.CD 



A HISTORY 



INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 




May He, who links the minds of all people, 
through the apertures of time, with new threads 
of knowledge like a garland of flowers, be pleased 
to accept this my thread of Eastern thought, offered, 
though it be small, with the greatest devotion. 



A HISTORY 

OF 

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 

BY 
SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA, M.A., Ph.D., 



VOLUME I 



CAMBRIDGE 

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 

1957 



PUBLISHED BY 
THE SYNDICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 

London Office: Bentley House, N.W.I 



First Printed 1922 

Reprinted 1932 

1951 

1957 




MAY 2 3 f95S 



Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cartridge 

Reprinted by offset-litho 
by Percy Lund Humphries & Co. Ltd. 



DEDICATION 

The work and ambition of a life-time is herein humbly 
dedicated with supreme reverence to the great sages 
of India, who, for the first time in history, formulated 
the true principles of freedom and devoted themselves 
to the holy quest of truth and the final assessment 
and discovery of the ultimate spiritual essence of 
man through their concrete lives, critical thought, 
dominant will and self-denial. 



NOTE ON THE PRONUNCIATION OF 

TRANSLITERATED SANSKRIT 

AND PALI WORDS 

The vowels are pronounced almost in the same way 
as in Italian, except that the sound of a approaches 
that of o in bond or u in but, and a that of a as in army. 
The consonants are as in English, except c, ch in church ; 
/, d, n are cerebrals, to which English t, d, n almost 
correspond; t, d, n are pure dentals; kk, gh, ch, jh, 
tk, dh, th, dh, ph, bh are the simple sounds plus an 
aspiration ; n is the French gn ; r is usually pronounced 
as n, and s, f as sk. 



PREFACE 

T~" N HE old civilisation of India was a concrete unity of many- 
J. sided developments in art, architecture, literature, religion, 
morals, and science so far as it was understood in those days. 
But the most important achievement of Indian thought was 
philosophy. It was regarded as the goal of all the highest 
practical and theoretical activities, and it indicated the point of 
unity amidst all the apparent diversities which the complex 
growth of culture over a vast area inhabited by different peoples 
produced. It is not in the history of foreign invasions, in the 
rise of independent kingdoms at different times, in the empires 
of this or that great monarch that the unity of India is to be 
sought. It is essentially one of spiritual aspirations and obedience 
to the law of the spirit, which were regarded as superior to every 
thing else, and it has outlived all the political changes through 
which India passed. 

The Greeks, the Huns, the Scythians, the Pathans and the 
Moguls who occupied the land and controlled the political 
machinery never ruled the minds of the people, for these political 
events were like hurricanes or the changes of season, mere 
phenomena of a natural or physical order which never affected 
the spiritual integrity of Hindu culture. If after a passivity of 
some centuries India is again going to become creative it is 
mainly on account of this fundamental unity of her progress and 
civilisation and not for anything that she may borrow from other 
countries. It is therefore indispensably necessary for all those 
who wish to appreciate the significance and potentialities of 
Indian culture that they should properly understand the history 
of Indian philosophical thought which is the nucleus round 
which all that is best and highest in India has grown. Much harm 
has already been done by the circulation of opinions that the 
culture and philosophy of India was dreamy and abstract. It is 
therefore very necessary that Indians as well as other peoples 
should become more and more acquainted with the true charac 
teristics of the past history of Indian thought and form a correct 
estimate of its special features. 

But it is not only for the sake of the right understanding of 



viii Preface 

India that Indian philosophy should be read, or only as a record 
of the past thoughts of India. For most of the problems that 
are still debated in modern philosophical thought occurred in 
more or less divergent forms to the philosophers of India. Their 
discussions, difficulties and solutions when properly grasped in 
connection with the problems of our own times may throw light 
on the course of the process of the future reconstruction of modern 
thought. The discovery of the important features of Indian 
philosophical thought, and a due appreciation of their full signi 
ficance, may turn out to be as important to modern philosophy 
as the discovery of Sanskrit has been to the investigation of 
modern philological researches. It is unfortunate that the task 
of re-interpretation and re-valuation of Indian thought has not 
yet been undertaken on a comprehensive scale. Sanskritists 
also with very few exceptions have neglected this important 
field of study, for most of these scholars have been interested 
more in mythology, philology, and history than in philosophy. 
Much work however has already been done in the way of the 
publication of a large number of important texts, and translations 
of some of them have also been attempted. But owing to the 
presence of many technical terms in advanced Sanskrit philo 
sophical literature, the translations in most cases are hardly in 
telligible to those who are not familiar with the texts themselves. 
A work containing some general account of the mutual rela 
tions of the chief systems is necessary for those who intend to 
pursue the study of a particular school. This is also necessary 
for lay readers interested in philosophy and students of Western 
philosophy who have no inclination or time to specialise in any 
Indian system, but who are at the same time interested to know 
what they can about Indian philosophy. In my two books The 
Study of Patanjali and Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian 
Systems of Thought I have attempted to interpret the Samkhya 
and Yoga systems both from their inner point of view and from 
the point of view of their relation to other Indian systems. The 
present attempt deals with the important features of these as also 
of all the other systems and seeks to show some of their inner 
philosophical relations especially in regard to the history of their 
development. I have tried to be as faithful to the original texts 
as I could and have always given the Sanskrit or Pali technical 
terms for the help of those who want to make this book a guide 



Preface ix 

for further study. To understand something of these terms is 
indeed essential for anyone who wishes to be sure that he is 
following the actual course of the thoughts. 

