledge which reveals them, then, if the knowledge is not limited in time and is eternal, the objects also will be eternal. For there can be no knowledge without an object. It cannot be said that at the time of sleep, drunkenness, or swoon, the pure experience is ex perienced as such without there being an object. If the pure ex perience were at that time experienced as such, one would re member this on waking ; for except in the case of experiences at the time of universal destruction (pralaya), and in the period when one s body is not in existence, all that is experienced is remembered. No one, however, remembers having experienced an experience at the time of sleep or swoon, so that no such pure revelation of know ledge exists at that time. What Ramanuja maintains here, as will be shown later on, is that during sleep or swoon we have a direct ex perience of the self and not the pure formless experience of the revelation of pure consciousness. Thus there cannot be any state in which knowledge is pure revelation without an object. Hence it cannot be argued that, because knowledge does not reveal the state in which it did not exist, it must always be in existence and never be produced ; for as each cognition is inseparably associated with its object, and as all objects are in time, knowledge must also be in time. Again, the argument that, since knowledge is unproduced, it cannot suffer any further modification or change, is false. Granting for the sake of argument that knowledge is unproduced, why should it on that account be necessarily changeless? The negation pre ceding a particular production (prdga-bhdva) is beginningless, but it is destroyed. So is the avidyd of the Sankarites, which is sup posed to be beginningless and yet to be suffering all kinds of changes and modifications, as evidenced by its false creations of the world- appearance. Even the self, which is beginningless and destruction- less, is supposed to be associated with a body and the senses, from which it is different. This apprehension of a difference of the self from avidyd means a specific character or a modification, and if this difference is not acknowledged, the self would have to be considered 170 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [CH. identical with avidyd. Again, it is meaningless to say that pure intelligence, consciousness, experience or intuition (anubhuti or samvid], is pure self-revelation; for, were it so, why should it be called even self-revelation, or eternal, or one ? These are different characters, and they imply a qualified character of the entity to which they belong. It is meaningless to say that pure consciousness is characterless ; for at least it has negative characters, since it is dis tinguished from all kinds of material, non-spiritual or dependent objects which are considered to be different from this pure con sciousness. Again, if this pure consciousness is admitted to be proved as existing, that must itself be a character. But to whom is it proved? It must be to the self who knows, and in that case its specific character is felt by the self who is aware of it. If it is argued that the very nature of the self-revelation of consciousness is the self, then that would be impossible; for knowledge implies a knower who is different from the knowledge which reveals certain objects. The knower must be permanent in all his acts of knowledge, and that alone can explain the fact of memory and recognition. The consciousness of pleasure, pain and of this or that object comes and goes, whereas the knower remains the same in all his experiences. How then can the experience be identified with the person who experiences? "I know it," "just now I have forgotten it" it is in this way that we all experience that our knowledge comes and goes and that the phases are different from ourselves. How can know ledge or consciousness be the same as the knower or the self? It is held that the self and ego or the entity referred to by "I" are different. The entity referred to by "I" contains two parts, a self-revealing independent part as pure consciousness, and an ob jective, dependent iion-self-revealed part as "myself," and it is the former part alone that is the self, whereas the latter part, though it is associated with the former, is entirely different from it and is only expressed, felt, or manifested by virtue of its association with the former. But this can hardly be admitted. It is the entity re ferred to by "I" which is the subjective and individual self and it is this which differentiates my experience from those of others. Even in liberation I am interested in emancipating this my indi vidual self, for which I try and work and not in a so-called subject- object-less consciousness. If "I" is lost, then who is interested in a mere consciousness, whether that is liberated or not ? If there is xx] Sankara and Rdmdnuja on Reality 171 no relation with this ego, the self, the " I," no knowledge is possible. We all say "I know," "I am the knower"; and, if this individual and subjective element were unsubstantial and false, what sig nificance would any experience have ? It is this ego, the " I," which is self-luminous and does not stand in need of being revealed by anything else. It is like the light, which reveals itself and in so doing reveals others as well. It is one whole and its intelligent nature is its self-revealing character. So the self-luminous self is the knower and not a mere revelation. Revelation, cognition or knowledge means that something is revealed to someone, and so it would be meaningless to say that the self and the knowledge are identical. Again, it has been maintained that self is pure consciousness; for this pure consciousness alone is what is non-material (ajada) and therefore the spirit. But what does this non-materiality mean ? It means with the Saiikarites an entity whose nature is such that its very existence is its revelation, so that it does not depend on any thing else for its revelation. Therefore, pleasures, pain, etc., are also self-revealing. There cannot be a toothache which is present and yet is not known ; but it is held that pleasures and pains cannot be revealed, unless there is a knower who knows them. Well the same would be true for knowledge even. Can consciousness reveal itself to itself? Certainly not; consciousness is revealed always to a knower, the ego or the self. As we say " I am happy," so we say " I know." If non-materiality (ajadatvd) is defined as revealing-to- itself in the above sense, such non-materiality does not belong to consciousness even. It is the ego, the "I," that is always self- revealed to itself by its very existence, and it must therefore be the self, and not the pure consciousness, which stands as much in need of self-revelation as do the pains and pleasures. Again, it is said that, though pure consciousness (anubhuti) is in itself without any object, yet by mistake it appears as the knower, just as the conch- shell appears by illusion as silver. But Ramanuja contends that this cannot be so ; for, had there been such an illusion, people would have felt "I am consciousness" as "this is silver." No one makes such a mistake ; for we never feel that the knowledge is the knower ; but, as a matter of fact, we always distinguish the two and feel our selves different from the knowledge as "I know" (aham anu- bhavdmi). It is argued that the self as changeless by nature cannot be the 172 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [CH. agent of the act of cognition and be a knower, and therefore it is only the changeful modifications of prakrti, the category of ahankdra, to which can he ascribed the capacity of being a knower. This ahankdra is the inner organ (antahkarand) or mind, and this alone can be called a knower; for the agency of an act of cognition is an objective and dependent characteristic, and, as such, cannot belong to the self. If the agency and the possibility of being characterized by the notion of ego could be ascribed to