A HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY A HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY BY SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA, M.A., Ph.D. PRINCIPAL, SANSKRIT COLLEGE, CALCUTTA VOLUME II CAMBRIDGE AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS PUBLISHED BY THE SYNDICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS London Office: Bentley House, N.W. I American Branch : New York Agents for Canada, India, and Pakistan: Macmillan First printed 1932 Reprinted 1952 MAY 2 printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge Reprinted by offset-litho by Percy Lund Humphries & Co. Ltd PREFACE NINE years have passed away since the first volume of this work was published, and the present volume has been in the press for more than two years . During the last seven years bad health has been responsible for many interruptions. In the first volume manu scripts were sparingly used, but in the present work numerous unpublished and almost unknown manuscripts have been referred to . These could not be collected easily, and it took time to read them ; many of them were old and moth-eaten and it was not often easy to decipher the handwriting. It has not always been possible, how ever, to give an elaborate account of the content of all these manu scripts, for in many cases they contained no new matter and had therefore only been mentioned by name, a fact which could be ascer tained only after long and patient study, since records of them were previously unknown. A considerable delay was also caused in the writing of this volume by the fact that large portions of what will appear in the third volume had to be compiled before the manuscripts had left the author s hands. In any event, the author offers his sincere apologies for the delay. The manuscript of the third volume has made good progress and, barring illness and other accidents, will soon be sent to press. This volume will contain a fairly elaborate account of the principal dualistic and pluralistic systems, such as the philosophy of the Panca-ratra, Bhaskara, Yamuna, Ramanuja and his followers, Madhva and his followers, the Bhagavata-purana and the Gaudlya school of Vaisnavism. The fourth and the fifth volumes will deal with the philosophy of Vallabha and some other lesser known schools of Vaisnavism, the philosophy of the Puranas, Tantras, the different schools of Saivas, Saktas, Indian Aesthetics, the philo sophy of right and law and the religious systems that have found their expression in some of the leading vernaculars of India. A new impression of the first volume is now in the press. The present volume contains four chapters on Sankara Vedanta, the Medical Speculations of the Ancient Hindus, and the Philosophy of the Yoga-vasistha and the Bhagavad-gltd. A good deal of the Sankara Vedanta, especially in regard to its controversy with VI Preface Bhaskara, Ramanuja, Madhva and their followers, still remains to be treated in the third volume. A word of explanation may be needed with regard to the inclusion in a work on Indian philosophy of the speculations of the Indian medical schools. Biology has recently played a great part in liberating philosophy from its old-world ideas. In ancient India, Biology had not grown into a separate science ; whatever biological ideas were current in India were mixed up with medical, osteological and physiological speculations, the only branches of study in ancient India which may be regarded as constituting an experimental science. It was therefore thought that a comprehensive work on the history of Indian philosophy would be sadly defective without a chapter on these speculations, which introduce also some dis tinctly new ethical and eschatological concepts and a view of life which is wholly original. The biological notions of growth, de* velopment and heredity of these schools are no less interesting, and their relations to the logical categories of Nyaya are very instructive. No attempt has been made to draw any comparisons or contrasts with Western philosophy, since in a work of this type it would most likely have been misleading and would have obscured the real philosophical issues. The study here presented is strictly faithful to the original Sanskrit texts within the limits of the present writer s capacities. Often the ground covered has been wholly new and the materials have been obtained by a direct and first-hand study of all available texts and manuscripts. Nevertheless some sources, containing, possibly, valuable materials, inevitably remain unconsulted, for many new manuscripts will be discovered in future, and our knowledge of Indian philosophy must advance but slowly. In spite of the greatest care, errors of interpretation, exposition and expression may have crept in and for these the author craves the indulgence of sympathetic readers. Since the publication of the first volume of the present work, many treatises on Indian philosophy have appeared in India and elsewhere. But it has not been possible to refer to many of these. The present attempt is mainly intended to give an exposition of Indian thought strictly on the basis of the original texts and commentaries, and not to eradicate false views by indulging in controversy ; and, since the author takes upon himself the responsi bility of all the interpretations of the texts that he has used, and since Preface vii he has drawn his materials mostly from them, it has seldom been possible to refer to the efforts of his fellow- workers in the field. Occasionally, however, he has had to discuss and sometimes to bor row the views of other writers in the assessment of chronological facts, and he also expresses his indebtedness to such other writers who have worked upon some of the special problems of Indian thought. It has been suggested to him that it would have been better if the views of other writers had been fully criticized, but however that may be, such criticism has been considered as beyond the scope of this work, which, as at present planned, will cover some 3000 pages when completed. The chronological views regarding the antiquity of the Gltd may appear heretical, but it is hoped that they may be deemed ex cusable, for this is an age of toleration, and they are not more heretical than the views of many distinguished writers on Indian chronology. In the chapter on the Gita, some repetition of the same views in different contexts was inevitable on account of the looseness of the structure of the Gita, which is an ethico-religious treatise and not a system of philosophy. This, however, has been studiously avoided in the other chapters. Neither the Yoga-vasistha nor the Glta are systematic works on philosophy, and yet no treatment of Indian philosophy can legitimately ignore their claims. For in a country where philosophy and religion have been inseparably associated, the value of such writings as breathe the spirit of philosophy cannot be over-estimated, and no history of Indian philosophy worth the name can do without them. I have no words sufficient to express my gratitude to my esteemed friend, Dr F. W. Thomas, Boden Professor of Sanskrit, Oxford, who went through the proofs in two of their stages and thus co-operated with me in the trouble of correcting them. I fear that in spite of our joint efforts many errors have escaped our eyes, but had it not been for his kind help the imperfections of the book would have been greater. I must similarly thank my friend, Mr Douglas Ainstie, for help with the proofs. My thanks are also due to my pupils, Dr M. Eleade (Bucharest), Mr Janakiballabh Bhattacharyya, M.A., and my other friends, Messrs Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., Durgacharan Chatterjee, M.A., Srish Chandra Das Gupta, M.A., and my daughter, Miss Maitreyi Devi, for the assistance they rendered me in getting the manuscript viii Preface ready for the press, inserting diacritical marks, comparing the references and the like, and also in arranging the index cards. But as none of them had the whole charge of any of these tasks, and as their help was only of an occasional nature, the responsibility for imperfections belongs to the author and not to them. SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA Calcutta, 1931 CONTENTS CHAPTER XI THE ^ANKARA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA (continued) PAGE 1 The World-Appearance ......... I 2 Thought and its Object in Buddhism and in Vedanta . . .13 3 ^ahkara s Defence of Vedanta; Philosophy of Badarayana and Bhartrprapanca . . . . . . . . . .36 4 Teachers and Pupils in Vedanta ....... 46 5 Vedanta Doctrine of Soul and the Buddhist Doctrine of Soullessness 58 6 Vedantic Cosmology . . . . . . *. . -73 7 arikara and his School 77 8 Mandana, Suresvara and Visvarupa ....... 82 9 Mandana (A.D. 800) .......... 87 10 Suresvara (A.D. 800) 98 11 Padmapada (A.D. 820) . . . . . . . . .102 12 Vacaspati Misra (A.D. 840) . . . . . . . .106 13 Sarvajnatma Muni (A.D. 900) . . . . . . . . in 14 Anandabodha Yati (eleventh or twelfth century A.D.) . . .116 1 5 Mahd-vidyd and the Development of Logical Formalism . . .118 16 Vedanta Dialectic of rlharsa (A.D. 1150) 125 17 Application of the Dialectic to the Different Categories and Concepts 133 1 8 Citsukha s Interpretations of the Concepts of Isarikara Vedanta (A.D. 1220) ............ 147 19 The Dialectic of Nagarjuna and the Vedanta Dialectic . . .163 20 Dialectical Criticisms of antaraksita and Kamalasila (A.D. 760) as forerunners of Vedanta Dialectics 171 (a) Criticisms of Samkhya Parindma Doctrine . . . . .171 (6) Criticism of Isvara . . . . . . . . .176 (c) Refutation of the Soul Theory 178 (d) Refutation of the Mimamsa Theory of the Self . . . .179 (e) Refutation of the Samkhya View of the Self . . . .181 (/) Refutation of the Upanisad View of the Self . . . .181 (g) Refutation of the Theory of the Persistence of Existing Entities . 182 (h) Refutation of Criticisms of the Non-permanency of Entities . 185 (i) Refutation of the Nyaya Vaisesika Categories . . . .187 21 Dialectic of ankara and Anandajnana 189 22 Philosophy of the Prakatdrtha-vivarana (A.D. 1200) . . . .196 23 Vimuktatman (A.D. 1200) . . . . . . . . .198 24 Ramadvaya (A.D. 1300) 204 25 Vidyaranya (A.D. 1350) ......... 214 26 Nrsimhasrama Muni (A.D. 1500) ....... 216 27 Appaya Dlksita (A.D. 1550) ........ 218 28 Praka&inanda (A.D. 1550 1600) ....... 220 29 Madhusudana SarasvatI (A.D. 1500) 225 x Contents CHAPTER XII THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE YOGA-VASISTHA PAGE 1 Yoga-vdsistha ........... 228 2 The Ultimate Entity 232 3 Origination . 235 4 Karma, Manas and the Categories 237 5 The World-Appearance ......... 240 6 Nature of Agency Kartrtva} and the Illusion of World Creation . . 242 7 The Stage of the Saint (Jlvan-mukta) 245 8 Energy of Free-will (Paurusd) 252 9 Prdna and its Control ......... 256 10 Stages of Progress .......... 264 1 1 Methods of Right Conduct ........ 267 12 Yoga-vdsistha, 3arikara Vedanta and Buddhist Vijnanavada . . 268 CHAPTER XIII SPECULATIONS IN THE MEDICAL SCHOOLS 1 Ayur-veda and the Atharva-Veda ....... 273 2 Bones in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda ..... 284 3 Organs in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda 288 4 Practice of Medicine in the Atharva-Veda ..... 293 5 The Foetus and the Subtle Body ....... 302 6 Foetal Development . . . . . . . . .312 7 Growth and Disease . . . . . . . . .319 8 Vdyu, Pitta and Kapha ......... 325 9 Head and Heart 340 10 The Circulatory and the Nervous System ..... 344 11 The Nervous System of the Tantras . . . . . -352 12 The Theory of Rasas and their Chemistry . . . . 357 13 The Psychological Views and other Ontological Categories . .366 14 Logical Speculations and Terms relating to Academic Dispute . 373 15 Did Logic Originate in the Discussions of Ayur-veda Physicians? . 392 1 6 Ayur-veda Ethics .......... 402 17 Springs of Action in the Caraka-samhitd 411 18 Good Life in Caraka 418 19 Ayur-veda Literature . . . . . . . . .423 Contents xi CHAPTER XIV THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE BHAGAVAD-GITA i The Gltd Literature 2 Gltd and Yoga PAGE 437 A A -7 3 Samkhya and Yoga in the Gltd .... 4 Samkhya Philosophy in the Gltd .... 5 Avyakta and Brahman ...... 6 Conception of Sacrificial Duties in the Gltd 7 Sense-control in the Gltd ..... 8 The Ethics of the Gltd and the Buddhist Ethics 9 Analysis of Action ....... 10 Eschatology ........ 455 . . . 461 470 . 479 . 488 - 493 - 515 12 Visnu, Vasudeva and Krsna 13 Bhagavata and the Bhagavad-gltd .... INDEX 535 545 ? > ? CHAPTER XI THE SANKARA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA (continued) THE treatment of the school of Sankara Vedanta in the preceding chapter may be considered fairly sufficient for all ordinary pur poses. But the reputation of this school of thought stands so high, and so many people are interested in it, that it was pointed out to me that it would be desirable to go into a little more detailed study of it. An additional justification for such a suggestion is to be found in the regrettable fact that, though numerous elementary and half-informed treatises have been published both in this country and in Europe, I do not know of any systematic study of the system in any of the modern languages of Europe or Asia which has been based on a first-hand study of the works of the great thinkers of this school who followed Sankara and developed his system in a remarkably recondite manner. The comparatively small compass of this chapter in a History of Indian Philosophy cannot be expected to fulfil adequately such a demand ; but still it may be expected that an attempt to bring out some of these materials by some amount of detailed study will be excusable, though it may seem slightly to disturb the general plan of this work. The World-Appearance. The Upanisads, called also the Vedanta, contain passages which indicate very different lines of thought, theistic, pantheistic, of self as the only ultimate reality, creationism, etc. The works of those commentators who wrote commentaries on the Upanisads before Sankara and tried to interpret them on the supposition that there was one uniform, systematic, dogmatic philosophy in them are now practically all lost, and all that we can know of them is contained in the meagre references that are found in Sankara s commentaries or the works of other, later, commentators. As an example I may refer to Bhartrprapanca, who tried to give a realistic interpretation of the Brhad-aranyaka Upanisad by treating the world and souls as real emanations from God or Brahman 1 . 1 Fragments of Bhartrprapanca from the writings of Sankara and his com mentator Anandajnana and from Suresvara s Vdrttika have been collected by Prof. Hiriyanna, Mysore, in a short paper read at the Third Oriental Conference in Madras in 1924, published in Madras in 1925. 2 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. Sarikara inherited from his predecessors the opinion that the Upanisads teach us one consistent systematic philosophy, but, being under the influence of Gaudapada, differed from them on the nature of this philosophy, which he propounded so elabo rately in all his commentaries on the Upanisads and the Brahma- sutras. The main thesis of Sankara, as has already been pointed out in the preceding chapter, consists of the view that Brahman alone is the ultimate reality, while everything else is false. He was interested in proving that this philosophy was preached in the Upanisads; but in the Upanisads there are many passages which are clearly of a theistic and dualistic purport, and no amount of linguistic trickery could convincingly show that these could yield a meaning which would support Sarikara s thesis. Sankara there fore introduces the distinction of a common-sense view (vyava- hdrikd) and a philosophic view (paramarthikd), and explains the Upanisads on the supposition that, while there are some passages in them which describe things from a purely philosophic point of view, there are many others which speak of things only from a common-sense dualistic view of a real world, real souls and a real God as creator. Sankara has applied this method of interpretation not only in his commentary on the Upanisads, but also in his commentary on the Brahma-sutra. Judging by the sutras alone, it does not seem to me that the Brahma-sutra supports the philosophical doctrine of Sankara, and there are some sutras which Sankara himself interpreted in a dualistic manner. He was never afraid of indulging in realistic interpretations ; for he could easily get out of the difficulty by asserting that all the realistic conceptions found in the sutras or in the Upanisad passages were merely an estimate of things from the common-sense point of view. Though on the basis of Sankara s own statements, as well as those of his later commentators and other adherents of his school, there is hardly any room for doubt regarding the meaning and force of Sarikara s philosophy, yet at least one Indian scholar has sought to prove that Sarikara s philosophy was realistic 1 . That there was some amount of realism in Sarikara is proved by his own con fession, when he criticizes the uncompromising Buddhistic idealists (vijnana-vadins) or the so-called Buddhistic nihilists (sunya-vadins). 1 Advaita Philosophy by K. Vidyaratna, published by the Calcutta Univer sity Press, 1924. xi] The World- Appearance 3 I have already discussed in a general way in what sense according to the Vedanta, from the point of view of the Sankara school of Vedanta as interpreted by his later adherents, the world is an illusion. But in the present section I propose to discuss Sahkara s own statements, as well as the statements of some of his important followers, on the subject of the nature of world-illusion. This is one of the most important points of the Sankara school of philosophy and needs a discussion in some detail. But before I take it up, I am naturally reminded of the views of Buddhist idealism and the so-called Buddhistic nihilism, and it seems desirable that Sankara s doctrine of illusion should be treated in connection with the doctrines of illusion in those systems of Buddhistic thought which preceded Sankara. Taking the Sunya- vdda theory of Nagarjuna and Candrakirti, we see that they also introduced the distinction between limited truth and absolute truth. Thus Nagarjuna says in his Madhyamika-sutras that the Buddhas preach their philosophy on the basis of two kinds of truth, truth as veiled by ignorance and depending on common-sense pre suppositions and judgments (samvrti-satya) and truth as unqualified and ultimate (paramartha-satya) 1 . The word samvrti literally means "closed." Candrakirti explains samvrti as meaning "closing on all sides " and says that it is ignorance (ajnand) which is denoted by the term samvrti here, because it covers the truth of all things 2 . In this sense the whole of the world of our experience of causes and effects, which we perceive and of which we speak, presents an appearance which is hidden by ignorance. This world is not con tradicted in our world-experience ; but, as each and every entity of this world is produced by other things or entities, and they again by others, and as we cannot specify the nature of each one of them without referring to others which produced them or from which they originated, and tracing those again to other causes and dve satye samupdsritya buddhdndm dharma-desand loka-samvrti-satyam ca satyam ca paramdrthatah. Mddhyamika-sutra, xxiv. 8, p. 492, B.B. edition. 2 Ajndnam hi samantdt sarva-paddrtha-tattvdvacchddandt samvrtir ity ucyate. Ibid. Candrakirti however gives two other meanings of the word samvrti, which do not seem to be so closely connected with the etymology. In the first of the two meanings samvrti means interdependent origination or pratltya-samutpdda, and in the second it means the conventional world of common-sense, which can be expressed or indicated by speech and language and which we are supposed to know and refer to in all our experiences involving the knower and the known samvrtih samketo loka-vyavahdrah, sa ca abhidhdndbhidheya-jndna-jneyddilak- sanah. 4 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. so on, it is not possible to assert anything as to the nature or characteristic (svabhavd) of anything as it is. Things are known to us only as being the result of the combination of many entities or as product complexes. Nothing is produced of itself, and so the pro ducts are never by themselves self- existent, but exist only through the coming together of different entities. That which has any nature of its own cannot owe its origination to other complexes, and so there is nothing in our world-experience which has a nature of its own. The apparent reality of the world has therefore the mysterious veil of ignorance over it, and it is this veil of ignorance which is referred to by the term loka-samvrta. This is spoken of also as tatkya-samvrti (real ignorance) , as distinguished from mithyd-samvrti (false ignor ance), properly used of the ordinary illusions and hallucinations of magic, mirage reflections, etc. 1 Those appearances which are due to sense-defects or other causes and are therefore contradicted in experience are called mithya-samvrta, because their falsehood is discovered in experience. The falsehood of the world-appearances, however, can be realized only when their real nature (paramdrtha- rupa) as a succession of essenceless products of causal complexes is properly understood. The world holds good and remains un- contradicted and has all the appearance of reality in all our practical experiences, and it is only when it is understood that these pheno mena have no nature of their own that they are considered false. All teachings in philosophy take for granted the world-appearances, subjective and objective, and try to give a rational analysis and estimate of them; and it is only through an experience of these world-phenomena and a rational understanding of them that one realizes their truth as being a mere flow of causes and effects devoid of essence. The appearance of the world as reality is therefore true only in a limited manner during the period when the veil of ignor ance is not removed from our eyes; and this is signified by designating the truth (satya) of the world as only loka-samvrta. This world-appearance is however relatively true when compared with the ordinary illusions of perception (when, e.g., a piece of rope is perceived as a snake, or when one sees a mirage in a desert). But a question arises if the world-appearance has no essence of its own, how is it that it appears to have one, or how is it that the world-phenomena appear at all? To such a question Nagarjuna s answer is that the appearance of the world is like the 1 Bodhi-caryavatdra-panjtka, p. 353, Biblotheca Indica Series, 1902. xi] The World- Appearance 5 appearance of mirages or dreams, which have no reality of their own, but still present an objective appearance of reality 1 . The world is not a mere nothing, like a lotus of the sky or the hare s horn, which are simply non-existent (avidyamana). Thus there is not only the ultimate truth (paramdrtha) ; there is also the relative truth of the phenomenal world (loka-samvrti-satya) ; there are, further, the sense-illusions, hallucinations and the like which are. contradicted in ordinary experience (aloka-samvrta or mithyd- samvrta), and also that which is merely non-existent, like the hare s horn. The error (viparydsd) of world-appearance is considered as being of four kinds, viz. the consideration of the momentary as eternal, the consideration of the painful as being pleasurable, the consideration of the unholy as holy, and of that which has no soul as having a soul 2 . And this error is due to ignorance (avidya). Candrakirti quotes a passage from the Arya-drdhasaya-pariprccha, in which it is said that, just as a man may see in a dream that he is spending the night with the wife of the king, and, suddenly realizing that he is discovered, tries to fly for fear of his life (thus perceiving the presence of a woman, where there is none), so we are always falling into the error of asserting that we have per ceived the manifold world-appearance where there is none 3 . Such analogies of error naturally suggest the supposition that there must be some reality which is mistaken as some other thing ; but, as has already been explained, the Buddhists emphasized the fact that, in dreams, the illusory appearances were no doubt objec tively known as objective presentations of which we had previously become aware experiences through which we pass, though there is no reality on which these appearances rest or are imposed. It was here that Sankara differed. Thus, in his introduction to the commentary on the Brahma-sutra he says that the essence of all illusory perception is that one thing is mistaken for another, that the qualities, characteristics or attributes of one thing are taken for the qualities, characteristics or attributes of another. Illusion is denned as the false appearance in some object of something 1 Mddhyamika-sfitra, xxm. 8. 2 Iha catvdro viparydsd ucyante: tadyathd pratiksana-vindsini skandha- pancake yo nityam iti grdhah sa viparydsah . . . duhkhdtmake skandha-pancake yah sukham iti viparlto grdhah so paro viparydsah,. . . sanram asuci-svabhdvam tatra yo sucitvena grdhah sa viparydsah,. . .panca-skandham nirdtmakam tasmin ya dtma-grdhah andtmani dtmdbhmivesah sa viparydsah. Candrakirti s commentary on ibid. xxm. 13. Compare it with the Yoga-sutra, n. 5, Anandasrama Series. 3 Candrakirti s commentary on the Mddhyamika-sutra, xxm. 13. 6 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. experienced before, resembling a memory image. It is explained by some as being the false affirmation of the characteristics of one thing in regard to another ; others explain it as an error due to the non- apprehension of the difference between that which is wrongly apprehended and the misapprehended object which the former is wrongly supposed to be; others think that, when one thing is misapprehended as another, the illusion consists in the fancying of the former entity as being endowed with strange characteristics (viparlta-dharmatva) ; but in all these different ways of analysis illusion fundamentally is nothing but the false appearance of one thing with the characteristics of another. So also it may be that a conch-shell appears as silver or that one moon appears as two moons 1 . Sankara then suggests that, since the universal self (pratyag-atmari) is felt through our feeling of "I" and since it is immediate in all experience (aparoksd), it is not absolutely un related and unindicated (avisaya) in experience, and consequently it is quite possible that the non-self (anatmari) and its character istics may be illusorily imposed upon the universal self. This illusory imposition of the non-self and its characteristics on the universal self is called nescience (avidya). In his commentary on Gaudapada s Karika, 1.17, Sankara says that, when a piece of rope falsely appears as a snake, this is merely false imposition or appearance, not existence. The illusory appear ance of the snake did not really bring into existence a snake, which later on became non-existent when right knowledge super vened. It was a mere illusion, and the rope-snake had no existence at all 2 . Sankara in commenting on Gaudapada s Karika explains with approval Gaudapada s view that the world of common ex perience is as illusory as a dream. Dreams are false ; for in a dream a man may have the experience of going to distant places, and yet, when he wakes up, he finds that he has been asleep for a few seconds only, and has not moved a foot from his bed. The dream experiences are therefore false, because they are contradicted by the waking experiences. But the waking experiences, being similar to dream experiences, are equally false. For both sets of ex periences involve the duality of subject and object, and are therefore 1 Sarikara s Adhyasa-bhdsya on the Brahmfi-siltra, Nirnaya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1904. 2 Rajjvdm sarpa iva kalpitatvdt na tu sa vidyate. . .no. hi rajjvdm bhrdnti- buddhyd kalpitah sarpo vidyamdnah san vivekato nivrttah; tathedarn prapafi- cdkhyam mdyd-mdtram. Gaudapada s Karika, I. 17, Anandasrama Series. xi] The World-Appearance 7 fundamentally more or less the same: so that, if one of them is false, the other also is false. The world-experience is like other well-known instances of illusion the mirage, for example. Since it had no existence in the beginning, and will not have any existence in the end, neither can it have existence in the intervening period of appearance. The objection that our waking experiences fulfil practical purposes and have thus associated with them the prag matic test of truth, which is absent in the case of dream experiences, is invalid ; for the pragmatic tests of the waking experiences may well be contradicted by dream experiences; a man who goes to sleep after a sumptuous feast may well dream that he has been starving for days together. Both our inner world of mind and its experiences and the outer objective world are thus false creations 1 . But Gaudapada and Sahkara differ from the Sunyavadin Buddhists in this that they think that even false creations must have some basis in truth. If a rope appears as a snake, the false creation of the snake has some basis in the truth of the rope : there could not be false creations and false appearances without any firm basis of truth (dspadd) underlying them 2 . Nagarjuna, it will be re membered, tried to prove the falsity of all appearances on the ground of their being interdependent and not having anything which could be pointed out as their own nature. The dialectic being applicable to all appearances, there was nothing left which was not relative and interdependent, nothing which was self- evident by nature and which was intelligible by itself without reference to anything else. It is this interdependence and relativity of all appearances that was called " nothingness" or sunyata by Nagarjuna. There was nothing which could be affirmed of anything independently by itself without reference to something else ; nothing therefore could be conceived as having any essence by itself. All appearances were therefore only interdependent phantom crea tions; and it was precisely this interdependence that proved the essencelessness of their natures. There was no basis of truth any where. There was nothing which had any essence. But neither Saiikara nor Gaudapada appears to have tried to show why the inner world of thoughts, ideas, emotions, volitions and the outer world of objects should be considered as being illusory appearances. 1 ankara s commentary on Gaudapada s Kdrikd, II. 1-12. 2 Na hi nirdspadd rajju-sarpa-mrgatrsnikddayah kvacit upalabhyante. Ibid. i. 6. 8 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. Their main point seems to consist in a dogmatic statement that all appearances or experiences are false just as dream experi ences are false. The imperfect analogy of waking experiences is made into an argument, and the entire manifold of appearances is declared to be false. But it is urged at the same time that these false creations must have some basis of truth; the changing ap pearances must have some unchanging basis on which they are imposed and this basis is the self (atman), or Brahman, which is the only thing that is permanent, unchanging and real. This self is the being of pure intelligence, which is one identical unit, negating all differences and duality (visuddha-vijnapti-matra-satta- dvaya-rUpena) 1 . Just as the false creation of " snake " appears in the case of the " rope," so all such judgments as " I am happy," " I am unhappy," "I am ignorant," "I am born," "I am old," "I am with a body," "I perceive," etc., are all merely false predications associated with the self; they are all false, changing and illusory predications, and it is only the self which remains permanent through all such judgments. The self is entirely different from all such predications; it is self-luminous and self-manifesting, shining independently by itself. By applying the dialectic of mutual interdependence, pratltya- samutpada, Nagarjuna tried to prove that there was nothing which could be pointed out as the essence of anything as it is; but he did not explain how the appearances which were nothing more than phantom creations came to be what they were. How did the world-appearance of essenceless interdependent phenomena show itself? Sankara did not try to prove with a keen logical dialectic that the world-appearance was false : he simply took it for granted, since the Upanisads proclaimed Brahman as the ultimate reality. But how did the world-appearance manifest itself? Sankara does not seem to go deeply into this question and simply passes it over in asserting that this world-appearance is all due to ignorance (avidya) ; it could not be spoken of as either existing or non-existing; it was merely illusory, like the conch-shell silver. ButPadmapada, who wrote the commentary known as Panca-padika on the first four sutras of Sankara s commentary on the Erahma- sutras, says that the precise meaning of the term "false conception " (mithya-jndnd) in Sankara s introduction to his commentary on the Brahma-sutras is that there is a force or power or potency (sakti) of 1 Gaudapada s Karika, u. 17. xi] The World-Appearance 9 nescience which constitutes materiality (jadatmika avidya-saktih), and that it is this potency which transforms itself into the stuff (upaddnd) of the world-appearance 1 . It is well to remember in this connection that, according to Sankara s philosophy, it is not only the objective world that constitutes the world of appearance, but also the subjective world of all experiences and predicates that may be associated with the self. Thus, when one says "I," this ego-hood is analysed as involving two parts the one, pure in telligence or pure consciousness; and the other, the concept of subjectivity, which is illuminated, expressed or manifested by the underlying pure intelligence with which it is falsely associated. The concept of subjectivity stands here as materiality, or objec tivity, which is made to float up by the power of pure intelligence, thus causing the judgment "I am" or "I am a man 2 ." This avidya-sakti, or power of avidya, subsists in the pure self and, on the one hand, arrests the revelation of its true nature as Brahman, and, on the other hand, transforms itself into the various concepts associated with the psychological self of our ordinary experience 3 . The illusion consists in the association of the psycho logical qualities of thinking, feeling, willing, etc. with the trans cendent or universal self (pratyak-citi). These psychological deter minations are all mutually connected with one another. Thus, to be able to enjoy pleasures, one must first act; one can only act when one has attachments, antipathies and desires, and one can have attachments and desires only when one has experienced joys and sorrows so these psychological determinations in a beginning- less cycle are always naturally associated with the transcendent self-luminous self 4 . It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that, as Padmapada or Prakasatman explains, ajnana or nescience is some kind of indefinable stuff out of the transformations of which subjective psychological experiences and the world of objects have come into being. This ajnana is not the ajnana of the Buddhists, i.e. a wrong notion or misconception, and this adhyasa, or illusion, 1 Panca-padikd, p. 4, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, 1891. 2 asmat-pratyaye yo nidam-amsas cid-eka-rasah tasmims tad-bala-nirbhdsita- tayd laksanato yusmad-arthasya manusydbhimdnasya sambhedaivdvabhdsah sa eva adhydsah. Ibid. p. 3. 3 atah sd pratyak-citi brahma-svarupdvabhdsam pratibadhndti ahamkdrdd- y-atad-rupa-pratibhdsa-nimittam ca bhavati. Ibid. p. 5. 4 Prakasatman s Panca-pddikd-vivarana, p. 10, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, 1892. io The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. is not the viparyaya of Nagarjuna ; for here it is a positive power or stuff. Thus Prakasatman argues that all effects have at their back some cause, which forms their stuff or material; the world- appearance, being also an effect, must have some stuff out of which it has evolved or was made up; and ajnana, lying in the trans cendent self as a separate power, is such a material cause 1 . This avtdyd-potency in the transcendent self is positive in its nature. This positive ajnana is directly perceived in such immediate per ceptions as "I do not know myself or others," and can also be inferred or comprehended by implication 2 . The fact that ajnana or avidyd is spoken of as a power inherent in the transcendent self shows that it is dependent thereon ; avidyd is not, however, a power, but a substance or entity which has certain powers by which it transforms itself into the cosmic appearances, subjective and ob jective ; yet it is called a power, or sakti, because of its dependence (para-tantrata) on the transcendent self, and it is in consideration of the entire dependence of avidyd and its transformations on the self that the self is regarded as the material cause of all effects the cosmic appearances of the world and the mind 3 . The self thus not only holds the ajnana within it as a dependent function, but in spite of its self-luminosity it can be reacted upon by the ajnana with its manifold powers in such a way that it can be veiled by this ajnana and made the underlying basis of all world- appearances of <2/nawa-transformations 4 . Appaya Dlksita, referring in his Siddhdnta-lesa to the view of the writer of the Paddrtha-tattva, summarizes the matter thus: Brahman and Maya form together the material cause (ubhayam updddnam), and hence it is that in the world-appearance there are two distinct characteristics, "being" (satta) from Brahman and materiality (jddyd) from Maya. Brahman is the cause, as the unchanging basis of the Maya, which is the cause as being the 1 sarvam ca kdryam sopdddnam bhdva-kdryatvdt ghatddivad ity anumanat ...tasmdn mithydrtha-taj-jndndlmakam mithyd-bhutam adhydsam updddna- kdrana-sdpekam . . . mithyd-jndnam eva adhydsopdddnam . Panca-pddikd-vivarana, pp. 11-12. 2 Ibid. p. 13. 3 saktir ity dtma-para-tantratayd dtmanah sarva-kdryopdddnasya nirvodh- rtvam. Ibid. p. 13. Atma-kdranatva-nirvodhrtvdd dtma-para-tantratvd ca sakti- inatydm apt sakti-sabda upacdritah. Akhandananda Muni s Tattva-dlpana, p. 65, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1902. 4 atah svaprakdse pi dtmani vidtra-sakti-bhdva-riipdvidyd-prayuktam dva- ranam durapahnavam. Ramananda Sarasvati s Vivaranopanydsa, p. 16, Chow khamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1901. xi] The World- Appearance n stuff that actually undergoes transformation 1 . Vacaspati Misra also conceives Brahman, jointly with its avidya, to be the material cause of the world (avidya-sahita-brahmopadanam) 2 . In his adora tion hymn at the beginning of his Bhamati he describes Brahman as being in association with its companion, the indefinable avidya, the unchanging cause of the entire objective universe 3 . Sarva- jnatma Muni, however, does not wish to give may a the same degree of co-operation in the production of the world-appearance as Brahman, and considers the latter to be the real material cause of the world through the instrumentality of Maya; for Brahman, being absolutely changeless, cannot by itself be considered as cause, so that, when Brahman is spoken of as cause, this can only be in a remote and modified sense (upalaksana) , through the instrumen tality of maya*. The author of the Siddhanta-muktdvall is referred to by Appaya Diksita as holding that it is the may a and may a alone that forms the stuff of the world-appearance ; and that Brahman is not in any way the material cause of the universe, but that it is only the basis of the subsistence of maya and is only from that point of view spoken of as being the material cause 5 . It is clear that the above differences of view regarding the nature of the relation between maya and the self or Brahman in the production of the world-appearance are mere scholastic dis putes over words or modes of expression, and have but little philosophical significance. As has already been said, these ques tions do not seem to have arisen in Sankara s mind. He did not think it worth while to explain anything definitely regarding the nature of avidya and its relation with Brahman, and the part that it played in supplying the material stuff of the universe. The world was an illusion, and Brahman was the basis of truth on which these illusions appeared ; for even illusions required something on which they could appear. He never faced squarely the difficulties that are naturally connected with the theory, and was not therefore concerned to explain the definite relation of maya to Brahman in connection with the production of the phantom show of the universe. The natural objection against such views is that the term 1 Siddhdnta-lesa, p. 12, V.S. Series, 1890. - Bhamati on aiikara s Bhdsya, i. i. 2, Nirnaya-Sagara Press, 1904. " Anirvdcydvidyd-dvitaya-sacivasya prabhavato vivartd yasyaite viyad-anila- tejob-avanavah, ibid. p. i. 4 Samksepa-sdnraka, I. 333, 334, Bhau ^astri s edition. 5 Siddhdnta-lesa, p. 13, V.S. Series, 1890. 12 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. avidya (formed by compounding the negative particle a and vidyd knowledge ") may mean either absence of knowledge (vidyd- bhdvah) or false knowledge (mithyd-jndnam) ; and in neither of these meanings can it be supposed to behave as the material cause or substance-stuff of anything; for a false knowledge cannot be a substance out of which other things are made 1 . The answer given by Anandabodha Bhattaraka to such an objection is that this avidya is not a psychological ignorance, but a special technical category, which is beginningless and indefinable (anddy-anirvdcydvidydsra- yandt). The acceptance of such a category is a hypothesis which one is justified in holding as valid, since it explains the facts. Effects must have some cause behind them, and a mere instru mental cause cannot explain the origination of the substratum of the effect; again, effects which are not true cannot have for their material cause (updddna-kdrana) that which is true, nor can they have for their material cause that which is absolutely non-existent. So, since the material cause of the world can neither be true nor be anything which is absolutely non-existent, the hypothesis is naturally forced upon the Vedantists that the material cause of this false world-appearance is an entity which is neither existent nor non-existent 2 . Anandabodha in his Pramdna-mdld quotes ap provingly from the Brahma-tattva-samlksd of Vacaspati to show that avidya. is called avidya or nescience because it is a hypothetic category which is neither is" nor "is not," and is therefore unintelligible; avidya signifies particularly the unintelligibility of this category 3 . Anandabodha points out that the acceptance of avidya is merely the logical consequence of indicating some possible cause of the world-appearance considering the nature of the world-appearance as it is, its cause can only be something which neither is nor is not; but what we understand by such a category, we cannot say; it is plainly unintelligible; the logical requirements of such a category merely indicate that that which is the material cause of this false world-appearance cannot be re garded either as existing or as non-existing; but this does not 1 avidya hi vidyabhavo mithyd-jnanam vd na cobhayam kasya cit samavdyi- kdranam adravyatvdt. Anandabodha s Nydya-makaranda, p. 122, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1901. 2 Ibid. pp. 122-124. 3 sad-asad-ubhaydnubhayddi-prakdraih anirvacanlyatvam eva hy avidydndm avidydtvam. Brahma-tattva-samlksd as quoted in Pramdna-mdld, p. 10, Chow khamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1907. xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 13 make this concept either intelligible or consistent 1 . The concept of avidya is thus plainly unintelligible and inconsistent. Thought and its Object in Buddhism and in Vedanta. The Vedanta takes a twofold view of things ; the first view refers to ultimate reality and the second to appearance. This ultimate reality is pure intelligence, as identical with pure bliss and pure being. This is called ultimately real in the sense that it is regarded as changeless. By pure intelligence the Vedanta does not mean the ordinary cognitional states; for these have a subjective and an objective content which are extraneous to them. This pure in telligence is pure immediacy, identical with the fact of revelation found in all our conscious states. Our apprehensions of objects are in some sense events involving both a subjective and an ob jective content ; but their special feature in every case is a revelatory inwardness or immediacy which is non-temporal and changeless. The fact that we see, hear, feel, touch, think, remember is equi valent to saying that there are various kinds of cognizings. But what is the nature of this cognizing? Is it an act or a fact? When I see a blue colour, there is a blue object, there is a peculiar revelation of an appearance as blue and a revelation of the "I" as perceiver. The revelation is such that it is both a revelation of a certain character as blue and of a certain thing called the blue object. When a revelation occurs in perception, it is one and it reveals both the object and its appearance in a certain character as blue. The revelation is not the product of a certain relation which happens to subsist at any time between the character-appearance and the object; for both the character- appearance as blue and the object are given in revelation. The revelation is self-evident and stands unique by itself. Whether I see, or hear, or feel, or change, the fact remains that there is some sort of an awareness which does not change. Awareness is ever present by itself and does not undergo the changes that its contents undergo. I may remember that I had seen a blue object five minutes pre viously ; but, when I do this, what I perceive is the image of a blue object, with certain temporal and spatial relations, which arises or 1 Vailaksanya-vdco-yuktir hi pratiyogi-niriipandd yauktikatva-prakatana- phald na tv evam-rupatdydh sdmanjasya-sampddandya ity avocdma. Pramdna- mdld, p. 10. 14 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. becomes revealed; but the revelation itself cannot be revealed again. I may be conscious, but I cannot be conscious of con sciousness. For consciousness as such, though ever present in its immediacy, cannot become an object of any other consciousness. There cannot be any such thing as the awareness of an awareness or the awareness of the awareness of an awareness, though we may multiply such phrases in language at our pleasure. When I re member that I have been to Trinity College this morning, that only means that I have an image of the way across the commons, through Church Street and Trinity Street ; my movements through them are temporally pushed backward, but all this is a revelation as image at the present moment and not a revelation of a past revelation. I cannot say that this present image in any way reveals that particular image as the object of the present revelation. But the former revelation could not be held to be distinct from the present one ; for distinction is always based on content and not on revelation. Revelation as such is identical and, since this is so, one revelation cannot be the object of another. It is incorrect to say that "A is A" means that one A becomes itself over again. It is owing to the limitations of grammatical terminology that identity is thus described. Identity thus understood is different from what we understand by identity as a relation. Identity understood as a relation presupposes some difference or otherness and thus is not self-contained. And it is because it is not self-contained that it can be called a relation. When it is said that A is identical with A, it means that on all the various occasions or contents in which A appeared it always signified the same thing, or that it had the same shape or that it was the same first letter of the English alphabet. Identity in this sense is a function of thought not existing by itself, but in relation to a sense of opponency or other ness. But revelation has no otherness in it; it is absolutely ubi quitous and homogeneous. But the identity of revelation of which we are speaking does not mean that the revelation signifies the same thing amidst a diversity of contents: it is simply the one essence identical in itself and devoid of any numerical or other kinds of difference. It is absolutely free from " now " and " then," " here " and "there," "such " or "not such " and " this " or " that." Consciousness of the self-shining self taken in this way cannot be regarded as the relation of an appearance to an object, but it is the fact of the revelation or the entity of the self. If we conceive xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Veddnta 15 of revelation in this way, it is an error to make any distinction in revelation as the revelation of the past or the revelation of the present moment. For moments are revealed as objects are re vealed; they do not constitute revelation or form any part of it. This revelation is identical with the self-shining self to which everything else has to be related in order to be known. 11 Is cognizing an act or a fact? " Before this can be answered the point to be made clear is what is meant by cognizing. If we ignore the aspect of revelation and speak of mental states which can be looked at from the point of view of temporal or qualitative change of character, we must speak of them as acts or events. If we look at any mental state as possessing certain characters and relations to its objects, we have to speak of these aspects. But, if we look at cognizing from the point of view of its ultimate truth and reality as revelation, we cannot call it either an act or a fact; for, as revelation, it is unique and unchangeable in itself. All relations and characters are revealed in it, it is self-evident and is at once in and beyond them all. Whether we dream or wake, whether we experience an. illusion or a truth, revelation is always there. When we look at our mental states, we find that they are always changing, but this is so only with reference to the contents. Apart from this there is a continuity in our conscious life. By this continuity the Vedanta apprehends not any sort of coherence in our ideas, but the fact of the permanence of revelation. It may be asked what remains of revelation, if the mental states are taken away. This question is not admissible ; for the mental states do not form part of revelation; they are rendered conscious by coming into relation with revelation. This category is the ultimate reality. It is not self or subject in the sense in which self or ego is ordinarily understood. For what is ordinarily understood as the ego or the "I" is as much a content of the perception of the moment as any other objective content. It is not impossible that any particular objective content may be revealed at any time without the corresponding "I perceive" being explicitly revealed at the same time. The notion of ego or I" does not refer to an everlasting abiding independent self or person ; for this notion is as changing as any other objective content. The " I " has no definite real content as referring to an existing entity, but is only a particular mode of mind which is often associated, as a relatively abiding content, with other changing contents of the 1 6 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. mind. As such, it is as changeable as is any other object. "I know this" only means that there is a revelation which at one sweep reveals both the this" and the "I." So far as the revelation appears as revealing the this" and the "I," it is manifested in a subjective mental state having a particular conscious centre different from other similar centres. But, since revelation cannot in reality be individuated, all that we may say about "I" or mine , " " thou " or " thine ," falls outside it . They are all contents , having some indefinite existence of their own and revealed by this principle of revelation under certain conditions. This principle of revelation thus has a reality in quite a different sense from that which is used to designate the existence of any other object. All other objects are dependent upon this principle of revelation for their manifestation, and their nature or essence, out of connection with it, cannot be defined or described. They are not self-evident, but are only expressed by coming into some sort of relation with this principle. We have already seen that this principle cannot be either subjective or objective. For all considera tions of subject or object fall outside it and do not in any way qualify it, but are only revealed by it. There are thus two principles, the principle of revelation and all that which is re vealed by it. The principle of revelation is one ; for there is nothing else like it; it alone is real in the highest and truest sense. It is absolute in the sense that there is no growth, decay, evolution or change in it, and it is perfectly complete in itself. It is infinite in the sense that no finitude can form part of it, though through it all finitude is being constantly revealed. It is all-pervading in the sense that no spatial or temporal limits can be said to affect it in any way, though all these are being constantly revealed by it. It is neither in my head nor in my body nor in the space before me ; but yet there is nowhere that it is not. It has sometimes been designated as the" Self "or atman, but only in the sense of denoting its nature as the supreme essence and transcendent reality of all the Brahman. Apart from this principle of revelation, all else is constituted of a substanceless indefinable stuff called mdya. In some schools of Sankara Vedanta it is said that all is pure and simple illusion, that things exist only when they are perceived and dissolve into nothingness as soon as we cease to perceive them ; this school has been designated the Drsti-srsti school, a doctrine which has been xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 17 briefly explained in the tenth chapter of the present work 1 . One of the most important texts of this school is the Siddhdnta-muktdvali by Prakasananda 2 . Prakasananda seems to have taken his inspiration from the Yoga-vasistha, and he denied the existence of things when they are not perceived (ajnata-sattvanabhyupagama). He tried to show that there were no grounds for holding that external objects existed even when they were not perceived or that external objects had a reality independent of their perceptions. Examining the capacity of perception as a proof to establish this difference be tween perception and its object, he argued that, since the difference between the awareness and its object was a quality of the awareness, the awareness itself was not competent to grasp this quality in the object, as it was one of the constituents of the complex quality involving a difference of the awareness and its object; to assert the contrary would be a fallacy of self-dependence (atmasrayatva). If the apprehended difference is a complex, such as "difference- between-awareness-and-its-object," and if this complex is a quality which is apprehended as existing in the object, it has to be assumed that, in order that the nature of awareness may be realized, vindi cated or established, it must depend upon itself involved as a con stituent in the complex "difference-between-awareness-and-its- object" directly and immediately which comes to the same thing as saying that awareness becomes aware of itself by being aware of itself; this is impossible and is called the logical fallacy of self- 1 A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I. pp. 477-478, by S. N. Dasgupta, published by the Cambridge University Press, 1922. 2 Prakasananda refers to the arguments of Prakasatman s (A.D. 1200) Panca- pddikd-vivaranaand Sarvajnatma Muni s (A.D. 900) Sarnksepa-sdrlraka and refers approvingly to Suresvara, the author of the Naiskarmya-siddhi. Appaya Dlksita (A.D. 1620) refers toPra.kasanandainhisSiddhdnta-lesa(pp.i3,72). Nana Dlksita, a follower of the school of Prakasananda and author of the Siddhdnta-dlpikd, in a commentary on the Siddhdnta-muktdvali, gives a list of Vedanta teachers. In this list he mentions the names of Prakasanubhavananda, Nrsimha and Raghavendra Yati. Venis thinks (see The Pandit, 1890, pp. 487-490) that Prakasanubhava is the same as Prakasatman and Nrsimha the same as Nrsimhasrama Muni, who is said to have converted Appaya Dlksita to Sarikara Vedanta, and thinks that Prakasananda lived in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, being wedged in between Nrsimha and Appaya. Though it would be difficult to settle his time so precisely and definitely, yet it would not be wrong to suppose that he lived sometime towards the latter half of the sixteenth century. Prakasananda s doctrine of Drsti-srsti is apparently unknown to the earlier Vedantic works and even the Veddnta-paribhdsd, a work of the early sixteenth century, ^does not seem to be aware of him, and it appears that the earliest mention of his name can be traced only to Appaya, who lived in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Prakasananda may thus be believed to have lived in the latter half of the sixteenth century. 1 8 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. dependence 1 . If it is held that the complex quality (" difference- of-awareness-from-the-object ") is directly perceived in the ob ject through the senses, then it has to be assumed that the said complex quality existed in the object even before the pro duction of the awareness, and this would involve the impossible supposition that the complex quality of which the awareness was a constituent was already present even before such an awareness had already come into being. If perception or direct awareness cannot be said to prove the difference between the awareness and its object, there can be no inference which may be supposed to do it. For such an inference has to take form thus "the object is different from its own awareness, because it is associated with entirely different kinds of qualities or characteristics 2 ." But how could it be known that the object has qualities of an entirely different character from its awareness, since a difference between an awareness and its object was contested and could not be proved by perception or any other means ? Prakasananda further says that the argument by implication (arthapatti), that awareness involves the acceptance of something different from the awareness of which the awareness is affirmed, because there cannot be any know ledge without a corresponding object, is invalid. In proving the invalidity of the supposition that knowledge necessarily implies an object, Prakasananda raises the question whether such an impli cation of an object as conditioning knowledge refers to the pro duction (utpatti) of knowledge, its persistence (sthiti) or its secondary cognition. As regards the first alternative Prakasananda says that according to the Vedanta consciousness is ever-existent and is never a product; and, even if it is regarded as a product, the process of cognition can itself be regarded as a sufficient cause for its production. It can by no means be urged that the presence of an external object is in all cases necessary for the production of knowledge; for, though it is arguable that in perception an object is necessary, no one will suggest that an external object is to be considered necessary in the production of inferential knowledge a fact which shows that the presence of an external object is not indispensable for the production of know ledge as such. As regards the persistence of knowledge it is said 1 Siddhanta-muktdvali, as printed in the Pandit, 1889, pp. 247-249. 2 vimato visayah sva-visaya-jndndd bhidyate tad-viruddha-dharmdsrayatvdt . Ibid, p. 252. xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 19 that awareness has not the object that it knows for its locus or sub stance (asrayd), in such a way that the absence of the object, as apart from the awareness, would make it impossible for the awareness to persist ; and, if knowledge is supposed to be persisting in anything, that something would not be a cognized object, but the cognizer itself as in the Nyaya view, where knowledge is regarded as an attribute of the self and the self is then regarded as the substance or locus (asrayd) of knowledge. Since again cognition and its object do not exist in the same space or in the same time (this is proved by the possibility of our knowing a past or a future object), there cannot be any such concomitance between the two that it would be right for any one to infer the external presence of an object because of there being a subjective cognition or awareness. So he argues that there is no proof that cognition and cognized objects are different. In the above account of Prakasananda s views it is clear that he does not attempt to give any positive proof in support of his thesis that the world-appearance and all objects contained in it have no existence while they are not perceived or that the being of all objects cognized is their percipi. He only tries to show that it cannot be logically established that awareness of blue and blue are two different objects; or, in other words, that it cannot be proved that the cognized object is different from its cognition. It could not legitimately be held that awareness (pratlti) was different from its object (pratyetavya). The whole universe, as we perceive it, is nothing but cognition without there being any object corresponding to it. As dreams are nothing but mere awareness, without there being any real objects behind them which manifest themselves in different ways of awareness and their objects, so also is the world of awaking consciousness 1 . The world has thus no independent substratum, but is mere cognition or mere aware ness (vijndna-matra or bhdva-matrd). This scheme of Vedanta philosophy is surprisingly similar to the idealism of Vasubandhu (A.D. 280-360), as taught in his Vimsatika with a short commentary of his own and in his Trimsika with a commentary by Sthiramati 2 . According to this idealism pratyetavya-pratltvos ca bhedah prdmdnikah kutah pratlti-mdtram evaitad bhdti visvam cardcaram jndna-jneya-prabhedena yathd svdpnam pratlyate vijndna-mdtram evaitat tathdjdgrac cardcaram. Siddhdnta-muktdvali, p. 258. z Vijnapti-mdtratd-siddhi, containing two treatises, Vimsatika and Trimsikd, 20 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. (vijnana-vadd) of Vasubandhu all appearances are but transforma tions of the principle of consciousness by its inherent movement, and none of our cognitions are produced by any external objects which to us seem to be existing outside of us and generating our ideas. Just as in dreams one experiences different objects at different places and countries without there being any objective existence of them, or as in dreams many people may come together and perform various actions, so what seems to be a real world of facts and external objects may well be explained as a mere creation of the principle of intelligence without any objective basis at all. All that we know as subjective or objective is mere ideation (vijnapti) and there is no substantive reality, or entity corre sponding to it; but that does not mean that pure non-conceptual (anabhilapyenatmana) thought, which the saints realize, is also false 1 . It is possible that the awareness of anything may become the object of a further awareness, and that of another ; but in all such cases where the awarenesses are significant (arthavati) there is no entity or reality represented by them; this, however, should not be interpreted as a denial of the principle of intelligence or pure knowledge as such. Vasubandhu then undertakes to show that the perceptual evidence of the existence of the objective world cannot be trusted. He says that, taking visual perception as an example, we may ask ourselves if the objects of the visual perception are one as a whole or many as atoms. They cannot be mere wholes, since wholes would imply parts ; they cannot be of the nature of atoms, since such atoms are not separately perceived ; they cannot be of the nature of combinations of atoms, since the existence of atoms cannot be proved 2 . For, if six atoms combine from six sides, that implies that the atoms have parts; if however six atoms combine with one another at one identical point, that would mean that the combined group would not have a size larger than that of one atom and would therefore be invisible. Again, if the objects of awareness and perception were only wholes, then succession and sequence would be inexplicable, and our perception of separate and distinct things would remain unaccountable. So they have Paris, 1925 . It seems probable that Vasubandhu flourished in A.D. 280-360 rather than in A.D. 420-500 as held by me in the first volume of the present work. See B. Bhattacharya s foreword to the Tattva-samgraha. 