In Sanskrit treatises the style of argument and methods of 
treating the different topics are altogether different from what 
we find in any modern work of philosophy. Materials had there 
fore to be collected from a large number of works on each system 
and these have been knit together and given a shape which 
is likely to be more intelligible to people unacquainted with 
Sanskritic ways of thought. But at the same time I considered 
it quite undesirable to put any pressure on Indian thoughts in 
order to make them appear as European. This will explain 
much of what might appear quaint to a European reader. But 
while keeping all the thoughts and expressions of the Indian 
thinkers I have tried to arrange them in a systematic whole in a 
manner which appeared to me strictly faithful to their clear 
indications and suggestions. It is only in very few places that I 
have translated some of the Indian terms by terms of English 
philosophy, and this I did because it appeared to me that those 
were approximately the nearest approach to the Indian sense of 
the term. In all other places I have tried to choose words which 
have not been made dangerous by the acquirement of technical 
senses. This however is difficult, for the words which are used in 
philosophy always acquire some sort of technical sense. I would 
therefore request my readers to take those words in an unsophisti 
cated sense and associate them with such meanings as are 
justified by the passages and contexts in which they are used. 
Some of what will appear as obscure in any system may I hope be 
removed if it is re-read with care and attention, for unfamiliarity 
sometimes stands in the way of right comprehension. But I 
may have also missed giving the proper suggestive links in 
many places where condensation was inevitable and the systems 
themselves have also sometimes insoluble difficulties, for no 
system of philosophy is without its dark and uncomfortable 
corners. 

Though I have begun my work from the Vedic and Brah- 
manic stage, my treatment of this period has been very slight. 
The beginnings of the evolution of philosophical thought, though 
they can be traced in the later Vedic hymns, are neither connected 
nor systematic. 



x Preface 

More is found in the Brahmanas, but I do not think it worth 
while to elaborate the broken shreds of thought of this epoch. 
I could have dealt with the Upanisad period more fully, but 
many works on the subject have already been published in 
Europe and those who wish to go into details will certainly go 
to them. I have therefore limited myself to the dominant current 
flowing through the earlier Upanisads. Notices of other currents 
of thought will be given in connection with the treatment of other 
systems in the second volume with which they are more intimately 
connected. It will be noticed that my treatment of early Bud 
dhism is in some places of an inconclusive character. This is 
largely due to the inconclusive character of the texts which were 
put into writing long after Buddha in the form of dialogues and 
where the precision and directness required in philosophy were 
not contemplated. This has given rise to a number of theories 
about the interpretations of the philosophical problems of early 
Buddhism among modern Buddhist scholars and it is not always 
easy to decide one way or the other without running the risk of 
being dogmatic ; and the scope of my work was also too limited 
to allow me to indulge in very elaborate discussions of textual 
difficulties. But still I also have in many places formed theories 
of my own, whether they are right or wrong it will be for scholars 
to judge. I had no space for entering into any polemic, but it 
will be found that my interpretations of the systems are different 
in some cases from those offered by some European scholars who 
have worked on them and I leave it to those who are acquainted 
with the literature of the subject to decide which of us may be 
in the right. I have not dealt elaborately with the new school of 
Logic (Navya-Nyaya) of Bengal, for the simple reason that most 
of the contributions of this school consist in the invention of 
technical expressions and the emphasis put on the necessity of 
strict exactitude and absolute preciseness of logical definitions 
and discussions and these are almost untranslatable in intelligible 
English. I have however incorporated what important differences 
of philosophical points of view I could find in it. Discussions of 
a purely technical character could not be very fruitful in a work 
like this. The bibliography given of the different Indian systems 
in the last six chapters is not exhaustive but consists mostly of 
books which have been actually studied or consulted in the 
writing of those chapters. Exact references to the pages of the 



Preface xi 

texts have generally been given in footnotes in those cases where 
a difference of interpretation was anticipated or where it was felt 
that a reference to the text would make the matter clearer, or 
where the opinions of modern writers have been incorporated. 

It gives me the greatest pleasure to acknowledge my deepest 
gratefulness to the Hon ble Maharaja Sir Manindrachandra 
Nundy, K.C.I. E. Kashimbazar, Bengal, who has kindly promised 
to bear the entire expense of the publication of both volumes 
of the present work. 

The name of this noble man is almost a household word in 
Bengal for the magnanimous gifts that he has made to educational 
and other causes. Up till now he has made a total gift of about 
.300,000, of which those devoted to education come to about 
200,000. But the man himself is far above the gifts he has 
made. His sterling character, universal sympathy and friendship, 
his kindness and amiability make him a veritable Bodhisattva 
one of the noblest of men that I have ever seen. Like many 
other scholars of Bengal, I am deeply indebted to him for the 
encouragement that he has given me in the pursuit of my studies 
and researches, and my feelings of attachment and gratefulness 
for him are too deep for utterance. 

I am much indebted to my esteemed friends Dr E. J. Thomas 
of the Cambridge University Library and Mr Douglas Ainslie 
for their kindly revising the proofs of this work, in the course 
of which they improved my English in many places. To the 
former I am also indebted for his attention to the translitera 
tion of a large number of Sanskrit words, and also for the 
whole-hearted sympathy and great friendliness with which he 
assisted me with his advice on many points of detail, in par 
ticular the exposition of the Buddhist doctrine of the cause of 
rebirth owes something of its treatment to repeated discussions 
with him. 