the self, such a self would have only a dependent existence and be non- spiritual, like the body, since it would be non-self-revealing. Ramanuja, in answer to such an objection, says that, if the word ahankdra is used in the sense of antahkarana, or the mind, as an inner organ, then it has all the non-spiritual characteristics of the body and it can never be considered as the knower. The capacity of being a knower (jndtrtia] is not a changeful characteristic (vikriydtmaka), since it simply means the possession of the quality of consciousness (jfidna-gundsraya}, and knowledge, being the natural quality of the eternal self, is also eternal. Though the self is itself of the nature of consciousness (jndna-svarupd), yet, just as one entity of light exists both as the light and as the rays emanating from it, so can it be regarded both as consciousness and as the possessor of con sciousness (mani-prabhrtlndm prabhdsrayatvam iva jnanairayatiam api aviruddham}. Consciousness, though unlimited of itself (svayam aparicchinnam evajndnam), can contract as well as expand (sankoca- vikdsdrham). In an embodied self it is in a contracted state (san- kucita-svarupairi) through the influence of actions (karmand\ and is possessed of varying degrees of expansion. To the individual it is spoken of as having more or less knowledge 1 , according as it is determined by the sense-organs. Thus one can speak of the rise of knowledge or its cessation. When there is the rise of knowledge, one can certainly designate it as the knower. So it is admitted that this capacity as knower is not natural to the self, but due to karma, and therefore, though the self is knower in itself, it is changeless in its aspect as consciousness. But it can never be admitted that the non- spiritual ahankdra could be the knower by virtue of its being in contact with consciousness (cit) ; for consciousness as such can never be regarded as a knower. The ahankdra also is not the knower, and therefore the notion of the knower could not be explained on such a 1 Srl-bhafya, p. 45. xx] Sankara and Rdmdnuja on Reality 173 view. It is meaningless to say that the light of consciousness falls on the non-spiritual ahankdra through contiguity ; for how can the invisible consciousness transmit its light to the non-spiritual ahankdra ? Even in sleep one feels the self as " I " ; for on waking one feels "I have slept happily." This also shows that during sleep it is the " I " that both knew and felt happy. It has to be admitted tha,t there is a continuity between the "I" before its sleep, the "I" during its sleep, and the "I" after its sleep; for after waking the "I" re members all that it had experienced before its sleep. The fact that one also feels "I did not know anything all this time" does not mean that the "I" had no knowledge at all; it means only that the "I" had no knowledge of objects and things which it knows on waking. There can be no doubt that the " I " knew during the sleep, since even a Sarikarite would say that during dreamless sleep the self (dtmari) has the direct intuitive perception (sdksi) of ignorance (ajndna), and no one can have any direct intuitive perception with out also being a knower. Thus, when after sleep a man says " I did not know even myself, I slept so well," what he means is that he did not know himself with all the particulars of his name, caste, parentage, etc., as he knows when he is awake. It does not mean that he had absolutely no knowledge at all. Even on liberation the entity denoted by "I" (aham-artha) remains; for it is the self that is denoted. If there is no one to feel or to know in the state of liberation, who is it that is liberated, and who is to strive for such a liberation ? To be revealed to itself is self-consciousness and im plies necessarily the knower as the "I" that knows, and therefore the notion of "I" denotes the self in its own nature as that which knows and feels. But the entity denoted by the notion of "I" (aham-artha} should be distinguished from the non-spiritual cate gory of mind or the antahkarana, which is but a modification of prakrti or the false feeling of conceit, which is always regarded as bad and is the cause of the implication of insult towards superior persons and this is clearly due to ignorance (avidya). The next point of discussion raised by Ramanuja in this con nection, to prove his point that there is no reality which can be re garded as characterless and unqualified in any absolute sense, is in the attempt that he makes to refute Saiikara s contention that the scriptures give us sufficient ground for acknowledging such a 174 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [CH. reality, and their authority is to be considered as the highest and as absolutely irrefutable. Sarikara had urged that the testimony of the scriptures was superior to that of perception. But the scriptures are based on the assumption of plurality, without which no language is possible. These are for that reason false. For the superiority that is ascribed to the scriptures was due to their teaching of the doctrine that all plurality and difference are false, and that the reality is absolutely differenceless; but yet since the meaning and the expres sions of the scriptures are themselves based on the assumption of difference, how can the teaching of the scriptures be anything but false? Again, since they are as faulty as perception on account of their assumption of plurality, why should they be regarded as having an authority superior to perception? When the scriptures are based on error, what is communicated by them must likewise be erroneous, though it may not be directly contradicted by experience. If a man who is absolutely out of touch with all men has an eye- disease which makes him see things at a great distance double, then his vision of two moons in the sky, though it may not be con tradicted by his or any one else s experience, is yet false. So, when there is defect, the knowledge produced by it must be false, whether it is contradicted or not. Hence, avidyd being false, the Brahman communicated by it through its manifested forms, the scriptures, must also be false. And one may well argue, that, since Brahman is the object of knowledge produced by means tainted by avidyd, it is false, just as the world is false (Brahma mithyd avidyddy-utpanna- jndna-visayatvdt prapancavat}. In anticipation of such objections Saiikara urges that even false dreams can portend real good or bad happenings, or an illusory sight of a snake may cause real death. Ramanuja s answer to this is that what is meant by saying that dreams are false is that there is some knowledge, corresponding to which there are no objects; so there is knowledge in illusion and real fear due to such knowledge, but the corresponding external object does not exist. So in these cases also the communication of truth, or a real thing, or a real fact, is not by falsehood, but real knowledge; for no one doubts that he had knowledge in his dream or in his illusion. So far as the fact that there was knowledge in dream is concerned, dreams are true, so that it is useless to say that in dreams falsehood portends real fact. Thus, from whatever point of view it may be argued, it is im- xx] Sankara and Rdmdnuja on Reality 175 possible to prove that the reality is characterless and differenceless, whether such a reality be pure being, or a unity of being, intel ligence and bliss, or pure intuitional experience, and such a con tention will so much cripple the strength of the scriptures that no thing can be proved on their authority and their right to supersede the authority of perception can hardly be established. But the scriptures also do not speak of any characterless and unqualified reality. For the texts referring to Brahman as pure being (Ch., vi. 2. i), or as transcendent (Mund., I. i. 5), or where the Brahman is apparently identified with truth and knowledge (Tait., n. i. i), can actually be proved to refer to Brahman not as qualityless, but as possessing