1 yo bdlair dhdrmdndm svabhdvo grdhya-grdhakddih parikalpitah tena kalpiten- dtmand tesdm nairdtmyam na tv anabhildpyendtmand yo buddhdndm visaya iti. Commentary on Vimsatikd, p. 6. 2 Ndpi te samhatd visayt-bhavanti, yasmdt paramdnur ekam dravyam na sidhyati. Ibid, p. 7. xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Veddnta 21 no real objective existence, though perception leads us to believe that they have. People are dreaming of the world of objects in the sleep of the sub-conscious habit of false imaginative construction (vitatha-vikalpabhyasa-vasana-nidraya), and in their dreams they construct the objective world; it is only when they become awake with the transcendent indeterminate knowledge (lokottara- nirvikalpa-jnana-labhat prabuddho bhavati) that they find the world-construction to be as false as the dream-construction of diverse appearances. In such a view there is no objective material world, and our cognitions are not influenced by external objects ; how then are our minds influenced by good instructions and associations? and, since none of us have any real physical bodies, how can one kill another? Vasubandhu explains this by the theory that the thought-currents of one person can sometimes determine the thought-currents of another. Thus the idea of killing of a certain type may produce such a disturbance of the vital powers of another as to produce a cessation of the continuity of the thought-processes, which is called death 1 . So also the good ideas of one may influence the ideas of another for good. In the Trimsika of Vasubandhu and its commentary by Sthir- amati this idealism is more clearly explained. It is said that both the soul (or the knower) and all that it knows as subjective ideas or. as ex ternal objects existing outside of us are but transformations of pure intelligence (vijnana-parinama) . The transformation (parinama) of pure intelligence means the production of an effect different from that of the causal moment simultaneously with the cessation of the causal moment 2 . There is neither externality nor subjectivity in pure intelligence, but these are imposed upon it (vijnana-svarupe parikalpita eva atma dharmas ca) . All erroneous impositions imply that there must be some entity which is mistaken for something else; there cannot be erroneous impositions on mere vacuity; so it has to be admitted that these erroneous impositions of various kinds of external characteristics, self, etc. have been made upon the transformations of pure intelligence 3 . Both Vasubandhu and Sthiramati repudiate the suggestion of those extreme idealists who 1 para-vijnapti-visesddhipatydt paresdm j lvitendriya-virodhirii kdcit rikriyd utpadyate yayd sabhdga-santati-viccheddkhyam maranam bhavati. Commentary on Vimsatikd, p. 10. 2 kdrana-ksana-nirodha-sama-kdlah kdrana-ksana-vilaksana-kdryasya dtma- Idbhah parindmah. Sthiramati s commentary on Trimsika, p. 16. 3 upacdrasya ca nirddhdrasydsambhavdd avasyam vijndna-parindmo vastuto sty upagantavyo yatra dtma-dharmopacdrahpravartate. Ibid. Compare Sarikara s commentary on Gaudapada s Kdrikd, " na hi nirdspadd mrgatrsnikadayah." 22 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. deny also the reality of pure intelligence on grounds of inter dependence or relativity (samvrti) 1 . Vasubandhu holds that pure consciousness (vijnapti-mdtrata) is the ultimate reality. This ulti mate consciousness is a permanent entity, which by its inherent power (sakti) undergoes threefold transformations as the inherent indeterminate inner change (vipakd), which again produces the two other kinds of transformations as the inner psychoses of mental operations (manana) and as the perception of the so-called external sensibles (visaya-vijnapti). The apprehension of all appearances or characterized entities (dharma) as cognized objects and that of selves as cognizers, the duality of perceivers and the perceived, are due to the threefold transformations of vipdka, manana and visaya-vijnapti. The ultimate consciousness (vijnapti-mdtrd) which suffers all these modifications is called alaya-vijndna in its modified transformations, because it is the repository of all experiences. The ultimate principle of consciousness is regarded as absolutely permanent in itself and is consequently also of the nature of pure happiness (sukhd) ; for what is not eternal is painful, and this, being eternal, is happy 2 . When a saint s mind becomes fixed (pratisthita) in this pure consciousness (vijnapti-mdtrd)^ the tendency to dual thought of the subjective and the objective (grdhya-grdhakdnusaya) ceases and there dawns the pure indeterminate (nir-vikalpa) and transcendent (lokottara) consciousness. It is a state in which the ultimate pure consciousness returns from its transformations and rests in itself. It is divested of all afflictions (klesd) or touch of vicious tendencies and is therefore called andsrava. It is unthinkable and undemonstrable, because it is, on the one hand, pure self-conscious ness (pratydtma-vedya) and omniscience (sarvajnatd] , as it is divested of all limitations (dvarana), and, on the other hand, it is unique in itself 3 . This pure consciousness is called the container of the seed of all (sarva-bija), and, when its first indeterminate and inde finable transformations rouse the psychosis- transformations and 1 Thus Lankdvatara, one of the most important works on Buddhistic idealism, denies the real transformation of the pure intelligence or dlaya-vijndna. See Lankdvatara, p. 46, published by the Otani University Press, Kyoto, 1923. 2 dhruvo nityatvdd aksayatayd; sukho nityatvdd eva yad anityam tad duhkham ayam ca nitya iti asmdt sukhah. Sthiramati s commentary on Trimsikd, p. 44. 3 Alaya-vijndna in this ultimate state of pure consciousness (vijnapti-mdtrata) is called the cause (dhdtii) of all virtues, and, being the ultimate state in which the dharmas or characterized appearances have lost all their limitations it is called the dharma-kdya of the Buddha (mahd-munih bhumi-pdramitddi-bhdva- nayd klesa-jneydvarana-prahdndt. . .sarva-dharma-vibhutva-ldbhatas ca dharma- kdya ity ucyate). Ibid. xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Veddnta 23 also the transformations as sense-perceptions, these mutually act and react against one another, and thus the different series rise again and again and mutually determine one another. These trans formations are like waves and ripples on the ocean, where each is as much the product of others as well as the generator of others 1 . In this view thought (vijnana) is regarded as a real substance, and its transformations are also regarded as real; and it is these transformations that are manifested as the selves and the charac terized appearances 2 . The first type of transformations, called vipdka, is in a way the ground of the other two transformations, which contain the indeterminate materials out of which the mani festations of the other two transformations appear. But, as has already been pointed out, these three different types of trans formations again mutually determine one another. The vipdka transformations contain within them the seeds of the constructive instincts (vikalpa-vasana) of the selves as cognizers,the constructive instincts of colours, sounds, etc., the substantive basis (dsraya) of the attribution of these twofold constructive instincts, as well as the sense-faculties and the localization of space-determinations (sthdna-vijnapti or bhajana-loka-sannivesa-vijnapti). They are also associated in another mode with sense-modifications involving the triune of the sense (indriyd), sense-object (visaya) and cognition (and each of these triunes is again associated with a characteristic affective tone corresponding to the effective tones of the other two members of the triune in a one-to-one relation), attention (manaskdra), discrimination (samjnd), volition (cetana) and feeling (vedand) 3 . The vipdka transformations have no determinate or limited forms (aparicchinndlambandkdra), and there are here no 1 tac ca varttate srotasaughavat. Ibid. p. 21. 2 avasyam vijndna-parindmo vastuto sty upagantavy oyatrdtmadharmopacdrah pravarttate. Ibid. p. 16. 3 Fee\mg(vedand) is distinguished here as painful, pleasurable and as the basic entity which is neither painful nor pleasurable, which is feeling per se (vedand anubhava-svabhdvd sd punar visayasya dhlddaka-paritdpaka-tadubhaya-kara- vivikta-svarupa-sdksdtkarana-bheddt). This feeling per se must be distinguished again from the non-pleasurable-painful feeling existing along with the two other varieties, the painful and the pleasurable. Here the vipdka transformations are regarded as evolving the basic entity of feeling, and it is therefore undifferentiated in it as pleasure or pain and is hence called "feeling as indifference (upeksdy and undifferentiated (avydkrtd). The differentiation of feeling as pleasurable or as painful takes place only as a further determination of the basic entity of feeling evolved in the vipdka transformations of good and bad deeds (subhdsubha- karma- vipdka). Good and bad (subhdsubha} are to be distinguished from moral and immoral as potential and actual determinations of virtuous and vicious actions. 24 The Sankara School of Vedanta [en. actualized emotional states of attachment, antipathy or the like, which are associated with the actual pleasurable or painful feelings. The vipaka transformations thus give us the basic concept of mind and its principal functions with all the potentialities of determinate subject-object consciousness and its processes. There are here the constructive tendencies of selves as perceivers, the objective con structive tendencies of colours, sounds, etc., the sense-faculties, etc., attention, feeling, discrimination, volition and sense-func tioning. But none of these have any determinate and actualized forms. The second grade of transformations, called manana, represents the actual evolution of moral and immoral emotions; it is here that the mind is set in motion by the ignorant references to the mental elements as the self, and from this ignorance about the self is engendered self-love (atma-sneha) and egoism (atma- mana). These references are again associated with the fivefold universal categories of sense-functioning, feeling, attention, voli tion and discrimination. Then comes the third grade of trans formations, which is associated with the fivefold universal cate gories together with the special manifestations of concrete sense- perceptions and the various kinds of intellectual states and moral and immoral mental states, such as desire (chandah) for different kinds of sense-experiences, decisions (adhimoksd) in conclusions firmly established by perceptions, reasoning, etc., memory , attentive reflection (samadhi), wisdom (prajna], faith and firm will for the good (sraddha), shamefulness (hri) for the bad, etc. The term alaya-vijnana is given to all these three types of transformations, but there is underneath it, as the permanent passive ground, the eternal and unchangeable pure thought (vijnapti-mdtrata). It may be pointed out here that in this system of philosophy the eternal and unchangeable thought-substance undergoes by virtue of its inner dynamic three different orders of superficial changes, which are compared to constantly changing streams and waves. The first of these represents the basic change which later determines all subjective and objective possibilities; the second starts the process of the psychosis by the original ignorance and false attribution of self-hood to non-self elements, self-love and egoism; and in the third grade we have all the concrete mental and extra-mental facts. The fundamental categories which make the possibility of mind, mental processes and the extra-mental relations, are evolved in the first stage of transformations ; and these xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Veddnta 25 abide through the other two stages of transformations and become more and more complex and concrete in course of their association with the categories of the other transformations. In analysing the knowledge situation Vasubandhu does not hold that our awareness of blue is only a modification of the " awareness," but he thinks that an awareness has always two relations, a relation with the subject or the knower (grahaka-grahd) and a relation with the object which is known (grahya-graha). Blue as an object is essential for making an awareness of blue possible; for the awareness is not blue, but we have an awareness of the blue. But Vasubandhu argues that this psychological necessity is due to a projection of objectivity as a necessary function of determinate thought, and it does not at all follow that this implies that there are real external objects existing outside of it and generating the awareness as external agent. Psychological objectivity does not imply onto- logical objectivity. It is argued that, if the agency of objective entities in the production of sense-knowledge be admitted, there could not be any case where sense-knowledge could be admitted to be produced without the operation of the objective entities ; but, since in dreams and illusions such sense-knowledge is universally regarded as being produced without the causal operation of such objective entities, no causal operation can be conceded to the objective entities for the production of sense-knowledge. Sankara, in attempting to refute the Buddhist idealism in his commentary on the Brahma-sutra, n. ii. 28, seems to refer to a school of idealism which is the same as that described by Santaraksita in his Tattva-samgraha (commented upon by Kama- lasila), but largely different from that described in Vasubandhu s Trimsika. The positive arguments against the impossibility of an external world constituted by partless atoms are the same 1 . But 1 Vacaspati, however, in his Bhdmatl commentary, II. ii. 28, introduces some new points. He says that spatial extension, as perceived in visual perception, cannot be due to the perception of partless atoms. Nor can it be said that the colour particles produced in uninterrupted succession generate the notion of spatial extension, though there is no spatial extension in the individual atom; for it is not possible that the groups of colour particles are not interrupted by taste, smell and the tactual particles. So it has to be admitted that the colour particles are at some distance from one another and are interrupted by other particles, and that the continuous appearance of colour in spatial distribution is a false appearance, like the appearance of continuous trees from a distance con stituting a forest (gandha-rasa-sparsa-paramdnv-antaritd hi te rupa-paramdnavo na nirantardh; tasmdd drat sdntaresu vrksesu eka-ghana-pratyayavad esa sthula- pratyayah paramanusu sdntaresu bhrdnta evd). 26 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. it is further argued on behalf of the Buddhist idealists that the awareness of a pillar, the awareness of a wall or of a jug or of a piece of cloth, implies that these individual awarenesses are mutually different in nature among themselves; and that consequently the apparent differences among objects are but differences among the ideas; and that therefore the objects are of the same nature as the particular ideas by which we are supposed to know them ; and, if that be so, the hypothesis of an external world of objects becomes unnecessary. Moreover the fact that both the idea of the object and the object are taken at one and the same moment proves that both the object and the idea are identical, just as the illusory second moon perceived simultaneously with the moon is identical with it 1 . When one of them is not perceived the other also is not perceived, If they were by nature separate and different, there would be no reason why there should be such a uniform and invariable relation between them. The reason for the diversity of our ideas is to be sought not in the diversity of external objects which are ordinarily supposed to produce them, but in the be- ginningless diversity of the instinctive sub-conscious roots (vasana) which produce all our ideas in the waking state, just as they produce dreams during sleep ; as dreams are admitted by all to be produced without any external objects, so are all ideas produced without any external real objects ; for as ideas the dream ideas are just the same as the waking ideas. But in both cases there are the in stinctive sub-conscious roots (vasana), without which no ideas, w r hether in the dream state or in the waking state, can be produced ; so these, being invariably present in all cases of production of ideas, are the cause of all ideas 2 . 1 This simile is adduced by Vacaspati probably from a quotation from Dirinaga sahopalambha-niyamdd abhedo riila-tad-dhiyoh bhedas ca bhranti- vijnanair drsyetenddv ivddvaye. Since both the blue and the idea of the blue are taken at the same moment, they are one and the same ; for any two things which are taken simultaneously are identical. As one moon appears as two in an illusory manner, so the dif ference between the idea and the object is also perceived only illusorily. This argument of sahopalarnbha-niyama is absent in Vasubandhu s Vimsatika and Trimsika. 2 Vacaspati summarizes in this connection the inference of the Sautrantikas for the existence of an external world of objects as the causes of the corre sponding ideas. The argument of the Sautrantikas runs thus: When, the old causes remaining the same, there is a new effect, that new effect must be due to a new cause. Now, though it should be admitted that in the passing series of inner consciousness each particular moment generates the succeeding one, and that this power of productivity is called vasana (tat-pravrtti-vijndna-janana-sak- xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Veddnta 27 Saiikara in refuting the above position says that such a view is untenable because it contradicts our experience, which always distinguishes the subject and the object from the awareness. We are directly aware of our sense-contact with external objects which we perceive, and the object of awareness and the awareness are not one and the same. Our awareness itself shows that it is different from its object. The awareness of a pillar is not the same as a pillar, but a pillar is only an object of the awareness of a pillar. Even in denying external objects, the Buddhist idealists have to say that what is knowable only within appears as if it was existing outside 1 . Sankara argues thus: if externality is absolutely non-existent, how can any sense-cognition appear as external? Visnumitra cannot appear as the son of a barren woman. Again, the fact that an idea has the same form as its object does not imply that there are no objects; on the other hand, if there were no objects, how could any idea have the same form as its corresponding object? Again, the maxim that any two things which are taken simultaneously are identical is false; for, if the object and its awareness are comprehended at the same moment, the very fact that one is taken along with the other shows that they cannot be identical. Moreover, we find that in all our awarenesses of blue or yellow, a jug or a wall, it is the qualifying or predicative factors of objects of knowledge that differ; awareness as such remains just the same. The objects of knowledge are like so many ex traneous qualities attributed to knowledge, just as whiteness or blackness may be attributed to a cow; so whether one perceives blue or red or yellow, that signifies that the difference of perception involves a difference in objects and not in the awareness itself. So the awareness, being one, is naturally different from the objects, which are many ; and, since the objects are many, tir vdsana), and that its tendency to effectuate itself is called its power of fruition (paripdka), even then it would be difficult to understand how each particular moment should have a power altogether different from other moments ; for, since there is nothing else to change the character of the moments, each moment is just as much a moment as any other. So it has to be admitted that there are other things which make one moment different in its power of effectuation from any other; and these are the external objects. 1 Saiikara says yad antar-jneya-rupam tad bahirvad avabhdsate. This seems to be a quotation from Diiinaga. Dihnaga s verse, as quoted by Kamalaslla in his commentary on the Tattva-samgraha, verses 2082-2084, runs as follows: yad antar-jneya-rupam tu bahirvad avabhdsate so rtho vijndna-rupatvdt tat-praiyayataydpi ca. This shows that S~ahkara had Diiinaga in his mind when he attempted to refute the Buddhist idealists. 28 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. they are different from the one, the awareness. The awareness is one and it is different from the objects, which are many 1 . Moreover, the argument that the appearance of world objects may be ex plained on the analogy of dreams is also invalid; for there is a great difference between our knowledge of dreams and of worldly objects dreams are contradicted by the waking experience, but the waking experiences are never found contradicted. It is curious to note here the contradictions in Sankara s ow r n statements. It has been already pointed out that he himself in his commentary on Gaudapada s Karika built a powerful argument for the non-existence of all objects of waking experience on the analogy of the non-existence of the objects of dream experience. Santarak- sita (A.D. 705) and Kamalasila (A.D. 728) in refuting a position similar to that of the view of Sankara that consciousness is one and unchangeable and that all objects are changing, but that the change of objects does not imply any change of the consciousness itself argue that, had this been so, then that would imply that all sensibles of different kinds of colours, sounds, etc. were known at one and the same time, since the consciousness that would reveal those objects is constant and unchangeable 2 . Kamalasila there fore holds that consciousness is not unchangeable and one, but that there are only the changeable ideas of the sensibles and each idea is different from the other which follows it in time. Sahkara s view that consciousness is only one and that it is only the objects that are many seems to be based on a separation due to an arbitrary abstraction. If the commentary on Gaudapada s Karika be admitted to be a work of Sankara, then it may be urged that Sankara s views had undergone a change when he was writing the commentary on the Brahma-sutra\ for in the commentary on Gaudapada s Karika he seems again and again to emphasize the view that the objects perceived in waking experience are as false and as non-existent as objects of dream experience. His only realism there consisted in the assertion that the world was but the result of a false illusory imposition on the real Brahman, since 1 dvdbhydm ca bheda ekasya siddho bhavati ekasmdc ca dvayoh; tasmdd artha-jnanayor bhedah. Ankara s Bhdsya, n. ii. 28, Nirnaya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1904. 2 tad yadi nityaika-jndna-pratibhdsdtmakd ami sabdddayah syus tadd vicitrds- tarana-pratibhdsavat sakrd eva pratibhdse ran ; tat-pratibhdsdtmakasya jndnasya sarvadd vasthitatvdt . Kamalaslla s commentary on the Tattva-samgraha, si. 331. Gaekwad s Oriental Series, 1926. Neither Santaraksita nor Kamalasila seems to be familiar with Sankara. xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Veddnta 29 illusions such as mirage, etc. must have some underlying basis upon which they are imposed. But in the commentary on the Brahma-sutra the world of objects and sensibles is seen to have an existence of some sort outside individual thought. Vacaspati in his Bhamati commentary distinguishes the position of Saiikara from that of Buddhist idealism by saying that the Vedanta holds that the " blue " is not an idea of the form of blue, but " the blue " is merely the inexplicable and indefinable object 1 . In discussing the views of Vasubandhu in the Vimsatika and Trimsika it has been pointed out that Vasubandhu did not try to repudiate the objectivity of the objects of awareness, but he re pudiated the idea that objects of awareness existed outside of thought and produced the different kinds of awareness. His idea seems to have been that the sensibles are made up of thought- stuff and, though they are the psychological objects of awareness, they do not exist outside of thought and determine the different ideas that we have of them. But both the sensibles and their ideas are determined by some inner law of thought, which determines the nature and methods of the whole process of the growth and development of the psychosis, and which determines not only its cognitional character, but also its moral and emotional character. All the arguments of Sarikara in which he emphasizes the psychological duality of awareness and its object would have no force against Vasubandhu, as Vasubandhu admits it himself and holds that "blue" (mid) is different from the idea of blue; the blue is an object (alambana) and the idea of the blue is an awareness. Ac cording to him thought splits itself into subject and object; the idea therefore expresses itself as a subject- object awareness. The subject and the object are as much products of thought as the idea itself; the fact that he considers the blue to be thought does not mean that he denies the objectivity of the blue or that the only existence of the blue is the blue-idea. The blue is objectively present before the idea of blue as a presentation, just as there is the subject to perceive it, but this objectivity does not imply that the blue is somewhere outside thought in the space outside ; for even space-locations are thought-products, and so there is no sense in attributing the sensibles of presentation to the outside world. The sensibles are objects of awareness, but they are not the excitants 1 na hi brahma-vadino nllddydkdram vittim abhyupagacchanti , kintu anir- vacanlyam nildditi. Bhdmati, II. ii. 28. 30 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. of the corresponding awareness. It does not seem that Sankara says anything to refute such a view. Sankara s position in the commentary on Gaudapada s Kdrika seems to have been the same sort of view as that of Dinnaga, which he takes so much pains to refute in the Brahma-sutra-bhasya, and as such it was opposed to the view of Nagarjuna that there must be some essence or reality on which the illusory impositions are made. But in the Brahma- sutra-bhasya he maintains the view that the objective world, as it appears to our consciousness, is present before it objectively and independently only its ultimate nature is inexplicable. The difference of the objects from the awareness and their inde pendent existence and activity have been accepted by most of the later Vedanta teachers of the Sankara school; and it is well known that in sense-perception the need of the mind-contact with the object of perception through the specific sense is considered indispensable 1 . Prakasatman (A.D. 1200) in his Panca-padikd-vivarana raises this point and says that the great difference between the Mahayanists and the Vedantins consists in the fact that the former hold that the objects (visaya) have neither any separate existence nor any independent purpose or action to fulfil as distinguished from the momentary ideas, while the latter hold that, though the objects are in essence identical with the one pure consciousness, yet they can fulfil independent purposes or functions and have separate, abiding and uncontradicted existences 2 . Both Padmapada and Prakasatman argue that, since the awareness remains the same while there is a constant variation of its objects, and therefore that which remains constant (anuvrtta) and that which changes (vydvrttd) cannot be considered identical, the object cannot be regarded as being only a modification of the idea 3 . It is suggested that the Buddhist idealist urges that, if the object (e.g. blue) is different from the awareness, it cannot be revealed in it, and, if the blue can be revealed in the awareness, at that moment all the other things of the world might as well be revealed ; for there is no such 1 See Vedanta-paribhasd, ch. I, Srivenkatesvar Press, Bombay, 1911. 2 tattva-darsinas tu advitiydt samvedandt abhede pi visayasya bhedendpi artha- kriyd-sdmarthya-sattvam sthdyitvam cdbddhitam astlti vadanti. Panca-pddikd-vi- varana, p. 73. In addition to this work Prakasatman also wrote two inde pendent commentaries on Brahma-sutra called dnraka-mimdmsd-nydya-sam- graha and Laukika-nydya-muktdvall. 3 anuvrttasya vydvrttdn no. bhedo nuvrttatvdd dkdsa-ghatddivat. Panca- pddikd-vivarana, p. 73. xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Veddnta 3 1 specific relation with the blue that the blue alone should appear in consciousness at that moment. If it is urged that the blue produces the awareness of the blue, then what would be the function of the visual organ? It is better, therefore, the Buddhist suggests, to admit a natural and unique relation of identity of the idea and the object 1 . The Vedantist objects to this and says that such a supposition cannot be true, since we perceive that the subject, object and the idea are not one and the same. To such an objection the Buddhist is supposed to reply that these three do not form a complex unity, but arise at three successive moments of time, and then by virtue of their potency or root-impression a complex of the three appears ; and this complex should not therefore be inter preted as being due to a relationing of three distinct entities 2 . Thus the fact that " I perceive blue" is not to be interpreted as a conscious relationing of "I," "the blue" and the awareness, but as an ideation arising at one particular point of time, involving all the three constituents in it. Such a supposition is necessary, be cause all appearances are momentary, and because the relationing of the three as three independent entities would necessarily be impossible without the lapse of some time for their operation of relationing. The theory of momentariness naturally leads us to the above supposition, that what appears as relationing is nothing but one momentary flash, which has the above three as its constituent elements ; so the Buddhist is supposed to admit that, psychologic- 1 tasmdt svdbhdvikdsddharandbhedasambandhdd eva vijndne nllam avabhdsate. Panca-pddikd-vivarana, p. 74. Arguing from a similar point of view, Santaraksita and Kamalaslla urge that, if the object was not identical with the awareness, there must be some im mutable law why they should appear simultaneously. This law according to the Buddhists could only be either of identity (tdddtmyd) or of causality as invariability of production (tad-utpatti) . The first alternative is what the Buddhists here are contending for as against the Vedantists. There cannot be the law of causality here ; for there cannot be any operation of the law of causality as production between two entities which are simultaneous. Tattva-samgraha and Panjikd, 2030, 2031. 2 tad vdsand-sameta-samanantcra-pratyaya-samuttham sankalandtmakam pra- tyaydntaram etan neha sambandhdgamah. Padmapada s (A.D. 820) Panca-pddikd , p. 25. This work exerted the greatest influence on the development of Vedantic thought for about six or seven centuries, and several commentaries were written on it. Most important of these are Prakasatman s Pancapddikd-vivarana, Pafi- ca-pddikddhydsa-bhdsya-vydkhyd, Panca-pddikd- sdstr a- darpana by Amrtananda, Tattva-dtpana by Amrtanandanatha, and also a commentary by Anandapurna Yati. Prakasatman s commentary on it, called Pancapddikd-vivarana, was com mented upon by Akhandananda Muni in his Tattva-dlpana, by Ramananda SarasvatI in his Vivaranopanydsa, and by Nrsimhasrama in his Panca-pddikd- vivarana-bhdva-prakdsikd. 32 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. ally, the awareness and its object seem to be different, but such a psychological appearance can at best be considered as a mental illusion or fiction; for logically the Buddhist cannot admit that a momentary appearance could subsist long enough to have the possibility of being relationed to the self and the awareness, as in " I know the blue " ; and, if the blue was not considered to be identical with awareness, there would remain no way to explain the possibility of the appearance of the blue in the awareness ] . Padmapada points out that the main point with the Buddhists is the doctrine of causal efficiency (artha-kriya-karitva), or the maxim that that alone exists which can prove its existence by effecting some purpose or action. They hold further that this criterion of existence can be satisfied only if all existents are momentary and if all things are momentary; the only epistemological view that can consistently be accepted is the identity of the awareness and the object. The main reason why only momentary existents can satisfy the criterion of causal efficiency is that, if the existents were not assumed to be momentary, they could not effect any purpose or action 2 . Padmapada urges in refutation of this that, if causal efficiency means the productivity of its own awareness (sva-visaya- jnana-jananani), then an awareness or idea has no existence; for it does not produce any other knowledge of itself (samvidam sva-visaya- jnana-jananadasallaksanatvam), and the awareness of one cannot be known by others except by inference, which again would not be direct cognition 3 . If causal efficiency means the production of another moment, then the last moment, having no other moment to produce, would itself be non-existent; and, if the last moment is proved to be non-existent, then by turns all the other moments would be non-existent. Existence is a nature of things; and even when a thing remains silent after an operation it does not on that account cease to exist 4 . On such a basis Prakasatman points out 1 ndnubhavam dsritya samvedandd abhinnam nllam brumah kintu vijndnena nilasya pratibhdsdnyathdnupapattyd ; ksanikasya tv dgantuka-sambandhdbhdve . . . pratibhdsa eva na sydt. Panca-pddikd-vivarana, p. 74. 2 See the first volume of this work, pp. 163-164, where the reasons in justification of the doctrine are briefly stated. 3 Padmapada derives the possibility of one s being aware of an awareness, which however hardly appears to be convincing. He thinks that an awareness, being of the nature of light, does not stand in need of any other light to illuminate it. na ca samvit samvido viayah samvid-dtmand bheddbhdvdt pradipasyeva pradlpdntaram . Panca-pddikd, p. 27. 4 ndrtha-kriyd-kdritva-laksanam sattvarn kintu svdbhdvikam itisakrt kdryyam krtvdtusrflmbhutasydpisthdyinah sattvarn na virudhyate. Panca-pddikd-vivarana, p. 80. xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Veddnta 33 that the supposed three notions of "I," "awareness" and the object are really not three distinct notions appearing as one on account of their similarity, but all the three are joined together in one identical subject-object-awareness which does not involve the three successive stages which the Buddhists suppose. This identity is proved by the fact that they are recognized (pratyabhijnd) to be so. We are, again, all conscious of our own identity, that we persist in all our changing states of consciousness, and that, though our ideas are continually changing with the changing objects, we remain unchanged all the same ; and this shows that in knowing ourselves as pure awareness we are successively connected with the changing objects. But the question arises who is to be convinced of this identity, a notion of which can be produced only by a relationing of the previous existence (through sub-conscious impressions of memory) to the existence of the present moment; and this cannot be done by the Vedantic self, which is pure self-revealing consciousness that cannot further be made an object of any other conscious state; for it is unchangeable, indestructible, and there cannot be in it a consciousness of relationing between a past state and a present state through the sub-conscious impressions of memory 1 . The mere persistence of the same consciousness is not the recognition of identity ; for the recognition of identity would be a relation uniting the past as past with the present as present; and, since there is no one to perceive the relation of identity, the appearance of identity is false. The Vedantic answer to such an objection is that, though the pure consciousness cannot behave as an individual, yet the same consciousness associated with mind (anlahkarana-visista) may behave as an individual who can recognize his own identity as well as that of others. The mind is associated with the sub-conscious impressions of a felt ego (ahamvrtti-samskara-sahitam), due to the experience of the self as associated with a past time ; being responsible for the experience of the self as associated with the present time, it produces the notion of the identity of the self as persisting both in the past and in the present. A natural objection against such an explanation is that, since the Vedanta does not admit that one awareness can be the object of another awareness, the revival of a past awareness is 1 purvdnubhava-samskdra-sahitdd iddmmtana-vastu-pramiti-kdrandj jdtam ekasya kdla-dvaya-sambandha-visayakam pratyaksa-jndnam pratyabhijnd iti cet, na tarhi dtmani sd sambhavati . . . vijnana-svabhdvasya hy dtmanah . . .jndndnta- r agamy atvdt. . . Panca-pddikd-vivararia, p. 75. 34 The Sankara School of Vedanta [CH. impossible, without which recognition of identity would be im possible. The answer of the Vedantist is that, just as an idea is remembered through its sub-conscious impressions, so, though recognition of identity was absent in the preceding moment, yet it could arise through the operation of the sub-conscious im pressions at a later moment 1 . According to the Vedanta the pure consciousness is the only unchanging substance underlying; it is this consciousness associated with mind (antahkarana) that behaves as the knower or the subject, and it is the same consciousness associated with the previous and later time that appears as the objective self with which the identity is felt and which is known to be identical with the knower the mind-associated conscious ness. We all have notions of self-identity and we feel it as "I am the same"; and the only way in which this can be explained is on the basis of the fact that consciousness, though one and universal, can yet be supposed to perform diverse functions by virtue of the diverse nature of its associations, by which it seems to transform itself as the knower and the thousand varieties of relations and objects which it knows. The main point which is to be noted in connection with this realization of the identity of the self is that the previous experience and its memory prove that the self existed in the past ; but how are we to prove that what existed is also existing at the present moment? Knowledge of identity of the self is some thing different from the experience of self in the past and in the present. But the process consists in this, that the two experiences manifest the self as one identical entity which persisted through both the experiences, and this new experience makes the self known in the aforesaid relation of identity. Again, when I remember a past experience, it is the self as associated with that experience that is remembered; so it is the self as associated with the different time relations that is apprehended in an experience of the identity of self. From all these discussions one thing that comes out clearly is that according to the Sankara Vedanta, as explained by the V war ana school of Padmapada and his followers, the sense-data and the objects have an existence independent of their being perceived; and there is also the mind called antahkarana, which operates in its own way for the apprehension of this or that object. Are objects already there and presented to the pure consciousness through the 1 Panca-pddika-vivarana, p. 76. xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Veddnta 35 mind? But what then are the objects? and the Sankarite s answer is that they in themselves are unspeakable and indescribable. It is easy to notice the difference of such a view from that of the Buddhistic idealism of Dinnaga or the Lankavatdra on the one hand and that of Vasubandhu in his Trimsika on the other. For in the case of the former there were no objects independent of their being perceived, and in the case of the latter the objects are trans formations of a thought-principle and are as such objective to the subject which apprehends them. Both the subject and the object are grounded in the higher and superior principle, the principle of thought. This grounding implies that this principle of thought and its transformations are responsible for both the subject and the object, as regards material and also as regards form. According to the Sankara Vedanta, however, the stuff of world- objects, mind, the senses and all their activities, functionings and the like are but modifications of may a, which is indescribable (anirvdcya) in itself, but which is always related to pure con sciousness as its underlying principle, and which in its forms as material objects hides from the view and is made self-conscious by the illuminating flash of the underlying principle of pure con sciousness in its forms as intellectual states or ideas. As already described, the Sunyavadins also admitted the objective existence of all things and appearances; but, as these did not stand the test of criticism, considered them as being essenceless (nihsvabhava) . The only difference that one can make out between this doctrine of essencelessness and the doctrine of indescribableness of the Sankara school is that this "indescribable" is yet regarded as an indescribable something, as some stuff which undergoes changes and which has transformed itself into all the objects of the world. The idealism of the Sahkara Vedanta does not believe in the sahopalam- bha-niyama of the Buddhist idealists, that to exist is to be perceived. The world is there even if it be not perceived by the individual ; it has an objective existence quite independent of my ideas and sensations; but, though independent of my sensations or ideas, it is not independent of consciousness, with which it is associated and on which it is dependent. This consciousness is not ordinary psychological thought, but it is the principle that underlies all conscious thought. This pure thought is independent and self- revealing, because in all conscious thought the consciousness shines by itself; all else is manifested by this consciousness and 3-2 36 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. when considered apart from it, is inconceivable and unmeaning. This independent and uncontradicted self-shiningness constitutes being (abadhita-svayam-prakasataiva asya satta) 1 . All being is pure consciousness, and all appearance hangs on it as something which is expressed by a reference to it and apart from which it has no conceivable status or meaning. This is so not only epistemologically or logically, but also ontologically. The object- forms of the world are there as transformations of the indescribable stuff of maya, which is not " being," but dependent on "being *; but they can only be expressed when they are reflected in mental states and presented as ideas. Analogies of world objects with dream objects or illusions can therefore be taken only as popular examples to make the conception of mayd popularly intelligible ; and this gives the Vedantic idealism its unique position. Sarikara s Defence of Vedanta; Philosophy of Badarayana and Bhartrprapanca. Sarikara s defensive arguments consisted in the refutation of the objections that may be made against the Vedantic conception of the world. The first objection anticipated is that from the followers of Samkhya philosophy. Thus it is urged that the effect must be largely of the same nature as the cause. Brahman, which is believed to be intelligent (cetana) and pure (suddha), could not be the cause of a world which is unintelligent (jada and acetana) and impure (asuddhd). And it is only because the world is so different in nature from the intelligent spirits that it can be useful to them. Two things which are identical in their nature can hardly be of any use to each other two lamps cannot be illuminating to each other. So it is only by being different from the intelligent spirits that the world can best serve them and exist for them. Sankara s answer to this objection is that it is not true that the effect should in every way be similar to the cause there are instances of inanimate hair and nails growing from living beings, and of living insects growing out of inanimate objects like cow- dung. Nor can it be denied that there is at least some similarity between Brahman and the world in this, that both have being. It cannot be urged that, because Brahman is intelligent, the world also should be intelligent; for there is no reason for such 1 Vacaspati Misra s Bhamatt, p. 13, Nirnaya-Sagara edition, 1904. xi] Sankara s Defence of Veddnta 37 an expectation. The converse of it also has not been found to be true it has not been found that what is unintelligent has been known to have been derived from a source other than Brahman 1 . The whole point of this argument seems to lie in the fact that, since the Upanisads assert that Brahman is the cause of the world, the apparent incompatibility of the production of an impure and unintelligent world from the intelligent and pure Brahman has to be explained away ; for such ultimate truths can be discovered not by reason, but by the testimony of the Upanisads. Another objec tion supposed to be raised by Samkhya against Vedanta is that at the time of dissolution (pralaya), when the world of effects will dissolve back into Brahman the cause, the impurities of the worldly state might also make the causal state of Brahmahood impure. Sankara refutes it by pointing out two sets of instances in which the effects do not affect the causal state when they return to it. Of these, one set of instances is to be found in those cases where articles of gold, silver, etc. are melted back into their original material states as unformed gold and silver, and are not seen to affect them with their specific peculiarities as formed articles. The other instance is to be found in the manifestation of magic by a magician. The magical creations of a magician are controlled by him and, when they vanish in this way, they cannot in any way affect the magician himself; for the magical creations have no reality. So also a dreamer is not affected by his dreams when he is awake. So the reality is one which remains altogether un touched by the changing states. The appearance of this reality as all the changing states is mere false show (mdyd-matram) , like the appearance of a rope as a snake. Again, as a man may in deep sleep pass into a state where there is no trace of his mundane experiences and may yet, when he becomes awake, resume his normal vocation in life, so after the dissolution of the world into its causal state there may again be the same kind of creation as there was before the dissolution. So there can be no objection that the world of impure effects will affect the pure state of Brahman at the time of dissolution or that there could be no creation after dissolution. These arguments of Sankara in answer to a supposed objection 1 kirn hi yac caitanyendnanvitam tad abrahma-prakrtikam drstam iti brahma- vddinam praty uddhriyeta samastasya vastujdtasya brahma-prakrtikatvdbhyu- pagamdt. Sarikara s Bhasya, n. i. 6. 38 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. that the world of effects, impure and unintelligent as it is, could not have been the product of pure and intelligent Brahman are not only weak but rather uncalled for. If the world of effects is mere may a and magic and has no essence (vastutva), the best course for him was to rush straight to his own view of effects as having no substantiality or essence and not to adopt the parindma view of real transformations of causes into effects to show that the effects could be largely dissimilar from their causes. Had he started with the reply that the effects had no real existence and that they were merely magical creations and a false show, the objection that the impure world could not come out of pure Brahman would have at once fallen to the ground; for such an objection would have validity only with those who believed in the real transformations of effects from causes, and not with a philo sopher like Sankara, who did not believe in the reality of effects at all. Instead of doing that he proceeded to give examples of the realistic return of golden articles into gold in order to show that the peculiar defects or other characteristics of the effect cannot affect the purity of the cause. Side by side with this he gives another instance, how magical creations may vanish without affecting the nature of the magician. This example, however, does not at all fit in with the context, and it is surprising how Sankara failed to see that, if his examples of realistic transformations were to hold good, his example of the magic and the magician would be quite out of place. If the parindma view of causation is to be adopted, the vivaria view is to be given up. It seems however that Sankara here was obliged to take refuge in such a confusion of issues by introducing stealthily an example of the vivaria view of unreality of effects in the commentary on sutras which could only yield a realistic interpretation. The sutras here seem to be so convincingly realistic that the ultimate reply to the suggested incompatibility of the production of effects dissimilar from their causes is found in the fact that the Upanisads hold that this impure and unintelligent world had come out of Brahman ; and that, since the Upanisads assert it, no objection can be raised against it on grounds of reason. In the next section the theory of realistic transformation of causes is further supported by the sutra which asserts that in spite of the identity of effects with their cause their plurality or diversity may also be explained on the analogy of many popular illustrations. Thus, though the waves are identical with the sea, yet they have xi] Sankara s Defence of Vedanta 39 an existence in their plurality and diversity as well. Here also Saiikara has to follow the implication of the sutra in his interpre tation. He, however, in concluding his commentary on this sutra, says that the world is not a result of any real transformation of Brahman as effect; Brahman alone exists, but yet, when Brahman is under the conditioning phenomena of a world-creation, there is room for apparent diversity and plurality. It may be pointed out, however, that such a supplementary explanation is wholly incom patible with the general meaning of the rule, which is decidedly in favour of a realistic transformation. It is unfortunate that here also Sankara does not give any reason for his supplementary remark, which is not in keeping with the general spirit of the sutra and the interpretation which he himself gave of it. In the next section the sutras seem plainly to assert the identity of cause and effect, " because of the possibility of the effect, because the cause exists, because the effect exists in the cause and is due to an elaboration of the cause and also for other reasons and the testimony of the Upanisads." Such a meaning is quite in keeping with the general meaning of the previous sections. Saiikara, however, interprets the sutra as meaning that it is Brahman, the cause, which alone is true. There cannot therefore be any real transformation of causes into effects. The omniscience of Brahman and His being the creator of the world have thus only a limited validity ; for they depend upon the relative reality of the world. From the absolute point of view therefore there is no Isvara who is the omniscient creator of the world 1 . Saiikara supports this generally on the ground of the testimony of some Upanisad texts (e.g. mrttiketyeva satyam, etc.). He however introduces an argument in support of the sat-karya-vada theory, or the theory that the effect is already existent in the cause. This theory is indeed common both to the parinama view of real transformation and the vivarta view, in two different ways. It is curious however that he should support the sat-karya-vada theory on parinama lines, as against the genera tive view of a-sat-karya-vdda of the Nyaya, but not on vivarta lines, where effects are treated as non-existent and false. Thus he 1 kuta-stha-brahmatma-vadinah ekatiiaikdntydt isitrlsitavyabhavah isvara- kdrana-pratijnd-virodha iti cet; na; avidydtmaka-ndma-rupa-blja-vydkarandpek- saivdt sarvajnatvasya. ^aiikara s Bhdsya on Brahma-sutra, n. i. 14. na tdttvikam aisvaryyam sarvajnatvam ca brahmanah kintv avidyopddhikam iti taddsrayam pratijnd-sutram, tattvdsrayam tu tad ancnyatva-sutram. Bhdmati on the above Bhdsya. 40 The Sankara School of Vedanta [CH. says that the fact that curd is produced from milk and not from mud shows that there is some such intimate relation of curd with milk which it has not with anything else. This intimate relation con sists in the special power or capacity (sakti) in the cause (e.g. the milk), which can produce the special effect (e.g. the curd). This power is the very essence of the cause, and the very essence of this power is the effect itself. If a power determines the nature of the effect, it must be already existent in the cause as the essence of the effect. Arguing against the Nyaya view that the cause is different from the effect, though they are mutually connected in an insepar able relation of inherence (samavaya), he says that, if such a samavaya is deemed necessary to connect the cause with the effect, then this also may require a further something to connect the samavaya with the cause or the effect and that another and that another adinfinitum. If it is urged that samavaya, being a rela tion, does not require any further relation to connect it with anything else, it may well be asked in reply how "conjunction" (samyoga), which is also regarded as a relation, should require the relation of inherence (samavaya) to connect it with the objects which are in conjunction (samyogiri). The conception of samavaya connecting substances with their qualities is unnecessary ; for the latter always appear identified with the former (tadatmya-pratiti). If the effect, say a whole, is supposed to be existing in the cause, the parts, it must exist in them all taken together or in each of the separate parts. If the whole exist only in the totality of the parts, then, since all the parts cannot be assembled together, the whole as such would be in visible. If the whole exist in the parts in parts, then one has to conceive other parts of the whole different from its constituent parts; and, if the same questions be again repeated, these parts should have other parts and these others; and thus there would be a vicious infinite. If the whole exists wholly in each of the parts at the same time, then there would be many wholes. If it exists successively in each of the parts, then the whole would at one time be existent only in one part, and so at that time the functions of the whole would be absent in the other parts. If it is said that, just as a class-concept (e.g. cow) exists wholly in each of the individuals and yet is not many, so a whole may also be wholly existent in each of the parts, it may well be replied that the experience of wholes is not like the experience of class-concepts. The class-concept of cow is realized in each and every cow; but xi] Sankara s Defence of Veddnta 41 a whole is not realized in each and every part. Again, if the effect is non-existent before its production, then, production being an action, such an action would have nothing as its agent, which is impossible for, since the effect is non-existent before its pro duction, it could not be the agent of its production; and, since being non-existent, it cannot be the agent of its production, such a production would be either itself non-existent or would be without any agent. If , however, production is not defined as an action, but as a relationing of an effect with its cause (svakarana-satta-samavaya) , then also it may be objected that a relation is only possible when there are two terms which are related, and, since the effect is as yet non-existent, it cannot be related to its cause. But, if the effect is already existent, what then is the necessity of the causal operation (karaka-vyapara)t The answer to such a question is to be found in the view that the effect is but an elabora tion of the cause into its effect. Just as a man may sit with his limbs collected together or stretched out and yet would be considered the same man, so an effect also is to be regarded as an expansion of the cause and as such identical with it. The effect is thus only a transformed state of the cause ; and hence the causal operation is necessary for bringing about this transformation ; but in spite of such a transformation the effect is not already existing in the cause as its potency or power. There are seven other smaller sections. In the first of these the objection that, if the world is a direct product of the intelligent Brahman, there is no reason why such an intelligent being should create a world which is full of misery and is a prison-house to himself, is easily answered by pointing out that the transcendent creator is far above the mundane spirits that suffer misery in the prison-house of the world. Here also Sankara adds as a supple mentary note the remark that, since there is no real creation and the whole world is but a magical appearance, no such objection that the creator should not have created an undesirable world for its own suffering is valid. But the siitras gave him no occasion for such a remark; so that indeed, as was the case with the previous sections, here also his may a theory is not in keeping even with his general interpretation of the sutras, and his remarks have to be appended as a note which hangs loosely and which does not appear to have any relevancy to the general meaning and purport of the siitras. 