I also wish to express my gratefulness to my friend Mr 
N. K. Siddhanta, M.A., late of the Scottish Churches College, and 
Mademoiselle Paule Povie for the kind assistance they have 
rendered in preparing the index. My obligations are also due to 
the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press for the honour 
they have done me in publishing this work. 

To scholars of Indian philosophy who may do me the honour 
of reading my book and who may be impressed with its inevit- 



xii Preface 

able shortcomings and defects, I can only pray in the words of 
Hemacandra: 

Pramdnasiddhantaviruddham atra 
Yatkincidnktam matimdndyadosdt 
Mdtsaryyam ntsdryya taddryyacittdh 
Prasddam ddhdya visodhayantu^. 

S.D. 

TRINITV COLLEGE, 
CAMBRIDGE. 

February, 1922. 



1 May the noble-minded scholars instead of cherishing ill feeling kindly correct 
whatever errors have been here committed through the dullness of my intellect in the 
way of wrong interpretations and misstat ements. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTORY z 

CHAPTER II 
THE VEDAS, BRAHMANAS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY 

1 The Vedas and their antiquity 10 

2 The place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind 10 

3 Classification of the Vedic literature 1 1 

4 The Samhitas 12 

5 The Brahmanas 13 

6 The Aranyakas .14 

7 The Rg-Veda, its civilization 14 

8 The Vedic gods 16 

9 Polytheism, Henotheism, and Monotheism 17 

10 Growth of a Monotheistic tendency ; Prajapati, Visvakarma . . 19 

11 Brahma 20 

12 Sacrifice ; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma . . .21 

13 Cosmogony Mythological and_ Philosophical 23 

14 Eschatology; the Doctrine of Atman 25 

15 Conclusion .26 

CHAPTER III ~ 

THE EARLIER UPANISADS (700 B.C. 600 B.C.) 

1 The place of the Upanisads in Vedic literature .... 28 

2 The names of the Upanisads; Non-Brahmanic influence . . 30 

3 Brahmanas and the Early Upanisads 31 

4 The meaning of the word Upanisad 38 

5 The composition and growth of diverse Upanisads .... 38 

6 Revival of Upanisad studies in modern times 39 

7 The Upanisads and their interpretations 41 

8 The quest after Brahman : the struggle and the failures . .42 

9 Unknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method ... 44 

10 The Atman doctrine 45 

1 1 Place of Brahman in the Upanisads 48 

12 The World 51 

13 The World-Soul 52 

14 The Theory of Causation 52 

15 Doctrine of Transmigration 53 

16 Emancipation 58 

CHAPTER IV 

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS 

OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 

i In what sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible? 62 



2 Growth of the Philosophic Literature 

3 The Indian systems of Philosophy . 

4 Some fundamental points of agreement 

1 The Karma theory 

2 The Doctrine of Mukti 

3 The Doctrine of Soul . 



65 
67 



74 
75 



5 The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the Optimistic 
Faith in the end 75 

6 Unity in Indian Sadhana (philosophical, religious and ethical 
endeavours) 77 



xiv Contents 

CHAPTER V 

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY 

PAGE 

1 The State of Philosophy in India before Buddha .... 78 

2 Buddha: his Life .......... 81 

3 Early Buddhist Literature . . . ... . . .82 

4 The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism ... 84 

5 The Khandhas 93 

6 Avijja and Asava .......... 99 

7 Slla and Samadhi 100 

8 Kamma 106 

9 Upanisads and Buddhism 109 

10 The Schools of Theravada Buddhism .112 

11 Mahayanism 125 

12 The Tathata Philosophy of Asvaghosa (80 A.D.) . . . .129 

13 The Madhyamika or the Sunyavada school Nihilism . . .138 

14 Uncompromising Idealism or the School of Vijnanavada Buddhism 145 

1 5 Sautrantika theory of Perception 151 

16 Sautrantika theory of Inference 155 

17 The Doctrine of Momentariness 158 

1 8 The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine of Causal 
Efficiency (Arthakriyakaritva) . . . . . . . .163 

19 Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems 
diverged 164 

20 Brief Survey of the Evolution of Buddhist Thought . . .166 



CHAPTER VI 
THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 



1 The Origin of Jainism . . . 

2 Two Sects of Jainism 

3 The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains 

4 Some General Characteristics of the Jains 

5 Life of Mahavira 

6 The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology 

7 The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (Anekantavada) 

8 The Doctrine of Nayas 

9 The Doctrine of Syadvada 

to Knowledge, its value for us 

1 1 Theory of Perception 

12 Non-Perceptual knowledge 

13 Knowledge as Revelation 



. 169 

. 170 

i?i 
. 172 

i?3 

173 

175 
. 176 

179 
. 181 

3 

. 185 

. 186 

14 The Jivas 188 

15 Karma Theory 190 

16 Karma, Asrava and Nirjara .192 

17 Pudgala 195 

1 8 Dharma, Adharma, Akasa 197 

19 Kala and Samaya 198 

20 Jaina Cosmography 199 

21 Jaina Yoga 199 

22 Jaina Atheism 203 

23 Moksa (emancipation) 207 



Contents xv 
CHAPTER VII 

THE KAPILA AND THE PATANJALA SAMKHYA (YOGA) 