diverse excellent qualities of omniscience, omnipotence, all-pervasiveness, eternality and the like. The denial of qualities is but a denial of undesirable qualities (heya-gundn pratisidhya}. When Brahman is referred to in the scriptures as one, that only means that there is no second cause of the world to rival him ; but that does not mean that His unity is so absolute that He has no qualities at all. Even where Brahman is referred to as being of the essence of knowledge, that does not mean that such an essence of knowledge is qualityless and characterless ; for even the knower is of the essence of knowledge, and, being of the essence of knowledge, may as well be considered as the possessor of knowledge, just as a lamp, which is of the nature of light, may well be regarded as pos sessing rays of light l . Refutation of Sahkara s avidya. It is urged by Sarikara that the self-luminous differenceless one reality appears as the manifold world through the influence of de fect (dosa). This defect, called avidya, hides its own nature and pro duces various appearances and can neither be described as being nor as non-being: for it cannot be being, since then the illusion and the realization of its being an error would be inexplicable, and it cannot be non-being since then the world-appearance, as well as its realization as being wrong, would be inexplicable. 1 jnana-svarupasyaiva tasya jndnd-srayatvam mani-dyumani-pradlpd-divad ity uktam eva. rl-bhasya, p. 61. The above is based on the discussions in the Srl-bhdsya known as mahd- purva-paksa and mahd-siddhdnta. $n-bhdsya, p. 10 et seq. 176 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [CH. Ramanuja, in refuting avidyd, says that this avidyd is impossible since it must lean on some other thing for its support (dsraya), and it is clear that individual souls cannot be its support, since they themselves are regarded as being the products of avidyd. The Brahman also cannot be its support; for it is self-luminous con sciousness and is hence opposed to avidyd, which is regarded as being liable to be recognized as illusory as soon as the true know ledge dawns. It cannot be argued that it is only the knowledge that Brahman is of the nature of pure knowledge, and not pure know ledge forming the essence of Brahman, that destroys avidyd; for there is no difference between these two, between knowledge as the essence of Brahman and knowledge as removing avidyd. The nature of Brahman that is revealed by the knowledge that Brahman is of the nature of pure knowledge is already present in His pure self- luminous nature, which must necessarily on that account destroy avidyd 1 . Moreover, in accordance with Sarikara s view, Brahman, being of the nature of pure intuition, cannot further be the object of any other knowledge, and hence the nature of Brahman should not be further the object of any other concept. So, if knowledge is to be opposed to ignorance or avidyd, it must be in its own essence as it is, in itself, and so Brahman, as pure knowledge, ought to be opposed to avidyd. Moreover, to say that Brahman, which is of the nature of pure self-illumination, is hidden by avidyd is to say that the very nature of Brahman is destroyed (svarupa-ndsd) ; for, since pure self-illumination is never produced, its concealment can only mean that it is destroyed, since it has no other nature than pure self-illumination. Again, if the contentless pure self-luminous in tuition is said to assume diverse forms on account of the defect of avidyd, which is supported by it, then the question may be asked, whether this defect is real or unreal. If it is real, then the monism fails, and, if it is unreal, then the question arises, how is this unreal defect brought about? If it is brought about by some other defect, then, that also being unreal, the same question will again arise, and hence there will be a vicious infinite (anavasthd). If it is held that even without any real basis one unreal defect may be the cause of another unreal defect and so on in a beginningless series, then we 1 Sudarsana Suri says here that, if there is such a difference between Brahman as essence and Brahman as destroying tividya, that would mean that one form of Brahman is different from its other form, or, in other words, that it is qualified. Sruta-prakasika, Pandit edition, Benares, vol. IX, p. 658. xx] Refutation of Sankara s avidyd 177 virtually have nihilism (Mddhyamika-paksa or Sunya-vdda) l . If, to escape these criticisms, it is held that the defect is the very essence of intuition (anubhuti) or Brahman, then, Brahman being eternal, the defect also will be eternal, and emancipation, or the cessation of the world-appearance, will never take place. Again, this avidyd is said to be indefinable, being different from both the existent and the non-existent (sad-asad-vilaksand). But how can this be? A thing must be either existing or not existing; how can there be anything which is neither existing nor not-existing? Referring to the arguments of the Sarikarites in favour of the existence of ajndna (nescience) as a positive entity and as directly perceived in such perceptions as "I am ignorant," "I do not know myself or any others," Ramanuja says that such perceptions refer only to the non-existence of the knowledge of an object prior to its apprehension (praga-bhdva). Ramanuja argues that the ignorance perceived cannot refer to its specific and determinate object; for, if it did, then the object would be known and there would be no ignorance at all; and if the ajndna does not refer to any specific object, how can the ajndna or ignorance, standing by itself, be per ceived or realized? If it is urged that ajndna refers to indistinct (a-visada-svarupa) knowledge, then also it may be said that this 1 Sudarsaria Suri here points out that the l^ahkarites try to evade the vicious infinite in three ways: firstly, those who think that ignorance (avidyd) is as sociated vfithjlv.a(jlvd-jndt]a-vddl)exp\a\n it by affirming it so as to involve an infinite series like the seed-and-the-shoot (vljdnkura), but not a vicious infinite; since on their view JIT a is produced by avidyd and avidyd is again produced by jlva (avidydydm jlvah jwdda vidyd). Those again who think that avidyd belongs to Brahman (Brahtnd-jndna-vddl) hold that avidyd is by nature beginningless and the irrationality or unreasonableness of its nature is nothing surprising. As regards the beginninglessness of avidyd in an infinite series (pravdlid-ndditva) of jlva and avidyd and avidya and jlva as propounded in the first view of the jtvd-jndna- vddins, the refutation of it by those who hold that the ajndna belongs to Brahman is enough. For they have pointed out that such a view goes against the uni versally accepted doctrine of the eternity of souls, since it held that the souls came out through avidyd and avidyd through souls. The other view, that the illusory series is by itself beginningless, is no better; for, if one illusion were the basis of another illusion in a beginningless series, this would be practically identical with the nihilistic philosophy. Moreover, even if the illusion is admitted to be begin ningless in nature, then also that must await some other root primary cause (miila-dofdpekfd) from which this successive series of illusions springs, and from that another, and so there will arise the vicious infinite. If no such root cause is awaited, the world-appearance may itself be regarded as avidyd, and there will be no need to suppose the existence of any root cause as avidyd. Again, if avidyd is held to be irrational in nature, why should it not affect the emancipated souls and also Brahman ? If it is answered that it does not do so because the emanci pated souls and Brahman are pure, then that means that this avidyd is rational and wise and not irrational. ruta-prakdsikd, in Pandit, vol. IX, pp. 636-665. 