42 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. In the next section an objection is raised that Brahman cannot without the help of any other accessory agents create the world ; the reply to such an objection is found in the fact that Brahman has all powers in Himself and can as such create the world out of Himself without the help of anything else. In the next section an objection is raised that, if the world is a transformation of Brahman, then, since Brahman is partless, the transformation must apply to the whole of Brahman ; for a partial transformation is possible only when the substance which is under going the transformation has parts. A reply to such an objection is to be found in the analogy of the human self, which is in itself formless and, though transforming itself into various kinds of dream experiences, yet remains unchanged and unaffected as a whole by such transformations. Moreover, such objections may be levelled against the objectors themselves; for Samkhya also admits the transformation of the formless prakrti. In another section it is urged that, since Brahman is complete in Himself, there is no reason why He should create this great world, when He has nothing to gain by it. The reply is based on the analogy of play, where one has nothing to gain and yet one is pleased to indulge in it. So Brahman also creates the world by His Ilia or play. Sankara, however, never forgets to sing his old song of the mdya theory, however irrelevant it may be, with regard to the purpose of the sutras, which he himself could not avoid following. Thus in this section, after interpreting the sutra as attributing the world-creation to God s playful activity, he remarks that it ought not to be forgotten that all the world-creation is but a fanciful appearance due to nescience and that the ultimate reality is the identity of the self and Brahman. The above discussion seems to prove convincingly that Badarayana s philosophy was some kind of bhedabheda-vada or a theory of transcendence and immanence of God (Brahman) even in the light of Saiikara s own commentary. He believed that the world was the product of a real transformation of Brahman, or rather of His powers and energies (sakti). God Himself was not exhausted by such a transformation and always remained as the master creator who by His play created the world and who could by His own powers create the world without any extraneous assistance. The world was thus a real transformation of God s powers, while He Himself, though remaining immanent in the xi] Philosophy of Bddardyana and Bhartrprapanca 43 world through His powers, transcended it at the same time, and remained as its controller, and punished or rewarded the created mundane souls in accordance with their bad and good deeds. The doctrine of bhedabheda-vada is certainly prior to Sarikara, as it is the dominant view of most of the puranas. It seems probable also that Bhartrprapanca refers to Bodhayana, who is referred to as vrttikara by Ramanuja, and as vrttikara and Upavarsa by Sarikara, and to Dramidacarya, referred to by Sarikara and Ramanuja ; all held some form of bhedabheda doctrine 1 . Bhartrpra panca has been referred to by Sankara in his commentary on the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad \ and Anandajnana, in his commentary on Sarikara s commentary, gives a number of extracts from Bhartrprapanca s Bhasya on the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad. Prof. M. Hiriyanna collected these fragments in a paper read before the Third Oriental Congress in Madras, 1924, and there he describes Bhartrprapanca s philosophy as follows. The doctrine of Bhartr prapanca is monism, and it is of the bhedabheda type. The relation between Brahman and thejiva, as that between Brahman and the world, is one of identity in difference. An implication of this view is that both thejiva and the physical world evolve out of Brahman, so that the doctrine may be described as Brahma-parinama-vada. On the spiritual side Brahman is transformed into the antaryamin and the jiva; on the physical side into avyakta, sutra, viraj and devata, which are all cosmic; and jati and pinda, which are not 1 Prof. S. Kuppusvami isastrl, in an article read before the Third Oriental Conference, quotes a passage from Verikata s Tattva-tlka on Ramanuja s com mentary on the Brahma-sutras, in which he says that Upavarsa is a name of Bodhayana vrttikdrasya Bodhdyanasvaiva hi Upavarsa iti sydn ndma Pro ceedings of the Third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1924. The commentators on arikara s Bhasya say that, when he refers to Vrttikara in I. i. 9, i. i. 23, 1. ii. 23 and in. iii. 53, he refers to Upavarsa by name. From the views of Upavarsa referred to in these sutras it appears that Upavarsa believed in the theory of jndna-kanna-samuccaya, held also by Bhaskara (an adherent of the bhedabheda theory), Ramanuja and others, but vehemently opposed by ^aiikara, who wanted to repudiate the idea of his opponents that the performance of sacrificial and Vedic duties could be conceived as a preliminary preparation for making oneself fit for Brahma-knowledge. References to Dramidacarya s commentary on the Chdndogya Upanisad are made by Anandagiri in his commentary on ^ahkara s commentary on the Chdn dogya Upanisad. In the commentary of Sarvajnatma Muni s Samksepa-sdriraka, in. 217-227, by Nrsimhasrama, the Vakyakara referred to by Sarvajnatma Muni as Atreya has been identified with Brahmanandin or Tanka and the bhasyakara (a quotation from whose Bhasya appears in Samksepa-sdnraka, in. 221, "antar- gund bhagavatl paradevateti" is referred to as a quotation from Dramidacarya in Ramanuja s Veddrtha-samgraha, p. 138, Pandit edition) is identified with Dramidacarya, who wrote a commentary on Brahmanandin s Chdadogyo- panisad-vdrttika . 44 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. cosmic. These are the avasthas or modes of Brahman, and re present the eight classes into which the variety of the universe may be divided. They are again classified into three rdsis, para- mdtma-rdsi, jiva-rasi and murttdmurtta-rasi, which correspond to the triple subject-matter of Religion and Philosophy, viz. God, soul and matter. Bhartrprapanca recognized what is known as pramana-samuccaya, by which it follows that the testimony of common experience is quite as valid as that of the Veda. The former vouches for the reality of variety and the latter for that of unity (as taught in the Upanisads). Hence the ultimate truth is dvaitddvaita. Moksa, or life s end, is conceived as being achieved in two stages the first leading to apavarga, where samsara is overcome through the overcoming of asanga\ and the second leading to Brahmahood through the dispelling of avidyd. This means of reaching either stage is jndna-karma-samuccaya, which is a corollary on the practical side to pramdna-samuccaya on the theoretical side. It is indeed difficult to say what were the exact characteristics of Badarayana s bheddbheda doctrine of Vcdanta; but there is very little doubt that it was some special type of bheddbheda doctrine, and, as has already been repeatedly pointed out, even Sankara s own commentary (if we exclude only his parenthetic remarks, which are often inconsistent with the general drift of his own commentary and the context of the sutras, as well as with their purpose and meaning, so far as it can be made out from such a context) shows that it was so. If, however, it is contended that this view of real transformation is only from a relative point of view (vyavahdrika) , then there must at least be one sutra where the absolute (para- mdrthikd) point of view is given ; but no such sutra has been dis covered even by Sankara himself. If experience always shows the causal transformation to be real, then how is one to know that in the ultimate point of view all effects are false and unreal? If, however, it is contended that there is a real transformation (parindma) of the mdyd stuff, whereas Brahman remains always unchanged, and if mdyd is regarded as the power (sakti) of Brahman, how then can the sakti of Brahman as well as its transformations be regarded as unreal and false, while the possessor of the sakti (or the saktimat, Brahman) is regarded as real and absolute? There is a great diversity of opinion on this point among the Vedantic writers of the Sankara school. Thus Appaya Dlksita in his Sid- dhdnta-lesa refers to the author of Paddrtha-nirnaya as saying that xi] Vivarta and Parindma in Veddnta 45 Brahman and mdyd are both material causes of the world-appear ance Brahman the vivarta cause, and mdya the parindma cause. Others are said to find a definition of causation intermediate between vivarta and parindma by defining material cause as that which can produce effects which are not different from itself (svd- bhinna-kdryajanakatvam updddnatvam) . The world is identical with Brahman inasmuch as it has being, and it is identical with nescience inasmuch as it has its characteristics of materiality and change. So from two different points of view both Brahman and mdya are the cause of the world. Vacaspati Misra holds that mdyd is only an acces sory cause (sahakdri), whereas Brahman is the real vivarta cause 1 . The author of the Siddhdnta-mukt avail, Prakasananda, however, thinks that it is the mdyd energy (mdyd-sakti) which is the material cause of the world and not Brahman. Brahman is unchangeable and is the support of mdyd ; and is thus the cause of the world in a remote sense. Sarvajnatma Muni, however, believes Brahman alone to be the vivarta cause, and mdyd to be only an instrument for the purpose 2 . The difficulty that many of the sutras of Badarayana give us a parindma view of causation was realized by Sarvajnatma Muni, who tried to explain it away by suggesting that the parindma theory was discussed approvingly in the sutras only because this theory w r as nearest to the vivarta, and by initiating people to the parindma theory it would be easier to lead them to the vivarta theory, as hinted in sutra n. i. i4 3 . This explanation could have some probability, if the arrangement of the sutras was 1 Vacaspati Misra flourished in about A.D. 840. In addition to his Bhdmatl commentary on the Brahma-sutra he wrote many other works and commentaries on other systems of philosophy. His important works are : Tattva-bindu, Tattva- vaisdradl (yoga), Tattva-samlksa Brahma- siddhi-itkd, Nydya-kanika on Vidhi- viveka, Nydya-tattvdloka, Nydya-ratna-tlkd, Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-ffka, Brahma-tattva-samhitoddlparii, Yukti-dlpikd (Samkhyd), Samkhya-tattva- kaumudi, Veddnta-tattva-kaumudi. 2 He lived about A.D. 900 during the reign of King Manukuladitya and was a pupil of Devesvara. 3 vivarta-vddasya hi purva-bhumir veddnta-vdde parindma-vddah vyavasthite smin parindma-vdde svayam samdydti vivarta-vddah. Samksepa-sdrlraka, n. 61. updyam dtisthati purvam uccair upeyam dptum Janata yathaiv a srutir muriindras ca vivarta- siddhyai vikdra-vddam vadatas tathaiva. Ibid. n. 62. vikdra-vddam Kapilddi-paksam upetya vddena tu sutra-kdrah srutis ca samjalpati pilrvabhumau sthitvd vivarta-pratipddandya. Ibid. n. 64. 46 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. such as to support the view that the parinama view was intro duced only to prepare the reader s mind for the vivarta view, which was ultimately definitely approved as the true view ; but it has been shown that the content of almost all the sutras of n. i. consistently support the parinama view, and that even the sutra n. i. 14 cannot be explained as holding the vivarta view of causation as the right one, since the other sutras of the same section have been explained by Sankara himself on the parinama view ; and, if the content be taken into consideration, this sutra also has to be explained on the parinama view of bhedabheda type. Teachers and Pupils in Vedanta. The central emphasis of Sankara s philosophy of the Upanisads and the Brahma-sutra is on Brahman, the self- revealed identity of pure consciousness, bliss and being, which does not await the performance of any of the obligatory Vedic duties for its realiza tion. A right realization of such Upanisad texts as "That art thou," instilled by the right teacher, is by itself sufficient to dispel all the false illusions of world-appearance. This, however, was directly against the Mlmamsa view of the obligatoriness of certain duties, and Sankara and his followers had to fight hard on this point with the Mimamsakas. Different Mlmamsa writers empha sized in different ways the necessity of the association of duties with Brahma-wisdom ; and a brief reference to some of these has been made in the section on Suresvara. Another question arose re garding the nature of the obligation of listening to the unity texts (e.g. "that art thou") of the Vedanta; and later Vedanta writers have understood it differently. Thus the author of the Prakatartha, who probably flourished in the twelfth century, holds that it is only by virtue of the mandate of the Upanisads (such as "thou shouldst listen to these texts, understand the meaning and medi tate") that one learns for the first time that one ought to listen to the Vedanta texts a view which is technically called apurva- vidhi. Others, however, think that people might themselves engage in reading all kinds of texts in their attempts to attain salvation and that they might go on the wrong track ; and it is just to draw them on to the right path, viz. that of listening to the unity texts of the Upanisads, that the Upanisads direct men to listen to the unity texts this view is technically called niyama-vidhi. xi] Teachers and Pupils in Veddnta 47 The followers of Sarvajnatma Muni, however, maintain that there can in no sense be a duty in regard to the attainment of wisdom of Brahma-knowledge, and the force of the duty lies in enjoining the holding of discussions for the clarification of one s understanding; and the meaning of the obligatory sentence "thou shouldst listen to" means that one should hold proper discussions for the clarifi cation of his intellect. Other followers of Suresvara, however, think that the force of the obligation lies in directing the student of Vedanta steadily to realize the truth of the Vedanta texts without any interruption; and this view is technically called parisamkhya-vidhi. Vacaspati Misra and his followers, however, think that no obliga tion of duties is implied in these commands ; they are simply put in the form of commands in order to show the great importance of listening to Vedanta texts and holding discussions on them, as a means of advancement in the Vedantic course of progress. But the central philosophical problem of the Vedanta is the conception of Brahman the nature of its causality, its relation with may a and the phenomenal world of world-appearance, and with individual persons. Sankara s own writings do not always manifest the same uniform and clear answer; and many passages in different parts of his work show tendencies which could be more or less diversely interpreted, though of course the general scheme was always more or less well-defined. Appaya Dlksita notes in the beginning of his Siddhanta-lesa that the ancients were more concerned with the fundamental problem of the identity of the self and the Brahman, and neglected to explain clearly the order of phenomenal appearance; and that therefore many divergent views have sprung up on the subject. Thus shortly after Sankara s death we have four important teachers, Suresvara and his pupil Sarvajnatma Muni, Padmapada and Vacaspati Misra, who represent three distinct tendencies in the monistic interpre tation of the Vedanta. Suresvara and his pupil Sarvajnatma Muni held that may a was only an instrument (dvara), through which the one Brahman appeared as many, and had its real nature hidden from the gaze of its individual appearances as individual persons. In this view may a was hardly recognized as a substance, though it was regarded as positive; and it was held that may a had, both for its object and its support, the Brahman. It is the pure Brahman that is the real cause underlying all appearances, and the may a only hangs on it like a veil of illusion which makes this one thing 48 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. appear as many unreal appearances. It is easy to see that this view ignores altogether the importance of giving philosophical explanations of phenomenal appearance, and is only concerned to emphasize the reality of Brahman as the only truth. Vacaspati s view gives a little more substantiality to mdyd in the sense that he holds that mdyd is coexistent with Brahman, as an accessory through the operation of which the creation of world-appearance is possible ; mdyd hides the Brahman as its object, but it rests on individual persons, who are again dependent on mdyd, and mdyd on them, in a beginningless cycle. The world-appearance is not mere subjective ideas or sensations, but it has an objective existence, though the nature of its existence is inexplicable and inde scribable ; and at the time of dissolution of the world (or pralayd) its constitutive stuff, psychical and physical, will remain hidden in avidyd, to be revived again at the time of the next world- appearance, otherwise called creation. But the third view, namely that of Padmapada, gives mdyd a little more substantiality, re garding it as the stuff which contains the double activity or power of cognitive activity and vibratory activity, one determining the psychical process and the other the physical process, and regarding Brahman in association with mdyd, with these two powers as Isvara, as the root cause of the world. But the roots of a very thoroughgoing subjective idealism also may be traced even in the writings of Sankara himself. Thus in the Brhaddranyaka-bhdsya he says that, leaving aside theories of limitation (avaccheda) or reflec tion (pratibimba), it may be pointed out that, as the son of Kunti is the same as Radheya, so it is the Brahman that appears as individual persons through beginningless avidyd] the individual persons so formed again delusively create the world-appearance through their own avidyd. It will be pointed out in a later section that Mandana also elaborated the same tendency shortly after Sankara in the ninth century. Thus in the same century we have four distinct lines of Vedantic development, which began to expand through the later centuries in the writers that followed one or the other of these schools ; and some additional tendencies also developed. The tenth century seems to have been very barren in the field of the Vedanta, and, excepting probably Jnanottama Misra, who wrote a commentary on Suresvara s Vdrttika, no writer of great reputation is known to us to have lived in this period. In other fields of philosophical development also this century was more or xi] Teachers and Pupils in Veddnta 49 less barren, and, excepting Udayana and Srldhara in Nyaya- Vaisesika, Utpala in Astronomy and Abhinavagupta in Saivism, probably no other persons of great reputation can be mentioned. There were, however, a few Buddhistic writers of repute in this period, such as Candragomin (junior) of Rajshahi, the author of Nydya-loka-stddhi, Prajnakara Gupta of Vikramasila, author of Pramana-vartikalankara and Sahopalambha-niscaya, Acarya Jetari of Rajshahi, the author of Hetu-tattvopadesa, Dharma-dharmi- viniscaya and Bdldvatdra-tarka, Jina, the author of Pramdna- vdrtikdlankdra-tikd, Ratnaklrti, the author of the Apoha-siddhi t Ksana-bhanga-siddhi and Sthira-siddhi-dusana, and Ratna Vajra, the author of the Yukti-prayoga. The eleventh century also does not seem to have been very fruitful for Vedanta philosophy. The only author of great reputation seems to have been Anandabodha Bhattarakacarya, who appears to have lived probably in the latter half of the eleventh century and the first half of the twelfth century. The mahdvidyd syllogisms of Kularka Pandita, however, probably began from some time in the eleventh century, and these were often referred to for refutation by Vedantic writers till the fourteenth century, as will be pointed out in a later section. But it is certain that quite a large number of Vedantic writers must have worked on the Vedanta before Anandabodha, although we cannot properly trace them now. Anandabodha says in his Nydya-makaranda that his work was a compilation (samgrahd) from a large number of Vedantic monographs (nibandha-puspdnjali). Citsukha in his com mentary on the Nydya-makaranda points out (p. 346) that Ananda bodha was refuting a view of the author of the Brahma-prakdsikd. According to Govindananda s statement in his Ratna-prabhd, p. 311, Amalananda of the thirteenth century refuted a view of the author of the Prakatdrtha. The author of the Prakatdrtha may thus be believed to have lived either in the eleventh or in the twelfth century. It was a commentary on Sankara s Bhdsya, and its full name was Sdrlraka-bhdsya-prakatdrtha ; and Anandajnana (called also Janardana) wrote his Tattvdloka on the lines of Vedantic interpretation of this work. Mr Tripathi says in his introduction to the Tarka-samgraha that a copy of this work is available in Tekka Matha; but the present writer had the good fortune of going through it from a manuscript in the Adyar Library, and a short account of its philosophical views is given below in a separate section. In the Siddhdnta-lesa of Appaya Dlksita we D II 4 50 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. hear of a commentary on it called Prakatartha-vivarana. But, though Anandajnana wrote his Tattvdloka on the lines of the Prakatdrtha, yet the general views of Anandajnana were not the same as those of the author thereof; Anandajnana s position was very much like that of Sarvajnatma Muni, and he did not admit many ajndnas, nor did he admit any difference between may a and avidyd. But the author of the Prakatdrtha, so far as can be judged from references to him in the Siddhdnta-lesa,gaveaseparate place to the antahkaranas of individual persons and thought that, just as the jivas could be cognizers through the reflection of pure intelligence in the antahkarana states, so Isvara is omniscient by knowing everything through may a modifications. The views of the author of the Prakatdrtha regarding the nature of vidhi have already been noted. But the way in which Anandajnana refers to the Prakatdrtha in Mundaka, p. 32, and Kena, p. 23, shows that he was either the author of the Prakatdrtha or had written some commentary to it. But he could not have been the author of this work, since he refers to it as the model on which his Tattvdloka was written; so it seems very probable that he had written a commentary to it. But it is surprising that Anandajnana, who wrote commentaries on most of the important commentaries of Sankara, should also trouble himself to write another commentary on the Prakatdrtha, which is itself a commentary on Sankara s commentary. It may be surmised, therefore, that he had some special reasons for respecting it, and it may have been the work of some eminent teacher of his or of someone in his parental line. However it may be, it is quite unlikely that the work should have been written later than the middle of the twelfth century 1 . It is probable that Gangapuri Bhattaraka also lived earlier than Anandabodha, as Citsukha points out. Gangapuri must then have lived either towards the latter part of the tenth century or the first half of the eleventh century. It is not improbable that he may have been a senior contemporary of Anandabodha. His work, Paddrtha-tattva-nirnaya, was commented on by Anandajnana. Ac cording to him both may a and Brahman are to be regarded as the cause of the world. All kinds of world-phenomena exist, and being may therefore be attributed to them ; and being is the same what ever may be the nature of things that exist. Brahman is thus the changeless cause in the world or the vivarta-kdrana; but all the 1 See Tripathi s introduction to the Tarka-samgraha . xi] Teachers and Pupils in Veddnta 51 changing contents or individual existents must also be regarded as products of the transformation of some substance, and in this sense may a is to be regarded as the parinami-karana of the world. Thus the world has Brahman as its vivarta-karana and mayd as its parinami-karana. The world manifests both aspects, the aspect of changeless being and that of changing materiality ; so both mayd and Brahman form the material cause of the world in two different ways (Brahmamdydcaityubhayopdddnam\ sattva-jddya-rupobhaya- dharmdnugaty-upapattis ca). Tarka-viveka and Siddhdnta-viveka are the names of two chapters of this book, giving a summary of Vaisesika and Vedanta philosophy respectively. The view of Gaiigapuri in the Paddrtha-tattva-nirnaya just referred to seems to have been definitely rejected by Anandabodha in his Pramdna- mdld, p. 16. When Kularka had started the mahd-vidyd syllogisms, and great Nyaya authors such as Jayanta and Udayana in the ninth and tenth centuries had been vigorously introducing logical methods in philo sophy and were trying to define all that is knowable, the Vedantic doctrine that all that is knowable is indefinable was probably losing its hold ; and it is probable that works like Anandabodha s Pramdna-mdld and Nydya-dipdvali in the eleventh century or in the early part of the twelfth century were weakly attempting to hold fast to the Vedantic position on logical grounds. It was Sriharsa who in the third quarter of the twelfth century for the first time attempted to refute the entire logical apparatus of the Naiyayikas. Sriharsa s work was carried on in Citsukha s Tattva-pradipikd in the early part of the thirteenth century, by Anandajnana in the latter part of the same century in his Tarka-samgraha and by Nrsimhasrama Muni in his Bheda-dhikkdra in the sixteenth century. On the last-named a pupil, Narayanasrama, wrote his Bheda- dhikkdra-satkriyd, and this had a sub-commentary, called Bheda- dhikkdra- satkriyojjv aid. The beginnings of the dialectical argu ments can be traced to Sankara and further back to the great Buddhist writers, Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Candraklrti, etc. Interest in these dialectical arguments was continuously kept up by com mentaries written on these works all through the later centuries. The names of these commentators have been mentioned in the sections on Sriharsa, Citsukha and Anandajnana. Moreover, the lines of Vedanta interpretation which started with Suresvara, Padmapada and Vacaspati were vigorously 4-2 52 The Sankara School of Vedanta [CH. continued in commentaries and in independent works through out the later centuries. Thus in the middle of the thirteenth century Vacaspati s Bhdmati was commented on by Amalananda in his Kalpa-taru ; and this Kalpa-taru was again commented on by Appaya Dlksita in the latter part of the sixteenth century and the first quarter of the seventeenth century, and by Laksminrsimha in his Abhoga towards the end of the seventeenth century or the beginning of the eighteenth 1 . Padmapada s Panca-pddikd was commented on by Prakasatman in the thirteenth century in his Panca-pddikd-vivarana^y Akhan- dananda in the fourteenth century in his Tattva-dipana, by Vidya- ranya in the same century in his Vivarana-prameya-samgraha, by Anandapurna and Nrsimha in the sixteenth century and by Rama Tlrtha in the seventeenth century 2 . The line of Suresvara also continued in the summary of his great Vdrttika (called Vdrt- tika-sdrd) by Vidyaranya and its commentaries, and also in the commentaries on the Samksepa-sdriraka from the sixteenth cen tury onwards. Many independent works were also written by persons holding more or less the same kinds of views as Sarvaj- fiatma Muni 3 . The philosophy of drsti-srsti-vada Vedanta, which was probably started by Mandana, had doubtless some adherents too; but we do not meet with any notable writer on this line, except Prakasananda in the sixteenth century and his pupil Nana Dlksita. The Veddnta-kaumudi is an important work which is 1 Allala Svari, son of Trivikramacarya, wrote a commentary on the Bhdmati, called the Bhdmatl-tilaka. 2 Samyagbodhendra Samyamin, pupil of Girvanendra (A.D. 1450), wrote a summary of the main contents of the Panca-pddikd-vivarana in six chapters (var- naka), and this work is called by two names, Advaita-bhusana and Vivarana- prameya-samgraha. There are again two other commentaries on Prakasatman s Panca-pddikd-vivarana : the Riju-vivarana by Visnubhatta, son of Janardana Sarvajna and pupil of Svamindrapurna, and the Ttkd-ratna by Anandapurna. The Riju-vivarana had again another commentary on it, called the Trayyanta- bhdva-pradipikd, by Ramananda, pupil of Bharati Tlrtha. There are, however, two other commentaries on the Panca-pddikd called Panca-pddikd-vydkhyd (by an_author whose name is not definitely known) and the Prabandha-parisodhim by Atmasvarupa, pupil of Nrsimhasvarupa. Dharma- rayadhvarlndra also wrote a commentary on Panca-pddikd, called the Panca- padika-tlkd. 3 Apart from the two published commentaries on the Samkfepa-sdrlraka, there is another work called the Samkepa-sdrlraka-sambandhokti by Vedananda, pupil of Vedadhyaksa-bhagavat-pujyapada, in which the author tries to show the mutual relation of the verses of it as yielding a consistent meaning. Nrslmha- srama also wrote a commentary on the Samksepa-sdriraka, called the Tattva- bodhinl. One Sarvajna tma Bhagavat wrote a small Vedantic work, called Panca- praktiya; but it is not probable that he is the same as Sarvajnatma Muni. xi] Teachers and Pupils in Veddnta 53 referred to by Appaya Dlksita in his Siddhanta-lesa. In this work the omniscience of Brahman consists in the fact that the pure con sciousness as Brahman manifests all that exists either as actually transformed or as potentially transformed, as future, or as latently transformed, as the past in the maya\ and it is the Paramesvara who manifests Himself as the underlying consciousness (saksiri) in individual persons, manifesting the ajnana transformations in them, and also their potential ajnana in dreamless sleep. Many other important Vedanta views of an original character are expressed in this book. This work of Ramadvaya has been found by the present writer in the Govt. Oriental MSS. Library, Madras, and a separate section has been devoted to its philosophy. From references in it to followers of Madhva it may be assumed that the Vedanta- kaumudi was written probably in the fourteenth century. From the fourteenth century, however, we have a large number of Vedanta writers in all the succeeding centuries; but with the notable exception of Prakasananda, Madhusudana SarasvatI in his Advaita-siddhi (in which he tried to refute the objections of Vyasa Tlrtha against the monistic Vedanta in the sixteenth century) and probably Vidyaranya s Vivarana-prameya-samgraha and Dhar- marajadhvarlndra s Paribhasa, and its Sikhamani commentary by Ramakrsna, there are few writers who can be said to reveal any great originality in Vedantic interpretations. Most of the writers of this later period were good compilers, who revered all sorts of past Vedantic ideas and collected them in well-arranged forms in their works. The influence of the Panca-pddikd-vivarana, however, is very strong in most of these writers, and the Vivarana school of thought probably played the most important part in Vedantic thought throughout all this period. These Vedantic writers grew up in particular circles inspired by particular teachers, whose works were carried on either in their own families or among their pupils ; a few examples may make this clear. Thus Jagannathasrama was a great teacher of south India in the latter half of the fifteenth century ; he had a pupil in Nrsimh- asrama, one of the most reputed teachers of Vedanta in the early half of the sixteenth century. He was generally inspired on the one hand by the Vivarana and on the other by Sriharsa and Citsukha and Sarvajnatma Muni: he wrote a number of Vedanta works, such as Advaita-dipika (his pupil, Narayanasrama, wrote a com mentary called Advaita-dlpikd-vivarana on it), Advaita-panca- 54 The Sankara School of Vedanta [CH. ratna, Advaita-bodha-dipikd, Advaita-ratna-kosa, Tattva-bodhinl, a commentary on the Samksepa-sdriraka, Tattva-viveka (which had two commentaries, Tattva-viveka- dipana of Narayanasrama and Tattva-vivecana of Agnihotra, pupil of Jnanendra Sarasvati), Pan- ca-pddikd-vivarana-prakdsikd,Bheda-dhikkdra,Advaita-ratna-vyd- khydna (a commentary on Mallanarodlya s Advaita-ratna), and Vedanta-tattva-viveka. The fact that he could write commentaries both on Sarvajnatma Muni s work and also on the Vivarana, and also write a Bheda-dhikkara (a work on dialectic Vedanta on the lines of Sriharsa s dialectical work) shows the syncretistic ten dencies of the age, in which the individual differences within the school were all accepted as different views of one Vedanta, and in which people were more interested in Vedanta as a whole and felt no hesitation in accepting all the Vedantic ideas in their works. Nrsimhasrama had a pupil Dharmarajadhvarindra, who wrote a Veddnta-paribhdsd, a commentary called Tarka-cuddmani on the Tattva-cintdmani of Gangesa, and also on the Nyaya-siddhanta- dipa of Sasadhara Acarya, and a commentary on the Panca-padika of Padmapada. His son and pupil Ramakrsna Dlksita wrote a com mentary on the first, called Veddnta-sikhdmani\ and Amaradasa, the pupil of Brahmavijnana, wrote another commentary on this Sikhamani of Ramakrsna 1 . Ramakrsna had also written a com mentary on Rucidatta s Tattva-cintamani-prakasa, called Nydya- sikhamani, and a commentary on the Veddnta-sdra. Other authors, such as Kasmatha Sastrin and Brahmendra Sarasvati, had also written separate works bearing the name Veddnta-paribhdsd after the Veddnta-paribhdsd of Dharmaraja in the seventeenth century. Under the sphere of Nrsimha s influence, but in the Saiva and Mimamsaka family of Rangaraja Adhvarin ,was born Appaya Dlksita , who became one of the most reputed teachers of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. His works have all been noted in the section devoted to him. He again was a teacher of Bhattoji Dlksita, who in addition to many works on grammar, law and ritual (smrti) wrote two important works on Vedanta, called Tattva-kaustubha and Veddnta-tattva-dipana-vydkhyd, the latter a commentary on the commentary, Tattva-viveka-dipana.oi Narayanasrama (a pupil of Nrsimhasrama) on the latter s work, Vedanta-tattva-viveka. This Narayanasrama had also written another commentary on 1 Petta Diksita, son of Narayana Dlksita, also wrote a commentary on the Vedanta-paribhdsa, called Vedanta-paribhdsd-prakasikd. xi] Teachers and Pupils in Veddnta 55 Nrsimhasrama s Bheda-dhikkara, called Bheda-dhikkara-satkriya\ and later on in the eighteenth century another commentary was written on Nrsimha s Bheda-dhikkara, called Advaita-candrika, by Narasimha Bhatta, pupil of Ramabhadrasrama and Nagesvara in the eighteenth century. Bhattojl Diksita s son Bhanujl Diksita was a commentator on the Amara-kosa (Vyakhya-sudha or Subodhinl). Bhattojl was, however, a pupil not only of Appaya, but also of Nrsimhasrama Muni. Bhattojl s younger brother and pupil, Ran- gojl Bhatta, wrote two works, the Advaita-cintamani and the Ad- vaita-sdstra-saroddhara, more or less on the same lines, containing a refutation of Vaisesika categories, a determination of the nature of the self, a determination of the nature of ajnana and the nature of the doctrine of reflection, proofs of the falsity of world-appearance and an exposition of the nature of Brahman and how Brahmahood is to be attained. His son Konda Bhatta was mainly a grammarian, who wrote also on Vaisesika. Again Madhusudana Sarasvati, who ,was a pupil of Visvesvara Sarasvati (pupil of Sarvajna Visvesa and pupil s pupil of Govinda Sarasvati), lived in the early half of the sixteenth century and was probably under the influence of Nrsimhasrama, who is reputed to have defeated Madhusudana Sarasvatl s teacher, Madhava Sarasvati. Madhusudana had at least three pupils, Purusottama, who wrote on Madhusudana s commentary the Siddhanta-tattva-bindu a commentary called Siddhanta-tattva-bindu-tika 1 ; the others were Balabhadra and Sesagovinda (the latter of whom wrote a commentary on Sankara s Sarva-darsana-siddhanta-samgraha, called Sarva-siddhanta-raha- sya-tika). Again Sadananda, the author of the Vedanta-sara, one of the most popular and well-read syncretistic works on Vedanta, was a contemporary of Nrsimhasrama; Nrsimha Sarasvati wrote in 1588 a commentary thereon, called Subodhinl. Devendra, the author of the Svanubhuti-prakasa, was also a contemporary of Nrsimhasrama. It has already been pointed out that Prakasananda was probably a contemporary of Nrsimhasrama, though he does not seem to have been under his influence. This shows how some of the foremost Vedanta writers of the sixteenth and seven teenth centuries grew up together in a Vedantic circle, many of whom were directly or indirectly under the influence of Nrsim hasrama and Appaya Diksita. 1 Brahmananda wrote on the Siddhanta-bindu another commentary, called Siddhanta-bindu-Llka. 56 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. Passing to another circle of writers, we see that Bhaskara Dlksita, who lived in the latter half of the seventeenth century, wrote a commentary, Ratna-tulika, on the Siddhanta-siddhanjana of his teacher Krsnananda. The Siddhanta-siddhanjana is an excellent syncretistic work on Vedanta, which contains most of the im portant Vedanta doctrines regarding the difference of dhar ma-vicar a and brahma-vicara, the relation of Mlmamsa theories of commands, and the need of Brahma-knowledge ; it introduces many Mlmamsa subjects and treats of their relations to many relevant Vedanta topics. It also introduces elaborate discussions on the nature of knowledge and ignorance. It seems, however, to be largely free from the influence of the Vivarana, and it does not enter into theories of perception or the nature of the antahkarana and its vrtti. It is thus very different from most of the works produced in the sixteenth century in the circles of Nrsimha or Appaya. Krsnananda lived probably in the middle of the seventeenth century. He had for teacher Ramabhadrananda ; and Ramabhadrananda was taught by Svayamprakasananda, the author of the Vedanta-naya-bhusana, a commentary on the Brahma-sutra on the lines of Vacaspati MiSra s Bhdmatl. This Svayamprakasa must be distinguished from the other Svayamprakasa, probably of the same century, who was a pupil of Kaivalyananda Yogindra and the author of the Rasdbhi- vyanjika, a commentary of Advaita-makaranda of Laksmldhara Kavi. Ramabhadrananda had as his teacher Ramananda SarasvatI, the author of the Vedanta-siddhanta-candrika, on which a commen tary was written by Gangadharendra SarasvatI (A.D. 1826), pupil of Ramacandra SarasvatI and pupil s pupil of Sarvajna SarasvatI, and author of the Samrajya-siddhi with its commentary, the Kaivalya- kalpadruma. Prakasananda was a pupil of Advaitananda, author of the Brahma-vidyabharana, a commentary on Sankara s Sanraka- bhasya Advaitananda was a disciple of Ramatlrtha, author of the Anvaya-prakasika (a commentary on the Samksepa-sariraka of Sarvajnatma Muni) and a disciple of Krsnatirtha, a contemporary of Jagannathasrama, the teacher of Nrsimhasrama. Ramatlrtha s Anvaya-prakasika shows an acquaintance with Madhusudana s Advaita-siddhi; and he may thus be considered to have lived in the middle of the seventeenth century. Svayamprakasananda, again, had for pupil Mahadevananda, or Vedantin Mahadeva, the author of the Advaita-cinta-kaustubha or Tattvanusandhdna. It seems very clear that these writers of the seventeenth and the early eighteenth xi I Teachers and Pupils in Veddnta 57 centuries flourished in a different circle of Vedantic ideas, where the views of Vacaspati, Suresvara and Sarvajnatma Muni had greater influence than the authors of the Vivarana school of Vedanta. Another important syncretistic Vedanta writer is Sada- nanda Kasmlraka, author of the Advaita-brahma-siddhi,vf\\o lived in the early part of the eighteenth century. The Advaita-brahma-siddhi is an excellent summary of all the most important Vedanta doc trines, written in an easy style and explaining the chief features of the Vedantic doctrines in the different schools of Advaita teachers. Narahari s Bodha-sara may be mentioned as one of the important products of the late eighteenth century 1 . The sort of relationship of teachers and students in particular circles that has been pointed out holds good of the earlier authors also, though it is difficult to trace them as well as can be done in the later years, since many of the earlier books are now missing and the footprints of older traditions are becoming more and more faint. Thus it may be pointed out that Vidyaranya was a con temporary of Amalananda in the fourteenth century, as both of them 1 A number of other important Vedanta works, written mostly during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, may also be mentioned. Thus Lokanatha, son of Sarvajnanarayana and grandson of Nrsimhasrama, wrote a metrical work in three chapters refuting the views of the dualists, called Advaita-muktd- sdra with a commentary on it called Kanti; Brahmananda Sarasvati wrote the Advaita-siddhanta-vidyotana ; Gopalananda Sarasvati, pupil of Yogananda, wrote the Akhanddtma-prakdsikd; Harihara Paramahamsa, pupil of Sivarama, pupil of Visvesvarasrama, wrote the Anubhava-vildsa, and early in the nineteenth century Samin, a pupil of Brahmananda, wrote a big work in twelve chapters, called Brahmdnanda-vildsa. In this connection it may not be out of place to mention the names of some important works of Vedanta dialectics in refutation of other systems of philosophical views more or less on the lines of those dialec tical writings which have been noticed in the present volume. Thus Ananda- pu na (A.D. 1600), who commented on S"r!harsa s Khandana-khanda-khddya, wrote the Nydya-candrikd in four chapters, refuting the views of the Nyaya, Mlmamsa and Vaisesika ; Anandanubhava, pupil of Narayana Jyotisha, who lived probably in the same century, wrote a similar work, called Paddrtha-tflttva-nirnaya; Jaiinaghana, who probably lived in the thirteenth century, wrote an elaborate dialectical work in thirty-three chapters (prakarana), called Tattva-suddhi; S~rmivasa Yajvan, who probably lived in the sixteenth century, wrote the Vddd- vall in twenty-six chapters in refutation of Visistadvaita and Dvaita views; Bhavanisarikara also wrote a similar dialectical work, called Siddhdnta-dlpikd. As examples of semi-popular Vedanta works of a syncretistic type, such works as the Tattva-bodha of Vasudevendra, the Guna-traya-viveka of Svayarnprakasa Yoglndra, the Jagan-mithydtva-dlpikd of Ramendra Yogin, the Ananda-dlpa of & vananda Yati (which had a commentary called Ananda-dipa-nkdr by Ramanatha) , the Svdtma-yoga-pradipa by Yoglsvara (which had a commentary by Amarananda) and the Veddnta-hrdaya (on the lines of the Yoga-vdsistha and Gauda- p<lda) by Varada Pandita may be mentioned. This latter work was probably later than Prakasananda s Veddnta-siddhdnta-muktdvali, which followed the same line of thought. 58 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. were pupils of Sankarananda and Anubhavananda respectively; these in turn were both pupils of Anandatman. Sankarananda was the author of the Gltd-tatparya-bodhinl and of a number of commentaries on the various Upanisads, and also of a summary of the Upanisads, called Upanisad-ratna. Amalananda, however, had as teacher not only Anubhavananda, but also Sukhaprakasa Muni, who again was a disciple of Citsukha, himself a disciple of Gaudesvara Acarya (called also Jnanottama). Vedanta Doctrine of Soul and the Buddhist Doctrine of Soullessness. One of the most important points of Sankara s criticism of Buddhism is directed against its denial of a permanent soul which could unite the different psychological constituents or could behave as the enjoy er of experiences and the controller of all thoughts and actions. The Buddhists argue that for the production of sense-cognition, as the awareness of a colour or sound, what is required in addition to the sense-data of colours, etc. is the corresponding sense- faculties, while the existence of a soul cannot be deemed indispens able for the purpose 1 . Vasubandhu argues that what is experienced is the sense-data and the psychological elements in groups called skandhas. What one calls self (atmari) cannot be anything more than a mere apparent cognitional existence (prajnapti-sat) of what in reality is but a conglomeration of psychological elements. Had the apparent self been something as different from the psycho logical elements as colours are from sounds, it would then be regarded as an individual (pudgald) ; but, if its difference from these psychological elements be of the same nature as the difference of the constituents of milk from the appearance of milk, then the self could be admitted only to have a cognitional existence (prajnapti- sat) 2 . The self has, in fact, only a cognitional appearance of separateness from the psychological elements; just as, though 1 The arguments here followed are those of Vasubandhu, as found in his Ahhidharma-kosa, and are based on Prof. Stcherbatsky s translation of the ap pendix to ch. viii of that work, called the Pudgala-viniscaya, and Yasomitra s commentary in manuscript from Nepal, borrowed from Visvabharati, Santini- ketan, Bengal. 2 yadi yathd rupddih sabddder bhdvdntaram abhipreyate pudgala iti abhyu- pagato bhavati bhinna-laksanam hi rupam sabddd ityddi kslrddivat samuddyas cet prajnaptitah. Abhidharma-kosa-vydkhyd, Visvabharati MS. p. 337. xi] Soul in Veddnta and Buddhism 59 milk appears to have a separate existence from the proper com bination of its constituent elements, yet it is in reality nothing more than a definite kind of combination of its constituent elements, so the self is nothing more than a certain conglomeration of the psychological elements (skandhd), though it may appear to have a separate and independent existence. The Vatsiputrlyas, however, think that the individual is something different, from the skandhas or psychological entities, as its nature is different from the nature of them. The Vatsiputrlyas deny the existence of a permanent soul, but believe in momentary individuals (pudgala) as a category separate and distinct from the skandhas. Just as fire is something different from the fuel that conditioned it, so the name individual" (pudgala) is given to something conditioned by the skandhas at a given moment in a personal life 1 . Vasuban- dhu, however, argues against the acceptance of such an individual and says that there is no meaning in accepting such an individual. Rain and sun have no effects on mere vacuous space, they are of use only to the skin; if the individual is, like the skin, a deter miner of the value of experiences, then it must be accepted as external ; if it is like vacuous space, then no purpose is fulfilled by accepting it 2 . The Vatsiputrlyas, however, thought that, just as the fuel conditioned the fire, so the personal elements conditioned the individual. By this conditioning the Vatsiputrlyas meant that the personal elements were some sort of a coexisting support 3 . What is meant by saying that the pudgala is conditioned by the personal elements is that, when the skandhas or psychological elements are present, the pudgala is also present there 4 . But Vasubandhu urges that a mere conditioning of this kind is not sufficient to establish the cognitional existence of an individual; for even colour is conditioned by the visual sense, light and attention in such a way that, these being present, there is the perception of light ; but can anybody on that ground consider the 1 Stcherbatsky s translation of the Pudgala-viniscaya, Bulletin de V Academic des Sciences de Russie, p. 830. The exact textof Vasubandhu, as translated from Tibetan in a note, runs thus : grhita-pratyutpanndbhyantara-skandham updddya pudgala-prajnaptih . Ibid, p . 9 5 3 . 2 Vdtsiputriydndm ttrthika-drstih prasajyate nisprayojanatvam ca varsdta-pdbhydm kirn vyomnas carmany-asti toyoh phalam carmopamas cet sa nityah khatulyas ced asatphalah. MS. of Yasomitra s commentary, p. 338. 3 dsraya-bhutah saha-bhutas ca. Ibid. 4 rupasydpi prajnaptir vaktavyd caksur-ddisu satsu tasyopalambhdt, tdni cak- sur-ddJny updddya rilpam prajndpyate. Ibid. 60 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. existence of colour to be a cognitional one ? And would cognitional entities deserve to be enumerated as separate categories? Again it may be asked, if such an individual exists, how is it experienced? For, if it be experienced by any of the senses, it must be a sense- datum: for the senses can grasp only their appropriate sense-data, and the individual is no sense-datum. Therefore, just as milk is nothing but the collected sense-data of colour, taste, etc., so also the so-called individual is nothing more than the conglomerated psychological elements 1 . The Vatsiputrlyas argue that, since the psychological elements, the sense-data, etc., are the causes of our experience of the individual, the individual cannot be regarded as being identical with these causal elements which are responsible for their experience; if it were so, then even light, eye, attention, etc., which are causes of the experience of the sense-data, would have to be regarded as being identical in nature with the indi vidual 2 . But it is not so maintained ; the sense-datum of sounds and colours is always regarded as being different from the individual, and one always distinguishes an individual from a sense-datum and says "this is sound," "this is colour" and "this is individual 3 ." But the individual is not felt to be as distinct from the psychological elements as colour is from sound. The principle of difference or distinctness consists in nothing but a difference of moments; a colour is* different from a sound because it is experienced at a different moment, while the psychological elements and the indi vidual are not experienced at different moments 4 . But it is argued in reply that, as the sense-data and the individual are neither different nor identical (ratio essendi), so their cognition also is neither different nor identical in experience (ratio cognoscendi) 5 . But Vasubandhu says that, if such a view is taken in this case, then it might as well be taken in all cases wherever there is any con glomeration 6 . Moreover, the separate senses are all limited to their special fields, and the mind which acts with them is also limited 1 yathd rupddlnyeva samastdni samuditdni ksiram iti udakam iti vdprajndpyate, tathd skandhds ca samastd pudgala iti prajndpyate, iti siddham. MS. of Yaso- mitra s commentary, p. 339 A. 2 yathd riipam pudgalopalabdheh kdranam bhavati sa ca tebhyo nyo na vaktavyah dloka-caksur-manaskdrd api rupopalabdheh kdranam bhavati tad api tad-abhinna-svabhdvah pudgalah prdpnoti. Ibid. 3 Ibid. p. 3 398. 4 svalaksandd api ksandntaram any ad ity uddhdryam. Ibid. 6 yathd rupa-pudgalayor anydnanyatvam avaktavyam evarn tadupalabdhyor api anydnanyatvam avaktavyam. Ibid. 6 yo yam siddhdntah pudgala eva vaktavyah so yam bhidyate samskrtam api avaktavyam iti krtvd. Ibid. xi] Soul in Veddnta and Buddhism 61 to the data supplied by them; there is, therefore, no way in which the so-called individual can be experienced. In the Ajita sermon Buddha is supposed to say : " A visual consciousness depends upon the organ of sight and a visible object. When these three (object, sense organ and consciousness) combine, a sensation is produced. It is accompanied by a feeling, a representation and a volition. Only so much is meant, when we are speaking of a human being. To these (five sets of elements) different names are given, such as a sentient being, a man, Manu s progeny, a son of Manu, a child, an individual, a life, a soul. If with respect to them the expression is used he sees the object with his own eyes/ it is false imputation (there being in reality nobody possessing eyes of his own). In common life such expressions with respect to them are current as that is the name of this venerable man, he belongs to such a caste and such a family, he eats such food, this pleases him, he has reached such an age, he has lived so many years, he has died at such an age. These O brethren! accordingly are mere words, mere conventional designations. Expressions are they, (but not truth) ! Real elements have no duration : Vitality makes them combine In mutually dependent apparitions 1 . " The Vatslputrlyas however refer to the Bhara-hara-siitra, in which Buddha is supposed to say : " O brethren, I shall explain unto you the burden (of life), and moreover I shall explain the taking up of the burden, the laying aside of it and who the carrier is. ...What is the burden ? All the five aggregates of elements the substrates of personal life. What is meant by the taking up of the burden? The force of craving for a continuous life, accompanied by pas sionate desires, the rejoicing at many an object. What is the laying aside of the burden? It is the wholesale rejection of this craving for a continuation of life, accompanied as it is by passionate desires and rejoicings at many an object, the getting rid of it in every circumstance, its extinction, its end, its suppression, an aversion to it, its restraint, its disappearance. Who is the carrier? We must answer: it is the individual, i.e. this venerable man having this name, of such a caste, of such a family, eating such food, finding pleasure or displeasure at such things, of such an age, who after a 1 Stcherbatsky s translation in Bulletin de V Academic des Sciences deRussie. 62 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. life of such length will pass away having reached such an age 1 . " But Vasubandhu points out that the carrier of the burden is not to be supposed to be some eternal soul or real individual. It is the momentary group of elements of the preceding moment that is designated as the burden, and the immediately succeeding one the carrier of the burden (bhdra-hdra) 2 . The Vatsiputrlyas again argue that activity implies an active agent, and, since knowing is an action, it also implies the knower who knows, just as the walking of Devadatta implies a Devadatta who walks. But Vasubandhu s reply to such a contention is that there is nowhere such a unity. There is no individual like Devadatta : what we call Devadatta is but a conglomeration of demerits. " The light of a lamp is a common metaphorical designation for an un interrupted production of a series of flashing flames. When this production changes its place, we say that the light has moved. Similarly consciousness is a conventional name for a chain of conscious moments. When it changes its place (i.e. appears in co-ordination with another objective element), we say that it ap prehends that object. And in the same way we speak about the existence of material elements. We say matter is produced, it exists ; but there is no difference between existence and the element which does exist. The same applies to consciousness (there is nothing that cognizes, apart from the evanescent flashing of consciousness itself) 3 ." It is easy to see that the analysis of consciousness offered by the Vedanta philosophy of the Sankara school is entirely different from this. The Vedanta holds that the fact of consciousness is entirely different from everything else. So long as the assemblage of the physical or physiological conditions antecedent to the rise of any cognition, as for instance, the presence of illumination, sense- object contact, etc., is being prepared, there is no knowledge, and it is only at a particular moment that the cognition of an object arises. This cognition is in its nature so much different from each and all the elements constituting the so-called assemblage of con ditions, that it cannot in any sense be regarded as the product of 1 Stcherbatsky s translation. 2 Yasomitra points out that there is no carrier of the burden different from the collection of the skandhas bhdrdddnavan na skandhebhyo rthdntara-bhutah pudgala ity arthah. Abhidharma-kosa-vydkhyd, VisvabharatI MS. 3 Stcherbatsky s translation in Bulletin de V Academic des Sciences de Russie, pp. 938-939- xi] Soul in Veddnta and Buddhism 63 any collocation of conditions. Consciousness thus, not being a product of anything and not being further analysable into any constituents, cannot also be regarded as a momentary flashing. Uncaused and unproduced, it is eternal, infinite and unlimited. The main point in which consciousness differs from everything else is the fact of its self- revelation. There is no complexity in consciousness. It is extremely simple, and its only essence or characteristic is pure self- revelation. The so-called momentary flashing of consciousness is not due to the fact that it is momentary, that it rises into being and is then destroyed the next moment, but to the fact that the objects that are revealed by it are reflected through it from time to time. But the conscious ness is always steady and unchangeable in itself. The immediacy (aparoksatva) of this consciousness is proved by the fact that, though everything else is manifested by coming in touch with it, it itself is never expressed, indicated or manifested by inference or by any other process, but is always self-manifested and self- revealed. All objects become directly revealed to us as soon as they come in touch with it. Consciousness (samvid) is one. It is neither identical with its objects nor on the same plane with them as a constituent element in a collocation of them and consciousness. The objects of consciousness or all that is manifested in consciousness come in touch with consciousness and themselves appear as conscious ness. This appearance is such that, when they come in touch with consciousness, they themselves flash forth as consciousness, though that operation is nothing but a false appearance of the non- conscious objects and mental states in the light of consciousness, as being identical with it. But the intrinsic difference between consciousness and its objects is that the former is universal (pratyak) and constant (anuvrtta), while the latter are particular (apratyak) and alternating (vyavrttd). The awarenesses of a book, a table, etc. appear to be different not because these are different flashings of knowledge, but because of the changing association of conscious ness with these objects. The objects do not come into being with the flashings of their awareness, but they have their separate existence and spheres of operation 1 . Consciousness is one and unchanging; it is only when the objects get associated with it that 1 tattva-darsl tu nityam advittyam vijndnam vifayas ca tatrddhyastdh prthag- artha-kriyd-samarthds tesdm cdbddhitam sthdyitvam astlti vadati. Vivarana- prameya-samgraha, p. 74, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1893. 64 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. they appear in consciousness and as identical with it in such a way that the flashing of an object in consciousness appears as the flashing of the consciousness itself. It is through an illusion that the object of consciousness and consciousness appear to be welded together into such an integrated whole, that their mutual difference escapes our notice, and that the object of consciousness, which is only like an extraneous colour applied to consciousness, does not appear different or extraneous to it, but as a specific mode of the consciousness itself. Thus what appear as but different aware nesses, as book-cognition, table-cognition, are not in reality different awarenesses, but one unchangeable consciousness suc cessively associated with ever-changing objects which falsely appear to be integrated with it and give rise to the appearance that quali tatively different kinds of consciousness are flashing forth from moment to moment. Consciousness cannot be regarded as momen tary. For, had it been so, it would have appeared different at every different moment. If it is urged that, though different conscious nesses are arising at each different moment, yet on account of extreme similarity this is not noticed; then it maybe replied that, if there is difference between the two consciousnesses of two successive moments, then such difference must be grasped either by a different consciousness or by the same consciousness. In the first alternative the third awareness, which grasps the first two awarenesses and their difference, must either be identical with them, and in that case the difference between the three awarenesses would vanish; or it may be different from them, and in that case, if another awareness be required to comprehend their difference and that requires another and so on, there would be a vicious infinite. If the difference be itself said to be identical with the nature of the consciousness (samvit-svarupa-bhuto bhedah), and if there is nothing to apprehend this difference, then the non- appearance of the difference implies the non-appearance of the consciousness itself; for by hypothesis the difference has been held to be identical with the consciousness itself. The non-appearance of difference, implying the non-appearance of consciousness, would mean utter blindness. The difference between the awareness of one moment and another cannot thus either be logically proved, or realized in experience, which always testifies to the unity of awareness through all moments of its appearance. It may be held that the appearance of unity is erroneous, and that, as such, it xi] Recognition in Veddnta and Buddhism 65 presumes that the awarenesses are similar; for without such a similarity there could not have been the erroneous appearance of unity. But, unless the difference of the awarenesses and their similarity be previously proved, there is nothing which can even suggest that the appearance of unity is erroneous 1 . It cannot be urged that, if the existence of difference and similarity between the awarenesses of two different moments can be proved to be false, then only can the appearance of unity be proved to be true ; for the appearance of unity is primary and directly proved by experience. Its evidence can be challenged only if the existence of difference between the awarenesses and their similarity be otherwise proved. The unity of awareness is a recognition of the identity of the awarenesses (pratyabhijna), which is self-evident. It has also been pointed out that the Buddhists give a different analysis of the fact of recognition. They hold that perception reveals the existence of things at the moment of perception, whereas recognition involves the supposition of their existence through a period of past time, and this cannot be apprehended by perception, which is limited to the present moment only. If it is suggested that recognition is due to present perception as asso ciated with the impressions (samskara) of previous experience, then such a recognition of identity would not prove the identity of the self as " I am he "for in the self-luminous self there cannot be any impressions. The mere consciousness as the flash cannot prove any identity; for that is limited to the present moment and cannot refer to past experience and unite it with the experience of the present moment. The Buddhists on their side deny the existence of recognition as the perception of identity, and think that it is in reality not one but two concepts "J" an d "that"- and not a separate experience of the identity of the self as per sisting through time. To this the Vedantic reply is that, though there cannot be any impressions in the self as pure consciousness, yet the self as associated with the mind (antahkarand) can well have impressions (samskara), and so recognition is possible 2 . But it may be objected that the complex of the self and mind would then be playing the double role of knower and the known ; for it is the mind containing the impressions and the self that together 1 Vivarana-prameya-samgraha, p. 76. 2 kevale ciddtmani janya-jndna-tat-samskdrayor asambhave py antahkarana- visiste tat-sambhavdd ukta-pratyabhtjnd kirn na sydt. Ibid. p. 76. 