PAGE 

1 A Review 208 

2 The Germs of Samkhya in the Upanisads 211 

3 Samkhya and Yoga Literature 212 

4 An Early School of Samkhya . 213 

5 Samkhya karika, Samkhya sutra, Vacaspati Misra and Vijnana 
Bhiksu 222 

6 Yoga and Patanjali 226 

7 The Samkhya and the Yoga doctrine of Soul or Purusa . . . 238 

8 Thought and Matter 241 

9 Feelings, the Ultimate Substances 242 

10 The Gunas 243 

11 Prakrti and its evolution 245 

1 2 Pralaya and the disturbance of the Prakrti Equilibrium . . . 247 

13 Mahat and Ahamkara . . . 248 

14 The Tanmatras and the Paramanus . . . . , .251 

15 Principle of Causation and Conservation of Energy . . . 254 

16 Change as the formation of new collocations 255 

17 Causation as Satkaryavada (the theory that the effect potentially 
exists before it is generated by the movement of the cause) . . 257 

1 8 Samkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism 258 

19 Buddhi and Purusa 259 

20 The Cognitive Process and some characteristics of Citta . .261 

21 Sorrow and its Dissolution 264 

22 Citta 268 

23 Yoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma) 270 

24 The Yoga Meditation 271 

CHAPTER VIII 
THE NYAYA- VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY 

1 Criticism of Buddhism and Samkhya from the Nyaya standpoint . 274 

2 Nyaya and Vaisesika sutras 276 

3 Does Vaisesika represent an old school of Mimamsa ? . . . 280 

4 Philosophy in the Vaisesika sutras . . . * . . . . 285 

5 Philosophy in the Nyaya sutras 294 

6 Philosophy of Nyaya sutras and Vaisesika sutras . . . .301 

7 The Vaisesika and Nyaya Literature 305 

8 The main doctrine of the Nyaya- Vaisesika Philosophy . . . 310 

9 The six Padarthas : Dravya, Guna, Karma, Samanya, ViSesa, Sama- 313 
vaya 313 

10 The Theory of Causation 319 

1 1 Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (Srsti) 323 

12 Proof of the Existence of Is* vara 325 

13 The Nyaya- Vaisesika Physics 326 

14 The Origin of Knowledge (Pramana) 330 

1 5 The four Pramanas of Nyaya 332 

1 6 Perception (Pratyaksa) 333 

17 Inference 343 

1 8 Upamana and Sabda 354 

19 Negation in Nyaya-Vai5eika 355 

20 The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices for the seeker 

of Salvation ........... 360 

2 1 The Doctrine of Soul 362 

22 Is" vara and Salvation 363 



xvi Contents 

CHAPTER IX 

MlMAMSA PHILOSOPHY 

PAGE 

1 A Comparative Review 367 

2 The Mlmamsa Literature . . 369 

3 The Paratah-pramanya doctrine of Nyaya and the Svatah-pramanya 
doctrine of Mlmamsa 372 

4 The place of Sense-organs in Perception 375 

5 Indeterminate and Determinate Perception 378 

6 Some Ontological Problems connected with the Doctrine of Per 
ception 379 

7 The Nature of Knowledge 382 

8 The Psychology of Illusion 384 

9 Inference 387 

10 Upamana, Arthapatti 391 

11 Sabda-pramana 394 

12 The Pramana of Non-perception (anupalabdhi) .... 397 

13 Self, Salvation, and God 399 

14 Mimamsa as Philosophy and Mlmamsa. as Ritualism . . . 403 



CHAPTER X 
THE SANKARA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA 

1 Comprehension of the Philosophical Issues more essential than the 
Dialectic of Controversy 406 

2 The philosophical situation : a Review 408 

3 Vedanta Literature 418 

4 Vedanta in Ga.udapa.da 420 

5 Vedanta and Sankara (788 820 A.D.) 429 

6 The main idea of the Vedanta philosophy .... 439 

7 In what sense is the world-appearance false? .... 443 

8 The nature of the world-appearance, phenomena . . . 445 

9 The Definition of Ajnana (nescience) ..... 452 

10 Ajnana established by Perception and Inference . . . 454 

11 Locus and Object of Ajnana, Ahamkara and Antahkarana . 457 

12 Anirvacyavada and the Vedanta dialectic . 461 

13 The Theory of Causation 465 

14 Vedanta theory of Perception and Inference .... 470 

15 Atman, Jlva, Isvara, Ekajlvavada and Drstisrstivada . . 474 

16 Vedanta theory of Illusion . 485 

17 Vedanta Ethics and Vedanta Emancipation .... 489 

1 8 Vedanta and other Indian systems 492 

INDEX 495 



CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTORY 

THE achievements of the ancient Indians in the field of philosophy 
are but very imperfectly known to the world at large, and it is 
unfortunate that the condition is no better even in India. There 
is a small body of Hindu scholars and ascetics living a retired 
life in solitude, who are well acquainted with the subject, but they 
do not .know English and are not used to modern ways of thinking, 
and the idea that they ought to write books in vernaculars in 
order to popularize the subject does not appeal to them. Through 
the activity of various learned bodies and private individuals both 
in Europe and in India large numbers of philosophical works in 
Sanskrit and Pali have been published, as well as translations of 
a few of them, but there has been as yet little systematic attempt 
on the part of scholars to study them and judge their value. There 
are hundreds of Sanskrit works on most of the systems of Indian 
thought and scarcely a hundredth part of them has been trans 
lated. Indian modes "of expression, entailing difficult technical 
philosophical terms are so different from those of European 
thought, that they can hardly ever be accurately translated. It 
is therefore very difficult for a person unacquainted with Sanskrit 
to understand Indian philosophical thought in its true bearing 
from translations. Pali is a much easier language than Sanskrit, 