178 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [CH. may be regarded as the absence of the rise of distinct knowledge. Thus, even if a positive ignorance is admitted, it must somehow be related to something else to which it refers. In whatever way one may attempt to explain ajndna (ignorance), either as want of knowledge, or as other than knowledge, or as opposed to know ledge, it can be made possible only by a knowledge of the very fact of which it will be the opposite. Even darkness has to be conceived as being opposed to light; and hence one must have knowledge of light in order to understand darkness, as being opposed to it. But the ajndna (ignorance) of the Sarikarites cannot stand by itself, and so must show its content by a reference to the object or entity of which there is ignorance. Therefore, in the aforesaid experiences, " I am ignorant, " " I do not know myself or any one else," it should be admitted that what is felt is this want of rise of knowledge and not any positive ignorance, as the latter is equally found to be re lative to the object and the subject and has no advantage over the former. Moreover, the Brahman, which is ever free and ever the same pure self-luminous intelligence, cannot at any time feel this ignorance or avidyd. It cannot hide Brahman ; for Brahman is pure intelligence, and that alone. If it is hidden, that amounts to the destruction of Brahman. Again, if Brahman can perceive ajndna, it can as well perceive the world appearance ; if by hiding Brahman the ajndna makes itself perceived by Brahman, then such ajndna cannot be removed by true knowledge, since it has the power of concealing knowledge and of making itself felt by it. Further, it cannot be said that avidyd hides the Brahman only partially; for Brahman has no part. So the above experience of " I did not know anything," as remembered in the awakened state and referring to experiences of deep sleep, is not the memory of ajndna or ignorance directly experienced in deep sleep (susupti), but an inference during the awakened state of not having any knowledge during deep sleep on account of there being no memory 1 . Inference also is unavailing for proving the existence of any ajndna; for not only would such premises of inference involve a faulty reason, but no proper ex ample could be found which could satisfy the claim of reason by a reference to any known case where a similar thing happens. More- 1 ato na kincid avedisam iti jnanam no. smaranam kintu asmarana-lingakam jnana-bhava-visayam anumiti-rupam. Sruta-prakdsika, p. 178. (Nirnayasagar ed. xx] Rdmdnujd s theory of Illusion 179 over, it is quite easy to formulate other series of inferences to dis prove the possibility of such ajndna as is accepted by the Saii- karites 1 . Ramanuja s theory of Illusion All knowledge is Real. Ramanuja says that all illusion may briefly be described as per ception in which a thing appears to be different from what it is (anyasya anyathdvabhdsah). It is unreasonable to imagine that the illusory content of perception must be due to no cause, or is some thing wholly unperceived or wholly unknown (atyantd-paridrstd- kdranaka-vastu-kalpand-yogdi). If such a wholly chimerical thing is imagined to be the content of illusory perception, then it must be inexpressible or indescribable (anirvacaniya)] but no illusory object appears as indescribable; it appears as real. If it appeared as an inexpressible entity, there would be neither illusion nor its correc tion. So it has to be admitted that in all illusions (e.g. in conch- shell-silver illusion) one thing (e.g. the conch-shell) appears in another form (e.g. silver). In all theories of illusion, whatever may be the extent of their error, they have ultimately to admit that in all illusions one thing appears in the form of another. Speaking against the Sarikarites, it may be asked, he urges, how is their inexpressible (anirvacaniya) silver produced ? The illusory perception cannot be the cause; for the perception follows only the production of the indescribable silver and cannot precede it to be its cause. It cannot be due to the defects in our sense-organs ; for such defects are sub jective and therefore cannot affect the nature of objective reality or object. Moreover, if it is inexpressible and indescribable, why should it appear under certain circumstances in the specific form of a particular kind of appearance, silver ? If it is urged that this is due to the fact of there being a similarity between silver and conch- shell, it may again be asked whether this similarity is real or unreal. It cannot be real, since the content is illusory; it cannot be unreal since it has reference to real objects (e.g. the real silver in a shop). So such a theory of illusion is open to many criticisms. Ramanuja seems to have himself favoured the anyathd-khydti theory of illusion, and says that there will be no explanations of contradiction of knowledge involved in illusory knowledge, or of consequent failure of behaviour as suggested by such knowledge, 1 Sruta-prakasikd, pp. 178-180. i8o Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [CH. unless error is ultimately explained as the wrongful appearance of one thing as another. He also says that all the other theories of illusion (except possibly the yathdrtha-khydti view, as suggested in the Sruta-prakdsikd commentary yathdrtha-khydti-vyatirikta- paksesu anyathd-khydti-paksah prabalah) would ultimately have to accept the analysis of error as the wrongful appearance of one thing as another (khydty-antardndm tu suduram apt gatvd anyathdva- bhdsah dsrayamyah Rdmdnujabhdsya). Ramanuja further points out that even the akhydti theory of illusion (i.e. illusion considered as being due to the non-apprehension of the difference between the presentation of the "this" of the conch-shell and the memory of silver) is a form of anyathd-khydti; for ultimately here also one has to accept the false identification of two characters or two ideas. Veiikatanatha, commenting on this point in his Nydya-parisuddhi, says that the appearance of one thing as another is the indispensable condition of all errors, but the non-apprehension of difference must always be granted as an indispensable condition which must exist in all cases of false identification and has therefore the advantage of a superior simplicity (Idghava) ; yet the anyathd-khydti theory gives the proper and true representation of the nature of illusion, and no theory of illusion can do away with the need of admitting it as a correct representation of the phenomenon of illusion. So Veiikata natha says that Ramanuja, while he agrees with the anyathd-khydti view as a theory of illusion, yet appreciates the superior simplicity of the akhydti view as giving us the indispensable condition of all forms of illusion. But, though Ramanuja himself prefers the anyathd-khydti view of illusion, he could not very well pass over the yathdrtha-khydti view, as advocated by the senior adherents and founders of the school of thought which he interpreted, viz. Bodhayana, Natha- muni and Varada Visnu Misra. Ramanuja is thus faced with two different theories, one that he himself advocated and the other that was advocated by his seniors. Fortunately for him, while his own theory of anyathd-khydti was psychological in character, the other theory of yathdrtha-khydti was of an ontological character, so that it was possible for one to hold the one view psychologically and the other view ontologically. Ramanuja, therefore, offers the yathdrtha- khydti view as an alternative. Venkatanatha says that this yathdrtha- khydti view can only be put forward as a theory based on scriptural xx] Ramanuja s theory of Illusion 181 evidence, but cannot be supported as a philosophical theory which can be experienced and therefore as a scientific theory of illusion. We have to make up our minds between the two plausible alter native theories of anyathd-khydti and akhydti. Ramanuja, to distinguish the yathdrtha-khydti theory of his seniors, whom he refers to by the term "Vedic school" (veda- viddm matam), develops this view in a number of verses and says that he understands on the strength of