66 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. play the part of the recognizer, and it is exactly those impressions together with the self that form the content of recognition also and hence in this view the agent and the object have to be regarded as one. But in reply to this Vidyaranya Muni urges that all systems of philosophy infer the existence of soul as different from the body; and, as such an inference is made by the self, the self is thus both the agent and the object of such inferences. Vidyaranya says that it may further be urged that the recognizer is constituted of the self in association with the mind, whereas the recognized entity is constituted of the self as qualified by past and present time 1 . Thus the recognition of self-identity does not strictly involve the fact of the oneness of the agent and its object. If it is urged that, since recognition of identity of self involves two concepts, it also involves two moments, then the assertion that all knowledge is momentary also involves two concepts, for momentariness cannot be regarded as being identical with knowledge. The complexity of a concept does not mean that it is not one but two different concepts occurring at two different moments. If such a maxim is accepted, then the theory that all knowledge is momentary cannot be admitted as one concept, but two concepts occurring at two moments ; and hence momentariness cannot be ascribed to know ledge, as is done by the Buddhists. Nor can it be supposed, in accordance with the Prabhakara view, that the existence of the permanent "this self" is admitted merely on the strength of the recognizing notion of "self-identity"; for the self which abides through the past and exists in the present cannot be said to depend on a momentary concept of recognition of self-identity. The notion of self-identity is only a momentary notion, which lasts only at the present time; and hence the real and abiding self cannot owe its reality or existence merely to a psychological notion of the moment. Again, if it is argued that memory, such as "I had an awareness of a book," shows that the self was existing at the past time when the book was perceived, it may be replied that such memory and previous experience may prove the past existence of the self, but it cannot prove that the self that was existing in the past is identical with the self that is now experiencing. The mere existence of self at two moments of time does not prove that the self had persisted through the intervening times. Two notions of 1 antahkarana-visistatayaivdtmanah pratyabhijnatrtvam purvdpara-kdla-vi- sistatayd ca pratyabhijneyatvam. Vivarana-prameya-samgraha, p. 77. xi] Recognition in Veddnta and Buddhism 67 two different times cannot serve to explain the idea of recognition, which presupposes the notion of persistence. If it were held that the two notions produce the notion of self-persistence through the notion of recognition, then that would mean that the Buddhist admits that one can recognize himself as "I am he." It cannot be said that, since the self itself cannot be perceived, there is no possibility of the perception of the identity of the self through recognition ; for, when one remembers " I had an experience," that very remembrance proves that the self was perceived. Though at the time when one remembers it the self at the time of such memory is felt as the perceiver and not as the object of that self -perception, yet at the time of the previous experience which is now being remembered the self must have been itself the object of the per ception. If it is argued that it is only the past awareness that is the object of memory and this awareness, when remembered, ex presses the self as its cognizer, then to this it may be replied that since at the time of remembering there is no longer the past awareness, the cognizer on whom this awareness had to rest itself is also absent. It is only when an awareness reveals itself that it also reveals the cognizer on whom it rests; but, if an awareness is remembered, then the awareness which is remembered is only made an object of present awareness which is self- revealed. But the past awareness which is supposed to be remembered is past and lost and, as such, it neither requires a cognizer on which it has to rest nor actually reveals such a cognizer. It is only the self-revealed cognition that also immediately reveals the cognizer with its own revelation. But, when a cognition is mediated through memory, its cognizer is not manifested with its remembrance 1 So the self which experienced an awareness in the past can be referred to only through the mediation of memory. So, when the Prabhakaras hold that the existence of the self is realized through such a complex notion as "I am he," it has to be admitted that it is only through the process of recognition (pratyabhijna) that the persistence of the self is established. The main point that Vidyaranya Muni urges in his Vivarana-prameya-samgraha is that the fact of recognition or the experience of self-identity cannot be explained by any assumption of two separate concepts, such as the memory of a past cognition or cognizer and the present awareness. 1 svayamprakasamdnam hi samvedanam dsrayam sddhayati na tu smrti- visayatayd para-prakdsyam. Vivarana-prameya-samgraha, p. 78. 5-2 68 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. We all feel that our selves are persisting through time and that I who experienced pleasure yesterday and I who am experiencing new pleasures to-day are identical ; and the only theory by which this notion of self-persistence or self-identity can be explained is by supposing that the self exists and persists through time. The Buddhist attempts at explaining this notion of self-identity by the supposition of the operation of two separate concepts are wholly inadequate, as has already been shown. The perception of self- identity can therefore be explained only on the basis of a per manently existing self. Again, the existence of self is not to be argued merely through the inference that cognition, will and feeling presuppose some entity to which they belong and that it is this entity that is called self; for, if that were the case, then no one would be able to distinguish his own self from that of others. For, if the self is only an entity which has to be presupposed as the possessor of cognition, will, etc., then how does one recognize one s own cognition of things as differing from that of others? What is it that distinguishes my experience from that of others? My self must be immediately perceived by me in order that I may relate any experience to myself. So the self must be admitted as being self-manifested in all ex perience; without admitting the self to be self-luminous in all experience the difference between an experience as being my own and as belonging to others could not be explained. It may be objected by some that the self is not self-luminous by itself, but only because, in self-consciousness, the self is an object of the cognizing operation (samvit-karma) . But this is hardly valid; for the self is not only cognized as an object of self-consciousness, but also in itself in all cognitional operations. The self cannot be also regarded as being manifested by ideas or percepts. It is not true that the cognition of the self occurs after the cognition of the book or at any different time from it. For it is true that the cognition of the self and that of the book take place at the same point of time; for the same awareness cannot comprehend two different kinds of objects at the same time. If this was done at different points of time, then that would not explain our ex perience "I have known this." For such a notion implies a relation between the knower and the known; and, if the knower and the known were grasped in knowledge at two different points of time, there is nothing which could unite them together in the yo The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. cognition, it is self-manifested and immediate without being an object of cognition 1 . The self-luminosity of cognition is argued by Anandabodha. He says that, if it is held that cognition does not manifest itself, though it manifests its objects, it may be replied that, if it were so, then at the time when an object is cognized the cognizer would have doubted if he had any cognition at the time or not. If anyone is asked whether he has seen a certain person or not, he is sure about his own knowledge that he has seen him and never doubts it. It is therefore certain that, when an object is revealed by any cognition, the cognition is itself revealed as well. If it is argued that such a cognition is revealed by some other cognition, then it might require some other cognition and that another and so on ad infinitum\ and thus there is a vicious infinite. Nor can it be held that there is some other mental cognition (occurring either simultaneously with the awareness of the object or at a later moment) by which the awareness of the awareness of the object is further cognized. For from the same mind-contact there cannot be two different awarenesses of the type discussed. If at a later moment, then, there is mind-activity, cessation of one mind-contact, and again another mind-activity and the rise of another mind-contact, that would imply many intervening moments, and thus the cognition which is supposed to cognize an awareness of an object would take place at a much later moment, when the awareness which it has to reveal is already passed. It has therefore to be admitted that cognition is itself self-luminous and that, while manifesting other objects, it manifests itself also. The objection raised is that the self or the cognition cannot affect itself by its own functioning (vrtti) ; the reply is that cognition is like light and has no intervening operation by which it affects itself or its objects. Just as light removes darkness, helps the operation of the eye and illuminates the object and manifests itself all in one moment without any intervening operation of any other light, so cognition also in one flash manifests itself and its objects, and there is no functioning of it by which it has to affect itself. This cognition cannot be described as being mere momentary flashes, on the ground that, when there is the blue awareness, there is not the yellow awareness ; for apart from the blue awareness, the 1 samveditd no. samvid-adhina-prakdsah samvit-karmatdm antarena aparok- satvdt samvedanavat. Nyaya-makaranda, p. 135. This argument is borrowed verbatim by Vidyaranya in his Vivarana-prameya-samgraha, p. 85. xi] Self as pure Consciousness 71 yellow awareness or the white awareness there is also the natural basic awareness or consciousness, which cannot be denied. It would be wrong to say that there are only the particular aware nesses which appear and vanish from moment to moment; for, had there been only a series of particular awarenesses, then there would be nothing by which their differences could be realized. Each awareness in the series would be of a particular and definite char acter, and, as it passed away, would give place to another, and that again to another, so that there would be no way of distinguishing one awareness from another; for according to the theory under discussion there is no consciousness except the passing awarenesses, and thus there would be no way by which their differences could be noticed; for, even though the object of awareness, such as blue and yellow, differed amongst themselves, that would fail to explain how the difference of a blue awareness and a yellow awareness could be apprehended. So the best would be to admit the self to be of the nature of pure consciousness. It will appear from the above discussion that the Vedanta had to refute three opponents in establishing its doctrine that the self is of the nature of pure consciousness and that it is permanent and not momentary. The first opponent was the Buddhist, who believed neither in the existence of the self nor in the nature of any pure permanent consciousness. The Buddhist objection that there was no permanent self could be well warded off by the Vedanta by appealing to the verdict of our notion of self-identity which could not be explained on the Buddhist method by the supposition of two separate notions of a past "that self" and the present "I am." Nor can consciousness be regarded as being nothing more than a series of passing ideas or particular awarenesses ; for on such a theory it would be impossible to explain how we can react upon our mental states and note their differences. Conscious ness has thus to be admitted as permanent. Against the second opponent, the Naiyayika, the Vedanta urges that the self is not the inferred object to which awarenesses, volitions or feelings belong, but is directly and immediately intuited. For, had it not been so, how could one distinguish his own experiences as his own and as different from those of others? The internalness of my own experiences shows that they are directly intuited as my own, and not merely supposed as belonging to some self who was the possessor of his experiences. For inference cannot reveal the Vr v \vV 72 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. internalness of any cognition or feeling. Against the third opponent, the Mlmamsaka, the Vedanta urges that the self- revealing character belongs to the self which is identical with thought as against the Mimamsa view, that thought as a self-revealing entity revealed the self and the objects as different from it. The identity of the self and thought and the self-revealing character of it are also urged ; and it is shown by a variety of dialectical reasoning that such a supposition is the only reasonable alternative that is left to us. This self as pure consciousness is absolutely impersonal, un limited and infinite. In order to make it possible that this one self should appear as many individuals and as God, it is supposed that it manifests itself differently through the veil of may a. Thus, according to the Siddhdnta-lesa, it is said in the Prakatdrtha- vivarana that, when this pure consciousness is reflected through the beginningless, indescribable mdyd, it is called Isvara or God. But, when it is reflected through the limited parts of mdyd containing powers of veiling and of diverse creation (called avidyd), there are the manifestations of individual souls or jivas. It is again said in the Tattva-viveka of Nrsimhasrama that, when this pure con sciousness is reflected through the pure sattva qualities, as domi nating over other impure parts of prakrti, there is the manifestation of God. Whereas, when the pure consciousness is reflected through the impure parts of rajas and tamas, as dominating over the sattva part of prakrti (called also avidyd), there are the manifestations of the individual selves orjivas. The same prakrti in its two aspects, as predominating in sattva and as predominating in rajas and tamas, goes by the name of mdyd and avidyd and forms the con ditioning factors (upddhi) of the pure consciousness, which on account of the different characters of the conditioning factors of mdyd and avidyd appear as the omniscient God and the ignorant individual souls. Sarvajnatma Muni thinks that, when the pure consciousness is reflected through avidyd, it is called Isvara, and, when it is reflected through mind (antahkarana) , it is called jiva. These various methods of accounting for the origin of indi vidual selves and God have but little philosophical significance. But they go to show that the principal interest of the Vedanta lies in establishing the supreme reality of a transcendental principle of pure consciousness, which, though always untouched and un attached in its own nature, is yet the underlying principle which xi] Veddntic Cosmology 73 can explain all the facts of the enlivening and enlightening of all our conscious experiences. All that is limited, be it an individual self or an individual object of awareness, is in some sense or other an illusory imposition of the modification of a non-conscious principle on the principle of consciousness. The Vedanta is both unwilling and incapable of explaining the nature of the world- process in all its details, in which philosophy and science are equally interested. Its only interest is to prove that the world- process presupposes the existence of a principle of pure conscious ness which is absolutely and ultimately real, as it is immediate and intuitive. Reality means what is not determined by anything else ; and in this sense pure consciousness is the only reality and all else is indescribable neither real nor unreal ; and the Vedanta is not interested to discover what may be its nature. Vedantic Cosmology. From what has been said above it is evident that mayd (also called avidya or ajnana) is in itself an indefinable mysterious stuff, which has not merely a psychological existence, but also an ontological existence as well. It is this ajnana which on the one hand forms on the subjective plane the mind and the senses (the self alone being Brahman and ultimately real), and on the other hand, on the objective plane, the whole of the objective universe. This ajnana has two powers, the power of veiling or covering (avarand) and the power of creation (viksepa). The power of veiling, though small, like a little cloud veiling the sun with a diameter of millions of miles, may, in spite of its limited nature, cover up the infinite, unchangeable self by veiling its self- luminosity as cognizer. The veiling of the self means veiling the shining unchangeable self-perception of the self, as infinite, eternal and limitless, pure consciousness, which as an effect of such veiling appears as limited, bound to sense-cognitions and sense-enjoy ments and functioning as individual selves 1 . It is through this covering power of ajnana that the self appears as an agent and an enjoyer of pleasures and pains and subject to ignorant fears of rebirth, like the illusory perception of a piece of rope in darkness as a snake. Just as through the creative power of ignorance a piece of 1 vastuto jndnasydtmdchddakatvdbhd ve pi pramdtr-buddhimdtrdchddakatvena ajndnasydtmdchddakatvam upacdrdd ucyate. Subodhini on Veddnta-sdra, p. 13, Nirnaya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1916. 74 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. rope, the real nature of which is hidden from view, appears as a snake, so does ignorance by its creative power create on the hidden self the manifold world-appearance. As the ajnana is supposed to veil by its veiling power (avarana-sakti) only the self-cognizing and self- revealing aspect of the self, the other aspect of the self as pure being is left open as the basis on which the entire world- appearance is created by the creative power thereof. The pure consciousness, veiled as it is by ajnana with its two powers, can be regarded as an important causal agent (nimitta), when its nature as pure consciousness forming the basis of the creation of the world- appearance is emphasized ; it can be regarded as the material cause, when the emphasis is put on its covering part, the ajnana. It is like a spider, which, so far as it weaves its web, can be regarded as a causal agent, and, so far as it supplies from its own body the materials of the web, can be regarded as the material cause of the web, when its body aspect is emphasized. The creative powers (viksepa-sakti) of ajnana are characterized as being threefold, after the manner of Samkhya prakrti, as sattva, rajas and tamas. With the pure consciousness as the basis and with the associated creative power of ajnana predominating in tamas, space (akasa) is first produced ; from akasa comes air, from air fire, from fire water, from water earth. It is these elements in their fine and uncompounded state that in the Samkhya and the Puranas are called tan-matras. It is out of these that the grosser materials are evolved as also the subtle bodies 1 . The subtle bodies are made up of seventeen parts, 1 As to how the subtle elements are combined for the production of grosser elements there are two different theories, viz. the trivrt-karana and the panci- karana. The trivrt-karana means that fire, water and earth (as subtle elements) are each divided into two halves, thus producing two equal parts of each; then the three half parts of the three subtle elements are again each divided into two halves, thus producing two quarter parts of each. Then the original first half of each element is combined with the two quarters of other two elements. Thus each element has half of itself with two quarter parts of other two elements. Vacaspati and Amalananda prefer trivrt-karana to panct-karana; for they think that there is no point in admitting that air and akasa have also parts of other elements integrated in them, and the Vedic texts speak of trivrt-karana and not of panel- karana. The pafjcl-karana theory holds that the five subtle elements are divided firstly into two halves, and then one of the two halves of these five elements is divided again into four parts, and then the first half of each subtle element is combined with the one-fourth of each half of all the other elements excepting the element of which there is the full half as a constituent. Thus each element is made up of one-half of itself, and the other half of it is constituted of the one-fourth of each of the other elements (i.e. one-eighth of each of the other four elements), and thus each element has at least some part of other elements integrated into it. This view is supported by the Vedanta-paribhaa and its Sikhamani commentary, p. 363. xi] Veddntic Cosmology 75 excluding the subtle elements, and are called sUksma-sarira or Unga-sarlra. This subtle body is composed of the five cognitive senses, the five conative senses, the five vayus or biomotor activities, buddhi (intellect) and manas, together with the five subtle elements in tanmatric forms. The five cognitive senses, the auditory, tactile, visual, gustatory and olfactory senses, are derived from the sattva parts of the five elements, akasa, vdyu, agni, ap and prthivl respectively. Buddhi, or intellect, means the mental state of determination or affirmation (niscayatmika antahkarana-vrtti). Manas means the two mental functions of vikalpa and sankalpa or of sankalpa alone resulting in doubt 1 . The function of mind (citta) and the function of egoism (ahamkara) are included in buddhi and manas 2 . They are all produced from the sattva parts of the five elements and are therefore elemental. Though they are elemental, yet, since they are produced from the compounded sattva parts of all the elements, they have the re vealing function displayed in their cognitive operations. Buddhi with the cognitive senses is called the sheath of knowledge (vijndnamaya-kosa). Manas with the cognitive senses is called the sheath of manas (manomaya-kosa). It is the self as associated with the vijnanamaya-kosa that feels itself as the agent, enjoyer, happy or unhappy, the individual self (jlva) that passes through worldly experience and rebirth. The conative senses are produced from the rajas parts of the five elements. The five vayus or biomotor activities are called Prana or the breathing activity, Udana or the upward activity and Samdna or the digestive activity. There are some who add another five vayus such as the Naga, the vomiting Apdna troydnes activity, Kurma, the reflex activity of opening the eyelids, Krkala, the activity of coughing, Devadatta, the activity of yawning, and Dhananjaya, the nourishing activity. These prdnas 1 The Veddnta-sdra speaks of sankalpa and vikalpa, and this is explained by the Subodhinl as meaning doubt. See Vedanta-sara and Subodhinl, p. 17. The Veddnta-paribhdsd and its commentators speak of sankalpa as being the only unction of manas, but it means "doubt." See pp. 88-89 and 358. 2 smarandkdra-vrttimad untahkaranam cittam (Veddnta-paribhdsd-Mani- prabhd, p. 89). anayor eva cittdhamkdrayor antarbhdvah (Veddnta-sdra, p. 17). But the Veddnta-paribhdsd says that manas, buddhi, ahamkara and citta, all four, constitute the inner organ (antahkarand). See Veddnta-paribhdsd, p. 88. The Veddnta-sdra however does not count four functions buddhi, manas, citta, ahamkara ; citta and ahamkara are regarded as the same as buddhi and manas. Thus according to the Veddnta-sdra there are only two categories. But since the Veddnta-paribhdsd only mentions buddhi and manas as constituents of the subtle body, one need not think that there is ultimately any difference between it and the Veddnta-sdra. 76 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. together with the cognitive senses form the active sheath of prana (pranamaya-kosa). Of these three sheaths, the vijnanamaya, mano- maya andpranamaya, the vijnanamaya sheath plays the part of the active agent (kartr-rupah) ; the manomaya is the source of all desires and volition, and is therefore regarded as having an instrumental function ; the pranamaya sheath represents the motor functions. These three sheaths make up together the subtle body or the suksma-sarira. Hiranyagarbha (also called Sutrdtma or prana) is the god who presides over the combined subtle bodies of all living beings. Individually each subtle body is supposed to belong to every being. These three sheaths, involving as they do all the sub conscious impressions from which our conscious experience is de rived, are therefore called a dream (jccgrad-vasanamayatvatsvapna). The process of the formation of the gross elements from the subtle parts of the elements is technically called pancikarana. It consists in a compounding of the elements in which one half of each rudimentary element is mixed with the eighth part of each other rudimentary element. It is through such a process of com pounding that each element possesses some of the properties of the other elements. The entire universe consists of seven upper worlds (Bhuh, Bhuvah, Svar, Mahar,Janah, Tapah and Satyam), seven lower worlds (Atala, Vitala, Sutala, Rasatala, Talatala, Mahdtala and Patala) and all the gross bodies of all living beings. There is a cosmic deity who presides over the combined physical bodies of all beings, and this deity is called Virat. There is also the person, the individual who presides over each one of the bodies, and, in this aspect, the individual is called Visva. The ajnana as constituting antahkarana or mind, involving the operative functions of buddhi and manas, is always associated with the self; it is by the difference of these antahkaranas that one self appears as many individual selves, and it is through the states of these antahkaranas that the veil over the self and the objects are removed, and as a result of this there is the cognition of objects. The antahkarana is situated within the body, which it thoroughly pervades. It is made up of the sattva parts of the five rudimentary elements, and, being extremely transparent, comes into touch with the sense objects through the specific senses and assumes their forms. It being a material stuff, there is one part inside the body, another part in touch with the sense-objects, and a third part between the two and connected with them both as one whole. xi] Sankara and his School 77 The interior part of the antahkarana is the ego or the agent. The intervening part has the action of knowledge, called also vrtti-jnana. The third part, which at the time of cognition is transformed into the form of the sense- objects, has the function of making them manifested in knowledge as its objects. The antahkarana of three parts being transparent, pure consciousness can well be manifested in it. Though pure consciousness is one, yet it manifests the three different parts of the antahkarana in three different ways, as the cognizer (pramatr), cognitive operation (pramdna) and the cogni tion, or the percept (pramiti). In each of the three cases the reality is the part of the pure consciousness, as it expresses itself through the three different modifications of the antahkarana. The sense-objects in themselves are but the veiled pure consciousness, brahman, as forming their substance. The difference between the individual consciousness (jiva-caitanyd) and the brahman-con sciousness (brahma-caitanya) is that the former represents pure consciousness, as conditioned by or as reflected through the antah karana, while the latter is the unentangled infinite consciousness, on the basis of which all the cosmic creations of may a are made. The covering of avidya, for the breaking of which the operation of the antahkarana is deemed necessary, is of two kinds, viz. subjective ignorance and objective ignorance. When I say that I do not know a book, that implies subjective ignorance as signified by "I do not know," and objective ignorance as referring to the book. The removal of the first is a precondition of all kinds of knowledge, perceptual or inferential, while the second is removed only in perceptual knowledge. It is diverse in kind according to the form and content of the sense-objects; and each perceptual cognition removes only one specific ignorance, through which the particular cognition arises 1 . Sankara and his School. It is difficult to say exactly how many books were written by Sankara himself. There is little doubt that quite a number of books attributed to Sankara were not written by him. I give here a list of those books that seem to me to be his genuine works, though it is extremely difficult to be absolutely certain. 1 See Madhusudana Sarasvatl s Siddhanta-bindu, pp. 132-150; and Brah- mananda Sarasvatl s Nydya-ratnavalt, pp. 132-150, Srividya Press, Kumba- konam, 1893. 78 The Sankara School of Vedanta [CH. I have chosen only those works which have been commented on by other writers, since this shows that these have the strength of tradition behind them to support their authenticity. The most important works of Sankara are his commentaries on the ten Upanisads, Isa, Kena, Katha, Prasna, Mundaka, Mdndukya, Aitareya, Taittiriya, Chdndogya and Brhad-dranyaka and the Sdriraka-mimdmsd-bhdsya. The main reasons why a number of works which probably were not written by him were attributed to him seem to be twofold ; first, because there was another writer of the same name, i.e. Sankaracarya, and second, the tendency of Indian writers to increase the dignity of later works by attributing them to great writers of the past. The attribution of all the Puranas to Vyasa illustrates this very clearly. Sankara s Isopanisad- bhdsya has one commentary by Anandajnana and another, Dipika, by the other Sankara Acarya. His Kenopanisad-bhdsya has two commentaries, Kenopanisad-bhasya-vivarana and a commentary by Anandajnana. The Kdthakopanisad-bhdsya has two commentaries, by Anandajnana and by Balagopala Yoglndra. The Prasnopanisad- bhdsya has two commentaries, by Anandajnana and Narayanendra Sarasvatl. The Mimdakopanisad-bhasya has two commentaries, by Anandajnana and Abhinavanarayanendra Sarasvatl. The Mandukyopanisad-bhasya has two commentaries, by Anandajnana and Mathuranatha Sukla, and a summary, called Mandukyopanisad- bhdsydrtha-samgraha, by Raghavananda. The Aitareyopanisad- bhdsya has six commentaries, by Anandajnana, Abhinavanarayana, Nrsimha Acarya, Balakrsnadasa, Jnanamrta Yati, and Visvesvara Tirtha. The Taittirlyopanisad-bhasya seems to have only one commentary on it, by Anandajnana. The ChandogyopanisadhsiS two commentaries, called Bhasya-tippana, and a commentary by Anan dajnana. The Brhad-dranyakopanisad-bhasya has a commentary by Anandajnana and a big independent work on it by Suresvara, called Brhad-aranyakopanisad-bhasya-vdrttika, or simply Vdrttika, which has also a number of commentaries ; these have been noticed in the section on Suresvara. His Aparoksdnubhava has four commen taries, by Sankara Acarya, by Balagopala, by Candesvara Varman (Anubhava-dipika), and by Vidyaranya. His commentary on Gauda- pada s Mdndukya-kdrikd, called Gaudapddiya-bhdsya or Agama- sdstra-vivarana, has two commentaries, one by Suddhananda and one by Anandajnana. HisAtma-jndnopadesa has two commentaries, by Anandajnana and by Purnananda Tirtha; the Eka-sloka has a xij Sankara and his School 79 commentary called Tattva-dipana, by Svayamprakasa Yati ; no com mentary ho wever is attributed to the Viveka-cudamani, which seems to be genuinely attributed to Sankara ; the Atma-bodha has at least five commentaries, by Advayananda, Bhasurananda, Bodhendra (Bhava-prakdsika), Madhusudana Sarasvati and RamanandaTlrtha ; The Atmdnatma-viveka has at least four commentaries, by Padma- pada, Purnananda Tlrtha, Sayana and Svayamprakasa Yati. The Atmopadesa-vidhi is said to have a commentary by Ananda- jnana; the Ananda-lahari has about twenty-four commentaries, by Appaya Dlksita, Kaviraja, Krsna Acarya (Manju-bhasini), Kesava- bhatta, Kaivalyasrama (Saubhagya-vardhim), Gangahari (Tattva- dipikd), Gangadhara, Goplrama, Goplkanta Sa,rvabhauma(Ananda- lahari-tari), Jagadisa?, Jagannatha Pancanana, Narasimha, Brahma- nanda (Bhavartha-dipika), Malla Bhatta, Mahadeva Vidyavaglsa, Mahadeva Vaidya, Ramacandra, Ramabhadra, Ramananda Tlrtha, Laksmldhara Desika and Visvambhara and Srlkantha Bhatta and another called Vidvan-manorama. The Upadesa-sahasri has at least four commentaries, by Anandajfiana, by Rama Tlrtha (Pada- yojanika), Bodha-vidhi by a pupil of Vidyadhaman, and by Sankara- carya. His Cid-ananda-stava-raja, called also Cid-ananda-dasaslokl or simply Dasa-slokt, has also a number of commentaries and sub- commentaries, such as the Siddhanta-tattva-bindu by Madhusu dana Sarasvati; Madhusudana s commentary was commented on by a number of persons, such as Narayana Yati (Laghu-tika), Purusottama Sarasvati (Siddhanta-bindu-sandipana) , Purnananda Sarasvati (Tattva-viveka), Gauda Brahmananda Sarasvati (Sid- dhanta-bindu-nyaya-ratnavali), by Saccidananda and Sivalala Sar- man. Gauda Brahmananda s commentary, Siddhdnta-bindu-nyaya- ratndvall, was further commented on by Krsnakanta (Siddhanta- nydya-ratna-pradipika). Sankara s Drg-drsya-prakarana was com mented on by Ramacandra Tlrtha ; his Panclkarana-prakriyd has again a number of commentaries that by Suresvara is Panci- karana-vdrttika, and this has a further commentary, called Pancl- karana-varttikdbharana, by Abhinavanarayanendra Sarasvati, pupil of Jnanendra Sarasvati. Other commentaries on the Panclkarana- prakriyd are Panclkarana-bhdva-prakdsikd, Pandkarana-tlkd- tattva-candrikd, Pancikarana-tdtparya-candrikd and Panclkarana- vivarana by Anandajnana, Pancikarana-vivarana by Svayam prakasa Yati and by Prajrianananda, and a sab-commentary called Tattva-candrikd. Sankara also commented on the Bhagavad- 8o The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. gltd\ this commentary has been examined in the chapter on the Bhagavad-gltd in the present volume. His Laghu-vdkya-vrtti has a commentary called Puspanjali, and another, called Laghu- vdkya-vrtti-prakdsikd, by Ramananda SarasvatI; his Vdkya-vrtti has a commentary by Anandajnana, and another commentary, called Vdkya-vrtti-prakdsikd, by Visvesvara Pandita. He starts his Vdkya-vrtti in the same manner as Isvarakrsna starts his Sdmkhya- kdrikd, namely by stating that, suffering from the threefold sorrows of life, the pupil approaches a good teacher for instruction regarding the ways in which he may be liberated from them. Suresvara in his Naiskarmya-siddhi also starts in the same manner and thus gives a practical turn to the study of philosophy, a procedure which one does not find in his Brahma-sutra-bhdsya. The answer, of course, is the same as that given in so many other places, that one is liberated only by the proper realization of the Upanisad texts that declare the unity of the self with Brahman. He then goes on to show that all external things and all that is called mind or mental or psychical is extraneous to self, which is of the nature of pure consciousness ; he also declares here that the effects of one s deeds are disposed by God (Isvara), the superior illusory form of Brahman, and not by the mysterious power of apurva admitted by the Mimamsists. He concludes this short work of fifty-three verses by insisting on the fact that, though the unity texts (advaita-sruti) of the Upanisads, such as " that (Brahman) art thou," may have a verbal construction that implies some kind of duality, yet their main force is in the direct and immediate apperception of the pure self without any intel lectual process as implied by relations of identity. The Vdkya-vrtti is thus conceived differently from the Aparoksdnubhiiti^ where yoga processes of posture and breath-regulations are described, as being helpful for the realization of the true nature of self. This may, of course, give rise to some doubts regarding the true authorship of the Aparoksdnubhiiti, though it may be explained as being due to the different stages of the development of Sankara s own mind; divergences of attitude are also noticeable in his thoroughgoing idealism in his commentary on Gaudapada s Kdrikd, where the waking life is regarded as being exactly the same as dream life, and external objects are deemed to have no existence whatsoever, being absolutely like dream-perceptions as contrasted with his Sdriraka-mimdmsd-bhdsya, where external objects are considered to have an indescribable existence, very different from dream- xi] Sankara and his School 81 creations. The Upadesa-sahasri, which in its nineteen chapters contains only six hundred and seventy-five stanzas, is more in a line with the Vakya-vrtti) and, though the well-known Vedanta topics are all slightly touched upon, greater emphasis is laid on the proper realization of the Vedantic unity texts, such as "that art thou," as means to the attainment of Brahmahood. There are also a number of short poems and hymns attributed to Sankaracarya, such as the Advaitanubhuti, Atma-bodha, Tattvopadesa, Praudhdnubhuti, etc., some of which are undoubtedly his, while there are many others which may not be so; but in the absence of further evidence it is difficult to come to any decisive conclusion 1 . These hymns do not contain any additional philosophical materials, but are intended to stir up a religious fervour and emotion in favour of the monistic faith. In some cases, however, the commentators have found an excuse for extracting from them Vedantic doctrines which cannot be said to follow directly from them. As an illustra tion of this, it may be pointed out that out of the ten slokas of Sankara Madhusudana made a big commentary, and Brahmananda SarasvatI wrote another big commentary on that of Madhusudana and elaborated many of the complex doctrines of the Vedanta which have but little direct bearing upon the verses themselves. But Sankara s most important work is the Brahma-sutra-bhdsya > which was commented on by Vacaspati Misra in the ninth century,, Anandajnana in the thirteenth, and Govindananda in the four teenth century. Commentaries on Vacaspati s commentary will be noticed in the section on Vacaspati Misra. Subrahmanya wrote a verse summary of Sankara s commentary which he calls Bhasyartha- nydya-mdld\ and BharatI Tirtha wrote also the Vaiydsika-nydya- mdld, in which he tried to deal with the general arguments of the Brahma-sutra on the lines of Sankara s commentary. Many other persons, such as Vaidyanatha Dlksita, Devarama Bhatta, etc., also wrote topical summaries of the main lines of the general arguments of the Brahma-sutra on the lines of Sankara s com mentary, called Nydya-mdld or Adhikarana-mdld. But many other persons were inspired by Sankara s commentary (or by the com mentaries of Vacaspati Misra and other great writers of the Sankara school) and under the name of independent commentaries on the Brahma-sutra merely repeated what was contained in these. Thus 1 The Atma-bodha was commented upon by Padmapada in his commentary Atma-bodha-vydkhydna, called also Veddnta-sara. D II 82 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. Amalananda wrote his Sdstra-darpana imitating the main lines of Vacaspati s commentary on Sankara s commentary; and Svayam- prakasa also wrote his Veddnta-naya-bhusana, in which for the most part he summarized the views of Vacaspati s Bhdmati commentary. Hari Dlksita wrote his Brahma-sutra-vrtti, Sankarananda his Brahma-sutra-dipika and Brahmananda his Vedanta-sutra-mukta- vall as independent interpretations of the Brahma-sutra, but these were all written mainly on the lines of Sankara s own commentary, supplementing it with additional Vedantic ideas that had been developed after Sankara by the philosophers of his school of thought or explaining Sankara s Bhasya 1 . Mandana, Suresvara and Visvarupa. General tradition has always identified Mandana with Suresvara and Visvarupa; and Col. G. A. Jacob in his introduction to the second edition of the Naiskarmya-siddhi seems willing to believe this tradition. The tradition probably started from Vidyaranya s Sankara-dig-vijaya, where Mandana is spoken of as being named not only Umbeka, but also Visvarupa (vm. 63). He further says in x. 4 of the same work that, when Mandana became a follower of Sankara, he received from him the name Suresvara. But the Sankara-dig-vijaya is a mythical biography, and it is certainly very risky to believe any of its statements, unless corroborated by other reliable evidences. There is little doubt that Suresvara was 1 Some of these commentaries are : Brahma-sutra-bhdsydrtha-samgraha by Brahmananda Yati, pupil of Visvesvarananda, Brahma- siitrdrtha-dlpikd by Verikata, son of Gauri and Siva, Brahma-sutra-vrtti (called also Mitdksara) by Annam Bhatta, and Brahma-sutra-bhdsya-vydkhyd (called also Vidyd-sri) by Jnanottama Bhattaraka, pupil of Jfianaghana. The peculiarity of this last work is that it is the only commentary on the eka-jlva-vdda line that the present writer could trace. In addition to these some more commentaries may be mentioned, such as Brahma-sutra-vrtti by Dharma Bhatta, pupil of Ramacandrarya and pupil s pupil of Mukundasrama, Sutra-bhdsya-vydkhydna (called also Brahma- vidyd-bharana} by Advaitananda, pupil of Ramananda and pupil s pupil of Brahmananda, Brahma-sutra-bhdsya-vydkhyd (called also Nydya-raksd-mani) by Appaya Dlksita, Brahma-tattva-prakdsikd (which is different from an earlier treatise called Brahma-prakdsikd) by Sadasivendra Sarasvati, Brahma-sutro- panydsa by Ramesvara Bharati, by a pupil of Ramananda, Sdrlraka-mlmdmsd- sutra-siddhdnta-kaumudl by Subrahmanya Agnicin Makhlndra, Veddnta-kaustu- bha by Sitarama ; none of which seem to be earlier than the sixteenth century. But Ananyanubhava, the teacher of Prakasatman (A.D. 1200), seems to have written another commentary, called Sdrlraka-nydya-manimdld. Prakasatman himself also wrote a metrical summary of the main contents of Sahkara s Bhasya called Sdriraka-mimdmsd-nydya-samgraha, and Krsnanubhuti, in much later times, wrote a similar metrical summary, called Sdrlraka-mlmdmsd-samgraha. xi] Mandana, Suresvara and Visvarupa 83 the author of a Varttika, or commentary in verse, on Sankara s Brhad-aranyaka Upanisad (which was also summarized by Vidya- ranya in a work called Vdrttika-sdra, which latter was further commented on by Mahesvara Tlrtha in his commentary, called the Laghu-samgrahd). The Varttika of Suresvara was commented on by at least two commentators, Anandagiri in his Sastra-prakasikd and Anandapurna in his Nydya-kalpa-latikd. In a commentary on the Pardsara-smrti published in the Bib. Ind. series (p. 51) a quotation from this Varttika is attributed to Visvarupa; but this commentary is a late work, and in all probability it relied on Vidyaranya s testimony that Visvarupa and Suresvara were identi cally the same person. Vidyaranya also, in his Vivarana-prameya- samgraha, p. 92, quotes a passage from Suresvara s Varttika (iv. 8), attributing it to Visvarupa. But in another passage of the Vivarana- prameya-samgraha (p. 224) he refers to a Vedanta doctrine, attri buting it to the author of the Brahma-siddhi. But the work has not yet been published, and its manuscripts are very scarce : the pre sent writer had the good fortune to obtain one. A fairly detailed examination of the philosophy of this work will be given in a separate section. The Brahma-siddhi is an important work, and it -was commented on by Vacaspati in his Tattva-samiksa, by Anandapurna in his Brahma-siddhi-vydkhyd-ratna, by Sankhapani in his Brahma- siddhi-tlkd, and by Citsukha in his Abhipraya- prakasika. But only the latter two works are available in manu scripts. Many important works however refer to the Brahma-siddhi and its views generally as coming from the author of Brahma-siddhi (Brahma-siddhi-kdra). But in none of these references, so far as it is known to the present writer, has the author of Brahma-siddhi been referred to as Suresvara. The Brahma-siddhi was written in verse and prose, since two quotations from it in Citsukha s Tattva- pradipikd (p. 381, Nirnaya-Sagara Press) and Nydya-kanikd (p. 80) are in verse, while there are other references, such as Tattva- pradipikd (p. 140) and elsewhere, which are in prose. There is, however, little doubt that the Brahma-siddhi was written by Mandana or Mandana Misra; for both Srldhara in his Nydya- kandall (p. 218) and Citsukha in his Tattva-pradlpikd (p. 140) refer to Mandana as the author of the Brahma-siddhi. Of these the evi dence of Srldhara, who belonged to the middle of the tenth century, ought to be considered very reliable, as he lived within a hundred years of the death of Mandana ; whoever Mandana may have been, 6-2 84 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. since he lived after Sankara (A.D. 820), he could not have flourished very much earlier than the middle of the ninth century. It is, therefore, definitely known that the Naiskarmya-siddhi and the Varttika were written by SuresVara, and the Brahma-siddhi by Mandana. The question regarding the identity of these two persons may be settled, if the views or opinions of the Brahma-siddhi can be compared or contrasted with the views of the Naiskarmya- siddhi or the Varttika. From the few quotations that can be traced in the writings of the various writers who refer to it it is possible to come to some fairly decisive conclusions 1 . Of all passages the most important is that quoted from the Brahma- siddhim the Vivarana-prameya-samgraha (p. 224). It is said there that according to the author of the Brahma-siddhi it is the individual persons (jlvah, in the plural) who by their own individual ignorance (svdvidyaya) create for themselves on the changeless Brahman the false world-appearance. Neither in itself, nor with the may a, or as reflection in may a, is Brahman the cause of the world (Brahma na jagat-kdranam). The appearances then are but creations of individual ignorance, and individual false ex periences of the world have therefore no objective basis. The agreement of individual experiences is due to similarity of illu sions in different persons who are suffering under the delusive effects of the same kinds of ignorance ; this may thus be compared with the delusive experience of two moons by a number of persons. Not all persons experience the same world; their delusive ex periences are similar, but the objective basis of their experience is not the same (samvddas tu bahu-purusdvagata-dvitiya-candravat sddrsydd upapadyate). If this account is correct, as may well be supposed, then Mandana Misra may be regarded as the originator of the Vedantic doctrine of drsti-srsti-vdda, which was in later times so forcefully formulated by Prakasananda. Again, in Prakasatman s Panca-pddikd-vivarana (p. 32), it is held that according to the author of the Brahma-siddhi both mdyd and avidyd are nothing but false experiences (avidyd mdyd mithyd-pratyaya iti). About the function 1 A copy of the manuscript of the Brahma-siddhi and its commentary was consulted by me in the Adyar and the Govt. Sanskrit MSS. Libraries after the above section had been written, and a thorough examination of its contents, I am happy to say, corroborates the above surmises. The Brahma-siddhi is expected to be shortly published by Prof. Kuppusvami isastri, and I con sulted the tarka-pada of it in proof by the kind courtesy of Prof. astrl in Madras in December 1928. A separate section has been devoted to the philosophy of Mandana s Brahma-siddhi. xi] Mandana, Suresvara and Visvarupa 85 of knowledge as removing doubts he is said to hold the view (as reported in the Nyaya-kandali, p. 218) that doubt regarding the validity of what is known is removed by knowledge itself. In the Nyaya-kanikd (p. 80) it is said that Mandana held that reality mani fests itself in unlimited conceptions of unity or universality , whereas differences appear only as a result of limited experience. Again, in the Laghu-candrikd (p. 112, Kumbakonam edition) Mandana is introduced in the course of a discussion regarding the nature of the dispersion of ignorance and its relation to Brahma-knowledge or Brahmahood. According to Sankara, as interpreted by many of his followers, including Suresvara, the dissolution of ignorance (avidya-nivrtti) is not a negation, since negation as a separate cate gory has no existence. So dissolution of ignorance means only Brah man. But according to Mandana there is no harm in admitting the existence of such a negation as the cessation of ignorance ; for the monism of Brahman means that there is only one positive entity. It has no reference to negations, i.e. the negation of duality only means the negation of all positive entities other than Brahman (bhdvddvaitd) . The existence of such a negation as the cessation of ignorance does not hurt the monistic creed. Again, Sarvajnatma Muni in his Samksepa-sdriraka(n. 174) says that ignorance (avidya) is supported (asraya) in pure consciousness (cin-matrasrita-visayam ajndnam) , and that, even where from the context of Sankara s Bhasya it may appear as if he was speaking of the individual person (jlvd) as being the support of ajnana, it has to be interpreted in this sense. Objections of Mandana, therefore, to such a view, viz. that ignorance rests with the individuals, are not to be given any consideration; for Mandana s views lead to quite different conclusions (parihrtya Mandana-vdcah taddhy anyathd prasthitam) 1 . The commentator of the Samksepa-sariraka, Ramatlrtha Svamin, also, in commenting on the passage referred to, contrasts the above view of Mandana with that of Suresvara, who according to him is referred to by an adjective bahu-sruta in the Samksepa-sdrlraka text, and who is reported to have been in agreement with the views of Sarvajnatma Muni, as against the views of Mandana. Now many of these views which have been attributed to Mandana are not shared by Suresvara, as will appear from what will be said below concerning him. It does not therefore appear that Mandana Misra and Suresvara were the same 1 Mr Hiriyanna, in J.R.A.S. 1923, mentions this point as well as the point concerning avidya-nivrtti in Mandana s view as admission of negation. 86 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. person. But, if Vidyaranya, who knows so much about the views of Mandana, had identified them in the Sankara-dig-vijaya, that might lead one to pause. Now Mr Hiriyanna seems to have removed this difficulty for us by his short note in J.R.A.S. 1924, where he points out that Vidyaranya in his Varttika-sara refers to the author of the Brahma-siddhi as a different authority from the author of the Varttika, viz. Suresvara. Now, if Vidyaranya, the author of the Varttika-sara,knew that Mandana, the author of the Brahma-siddhi, was not the same person as Suresvara, he could not have identified them in his Sankara-dig-vijaya. This naturally leads one to suspect that the Vidyaranya who was the author of the Vivarana-prameya- samgraha and the Varttika-sara was not the same Vidyaranya as the author of Sankara-dig-vijaya. Another consideration also leads one to think that Vidyaranya (the author of the Vivarana- prameya-samgraha) could not have written the Sankara-dig-vijaya. Anandatman had two disciples, Anubhavananda and Sankara - nanda. Anubhavananda had as his disciple Amalananda, and Sankarananda had Vidyaranya as his disciple. So Amalananda may be taken as a contemporary of Vidyaranya. Now Amalananda had another teacher in Sukhaprakasa, who had Citsukha as his teacher. Thus Citsukha may be taken to be a contemporary of the grand teacher ( parama-guru) , Anandatman, of Vidyaranya. If this was the case, he could not have written in his Sankara-dig-vijaya (XHI. 5) that Citsukha, -who lived several centuries after Padmapada, w r as a disciple of Padmapada. It may therefore be safely asserted that the author of the Sankara-dig-vijaya was not the author of the Vivarana-prameya-samgraha. Now, if this is so, our reliance on the author of the Vivarana-prameya-samgraha cannot be considered to be risky and unsafe. But on p. 92 of the Vivarana-prameya- samgraha a passage from the Varttika of Suresvara (iv. 8) is attributed to Visvarupa Acarya. It may therefore be concluded that Mandana, the author of the Brahma-siddhi, was not the same person as Suresvara, unless we suppose that Mandana was not only a Mimamsa writer, but also a Vedanta writer of great repute and that his conversion by Sankara meant only that he changed some of his Vedantic views and accepted those of Sankara, and it was at this stage that he was called Suresvara. On this theory his Brahma-siddhi was probably written before his conversion to Saiikara s views. It seems likely that this theory may be correct, and that the author of the Vidhi-viveka was also the author of the xi] Mandana 87 Brahma- siddhi\ for the passage of the Brahma-siddhi quoted by Vacaspati in his Nydya-kanika is quoted in a manner which suggests that in all probability the author of the Vidhi-viveka was also the author of the Brahma-siddhi. It may also be concluded that in all probability Visvarupa was the same person as Suresvara, though on this subject no references of value are known to the present writer other than by the author of the Vivarana-prameya- samgraha. Mandana (A.D. 800). Mandana Misra s Brahma-siddhi with the commentary of San- khapani is available in manuscript, and Mahamahopadhyaya Kup- pusvami Sastrl of Madras is expected soon to bring out a critical edition of this important work. Through the courtesy of Mahama hopadhyaya Kuppusvami Sastrl the present writer had an oppor tunity of going through the proofs of the Brahma-siddhi and through the courtesy of Mr C. Kunhan Raja, the Honorary Director of the Adyar Library, he was able also to utilize the manuscript of Sankhapani s commentary 1 . The Brahma-siddhi is in four chapters, Brahma-kanda, Tarka-kanda, Niyoga-kanda, and Siddhi- kanda, in the form of verses (karika) and long annotations (vrtti). That Mandana must have been a contemporary of Sankara is evident from the fact that, though he quotes some writers who flourished before Sankara, such as Sahara, Kumarila or Vyasa, the author of the Yoga-sutra-bhasya, and makes profuse references to the Upanisad texts, he never refers to any writer who flourished after Sankara 2 . Vacaspati also wrote a commentary, called Tattva- samiksa, on Mandana s Brahma-siddhi; but unfortunately this text, so far as is known to the present writer, has not yet been 1 Citsukha, the pupil of Jnanottama, also wrote a commentary on it, called Abhiprdya-prakdsikd, almost the whole of which, except some portions at the beginning, is available in the Government Oriental Manuscript Library, R. No. 3853. Anandapurna also wrote a commentary on the Brahma-siddhi, called Bhdva-suddhi. 2 Mandana s other works are Bhdvand-viveka, Vidhi-viveka, Vibhrama-viveka and Sphota-siddhi. Of these the Vidhi-viveka was commented upon by Vacaspati Misra in his Nydya-kanikd, and the Sphota-siddhi was commented upon by the son of Bhavadasa, who had also written a commentary, called Tattva-vibhavanti, on Vacaspati Misra s Tattva-bindu . The commentary on the Sphota-siddhi is called Gopdlika. Mandana s Vibhrama-viveka is a small work devoted to the dis cussion of the four theories of illusion (khydti),dtma-khydti, asat-khydti, anyathd- khydti and akhydti. Up till now only his Bhdvand-viveka and Vidhi-viveka have been published. 88 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. discovered. In the Brahma-kdnda chapter Mandana discusses the nature of Brahman ; in the Tarka-kanda he tries to prove that we cannot perceive "difference" through perception and that therefore one should not think of interpreting the Upanisad texts on dualistic lines on the ground that perception reveals difference. In the third chapter, the Niyoga-kdnda, he tries to refute the Mlmamsa view that the Upanisad texts are to be interpreted in accordance with the Mlmamsa principle of interpretation, that all Vedic texts command us to engage in some kind of action or to restrain ourselves from certain other kinds of action. This is by far the longest chapter of the book. The fourth chapter, the Siddhi-kanda, is the shortest: Mandana says here that the Upanisad texts show that the manifold world of appearance does not exist at all and that its apparent existence is due to the avidyd of jiva. In the Brahma-kdnda the most important Vedantic concepts are explained by Mandana according to his own view. He first introduces the problem of the subject (drastr) and the object (drsya) and says that it is only by abolishing the apparent duality of subject and object that the fact of experience can be explained. For, if there was any real duality of subject and object, that duality could not be bridged over and no relation between the two could be established; if, on the other hand, there is only the subject, then all things that are perceived can best be explained as being illusory creations imposed on self, the only reality 1 . Proceeding further with the same argument, he says that attempts have been made to bring about this subject- object relation through the theory of the operation of an intermediary mind (antahkarand) ; but whatever may be the nature of this intermediary, the pure un changeable intelligence, the self or the subject, could not change with its varying changes in accordance with its connection with different objects ; if it is held that the self does not undergo any transformation or change, but there is only the appearance of a transformation through its reflection in the antahkarana, then it is plainly admitted that objects are not in reality perceived and that there is only an appearance of perception. If objects are not perceived in reality, it is wrong to think that they have a separate 1 ekatva evdyam drastr-drsya-bhdvo vakalpate, drastur eva cid-dtmanah tathd tathd viparindmdd vivartandd vd; ndndtve tu vivikta-svabhdvayor asamsrsta- paraspara-svarupayor asambaddhayoh kldrso drastr-drsya-bhdvah. Kuppusvami edition of Brahma- siddhi, p. 7. (In the press.) xi] Mandana 89 and independent existence from the self 1 . Just as the very same man sees his own image in the mirror to be different from him and to exist outside of him as an object, so the same self appears as all the diverse objects outside of it. It is difficult to conceive how one could admit the existence of external objects outside the pure intelligence (cit) ; for in that case it would be impossible to relate the two 2 . According to Mandana avidya is called may a, or false appearance , because it is neither a characteristic (sva-bhdva) of Brahman nor different from it, neither existent nor non-existent. If it was the characteristic of anything, then, whether one with that or different from it, it would be real and could not therefore be called avidya ; if it was absolutely non-existent, it would be like the lotus of the sky and would have no practical bearing in experience (na vyavahara-bljam) such as avidya has ; it has thus to be admitted that avidya is indescribable or unspeakable (anirvacanlya) 3 . According to Mandana avidya belongs to the individual souls (jlva). He admits that there is an inconsistency in such a view; but he thinks that, avidya being itself an inconsistent category, there is no wonder that its relation with jlva should also be incon- 1 ekantahkarana-samkrdntdv asty eva sambandha iti cet, na, citeh suddhatvdd aparindmdd aprati-samkramdc ca; drsyd buddhih citi-sannidhei chdyaya vivartata iti ced atha keyam tac chdyatd? a-tad-dtmanah tad-avabhdsah ; na tarhi paramdrthato dfsyam drsyate, paramdrthatas ca drsyamdnam drastr-vyatiriktam asti iti dur- bhanam. Ibid. Jsankhapani in commenting on this discards the view that objects pass through the sense-channels and become superimposed on the antahkaranaoi durbhanam and thereby become related to the pure intelligence of the self and objectified : na tu sphatikopame cetasi indriya-prandll-samkrdntdndm arthdndm tatraiva samkrdntena dtma-caitanyena sambaddhdndm tad-drsyatvam ghatisyate. Adyar MS. p. 75. It may not be out of place to point out in this connection that the theory of Padmapada, Prakasatman, as developed later on by Dharmarajadhvarlndra, which held that the mind (antahkarand) becomes superimposed on external objects in perception, was in all probability borrowed from the Samkhya doctrine of cic-chdydpatti in perception, which was somehow forced into Sahkara s loose epistemological doctrines and worked out as a systematic epistemological theory. The fact that Mandana discards this epistemological doctrine shows, on the one hand, that he did not admit it to be a right interpretation of $arikara and may, on the other hand, be regarded as a criticism of the contemporary inter pretation of Padmapada. But probably the reply of that school would be that, though they admitted extra-individual reality of objects, they did not admit the reality of objects outside of pure intelligence (cit}. 2 tathd hi darpana-tala-stham dtmdnam vibhaktam ivdtmanah pratyeti; cites tu vibhaktam asamsrstam tayd cetyata iti dur-av agamy am. Ibid. 3 Ibid. p. 9. It may not be out of place here to point out that Anandabodha s argument in his Nydya-makaranda regarding the unspeakable nature of avidyd t which has been treated in a later section of this chapter, is based on this argument of Mandana. 90 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. sistent and unexplainable. The inconsistency of the relationship of avidyd with the jlvas arises as follows : the jlvas are essentially identical with Brahman, and the diversity of jlvas is due to imagination (kalpana) ; but this imagination cannot be of Brahman, since Brahman is devoid of all imagination (tasyd vidydtmanah kal- pand-sunyatvdt) ; it cannot be the imagination of the jlvas, since the jlvas themselves are regarded as being the product of imagination 1 . Two solutions may be proposed regarding this difficulty, firstly, that the word mdyd implies what is inconsistent; had it been a consistent and explainable concept, it would be reality and not mdyd 2 . Secondly, it may be said that from avidyd come the jlvas and from the jlvas comes the avidyd, and that this cycle is begin - ningless and therefore there is no ultimate beginning either of the jlvas or of the avidyd 3 . This view is held by those who think that avidyd is not the material cause of the world : these are technically called avidyopdddna-bheda-vddins . It is through this avidyd that the jlvas suffer the cycle of births and rebirths, and this avidyd is natural to the jlvas, since the jlvas themselves are the products of avidyd*. And it is through listening to the Vedantic texts, right thinking, meditation, etc. that true knowledge dawns and the avidyd is destroyed ; it was through this avidyd that the jlvas were separated from Brahman ; with its destruction they attain Brahma- hood 5 . In defining the nature of Brahman as pure bliss Sahkhapani the commentator raises some very interesting discussions. He starts by criticizing the negative definition of happiness as cessation of pain or as a positive mental state qualified by such a negative condition 6 . He says that there are indeed negative pleasures which are enjoyed as negation of pain (e.g. a plunge into cold water is an escape from the painful heat); but he holds that there are cases where pleasures and pains are experienced simultaneously itaretardsrava prasangdt kalpanddhino hi jiva vibhdgah, jlvdsrayd kalpana. Ibid. p. 10. 