but a knowledge of Pali is helpful in understanding only the 
earliest school of Buddhism, when it was in its semi-philosophical 
stage. Sanskrit is generally regarded as a difficult language. But 
no one from an acquaintance with Vedic or ordinary literary 
Sanskrit can have any idea of the difficulty of the logical and 
abstruse parts of Sanskrit philosophical literature. A man who 
can easily understand the Vedas, the Upanisads, the Puranas, the 
Law Books and the literary works, and is also well acquainted with 
European philosophical thought, may find it literally impossible 
to understand even small portions of a work of advanced Indian 
logic, or the dialectical Vedanta. This is due to two reasons, the 
use of technical terms and of great condensation in expression, 
and the hidden allusions to doctrines of other systems. The 

D. I 



2 Introductory [CH. 

tendency to conceiving philosophical problems in a clear and un 
ambiguous manner is an important feature of Sanskrit thought.but 
from the ninth century onwards, the habit of using clear, definite, 
and precise expressions, began to develop in a very striking manner, 
and as a result of that a large number of technical terms began to be 
invented. These terms are seldom properly explained, and it is 
presupposed that the reader who wants to read the works should 
have a knowledge of them. Any one in olden times who took to the 
study of any system of philosophy, had to do so with a teacher, who 
explained those terms to him. The teacher himself had got it from 
his teacher, and he from his. There was no tendency to popularize 
philosophy, for the idea then prevalent was that only the chosen 
few who had otherwise shown their fitness, deserved to become 
fit students (adhikdrt) of philosophy, under the direction of a 
teacher. Only those who had the grit and high moral strength 
to devote their whole life to the true understanding of philosophy 
and the rebuilding of life in accordance with the high truths of 
philosophy were allowed to study it. 

Another difficulty which a beginner will meet is this, that 
sometimes the same technical terms are used in extremely 
different senses in different systems. The student must know the 
meaning of each technical term with reference to the system in 
which it occurs, and no dictionary will enlighten him much about 
the matter 1 . He will have to pick them up as he advances and 
finds them used. Allusions to the doctrines of other systems and 
their refutations during the discussions of similar doctrines in any 
particular system of thought are often very puzzling even to a 
well-equipped reader; for he cannot be expected to know all the 
doctrines of other systems without going through them, and so 
it often becomes difficult to follow the series of answers and 
refutations which are poured forth in the course of these discus 
sions. There are two important compendiums in Sanskrit giving 
a summary of some of the principal systems of Indian thought, 
viz. the Sarvadarsanasamgraha, and the Saddarsanasamuccaya of 
Haribhadra with the commentary of Gunaratna; but the former is 
very sketchy and can throw very little light on the understanding 
of the ontological or epistemological doctrines of any of the 
systems. It has been translated by Cowell and Gough, but I 

1 Recently a very able Sanskrit dictionary of technical philosophical terms called 
Nyayakoda has been prepared by M. M. Bhimacarya Jhalkikar, Bombay, Govt. Press. 



i] Introductory 3 

am afraid the translation may not be found very intelligible. 
Gunaratna s commentary isexcellentso faras Jainism is concerned, 
and it sometimes gives interesting information about other 
systems, and also supplies us with some short bibliographical 
notices, but it seldom goes on to explain the epistemological or 
ontological doctrines or discussions which are so necessary for the 
right understanding of any of the advanced systems of Indian 
thought. Thus in the absence of a book which could give us in 
brief the main epistemological, ontological, and psychological 
positions of the Indian thinkers, it is difficult even for a good 
Sanskrit scholar to follow the advanced philosophical literature, 
even though he may be acquainted with many of the technical 
philosophical terms. I have spoken enough about the difficulties 
of studying Indian philosophy, but if once a person can get him 
self used to the technical terms and the general positions of the 
different Indian thinkers and their modes of expression, he can 
master the whole by patient toil. The technical terms, which are 
a source of difficulty at the beginning, are of inestimable value in 
helping us to understand the precise and definite meaning of the 
writers who used them, and the chances of misinterpreting or 
misunderstanding them are reduced to a minimum. It is I think 
well-known that avoidance of technical terms has often rendered 
philosophical works unduly verbose, and liable to misinterpre 
tation. The art of clear writing is indeed a rare virtue and every 
philosopher cannot expect to have it. But when technical ex 
pressions are properly formed, even a bad writer can make himself 
understood. In the early days of Buddhist philosophy in the 
Pali literature, this difficulty is greatly felt. There are some 
technical terms here which are still very elastic and their repeti 
tion in different places in more or less different senses heighten 
the difficulty of understanding the real meaning intended to be 
conveyed. 