the scriptural texts that the material world was created by the intermingling of the three ele ments, fire, water and earth, so that in each object there are all the three elements. When a particular element predominates in any material object, it is found tc possess more qualities of that element and is designated by its character, though it still holds the qualities of other elements in it. Thus it may in some sense be said that all things are in all things. A conch-shell possesses also the qualities of tejas, or silver, and it is on that account that it may be said to resemble silver in some sense. What happens in the case of illusion is that through defects of organs, etc., the qualities or characters in a conch-shell representing other elements are not noticed and hence the perception can only grasp the qualities or characters of silver existing in the conch-shell, and the conch-shell is perceived as silver. So the knowledge of silver in a conch-shell is neither false, nor unreal, but is real, and refers to a real object, the silver element existing in the conch-shell 1 . In this view of illusion all knowledge is regarded as referring to a real object (yathdrtha-khydti) 2 . The difference between this view and that of Prabhakara is this, that, while Prabhakara was content with the negative condition of non- apprehension of the difference between the present perception of a glittering conch-shell and the memory of silver in the shop as the cause of the illusion, and urges that knowledge is real either as per ception or as the memory, and that illusion has been the result of non-apprehension of the distinction of the two, Ramanuja is more radical, since he points out that the perception of silver in a 1 See Sruta-prakasikd, pp. 183-6. 2 According to Sudarsana Suri this view is the traditional view (sampra ddyika) accepted by Bodhayana, Nathamuni, Rama Misra and others, which Ramanuja, as a faithful follower of that school, had himself followed. Thus, Ramanuja says : yathd-rtham sarva-vijndnam iti veda-viddm matam sruti-smrtibhyah sarvasya sarvd-tmatva-pratltitah. Bhdsya and Sruta-prakdsikd, p. 183. 182 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [CH. conch-shell is due to the real perception of the element of silver in a conch-shell and the non-apprehension owing to defects (dosa) of the other elements present in it which would have shown its difference from silver. So what is called the illusory perception of silver in the conch-shell has a real objective basis to which it refers. Dreams are explained by Ramanuja as being creations of God, intended to produce corresponding perceptions in the minds of the dreamers. The case of the appearance of a conch-shell as yellow to a person with jaundiced eyes is explained by him as due to the fact that yellow colour emanates from the bile of his eyes, and is carried to the conch-shell through the rays of the eyes which turn the white shell yellow. The appearance of the conch-shell as yellow is therefore a real transformation of the conch-shell, noticed by the eye of a jaundiced person, though this transformation can be noticed only by him and not by other persons, the yellow being very near his eyes 1 . The akhydti and the yathdrtha-khydti views agree in holding that the imposed idea has a real basis as its object. But, while the former holds that this real basis is a past presentation, the latter holds that it is given as a presentation along with the object, i.e. the silver element, being mixed up with the conch-shell element, is also presented to the senses, but owing to some defects of circum stances, organs of sight, etc., the conch-shell, which ought to be the main part, is not perceived. Thus, it is only the silver part that forms the presentation, and hence the error. So non-perception of the conch-shell part is common to both the views; but, while the akhydti view holds that the silver part is only a reproduced image of past experience, the yathdrtha-khydti view grounds itself on the trivrt-karana texts of the Upanisads and holds that the silver part is perceived at the time. But Sudarsana Suri refers to the views of other teachers (kecid dcdrydh] and says that the trivrt-karana view may well explain the misapprehension of one element (bhuta) for another; but in the cases of misapprehension due to similarity trivrt-karana is not of much use, for trivrt-karana and panci-karana 1 Other types of errors or illusions are similarly explained by Ramanuja as having a real objective existence, the error being due to the non-apprehension of other elements which are objectively existent and associated with the entity which is the object of illusory perception, but which owing to defects are not perceived. See ibid. pp. 187, 188. xx] Rdmdnuja s theory of Illusion 183 can explain the intermixture of bhutas, but not of the bhautikas, or the later modifications of the five elements into the varied sub stances such as conch-shell and silver, which are mutually mis apprehended for each other on account of their similarity. It has, therefore, to be maintained that in these 6/mta-modifications also the trivrt-karana principle applies to a certain extent ; for here also the molecules or atoms of things or substances are made up of large parts of some 6/ZMta-rnodification and smaller parts of one or more of other &/mta-modifications. The conch-shell molecules are thus made up of large parts of conch-shell material and smaller parts of the silver material, and this explains the similarity of the one ele ment to the other. The similarity is due to the real presence of one element in the other, and is called the pratinidht-nydya, or the maxim of determining similarity by real representation. So in all cases of misapprehension of one thing as another through similarity there is no misapprehension in the strict sense, but a right appre hension of a counterpart in the other object constituting the basis of the similarity, and the non-apprehension of the bigger and the larger part which held the counterpart coeval with it. It is because the conch-shell contains a major part of conch-shell element (sukty- amsd) and only a minor part of silver that it passes as conch-shell and not as silver. Conch-shell cannot serve the purpose of silver, despite the silver element in it, on account of the obstruction of the major part of the conch-shell element; and it is also on account of this that under normal circumstances the silver element in it is hidden by the conch-shell element, and we say that we perceive conch-shell and not silver. When it is said that this is conch-shell and not silver (nedam rajatam), the "not silver" has no other meaning than that of the conch-shell, the apprehension of which dispelled the idea of silver. It is the conch-shell that is designated in its negative aspect as "not silver" and in its positive aspect as conch-shell. Ramanujacarya, alias Vadihamsambuvahacarya, the maternal uncle of Verikatanatha, seems to support the Ramanuja method of sat-khydti by showing that all the other three rival theories of illusion, such as that of anyathd-khydti, akhydti, and the anirva- canlya-khydti, cross each other and are therefore incompatible. But he takes great pains to show that the sat-khydti theory may be sup ported on the basis of the logical implications involved in both the 184 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [CH. anyathd-khydti and the akhydti types of realism. He starts the dis cussion by taking for granted the akhydti type of realism and its logical implications. He holds that it also would ultimately lead to anyathd-khydti, and that therefore (excepting the sat-khydti), of all the khydtis, anyathd-khydti is perhaps the best. He says in his Nydya-kulisa that, since the way of knowledge requires that the sense-organs should reach their objects, even in illusory perception there must be some objects which they reach; for they could not convey any knowledge about an object with which they were not in contact 1 . The defect (dosa) cannot