2 anupapadyamdndrthaiva hi mdyd; iipapadyamdndrthatve yathartha-bhdvdn na mdyd sydt. Ibid. 3 andditvdn netaretardsrayatva-dosah. Ibid. 4 na hi jivesu nisarga-jd vidydsti, avidyaiva hi naisargikl, dgantukyd vidydydh pravilayah. Ibid. pp. 11-12. 5 avidyayaiva tu brahmano jlvo vibhaktah, tan-nivrttau brahma-svarupam eva bhavati, yathd ghatddi-bhede tad-dkdsam parisuddham paramdkasam eva bhavati. Ibid. 6 duhkha nivrttir va tad-visistdtmopalabdhir vd sukham astu, saruathd sukham ndma na dharmdntaram asti. Adyar MS. of the Sahkhapani commentary, p. 18. xi] Mandana 91 and not as negation of each other. A man may feel painful heat in the upper part of his body and yet feel the lower part of his body delightfully cool and thus experience pleasure and pain simul taneously (sukha-duhkhe yugapaj janyete). Again, according to the scriptures there is unmixed pain in Hell, and this shows that pain need not necessarily be relative. Again, there are many cases (e.g. in the smelling of a delightful odour of camphor) where it cannot be denied that we have an experience of positive pleasure 1 . Sahkhapani then refutes the theory of pain as unsatisfied desire and happiness as satisfaction or annulment of desires (visaya- prdptim vind kdma eva duhkham atah tan-nivrttir eva sukham bhavisyati) by holding that positive experiences of happiness are possible even when one has not desired them 2 . An objection to this is that experience of pleasures satisfies the natural, but temporarily inactive, desires in a sub-conscious or potential condition 3 . Again, certain experiences produce more pleasures in some than in others, and this is obviously due to the fact that one had more latent desires to be fulfilled than the other. In reply to these objections Sankhapani points out that, even if a thing is much desired, yet, if it is secured after much trouble, it does not satisfy one so much as a pleasure which comes easily. If pleasure is defined as removal of desires, then one should feel happy before the pleasurable experience or after the pleasurable experience, when all traces of the desires are wiped out, but not at the time of enjoying the pleasurable experience ; for the desires are not wholly extinct at that time. Even at the time of enjoying the satisfaction of most earnest desires one may feel pain. So it is to be admitted that pleasure is not a relative concept which owes its origin to the sublation of desires, but that it is a positive concept which has its existence even before the desires are sublated 4 . If negation of desires be defined as happiness, then even disinclination to food through bilious attacks is to be called happiness 5 . So it is to be admitted that positive pleasures are in the first instance experienced and then are desired. The theory that pains and pleasures are relative and that without pain there can be no experience of pleasure and that there can be no experience of pain without an 1 Ibid. pp. 20, 21. 2 Ibid. p. 22. 3 sahajo hi rdgah sarva-pumsdm asti sa tu visaya-visesena dvir-bhavati. Ibid. P- 23. 4 atah kdma-nivrtteh prdg-bhdvi sukha-vastu-bhutam estavyam. Ibid. p. 27. 5 Ibid. p. 25. 92 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. experience of pleasure is false and consequently the Vedantic view is that the state of emancipation as Brahmahood may well be described as an experience of positive pure bliss 1 . Sankara in his commentary on the Brahma-sutra and in his commentaries on some of the Upanisads and the Mandukya- kdrika had employed some elements of dialectical criticism, the principles of which had long been introduced in well-developed forms by the Buddhists. The names of the three great dialecticians, Sriharsa, Anandajnana and Citsukha, of the Sankara school, are well known, and proper notice has been taken of them in this chapter. But among the disciples of Sankara the man who really started the dialectical forms of argument, who was second to none in his dialectical powers and who influenced all other dialecticians of the Sankara school, Anandabodha, Sriharsa, Anandajnana, Citsukha, Nrsimhasrama and others, was Mandana. Mandana s great dia lectical achievement is found in his refutation of the perception of difference (bheda) in the Tarka-kanda chapter of his Brahma- siddhi. The argument arose as follows : the category of difference (bheda) is revealed in perception, and, if this is so, the reality of difference cannot be denied, and therefore the Upanisad texts should not be interpreted in such a way as to annul the reality of "difference." Against such a view-point Mandana undertakes to prove that " difference," whether as a quality or character istic of things or as an independent entity, is never experienced by perception (pratyaksd) 2 . He starts by saying that perception yields three possible alternatives, viz. (i) that it manifests a positive object, (2) that it presents differences from other objects, (3) that it both manifests a positive object and distinguishes it from other objects 3 . In the third alternative there may again be three other alternatives, viz. (i) simultaneous presentation of the positive object and its distinction from others, (ii) first the pre sentation of the positive object and then the presentation of the difference, (iii) first the presentation of the difference and then the presentation of the positive object 4 . If by perception differences 1 yadi dnhkhd-bhdvah sukharn sydt tatah sydd evam bhdvdntare tu sukhe duhkhdbhdve ca tathd sydd eva. Ibid. p. 161. 2 This discussion runs from page 44 of the Brahma-siddhi (in the press) to the end of the second chapter. 8 tatra pratyakse trayah kalpdh, vastu-svarupa-siddhih vastv-antarasya vya- vacchedah ubhayam vd. Brahma-siddhi, n. 4 ubhayasminn api traividhyam, yaugapadyam, vyavaccheda-piirvako vidhih, vidhi-purvako vyavacchedah. Ibid. xij Mandana 93 from other objects are experienced, or if it manifests both the object and its differences, then it has to be admitted that "difference" is presented in perception ; but, if it can be proved that only positive objects are presented in perception, unassociated with any pre sentation of difference, then it has to be admitted that the notion of difference is not conveyed to us by perception, and in that case the verdict of the Upanisads that reality is one and that no diversity can be real is not contradicted by perceptual experience. Now follows the argument. Perception does not reveal merely the difference, nor does it first reveal the difference and then the positive object, nor both of them simultaneously; for the positive object must first be revealed, before any difference can be manifested. Difference must concern itself in a relation between two positive objects, e.g. the cow is different from the horse, or there is no jug here. The negation involved in the notion of difference can have no bearing without that which is negated or that of which it is negated, and both these are positive in their notion. The negation of a chimerical entity (e.g. the lotus of the sky) is to be inter preted as negation of a false relation of its constituents, which are positive in themselves (e.g. both the lotus and the sky are existents, the incompatibility is due to their relationing, and it is such a relation between these two positive entities that is denied), or as denying the objective existence of such entities, which can be imagined only as a mental idea 1 . If the category of difference distinguishes two objects from one another, the objects between which the difference is manifested must first be known. Again, it cannot be held that perception, after revealing the positive object, reveals also its difference from other objects; for perception is one unique process of cognition, and there are no two moments in it such that it should first reveal the object with which there is present sense-contact and then reveal other objects which are not at that moment in contact with sense, as also the difference between the two 2 . In the case of the discovery of one s own illusion, such as "this is not silver, but conch-shell," only the latter knowledge is perceptual, and this knowledge refers to and negates after the previous knowledge of the object as silver has been negated. It was 1 kutascin nimiltdd buddhau labdha-rupdndm bahir nisedhah kriyatc. Brahma-siddhi, n. kramah samgacchate yuktyd naika-vijndna-karmanoh na sannihita-jam tac ca tadanydmarsi jay ate. Ibid. II. Kdrikd 3. 94 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. only when the presented object was perceived as "this before" that it was denied as being the silver for which it was taken, and when it was thus negated there was the perception of the conch - shell. There is no negative concept without there first being a positive concept; but it does not therefore follow that a positive concept cannot be preceded by a negative concept 1 . This is therefore not a case where there are two moments in one unique perception, but there are here different cognitive experiences 2 . Again, there is a view (Buddhist) that it is by the power or potency of the indeterminate cognition of an object that both the positive determinate cognition and its difference from others are produced. Though the positive and the negative are two cognitions, yet, since they are both derived from the indeterminate cognition, it can well be said that by one positive experience we may also have its difference from others also manifested (eka-vidhir eva anya- vyavacchedah) 3 . Against such a view Mandana urges that one positive experience cannot also reveal its differences from all other kinds of possible and impossible objects. A colour perceived at a particular time and particular place may negate another colour at that particular place and time, but it cannot negate the presence of taste properties at that particular place and time ; but, if the very perception of a colour should negate everything else which is not that colour, then these taste properties would also be negated, and, since this is not possible, it has to be admitted that perception of a positive entity does not necessarily involve as a result of that very process the negation of all other entities. There is again a view that things are by their very nature different from one another (prakrtyaiva bhinna bhdvah), and thus, when by perception an object is experienced, its difference from other objects is also grasped by that very act. In reply to this objection Mandana says that things cannot be of the nature of differences ; firstly, in that case all objects would be of the nature of difference, and hence there would be no difference among them ; secondly, as 1 purva-vijfidna-vihite rajatddau "idam " iti ca sannihitdrtha-sdmdnye nisedho vidhi-purva eva, suktikd-siddhis tu virodhi-nisedha-purva ucyate; vidhi-purvatd ca niyamena nisedhasyocyate, na vidher nisedha-purvakatd nisidhyate. Brahma- siddhi, ii. Kdrikd 3. 2 na ca tatra eka-jndnasya kramavad-vydpdratdubhaya-rupasya utpatteh. Ibid. 3 nilasya nirvikalpaka-darsanasya yat sdmarthyam niyataika-kdranatvam tena anddi-vdsand-vasdt pratibhdsitam janitam idam nedam iti vikalpo bhdvdbhd- va-vyavahdram pravartayati...satyam jndna-dvayam idam savikalpakam tu nirvikalpakam tayor mula-bhutam tat pratyaksam tatra ca eka-vidhir eva anya- vyavaccheda iti bruma iti. ^ankhapani s commentary, ibid. xi] Mandana 95 difference" has no form, the objects themselves would be formless; thirdly, difference being essentially of the nature of negation, the objects themselves would be of the nature of negation ; fourthly, since difference involves duality or plurality in its concept, no object could be regarded as one; a thing cannot be regarded as both one and many 1 . In reply to this the objector says that a thing is of the nature of difference only in relation to others (parapeksam vastuno bheda-svabhavah natmapeksam), but not in relation to itself. In reply to this objection Mandana says that things which have been produced by their own causes cannot stand in need of a relation to other entities for their existence; all relationing is mental and as such depends on persons who conceive the things, and so relationing cannot be a constituent of objective things 2 . If relationing with other things constituted their essence, then each thing would depend on others they would depend on one another for their existence (itaretarasraya-prasangai). In reply to this it may be urged that differences are different, corresponding to each and every oppositional term, and that each object has a different specific nature in accordance with the different other objects with which it may be in a relation of opposition ; but, if this is so, then objects are not produced solely by their own causes; for, if differences are regarded as their constituent essences, these essences should vary in accordance with every object with which a thing may be opposed. In reply to this it is urged by the objector that, though an object is produced by its own causes, yet its nature as differences appears in relation to other objects with which it is held in opposition. Mandana rejoins that on such a view it would be difficult to understand the meaning and function of this oppositional relation (apeksa) ; for it does not produce the object, which is produced by its own causes, and it has no causal efficiency and it is also not experienced, except as associated with the other objects (nanapeksa-pratiyoginam bhedah pr ally ate). Difference also cannot be regarded as being of the essence of oppositional relation ; it is only when there is an oppositional re lation between objects already experienced that difference manifests no. bhedo vastuno rupam tad-abhava-prasangatah arupena ca bhinnatvam vastuno ndvakalpate. Brahma- siddhi, u. 5. 2 ndpeksd nama kascid vastu-dharmo yena vastuni vyavasthapyeran, na khalu sva-hetu-prdpitodayesu sva-bhdva-vyavasthitesu vastusu sva-bhdva-sthitaye vastv- antardpeksd yujyate. Ibid. n. 6, vrtti. 96 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. itself. Relations are internal and are experienced in the minds of those who perceive and conceive 1 . But it is further objected to this that concepts like father and son are both relational and obviously externally constitutive. To this Mandana s reply is that these two concepts are not based on relation, but on the notion of production ; that which produces is the father and that which is produced is the son. Similarly also the notions of long and short depend upon the one occupying greater or less space at the time of measurement and not on relations as constituting their essence. In reply to this the objector says that, if relations are not regarded as ultimate, and if they are derived from different kinds of actions, then on the same ground the existence of differences may also be admitted. If there were no different kinds of things, it would not be possible to explain different kinds of actions. But Mandana s reply is that the so-called differences may be but differences in name ; the burning activity of the same fire is described sometimes as burning and sometimes as cooking. In the Vedanta view it is held that all the so-called varied kinds of actions appear in one object, the Brahman, and so the objection that varied kinds of actions necessarily imply the existence of difference in the agents which produce them is not valid. Again, the difficulty in the case of the Buddhist is in its own way none the less ; for according to him all appearances are momentary, and, if this be so, how does he explain the similarities of effects that we notice? It can be according to them only on the basis of an illusory notion of the sameness of causes ; so , if the Buddhist can explain our experience of similarity on the false appearance of sameness of causes, the Vedantist may also in his turn explain all appearances of diversity through illusory notions of difference, and there is thus no necessity of admitting the reality of differences in order to explain our notions of difference in experience 2 . Others again argue that the world must be a world of diversity, as the various objects of our experience serve our various purposes, and it is impossible that one and the same thing should serve different purposes. But this objection is not valid, because even the self-same thing can serve diverse purposes ; the same fire can burn, illuminate and cook. There is no objection to there being a number of limited (avacchinnd) qualities 1 pauruseylm apeksdm na vastv anuvartate, ato no. vastu-svabhdvah. Ibid. 2 atha nir-anvaya-vindsdndm api kalpand-visaydd abheddt kdryasya tulyatd hanta tarhi bheddd eva kalpand-visaydt kdrydbheda-siddher mudhd kdrana- bheda-kalpand. Ibid. xi] Mandana 97 or characters in the self-same thing. It is sometimes urged that things are different from one another because of their divergent powers (e.g. milk is different from sesamum because curd is produced from milk and not from sesamum) ; but divergence of powers is like divergence of qualities, and, just as the same fire may have two different kinds of powers or qualities, namely, that of burning and cooking, so the same entity may at different moments both possess and not possess a power, and this does not in the least imply a divergence or difference of entity. It is a great mystery that the one self-same thing should have such a special efficiency (sdmarthyatisayd) that it can be the basis of innumerable divergent appearances. As one entity is supposed to possess many divergent powers, so one self-same entity may on the same principle be regarded as the cause of divergent appearances. Again,- it is held by some that difference" consists in the negation of one entity in another. Such negations, it may be replied, cannot be indefinite in their nature; for then negations of all things in all places would make them empty. If, however, specific negations are implied with reference to determinate entities, then, since the character of these entities, as different from one another, depends on these implied negations, and since these implied negations can operate only when there are these different entities, they depend mutually upon one another (itaretarasraya) and cannot therefore hold their own. Again, it cannot be said that the notion of " difference " arises out of the operation of perceptual processes like determinate perception (occurring as the culmination of the perceptual process) ; for there is no proof whatsoever that " difference," as apart from- mutual negation, can be definitely experienced. Again, if unity of all things as "existents" {sat) was not realized in experience, it would be difficult to explain how one could recognize the sameness of things. This sameness or unity of things is by far the most fundamental of experiences, and it is first manifested as indeterminate experience, which later on transforms itself into various notions of difference 1 . In this connection Mandana also takes great pains in refuting the view that things are twofold in their nature, both unity and difference, and also pratyekam anubiddhatvdd abhedena mrsd matah bhedo yathd tarangdndm bheddd bhedah kaldvatah. Brahma-siddhi, n. Kdrikd 31. D II 98 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. the Jaina view that unity and difference are both true in their own respective ways. But it is not necessary to enter into these details. The main point in his refutation of the category of difference consists in this, that he shows that it is inconceivable and dia- lectically monstrous to suppose that the category of difference can be experienced through perception and that it is philosophically more convenient to suppose that there is but one thing which through ignorance yields the various notions of difference than to suppose that there are in reality the infinite agreements of unity and difference just as they are experienced in perception 1 . In the third chapter of the Brahma-siddhi, called the Niyoga- kanda, Mandana refutes the Mimamsa view that the Vedantic texts are to be interpreted in accordance with the Mimamsa canon of interpretation, viz. that Vedic texts imply either a command or a prohibition. But, as this discussion is not of much philosophical importance, it is not desirable to enter into it. In the fourth chapter, called the Siddhi-kanda> Mandana reiterates the view that the chief import of the Upanisad texts consists in showing that the manifold world of appearance does not exist and that its mani festation is due to the ignorance (avidya) of the individual souls (jlva). The sort of ultimate reality that is described in the Upanisad texts is entirely different from all that we see around us, and it is as propounding this great truth, which cannot be known by ordinary experience, that the Upanisads are regarded as the only source from which knowledge of Brahman can be obtained. Suresvara (A.D. 800). Suresvara s chief works are the Naiskarmya-siddhi and Brhad- aranyakopanisad-bhdsya-varttika. The Naiskarmya-siddhi has at least five commentaries, such as the Bhdva-tattva-prakasika by Citsukha, which is based on Jnanottama s Candrika. This Candrika is thus the earliest commentary on the Naiskarmya-siddhi. It is difficult to determine Jnanottama s date. In the concluding verses of this commentary the two names Satyabodha and Jnanottama occur ; and Mr Hiriyanna points out in his introduction to the Naiskarmya- siddhi that these two names also occur in the Sarvajna-pitha of Con- jeeveram, to which he claims to have belonged as teacher and pupil, ekasyaivdstu mahirnd yan ndneva prakdsate Idghavdn na tu bhinndndm yac cakdsaty abhinnavat. Brahma-siddhi, n. Kdrikd 32. xi] Suresvara 99 and according to the list of teachers of that Matha Jnanottama was the fourth from Sankara. This would place Jnanottama at a very early date; if, however, the concluding verses are not his, but in serted by someone else, then of course they give no clue to his date except the fact that he must have lived before Citsukha, since Citsukha s commentary was based on Jnanottama s commentary Candrika. Another commentary is the Vidya-surabhi of Jnanamrta, the pupil of Uttamamrta; another is the Naiskarmya-siddhi- vivarana of Akhilatman, pupil of Dasarathapriya ; and there is also another commentary, called Sdrartha, by Ramadatta, which is of comparatively recent date. Suresvara s Naiskarmya-siddhi is divided into four chapters. The first chapter deals with discussions regarding the relation of Vedic duties to the attainment of Vedantic wisdom. Avidya is here defined as the non-perception in one s experience of the ultimate oneness of the self: through this rebirths take place, and it is the destruction of this ignorance which is emancipation (tan- naso muktir atmanah). The Mlmamsists think that, if one ceases to perform actions due to desire (kamya-karmd) and prohibited actions, then the actions which have already accumulated will naturally exhaust themselves in time by yielding fruits, and so, since the obligatory duties do not produce any new karma, and since no other new karmas accumulate, the person will naturally be emanci pated from karma. There is, however, in the Vedas no injunction in favour of the attainment of right knowledge. So one should attain emancipation through the performance of the Vedic duties alone. As against this Mlmamsa view Suresvara maintains that emancipation has nothing to do with the performance of actions. Performance of Vedic duties may have an indirect and remote bearing, in the way of purifying one s mind, but it has certainly no direct bearing on the attainment of salvation. Suresvara states a view attributed to Brahmadatta in the Vidya-$urabhi commentary, that ignorance is not removed merely by the knowledge of the identity of oneself with Brahman, as propounded in Vedanta texts, but through long and continuous meditation on the same. So the right apprehension of the Upanisadic passages on the identity of the Brahman and the individual does not immediately produce salvation; one has to continue to meditate for a long time on such ideas of identity; and all the time one has to perform all one s obligatory duties, since, if one ceased to perform them, this 7-2 ioo The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. would be a transgression of one s duties and would naturally produce sins, and hence one would not be able to obtain emancipation. So knowledge must be combined with the performance of duties (jnana-karma-samuccaya), which is vehemently opposed by Sankara. Another view which occurs also in the Varttika, and is there referred to by the commentator Anandajnana as being that of Mandana, is that, as the knowledge derived from the Vedantic texts is verbal and conceptual, it cannot of itself lead to Brahma-knowledge, but, when these texts are continually repeated, they produce a knowledge of Brahman as a mysterious effect by just the same kind of process as gives rise to the mysterious effects of sacrificial or other Vedic duties. The Varttika refers to various schools among the adherents of the joint operation of knowledge and of duties (jnana-karma-samuccaya), some regarding jnana as being the more important, others regarding karma as more im portant, and still others regarding them both as being equally important, thus giving rise to three different schools of jnana- karma-samuccaya. Suresvara tries to refute all these views by saying that true knowledge and emancipation are one and the same thing, and that it does not in the least require the per formance of any kind of Vedic duties. Suresvara also refutes the doctrine of the joint necessity of karma andjndna on the view of those modified dualists, like Bhartrprapanca, who thought that reality was a unity in differences, so that the doctrine of differences was as true as that of unity, and that, therefore, duties have to be performed even in the emancipated state, because, the differences being also real, the necessity of duties cannot be ignored at any stage of progress, even in the emancipated state, though true knowledge is also necessary for the realization of truth as unity. Suresvara s refutation of this view is based upon two considera tions, viz. that the conception of reality as being both unity and difference is self-contradictory, and that, when the oneness is realized through true knowledge and the sense of otherness and differences is removed, it is not possible that any duties can be performed at that stage; for the performance of duties implies experience of duality and difference 1 . The second chapter of the Naiskarmya-siddhi is devoted to the exposition of the nature of self-realization, as won through the proper interpretation of the unity texts of the Upanisads by a 1 See also Prof. Hiriyanna s introduction to his edition of the Nai$karmya-siddhi. xil Suresvara 101 proper teacher. The experience of the ego and all its associated experiences of attachment, antipathy, etc., vanish with the dawn of true self-knowledge of unity. The notion of ego is a changeful and extraneous element, and hence outside the element of pure consciousness. All manifestations of duality are due to the dis tracting effects of the antahkarana. When true knowledge dawns, the self together with all that is objectivity in knowledge vanishes. All the illusory appearances are due to the imposition of ajnana on the pure self, which, however, cannot thereby disturb the unper turbed unity of this pure self. It is the antahkarana, or the intellect, that suffers all modifications in the cognitive operations; the underlying pure consciousness remains undisturbed all the same. Yet this non-self which appears as mind, intellect, and its objects is not a substantive entity like the prakrti of the Samkhya ; for its appearance is due merely to ignorance and delusion. This world- appearance is only a product of nescience (ajnana) or false and indescribable illusion on the self, and is no real product of any real substance as the Samkhya holds. Thus it is that the whole of the world-appearance vanishes like the illusory silver in the conch-shell as soon as truth is realized. In the third chapter Suresvara discusses the nature of ajnana, its relation with the self, and the manner of its dissolution. There are two entities, the self and the non-self; now the non-self, being itself a product of ajnana (nescience or ignorance), cannot be regarded as its support or object ; so the ajnana has for its support and object the pure self or Brahman ; the ignorance of the self is also in regard to itself, since there is no other object regarding which ignorance is possible the entire field of objective appearance being regarded as the product of ignorance itself. It is the ignorance of the real nature of the self that transforms itself into all that is subjective and objective, the intellect and its objects. It is thus clear that according to Suresvara, unlike Vacaspati Misra and Mandana, the avidya is based not upon individual persons (jlva), but upon the pure intelligence itself. It is this ignorance which, being connected and based upon the pure self, produces the appearances of individual persons and their subjective and objective experiences. This ajnana, as mere ignorance, is experienced in deep dreamless sleep, when all its modifications and appearances shrink within it and it is ex perienced in itself as pure ignorance, which again in the waking state manifests itself in the whole series of experiences. It is easy to 102 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. see that this view of the relation of ajnana to pure intelligence is different from the idealism preached by Mandana, as noticed in the previous section. An objection is raised that, if the ego were as much an extraneous product of ajnana as the so-called external objects, then the ego should have appeared not as a subject, but as an object like other external or internal objects (e.g. pleasure, pain, etc.). To this Suresvara replies that, when the antahkarana or mind is trans formed into the form of the external objects, then, in order to give subjectivity to it, the category of the ego (ahamkdra) is produced to associate objective experiences with particular subjective centres, and then through the reflection of the pure intelligence by way of this category of the ego the objective experience, as associated with this category of the ego, appears as subjective experience. The category of the ego, being immediately and intimately related to the pure intelligence, itself appears as the knower, and the objec tivity of the ego is not apparent, just as in burning wood the fire and that which it burns cannot be separated. It is only when the pure intelligence is reflected through the ajnana product of the category of the ego that the notion of subjectivity applies to it, and all that is associated with it is experienced as the "this," the object, though in reality the ego is itself as much an object as the objects themselves. All this false experience, however, is destroyed in the realization of Brahman, when Vedantic texts of unity are realized. In the third chapter of the Naiskarmya-siddhi the central ideas of the other three chapters are recapitulated. In the Varttika Suresvara discusses the very same problems in a much more elaborate manner, but it is not useful for our present purposes to enter into these details. Padmapada (A.D. 820). Padmapada is universally reputed to be a direct disciple of Sankaracarya, and, since the manner of his own salutation to Sahkaracarya confirms this tradition, and since no facts are known that can contradict such a view, it may safely be assumed that he was a younger contemporary of Sahkaracarya. There are many tradi tional stories about him and his relations with Sankaracarya ; but, since their truth cannot be attested by reliable evidence, it is not possible to pronounce any judgment on them. Only two works are attributed to him, viz. the Panca-pddika, which is a commentary on xi] Padmapdda 103 Sankara s commentary on the first four sutras of the Brahma-sutra and Sankara s introduction to his commentary known as the adhydsa and the sambhdvand-bhdsya, and the Atma-bodha-vydkhydna, called also Vedanta-sara. This Panca-padikd, is one of the most important of the Vedanta works known to us. It was commented on by Prakasatman (A.D . 1 200) in his Panca-padika-vivarana 1 . The Panca- pddikd-vivarana was further commented on by Akhandananda (A.D. 1350), a pupil of Anandagiri, in his Tattva-dlpana. Ananda- purna (A.D. 1600), who wrote his Vidya-sagari commentary on Sriharsa s Khandana-khanda-khadya and also a commentary on the Mahd-vidyd-vidambana, wrote a commentary on the Panca-padikd 2 . Nrsimhasrama also wrote a commentary on the Panca-pddikd- vivarana, called thePanca-padikd-vivarana-prakasikd, and Srikrsna also wrote one on the Panca-pddikd-vivarana. Aufrecht refers to another commentary by Amalananda as Panca-pddikd-sdstra-dar- pana ; but this is undoubtedly a mistake for his Sdstra-darpana, which is noticed below. Amalananda was a follower of the Vacaspati line and not of the line of Padmapada and Prakasatman. Ramananda SarasvatI, a pupil of Govindananda, the author of the Ratna-prabhd commentary on the Sdnkara-bhdsya, wrote his Vivaranopanydsa (a summary of the main theses of the Vivarana) as a commentary on Sankara s Bhdsya\ but this was strictly on the lines of the Panca-pddikd-vivarana^ though it was not a direct commentary thereon. Vidyaranya also wrote a separate monograph, called Vivarana-prameya-samgraha, in which he interpreted the Vedantic doctrines on the lines of the Panca-pddikd-vivarana. Of all these the Vivaranopanydsa of Ramananda SarasvatI was probably the last important work on the Vivarana line; for Ramananda s teacher Govindananda, the pupil of Gopala SarasvatI and the pupil s pupil of Sivarama, refers in his Ratna-prabhd commentary to Jagannathasrama s commentary on the Sankara-bhdsya, called the Bhdsya-dlpikd, and also to Anandagiri s commentary as "wddhah" p. 5 (Nirnaya-Sagara Press, 1904). Jagannatha was the teacher of Nrsimhasrama; Govindananda must therefore have lived towards the end of the sixteenth century. Ramananda may 1 Prakasatman also wrote a metrical summary of Sankara s Bhdsya and a work called abda-nirnaya, in which he tried to prove the claims of scriptural testi mony as valid cognition. z As Mr Telang points out in his introduction to the Mahd-vidya-vidambana, it seems that Anandapurna lived after Saiikara Misra (A.D. 1529), as is seen from his criticism of his reading of a passage of the Khandana-khanda-khadya, p. 586 (Chowkhamba). 104 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. therefore be placed in the early part of the seventeenth century. Govindananda himself also in his Ratna-prabhd commentary followed the Vivarana line of interpretation, and he refers to Prakasatman with great respect as Prakdsdtma-sri-caranaih (Ratna- prabhd, p. 3). Padmapada s method of treatment, as interpreted by Prakas - atman, has been taken in the first and the second volumes of the present work as the guide to the exposition of the Vedanta. It is not therefore necessary that much should be said in separate sections re garding the Vedantic doctrines of these two great teachers. But still a few words on Padmapada s philosophy may with advantage be read separately. Padmapada says that may a, avydkrta, prakrti, agrahana, avyakta, tamah, kdrana, lay a, sakti, mahdsupti, nidrd, ksara and akdsa are the terms which are used in older literature as synonymous with avidyd. It is this entity that obstructs the pure and independently self- revealing nature of Brahman, and thus, standing as the painted canvas (citra-bhitti) of ignorance (avidyd), deeds (karma) and past impressions of knowledge (purva- prajnd-samskdra) produce the individual persons (jlvatvdpddikd). Undergoing its peculiar transformations with God as its support, it manifests itself as the two powers of knowledge and activity (vijndna-kriyd-sakti-dvaydsraya) and functions as the doer of all actions and the enjoyer of all experiences (kartrtva-bhoktrtvaikd- dhdrah). In association with the pure unchangeable light of Brah man it is the complex of these transformations which appears as the immediate ego (ahamkdra). It is through the association with this ego that the pure self is falsely regarded as the enjoyer of experiences. This transformation is called antahkarana, manas, buddhi and the ego or the ego-feeler (aham-pratyayin) on the side of its cognitive activity, while on the vibratory side of its activity (spanda-saktya), it is called prdna or biomotor functions. The asso ciation of the ego with the pure dtman, like the association of the redness of zjapd flower with a crystal, is a complex (granthi) which manifests the dual characteristics of activity of the avidyd stuff and the consciousness of the pure self (sambhinnobhaya-rupatvdt). On the question as to whether avidyd has for both support (dsraya) and object (visaya) Brahman Padmapada s own attitude does not seem to be very clear. He only says that avidyd mani fests itself in the individual person (jlva) by obstructing the real nature of the Brahman as pure self-luminosity and that the xi] Padmapdda 105 Brahman by its limitation (avaccheda) through beginningless avidyd is the cause of the appearance of infinite individual persons. But Prakasatman introduces a long discussion, trying to prove that Brahman is both the support and the object of avidyd as against the view of Vacaspati Misra that avidyd has the Brahman as its object and the jiva as its support (asraya). This is thus one of the fundamental points of difference between the Vivarana line of interpretation and the interpretation of the Vacaspati line. In this Prakasatman agrees with the view of Suresvara and his pupil Sarvajnatman, though, as will be noticed, Sarvajnatman draws some nice distinctions which are not noticed by Suresvara. Padmapada draws a distinction between two meanings of false hood (mithya), viz. falsehood as simple negation (apahnava-vacand) and falsehood as the unspeakable and indescribable (anirvacanl- yatd-vacand). It is probably he who of all the interpreters first described ajndna or avidyd as being of a material nature (jaddtmika) and of the nature of a power (jaddtmika avidyd-sakti), and inter preted Sankara s phrase " mithya-jnana-nimittah" as meaning that it is this material power of ajndna that is the constitutive or the material cause of the world-appearance. Prakasatman, however, elaborates the conception further in his attempts to give proofs in support of the view that avidyd is something positive (bhdva-rupa). These proofs have been repeatedly given by many other later writers, and have already been dealt with in the first volume of the present work. Padmapada is also probably the first to attempt an explanation of the process of Vedantic perception which was later on elaborated by Prakasatman and later writers, and his views were all collected and systematized in the exposition of the Veddnta- paribhdsd of Dharmaraja Adhvarmdra in the sixteenth century. Describing this process, Padmapada says that, as a result of the cognitive activity of the ego, the objects with which that is con cerned become connected with it, and, as a result of that, certain changes are produced in it, and it is these changes that constitute the subject-object relation of knowledge (jndturjneya-sambandhah). Theantahkarana, or psychical frame of mind, can lead to the limited expression of the pure consciousness only so far as it is associated with its object. The perceptual experience of immediacy (aparoksa) of objects means nothing more than the expression of the pure consciousness through the changing states of the antahkarana. The ego thus becomes a perceiver (pramdtf) through its connection 106 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. with the underlying consciousness. Prakasatman, however, elab orates it by supposing that the antahkarana goes out to the objective spatial positions, and assumes the spatial form of the objects perceived. Hence what Padmapada conceived merely as the change of the antahkarana states through the varying relation of the antahkarana with its objects, is interpreted in the definite meaning of this relation as being nothing more than spatial super position of the antahkarana on its objects. In inference, however, there is no immediate knowledge, as this is mediated through relations with the reason (lingo) . Knowledge however would mean both mediate and immediate knowledge ; for it is defined as being the manifestation of the object (artha-prakasa). On the subject of the causality of Brahman Padmapada says that that on which the world-appearance is manifested, the Brahman, is the cause of the world. On this point Prakasatman offers three alternative views, viz. (i) that, like two twisted threads in a rope, maya and Brahman are together the joint cause of the world, (2) that that which has maya as its power is the cause, and (3) that the Brahman which has maya supported on it is the cause of the world, but in all these the ultimate causality rests with Brahman, since maya is dependent thereon. Brahman is sarva-jna (omniscient) in the sense that it manifests all that is associated with it, and it is the Brahman that through its maya appears as the world of experience. The doctrines of avaccheda-vada and pratibimba- vada explained in the first volume of the present work are also at least as old as Padmapada s Panca-padika, and both Padmapada and Prakasatman seem to support the reflection theory (prati- bimba-vada), the theory that the jiva is but a reflected image of Brahman 1 . Vacaspati Misra (A.D. 840). Vacaspati Misra, the celebrated author of a commentary called Bhamation Sankara s commentary, is the author of a Tattva-samiksa, a commentary on Mandana s Brahma-siddhi\ he also commented on the Samkhya-karika, Vidhi-viveka, Nyaya-varttika, and he was 1 See volume I, pp. 475, 476. These two doctrines were probably present in germinal forms as early as the ninth century. But gradually more and more attention seems to have been paid to them. Appaya Diksita gives a fairly good summary of these two doctrines in the Parimala, pp. 335~343> " Vani Vilasa Press, Srirangam, without committing either himself or Vacaspati to any one of these views. xi] Vdcaspati Misra 107 the author of a number of other works. In his Nydya-suclni- bandhahe gives his date as 898 (vasv-anka-vasu-vatsare), which in all probability has to be understood as of the Vikrama-samvat, and con sequently he can safely be placed in A.D. 842. In his commentary called Bhdmati he offers salutation to Martanda-tilaka-svamin, which has been understood to refer to his teacher. But Amala- nanda in commenting thereon rightly points out that this word is a compound of the two names Martanda and Tilakasvamin, belong ing to gods adored with a view to the fruition of one s actions. Tilakasvamin is referred to in Yajnavalkya, i. 294 as a god, and the Mitaksara explains it as being the name of the god Karttikeya or Skanda. Udayana, however, in his Nydya-vdrttika-tdtparya-pari- suddhi (p. 9), a commentary on Vacaspati s Tdtparya-tlkd, refers to one Trilocana as being the teacher of Vacaspati, and Vardhamana in his commentary on it, called Nyaya-nibandha-prakasa, con firms this : Vacaspati himself also refers to Trilocanaguru, whom he followed in interpreting the word vyavasdya (Nydya-sutra, I. i. 4) as determinate knowledge (savikalpa) 1 . It is however interesting to note that in the Nydya-kanikd (verse 3) he refers to the author of the Nydya-mafijari (in all probability Jayanta) as his teacher (vidyd- taru) 2 . Vacaspati says at the end of his Bhdmati commentary that he wrote that work when the great king Nrga was reigning. This king, so far as the present writer is aware, has not yet been histori cally traced. Bhdmati was Vacaspati s last great work; for in the colophon at the end of the Bhdmati he says that he had already written his Nydya-kanikd, Tattva-samlksd, Tattva-bindu and other works on Nyaya, Samkhya and Yoga. Vacaspati s Vedantic works are Bhdmati and Tattva-samlksd (on Brahma- siddhi). The last work has not yet been published. Aufrecht, referring to his work, Tattva-bindu, says that it is a Vedanta work. This is however a mistake, as the work deals with the sphota doctrines of sound, and has nothing to do with Vedanta. In the absence of Vacaspati s Tattva-samlksd, which has not been published, and manuscripts of which have become extremely scarce, it is difficult to give an entirely satisfactory account of the special features of Vacaspati s view of Vedanta. But his Bhdmati 1 trilocana-gurunnlta-mdrgdnugamanonmukhaih yathdmdnam yathd-vastu vydkhydtam idam tdrsam. Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-tlkd, p. 87. Benares, 1898. ajndna-timira-samanlm nydya-manjarlm rucirdm prasavitre prabhavitre vidyd-tarave namo gurave. Nydya-kanikd, introductory verse. io8 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. commentary is a great work, and it is possible to collect from it some of the main features of his views. As to the method of Vacaspati s commentary, he always tries to explain the text as faithfully as he can, keeping himself in the background and direct ing his great knowledge of the subject to the elucidation of the problems which directly arise from the texts and to explaining the allusions and contexts of thoughts, objections and ideas of other schools of thought referred to in the text. The Bhdmatl commentary on Sankara s Bhasya is a very important one, and it had a number of important sub-commentaries. The most important and earliest of these is the Vedanta-kalpa-taru of Amalananda (A.D. 1247-1260), on which Appaya Diksita (about A.D. 1600) wrote another commentary called Vedanta-kalpa taru-parimala 1 . The Vedanta-kalpa-taru was also commented on by Laksmmrsimha, author of the Tarka-dipika, son of Konda- bhatta and grandson of Rangojl Bhatta, towards the end of the seventeenth century, and this commentary is called Abhoga. The Abhoga commentary is largely inspired by the Vedanta- kalpa-taru-parimala, though in many cases it differs from and criticizes it. In addition to these there are also other commentaries on the Bhamatl, such as the Bhdmatl- tilaka, the Bhdmati-vildsa, the Bhdmati-vydkhya by Sriranganatha and another commentary on the Vedanta-kalpa-taru, by Vaidyanatha Payagunda, called the Veddnta-kalpa-taru-rnanjari. Vacaspati defines truth and reality as immediate self-revelation (sva-prakasata) which is never contradicted (abddhitd). Only the pure self can be said to be in this sense ultimately real. He thus definitely rejects the definition of reality as the participation of the class-concept of being, as the Naiyayikas hold, or capacity of doing work (artha-kriyd-kdritva), as the Buddhists hold. He admits two kinds of ajndna, as psychological and as forming the material cause of the mind and the inner psychical nature of man or as the material world outside. Thus he says in his commentary on the Sankara- 1 Amalananda also wrote another work, called Sdstra-darpana, in which, taking the different topics (adhikaranas) of the Brahma-sutras , he tried to give a plain and simple general explanation of the whole topic without entering into much discussion on the interpretations of the different sutras on the topic. These general lectures on the adhikaranas of the Brahma-sutras did not, however, reveal any originality of views on the part of Amalananda, but were based on Vacas pati s interpretation, and were but reflections of his views, as Amalananda himself admits in the second verse of the Sdstra-darpana ( Vdcaspati-mati-vimbi- tam ddarsam prarabhe vimalam) Sri Vani Vilasa Press, 1913 , Srirangam, Madras. xi] Vdcaspati Misra 109 bhdsya, i. in. 30, that at the time of the great dissolution (maha- pralayd) all products of avidyd, such as the psychical frame (antahkarand), cease to have any functions of their own, but are not on account of that destroyed ; they are at that time merged in the indescribable avidyd, their root cause, and abide there as potential capacities (suksmena sakti-rupena) together with the wrong impressions and psychological tendencies of illusion. When the state of mahd-pralaya is at an end, moved by the will of God, they come out like the limbs of a tortoise or like the rejuvenation during rains of the bodies of frogs which have remained inert and lifeless all the year round, and then, being associated with their proper tendencies and impressions, they assume their particular names and forms as of old before the mahd-pralaya. Though all creation takes place through God s will, yet God s will is also determined by the conditions of karma and the impressions pro duced by it. This statement proves that he believed in avidyd as an objective entity of an indescribable nature (anirvdcyd avidyd), into which all world-products disappear during the mahd-pralaya and out of which they reappear in the end and become associated with psychological ignorance and wrong im pressions which had also disappeared into it at the time of the mahd-pralaya. Avidyd thus described resembles very much the prakrti of Yoga, into which all the world-products disappear during a mahd-pralaya together with the fivefold avidyd and their impressions, which at the time of creation become associated with their own proper buddhis. In the very adoration hymn of the Bhdmati Vacaspati speaks of avidyd being twofold (avidyd- dvitaya), and says that all appearances originate from Brahman in association with or with the accessory cause (sahakdri-kdrana) of the two avidyds (avidyd-dvitaya-sacivasyd). In explaining this passage Amalananda points out that this refers to two avidyds, one as a beginningless positive entity and the other as the preceding series of beginningless false impressions (anyd purvdpurva-bhrama- samskdrah). There is thus one aspect of avidyd which forms the material stuff of the appearances ; but the appearances could not have been appearances if they were not illusorily identified with the immediate and pure self -revelation (sva-prakdsd cit). Each individual person (jlva) confuses and misapprehends his psychical frame and mental experiences as intelligent in themselves, and it is by such an illusory confusion that these psychical states no The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. attain any meaning as appearances ; for otherwise these appearances could not have been expressed at all. But how does the person come in, since the concept of a person itself presupposes the very confusion which it is supposed to make? To this Vacaspati s reply is that the appearance of the personality is due to a previous false confusion, and that to another previous false confusion (cf. Man- dana). So each false confusion has for its cause a previous false confusion, and that another false confusion and so on in a beginning- less series . It is only through such a beginningless series of confusions that all the later states of confusion are to be explained. Thus on the one hand the avidya operates in the individual person, the jiva, as its locus or support (dsraya), and on the other hand it has the Brahman or pure self-revealing intelligence as its object (visaya), which it obscures and through which it makes its false appearances to be expressed, thereby giving them a false semblance of reality, whereby all the world-appearances seem to be manifes tations of reality 1 . It is easy to see how this view differs from the view of the Samksepa-sariraka of Sarvajnatma Muni; for in the opinion of the latter, the Brahman is both the support (asrayd) and the object (visayd) of ajiiana, which means that the illusion does not belong to the individual person, but is of a transcendental character. It is not the individual person as such (jlva), but the pure intelli gence that shines through each individual person (pratyak-cit), that is both obscured and diversified into a manifold of appearances in a transcendental manner. In Vacaspati s view, however, the illusion is a psychological one for which the individual person is responsible, and it is caused through a beginningless chain of illusions or confusions, where each succeeding illusory experience is explained by a previous illusory mode of experience, and that by another and so on. The content of the illusory experiences is also derived from the indescribable avidya, which is made to appear as real by their association with Brahman, the ultimately real and self-revealing Being. The illusory appearances, as they are, cannot be described as being existent or non-existent ; for, though they seem to have their individual existences, they are always negated by other existences, and none of them have that kind of reality which can be said to defy all negation and contradiction; and it is only such uncontradicted self-revelation that can be said to be 1 It is in the latter view that Vacaspati differs from Mandana, on whose Brahma-siddhi he wrote his Tattva-samiksa. xi] Sarvajnatma Muni in ultimately real. The unreality of world-appearances consists in the fact that they are negated and contradicted ; and yet they are not absolutely non-existent like a hare s horn, since, had they been so, they could not have been experienced at all. So in spite of the fact that the appearances are made out of avidya, they have so far as any modified existence can be ascribed to them, the Brahman as their underlying ground, and it is for this reason that Brahman is to be regarded as the ultimate cause of the world. As soon as this Brahman is realized, the appearances vanish; for the root of all appearances is their illusory confusion with reality, the Brahman. In the Bhamatl commentary on Sankara s commentary, n. ii. 28, Vacaspati points out that according to the Sankara Vedanta the objects of knowledge are themselves indescribable in their nature (anirvacaniyam nlladi) and not mere mental ideas (na hi brahma- vddino nilddy-dkdrdm vittim abhyupagacchanti kintu anirvacaniyam nlladi). The external objects therefore are already existent outside of the perceiver, only their nature and stuff are inde scribable and irrational (anirvacyd). Our perceptions therefore refer always to such objects as their excitants or producers, and they are not of the nature of pure sensations or ideas generated from within, without the aid of such external objects. Sarvajnatma Muni (A. 0.900). Sarvajnatma Muni was a disciple of Suresvaracarya, the direct disciple of Sankara, to whom at the beginning of his work Samk- sepa-sariraka he offers salutation by the name Devesvara, the word being a synonym of the word sura in Suresvara. The identification of Devesvara with Suresvara is made by Rama Tirtha, the commentator on the Samksepa-sariraka, and this identification does not come into conflict with anything else that is known about Sarvajnatma Muni either from the text of his work or from other references to him in general. It is said that his other name was Nityabodhacarya. The exact date of neither Suresvara nor Sarvajnatma can be definitely determined. Mr Pandit in his introduction to the Gauda- vaho expresses the view that, since Bhavabhuti was a pupil of Kumarila, Kumarila must have lived in the middle of the seventh century, and, since Sankara was a contemporary of Kumarila (on the testimony of the Sankara-dig-vijaya), he must have lived either in the seventh century or in the first half of the eighth century. In the ii2 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. first volume of the present work Sankara was placed between A.D. 780-820. The arguments of Mr Pandit do not raise any new point for consideration. His theory that Bhavabhuti was a pupil of Kuma- rila is based on the evidence of two manuscripts, where, at the end of an act of the Malati-Madhava, it is said that the work was written by a pupil of Kumarila. This evidence, as I have noticed elsewhere, is very slender. The tradition that Sankara was a contemporary of Kumarila, based as it is only on the testimony of the Sankara-dig- vijaya, cannot be seriously believed. All that can be said is that Kumarila probably lived not long before Sankara, if one can infer this from the fact that Sankara does not make any reference to Kumarila. Hence there seems to be no reason why the traditionally accepted view that Sankara was born in Samvat 844, or A.D. 788, or Kali age 3889, should be given up 1 . Taking the approximate date of Sankara s death to be about A.D. 820 and taking into con sideration that Suresvara, the teacher of Sarvajnatman, occupied his high pontifical position for a long time, the supposition that Sarvajnatman lived in A.D. 900 may not be very far wrong. More over, this does not come into conflict with the fact that Vacaspati, who probably wrote his earlier work the Nyaya-sucl-nibandha in A. 0.842, also wrote his commentary on Mandana s Brahma-siddhi when Suresvara was occupying the pontifical position. Sarvajnatma Muni was thus probably a younger contemporary of Vacaspati Misra. In his Samksepa-sarlraka he tries to describe the fundamental problems of the Vedanta philosophy, as explained by Sankara. This work, which is probably the only work of his that is known to us, is divided into four chapters, written in verses of different metres. It contains, in the first chapter 563 verses, in the second 248, in the third 365 and in the fourth 63. In the first chapter of the work he maintains that pure Brahman is the ultimate cause of everything through the instrumentality (dvdra) of ajndna. The ajndna, which rests on (asrayd) the pure self and operates on it as its object (visaya), covers its real nature (dcchddya) and creates delusory appearances (viksipati), thereby producing the threefold appearances of God (Isvara), soul (jlva) and the world. This ajndna has no independent existence, and its effects are seen only through the pure self (cid-dtmari) as its ground and object, and its creations are all false. The pure self is directly perceived in the state of dreamless sleep as being of the nature 1 See Arya-vidyd-sudhd-kara, pp. 226, 227. xi] Sarvojndtma Muni 113 of pure bliss and happiness without the slightest touch of sorrow ; and pure bliss can only be defined as that which is the ultimate end and not under any circumstances a means to anything else; such is also the pure self, which cannot be regarded as being a means to anything else ; moreover, there is the fact that everyone always desires his self as the ultimate object of attainment which he loves above anything else. Such an infinite love and such an ultimate end cannot be this limited self, which is referred to as the agent of our ordinary actions and the sufferer in the daily concerns of life. The intuitive perception of the seers of the Upanisads also confirms the truth of the self as pure bliss and the infinite. The illusory impositions on the other hand are limited appearances of the subject and the object which merely contribute to the possibility of false attribution and cannot therefore be real (na vastavam tat). When the Brahman is associated with ajnana there are two false entities, viz. the ajnana and the Brahman as asso ciated with the ajnana\ but this does not imply that the pure Brahman, which underlies all these false associations, is itself also false, since this might lead to the criticism that, everything being false, there is no reality at all, as some of the Buddhists contend. A distinction is drawn here between adhara and adhisthdna. The pure Brahman that underlies all appearances is the true adhi- sthana (ground), while the Brahman as modified by the false ajnana is a false adhara or a false object to which the false appearances directly refer. All illusory appearances are similarly experienced. Thus in the experience "I pe-rceive this piece of silver" (in the case of the false appearance of a piece of conch-shell as silver) the silvery character or the false appearance of the silver is associated with the "this" element before the perceiver, and the "this" element in its turn, as the false object, becomes associated with the false silver as the "this silver." But, though the objectivity of the false silver as the "this" before the perceiver is false, the "this" of the true object of the conch-shell is not false. It is the above kind of double imposition of the false appearance on the object and of the false object on the false appearance that is known as parasparadhyasa. It is only the false object that appears ia the illusory appearance and the real object lies untouched. The inner psychical frame (antahkarana) to a certain extent on account of its translucent character resembles pure Brahman, and on account of this similarity it is often mistaken for the pure self and the pure ii4 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. self is mistaken for the antahkarana. It may be contended that there could be no antahkarana without the illusory imposition, and so it could not itself explain the nature of illusion. The reply given to such an objection is that the illusory imposition and its conse quences are beginningless and there is no point of time to which one could assign its beginning. Hence, though the present illusion may be said to have taken its start with the antahkarana, the antahkarana is itself the product of a previous imposition, and that of a previous antahkarana, and so on without a beginning. Just as in the illusion of the silver in the conch-shell, though there is the piece of conch-shell actually existing, yet it is not separately seen, and all that is seen to exist is the unreal silver, so the real Brahman exists as the ground, though the world during the time of its ap pearance is felt to be the only existing thing and the Brahman is not felt to be existent separately from it. Yet this ajnana has no real existence and exists only for the ignorant. It can only be removed when the true knowledge of Brahman dawns, and it is only through the testimony of the Upanisads that this knowledge can dawn ; for there is no other means of insight into the nature of Brahman. Truth again is defined not as that which is amenable to proof, but as that which can be independently and directly felt. The ajnana, again, is defined as being positive in its nature (bhava- rupam) and, though it rests on the pure Brahman, yet, like butter in contact with fire, it also at its touch under certain circumstances melts away. The positive character of ajnana is felt in the world in its materiality and in ourselves as our ignorance. The real ground cause, however, according to the testimony of the Upanisads, is the pure Brahman, and the ajnana is only the instrument or the means by which it can become the cause of all appearances ; but, ajnana not being itself in any way the material cause of the world, Sarvajnatman strongly holds that Brahman in association and jointly with ajnana cannot be regarded as the material cause of the world. The ajnana is only a secondary means, without which the transformation of appearances is indeed not possible, but which has no share in the ultimate cause that underlies them. He definitely denies that Brahman could be proved by any inference to the effect that that which is the cause of the production, existence and dis solution of the world is Brahman, since the nature of Brahman can be understood only by the testimony of the scriptures. He indulges in long discussions in order to show how the Upanisads xi] Sarvajnatma Muni 115 can lead to a direct and immediate apprehension of reality as Brahman. The second chapter of the book is devoted mainly to the further elucidation of these doctrines. In that chapter Sarvajnatma Muni tries to show the difference of the Vedanta view from the Buddhist, which difference lies mainly in the fact that, in spite of the doctrine of illusion, the Vedanta admits the ultimate reality to be Brahman, which is not admitted by the Buddhists. He also shows how the experiences of waking life may be compared with those of dreams. He then tries to show that neither perception nor other means of proof can prove the reality of the world-appearance and criticizes the philosophic views of the Samkhya, Nyaya and other systems. He further clarifies his doctrine of the relation of Brahman to ajnana and points out that the association of ajnana is not with the one pure Brahman, nor with individual souls, but with the pure light of Brahman, which shines as the basis and ground of individual souls (pratyaktva) ; for it is only in connection with this that the ajnana appears and is perceived. When with the dawn of right knowledge pure Brahman as one is realized, the ajnana is not felt. It is only in the light of Brahman as underlying the individual souls that the ajnana is perceived, as when one says, " I do not know what you say " ; so it is neither the individual soul nor the pure one which is Brahman, but the pure light as it reveals itself through each and every individual soul 1 . The true light of Brahman is always there, and emancipation means nothing more than the destruction of the ajnana. In the third chapter Sarvajnatman describes the ways (sadhana) by which one should try to destroy this ajnana and prepare oneself for this result and for the final Brahma knowledge. In the last chapter he describes the nature of emancipation and the attainment of Brahmahood. The Samksepa-sariraka was commented upon by a number of distinguished writers, none of whom seem to be very old. Thus Nrsimhasrama wrote a commentary called Tattva-bodhini, Puru- sottama t)lksita wrote another called Subodhini, Raghavananda another called Vidyamrta-varsini, Visvadeva another called Sid- dhanta-dipa, on which Rama Tlrtha, pupil of Krsna Tirtha, 1 ndjndnam advayasamdsrayam istam evam nddvaita-vastu-visayam nisiteksandndm ndnanda-nitya-visaydsrayam istam etat pratyaktva-mdtra-visaydsrayatdnubhuteh. Samksepa-sdrlraka, II. 211. n6 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. based his commentary Anvayartha-prakasika. Madhusudana Sara- svati also wrote another commentary, called Samksepa-sarlraka- sara-samgraha. Anandabodha Yati. Anandabodha is a great name in the school of Sankara Vedanta. He lived probably in the eleventh or the twelfth century 1 . He refers to Vacaspati s Tattva-samiksa and criticizes, but without mentioning his name, Sarvajnatman s viev> of the interpretation of the nature of self as pure bliss. He wrote at least three works on Sankara Vedanta, viz. Nyaya-makaranda, Nyaya-dipdvali and Pramana-mald. Of these the Nyaya-makaranda was commented upon by Citsukha and his pupil Sukhaprakasa in works called Nyaya-makaranda-tika and Nyaya-makaranda-vivecanl. Sukha prakasa also wrote a commentary on the Ny ay a- dip avail, called Nyaya-dipavali-tatparya-tika. Anubhutisvarupa Acarya (late thir teenth century), the teacher of Anandajnana, also wrote commen taries on all the three works of Anandabodha. Anandabodha does not pretend to have made any original contribution and says that he collected his materials from other works which existed in his time 2 . He starts his Nyaya-makaranda with the thesis that the apparent difference of different selves is false, since not only do the Upanisads hold this doctrine, but it is also intelligible on grounds of reason that the apparent multiplicity of selves can be explained on an imaginary supposition of diversity (kalpanika- purusa-bheda) , even though in reality there is but one soul. Arguing on the fact that even the illusory supposition of an imaginary diversity may explain all appearances of diversity, Anandabodha tries to refute the argument of the Samkhya-karika that the diversity of souls is proved by the fact that with the birth and death of some there is not birth or death of others. Having refuted the plurality of subjects in his own way, he turns to the refutation of plurality of objects. He holds that difference (bheda) cannot be perceived by sense-perception, since difference cannot be perceived without perceiving both the object and all else from which it differs. It cannot be said that first the object is perceived and then the difference; for perception will naturally 1 Mr Tripathi in his introduction to Anandajnana s Tarka-samgraha gives Anandabodha s date as A.D. 1200. Ndnd-nibandha-kusuma-prabhavdvaddta- nydydpadesa-makaranda-kadamba esa. Nyaya-makaranda, p. 359. xi] Anandabodha Yati 117 cease with awareness of its object, and there is no way in which it can operate for the comprehension of difference ; neither can it be held that the comprehension of difference can in any way be regarded as simultaneous with the perception of the sensibles. Nor is it possible that, when two sensibles are perceived at two different points of time, there could be any way in which their difference could be perceived; for the two sensibles cannot be perceived at one and the same time. It cannot, again, be said that the perception of any sensible, say blue, involves with it the per ception of all that is not blue, the yellow, the white, the red, etc.; for in that case the perception of any sensible would involve the perception of all other objects of the world. The negation of the difference of an entity does not mean anything more than the actual position of it. It is not, however, right to hold that all positive entities are of the nature of differences ; for this is directly against all experience. If differences are perceived as positive entities, then to comprehend their differences further differences would be required, and there would thus be a vicious infinite. Moreover, differences, being negative in their nature, cannot be regarded as capable of being perceived as positive sensibles. Whether differ ence is taken as a subject or a predicate in the form "the difference of the jug from the pillar," or "the jug is different from the pillar," in either case there is comprehension of an earlier and more primitive difference between the two objects, on the basis of which the category of difference is realized. Anandabodha then discusses the different theories of error held by the Nyaya, Mlmamsa, Buddhism, etc. and supports the anirva- canlya theory of error 1 . In this connection he records his view as to why nescience (avidya) has to be admitted as the cause of world- appearance. He points out that the variety and multiplicity of world-appearance cannot be explained without the assumption of a cause which forms its substance. Since this world-appearance is unreal, it cannot come out of a substance that is real, nor can it come out of something absolutely non-existent and unreal, since such a thing evidently could not be the cause of anything; hence, since the cause of world-appearance cannot be either real or unreal, it must have for its cause something which is neither real nor unreal, and the neither-real-nor-unreal entity is avidya 2 . 