But is it necessary that a history of Indian philosophy should 
be written? There are some people who think that the Indians 
never rose beyond the stage of simple faith and that therefore they 
cannot have any philosophy at all in the proper sense of the term. 
Thus Professor Frank Thilly of the Cornell University says in 
his History of Philosophy 1 ^ 1 h. universal history of philosophy would 
include the philosophies of all peoples. Not all peoples, however 

1 New York, 1914, p. 3. 

I 2 



4 Introductory [CH. 

have produced real systems of thought, and the speculations of 
only a few can be said to have had a history. Many do not rise 
beyond the mythological stage. Even the theories of Oriental 
peoples, the Hindus, Egyptians, Chinese, consist, in the main, of 
mythological and ethical doctrines, and are not thoroughgoing 
systems of thought: they are shot through with poetry and faith. 
We shall, therefore, limit ourselves to the study of the Western 
countries, and begin with the philosophy of the ancient Greeks, 
on whose culture our own civilization in part, rests." There are 
doubtless many other people who hold such uninformed and 
untrue beliefs, which only show their ignorance of Indian matters. 
It is not necessary to say anything in order to refute these views, 
for what follows will I hope show the falsity of their beliefs. If 
they are not satisfied, and want to know more definitely and 
elaborately about the contents of the different systems, I am afraid 
they will have to go to the originals referred to in the biblio 
graphical notices of the chapters. 

There is another opinion, that the time has not yet come for 
an attempt to write a history of Indian philosophy. Two 
different reasons are given from two different points of view. It 
is said that the field of Indian philosophy is so vast, and such a 
vast literature exists on each of the systems, that it is not possible 
for anyone to collect his materials directly from the original 
sources, before separate accounts are prepared by specialists 
working in each of the particular systems. There is some truth 
in this objection, but although in some of the important systems 
the literature that exists is exceedingly vast, yet many of them 
are more or less repetitions of the same subjects, and a judicious 
selection of twenty or thirty important works on each of the 
systems could certainly be made, which would give a fairly correct 
exposition. In my own undertaking in this direction I have 
always drawn directly from the original texts, and have always 
tried to collect my materials from those sources in which they 
appear at their best. My space has been very limited and I have 
chosen the features which appeared to me to be the most 
important. I had to leave out many discussions of difficult 
problems and diverse important bearings of each of the systems 
to many interesting aspects of philosophy. This I hope may be 
excused in a history of philosophy which does not aim at com 
pleteness. There are indeed many defects and shortcomings, and 



i] Introductory 5 

these would have been much less in the case of a writer abler 
than the present one. At any rate it may be hoped that the 
imperfections of the present attempt will be a stimulus to those 
whose better and more competent efforts will supersede it. No 
attempt ought to be called impossible on account of its imper 
fections. 

In the second place it is said that the Indians had no proper 
and accurate historical records and biographies and it is therefore 
impossible to write a history of Indian philosophy. This objection 
is also partially valid. But this defect does not affect us so much 
as one would at first sight suppose; for, though the dates of the 
earlier beginnings are very obscure, yet, in later times, we are in 
a position to affirm some dates and to point out priority and 
posteriority in the case of other thinkers. As most of the systems 
developed side by side through many centuries their mutual 
relations also developed, and these could be well observed. The 
special nature of this development has been touched on in the 
fourth chapter. Most of the systems had very early beginnings 
and a continuous course of development through the succeeding 
centuries, and it is not possible to take the state of the philosophy 
of a particular system at a particular time and contrast it with 
the state of that system at a later time; for the later state did not 
supersede the previous state, but only showed a more coherent 
form of it, which was generally true to the original system but 
was more determinate. Evolution through history has in Western 
countries often brought forth the development of more coherent 
types of philosophic thought, but in India, though the types 
remained the same, their development through history made them 
more and more coherent and determinate. Most of the parts 
were probably existent in the earlier stages, but they were in an 
undifferentiated state; through the criticism and conflict of the 
different schools existing side by side the parts of each of the 
systems of thought became more and more differentiated, deter 
minate, and coherent. In some cases this development has been 
almost imperceptible, and in many cases the earlier forms have 
been lost, or so inadequately expressed that nothing definite 
could be made out of them. Wherever such a differentiation 
could be made in the interests of philosophy, I have tried to do 
it. But I have never considered it desirable that the philosophical 
interest should be subordinated to the chronological. It is no 



6 Introductory [CH. 

doubt true that more definite chronological information would be 
a very desirable thing, yet I am of opinion that the little 
chronological data we have give us a fair amount of help in form 
ing a general notion about the growth and development of the 
different systems by mutual association and conflict. If the con 
dition of the development of philosophy in India had been the 
same as in Europe, definite chronological knowledge would be 
considered much more indispensable. For, when one system 
supersedes another, it is indispensably necessary that we should 
know which preceded and which succeeded. But when the systems 
are developing side by side, and when we are getting them in 
their richer and better forms, the interest with regard to the 
conditions, nature and environment of their early origin has rather 
a historical than a philosophical interest. I have tried as best 
I could to form certain general notions as regards the earlier 
stages of some of the systems, but though the various features of 
these systems at these stages in detail may not be ascertainable, 
yet this, I think, could never be considered as invalidating the 
whole programme. Moreover, even if we knew definitely the 
correct dates of the thinkers of the same system we could not 
treat them separately, as is done in European philosophy, without 
unnecessarily repeating the same thing twenty times over; for 
they all dealt with the same system, and tried to bring out the 
same type of thought in more and more determinate forms. 