account for the production of new knowledge, for it only serves to obstruct anything from being perceived or known. Defects only obstruct the course of the natural sequence of cause and effect 2 , just as fire would destroy the natural shooting powers of seeds 1 . Moreover, taking the old ex ample of the conch-shell-silver, it may be asked how, if there was no silver at all objectively present, there could be any knowledge of such an absolutely non-existing thing? Since our awareness can not refer to non-existing entities, all forms of awareness must guarantee the existence of corresponding objects. What happens in the case of the illusion of conch-shell-silver is that there is memory of silver previously experienced and the "this," which is ex perienced at the time of the illusion; and it is on account of the de fects (dosa) that it is not grasped that the silver is only a memory of past experience, while it is only the "this" in front of us that is experienced at the time (dosdt pramusita-tadavamarsah) 3 . Vadiharnsambuvaha, weighing the various arguments of the rival theories of anyathd-khydti and akhydti, deals with the argu ments of the anyathd-khydti view which holds that it is the conch- shell that appears as silver. As against the objections raised by such a view in opposition to the akhydti view, viz., if each thing is dif ferent from every other thing, how can an illusion be explained as being due to the non-apprehension of the difference between the silver remembered and the "this" perceived directly in experience? Arguing in its favour, he says that the difference which is not 1 indrivdndm prdpya-kdritvcna aprdptd-rtha-prakdsana nupapatteh. \ydy<i- kulisa, Madras Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4910. 2 dosdndm hdrya-vixhdta-mdtra-hetutvena kdryd-ntaro-pajanakatrd-yogdt, na hy agni-samsprstasya kalama-vljasya ankuro-tpddane sdmarthyam asti. Ibid. 3 idam iti puro-vastitni anubhavah rajatum iti ca purvd-nitbhuta-rajata-visayd smrtih. Ibid. xx] Ramanuja s theory of Illusion 185 apprehended here consists of that characteristic which exists in things by virtue of which one thing is not confused with or misappre hended as another thing, and it is the non-apprehension of this differentiating characteristic that causes the misapprehension of the conch-shell as silver (samsarga-virodhi-vaidharmya-visesa-rupa- bhedd-grahah pravrtti-hetuh) l . But the real objections to holding this akhydti view of illusion to be ultimately sufficient consists in the fact that it cannot do away with the necessity of the synthetic operation (samsarga-vydpdra) consisting of a thing being regarded as such-and-such, as found in all discussions of disputants, in all our behaviours and concepts of error and illusion. This forces us to accept the anyathd-khydti view as an unavoidable and ultimate explanation 2 . Vadihamsambuvaha urges that, since the silver is felt to be in that which is only a piece of conch-shell, this must imply the imposition of the one on the other (which is the essential part of anyathd-khydti). Just as in the real perception of a piece of silver the object before us is experienced as silver, so in the conch- shell-silver illusion, the object before us is experienced as silver, 1 Madras Govt. MS. No. 4910. 2 Like the seniors referred to by Ramanuja, Prabhakara also considers all knowledge to be valid (yathartham sarvam eve ha vijnanam iti, Prakarana-pancikd, p. 32), though the former does so on ontological grounds and the latter on psycho logical and experiential grounds, alikanatha, representing Prabhakara s view, says that, whatever is the content of awareness, that alone is known, and at the time of the conch-shell-silver illusion, what is known is " this is silver," but there is no knowledge of conch-shell, since it is not the content of awareness at the time. Thus it cannot be said that the illusory knowledge consists of knowing the conch-shell as silver, but of the "this" as silver; for, when there is the knowledge of illusory silver, there is no knowledge of conch-shell. What happens in illusory perception is that through defects the differentiating characteristics of the conch- shell are not apprehended and the conch-shell is perceived only in its general character as an object. Then there is memory of silver, and through a defect in the mental process (mano-dosat) the silver is not remembered with its original association of time and place as that silver which was perceived there, but is simply remembered as an image of silver (tad-ity-umsa-paramarsa-vivarjitam). Though there is no such definite experience that I remember silver, yet the idea of silver has to be admitted to be due to memory ; for it cannot be due either to per ception or to inference or to any other source of knowledge. Thus, through the elimination of all other sources of knowledge, silver has to be admitted to be due to memory (ananya-gatitah smrtir atrd vagamyate). On account of the absence of a feeling that I remember a past experience, the memory of silver cannot be distinguished from a percept ; for it is only these facts that distinguish a present percept from a reproduced image ; and so we fail to differentiate between this memory and the actual perception of some object before us (the differentiating characteristics of which are entirely lost to us through defects of sense-organs or the like). On account of the non-apprehension of the distinction, these two dif ferent kinds of awareness themselves produce the illusion of a direct and im mediate perception of silver which is not there at the time, and even tempt us to 1 86 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [CH. and here also it is the conch-shell that appears as silver. When the illusion is dispelled, we say that "this is not silver"; this cannot mean the mere presence of the conch-shell, but it must mean the denial of the imposition that was made previously. For, if nega tions could be treated as positive entities, then there would be no difference between positives and negatives (bddhyasya vidhi- rupatve vidhi-nisedha-vyatydsam ca nisedhe bddha iti tulyarthatvdt) 1 . The akhydti view speaks of non-apprehension of absence of as sociation (e.g. of conch-shell-silver, asamsargdgraha) to be the cause of illusion. It may well be asked, What is this absence of association? It cannot be the mere thing itself; for, had it been so, we should expect that the thing itself (say the conch-shell) is not perceived and this alone constitutes error, which is impossible. Moreover, the silver is felt to be in front of us as the object we per ceive and not as something which we remember. We know that, when we perceive illusorily that "this is silver," there is the per ception of a false association (bddhaka-samsarga-grahanam) ; but the concept of non-apprehension of difference (bheddgraha) never seems to be practically realized in experience. If we inquire into the nature of what constitutes falsity or contradiction (e.g. in conch- shell-silver), we find that it is not the fact that a conch-shell when burnt becomes ash while silver, when burnt, may be made into a finger-ring that constitutes error, but the fact that what was believed to be capable of being rendered into a finger-ring by being put into fire cannot be so done (yadi tv-angullyakddi-hetutaydbhimatasya vyavahdrasya bhasma-hetutvako hy atra visesah). If this is what is really meant by falsehood, it is nothing but the apprehension of the cause of one kind of action as being another cause (anya-hetu- vyavahdro nya-hetutaydvagatah). This will be anyathd-khydti\ for, if even here it is urged to be non-apprehension of difference, then stretch our hands to pick it up, as if there were a real piece of silver before us. (See Prakarana-pancika, Ch. iv, Naya-vlthi.) Sudarsana Suri, commenting on the akhydti view in his Sruta-prakasikd in connection with his commentary on the yathdrtha-khydti view of Ramanuja s seniors, says that the akhydti view has the advantage of superior simplicity or the