1 See the first volume of the present work, ch. x, p. 485. 2 Nydya-makaranda, pp. 122, 123. n8 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. He next proceeds to prove the doctrine that the self is of the nature of pure consciousness (dtmanah samvid-rupatva). This he does, firstly, by stating the view that awareness in revealing itself reveals also immediately its objects, and secondly, by arguing that even though objects of awareness may be varying, there is still the unvarying consciousness which continues the same even when there is no object. If there were only the series of awarenesses arising and ceasing and if there were constant and persistent awarenesses abiding all the time, how could one note the difference between one awareness and another, between blue and yellow? Referring to avidya, he justifies the view of its being supported on Brahman, because avidya, being indefinable in its nature, i.e. being neither negative nor positive, there can be no objection to its being regarded as supported on Brahman. Moreover, Brahman can only be regarded as omniscient in its association with avidya, since all relations are of the nature of avidya and there cannot be any omni science without a knowledge of the relations. In his Nyaya-dipavali he tries by inference to prove the falsity of the world-appearance on the analogy of the falsity of the illusory silver. His method of treatment is more or less the same as the treatment in the Advaita- siddhi of Madhusudana Sarasvati at a much later period. There is practically nothing new in his Pramdna-mdld. It is a small work of about twenty-five pages, and one can recognize here the argu ments of the Nydya-makaranda in a somewhat different form and with a different emphasis. Most of Anandabodha s arguments were borrowed by the later writers of the Vedanta school. Vyasatirtha of the Madhva school of Vedanta collected most of the standard Vedanta arguments from Anandabodha and Prakasatman for re futation in his Nydydmrta, and these were again refuted by Madhusudana s great work, the Advaita-siddhi, and these refuted in their turn in Rama Tirtha s Nyayamrta-tarangini. The history of this controversy will be dealt with in the third volume of the present work. Maha-vidya and the Development of Logical Formalism. The Buddhists had taken to the use of the dialectic method of logical discussions even from the time of Nagarjuna. But this was by no means limited to the Buddhists. The Naiyayikas had also adopted these methods, as is well illustrated by the writings xi] Mahd-vidya and Development of Logical Formalism 119 of Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara, Vacaspati, Udayana and others. Sankara himself had utilized this method in the refutation of Buddhistic, Jaina, Vaisesika and other systems of Indian philo sophy. But, though these writers largely adopted the dialectic methods of Nagarjuna s arguments, there seems to be little attempt on their part to develop the purely formal side of Nagarjuna s logical arguments, viz. the attempt to formulate definitions with the strictest formal rigour and to offer criticisms with that over emphasis of formalism and scholasticism which attained their cul mination in the writings of later Nyaya writers such as Raghunatha Siromani, Jagadisa Bhattacarya, Mathuranatha Bhattacarya and Gadadhara Bhattacarya. It is generally believed that such methods of overstrained logical formalism were first started by Gangesa Upadhyaya of Mithila early in the thirteenth century. But the truth seems to be that this method of logical formalism was steadily growing among certain writers from as early as the tenth and eleventh centuries. One notable instance of it is the formu lation of the maha-vidya modes of syllogism by Kularka Pandita in the eleventh century. There is practically no reference to this maha-vidya syllogism earlier than Srlharsa (A.D. i iSy) 1 . References to this syllogism are found in the writings of Citsukha Acarya (A.D. 1220), Amalananda, called also Vyasasrama (A.D. 1247), Anandajnana (A.D. 1260), Venkata (A.D. 1369), Sesa Sarngadhara (A.D. 1450) and others 2 . The maha-vidya syllogisms were started probably some time in the eleventh century, and they continued to be referred to or refuted by writers till the fifteenth century, though it is curious to notice that they were not mentioned by Gangesa or any of his followers, such as Raghunatha, Jagadisa and others, in their discussions on the nature of kevalanvayi types of inference. 1 gandhe gandhantara-prasanjika na ca yuktir asti ; tadastitve va kd no hdnih ; tasyd apy asmdbhih khandanlyatvdt. ^riharsa s Khandana-khanda-khddya, p. 1 1 8 1 , Chowkhamba edition. 2 athavd ayam ghatah etadghatdnyatve sati vedyatvdnadhikarandnya-paddr- hatvdt patavad ity-ddimahdvidyd-prayogair apt vedyatva-siddhir apy uhanlyd. Citsukha Acarya s Tattva-pradlpikd t p. 13, also p. 304. The commentator Pratyag- rupa-bhagavan mentions Kularka Pandita by name, evam sarvd mahavidyds tac- chdyd vdnye prayogdh khandanlyd hi. Amalananda s Veddnta-kalpa-taru, p. 304 (Benares, 1895). sarvdsv eva mahdvidydsu, etc. Anandaj Sana s Tarka-samgraha, p. 22. Also Vehkata s Nydya-parisuddhi, pp. 125, 126, 273-276, etc., and Tattva-muktd-kaldpa with Sarvdrtha-siddhi, pp. 478, 485, 486-491. Mr M. R. Telang has collected all the above references to mahd-vidyd in his introduction to the Mahd-vidyd-vidambana, Gaekwad s Oriental Series, Baroda, 1920. The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. In all probability mahd-vidyd syllogisms were first started by Kularka Pandita in his Dasa-sloki-mahd-vidyd-sutra containing sixteen different types of definitions for sixteen different types of mahd-vidyd syllogisms. Assuming that Kularka Pandita, the founder of mahd-vidyd syllogisms, flourished in the eleventh century, it may well be suggested that many other writers had written on this subject before Vadindra refuted them in the first quarter of the thirteenth century. Not only does Vadindra refer to the arguments of previous writers in support of mahd-vidyd and in refutation of it in his Mahd-vidyd-vidambana, but Bhuvana- sundara Suri also in his commentary on the Mahd-vidyd-vidambana refers to other critics of mahd-vidyd. Recently two different com mentaries have been discovered on mahd-vidyd^ by Purusottama- vana and Purnaprajna. Venkata in his Nydya-parisuddhi refers to the Mahd-vidyd, the Mdna-manohara and the Pramdna-manjarl, and Srinivasa in his commentary Nydya-sdra on the Nydya-pari suddhi describes them as works which deal with roundabout syllogisms (vakrdnumdna) 1 . This shows that for four or five centuries mahd-vidyd syllogisms were in certain quarters supported and refuted from the eleventh century to the sixteenth century. It is well known that the great Mimamsa writers, such as Kumarila Bhatta and his followers, believed in the doctrine of the eternity of sounds, while the followers of the Nyaya and Vaisesika, called also Yaugacaryas, regarded sound as non-eternal (anityd). Mahd-vidyd modes were special modes of syllogism, invented prob ably by Kularka Pandita for refuting the Mimamsa arguments of the eternity of sounds and proving the non-eternity of sounds. If these modes of syllogism could be regarded as valid, they would also have other kinds of application for the proving or disproving of other theories and doctrines. The special feature of the mahd- vidyd syllogisms consisted in their attempt to prove a thesis by the kevaldnvayi method. Ordinarily concomitance (vydpti) con sists in the existence of the reason (hetu) in association with the probandum and its non-existence in all places where the pro- bandum is absent (sddhydbhdvavad-avrttitvam). But the kevaldn vayi form of inference which is admitted by the Naiyayikas applies to those cases where the probandum is so universal that there is no case where it is absent, and consequently it cannot have a reason (hetu) whose concomitance with it can be determined by 1 See M. R. Telang s introduction to the Mahd-vidyd-vidambana. xi] Mahd-vidyd and Development of Logical Formalism 1 2 1 its non-existence in all cases where the probandum is absent and its existence in all cases where the probandum is present. Thus in the proposition, "This is describable or nameable (idam abhi- dheyani) because it is knowable (prameyatvat)" both the pro bandum and the reason are so universal that there is no case where their concomitance can be tested by negative instances. Maha-vidya syllogisms were forms of kevalanvayi inference of this type, and there were sixteen different varieties of it which had this advantage associated with them, that, they being kevalanvayi forms of syllogism, it was not easy to criticize them by pointing out defects or lapses of concomitance of the reason and the probandum, as no negative instances are available in their case. In order to make it possible that a kevalanvayi form of syllogism should be applicable for affirming the non-eternity of sound, Kularka tried to formulate propositions in sixteen different ways so that on kevalanvayi lines such an affirmation might be made about a subject that by virtue of it the non-eternity of sound should follow necessarily as the only consequence, other possible alternatives being ruled out. It is this indirect approach of inference that has been by the critics of maha-vidya styled roundabout syllogism. Thus maha-vidya has been defined as that method of syllogism by which a specific probandum which it is desired to prove by the joint method of agreement and difference (3 , anvaya-vyatireki-sddhya- visesam vddy-abhimatam sadhayati) is proved by the necessary impli cation of the existence of a particular probandum in a particular subject (z^paksevydpaka-pratltya-paryavasdna-baldt), affirmed by the existence of hetu in the subject on kevalanvayi lines (i , kevaldn- vayini vydpake pravartamdno hetnh) . In other words, a reason which exists in a probandum inseparably abiding in a subject (paksa) without failure (proposition i) proves (sddhayati), by virtue of the fact, that such an unfailing existence of that probandum in that subject in that way is only possible under one supposition (pro position 2), namely, the affirmation of another probandum in another subject (e.g. the affirmation of the probandum "non- eternity "to the subject "sound"), which is generally sought to be proved by the direct method of agreement and difference (pro position 3). This may be understood by following a typical mahd- vidyd syllogism. Thus it is said that by reason of knowability (meyatva) as such the self, dissociated from the relations of all eternal and non -eternal qualities of all other objects excepting i22 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. sound, is related to a non-eternal entity (dtmd sabdetardnitya-nitya- yavrttitvdnadhikarandnitya-vrtti-dharmavdn meyatvdd ghatavat) . Now by the qualifying adjunct of self " the self is dissociated from all qualities that it shares with all other eternal and non-eternal objects excepting sound, and the consequence is that it is left only with some kind of non-eternal quality in relation with sound, as this was left out of consideration in the qualifying adjunct, which did not take sound within its purview. Since many relations are also on the Nyaya view treated as qualities, such a non-eternal relation of the self to sound may be their mutual difference or their mutual negation (anyonydbhdva) . Now, if the self, which is incontestably admitted to be eternal, has such a non-eternal quality or relation to sound, then this can only be under one supposition, viz. that sound is non-eternal. But, since all other non-eternal relations that the self may have to other non-eternal objects, and all other eternal relations that it may have to other eternal objects, and all other such relations that it may have to all eternal and non-eternal objects jointly, except sound, have already been taken out of consideration by the qualifying phrase, the in separable and unfailing non-eternal quality that the self may have, in the absence of any negative instances, is in relation to sound; but, if it has a non-eternal quality in relation to sound, then this can be so only under one supposition, viz. that sound is itself non-eternal; for the self is incontestably known as eternal. This indirect and roundabout method of syllogism is known as maha- vidyd. It is needless to multiply examples to illustrate all the sixteen types of propositions of maha-vidya syllogism, as they are all formed on the same principle with slight variations. Vadindra in his Mahd-vidyd-vidambana refuted these types of syllogism as false, and it is not known that any one else tried to revive them by refuting Vadlndra s criticisms. Vadindra styles himself in the colophon at the end of the first chapter of his Mahd-vidyd-vidambana " Hara-kinkara-ny ay deary a-parama- pandita-bhatta-vddindra," and in the concluding verse of his work refers to Yoglsvara as his preceptor. The above epithets of Hara- kinkara, ny ay deary a, etc. do not show however what his real name was. Mr Telang points out in his introduction to the Mahd-vidyd- vidambana that his pupil Bhatta Raghava in his commentary on Bhasarvajna s Nydya-sdra y called Nydya-sdra-vicdra, refers to him by the name Mahadeva. Vadlndra s real name, then, was Mahadeva, xi] Maha-vidyd and Development of Logical Formalism 123 and the rest of the epithets were his titles. Bhatta Raghava says that the name of Vadlndra s father was Saranga. Bhatta Raghava gives his own date in the Saka era . The sentence however is liable to two dif ferent constructions, giving us two different dates, viz. A. D. 1252 and 1352. But, judging from the fact that Vadlndra was a religious coun sellor of King Srisimha (also called Siiighana) , who reigned in Deva- giri A.D. 1210-1247, and that in all probability he lived before Venkata (A.D. 1267-1369), who refers to his Maha-vidya-vidambana, Mr Telang suggests that we should take A.D. 1252 to be the date of Bhatta Raghava ; and, since he was a pupil of Vadlndra, one may deduct about 27 years from his date and fix Vadlndra s date as A.D. 1225. Mr Telang points out that such a date would agree with the view that he was a religious counsellor of King Srlsimha. Vadlndra refers to Udayana (A.D. 984) and Sivaditya Misra (A.D. 975-1025). Mr Telang also refers to two other works of Vadlndra, viz. Rasa-sara and Kandda-sutra-nibandha, and argues from allusions contained in Vadlndra s Maha-vidya-vidambana that he must have written other works in refutation of mahd-vidya. Vadlndra s Maha-vidya-vidambana consists of three chapters. In the first chapter he gives an exposition of the maha-vidya syllogisms ; the second and third chapters are devoted to the refutation of these syllo gisms. Vadlndra s Maha-vidya-vidambana has two commentaries, one called Maha-vidya-vidambana-vyakhyana, by Anandapurna (A.D. 1600), and the other, called Vyakhyana-dipika, by Bhuvana- sundara Suri (A.D. 1400). In addition to these Bhuvanasundara Suri also wrote a small work called the Laghu-maha-vidyd-vidam- bana and a commentary, Maha-vidya-vivarana-tippana, on a Maha-vidya-dasasloki-vivarana by an unknown author. The main points of Vadlndra s criticisms may briefly be stated as follows : He says that it is not possible that there should be a proper reason (hetu) which has no negative instances (kevaldnvayi- hetor eva nirvaktum asakyatvat). It is difficult to prove that any particular quality should exist everywhere and that there should not be any instance or case where it does not occur. In the third chapter he shows that not only is it not possible to have kevaldnvayi hetus, but that even in arguments on the basis of such kevaldnvayi hetu there would be great scope for fallacies of self-contradiction (sva-vydghdta) and fallacies of illicit distribution of the middle term (anaikdntikatva) and the like. He also shows how all these fallacies apply to all the mahd-vidyd syllogisms invented by Kularka Pandita. 124 The Sankara School oj Vedanta [CH. It is needless for our present purposes to enter into any elaborate logical discussion of Vadlndra; for the present digression on maha-vidyd syllogisms is introduced here only to show that scholastic logicisms were not first introduced by Sriharsa, but had already come into fashion a few centuries before him, though Sriharsa was undoubtedly the most prominent of those who sought to apply these scholastic methods in philosophy. It will thus be seen that the fashion of emphasizing the em ployment of logical formalism as a method in philosophy was inherited by the Naiyayikas and Vedantists alike from Buddhists like Nagarjuna, Aryadeva and others in the third and the fourth centuries and their later successors in the fifth, sixth and seventh centuries. But during the eighth, ninth and tenth centuries one notices a steady development on this side in the works of prominent Nyaya writers such as Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara, Vacaspati Misra and Udayana and Vedantic authors such as the great master Sankaracarya, Vacaspati Misra and Anandabodha Yati. But the school of abstract and dry formalism may be said to have properly begun with Kularka Pandita, or the authors of the Mdna-manohara and Pramdna-manjarl in the latter part of the eleventh century, and to have been carried on in the works of a number of other writers, until we come to Gaiigesa of the early thirteenth century, who enlivened it with the subtleties of his acute mind by the introduction of the new concepts of avacchedakata, which may be regarded as a new turning point after vydpti. This work was further carried on extremely elaborately by his later successors, the great writers of this new school of logic (navya-nydya), Raghunatha Siromani, Jagadisa Bhattacarya, Gadadhara Bhattacarya and others. On the Vedanta side this formalism was carried on by Sriharsa (A.D. 1 187), Citsukha of about A.D. 1220 (of whom Vadlndra was a contem porary), Anandaj nana or Anandagiri of about A.D. 1 260 and through a number of minor writers until we come to Nrsimhasrama and Madhusudana Sarasvati of the seventeenth century. It may be surmised that formal criticisms of Sriharsa were probably largely responsible for a new awakening in the Naiyayikas, who began to direct their entire attention to a perfecting of their definitions and discussions on strict lines of formal accuracy and preciseness to the utter neglect of the collection of new data, new experiences or the investigation of new problems or new lines of enquiry, which is so essential for the development of true philo- xi] Veddnta Dialectic of Snharsa 125 sophy. But, when once they started perfecting the purely logical appliances and began to employ them successfully in debates, it became essential for all Vedantists also to master the ways of this new formalism for the defence of their old views, with utter neglect of new creations in philosophy. Thus in the growth of the history of the dialectic of logical formalism in the Vedanta system of thought it is found that during the eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh centuries the element of formalism was at its lowest and the controversies of the Vedanta with the Buddhists, Mimamsists and Naiyayikas were based largely on the analysis of experience from the Vedantic standpoint and its general approach to philosophy. But in the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries the controversy was largely with the Nyaya and Vaisesika and dominated by considerations of logical formalism above every thing else. Criticisms became for the most part nothing more than criticisms of Nyaya and Vaisesika definitions. Parallel to this a new force was gradually growing during these centuries in the writings of Ramanuja and his followers, and in the succeeding centuries the followers of Madhva, the great Vaisnava writer, began to criticize the Vedantists (of the Sankara school) very strongly. It is found therefore that from the thirteenth or fourteenth century the Vedantic attack was largely directed against the followers of Ramanuja and Madhva. A history of this controversy will be given in the third and fourth volumes of the present work. But the method of logical formalism had attained such an importance by this time that, though the Vaisnavas brought in many new con siderations and points of view in philosophy, the method of logical formalism never lost its high place in dialectic discussions. Vedanta Dialectic of Snharsa (A.D. 1150). Srlharsa flourished probably during the middle of the twelfth century A.D. Udayana, the great Nyaya writer, lived towards the end of the tenth century, as is evident from the colophon of his Laksanavall 1 . Srlharsa often refutes the definitions of Udayana, and therefore must have flourished after him. Again, the great logician Garigesa of Mithila refers to Srlharsa and refutes his tarkdmbardnka(go6)pramitesv atltesu sakdntatah varsesudayanas cakre subodhdm laksandvallm. Laksanavall, p. 72, Surendralal Gosvamin s edition, Benares, 1900. 126 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. views, and, since Gahgesa lived in A.D. 1200, Srlharsa must have lived before that date. Accordingly Srlharsa was after Udayana and before Garigesa, i.e. between the tenth and twelfth centuries A.D. At the end of his book he refers to himself as honoured by the King of Kanauj (Kanyakubjesvard). It is probable that this king may be Jayacandra of Kanauj, who was dethroned about A.D. H95 1 . In his poetical work Naisadha-carita he mentions at the end of the several chapters many works of his, such as Arnava- varnana, Gaudorvisa-kula-prasasti, Nava-sahasanka-carita, Vijaya- prasasti, Siva-sakti-siddhi, Sthairya-vicarana, Chandah-prasasti, and also Isvarabhisandhi and Pancanallya kavya 2 . The fact that he wrote a work eulogizing the race of the kings of Gauda leads one to suspect that he may have been one of the five Brahmans invited by Adisura of Bengal from Kanauj in the early part of the eleventh century, in which case Srlharsa would have to be placed at that time, and cannot be associated with Jayacandra, who was dethroned in A.D. 1195. Sriharsa s most important philo sophical contribution was the Khandana-khanda-khadya (lit. "the sweets of refutation"), in which he attempts to refute all defini tions of the Nyaya system intended to justify the reality of the categories of experience and tries to show that the world and all world-experiences are purely phenomenal and have no reality behind them. The only reality is the self-luminous Brahman of pure consciousness 3 . His polemic is against the Nyaya, which holds that 1 Anandapurna in his commentary on the Khandana-khanda-hhddya, called Khandana-phakkika, explains Kanyakubjesvara as Kaslraja, i.e. King of Kasi or Benares. z None of these however are available. 3 Srlharsa at the end of this work speaks of having purposely made it ex tremely knotty here and there, so that no one could understand its difficulties easily except when explained by the teacher. Thus he says : grantha-granthir iha kvacit kvacid api nydsi prayatndn mayd prdjiiammanya-mand hathena pathitlmdsmin khalah khelatu, sraddhdrdddha-guruh slathikrta-drdha-granthih samdsddayat tv etat-tarkarasormmi-majjana sukhe$v dsanjanam sajjanah. Khandana-khanda-khddya, p. 1341. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1914. Several commentaries have been written on this celebrated work by various people, e.g. Kharidana-mandana by Paramananda, Khandana-mandana by Bhavanatha, Didhiti by Raghunatha Siromani, Prakdsa by Vardhamana, Vidyd- bharanl by Vidyabharana, Vidyd-sdgarl by Vidyasagara, Khandana-tlkd by Padmanabha Pandita, Ananda-vardhana by Sankara Misra, $rl-darpana by ^ubhaiikara, Khandana-mahd-tarka by Caritrasimha, Khandana-khandana by Pragalbha Misra, Sisya-hitaisinl by Padmanabha, Khandana-kuthdra by Goku- lanatha Upadhyaya. At least one refutation of it was attempted by the Naiya- yikas, as is evidenced by the work of a later Vacaspati (A.D. 1350) from Bengal, called Khandanoddhdra. xi] Veddnta Dialectic of Sriharsa 127 whatever is known has a well-defined real existence, and Srlharsa s main point is to prove that all that is known is indefinable and unreal, being only of a phenomenal nature and having only a relative existence based on practical modes of acceptance, customs and conventions. But, though his chief polemic is against the Nyaya, yet, since his criticisms are almost wholly of a destructive nature like those of Nagarjuna, they could be used, with modifications, no less effectively against any other system. Those who criticize with the object of establishing positive definitions would object only to certain definitions or views of other schools ; but both Sriharsa and the nihilists are interested in the refutation of all definitions as such, and therefore his dialectic would be valid against all views and definitions of other systems 1 . He starts with the proposition that none of our awarenesses ever stand in need of being further known or are capable of being the objects of any further act of knowledge. The difference of the Vedanta from the idealistic Buddhists consists in this, that the latter hold that everything is unreal and indefinable, not even excepting cognitions (vijnand) ; while the Vedanta makes an excep tion of cognitions and holds that all the world, excepting knowledge or awareness, is indefinable either as existent or non-existent (sad-asadbhyam vilaksanam) and is unreal 2 . This indefinableness is in the nature of all things in the world and all experiences (meya- svabhavanugaminyam anirvacaniyata), and no amount of in genuity or scholarship can succeed in defining the nature of that which has no definable nature or existence. Sriharsa undertakes to show that all definitions of things or categories put forward by the Nyaya writers are absolutely hollow and faulty even according to the canons of logical discussions and definitions accepted by the Naiyayika; and, if no definition can stand or be supported, it necessarily follows that there can be no definitions, or, in other words, that ho definitions of the phenomenal world are possible and that the world of phenomena and all our so-called experiences 1 Sriharsa himself admits the similarity of his criticisms to those of Nagarjuna and says: " tathd hi yadi darsanesu sunya-vdddnirvacanlya-paksayor dsrayanam tada tdvad amudm nir-bddhaiva sarva-pathlnatd" etc. Khandana-khanda- khddya, pp. 229-230, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1914. z By the idealistic Buddhists Srlhars? here means the idealism of the Lankdvatdra, from which he quotes the following verse : buddhyd vivicyamdndndm svabhdvo ndvadhdryate ato nirabhilapyds te nissvabhdvds ca desitdh. Lankdvatdra-sutra, p. 287, Otani University Press, 1923. 128 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. of it are indefinable. So the Vedantist can say that the unreality of the world is proved. It is useless for any one to attempt to find out what is true by resorting to arguments ; for the arguments can be proved to be false even by the canons on which they are based. If anyone, however, says that the arguments of Sriharsa are open to the same objection and are not true, then that would only establish his own contention. For Sriharsa does not believe in the reality of his arguments and enters into them without any assumption of their reality or unreality. It can be contended that it is not possible to argue without first admitting the reality of the arguments. But such reality cannot be established without first employing the pramanas or valid means of proof; and the employment of the pramanas would require further arguments, and these further employment of the pramanas and so on until we have vicious infinite regress. If, however, the very arguments employed in accordance with the canons of the opponents to destroy their definitions be regarded as false, this would mean that the opponents reject their own canons, so that the Vedantic argu ments in refuting their position would be effective. The Vedanta is here interested only in destroying the definitions and positions of the opponents; and so, unless the opponents are successful in defending their own positions against the attacks of the Vedanta, the Vedanta point of view is not refuted. So the manifold world of our experience is indefinable, and the one Brahman is absolutely and ultimately real. Regarding the proof that may be demanded of the ultimate oneness Sriharsa says that the very demand proves that the idea of ultimate oneness already exists, since, if the idea were not realized, no one could think of asking for a proof of it. Now, if it is admitted that the idea of absolute oneness is realized (pratlta), then the question arises whether such realization is right knowledge (prama) or error (aprama). If it is a right idea, then, whatever may have produced it, this right idea is to be regarded as valid proof. If such an idea is false, one cannot legitimately ask the Vedantist to adduce any proofs to demonstrate what is false. It may be urged that, though the Naiyayika considers it false, it is regarded by the Vedantist as true and hence the Vedantist may be called upon to prove that the way in which or the means of proof through which he came to have his idea was true. This, however, the Vedantist would readily deny ; for, even though the idea of the absolute oneness may xi] Vedanta Dialectic of Srlharsa 129 be right, yet the way in which one happened to come by this idea may be wrong. There may be a fire on a hill ; but yet, if one infers the existence of such afire from fog appearing as smoke, then such an inference is false, even though the idea of the fire may itself be right. Leaving aside the discussion of the propriety of such demands on the part of the opponents, the Vedantist says that the Upanisadic texts demonstrate the truth of the ultimate oneness of reality. The ultimate oneness of all things, taught in the Upanisad texts, cannot be said to be negatived by our perceptual experience of "many." For our perception deals with individual things of the moment and therefore cannot apply to all things of the past, present, and future and establish the fact of their all being different from one another. Perception applies to the experience of the immediate present and is therefore not competent to contradict the universal proposition of the oneness of all things, as taught by the Upanisads. Again, as Sriharsa says, in our perception of the things of experience we do not realize the differences of the perceptual objects from ourselves, but the differences among the objects themselves. The self- revelation of knowledge also fails to show its difference from all objects of the world. The difference, again, of the perceived objects from all other things is not revealed in the nature of the perceived objects themselves as svariipa-bheda, or difference as being of the nature of the objects which are differenced if that were the case, then the false and erroneous perception of silver would also at once manifest its difference from the object (the conch-shell) on which the false silver is imposed. In this way Srlharsa tried to prove that the purport of non-duality, as asserted in the Vedic texts, is not contradicted by any other, stronger, proof. Most of these arguments, being of a verbal nature, may better here be dropped. The main stress seems to rest on the idea that the immediate differences between the things perceived do not in the least suggest or imply that they, in their essence or in their totality, could not ultimately, as a result of our pro gressive and better knowledge of things, be considered as one identical reality (as is asserted in the Upanisads). If perception cannot prove anything, inferences by themselves cannot stand alone or contradict the non-duality taught in the Upanisads. In our world of phenomenal experience our minds are always im pressed with the concept of difference ; but Srlharsa says that the 13 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. mere existence of an idea does not prove its reality. Words can give rise to ideas relating even to absolutely non-existing things. Again, the concept of " difference " can hardly be defined. If it lies involved within the essential nature of all things that differ, then difference would be identical with the nature of the things that differ. If difference were different from the things that differ, then it would be necessary to find out some way of establishing a relation between "difference" and the things that differ, and this might require another connection, and that another, and so we should have a vicious endless series. He says that "difference" may be looked upon from a number of possible points of view. Firstly, "difference" is supposed to be of the nature of things. But a "difference" which is of the nature of the things which differ must involve them all in one; for there cannot be any difference without referring to the things from which there is difference. If by "book" we mean its difference from table, then the table has to enter into the nature of the book, and that would mean the identity of the table and the book. There is no meaning in speaking of "difference" as being the thing, when such differ ences can only be determined by a reference to other things. If "difference" be the nature of a thing, such a nature cannot be in need of being determined by other things. One thing, say a book, is realized as being different from a table the nature of the difference may here be described as being "the quality of being distinguished from a table"; but "the quality of being distin guished " would have no meaning or locus standi, unless " the table " w r ere also taken with it. If anyone says that a book is identical with "the quality of being distinguished from," then this will in variably include "the table" also within the essence of the book, as "the table" is a constituent of the complex quality "to be dis tinguished from," which necessarily means "to be distinguished from a table." So on this view also " the table " and all other things which could be distinguished from the book are involved in the very essence of all things a conclusion which contradicts the very concept of difference. It may also be pointed out that the concept of difference is entirely extraneous to the concept of things as they are understood or perceived. The notion of "difference" is itself different from the notion of the book and the table, whether jointly or separately. The joint notion of the book and the table is different xi] Veddnta Dialectic of Sriharsa 131 from the notion that " the book differs from the table." For under standing the nature of a book it is not necessary that one should understand previously its difference from a table. Moreover, even though the notion of difference may in some sense be said to lead to our apprehension of individual things, the apprehension of such individual things does not carry with it the idea that it is on account of such difference that the individual things are perceived. It is through similarity or resemblance between two things say be tween a wild cow (gavaya) and the domestic cow (go) that a man can recognize an animal as a wild cow ; but yet, when he so con siders an animal as a wild cow, he does not invariably because of such a resemblance to a cow think the animal to be a wild cow. The mental decision regarding an animal as a cow or a wild cow takes place immediately without any direct participation of the cause which produced it. So, even though the notion of differ ence may be admitted to be responsible for our apprehension of the different individual things, an apprehension of an individual thing does not involve as a constituent any notion of difference. It is therefore wrong to think that things are of the nature of difference. In another view, wherein difference is interpreted as "mental negation" or "otherness" (anyonyabhdva), this "otherness" (say of the book from the table) is explained as being the negation of the identity of one with the other. When one says that the book is other than the table, what is meant is that identity of the book with the table is denied. Sriharsa here raises the objection that, if the identity of the book with the table was absolutely chimerical, like the hare s horn, such a denial of identity would be absolutely meaning less. It cannot, again, be suggested that this mental negation, or negation as otherness, means the denial of one class-concept in respect of another (e.g. that of book on the table) ; for there is in these class-concepts no such special characteristic (dharmd) by virtue of which one could be denied of the other or they could be distinguished from each other, since the Naiyayika, against whom Srlharsa s arguments are directed, does not admit that class-con cepts possess any distinguishing qualities. In the absence of such distinguishing qualities they may be regarded as identical : but in that case the denial of one class-concept (say of the table) would involve the denial of the class-concept of the thing itself (e.g. the book), since the class-concepts of the book and the table, not having 9-2 132 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. any distinguishing qualities, are identical; and, further, through mental denial both the book and the table would be devoid of the class-concepts of book and table, and so there would be no way of distinguishing one thing from another, book from table. It is easy to see therefore that there is no way of making a special case re garding negation as otherness (anyonyabhavd). Again, if difference is regarded as the possession of opposite characters (vaidharmya), then also it may be asked whether the opposite characters have further opposite characters to distinguish them from one another, and these again others, and so there is a vicious infinite; if these are supposed to stop anywhere, then the final characters at that stage, not having any further opposite characters to distinguish them, would be identical, and hence all opposite characters in the backward series would be meaningless and all things would be identical. If on the contrary it is admitted at the very first stage that opposite or differing characters have no differing characters to distinguish them from one another, then the characters will be identical. Again, it may be asked whether these distinguishing characters are themselves different from the objects which possess them or not. If they are different, one may again ask concerning the opposing characters which lead to this difference and then again about other opposing characters of these, and so on. If these infinite differences were to hold good, they could not arrive in less than infinite time, whereas the object is finite and limited in time. If, again, they came all at once, there would be such a disorderly medley of these infinite differences that there would be no way of determining their respective substrates and their orderly successive dependence on one another. And, since in the series the earlier terms of difference can only be established by the establishment of the later terms of difference, the forward movement in search of the later terms of difference, in support of the earlier terms of difference, makes these earlier terms of difference un necessary 1 . It cannot, therefore, be said that our perception of differences has any such intrinsic validity that it can contradict the ultimate unity taught in the Upanisad texts. Sriharsa does not deny that we perceive seeming differences in all things, but he denies their 1 prathama-bheddsvlkdra-prayojanasya bheda-vyavahdrdder dvitlya-bheddd eva siddheh prathama-bhedo vyarthah sydd eva, dvitlya-bhedddi-prayojanasya trtlya-bhedddinaiva siddheh so pi vyarthah sydt. Vidyd-sdgart on Khandana- khanda-khddya, p. 206. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1914. xi] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 133 ultimate validity, since he considers them to be due to avidyd or nescience alone 1 . The chief method of Srlharsa s dialectic depends upon the assumption that the reality of the things that one defines depends upon the unimpeachable character of the definitions; but all definitions are faulty, as they involve the fallacy of argument in a circle (cakrakd), and hence there is no way in which the real nature of things can be demonstrated or defined. Our world of experience consists of knower, known and knowledge ; if a knower is defined as the possessor of knowledge, knowledge can only be understood by a reference to the knower; the known, again, can be understood only by a reference to knowledge and the knower, and so there is a circle of relativity which defies all attempts at giving an inde pendent definition of any of these things. It is mainly this rela tivity that in specific forms baffles all attempts at definition of all categories. Application of the Dialectic to the Different Categories and Concepts. Sriharsa first takes for his criticism the definitions of right cognition. Assuming the definition of right cognition to be the direct apprehension of the real nature of things, he first urges that such a definition is faulty, since, if one accidentally guesses rightly certain things hidden under a cover and not perceived, or makes a right inference from faulty data or by fallacious methods, though the awareness may be right, it cannot be called right cognition 2 . It is urged that cognition, in order to be valid, must be produced through unerring instruments; here, however, is a case of chance guesses which may sometimes be right without being produced by unerring instruments of senses. Nor can correspondence of the cognition with its object (yatharthanubhavah prama) be regarded as a proper definition of right cognition. Such correspondence can be defined as meaning either that which represents the reality of the object itself or similarity to the object. The real nature of 1 na vayam bhedasya sarvathaivdsattvam abhyupagacchdmah, kirn ndma no. pdramdrthikam sattvam; avidyd-vidyamdnatvam tu tadtyam isyata eva. Khan- dana-khanda-khddya, p. 214. 2 E.g. when a man rightly guesses the number of shells closed in another man s hand, or when one makes a false inference of fire on a hill from a fog looking like smoke from a distance and there is fire on the hill by chance his judgment may be right though his inference may be false. 134 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. an object is indeterminable, and so correspondence of awareness with the object may rather be defined as similarity of the former to the latter. If this similarity means that the awareness must have such a character as is possessed by the object (jnana- visayikrtena rupena sadrsyani), then this is clearly impossible; for qualities that belong to the object cannot belong to the awareness there may be an awareness of two white hard marbles, but the awareness is neither two, nor white, nor hard 1 . It may be urged that the correspondence consists in this, that the whiteness etc. belong to the object as qualities possessed by it, whereas they belong to awareness as being qualities which it reveals 2 . But that would not hold good in the case of illusory perception of silver in a conch-shell; the awareness of "before me" in the perception of "before me the silver" has to be admitted as being a right cognition. If this is admitted to be a right cognition, then it was meaningless to define right cognition as true correspondence ; it might as well have been defined as mere cognition, since all cognition would have some object to which it referred and so far as that only was concerned all cognitions would be valid. If, however, entire correspondence of thought and object be urged, then partial correspondence like the above can hardly be considered satisfactory. But, if entire correspondence is considered indispensable, then the correctness of the partial correspondence has to be ignored, whereas it is admitted by the Naiyayikathat, so far as reference to an object is concerned, all cognitions are valid; only the nature of cognition may be disputed as to right or wrong, when we are considering the correspondence of the nature of the object and the nature charac terized by the awareness of the object. If entire correspondence with the object is not assured, then cognition of an object with imperfect or partial correspondence, due to obstructive circum stances, has also to be rejected as false. Again, since the correspondence always refers to the character, form or appearance of the thing, all our affirmations regarding the objects to which the characters are supposed to belong would be false. Referring to Udayana s definition of right cognition as samyak paricchitti, or proper discernment, Sriharsa says that the word 1 dvau ghatau suklav ityatra rupa-samkhyddi-samavdyitvam na jndnasya gunatvdd atah prakdsamdna-rupena artha-sddrsyam jndnasya ndsti asti ca tasya jndnasya tatra ghatayoh pramdtvam. Vidyd-sdgarl on Khandana, p. 398. 2 arthasya hi yathd samavdydd rupam visesanlbhavati tathd visayabhdvdj jndnasydpi tad-visesanam bhavaty eva. Khandana, p. 399. xi] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 135 " samyak " (proper) is meaningless ; for, if samyak means " entire," then the definition is useless, since it is impossible to see all the visible and invisible constituent parts of a thing, and no one but an omniscient being could perceive a thing with all its characters, properties or qualities. If right discernment means the discern ment of an object with its special distinguishing features, this again is unintelligible; for even in wrong cognition, say of conch-shell as silver, the perceiver seems to perceive the distinguishing marks of silver in the conch-shell. The whole point lies in the difficulty of judging whether the distinguishing marks observed are real or not, and there is no way of determining this. If, again, the dis tinguishing features be described as being those characteristics without the perception of \vhich there can be no certain knowledge and the perception of which ensures right cognition, then it may well be pointed out that it is impossible to discover any feature of any cognition of which one can be positively certain that it is not wrong. A dreamer confuses all sorts of characters and appearances and conceives them all to be right. It may be urged that in the case of right perception the object is perceived with its special distinguishing features, as in the case of the true perception of silver, whereas in the case of the false perception of silver in the conch-shell no such distinguishing features are observed. But even in this case it would be difficult to define the essential nature of the distinguishing features ; for, if any kind of distinguishing feature would do, then in the case of the false perception of silver in the conch-shell the distinguishing feature of being before the eyes is also possessed by the conch-shell. If all the particular distinguishing features are insisted on, then there will be endless distinguishing features, and it would be impossible to make any definition which would include them all. The certitude of a cogni tion which contradicts a previous wrong cognition would often be liable to the same objection as the wrong cognition itself, since the nature of the special distinguishing features which would establish its validity cannot be established by any definition of right knowledge. Arguing against the definition of right cognition as "appre hension which is not incorrect or not defective" (avyabhicdri anubhavah), Srlharsa says that "not incorrect" or "not defective" cannot mean that the cognition must exist only at the time when the object exists; for then inferential cognition, which often refers 136 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. to past and future things, would be false. Neither can it mean that the cognition coexists in space with its objects ; nor can it mean that the right cognition is similar to its object in all respects, since cognition is so different in nature from the object that it is not possible that there should be any case in which it would be similar thereto in all respects. And, if the view that an awareness and its object are one and the same be accepted, then this would apply even to those cases where one object is wrongly perceived as another; and hence the word " avyabhicarl" is not sufficient to distinguish right knowledge from wrong cognition. Arguing against the Buddhist definition of right cognition as "an apprehension which is not incompatible (avisamvadi) with the object known," Sriharsa tries to refute the definition in all the possible senses of incompatibility of cognition with object which determines wrong knowledge. If the definition is supposed to restrict right cognition to cognition which is cognized by another cognition as being in agreement with its object, then a wrong cognition, repeated successively through a number of moments and found to be in agreement with its object through all the successive moments until it is contradicted, would also have to be admitted as right, because in this case the previous cognition is certified by the cognition of the succeeding moments. If, again, right cognition is defined as a cognition the incompatibility of which with its object is not realized by any other cognition, then also there are difficulties in the way. For even a wrong cognition may for some time be not contradicted by any other cognition. Moreover, the vision of the conch-shell by the normal eye as white may be contradicted by the later vision by the jaundiced eye as yellow. If it is urged that the contradiction must be by a faultless later cognition, then it may be pointed out that, if there had been any way of defining faultless cognition, the definition of right cognition would have been very easy. On the other hand, unless right cognition is properly defined, there is no meaning in speaking of faulty or wrong cognition. If right cognition is defined as a cognition which has causal efficiency, that in fact is not a proper definition; for even the wrong cognition of a snake might cause fear and even death. If it is urged that the causal efficiency must be exercised by the object in the same form in which it is perceived, then it is very difficult to ascertain this; and there may be a false cognition of causal effi- xi] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 137 ciency also ; hence it would be very difficult to ascertain the nature of right cognition on the basis of causal efficiency. Srlharsa points out again that in a similar way Dharmaklrti s definition of right cognition as enabling one to attain the object (artha-prapakatvd) is also unintelligible, since it is difficult to determine which object can be actually attained and which not, and the notion that the thing may be attained as it is perceived may be present even in the case of the wrong perception of silver in the conch-shell. If right cognition is defined as cognition which is not contradicted, then it may be asked whether the absence of contradiction is at the time of perception only, in which case even the wrong perception of silver in the conch-shell would be a right cognition, since it is uncontradicted at least at the time when the illusion is produced. If it is urged that a right cognition is that which is not contradicted at any time, then we are not in a position to assert the Tightness of any cognition ; for it is impossible to be certain that any par ticular cognition will never at any time be contradicted. After showing that it is impossible to define right cognition (prama) Sriharsa tries to show that it is impossible to define the idea of instruments (karana} or their operative action (vyapara) as involved in the idea of instruments of cognition (pramdnd). Srlharsa attempts to show that instrumentality as an agent cannot be separately conceived as having an independent existence, since it is difficult to determine its separate existence. It would be a long tale to go into all the details of this discussion as set forth by Sriharsa, and for our present purposes it is enough to know that Srlharsa refuted the concept of "instrumentality" as a separate agent, both as popularly conceived or as conceived in Sanskrit grammar. He also discusses a number of alternative meanings which could be attributed to the concept of "karana" or instru ment, and shows that none of these meanings can be satisfactorily justified 1 . In refuting the definition of perception he introduces a long discussion showing the uselessness of defining perception as an instrument of right knowledge. Perception is defined in the Nyaya as cognition which arises through the contact of a particular sense with its object ; but it is impossible to know whether any cognition has originated from sense-contact, since the fact of the production 1 Among many other definitions Sriharsa also refutes the definition of karana as given by Uddyotakara "yadvan eva karoti tat karanam." Khandana, p. 506. 