The earliest literature of India is the Vedas. These consist 
mostly of hymns in praise of nature gods, such as fire, wind, etc. 
Excepting in some of the hymns of the later parts of the work 
(probably about 1000 B.C.), there is not much philosophy in them 
in our sense of the term. It is here that we first find intensely 
interesting philosophical questions of a more or less cosmological 
character expressed in terms of poetry and imagination. In the 
later Vedic works called the Brahmanas and the Aranyakas written 
mostly in prose, which followed the Vedic hymns, there are two 
tendencies, viz. one that sought to establish the magical forms of 
ritualistic worship, and the other which indulged in speculative 
thinking through crude generalizations. This latter tendency was 
indeed much feebler than the former, and it might appear that 
the ritualistic tendency had actually swallowed up what little of 
philosophy the later parts of the Vedic hymns were trying to 
express, but there are unmistakable marks that this tendency 



i] Introductory 7 

existed and worked. Next to this come certain treatises written 
in prose and verse called the Upanisads, which contain various 
sorts of philosophical thoughts mostly monistic or singularistic 
but also some pluralistic and dualistic ones. These are not 
reasoned statements, but utterances of truths intuitively perceived 
or felt as unquestionably real and indubitable, and carrying great 
force, vigour, and persuasiveness with them. It is very probable 
that many of the earliest parts of this literature are as old as 
500 B.C. to 700 B.C. Buddhist philosophy began with the Buddha 
from some time about 500 B.C. There is reason to believe that 
Buddhist philosophy continued to develop in India in one or 
other of its vigorous forms till some time about the tenth or 
eleventh century A.D. The earliest beginnings of the other Indian 
systems of thought are also to be sought chiefly between the age 
of the Buddha to about 200 B.C. Jaina philosophy was probably 
prior to the Buddha. But except in its earlier days, when it came 
in conflict with the doctrines of the Buddha, it does not seem to 
me that the Jaina thought came much in contact with other 
systems of Hindu thought. Excepting in some forms of Vaisnava 
thought in later times, Jaina thought is seldom alluded to by 
the Hindu writers or later Buddhists, though some Jains like 
Haribhadra and Gunaratna tried to refute the Hindu and Buddhist 
systems. The non-aggressive nature of their religion and ideal 
may to a certain extent explain it, but there may be other 
reasons too which it is difficult for us to guess. It is interesting 
to note that, though there have been some dissensions amongst 
the Jains about dogmas and creeds, Jaina philosophy has not 
split into many schools of thought more or less differing from one 
another as Buddhist thought did. 

The first volume of this work will contain Buddhist and Jaina 
philosophy and the six systems of Hindu thought. These six sys 
tems of orthodox Hindu thought are the Samkhya, the Yoga, the 
Nyaya, the Vaisesika, the Mlmamsa (generally known as Purva 
Mlmamsa), and the Vedanta (known also as Uttara Mlmamsa). 
Of these what is differently known as Samkhya and Yoga are but 
different schools of one system. The Vaisesika and the Nyaya in 
later times became so mixed up that, though in early times the 
similarity of the former with Mlmamsa was greater than that with 
Nyaya, they came to be regarded as fundamentally almost the 
same systems. Nyaya and Vaisesika have therefore been treated 



8 Introductory [CH. 

together. In addition to these systems some theistic systems began 
to grow prominent from the ninth century A.D. They also probably 
had their early beginnings at the time of the Upanisads. But at 
that time their interest was probably concentrated on problems 
of morality and religion. It is not improbable that these were 
associated with certain metaphysical theories also, but no works 
treating them in a systematic way are now available. One of 
their most important early works is the Bhagavadgltd. This book 
is rightly regarded as one of the greatest masterpieces of Hindu 
thought. It is written in verse, and deals with moral, religious, 
and metaphysical problems, in a loose form. It is its lack of 
system and method which gives it its peculiar charm more akin 
to the poetry of the Upanisads than to the dialectical and syste 
matic Hindu thought. From the ninth century onwards attempts 
were made to supplement these loose theistic ideas which were 
floating about and forming integral parts of religious creeds, by 
metaphysical theories. Theism is often dualistic and pluralistic, 
and so are all these systems, which are known as different schools 
of Vaisnava philosophy. Most of the Vaisnava thinkers wished 
to show that their systems were taught in the Upanisads, and thus 
wrote commentaries thereon to prove their interpretations, and 
also wrote commentaries on the Brahmasutra, the classical ex 
position of the philosophy of the Upanisads. In addition to the 
works of these Vaisnava thinkers there sprang up another class 
of theistic works which were of a more eclectic nature. These 
also had their beginnings in periods as old as the Upanisads. 
They are known as the Saiva and Tantra thought, and are dealt 
with in the second volume of this work. 