minimum assumption, viz. that in illusion only an indefinite object is seen, and the distinction between this and the image roused in memory by it is not apprehended. This has to be admitted in all theories of illusion, and in addition other assumptions have to be made. 1 Nydya-kulisa of Vadihamsambuvaha Ramanujacarya, Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4910. xx] Rdmanujcfs theory of Illusion 187 the experience in such cases of the belief of one thing as another is not explained 1 . In all such cases the final appeal must be made to experience, which attests all cases of illusion as being the appear ance of one thing as another 2 . But though Vadihamsambuvahacarya thus tries to support the anyathd-khydti view of illusion, yet he does not dismiss the akhydti view of error curtly, but admits that it may also properly explain facts of illusion, when looked at from another point of view. For, if there was not the non-apprehension of difference between silver and conch-shell, the conch-shell could not be mistaken as silver. So, even in anyathd-khydti, there is one element of akhydti in volved ; for in order that one may behave towards a piece of conch- shell in the same way as one would do to a piece of silver, it is necessary that one should not be able to distinguish between what one sees before one and what one remembers. But, though the negative fact of akhydti, i.e., non-apprehension of difference, may be regarded in many cases as a necessary stage, yet the positive fact of association (samsarga) or synthesis has to be admitted as an in dispensable process, connecting the different elements constituting a concrete perception. The root-cause of all our behaviour and action, being of the nature of synthetic association, it would be wrong to suppose that non-apprehension of difference could by itself be made a real cause of our actions (na ca mula-bhute samsarga- jndne pravrtti-kdrane siddhe tad-upajivino nirantara-jndnasya pravrttihetutvam iti yuktam vaktum) 1 . Although Vadihamsam- buvaha spends all his discussions on the relative strength of akhydti and anyathd-khydti as probable theories of illusion, yet he refers to the view of illusion mentioned by Ramanuja that all things are present in all things and that therefore no knowledge is illusory. He considers this view as the real and ultimately correct view. But, if this were so, all his discussions on the akhydti and anyathd- khydti theories of illusion would be futile. Vadihamsambuvaha does not, however, attempt to show how, if this theory be admitted, the other theories of akhydti or anyathd-khydti could be sup- 1 yadi ca trapi bhedd-grahah saranam sydt tato bhimdna-visesa-krta-bddha- vyavasthd na sidhyet. Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4910. 2 katham ayam loka-vyavahdro vrtta iti, na hi kancid upddhim andlambya lake sabda-prayogo vakalpyate, tasmddbddhya-bddhaka-bhdvd-nyathd-nupapattydany- athd-khydti-siddhih. Ibid. 8 Ibid. 1 88 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [CH. ported 1 . He further criticizes the anirvacaniya-khydti (illusion as the indescribable creation of, say, the appearance of silver in the conch-shell-silver illusion), a view of illusion as held by the San- karites, in the stereotyped form with which we are already familiar. Anantacarya, a writer of the nineteenth century, laid stress on the view of illusion which held that all things were contained in all things, and hence the perception of conch-shell as silver was neither false knowledge nor non-apprehension of the difference between what is perceived and what is remembered; for the perception "this is silver" is a complex of two perceptions, "this" and "silver." Had not this been a case of actual perception, we should not have felt as if we perceived the "this" before us as "silver." The function of dosa (defect) was only to hide the conch-shell part (mixed up with the silver part) from perception. To say that all perceptions have objective entities corresponding to them (yath- drtha) does not mean that things are as they are perceived, but it means that it is not true that what is perceived has not an objective basis corresponding to it 2 . That sort of tejas-substance which forms the material cause of silver certainly exists in the elemental tejas, and, the earth-particles forming the material cause of conch-shells being present in the elemental earth-substances, these substances get mixed in the primitive stage of compounding by trivrt-karana, and this explains the presence of the objective substratum of silver in the illusory perception of silver 3 . It is evident, argues Anant acarya, that conch-shell cannot appear as silver; for, since conch- shell is not silver, how can it appear as silver? In order properly to accTount for the perceptual experience "this is silver," it is necessary to assume that the two constituents, "this" and "silver," of the complex "this is silver" are both perceptually determined; for it is only in this way that one can justify the perception "I perceive this silver." 1 yady api bhutdndm panclkarana-labdha-paraspara-vydptyd suktikdydm api sddrsydt rajatai-kadeso vidyata eva iti siddhdntah tathdpi na vidyata iti krtvd cintyatevddy<-uddharana-prasiddhy-anurodhdya. Govt. Oriental MSS. No. 4910. 2 tad-visayaka-jfidna-sdmdnyam visesydvrtti-dharma-prakdrakatvd-bhdvavad iti yathdrtham sarva-vijfidnani. Jndna-ydthdrthya-vdda, MSS. No. 4884. 3 yadrsa-dharma-vacchinnat tejo msdd rajatd-rambhah tddrsa-dharmd- vacchinndndm apy amsdndm mahd-bhutdtmake tejasi sattvena sukty-drambhakatd- vacchedaka-dharmd-vacchinndndm pdrthiva-bhdgdndm api mahd-prthivydm sattvena tayoh mahd-bhuta-trivrt-karana-dasdydm eva meland-sambhavdcchukty- ddau rajatd-sad-bhdvo-papatteh. Ibid. This is an answer to the already noted objection raised by the Sruta-prakdsikd. xx] Failure of Theistic Proofs 189 Failure of theistic proofs. The existence of God can be known by the testimony of the scriptures (sdstra-pramdnaka), and by that alone. All other proofs which seem to demonstrate the existence of God ultimately fail to do so, since suitable counter-arguments may always be successfully arrayed to destroy the efficacy of such arguments. God cannot be perceived either by any of the sense-organs or by the mind; for the former can make known only those objects with which they have come in contact, and the latter (excepting in the direct communication of feelings like pleasure, pain, etc.) can not make external objects known to us without depending on the sense-organs. Further, God cannot be perceived by the special perception of saints (yogi-pratyaksd) ; for these are of the nature of memory, and do not convey any facts previously unknown through the senses. The saints can perceive only what has been already perceived, though these may not be present to the senses at the time. Objects too small for the senses cannot be perceived; for there cannot be any sense-contact with them. No reason can be perceived by means of which a necessary inference could be drawn regarding the existence of a supreme person who has a direct acquaintance with all things and the power of making them all. The ordinary argument that is offered is from effect to cause since the world is "effect" (kdrya), it must have a cause, a maker, who has direct acquaintance with all its materials and their utility and enjoys them. The world is "effect" because, like all effects, it is made up of parts (sdvayava) ; like a healthy human body, there fore, it is under the guidance and superintendence of one person and one alone. But the point is that the two cases are not analogous. The human body is neither produced nor maintained in existence by its superintendent, the soul. The production of the body of a person is due to the adrsta (unseen effects of deeds) not only of that person, but also of beings who are benefited or in some way con nected with it. Its existence as connected parts is due to the union of its parts, and does not depend for that on the living person who superintends