138 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. of knowledge from sense-contact cannot itself be directly perceived or known by any other means. Since in perception the senses are in contact on the one hand with the self and on the other hand with the external objects, Sriharsa urges by a series of argu ments that, unless the specific object with which the sense is in contact is mentioned in each case, it would be difficult to formulate a definition of perception in such a way that it would imply only the revelation of the external object and not the self, which is as much in contact with the sense as is the object. Again, the specifi cation of the object in the case of each perception would make it particular, and this would defeat the purposes of definition, which can only apply to universal concepts. Arguing against a possible definition of perception as immediateness, Sriharsa supposes that, if perception reveals some specific quality of the object as its per manent attribute, then, in order that this quality may be cognized, there ought to be another attribute, and this would presuppose another attribute, and so there would be an infinite regress; and, if at any stage of the infinite regress it is supposed that no further attribute is necessary, then this involves the omission of the preced ing determining attributes, until the possibility of the perception is also negatived. If this immediateness be explained as a cognition produced by the instrumentality of the sense-organs, this again is unintelligible; for the instrumentality of sense-organs is incom prehensible. Sriharsa takes a number of alternative definitions of perceptions and tries to refute them all more or less in the same way, mostly by pointing out verbal faults in the formulation of the definitions. Citsukha Acarya, a commentator on Sriharsa s Khandana- khanda-khadya, offers a refutation of the definition of perception in a much more condensed form. He points out that the definition of perception by Aksapada as an uncontradicted cognition arising out of sense-contact with the object is unintelligible. How can we know that a cognition would not be contradicted? It cannot be known from a knowledge of the faultlessness of the collocating cir cumstances, since the faultlessness can be known only if there is no contradiction, and hence faultlessness cannot be known previously and independently, and the collocating circumstances would con tain many elements which are unperceivable. It is also impossible to say whether any experience will for ever remain uncontradicted. Nor can it again be urged that right cognition is that which can xi] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 139 produce an effort on the part of the perceiver (pravrtti-samarthya) ; for even an illusory knowledge can produce an effort on the part of the perceiver who is deceived by it. Mere achievement of the result is no test for the Tightness of the cognition ; for a man may see the lustre of a gem and think it to be a gem and really get the gem, yet it cannot be doubted that his apprehension of the ray of the gem as the gem was erroneous 1 . In the case of the perception of stars and planets there is no chance of any actual attainment of those objects, and yet there is no reason to deny the validity of the cognitions. Passing over the more or less verbal arguments of Srlharsa in refutation of the definitions of inference (anumand) as linga-para- marsa or the realization of the presence in the minor term (paksa, e.g. the mountain) of a reason or probans (linga, e.g. smoke) which is always concomitant with the major term (sddhya, e.g. fire), or as invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum or the major term (sadhya, e.g. fire), and its other slightly modified varieties, I pass on to his criticism of the nature of concomitance (vyapti), which is at the root of the notion of inference. It is urged that the universal relationship of invariable concomitance required in. vydpti cannot be established unless the invariable concomitance of all the individuals involved in a class be known, which is impossible. The Naiyayika holds that the mind by a sort of mental contact with class-concepts or universals, called samanya- pratyasatti, may affirm of all individuals of a class without actually experiencing all the individuals. It is in this way that, perceiving the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire in a large number of cases, one understands the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire by experiencing a sort of mental contact with the class-concept "smoke" when perceiving smoke on a distant hill. Sriharsa argues in refutation of such an interpretation that, if all individual smoke may be known in such a way by a mental contact with class-con cepts, then by a mental contact with the class-concept " knowable " we might know all individual knowables and thus be omniscient as well. A thing is knowable only as an individual with its specific qualities as such, and therefore to know a thing as a knowable would involve the knowledge of all such specific qualities ; for the 1 drsyate hi mani-prabhdydm mani-buddhyd pravartamdnasya mani-prdpteh pravrtti-sdmarthyam na cdvyabhicdritvam. Tattva-pradlpikd, p. 218. Nirnaya- Sagara Press, Bombay, 1915. 140 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. class-concept " knowable " would involve all individuals which have a specific knowable character. It may be urged that knowability is one single character, and that things may be otherwise completely different and may yet be one so far as knowability is concerned, and hence the things may remain wholly unknown in their diversity of characters and may yet be known so far as they are merely know- able. To this Sriharsa answers that the class-concept "knowable" would involve all knowables and so even the diversity of characters would be involved within the meaning of the term "knowable." Again, assuming for the sake of argument that it is possible to have a mental contact with class-concepts through individuals, how can the invariable concomitance itself be observed? If our senses could by themselves observe such relations of concomitance, then there would be no possibility of mistakes in the observation of such concomitance. But such mistakes are committed and corrected by later experience, and there is no way in which one can account for the mistake in the sense-judgment. Again, if this invariable concomitance be defined as avindbhava, which means that when one is absent the other is also absent, such a definition is faulty; for it may apply to those cases where there is no real invariable concomitance. Thus there is no real concomitance be tween "earth" and "possibility of being cut"; yet in dkdsa there is absence of earth and also the absence of "possibility of being cut." If it is urged that concomitance cannot be determined by a single instance of the absence of one tallying with the absence of the other, it must be proved that universally in all instances of the absence of the one, e.g. the fire, there is also the absence of the other, e.g. the smoke. But it is as difficult to ascertain such uni versal absence as it is to ascertain universal concomitance. Again, if this concomitance be defined as the impossibility of the presence of the middle term, the reason or the probans, where the major term or the probandum is also absent, then also it may be said that it is not possible to determine such an impossibility either by sense- knowledge or by any other means. Now tarka or eliminatory consideration in judging of possi bilities cannot be considered as establishing invariable concomi tance; for all arguments are based on invariable concomitance, and such an assumption would lead to a vicious mutual interdepend ence. The great logician Udayana objects to this and says that, if invariable concomitance between smoke and fire be denied, then xi] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 141 there are strong arguments (tarka) against such a denial (badhakas tarkah) y namely, that, if smoke is not regarded as concomitant with fire, then smoke would either exist without any cause or not exist at all, which is impossible. But Sriharsa says that there is room for an alternative proposition which Udayana misses, namely, that smoke is due to some cause other than fire. It may be that there are smokes which are not caused by fire. How can one be sure that all smokes are caused by fire ? There may be differences in these two classes of fire which remain unnoticed by us, and so there is always room for the supposition that any particular smoke may not be caused by fire, and such doubts would make inference impossible. Udayana had however contended that, if you entertain the doubt, with regard to a future case, that it is possible that there may be a case in which the concomitance may be found wrong, then the possibility of such a doubt (sanka) must be supported by inference, and the admission of this would involve the admission of inference. If such an exaggerated doubt be considered illegitimate, there is no obstruction in the way of inference. Doubts can be enter tained only so long as such entertainment of doubts is compatible with practical life. Doubts which make our daily life impossible are illegitimate. Every day one finds that food appeases hunger, and, if in spite of that one begins to doubt whether on any particular day when he is hungry he should take food or not, then life would be impossible 1 . Sriharsa, however, replies to this contention by twisting the words of Udayana s own karika, in which he says that, so long as there is doubt, inference is invalid ; if there is no doubt, this can only be when the invalidity of the inference has been made manifest, and until such invalidity is found there will always be doubts. Hence the argument of possibilities (tarka) can never remove doubts 2 . Sriharsa also objects to the definition of "invariable concomi tance" as a natural relation (svabhavikah sambandhah) . He rejects the term "natural relation" and says that invariable concomitance 1 sankd ced anumdsty eva na cec chankd tatastardm vydghdtdvadhir dsankd tarkah sankdvadhir matah. Kusumdnjalt, ill, 7. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1912. vydghdto yadi sankdsti na cec chankd tatastardm vydghdtdvadhir dsankd tarkah sankdvadhih kutah. Khandana-khanda-khddya, p. 693. 142 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. would not be justifiable in any of its possible meanings, such as (i) depending on the nature of the related (sambandhi-svabhava- srita), (ii) produced by the nature of the related (sambandhi-sva- bhava-janya), (iii) not different from the nature constituting the re- latedness, since, as these would be too wide and would apply even to those things which are not invariable concomitants, e.g. all that is earthen can be scratched with an iron needle. Though in some cases earthen objects may be scratched with an iron needle, not all earthen objects can be so scratched. He further refutes the defini tion of invariable concomitance as a relation not depending upon conditional circumstances (upadhi). Without entering into the details of Sriharsa s argument it may be pointed out that it rests very largely on his contention that conditionality of relations can not be determined without knowledge of the nature of invariable concomitance and also that invariable concomitance cannot be determined without a previous determination of the conditionality of relations. Sriharsa s brief refutation of analogy, implication and testimony, as also his refutation of the definitions of the different fallacies of inference, are not of much importance from a philosophical point of view, and need not be detailed here. Turning now to Sriharsa s refutation of the Nyaya categories, we note that he begins with the refutation of " being " or positivity (bhavatva). He says that being cannot be defined as being existent in itself, since non-being is also existent in itself; we can with as much right speak of being as existing as of non-being as existing ; both non-being and being may stand as grammatical nominatives of the verb exists." Again, each existing thing being unique in itself, there is no common quality, such as " existence " or " being," which is possessed by them all. Again, "being" is as much a negation of "non-being" as "non-being" of "being"; hence "being" cannot be defined as that which is not a negation of anything. Negation is a mere form of speech, and both being and non-being may be expressed in a negative form. Turning to the category of non-being (abhava), Srlharsa says that it cannot be defined as negation of anything; for being may as well be interpreted as a negation of non-being as non-being of being (bhdvabhdvayor dvayor apt paraspara-pratiksepatmakatvai). Nor again can non-being be defined as that which opposes being ; for not all non-being is opposed to all being (e.g. in "there is no jug xi] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 143 on the ground" the absence of jug does not oppose the ground in respect of which the jug is denied) ; if non-being opposes some existent things, then that does not differentiate negation ; for there are many existent things which are opposed to one another (e.g. the horse and the bull). In refuting the Nyaya definition of substance (dravya) as that which is the support of qualities, Sriharsa says that even qualities appear to have numeral and other qualities (e.g. we speak of two or three colours, of a colour being deep or light, mixed or primary and colour is regarded as quality). If it is urged that this is a mistake, then the appearance of the so-called substances as being endowed with qualities may also be regarded as equally erroneous. Again, what is meant by defining substance as the support (asraya) of qualities? Since qualities may subsist in the class-concept of quality (gunatva), the class-concept of quality ought to be regarded as substance according to the definition. It may be urged that a substance is that in which the qualities inhere. But what would be the meaning here of the particle "in"? How would one dis tinguish the false appearance, to a jaundiced eye, of yellowness in a white conch-shell and the real appearance of whiteness in the conch-shell? Unless the falsity of the appearance of yellow in the conch-shell is realized, there can be no difference between the one case and the other. Again, substance cannot be defined as the inhering or the material cause (samavayi-karana), since it is not possible to know which is the inhering cause and which is not ; for number is counted as a quality, and colour also is counted as a quality, and yet one specifies colours by numbers, as one, two, or many colours. Furthermore, the Nyaya definition of quality as that which has a genus and is devoid of qualities is unintelligible ; for the defini tion involves the concept of quality, which is sought to be defined. Moreover, as pointed out above, even qualities, such as colours, have numeral qualities ; for we speak of one, two or many colours. It is only by holding to this appearance of qualities endowed with numeral qualities that the definition of quality can be made to stand, and it is again on the strength of the definition of quality that such appearances are to be rejected as false. If colours are known as qualities in consideration of other reasons, then these, being en dowed with numeral qualities, could not for that very reason be called qualities ; for qualities belong according to definition only to 144 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. substances. Even the numerals themselves are endowed with the quality of separateness. So there would not be a single instance that the Naiyayika could point to as an example of quality. Speaking of relations, Sriharsa points out that, if relation is to be conceived as something subsisting in a thing, then its meaning is unintelligible. The meaning of relation as "in" or "herein" is not at all clear; for the notion of something being a container (adhard) is dependent on the notion of the concept of "in" or "herein," and that concept again depends on the notion of a container, and there is no other notion which can explain either of the concepts independently. The container cannot be supposed to be an inhering cause; for in that case such examples as "there is a grape in this vessel" or "the absence of horns in a hare" would be unexplainable. He then takes a number of possible meanings which can be given to the notion of a container; but these, not being philosophically important, are omitted here. He also deals with the impossibility of defining the nature of the subject-object relation (visaya-visayi-bhava) of knowledge. In refuting the definition of cause Sriharsa says that cause cannot be defined as immediate antecedence ; for immediate antece dence can be ascribed only to the causal operation, which is always an intervening factor between the cause and the effect. If, on the theory that what (e.g. the causal operation) belongs to a thing (e.g. the cause) cannot be considered as a factor which stands between it (cause) and that which follows it (effect), the causal operation be not regarded as a separate and independent factor, then even the cause of the cause would have to be regarded as one with the cause and therefore cause. But, if it is urged that, since the cause of the cause is not an operation, it cannot be regarded as being one with the cause, one may well ask the opponent to define the meaning of operation. If the opponent should define it as that factor without which the cause cannot produce the effect, then the accessory circumstances and common and abiding conditions, such as the natural laws, space, and so forth, without which an effect cannot be produced, are also to be regarded as operation, which is impossible. Further, "operation" cannot be qualified as being itself produced by the cause ; for it is the meaning of the concept of cause that has still to be explained and defined. If, again, cause is defined as the antecedence of that which is other than the not- cause, then this again would be faulty ; for one cannot understand xi] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 145 the " not-cause " of the definition without understanding what is the nature of cause, and vice-versa. Moreover, space, being a per manent substance, is always present as a not-cause of anything, and is yet regarded as the cause of sound. If, again, cause is defined as that which is present when the effect is present and absent when the effect is absent, this would not explain the causality of space, which is never known to be absent. If, again, cause is defined as invariable antecedence, then permanent substances such as space are to be regarded as the sole causes of effects. If, however, in variable antecedence be understood to mean unconditional ante cedence, then two coexistent entities such as the taste and the colour of an earthen pot which is being burnt must mutually be the cause of the colour and the taste of the burnt earthen pot ; for neither does the colour condition taste, nor does the taste condition colour. Moreover, if mere invariable antecedents be regarded as cause, then the invariably preceding symptoms of a disease are to be regarded as the cause of the disease on account of their in variable antecedence. Again, causality cannot be regarded as a specific character or quality belonging to certain things, which quality can be directly perceived by us as existing in things. Thus we may perceive the stick of the potter s wheel to be the cause of the particular jugs produced by it, but it is not possible to perceive causality as a general quality of a stick or of any other thing. If causality existed only with reference to things in general, then it would be impossible to conceive of the production of individual things, and it would not be possible for anyone to know which particular cause would produce a particular effect. On the other hand, it is not possible to perceive by the senses that an individual thing is the cause of a number of individual effects ; for until these individual effects are actually produced it is not possible to perceive them, since perception involves sense-contact as its necessary condition. It is not necessary for our present purposes to enter into all the different possible concepts of cause which Srlharsa seeks to refute: the above examination is expected to give a fairly comprehensive idea of the methods of Sriharsa s refutation of the category of cause. Nor is it possible within the limited range of the present work to give a full account of all the different alternative defences of the various categories accepted in Nyaya philosophy, or of all the various ways in which Srlharsa sought to refute them in his 146 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. Khandana-khanda-khadya. I have therefore attempted to give here only some specimens of the more important parts of his dialectical argument. The chief defect of Sriharsa s criticisms is that they often tend to grow into verbal sophisms, and lay greater stress on the faults of expression of the opponent s definitions and do not do him the justice of liberally dealing with his general ideas. It is easy to see how these refutations of the verbal definitions of the Nyaya roused the defensive spirit of the Naiyayikas into re-stating their definitions with proper qualificatory phrases and adjuncts, by which they avoided the loopholes left in their former definitions for the attack of Srlharsa and other critics. In one sense, therefore, the criticisms of Srlharsa and some of his followers had done a great disservice to the development of later Nyaya thought ; for, unlike the older Nyaya thinkers, later Nyaya writers, like Gahgesa, Raghunatha and others, were mainly occupied in inventing suitable qualificatory adjuncts and phrases by which they could define their categories in such a way that the undesirable applications and issues of their definitions, as pointed out by the criticisms of their opponents, could be avoided. If these criticisms had mainly been directed towards the defects of Nyaya thought, later writers would not have been forced to take the course of developing verbal ex pressions at the expense of philosophical profundity and acuteness. Srlharsa may therefore be said to be the first great writer who is responsible indirectly for the growth of verbalism in later Nyaya thought. Another defect of Srlharsa s criticisms is that he mainly limits himself to criticizing the definitions of Nyaya categories and does not deal so fully with the general ideas involved in such categories of thought. It ought, however, in all fairness to Srlharsa to be said that, though he took the Nyaya definitions as the main objective of his criticisms, yet in dealing with the various alternative varia tions and points of view of such definitions he often gives an exhaustive treatment of the problems involved in the discussion. But in many cases his omissions become very glaring. Thus, for example, in his treatment of relations he only tries to refute the definitions of relation as container and contained, as inherence, and as subject- object relation of cognitions, and leaves out many other varieties of relation which might well have been dealt with . Another characteristic feature of his refutation is, as has already been pointed out, that he has only a destructive point of view and is xi] Citsukha s Interpretations of Veddnta Concepts 147 not prepared to undertake the responsibility of denning any position from his own point of view. He delights in showing that none of the world-appearances can be defined in any way, and that thus, being indescribable, they are all false. But incapacity to define or describe anything in some particular way cannot mean that the thing is false. Sriharsa did not and could not show that the ways of definition which he attempted to refute were the only ways of defining the different categories. They could probably be defined in other and better ways, and even those definitions which he refuted could be bettered and improved by using suitable qualificatory phrases. He did not attempt to show that the concepts involved in the categories were fraught with such contradictions that, in whatever way one might try to define, one could not escape from those inner contradictions, which were inherent in the very nature of the concepts themselves. Instead of that he turned his attention to the actual formal definitions which had been put forward by the Nyaya and sometimes by Prabhakara and tried to show that these definitions were faulty. To show that particular definitions are wrong is not to show that the things defined are wrong. It is, no doubt, true that the refutation of certain definitions involves the refutation of the concepts involved in those definitions; but the refutation of the particular way of presentation of the concept does not mean that the concept itself is impossible. In order to show the latter, a particular concept has to be analysed on the basis of its own occurrences, and the inconsistencies involved in such an analysis have to be shown. Citsukha s Interpretations of the Concepts of Sarikara Vedanta. Citsukha (about A.D. 1220), a commentator on Sriharsa, had all Sriharsa s powers of acute dialectical thought, but he not only furnishes, like Sriharsa, a concise refutation of the Nyaya categories, but also, in his Tattva-pradlpikd, commented on by Pratyagbha- gavan (A.D. 1400) in his Nayana-prasadini 1 , gives us a very acute 1 Citsukha, a pupil of Gaudesvara Acarya, called also Jnanottama, wrote a commentary on Anandabodha Bhattarakacarya s Nydya-makaranda and also on Sriharsa s Khandana-khanda-khddya and an independent work called Tattva- pradlpikd or Cit-sukhl, on which the study of the present section is based. In this work he quotes Udayana, Uddyotakara, Kumarila, Padmapada, Vallabha (Lllavatl), Salikanatha, Suresvara, Sivaditya, Kularka Pandita and ridhara 148 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. analysis and interpretation of some of the most important concepts of Sankara Vedanta. He is not only a protector of the Advaita doctrine of the Vedanta, but also an interpreter of the Vedantic con cepts 1 . The work is written in four chapters. In the first chapter Citsukha deals with the interpretation of the Vedanta concepts of self- revelation (sva-prakaa) 9 the nature of self as consciousness (dtmanah samvid-rupatva),the nature of ignorance as darkness, the nature of falsity (mithyatva), the nature of nescience (avidya), the nature of the truth of all ideas (sarva-pratyaydndm yathd thatvam), the nature of illusions, etc. In the second chapter he refutes the Nyaya categories of difference, separateness, quality, action, class- concepts, specific particulars (visesd), the relation of inherence (samavaya), perception, doubt, illusion, memory, inference, in variable concomitance (vydpti), induction (vyapti-graha), existence of the reason in the minor term (paksa-dharmata) , reason (hetu), analogy (upamdna), implication, being, non-being, duality, measure, causality, time, space, etc. In the third chapter, the smallest of the book, he deals with the possibility of the realization of Brahman and the nature of release through knowledge. In the fourth chapter, which is much smaller than the first two, he deals with the nature of the ultimate state of emancipation. Citsukha starts with a formal definition of the most funda mental concept of the Vedanta, namely the concept of self- reve lation or self-illumination (sva-prakdsa). Both Padmapada and Prakasatman in the Panca-pddikd and Panca-pddikd-vivarana had distinguished the self from the ego as self- revelation or self-illumi- (Nydya-kandati) . In addition to these he also wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sutra-bhdsya of Sankara, called Bhdsya-bhdva-prakdsikd, Vivarana- tdtparya-dlpikd, a commentary on the Pramana mold of Anandabodha, a com mentary on Mandana s Brahma-siddhi, called Abhiprdya-prakdsikd, and an index to the adhikaranas of the Brahma-sutra, called Adhikarana-manjarl. His teacher Jnanottama wrote two works on Vedanta, called Nydya-sudhd and Jndna- siddhi; but he seems to have been a different person from the Jnanottama who wrote a commentary on Suresvara s Naiskarmya-siddhi; for the latter was a householder (as he styles himself with a householder s title, misra), and an inhabitant of the village of Mangala in the Cola country, while the former was an ascetic and a preceptor of the King of Gauda, as Citsukha describes him in his colophon to his Tattva-pradlpikd. He is also said to have written the Brahma- stuti, Visnu-purdna-tlkd, Sad-darsana-samgraha-vrtti y Adhikarana-sangati (a work explaining the inter-relation of the topics of the Brahma-sutra) and a com mentary on the Naiskarmya-stddhi, called the Naiskarmya-siddhi-tlkd or the Bhdva-tattva-prakdsikd. His pupil Sukhaprakasa wrote a work on the topics of the Brahma-sutra, called Adhikarana-ratna-mdld . 1 Thus Pandita Harinatha arma in his Sanskrit introduction to the Tattva- pradlpikd or Cit-sukhl speaks of this work as advaita-siddhdnta-raksako py advaita- siddhdnta-prakdsako vyutp&dakai ca. xi] Citsukhcfs Interpretations of Veddnta Concepts 149 nation (svayam-prakdsd) . Thus Prakasatman says that consciousness (samvid) is self-revealing and that its self-revelation is not due to any other self- revealing cause 1 . It is on account of this natural self-revelation of consciousness that its objects also appear as self- revealing 2 . Padmapada also says the same thing, when he states that the self is of the nature of pure self-revealing consciousness ; when this consciousness appears in connection with other objects and manifests them, it is called experience (anubhava) , and, when it is by itself, it is called the self or atman 3 . But Citsukha was probably the first to give a formal definition of the nature of this self- revelation. Citsukha defines it as that which is entitled to be called immediate (aparoksa-vyavahdra-yogya), though it is not an object of any cognition or any cognizing activity (avedyatve pi)*. It may be objected that desires, feelings, etc. also are not objects of any cognition and yet are entitled to be regarded as immediate, and hence the definition might as well apply to them; for the object of cognition has a separate objective existence, and by a mind-object contact the mind is transformed into the form of the object, and thereby the one consciousness, which was apparently split up into two forms as the object-consciousness which appeared as material objects and the subject-consciousness which appeared as the cognizer, is again restored to its unity by the super-imposition of the subjective form on the objective form, and the object-form is revealed in consciousness as a jug or a book. But in the case of our experience of our will or our feelings these have no existence separate from our own mind and hence are not cognized in the same way as external objects are cognized. According to Vedanta epistemology these subjective experiences of will, emotions, etc. are different mental constituents, forms or states, which, being directly and illusorily imposed upon the self-revealing conscious ness, become experienced. These subjective states are therefore not cognized in the same way as external objects. But, since the 1 samvedanam tu svayam-prakdsa eva na prakdsdntara-hetuh. Panca-pddikd- vivarana, p. 52. 2 tasmdd anubhavah sajdtiya-prakdsdntara-nirapeksah prakdsamdna eva visaye prakdsddi-vyavahdra-nimittam bhavitum arhati avyavadhdnena visaye prakdsd- di-vyavahdra-nimittatvdt. Ibid. 3 tasmdt cit-svabhdva evdtmd tena tena prameya-bhedena upadhlyamdno nubha- vdbhidhdnlyakam labhate avivaksitopddhir dtmddi-sabdaih. Panca-pddikd, p. IQ. 4 avedyatve saty aparoksa-vyavahdra-yogyatvam svayam-prakdsa-laksanam* Ctt-sukhl, p. 9. 150 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. experience of these states is possible only through a process of illusory imposition, they are not entitled to be called immediate 1 . So, though they appear as immediate, they have no proper yogyata, or, in other words, they are not entitled to be called immediate. But in the true sense even external objects are but illusory impositions on the self- revealing consciousness, and hence they also cannot be said to be entitled to be called immediate. There is therefore no meaning in trying to distinguish the self- revealing consciousness as one which is not an object of cognition ; for on the Vedanta theory there is nothing which is entitled to be called immediate, and hence the phrase avedyatve (not being an object of cognition) is unnecessary as a special distinguishing feature of the self- revealing consciousness; the epithet "imme diate "is therefore also unnecessary. To such an objection Citsukha s reply is that the experience of external objects is only in the last stage of world-dissolution and Brahmahood found non-immediate and illusory, and, since in all our ordinary stages of experience the experience of world-objects is immediate, the epithet avedyatva successfully distinguishes self-revealing consciousness from all cognitions of external objects which are entitled to be called im mediate and are to be excluded from the range of self-revealing con sciousness only by being objects of cognition. In the field of ordinary experience the perceived world-objects are found to be entitled to be called immediate no less than the self-revealing conscious ness, and it is only because they are objects of cognition that they can be distinguished from the self- revealing consciousness. The main argument in favour of the admission of the category of independent self-revealing consciousness is that, unless an in dependent self- revealing consciousness is admitted, there would be a vicious series in the process preceding the rise of any cog nition ; for, if the pure experience of self-revealing consciousness has to be further subjected to another process before it can be understood, then that also might require another process, and that another, and so there would be an unending series. Moreover, that the pure experience is self- revealing is proved by the very fact of the experience itself; for no one doubts his own ex perience or stands in need of any further corroboration or con firmation as to whether he experienced or not. It may be objected 1 avedyatve pi ndparoksa-vyavahdra-yogyatd tesdm, adhyastatayaiva tesam siddheh. Cit-sukhi, p. 10. Nirnaya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1915. xi] Citsukha 9 s Interpretations of Vedanta Concepts 151 that it is well known that we may be aware of our awareness of anything (anu-vyavasaya), and in such a case the self- revealing consciousness may become further cognized. Citsukha s reply to this is that, when one perceives a jug, there is the mental activity, then a cessation of that activity, then a further starting of new activity and then the knowledge that I know the jug, or rather I know that I know the jug and hence such a cognition cannot be said to be directly and immediately cognizing the first awareness, which could not have stayed through so many moments 1 . Again, since neither the senses nor the external objects can of themselves produce the self- revelation of knowledge, if knowledge were not admitted as self-revealing, the whole world would be blind and there would be no self -revelation. When one knows that he knows a book or a jug, it is the cognized object that is known and not the awareness that is cognized; there can be no awareness of awareness, but only of the cognized object 2 . If the previous aware ness could be made the object of subsequent awareness, then this would amount to an admission of the possibility of the self being known by the self (svasydpi svena vedyatvdpdtdf) a theory which would accord not with the Vedanta idealism, but with the Buddhistic. It is true, no doubt, that the pure self-revealing con sciousness shows itself only on the occasion of a mental state ; but its difference from other cognitive states lies in the fact that it has no form or object, and hence, though it may be focussed by a mental state, yet it stands on a different footing from the objects illuminated by it. The next point that Citsukha urges is that the self is of the nature of pure self- revealing consciousness (dtmanah samvld- rupatva). This is, of course, no new contribution by Citsukha, since this view had been maintained in the Upanisads and repeated by Sankara, Padmapada, Prakasatman and others. Citsukha says that, like knowledge, the self also is immediately revealed or experienced without itself being the object of any cognizing activity or cognition, and therefore the self is also of the nature of knowledge. No one doubts about his own self ; for the self always stands directly and 1 ghata-jndnodaya-samaye manasi kriyd tato vibhdgas tatah purva-samyoga-vi- ndsas tata uttara-samyogotpattis tato jridndntaram iti aneka-ksana-vilambena utpa- dyamdnasya jndnasya aparoksatayd pnrva-jndna-grdhakatvdnupapatteh. Cit- sukhl, p. 17. 2 vidito ghata ity atra anuvyavasdyena ghatasyaiva viditatvam avaslyate na tu vitteh. Ibid. p. 18. 152 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. immediately self- revealed. Self and knowledge being identical, there is no relation between the two save that of identity (jnandtmanoh sambandhasyaiva abhavat) . Citsukha defines falsity (mithyatvd) as the non-existence of a thing in that which is considered to be its cause 1 . He shows this by pointing out that a whole, if it is to exist anywhere, must exist in the parts of which it is made, and, if it does not exist even there, it does not exist anywhere and is false. It is, however, evident that a whole cannot exist in the parts, since, being a whole, it cannot be in the parts 2 . Another argument adduced by Citsukha for the falsity of the world-appearance is that it is impossible that there should be any relation between the self -revealing consciousness, the knower (drk), and the objects which are cognized (drsya). Knowledge cannot be said to arise through sense-contact; for in the illusory perception of silver there is the false perception of silver without any actual sense-contact with silver. A reference to subject-object relation (visaya-visayi-bhava) cannot explain it, since the idea of subject-object relation is itself obscure and unexplain- able. Arguing as to the impossibility of properly explaining the subject-object re\ation(visaya-visayi-bhava) in knowledge, Citsukha says that it cannot be held that the subject- object relation means that knowledge produces some change in the object (visaya) and that the knower produces such a change. For what may be the nature of such a change? If it be described as jnatata, or the character of being known, how can such a character be by my knowledge at the present moment generated as a positive quality in an object which has now ceased to exist? If such a quality can be produced even in past objects, then there w r ould be no fixed law according to which such qualities should be produced. Nor can such a relationship be explained on a pragmatic basis by a re ference to actual physical practical action with reference to objects that we know or the internal volitions or emotions associated with our knowledge of things. For in picking up a piece of silver that we see in front of us we may quite unknowingly be drawing with it the dross contained in the silver, and hence the fact of the physical sarvesdm apt bhdvdndm dsrayatvena sammate pratiyogitvam atyantdbhdvam prati mrsdtmatd. Cit-sukhi, p. 39. Some of these definitions of falsity are collected in Madhusudana s Advaita- siddhi, a work composed much later than the Cit-sukhi. 2 amsinah svdmsa-gdtyantdbhdvasya pratiyoginah amsitvdd itardmslva. . . vimatah patah etat-tantu-nisthdtyantdbhdva-pratiyogl avayavitvdt patdntaravat . Cit-sukhi, pp. 40., 41. xi] Citsukha s Interpretations of Veddnta Concepts 153 drawing of the dross cannot on that ground alone make it an object of my knowledge, and hence the subject- object relation of know ledge cannot be defined as a mere physical action following cognition . The internal mental states of volition and the emotions associated with knowledge belong to the knower and have nothing to do with the object of knowledge. If, however, it is urged that objectivity consists in the fact that whatever is known appears in conscious ness, the question arises, what does this appearing in consciousness mean ? It cannot mean that consciousness is the container and the object is contained in it ; for, consciousness being internal and the object external, the object cannot be contained in it. It cannot be a mere undefined relatedness ; for in that case the object may as well be considered subject and the subject, object. If objectivity be defined as that which can induce know ledge, then even the senses, the light and other accessories which help the rise of knowledge may as well be regarded as objects. Object cannot be defined as that to which knowledge owes its particular form ; for, knowledge being identical with its form, all that helps the rise of knowledge, the senses, light, etc., may as well be regarded as objects. So, in whatever way one may try to conceive the nature of the subject-object relation, he will be disappointed. Citsukha follows the traditional view of nescience (ajndnd) as a positive entity without beginning which disappears with the rise of true knowledge 1 . Nescience is different from the conception of positivity as well as of negativity, yet it is called only positive because of the fact that it is not negative 2 . Ignorance or nescience is described as a positive state and not a mere negation of know ledge ; and so it is said that the rise of right knowledge of any object in a person destroys the positive entity of ignorance with reference to that object and that this ignorance is something different from what one would understand by negation of right knowledge 3 . Citsukha says that the positive character of ignorance becomes apparent when we say that " We do not know whether what you say is true." Here there is the right knowledge of the fact that 1 anddi-bhdva-rupam yad-vijndnena villyate tad ajndnam iti prdjnd-laksanam sampracaksate andditve sati bhdva-rupam vijndna-nirdsyam ajndnam iti laksanam iha vivaksitam. Cit-sukhi, p. 57. 2 bhdvdbhdva-vilaksanasya ajnanasya abhdva-vilaksanatva-mdtrena bhdvatvo- pacdrdt. Ibid. 3 vigltam Deva-datta-nistha-pramdna-jndnam Devadatta-nistha-pramdbhdvd- tiriktdnddernivarttakam pramdnatvdd Yajnadattddigata-pramdna-jndnavad ity anumdnam. Ibid. p. 58. 154 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. what is said is known, but it is not known whether what is said is valid 1 . Here also there is a positive knowledge of ignorance of fact, which is not the same as mere absence of knowledge. Such an ignorance, however, is not experienced through sense-contact or sense-processes, but directly by the self- revealing consciousness the saksin. Just before the rise of right knowledge about an object there is ignorance (ajnana), and the object, as qualified by such an ignorance, is experienced as being unknown. All things are the objects of the inner unmoved intuitive consciousness either as known or as unknown 2 . Our reference to deep dreamless sleep as a state in which we did not know anything (na kimcid-avedisam) is also referred to as a positive experience of ignorance in the dream less state. One of the chief tenets of Vedanta epistemology lies in the supposition that a presentation of the false is a fact of experience. The opposite view is that of Prabhakara, that the false is never presented in experience and that falsehood consists in the wrong construction imposed upon experience by the mind, which fails to note the actual want of association between two things which are falsely associated as one. According to this theory all illusion consists of a false association or a false relationing of two things which are not presented in experience as related. This false asso ciation is not due to an active operation of the mind, but to a failure to note that no such association was actually presented in experience (asamsargagraha). According to Prabhakara, the great Mimamsa authority, the false is never presented in experience, nor is the false experience due to an arbitrary positive activity of wrong construction of the mind, but merely to a failure to note certain distinctions presented in experience. On account of such a failure things which are distinct are not observed as distinct, and hence things which are distinct and different are falsely associated as one, and the conch-shell is thus regarded as silver. But here there is no false presentation in experience. Whatever is known is true; falsehood is due to omissions of knowledge and failure in noting differences. Citsukha objects to this view and urges that such an explanation 1 tvadukte rthe pramdna-jndnam mama nusti ity asya visista-visaya-jndnasya pramdtvdt. Cit-sukhl, p. 59. 2 asman-mate ajndnasya sdksi-siddhataydpramdndbodhyatvdt, pramdna-jndno- daydtprdk-kdlc ajridnam tad-visesito rthah sdksi-siddhah ajiidta ity anuvdda gocarah . . .sarvam vastu jndtatayd ajndtatayd vd sdksi-caitanyasya visayah. Ibid. p. 60. xi] Citsukha s Interpretations of Veddnta Concepts 155 can never explain all cases of false apprehension. Take the pro position, There are false apprehensions and false presentations"; if this proposition is admitted to be correct, then Prabhakara s contention is false; if it is admitted to be false, then here is a false proposition, the falsehood of which is not due to a failure to note differences. If the falsity of all propositions be said to be due to a failure to note differences, then it would be hard to find out any true proposition or true experience. On the analogy of our false experience of the everchanging flame of a lamp as the same identical one all cases of true recognition might no less be regarded as false, and therefore all inferences would be doubtful. All cases of real and true association could be explained as being due to a failure to note differences. There could be no case in which one could assure himself that he was dealing w 7 ith a real association and not a failure to apprehend the absence of association (asamsarga- grahd). Citsukha therefore contends that it is too much to expect that all cases of false knowledge can be explained as being due to a mere non-apprehension of difference, since it is quite reasonable to suppose that false knowledge is produced by defective senses which oppose the rise of true knowledge and positively induce false appearance 1 . Thus in the case of the illusory perception of conch-shell as silver it is the conch-shell that appears as a piece of silver. But what is the nature of the presentation that forms the object (alambana) of false perception? It cannot be regarded as absolutely non-existent (asai), since that which is abso lutely non-existent cannot be the object of even a false perception, and moreover it cannot through such a perception (e.g. the tendency of a man to pick up the piece of silver, which is but a false per ception of a piece of conch-shell) induce a practical movement on the part of the perceiver. Neither can it be regarded as existent ; for the later experience contradicts the previous false perception, and one says that there is no silver at the present time and there was no silver in the past it was only the conch-shell that appeared as silver. Therefore the false presentation, though it serves all the purposes of a perceptual object, cannot be described either as existent or as non-existent, and it is precisely this character that constitutes the indefinable nature (anirvacanlyata) of all illusions 2 . 1 tathd dosdndm api yathdrtha-jndna-pratibandhakatvam ayathdrtha-jndna- janakatvam ca kirn na sydt. Cit-sukhl, p. 66. 2 pratyekam sad asattvdbhydm vicdra-padavlm na yad gdhate tad anirvdcyam dhur veddnta-vedinah. Ibid. p. 79. 156 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. It is unnecessary to deal with the other doctrines of Vedanta which Citsukha describes, since there is nothing new in them and they have already been described in chapter x of volume I of this work. It is therefore desirable to pass on to his dialectic criticism of the Nyaya categories. It will suffice, however, to give only a few of these criticisms, as they mostly refer to the refutation of such kinds of categories as are discussed in Srlharsa s great work Khandana- khanda-khadya, and it would be tedious to follow the refutation of the same kinds of categories by two different writers, though the arguments of Citsukha are in many cases new and different from those given by Sriharsa. Citsukha s general approach to such refu tations is also slightly different from that of Sriharsa. For, unlike Sriharsa, Citsukha dealt with the principal propositions of the Vedanta, and his refutations of the Nyaya categories were not intended so much to show that they were inexplicable or indefinable as to show that they were false appearances, and that the pure self- revealing Brahman was the only reality and truth. Thus, in refuting time (kala), Citsukha says that time cannot be perceived either by the visual sense or by the tactual sense, nor can it be apprehended by the mind (manas), as the mind only operates in association with the external senses. Moreover, since there are no perceptual data, it cannot be inferred. The notions of before and after, succession and simultaneity, quickness and dura tion, cannot by themselves indicate the nature of time as it is in itself. It may be urged that, since the solar vibrations can only be associated with human bodies and worldly things, making them appear as young or old only through some other agency such as days, months, etc., such an agency, which brings about the con nection of solar vibrations with worldly things, is called time 1 . To this Citsukha replies that, since the self itself can be regarded as the cause of the manifestation of time in events and things in accordance with the varying conditions of their appearance, it is unnecessary to suppose the existence of a new category called time. Again, it cannot be said that the notions of before and after have time as their material cause; for the validity of these notions is challenged by the Vedantist. They may be regarded as the im- 1 tarani-parispanda-visesdndm yuva-sthavira-sarlrddi-pindesu mdsddi-vicitra- buddhi-janana-dv arena tad-upahitesu paratvdparatvddi-buddhi-janakatvam na ca fair asambaddhdndm tatra buddhi-janakatvam, na ca sdksdt sambandho ravi- parispanddndm pindair asti atah tat-sambandhakatayd kascid astadravya-vilaksano dravya-visesah smkartavyah, tasya ca kdla iti samjnd. (This is Vallabha s view of time.) Nayana-prasddirii commentary on Cit-sukht, p. 321, by Pratyak-svarupa- bhagavat. Nirnaya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1915. xi] Citsukha s Interpretations of Vedanta Concepts 157 pressions produced by a greater or lesser quantity of solar vibra tions. There is therefore no necessity to admit time as a separate category, since its apprehension can be explained on the basis of our known data of experience. From considerations of some data relative space (dik) has to be discarded ; for relative space cannot be perceived by the senses or inferred for want of data of ex perience. Both time and relative space originate from a sense of relativity (apeksa-buddhi), and, given that sense of relativity, the mind can in association with our experience of bodily movements form the notion of relative space. It is therefore unnecessary to admit the existence of relative space as a separate category. In refuting the atomic theory of the Vaisesikas Citsukha says that there is no ground for admitting the Vaisesika atoms. If these atoms are to be admitted on the ground that all things are to be conceived as being divisible into smaller and smaller parts, then the same may apply to the atoms as well. If it is urged that one must stop somewhere, that the atoms are therefore regarded as the last state, and are uniform in size and not further divisible, then the specks of dust that are seen in the windows when the sun is shining (called irasarenus) may equally be regarded as the last stage of divisible size. If it is contended that, since these are visible, they have parts and cannot therefore be considered as indivisible, it may be said in reply that, since the Nyaya writers admit that the atoms can be perceived by the yogins, visibility of the trasarenus could not be put forward as a reason why they could not be regarded as indivisible . Moreover, if the atoms were partless , how could they be admitted to combine to produce the grosser material forms? Again, it is not indispensable that atoms should combine to form bigger particles or make grosser appearances possible ; for, like threads in a sheet, many particles may make gross appearances possible even without combining. Citsukha then re peats Sankara s refutation of the concept of wholes and parts, saying that, if the wholes are different from the parts, then they must be in the parts or they would not be there ; if they are not in the parts, it would be difficult to maintain that the wholes were made of parts; if they are in the parts, they must be either wholly or partly in them ; if they are wholly in the parts, then there would be many such wholes, or in each part the whole would be found; and, if they are partly in the parts, then the same difficulty of wholes and parts would appear. Again, the concept of contact (samyogd) is also inexplicable. It 158 The Sankara School of Vedanta [CH. cannot be defined as the coming together of any two things which are not in contact (apraptayoh prdptih samyogah) ; for, until one knows the meaning of the concept of contact, one cannot under stand the meaning of the phrase "not in contact." If it is defined as the coming together of two things which are unrelated, then contact (samyoga) would include even the relation of inherence, such as that which exists between a piece of cloth and the threads. If it is defined as a relation which is produced in time and is transitory (anityah sambandhah janyatva-visesito va), then cases of beginningless contact would not be included, and even the pos session of an article by purchase would have to be included as contact, since this relation of possession is also produced in time. It cannot be objected that "possession" is not a relation, since a relation to be such must be between two things ; for, if the objection were valid, the relation between substance and quality would not be a relation, since quality and substance exist together, and there are no two separate things which can be related. If the objector means that the relation must be between two terms, then there are two terms here also, namely, the article possessed and the possessor. Moreover, if contact is defined as relation which does not connect two things in their entirety (avyapya-vrttitva-visesito), then again it would be wrong, since in the case of partless entities the relation of contact cannot connect the parts, as they have no parts. Citsukha refutes the concept of separation (vibhaga) on the same lines and passes over to the refutation of number, as two, three and the like. Citsukha urges that there is no necessity of admitting the existence of two, three, etc. as separate numbers, since what we per ceive is but the one thing, and then by a sense of oscillation and mutual reference (apeksa-buddhi) we associate them together and form the notions of two, three, etc. These numbers therefore do not exist separately and independently, but are imaginatively pro duced by mental oscillation and association from the experience of single objects. There is therefore no necessity of thinking that the numbers, two, three, etc., are actually produced. We simply deal with the notions of two, three, etc. on the strength of our powers of mental association 1 . 1 dropita-dvitva-tritvddi-visesitaikatva-samuccaydlamband buddhir dvitvddi- janiketi cet; na; tathdbhutdyd eva buddher dvitvddi-vyavahdra-janakatvopapattau dvitvddy-utpddakatva-kalpand-vaiyarthydt. Nayana-prasddinl, p. 300. xi] Citsukhcfs Interpretations of Veddnta Concepts 159 Citsukha then refutes the notion of class-concept (jatt) on the ground that it cannot be proved either by perception or by in ference. The question is what exactly is meant by class-concept. If it is said that, when in perceiving one individual animal we have the notion of a cow, and in perceiving other individual animals also we have the same notion of cow, there is^ ata, then it may be replied that this does not necessarily imply the admission of a separate class-concept of cow; for, just as one individual had certain peculiarities which entitled it to be called a cow, so the other individuals had their peculiarities which entitled them to be called cows. We see reflections of the moon in different places and call each of them the moon. What constitutes the essentials of the concept of cow? It is difficult to formulate one universal charac teristic of cows; if one such characteristic could be found, then there would be no necessity of admitting the class-concept of cow. For it would then be an individual characteristic, and one would recognize it as a cow everywhere, and there would be no necessity of admitting a separate class-concept. If one admits a class-concept, one has to point out some trait or quality as that which indicates the class-concept. Then again one could not get at this trait or quality independently of the class-concept or at the class-concept independently of it, and this mutual dependence would make the definition of either of them impossible. Even if one admits the class-concept, one has to show what constitutes the essentials of it in each case, and, if such essentials have to be found in each case, then those essentials would be a sufficient justification for knowing a cow as cow and a horse as horse: what then is the good of admitting a class-concept? Again, even if a class-concept be ad mitted, it is difficult to see how it can be conceived to be related to the individuals. It cannot be a relation of contact, identity, inherence or any other kind of relation existing anywhere. If all class-concepts existed everywhere, there would be a medley of all class-concepts together, and all things would be everywhere. Again, if it is held that the class-concept of cow exists only in the existing cows, then how does it jump to a new cow when it is born? Nor has the class-concept any parts, so as to be partly here and partly there. If each class-concept of cow were wholly existent in each of the individual cows, then there would be a number of class- concepts; and, if each class-concept of cow were spread out over all the individual cows, then, unless all the individual cows were 160 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. brought together, one could not have the notion of any class- concept. Speaking of the refutation of cause (karana), Citsukha says that cause cannot be denned as mere antecedence (purva-kala-bhavitva) ; for then the ass which is always found in the house of a washerman and on the back of which the washerman carries his clothes might be regarded as a thing antecedent to the smoky fire kindled in the washerman s house and thus as a cause of fire. If this antecedence be further qualified as that which is present in all cases of the presence of the effect and absent in all cases of the absence of the effect, then also the washerman s ass may be considered to satisfy the conditions of such an antecedence with reference to the fire in the washerman s house (when the washerman is away from the house with his ass, the fire in the washerman s house is also absent, and it is again kindled when he returns to his house with his ass). If "unconditionally " (ananyatha-siddha) is further added as a qualifying condition of antecedence, even then the ass and the common abiding elements such as space, ether and the like may be regarded as causes of the fire. If it be argued that the ass is present only because of the presence of other conditioning factors, the same may be said of seeds, earth, water, etc., which are all however regarded as being causes for the production of the shoots of plants. If objection be raised against the possibility of ether (akasa) being regarded as the cause of smoke on the ground of its being a common, abiding and all-pervasive element, then the same argument ought to stand as an objection against the soul (which is an all-pervasive entity) being regarded on the Nyaya view as the cause of the production of pleasure and pain. The cause cannot be defined as that which being there the effect follows; for then a seed cannot be regarded as the cause of the shoot of the plant, since the shoots cannot be produced from seeds without the help of other co-operating factors, such as earth, water, light, air, etc. Cause, again, cannot be defined as that which being present in the midst of the co-operating factors or even accessories (sahakari), the effect follows ; for an irrelevant thing, like an ass, may be present among a number of co-operating circumstances, but this would not justify anybody calling an irrelevant thing a cause. Moreover, such a definition would not apply to those cases where by the joint operation of many co-operating entities the effect is produced. Furthermore, unless the cause can be properly defined, there is xi] Citsukha s Interpretations of Veddnta Concepts 161 no way of defining the co-operating conditions. Nor can a cause be defined as that which being there the effect follows, and which not being there there is no effect (sati bhdvo saty abhava eva) ; for such a maxim is invalidated by the plurality of causes (fire may be produced by rubbing two pieces of wood, by striking hard against a flint, or by a lens). It may be urged that there are differences in each kind of fire produced by the different agencies : to which it may be replied that, even if there were any such difference, it is impossible to know it by observation. Even when differences are noticeable, such differences do not necessarily imply that the different effects belong to different classes ; for the differ ences might well be due to various attendant circumstances. Again, a cause cannot be defined as a collocation of things, since such a collocation may well be one of irrelevant things. A cause cannot be defined as a collocation of different causes, since it has not so far been possible to define what is meant by "cause." The phrase " collocation of causes " will therefore be meaningless. Moreover, it may be asked whether a collocation of causes (samagrl) be something different from the causes, or identical with them. If the former alternative be accepted, then effects would follow from individual causes as well, and the supposition of a collocation of causes as producing the effects would be uncalled-for. If the latter alternative be accepted, then, since the individuals are the causes of the col location, the individuals being there, there is always the colloca tion and so always the effect, which is absurd. Again, what does this collocation of causes mean? It cannot mean occurrence in the same time or place; for, there being no sameness of time and place for time and place respectively, they themselves would be without any cause. Again, it cannot be said that, if the existence of cause be not admitted, then things, being causeless, would be non-existent; for the Nyaya holds that there are eternal substances such as atoms, souls, etc., which have no cause. Since cause cannot be defined, neither can effect (karya) be satisfactorily defined, as the conception of effect always depends upon the notion of cause. In refuting the conception of substance (dravya) Citsukha says that a substance can be defined only as being that in which the qualities inhere. But, since even qualities are seen to have qualities and a substance is believed by the Naiyayikas to be without any quality at the moment of its origination, such a definition cannot DII JI 1 62 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. properly distinguish or define a substance. If a substance be defined in a roundabout way as that in which there is no presence of the absolute negation of possessing qualities (gunavattvaty- antdbhdvanadhikaranata) , then also it may be objected that such a definition would make us regard even negation (abhava) as a quality, since the absence of the negation of qualities, being itself a negation, cannot exist in a negation 1 . It may again be asked whether the absence of the negation of qualities refers to the negation of a number of qualities or the negation of all qualities ; in either case it is wrong. For in the first case a substance, which contains only some qualities and does not possess others, would not be called a substance, and in the latter case it would be difficult to find anything that cannot be called a substance; for where is the substance which lacks all qualities? The fact also remains that even such a roundabout definition cannot distin guish a substance from a quality; for even qualities have the numerical qualities and the qualities of separateness 2 . If it is argued that, if qualities are admitted to have further qualities, there will be a vicious infinite, it may be said in reply that the charge of vicious infinite cannot be made, since the qualities of number and separateness cannot be said to have any further qualities. Substances, again, have nothing in common by virtue of which they could be regarded as coming under the class-concept of substances 3 . Gold and mud and trees are all regarded as substances, but there is nothing common in them by virtue of which one can think that gold is the same as mud or tree; therefore it cannot be admitted that in the sub stances one finds any characteristic which remains the same in them all 4 . Referring to qualities (guna), Citsukha deals with the definition of guna in the Vaisesika-bhasya of Prasastapada. There Prasastapada defines guna as that which inheres in a substance, is associated with the class-concept of substance, is itself without any quality 1 tatraiva atyantdbhave tivydpteh; sopi hi gunavattvdtyantdbhdvas tasyddhi- karanam svasya svasminnavrtteh . Cit-sukht, p. 176. 2 asminnapi vakra-laksane gunddisu apt samkhyd-prthaktva-gunayoh pr.atiteh katham ndtivydptih. Ibid. p. 177. 3 jatim abhyupagacchatd tajjdti-vyanjakam kimcid-avasyam abhyupeyam na ca tannirupanam susakam. Ibid. p. 178. 4 dravyam dravyam iti anugata-pratyayah pramdnam iti cenna suvarnam- upalabhya mrttikdm-upalabhyamdnasya laukikasya tad evedam dravyam iti pratyayd-bhdvdt parlk$akdndm cdnugata-pratyaye vipratipatteh. Ibid. p. 179. xij Dialectic of Nagdrjuna and Vedanta Dialectic 163 and which has no motion (niskrtya) 1 . But the definition of a quality cannot involve the phrase "without a quality" ; for quality is still to be defined. Again, unless the guna is properly defined, its difference from motion is not known, and so the phrase "which has no motion" is meaningless. The class-concept of quality, again, can be determined only when the general character of qualities is known and the nature of class-concepts also is determined. Hence, from whatever point of view one may look at the question, it is impossible to define qualities. It is needless now to multiply examples of such refutation by Citsukha. It will appear from what has been adduced that Citsukha enters into detail concerning most concepts of particular categories and tries to show their intrinsic impossibility. In some cases, how ever, he was not equal to the task and remained content with criti cizing the definitions given by the Naiylyikas. But it may be well to point out here that, though Sriharsa and Citsukha carried out an elaborate scheme of a critique of the different categories in order to show that the definitions of these categories, as given by the Nyaya, are impossible, yet neither of them can be regarded as the originator of the application of the dialectic method in the Vedanta. Sankara himself had started it in his refutation of the Nyaya and other systems in his commentary on the Veddnta-sutras, n. n. The Dialectic of Nagarjuna and the Vedanta Dialectic. The dialectic of Sriharsa was a protest against the realistic definitions of the Nyaya- Vaisesika, which supposed that all that was knowable was also definable. It aimed at refuting these definitions in order to prove that the natures of all things are indefinable, as their existence and nature are all involved in may a. The only reality is Brahman. That it is easy to pick holes in all definitions was taught long ago by Nagarjuna, and in that sense (except for a tendency to find faults of a purely verbal nature in Nyaya defini tions) Sriharsa s method was a continuation of Nagarjuna s, and an application of it to the actual definitions of the Nyaya- Vaisesika. But the most important part of Nagarjuna s method was de liberately ignored by Sriharsa and his followers, who made no attempt to refute Nagarjuna s conclusions. Nagarjuna s main thesis is that all things are relative and hence indefinable in 1 rupddindm gundndm sarvesdm gunatvdbhisambandho dravydsntatvam nirgunatvam niskriyatvam. Prasastapdda-bhdsya, p. 94, The Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1895. 164 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. themselves, and so there is no way of discovering their essences; and, since their essences are not only indefinable and indescribable, but incomprehensible as well, they cannot be said to possess any essences of their own. Nagarjuna was followed by Aryadeva, a Ceylonese by birth, who wrote a separate work on the same subject in 400 verses. For about two centuries after this the doctrines of Nagarjuna lay dormant, as is evidenced by the fact that Buddha- ghosa of the fourth century A.D. does not refer to them. During the Gupta empire, in the fifth century A.D., Asahga and Vasubandhu flourished. In the sixth century A.D the relativist philosophy of Nagarjuna again flourished in the hands of Buddhapalita, of Valabhl in Surat, and of Bhavya, or Bhavaviveka, of Orissa. The school of Bhavya was called Madhyamika-Sautrantika on account of his supplementing Nagarjuna s arguments with special argu ments of his own. At this time the Yogacara school of Mahayana monism developed in the north, and the aim of this school was to show that for the true knowledge of the one consciousness (vijnana) all logical arguments were futile. All logical arguments showed only their own inconsistency 1 . It seems very probable that Srlharsa was inspired by these Yogacara authors, and their relativist allies from Nagarjuna to Bhavya, and Candraklrti, the master commentator on Nagar)una sMadhyamika-karikd. Buddha palita sought to prove that the apprehension and realization of the idealistic monism cannot be made by any logical argument, since all logic is futile and inconsistent, while Bhavaviveka sought to estab lish his idealistic monism by logical arguments. Candraklrti finally supported Buddhapalita s scheme as against the scheme of Bhava viveka and tried to prove the futility of all logical arguments. It was this Madhyamika scheme of Candraklrti that finally was utilized in Tibet and Mongolia for the realization of idealistic monism. In taking up his refutation of the various categories of being Nagarjuna begins with the examination of causation. Causation in the non-Buddhistic systems of philosophy is regarded as being production from the inner changes of some permanent or abiding stuff or through the conglomeration (samagrl) of several factors or through some factors operating upon an unchangeable and abiding stuff. But Nagarjuna denies not only that anything is ever produced, but also that it is ever produced in any one of the above ways. Buddhapalita holds that things cannot arise 1 The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, pp. 66-67. Published by the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Leningrad, 1927. xi] Dialectic of Ndgdrjuna and Vedanta Dialectic 165 of themselves, since, if they are already existing, there is no meaning in their being produced ; if things that are existing are regarded as capable of being produced again, then things would eternally continue to be produced. Bhavaviveka, criticizing Buddhapalita, says that the refutation of Buddhapalita should have been supplemented with reasons and examples and that his refutation would imply the undesirable thesis that, if things are not produced of themselves, they must be produced by other factors. But Candraklrti objects to this criticism of Bhavaviveka and says that the burden of proof in establishing the identity of cause and effect lies with the opponents, the Samkhyists, who hold that view. There is no meaning in the production of what already exists, and, if that which is existent has to be produced again, and that again, there will be an infinite regress. It is unnecessary to give any new argument to refute the Samkhya sat-kdrya-vada view ; it is enough to point out the inconsistency of the Samkhya view. Thus Aryadeva says that the Madhyamika view has no thesis of its own which it seeks to establish, since it does not believe in the reality or unreality of anything or in the combination of reality and unreality 1 . This was exactly the point of view that was taken by Sriharsa. Sriharsa says that the Vedantists have no view of their own regarding the things of the world and the various cate gories involved in them. Therefore there was no way in which the Vedanta view could be attacked. The Vedanta, however, is free to find fault with other views, and, when once this is done and the inconsistencies of other positions are pointed out, its business is finished; for it has no view of its own to establish. Nagarjuna writes in his Vigraha-vydvartani thus : When I have these (of my own to prove), I can commit mistakes just for the sake (of proving) ; But I have none. I cannot be accused (of being inconsistent). If I did (really) cognize some (separate) things, I could then make an affirmation or a denial Upon the basis of these things perceived or (inferred). But these (separate) things do not exist for me. Therefore I cannot be assailed on such a basis 2 . sad asat sad~asac ceti yasya pakso na vidyate updlambhas cirendpi tasya vaktum na sakyate. Mddhyamika-vrtti, p. 16. anyat pratltya yadi ndma paro bhavisyat jdyeta tarhi bahulah sikhino ndhakdrah sarvasya janma ca bhavet khalu sarvatas ca tulyam paratvam akhile janake pi yasmdt. Ibid. p. 36. 1 66 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. Candrakirti thus emphasizes the fact that it is not possible for the Madhyamikas to offer new arguments or new examples in criticizing any view, since they have no view of their own to support. They cannot even prove their own affirmations, and, if their affirma tions contain any thesis, they quarrel with it also themselves. So the Madhyamika scheme of criticism consists only in finding fault with all theses, whatever they may be, and in replying to the counter-charges so far as inconsistencies can be found in the opponents theses and methods, but not in adducing any new arguments or any new counter- theses, since the Madhyamikas have no theses of their own. In an argument one can only follow the principles that one admits ; no one can be defeated by arguments carried on on the basis of principles admitted only by his opponents. Things are not produced by any conglomeration of foreign factors or causes ; for, were it so, there would be no law of such production and anything might come from any other thing, e.g. dark ness from light 1 . And, if a thing cannot be produced out of itself or out of others, it cannot be produced by a combination of them both. Again, the world could not have sprung into being without any cause (ahetutah). The Buddhist logicians try to controvert this view by pointing out that, whatever a view may be, it must be established by proper proof. So, in order to prove the thesis that all existents are un- produced, the Madhyamikas must give some proofs, and this would involve a further specification of the nature of such proofs and a specification of the number of valid proofs admitted by them. But, if the thesis that all existents are unproved" is a mere assertion without any proof to support it, then any number of counter- assertions may be made for which no proof need be shown ; and, if proofs are not required in one case, they cannot be required in the other. So one could with equal validity assert that all existents are real and are produced from causes. The Madhyamika answer to such an objection, as formulated by Candrakirti, is that the Madhyamika has no thesis of his own and so the question whether his thesis is supported by valid proof or not is as meaningless as the question regarding the smallness or the greatness of a mule s horn. Since there is no thesis, the Madhyamika has nothing to 1 Mddhyamika-vrtti, p. 36. See also Stcherbatsky s The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, to which the author is indebted for the translation and some of the materials of the last two paragraphs. xi] Dialectic of Ndgdrjuna and Vedanta Dialectic 167 say regarding the nature of valid proofs (pramand) or their number. But it may well be asked why, if the Madhyamika has no thesis of his own, should he hold the proposition that all existents are unproduced (sarve bhava anutpannah)? To this the Madhyamika replies that such propositions appear as definite views only to ordinary people, not to the wise. The proper attitude for the wise is always to remain silent. They impart instruction only from a popular point of view to those who want to listen to them. Their arguments are not their own or those which they believe to be right, but only such as would appeal to their hearers. It is not out of place here to mention that the Madhyamika school wishes to keep the phenomenal and the real or the transcen dental views wide apart. In the phenomenal view things are ad mitted to be as they are perceived, and their relations are also conceived as real. It is interesting to refer to the discussion of Candrakirti with Dinnaga regarding the nature of sense-percep tions. While Dinnaga urges that a thing is what it is in itself (sva-laksana) , Candrakirti holds that, since relations are also per ceived to be true, things are relational as well. Phenomenally substances exist as well as their qualities. The "thing in itself" of Dinnaga was as much a relative concept as the relational things that are popularly perceived as true ; that being so, it is meaningless to define perception as being only the thing in itself. Candrakirti thus does not think that any good can be done by criticizing the realistic logic of the Naiyayikas, since, so far as popular perceptions or conceptions go, the Nyaya logic is quite competent to deal with them and give an account of them. There is a phenomenal reality and order which is true for the man in the street and on which all our linguistic and other usages are based. Dinnaga, in defining perception, restricts it to the unique thing in itself (sva-laksand) and thinks that all associations of quality and relations are ex traneous to perceptions and should be included under imagination or inference. This however does violence to our ordinary experience and yet serves no better purpose ; for the definition of perception as given by Dinnaga is not from the transcendental point of view. If that is so, why not accept the realistic conceptions of the Nyaya school, which fit in with the popular experience? This reminds us of the attitude of the Vedantists, who on the one hand accepted the view-point of popular experience and regarded all things as having a real objective existence, and on the other 1 68 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. hand considered them as false and unreal from the transcendental point of view of ultimate reality. The attitude of the Vedantists on this point seems to have been directly inspired by that of the Madhyamikas. The attempts of Srlharsa to refute the realistic definitions of the Nyaya were intended to show that the definitions of the Nyaya could not be regarded as absolute and true, as the Naiyayikas used to think. But, while the Madhyamikas, who had no view-points of their own to support, could leave the field of experience absolutely undisturbed and allow the realistic defini tions of the Nyaya to explain the popular experience in any way they liked, the Vedanta had a thesis of its own, namely, that the self-luminous Brahman was the only reality and that it was through it that everything else was manifested. The Vedanta there fore could not agree with Nyaya interpretations of experience and their definitions. But, as the Vedanta was unable to give the manifold world-appearance a footing in reality, it regarded it as somehow existing by itself and invented a theory of perception by which it could be considered as being manifested by coming in touch with Brahman and being illusorily imposed on it. Continuing the discussion on the nature of causation, Nagar- juna and Candrakirti hold that collocations of causal conditions which are different from the effect cannot produce the effect, as is held by the Hinayana Buddhists ; for, since the effect is not per ceived in those causal conditions, it cannot be produced out of them, and, if it is already existent in them, its production becomes useless. Production of anything out of some foreign or extraneous causes implies that it is related to them, and this relation must mean that it was in some way existent in them. The main principle which Nagarjuna employs in refuting the idea of causation or production in various ways is that, if a thing exists, it cannot be produced, and, if it does not exist, it cannot be produced at all. That which has no essence in itself cannot be caused by anything else, and, having no essence in itself, it cannot be the cause of anything else 1 . Nagarjuna similarly examines the concepts of going and coming and says that the action of going is not to be found in the space traversed, nor is it to be found in that which is not traversed; and apart from the space traversed and not traversed there cannot be any action of going. If it is urged that going is neither in the space 1 Mddhyamika-vrtti, p. 90, 1. 6. xi] Dialectic of Ndgdrjuna and Veddnta Dialectic 169 traversed nor in the space untraversed, but in the person who continues to go, since going is in him in whom there is the effort of going, then this again cannot be right. For, if the action of going is to be associated with the person who goes, it cannot be asso ciated with the space traversed. One action cannot be connected with both; and, unless some space is gone over, there cannot be a goer. If going is in the goer alone, then even without going one could be called a goer, which is impossible. If both the goer and the space traversed have to be associated with going, then there must be two actions and not one ; and, if there are two actions, that implies that there are also two agents. It may be urged that the movement of going is associated with the goer and that therefore going belongs to the goer ; but, if there is no going without the goer and if there is no goer without going, how can going be associated with the goer at all? Again, in the proposition "the goer goes" (gantd gacchati) there is only one action of going, and that is satisfied by the verb "goes"; what separate "going" is there by virtue of association with which a "goer" can be so called? and, since there are no two actions of going, there cannot be a goer. Again, the movement of going cannot even be begun; for, when there is the motion of going, there is no beginning and when there is no motion of going, there cannot be any beginning. Again, it cannot be urged that "going" must exist, since its opposite, "re maining at rest" (sthiti), exists; for who is at rest? The goer cannot be at rest, since no one can be a goer unless he goes ; he who is not a goer, being already at rest, cannot be the agent of another action of being at rest. If the goer and going be regarded as identical, then there would be neither verb nor agent. So there is no reality in going. " Going" stands here for any kind of passage or becoming, and the refutation of " going" implies the refutation of all kinds of passage (niskarsand) as well. If seeds passed into the state of shoots (ankura), then they would be seeds and not shoots; the shoots neither are seeds nor are different from them; yet, the seeds being there, there are the shoots. A pea is from another pea, yet no pea becomes another pea. A pea is neither in another pea nor different from it. It is as one may see in a mirror the beautiful face of a woman and feel attracted by it and run after her, though the face never passed into the mirror and there was no human face in the reflected image. Just as the essenceless reflected image of a woman s face may rouse attachment in fools, 1 70 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. so are world-appearances the causes of our delusion and attach ment. It is needless to multiply examples and describe elaborately Nagarjuna s method of applying his dialectic to the refutation of the various Buddhistic and other categories. But from what has been said it may be possible to compare or contrast Nagarjuna s dialectic with that of Sriharsa. Neither Nagarjuna nor Sriharsa is interested to give any rational explanation of the world-process, nor are they interested to give a scientific reconstruction of our world-experience. They are agreed in discarding the validity of world-experience as such. But, while Nagarjuna had no thesis of his own to uphold, Sriharsa sought to establish the validity and ultimate reality of Brahman. But, it does not appear that he ever properly tried to apply his own dialectic to his thesis and attempted to show that the definition of Brahman could stand the test of the criticism of his own dialectic. Both Nagarjuna and Sriharsa were, however, agreed in the view that there was no theory of the recon struction of world-appearance which could be supported as valid. But, while Sriharsa attacked only the definitions of the Nyaya, Nagarjuna mainly attacked the accepted Buddhistic categories and also some other relevant categories which were directly connected with them. But the entire efforts of Sriharsa were directed to showing that the definitions of the Nyaya were faulty and that there was no way in which the Nyaya could define its categories properly. From the fact that the Nyaya could not define its categories he rushed to the conclusion that they were intrinsically indefinable and that therefore the world-appearance which was measured and scanned in terms of those categories was also false. Nagarjuna s methods differ considerably from those of Sriharsa in this, that the concepts which he criticized were shown by him to have been intrinsically based and constructed on notions which had no essential nature of their own, but were understood only in relation to others. No concept revealed any intrinsic nature of its own, and one could understand a concept only through another, and that again through the former or through another, and so on. The entire world-appearance would thus be based on relative conceptions and be false. Nagarjuna s criticisms are, however, largely of an a priori nature, and do not treat the concepts in a concrete manner and are not based on the testimony of our psychological experience. The oppositions shown are therefore xi] Dialectical criticisms of Santaraksita and Kamalaslla 171 very often of an abstract nature and occasionally degenerate into verbalism. But as a rule they are based on the fundamentally relative nature of our experience. They are never half so elaborate as the criticisms of Srlharsa ; but at the same time they are funda mentally more convincing and more direct than the elaborate roundabout logical subtleties of Srlharsa s dialectic. It cannot be denied that, based on the dialectical methods of Nagarjuna, Buddhapalita and Candrakirti, Sriharsa s criticisms, following an altogether different plan of approach, show wonderful powers of logical subtlety and finesse, though the total effect can hardly be regarded as an advance from the strictly philosophical point of view, while the frequent verbalism of many of his criticisms is a discredit to his whole venture. Dialectical criticisms of Santaraksita and Kamalaslla (A.D. 760) as forerunners of Vedanta Dialectics. (a) Criticisms of the Sdmkhya Parindma Doctrine. In tracing the history of the dialectical ways of thinking in the Vedanta it has been pointed out in the previous sections that the influence of Nagarjuna and Candrakirti on Sankara and some of his followers, such as Srlharsa, Citsukha and others, was very great. It has also been pointed out that not only Nagarjuna and Candra kirti, but many other Buddhist writers, had taken to critical and dialectical ways of discussion. The criticism of the different schools of Indian thought, as contained in Santaraksita s Tattva-samgraha with Kamalaslla s commentary Panjika, is a remarkable instance of this. Santaraksita lived in the first half of the eighth century A.D., and Kamalaslla was probably his junior contemporary. They refuted the views of Kambalasvatara, a follower of the Lokayata school, the Buddhist Vasumitra (A.D. 100), Dharmatrata (A.D. 100), Ghosaka (A.D. 150), Buddhadeva (A.D. 200), the Naiyayika Vatsya- yana (A.D. 300), the Mimamsist Sabarasv^min (A.D. 300), the Samkhyist Vindhyasvamin (A.D. 300), the Buddhist Sarighabhadra (A.D. 350), Vasubandhu (A.D. 350), the Samkhyist Isvarakrsna (A.D. 390), the Buddhist Dinnaga (A.D. 400), the Jaina Acaryasuri (A.D. 478), the Samkhyist Mathara Acarya (A.D. 500), the Naiyayika Uddyotakara (A.D. 600), the rhetorician Bhamaha (A.D. 640), the Buddhist Dharmakirti (A.D. 650), the grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari (A.D. 650), the Mimamsist Kumarila Bhatta (A.D. 680), 172 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. the Jaina Subhagupta (A.D. 700), the Buddhist Yugasena (A.D. 700), the Naiyayika Aviddhakarna (A.D. 700), Sankarasvamin (A.D. 700), Prasastamati (A.D. 700), Bhavivikta (A.D. 700), the Jaina Patrasvamin (A.D. 700), Ahrika (A.D. 700), Sumati (A.D. 700), and the Mlmamsist Uveyaka (A.D. 700) 1 . It is not possible here, of course, to enter into a complete analysis of all the criticisms of the different philosophers by Santaraksita and Kamalaslla ; yet some of the important points of these criticisms may be noted in order to show the nature and importance of this work, which also reveals the nature of the critical thinking that prevailed among the Buddhists before Sankara and by which Sankara and his followers, like Sriharsa, Citsukha or Anandajnana, were in all probability greatly in fluenced. In criticizing the Samkhya views they say that, if the effects, the evolutes, be identical with the cause, the pradhana, why should they be produced from the pradhanat If they are identical, then the evolutes themselves might be regarded as cause or the pradhana as effect. The ordinary way of determining causality is invariable antecedence, and that is avowedly not available here. The idea of parinama, which means identity in diversity, the causal scheme of the Samkhya, is also inadmissible; for, if it is urged that any entity changes into diverse forms, it may be asked whether the nature of the causal entity also changes or does not change. If it does not change, then the causal and the effect states should abide together in the later product, which is impossible; if it changes, then there is nothing that remains as a permanent cause ; for this would only mean that a previous state is arrested and a new state is produced. If it is urged that causal trans formation means the assumption of new qualities, it may be asked whether such qualities are different from the causal sub stance or not; if they are, then the occurrence of new qualities cannot entitle one to hold the view that the causal substance is undergoing transformations (parinama). If the changing qualities and the causal substance are identical, then the first part of the argument would reappear. Again, the very arguments that are given in favour of the sat-karya-vada (existence of the effect in the cause) could be turned against it. Thus, if curds, etc. already exist 1 These dates are collected from Dr B.Bhattacharya s foreword to the Tattva- samgraha. The present author, though he thinks that many of these dates are generally approximately correct, yet, since he cannot spare the room for proper discussions, does not take responsibility for them. xi] Dialectical criticisms of Sdntaraksita and Kamalasila 173 in the nature of the milk, then what is the meaning of their being produced from it? If there is no idea of production, there is no idea of causality. If it is urged that the effects are potentially existent in the cause, and causal operations only actualize them, then it is admitted that the effects are actually non-existent in the cause, and we have to admit in the cause some specific character istic, brought about by the causal operation, on account of the absence of which the effects remained in the potential state in the cause, and that the causal operations which actualize the effects produce some specific determinations in the cause, in consequence of which the effect, which was non-existent before, is actualized; this would mean that what was non-existent could be produced, which would be against the sat-karya-vada theory. In the light of the above criticisms, since according to the sat-karya-vada theory causal productions are impossible, the arguments of Samkhya in favour of sat-karya-vada, that only particular kinds of effects are produced from particular kinds of causes, are also inadmissible. Again, according to Samkhya, nothing ought to be capable of being definitely asserted, since according to the sat-karya-vada theory doubts and errors are always existent as a modification of either buddhi, manas or caitanya. Again, the application of all Samkhya arguments might be regarded as futile, since all arguments are intended to arrive at decisive conclusions ; but de cisive conclusions, being effects, are already existent. If, however, it is contended that decisive conclusions were not existent before, but were produced by the application of arguments, then there is production of what was non-existent, and thus the sat-karya-vada theory fails. If it is urged that, though the decisive conclusion (niscaya) is already existent before the application of the argumen tative premises, yet it may be regarded as being manifested by the application of those premises, the Samkhyist may be asked to define what he means by such manifestation (abhivyakti). This manifes tation may mean either some new characteristic or some knowledge or the withdrawal of some obscuration to the comprehension. In the first alternative, it may again be asked whether this new character (svabhavatisayd) that is generated by the application of the premises is different from the decisive conclusion itself or identical with it. If it is identical, there is no meaning in its introduction; if it is different, no relation is admissible between these two, since any attempt to introduce a relation between 174 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. two unrelated entities would launch us into a vicious infinite (anavastha). It cannot mean the rise of the knowledge about that particular object for the manifestation of which the premises are applied; for, according to the sat-karya-vada theory, that know ledge is already there. Again, it cannot mean the removal of the obscuration of knowledge; for, if there is obscuration, that also must be ever- existent. As a matter of fact, the whole of the teachings of Samkhya philosophy directed to the rise of true knowledge ought to be false, for true knowledge is ever-existent, and therefore there ought to be no bondage, and therefore all persons should always remain emancipated. Again, if there is any false knowledge, it could not be destroyed, and therefore there could be no emancipation. Santaraksita and Kamalasila then urge that, though the above refutation of the sat-karya-vada ought naturally to prove the a-sat- karya-vdda (the production of that which did not exist before) doctrine, yet a few words maybe said in reply to the Samkhya refuta tion of a- sat-karya-vada. Thus the argument that that which is non existent has no form (nairupya) and therefore cannot be produced is false ; for the operation of production represents itself the character of the thing that is being produced. As the Satkaryavadins think that out of the same three gunas different kinds of effects may be pro duced according to causal collocations, so here also, according to the law of different kinds of causal forces (karana-sakti-pratiniyamai), different kinds of non-existing effects come into being. It is meaningless to hold that the limitation of causal forces is to be found in the pre-existence of effects ; for, in reality, it is on account of the varying capacities of the causal forces that the various effects of the causes are produced. The production of various effects is thus solely due to the diverse nature of the causal forces that produce them. The law of causal forces is thus ultimately funda mental. The name a- sat-karya-vada, however, is a misnomer; for certainly there is no such non-existent entity which comes into being 1 . Production in reality means nothing more than the charac teristic of the moment only, divested from all associations of a previous and a succeeding point of time 2 . The meaning of a-sat- karya-vada is that an entity called the effect is seen immediately 1 na hy asan-ndma kincid asti yad utpattim dviset, kintu kdlpaniko yam vyava- hdro yad asad ntpadyata iti ydvat. Tattva-samgraha-panjikd, p. 33. 2 vastundm purvdpara-koti-sunya-ksana-mdtrdvasthdyl svabhdva eva utpddah ity ucyate. Ibid. xi] Dialectical criticisms of Santaraksita and Kamalasila 175 after a particular causal operation; and it certainly did not exist before this second moment, since, if it did exist at the first moment of the causal operation, it would have been perceived ; it is therefore said that the effect did not exist before; but this should not be interpreted to mean that the Buddhists believed in the non-existing existence of the effect, which suddenly came into being after the causal operadon. Refuting the other Samkhya doctrines, Santaraksita and Kamalasila point out that, if an effect (e.g. curd) is said to exist in the cause (e.g. milk), it cannot do so in the actual form of the effect, since then milk would have tasted as curd. If it is said to exist in the form of a special capacity or potency (sakti), then the existence of the effect in the cause is naturally denied ; for it is the potency of the effect that exists in the cause and not the effect itself. Again, the Samkhyists believe that all sensible things are of the nature of pleasure and pain; this, however, is obviously im possible, since only conscious states can be regarded as pleasurable or painful. There is no sense at all in describing material things as of the nature of pleasure or pain. Again, if objective material things were themselves pleasurable or painful, then the fact that the same objects may appear pleasurable to some and painful to others would be unexplainable. If, however, it is held that even pleasurable objects may appear painful to someone, on account of his particular state of mind or bad destiny, then the objects them selves cannot be pleasurable or painful. Again, if objects are re garded as being made up of three gunas, there is no reason for admitting one eternal prakrti as the source of them all. If causes are similar to effects, then from the fact that the world of objects is many and limited and non-eternal one ought to suppose that the cause of the objects also should be many, limited and non- eternal. It is sometimes held that, as all earthen things are produced from one earth, so all objects are produced from one prakrti\ but this also is a fallacious argument, since all earthen things are produced not out of one lump of earth, but from different lumps. Thus, though it may be inferred that the world of effects must have its causes, this cannot lead us to infer that there is one such cause as the prakrti of the Samkhyists. 176 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. (b) Criticism of Isvar a. One of the chief arguments of the Naiyayika theists in favour of the existence of God is based on the fact that the specific forms and shapes of the different objects in the world cannot be explained except on the supposition of an intelligent organizer or shaper. To this Santaraksita and Kamalaslla reply that we perceive only the different kinds of visual and tactile sensibles and that there are no further shaped wholes or so-called objects, which men fancy themselves to be perceiving. It is meaningless to think that the visual sensibles and tactile sensibles go together to form one whole object. When people say that it is the same coloured object, seen in the day, that we touched in the night when we did not see it, they are wrong ; for colour sensibles or sense-data are entirely different kinds of entities from tactile sense- data, and it is meaning less to say that it is the same object or whole which has both the colour and tactile characteristics. If two colour sensibles, say yellow and blue, are different, then still more different are the colour sensibles and the tactile ones. What exist therefore are not wholes having colour and tactile characters, but only discrete elements of colour and tactile sense-data ; the combining of them into wholes is due only to false imagination. There are no objects which can be perceived by the two senses; there is no proof that it is one identical object that is perceived by the eye as well as touched. There exist therefore only loose and discrete sense- data. There being thus no shaped wholes, the supposition of the existence of God as shaper and organizer is inadmissible. The mere fact that there are the effects cannot lead to the inference that there is one intelligent creator and organizer, since a causal inference cannot be made from mere similarity of any description ; there must be a law of unconditional and invariable connection (pratibandha). The argument that, since jugs, etc. are made by an intelligent potter, so trees, etc. must also have been made by an intelligent creator, is faulty; for trees, etc., are so different in nature from jugs, etc., that it is wrong to make any assertion from the former to the latter. The general Buddhist arguments against the existence of any eternal entity will also apply against the existence of any eternal God. The argument that, since a state of arrest breaks up into a state of motion or production in all natural phenomena, there must be an intelligent creator, is wrong; xi] Dialectical criticisms of Sdntaraksita and Kamalasila 177 for there is no state of arrest in nature ; all things in the world are momentary. Again, if things are happening in succession, at intervals, through the operation of a causal agent, then God also must be operating at intervals and, by the arguments of the opponents themselves, He must have another being to guide His operations, and that another, and that another, and there would thus be a vicious infinite. If God had been the creator, then everything would have sprung into being all at once. He ought not to depend on accessory assistance; for, He being the creator of all such accessory circumstances, they could not render Him any assistance in His creation. Again, if it is urged that the above argument does not hold, because God only creates when He wishes, then it may be replied that, since God s will is regarded as eternal and one, the old objection of simultaneous production holds good. Moreover, since God is eternal and since His will depends only on Him and Him alone, His will cannot be transitory. Now, if He and His will be always present, and yet at the moment of the production of any particular phenomenon all other pheno mena are not produced, then those phenomena cannot be regarded as being caused by God or by His will. Again, even if for argu ment s sake it may be granted that all natural objects, such as trees, hills, etc., presuppose intelligent creators, there is no argu ment for supposing that one intelligent creator is the cause of all diverse natural objects and phenomena. Therefore there is no argument in favour of the existence of one omniscient creator. The arguments urged in refutation of prakrti and Isvara would also apply against the Patanjala-Samkhya, which admits the joint causality of Isvara and prakrti; for here also, prakrti and Isvara being eternal causes, one would expect to have simultaneous pro duction of all effects. If it is urged that the three gunas behave as accessory causes with reference to God s operation, then also it may be asked whether at the time of productive activity (sarga) the activity of dissolution or of maintenance (sthiti) may also be expected to be operated, or whether at the time of dissolution, there might be productive operation as well. If it is urged that, though all kinds of forces are existent in prakrti, yet it is only those that become operative that take effect, it may be objected that some other kind of cause has to be admitted for making some powers of prakrti operative, while others are inoperative, and this would introduce a third factor; thus the joint causality of purnsa DII 2 178 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. and prakrti is also easily refuted. Again, the view that God produces the world through kindness is also false ; for, had it been so, the world would not have been so full of misery. Again, there being before creation no beings, God could not feel kindness to non existent beings. He would not have destroyed the world had He been so kind ; if He created and destroyed the world in accordance with the good or bad deeds, then He would not be independent. Had He been independent, He would not have allowed Himself to be influenced by the consequences of bad deeds in producing misery in the world. If He created the world out of mere playful instincts, then these playful instincts would be superior to Him. If He derived much enjoyment from His productive and destructive play, then, if He were able, He would have created and destroyed the world simultaneously. If He is not capable of creating and de stroying the world simultaneously, then there is no reason to suppose that He would be able to do it at intervals. If it is urged that the world was produced naturally by His own existence, then there would be simultaneous production. If it is objected that, just as spiders, though they naturally go on producing webs, yet do not produce them all at once, so God also may be producing the world gradually and not all at once, it may then be pointed out that the analogy of spider s webs is false, since the spider does not naturally produce webs, but only through greed for eating insects, and its activities are determined by such motives. God, however, is One who can have only one uniform motive. If it is urged that creation flows from God unconsciously, as it were, it may readily be objected that a being who creates such a great universe without any intelligent purpose would indeed be very unintelligent. (c) Refutation of the Soul Theory. The Nyaya view of the soul, that our thoughts must have a knower and that our desires and feelings must have some entity in which they may inhere and that this entity is soul and that it is the existence of this one soul that explains the fact of the unity of all our conscious states as the experience of one individual, is objected to by Santaraksita and Kamalaslla. They hold that no thought or knowledge requires any further knower for its illumina tion; if it had been so, there would be a vicious infinite. Again, desires, feelings, etc., are not like material objects, which would xi] Dialectical criticisms of Sdntaraksita and Kamalaslla 179 require a receptacle in which they might be placed. The so-called unity of consciousness is due to a false unifying imagination of the momentary ones as one. It is also well known that different entities may be regarded as combined on account of their fulfilling the same kinds of functions. It is knowledge in its aspect of ego that is often described as the self, though there is no objective entity corresponding to it. It is sometimes argued that the existence of the soul is proved by the fact that a man is living only so long as his vital currents are connected with the soul, and that he dies when they are disconnected from it; but this is false, since, unless the existence of soul be proved, the supposition of its con nection with vital currents as determining life is untenable. Some, however, say that the self is directly perceived in experience ; if it had not been, there would not have been such diversity of opinion about its existence. The sense of ego cannot be said to refer to the self; for the sense of ego is not eternal, as it is supposed to be. On the other hand, it refers sometimes to our body (as when I say, " I am white "), sometimes to the senses (as when I say, " I am deaf "), and sometimes to intellectual states. It cannot be said that its reference to body or to senses is only indirect ; for no other per manent and direct realization of its nature is found in experience. Feelings, desires, etc., also often arise in succession and cannot therefore be regarded as inhering in a permanent self. The con clusion is that, as all material objects are soulless, so also are human beings. The supposed eternal soul is so different from the body that it cannot be conceived how one can help the other or even be related to it. Thus there is hardly any argument in favour of the soul theory of the Nyaya and Vaisesika. ( d) Refutation of the Mlmamsa Theory of the Self. Kumarila believed that, though the nature of the self as pure consciousness was eternal and unchangeable, yet it passed through various changing phases of other feeling and volitional states. That the self was of the nature of pure consciousness was proved by the fact that it perceives itself to be knower in the past and in the present. So the existence of the self is proved by the fact of self-consciousness. To this Santaraksita and Kamalaslla reply that, if the self is regarded as one eternal consciousness, then know ledge or the knowing faculty (buddhi) ought also to be regarded as similarly one and eternal; but seemingly Kumarila does not 180 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. consider buddhi to be such. If the knowing faculty be regarded as eternal and one, how are the varying states of cognition, such as colour-cognition, taste-cognition, etc., to be explained? If it is urged that, though the knowing faculty is one, yet (just as a fire, though it has always a capacity of burning, yet burns only when combustible substances are put in it) it only passes through various kinds of perception according as various kinds of objects are presented to it ; or, just as a mirror, though it has always the power of reflecting, yet only reflects when the objects are presented to it, so the selves are eternally conscious and yet operate only in connection with their specific bodies and grasp the various kinds of sense-data, and all cognitions are forged from them(selves). If the change of cognitions is due to the changing operations of the senses and the sense-objects, then such a cognizing faculty cannot be regarded as eternal and one. If the knowing faculty is to be re garded as eternal owing to an experience of continuity of conscious ness, then how can one explain the variety of cognitions? If it is urged that the variety of cognitions is due to the assumption by the cognizing faculty of various forms of objects, then how can one explain the experience of the variety of cognitions in hallucinations, when there are no objects? Moreover the Mlmamsist does not think that the cognizing faculty assumes the forms of the objects cognized, but believes that cognition reveals the objects in the objective world and the cognizing faculty has itself no forms (nirdkdrd buddhih). The fact that there may be cognitions without a corresponding real objective presentation proves that our cogni tions are subjective and self-revealed and that they do not reveal objective entities. If it is urged that the knowing faculty has always the power of revealing all things, then sound-cognition would be the same as colour-cognition. The analogy of fire is also false, since there is not one fire that is constant ; the analogy of the reflecting mirror is also false, since there is really no reflection in the mirror itself; one can see a reflection in a mirror at a particular angle, the mirror therefore is only an apparatus for producing an illusory cognition. Again, the buddhi cannot be compared to a mirror as an apparatus for producing illusory images; for then some other buddhi would be necessary for perceiving illusory images. Again, if the self is regarded as one and eternal, then it cannot pass through the varying feeling and volitional states. If these states are not entirely different from the self, then their changes would imply the change of the self; and again, if they are entirely different from xi] Dialectical criticisms of Sdntaraksita and Kamalasila 181 the self, how should their change affect the self? Again, if these states all belong to the self and it is urged that it is when the pleasurable state is submerged in the nature of the common self, that the painful state may arise, it may be pointed out in objection that, if the pleasurable states could be submerged in the nature of the self in identity with itself, then they would be identical with the nature of the self. It is also wrong to suppose that the sense of self-consciousness refers to a really existing entity corresponding to it. It has in reality no specific object to refer to as the self. It may therefore be safely asserted that the existence of the self is not proved by the evidence of self-consciousness. (e) Refutation of the Samkhya View of the Self. Against the Samkhya view of the self it is pointed out that the Samkhya regards the self as pure consciousness, one and eternal, and that, as such, it ought not to be able to enjoy diverse kinds of experiences. If it is held that enjoyment, etc., all belong to buddhi and the purusa only enjoys the reflections in the buddhi, it may well be objected that if the reflections in the buddhi are identical with purusa, then with their change the purusa also undergoes a change; and if they are different, the purusa cannot be considered to be their enjoy er. Again, if the prakrti concen trates all its activities for the enjoyment of the purusa, how can it be regarded as unconscious? Again, if all actions and deeds belong to buddhi, and if buddhi be different from purusa, why should the purusa suffer for what is done by the buddhit If, again, the nature of purusa cannot be affected by the varying states of pleasure and pain, then it cannot be regarded as an en- joyer; and, if it could be affected, it would itself be changeable. (/) The Refutation of the Upanisad View of the Self. The Upanisadic thinkers hold that it is one eternal conscious ness that illusorily appears as all objects, and that there is in reality no perceiver and perceived, but only one eternal consciousness. Against this view it is urged by Santaraksita and Kamalasila that, apart from the individual cognitions of colour, taste, etc., no eternal, unchangeable consciousness is experienced. If one eternal consciousness is the one reality, then there cannot be a distinction of false knowledge and right knowledge, bondage and emancipa tion. There being only one reality, there is no right knowledge which need be attained. 1 82 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. (g) Refutation of the Theory of the Persistence of Existing Entities. Santaraksita and Kamalaslla point out that the Naiyayikas divide existing entities into two classes, as produced (krtaka) and unproduced (a-krtakd), and they hold that those which are produced are destructible. The Vatsiputriyas also similarly divide existing entities into momentary (e.g. ideas, sound, flame, etc.) and non-momentary (e.g. earth, sky, etc.). On this point Santa- raksita and Kamalaslla urge that whatever is produced is momen tary, since the destructibility of momentary things does not de pend on any cause excepting the fact that they are produced ; for, had the destructibility of such entities depended on conditions or causes other than the fact of their being produced, then the premise that whatever is produced is necessarily destructible would be false. The Naiyayika view, therefore, that produced entities depend for their destruction on other conditions, is false. If pro duced entities do not depend for their destruction on any other condition or cause than the fact of their being produced, then they must be destroyed the moment they are produced, or in other words they are momentary. Moreover, destruction, being nega tion, is not a positive entity and is absolutely contentless, and only positive entities depend on other conditions or causes for their production. Destruction, being negation, is not produced by any conditions or causes like a positive entity. Destruction therefore is not generated by any separate causal apparatus, but the very causes that lead to the production of an entity lead also to its destruction the next moment. Destructibility being a necessary characteristic of productibility, destruction cannot need the inter ference of any causes. It has also been stated above that destruc tion is pure negation and has therefore no characteristics which have to be generated by any positive set of causes or conditions 1 . 1 The word ksanika, which is translated as "momentary," is, according to ^antaraksita, a technical term. The character in an entity of dying immediately after production, is technically called ksana, and whatever has this quality is called ksanika (utpdddnantara-vindsi-svabhdvo vastunah ksana ucyate, sa yasydsti sa ksanika hi. Tattva-samgraha, p. 142); ksana therefore does not mean time- moment. It means the character of dying immediately after being produced. The objection of Uddyotakara that what only stays for a moment of time (ksana) cannot be called ksanika, because at the expiry of the moment nothing remains which can be characterized as momentary, is therefore inadmissible. There is, however, no entity separate from the momentary character, and the use of the term ksanika, which grammatically distinguishes the possessor of the momentary character from the momentary character itself, is due only to verbal license. xi] Dialectical criticisms of Sdntaraksita and Kamalaslla 183 Kumalaslla and Santaraksita urge that existence (sattva) can be affirmed only of those entities which are capable of serving a purpose (artha-kriya-samartha). They urge that entities can only serve a purpose, if they are momentary. Entities that persist cannot serve any purpose and therefore cannot have any existence. In order to prove their thesis they enter into the following argument. If any purpose is to be served, then that can be either in succession or simultaneously, and no middle alternative is possible. If an existing entity persists in time, then all its effects ought to come about simultaneously; for, the complete cause being there, the effects must also be there, and there is no reason why the effects should happen in succession ; but it is well known in experience that effects happen only in succession and not simultaneously. If, however, it is objected that even a persisting entity can perform actions in succession owing to its association with successive acces sories (kraminah sahakarinati), then one may well enquire as to the nature of the assistance given by the successive accessories to the persisting entity in the production of the effect ; is it by pro ducing a special modification (atisayadhand) of the persisting cause or by independent working in consonance with the productive action of the persisting entity? In the first alternative, the special modification may be either identical with or different from the nature of the persisting entity, and both these alternatives are impossible; for, if it is identical, then, since the effect follows in consequence of the special modification of the accessories, it is the element of this special modification that is to be regarded as the cause of the effect, and not the persisting entity. If it is again urged that the effect is due to the association of the special modification with the persisting entity, then it would be impossible to define the nature of such association ; for an association may be either of identity or of productivity (tadatmya and tad-utpatti)y&nd neither of them is possible in the present case, since the special modification is recognized as being different from the persisting entity and is acknowledged by assumption to be produced by the accessories. Again, such association cannot be regarded as being of the nature of samavaya; for this special modification, being of the nature of an additional assistance (upakara), cannot be regarded as being of the nature of inseparable inherence (samavaya). If this special modification be regarded as being neither of the nature of an o o additional assistance (upakdra) nor of the nature of an essence 184 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. identical with the persisting entity, and if it is still regarded as being associated with the persisting entity in a relation of samavaya, then anything in the world could be regarded as being in the samavdya relation with anything else. In the other alternative, in which it is maintained that the persisting entity awaits only the independent working of the accessories, it may well be asked whether the causal nature of the persisting entity is the same together with the totality of the accessories as it is without them? In the former case, the accessories would also be persistent. In the latter case, the per sisting entity can no longer be regarded as persisting. Regarding the objection of Bhadanta Yogasena, that the same difficulties would arise in the assumption of entities as momentary, Santaraksita and Kamalasila reply that in their view the accessories behave in two ways, firstly, as independent co-operation (ekartha- kriyd-kdrita) and, secondly, as mutual help (parasparopakdritd). Thus in the first moment the different accessory-units are only independently co-operant, since, in one moment, their mutual actions cannot help one another; but in the second moment, the effects may be regarded as being of a joint nature, and therefore mutually determining one another, in the production of the effect of the third moment. In this view, though each entity operates independently, yet none of their operations are irrelevant. They are all being produced and determined by the respective causes and conditions in a beginningless series. The objection against the momentariness of all things on the ground that things are perceived and recognized to be the same, and as persisting, is not a valid one. For the fact of persistence cannot be perceived by the senses and must be regarded as due to false imagination. All recognition is due to the operation of memory, which is almost universally recognized as invalid for purposes of right knowledge. On this point it may be argued that in recognition, if the entity now perceived be the same as the entity perceived at a previous time, then how can a cognition in the past comprehend an entity of the present time? If they are held to be different, then it is acknowledged that the entities perceived as the same in recognition are not really the same. The objector s argu ment that, since things pass by the same name, they must be persistent is invalid ; for it is well known that even in ordinary per ception, where a flame is known to be destroyed every moment, and produced anew, it is still said in common verbal usage to be xi] Dialectical criticisms of Santaraksita and Kamalasila 185 the same flame. Thus all existing things must be regarded as momentary. (h) Refutation of Criticisms of the Non-permanency of Entities. It is objected by the Naiyayikas and others that, if things are momentary, then the theory of karma would fail; for how can it be understood that the deeds be performed by one, and the fruits reaped by another? How, again, can it be understood that a momen tary cause which does not abide till the rise of the effect should produce the same? Again, if objects are momentary, how can they be perceived by the eye? The phenomena of recognition would also be inexplicable, as there would be no permanent perceiver who would identify the present and the past as being one. How, again, would the phenomenon of bondage and of emancipation apply to a non-permanent being? In reply to this Santaraksita and Kamalasila say that, just as a seed by means of its invariable power produces the shoots, without being superintended by any conscious agent, so the inner states of a man may generate other states, without being superintended by any permanent conscious agent; the formula (dharma-samketa) for all production is, this happening, that happens"; "this being produced, that is pro duced." It is through ignorance that a man cannot discern that all subsequent states are determined by the natural forces of the preceding ones and thinks of himself as performing this or that action or as striving for emancipation. The true nature of things cannot be determined by the illusory experience of ignorant people. It is sometimes objected that the parts of a seed attain a due constitution by assimilating nutritive elements at the second stage, and then again at the third stage attain a new constitution by further accretion of new nutritive elements, and that therefore it cannot be held that the parts of the seed are entirely destroyed at the second stage. To this the reply of Santaraksita is that in the second moment the effect is produced in dependence on the undestroyed causal efficiency of the first causal moment; so that the effect is produced by the causal efficiency of the first moment, when the cause is not destroyed. The cause however perishes in the second moment; for, once the cause has produced the effect, it cannot be producing it again and again; if it did, there would be a vicious infinite. It must therefore be admitted that the causal 1 86 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. efficiency of the cause ceases immediately after production 1 . The view that the effect is produced simultaneously with the cause (saha- bhutam kdryam) is unreasonable, since the cause cannot produce the effect before it is itself produced ; again, it cannot produce after it is itself produced ; for then the effect also has to be acknowledged to be of the same nature as the cause ; but at the same moment it can have no scope for its efficiency. Thus the cause and effect cannot be produced simultaneously. There is no necessity also for admitting a causal operation (vyapara), as separate and distinct from the cause. Invariable antecedence is the only qualification of cause 2 . If a causal operation has to be admitted for connecting the cause with the effect, then that would require another opera tion, and that another, and there would be a vicious infinite. If the causal operation is admitted to be able to generate the effect independently by itself, so can the cause be also admitted to be able to produce the effect. The objection that, if antecedence be ad mitted to be alone the determinant of causality, then the fact, that a thing is smelled after it is seen may also lead one to infer that colour is the cause of smell, is invalid, for the Buddhists have no objection to regarding colour as an accessory cause of