it. Its existence as living is wholly unique and cannot be found in the case of the world as a whole. The superintendence of one person need not be considered as the invariable cause of all movements; for it is well known that many persons unite their 190 Philosophy of the Rdmdnnja School of Thought [CH. efforts to move some heavy object which could not otherwise be moved. Moreover, if such a maker of the universe is to be admitted, could not the making of the world be better ascribed to one or more individual souls ? They have a direct acquaintance with the materials of the world. It is not necessary that the maker should be ac quainted with the inner efficiencies or power of things; for it is enough if the objects containing those powers are directly known. We see also that in all examples of making, such as the making of a jug, a cloth, or the like, the maker is an ordinary human being. Since the inference of the existence of a cause of the world is in spired by these examples, it will be only fair to assume that the maker of the universe belongs to the same class of beings as the makers of the ordinary mundane effects, such as a jug or a cloth. Thus, instead of assuming a supreme being to be the maker of the universe, we might as well assume an individual soul to be the maker of the universe. Hence it is difficult to prove the existence of God by inference. Ordinarily inferences are applied for the knowing of an object which may also be known in other ways, and in all such cases the validity of any inference is tested by these. But in the case of the application of inference for the knowing of God this is not possible; for God cannot be known by any other direct or indirect method. So the application of inference is not of any use here, since there is nothing which can test the validity of the inference or can determine that inference in a particular way and in that way alone. Therefore, since all sorts of inferences can be made from diverse propositions, it is not possible to determine that any particular kind of inference would be more acceptable than any other. There are some who would still want to support the cosmo- logical argument on the ground that no less than a supreme person, entirely different from the individual persons, could be regarded as the maker of this vast universe ; for the individuals cannot have the power of perceiving subtle things, or things which are ob structed from our view, or things which are far away. Thus it is necessary to hold that the maker of the universe must be a being of unlimited powers. From the effect we infer its cause; and again from the nature of the effect we infer the nature of the cause. So, if the cause of the universe is to be inferred, then only such a cause xx] Failure of Theistic Proofs 191 can be inferred as really has the unlimited powers required for pro ducing such an effect. It is irrelevant to infer such a cause as cannot produce it. Also the unessential conditions of ordinary causes need not be imported by suggesting that, just as in the case of ordinary human beings there must be a body and also instruments by which they can operate and produce the effect, so also in the case of the supreme cause it might be expected that He should have a body and should have instruments by which He could operate. This cannot be; for we know that many effects are wrought by sheer force of will and desire (sankalpd) and neither will nor desire needs a body for its existence, since these are generated not by body, but by mind (manas). The existence of manas also is independent of the existence of body; for the mind continues to exist even when it is dissociated from body. Since limited beings, who are under the sway of virtue and vice, are unable to produce this manifold uni verse of such wonderful and diverse construction, it has to be ad mitted that there exists a supreme person who has done it. More over, since the material cause is seen in all known examples to be entirely different from the cause as agent or doer, there cannot be a Brahman which is both the material cause (updddna-kdrand) and the cause as agent (nimitta-kdrana) of this universe. To this, however, it may be replied that it is admitted that the world is effect and that it is vast, but it is not known that all parts of this vast world originated at one time and from one person. Not all jugs are made at one time and by one person. How can any room be made for an unknown supreme person and the possibility be ruled out that different individual souls, by virtue of special merit and special powers, should at different times create the different parts of the world, which now appear as one unified whole created by one person at one time? It is quite possible that the different parts of the world were created at different times and will similarly be destroyed at different times. To imagine the existence of one such supreme person who could create all this manifold may well be regarded as almost chimerical. From the fact that the world is effect all that can be argued is that it must have been produced by an intelligent being, but there is nothing to infer that it is neces sarily the creation of one intelligent being. This infinite universe could not have sprung into being at any one moment, and there is no proof that it did so. And, if it came into being gradually, it may 192 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [CH. well be supposed that there were many intelligent beings who brought it into being gradually. Moreover, God, being absolutely complete in Himself, could not be conceived as having any need to effect such a creation, and He has neither body nor hands with which He could create. It is true that mind does not die with the body, but it is not found in any active state when it is not associated with the body. If it is admitted that God has a body, then He can not be eternal. If His body could be eternal, though having parts, then on the same grounds the world too might be regarded as eternal. If the world is admitted to have come into being by His mere wish, that would be so strange as to be entirely dissimilar to all known cases of cause and effect. So, if one has to argue the ex istence of God as cause of the world on the basis of the analogy of known causes and effects as experienced by us, and if such a God is endowed with all the attributes with which He is generally as sociated, and with strange ways of creating this world, He must be such a cause as could never be inferred on the basis of the similarity of known causes and their modes of creating the effect. Thus, God can never be proved by inference. His existence has to be admitted on the testimony of scriptural texts and of that alone. Bhaskara and Ramanuja. Every careful reader of Bhaskara and Ramanuja must have noticed that Ramanuja was largely indebted for his philosophical opinions and views to Bhaskara, and on most topics their doctrines are more or less the same. It is possible that Ramanuja was in debted for his views to Bodhayana or other Yaisnava writers, but, however that may be, his indebtedness to Bhaskara also was very great, as a comparative study of the two systems would show. However, the two systems are not identical, and there is an im portant point on which they disagree. Bhaskara believed that there is Brahman as pure being and intelligence, absolutely formless, and the causal principle, and Brahman as the manifested effect, the world. According to Bhaskara there is no contradiction or dif ficulty in such a conception, since all things have such a dual form as the one and the many or as unity and difference. "Unity in difference" is the nature of all things. Ramanuja, however, holds that difference and unity cannot both be affirmed of the same thing. Thus, when we affirm "this is like this," it is not true that the same xx] Bhdskara and Rdmdnuja 193 entity is both the subject and the predicate. For example, when "this" in the above proposition stands for a cow, the predicate "like this" st