We thus see that the earliest beginnings of most systems of 
Hindu thought can be traced to some time between 600 B.C. to 
IOO or 200 B.C. It is extremely difficult to say anything about 
the relative priority of the systems with any degree of certainty. 
Some conjectural attempts have been made in this work with 
regard to some of the systems, but how far they are correct, it 
will be for our readers to judge. Moreover during the earliest 
manifestation of a system some crude outlines only are traceable. 
As time went on the systems of thought began to develop side 
by side. Most of them were taught from the time in which they 
were first conceived to about the seventeenth century A.D. in an 
unbroken chain of teachers and pupils. Even now each system 
of Hindu thought has its own adherents, though few people now 



i] Introductory 9 

care to write any new works upon them. In the history of the 
growth of any system of Hindu thought we find that as time went 
on, and as new problems were suggested, each system tried to 
answer them consistently with its own doctrines. The order in 
which we have taken the philosophical systems could not be 
strictly a chronological one. Thus though it is possible that the 
earliest speculations of some form of Samkhya, Yoga, and 
Mlmamsa were prior to Buddhism yet they have been treated 
after Buddhism and Jainism, because the elaborate works of these 
systems which we now possess are later than Buddhism. In my 
opinion the Vaisesika system is also probably pre-Buddhistic, 
but it has been treated later, partly on account of its association 
with Nyaya, and partly on account of the fact that all its com 
mentaries are of a much later date. It seems to me almost certain 
that enormous quantities of old philosophical literature have been 
lost, which if found could have been of use to us in showing the 
stages of the early growth of the systems and their mutual 
relations. But as they are not available we have to be satisfied 
with what remains. The original sources from which I have drawn 
my materials have all been indicated in the brief accounts of the 
literature of each system which I have put in before beginning 
the study of any particular system of thought. 

In my interpretations I have always tried to follow the original 
sources as accurately as I could. This has sometimes led to old 
and unfamiliar modes of expression, but this course seemed to me 
to be preferable to the adoption of European modes of thought 
for the expression of Indian ideas. But even in spite of this 
striking similarities to many of the modern philosophical doctrines 
and ideas will doubtless be noticed. This only proves that the 
human mind follows more or less the same modes of rational 
thought. I have never tried to compare any phase of Indian 
thought with European, for this is beyond the scope of my present 
attempt, but if I may be allowed to express my own conviction, 
I might say that many of the philosophical doctrines of European 
philosophy are essentially the same as those found in Indian 
philosophy. The main difference is often the difference of the 
point of view from which the same problems appeared in such a 
variety of forms in the two countries. My own view with regard 
to the net value of Indian philosophical development will be ex 
pressed in the concluding chapter of the second volume of the 
present work. 



CHAPTER II 

THE VEDAS, BRAHMANAS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY 

The Vedas and their antiquity. 

THE sacred books of India, the Vedas, are generally believed 
to be the earliest literary record of the Indo-European race. It 
is indeed difficult to say when the earliest portions of these com 
positions came into existence. Many shrewd guesses have been 
offered, but none of them can be proved to be incontestably true. 
Max Miiller supposed the date to be 1200 B.C., Haug 2400 B.C. 
and Bal Garigadhar Tilak 4000 B.C. The ancient Hindus seldom 
kept any historical record of their literary, religious or political 
achievements. The Vedas were handed down from mouth to 
mouth from a period of unknown antiquity ; and the Hindus 
generally believed that they were never composed by men. It was 
therefore generally supposed that either they were taught by God 
to the sages, or that they were of themselves revealed to the sages 
who were the "seers" (mantradrasta) of the hymns. Thus we find 
that when some time had elapsed after the composition of the 
Vedas, people had come to look upon them not only as very old, 
but so old that they had, theoretically at least, no beginning in 
time, though they were believed to have been revealed at some 
unknown remote period at the beginning of each creation. 

The place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind. 

When the Vedas were composed, there was probably no 
system of writing prevalent in India. But such was the scrupulous 
zeal of the Brahmins, who got the whole Vedic literature by 
heart by hearing it from their preceptors, that it has been trans 
mitted most faithfully to us through the course of the last 3000 
years or more with little or no interpolations at all. The religious 
history of India had suffered considerable changes in the latter 
periods, since the time of the Vedic civilization, but such was 
the reverence paid to the Vedas that they had ever remained as 
the highest religious authority for all sections of the Hindus at 
all times. Even at this day all the obligatory duties of the Hindus 
at birth, marriage, death, etc., are performed according to the old 



CH. n] Classification of the Vedic literature 1 1 

Vedic ritual. The prayers that a Brahmin now says three times 
a day are the same selections of Vedic verses as were used as 
prayer verses two or three thousand years ago. A little insight 
into the life of an ordinary Hindu of the present day will show 
that the system of image-worship is one that has been grafted 
upon his life, the regular obligatory duties of which are ordered 
according to the old Vedic rites. Thus an orthodox Brahmin 
can dispense with image-worship if he likes, but not so with his 
daily Vedtc prayers or other obligatory ceremonies. Even at 
this day there are persons who bestow immense sums of money 
for the performance and teaching of Vedic sacrifices and rituals. 
Most of the Sanskrit literatures that flourished after the Vedas 
base upon them their own validity, and appeal to them as 
authority. Systems of Hindu philosophy not only own their alle 
giance to the Vedas, but the adherents of each one of them would 
often quarrel with others and maintain its superiority by trying 
to prove that it and it alone was the faithful follower of the 
Vedas and represented correctly their views. The laws which 
regulate the social, legal, domestic and religious customs and 
rites of the Hindus even to the present day are said to be but 
mere systematized memories of old Vedic teachings, and are 
held to be obligatory on their authority. Even under British 
administration, in the inheritance of property, adoption, and in 
such other legal transactions, Hindu Law is followed, and this 
claims to draw its authority from the Vedas. To enter into 
details is unnecessary. But suffice it to say that the Vedas, far 
from being regarded as a dead literature of the past, are still 
looked upon as the origin and source of almost all literatures 
except purely secular poetry and drama. Thus in short we may 
say that in spite of the many changes that time has wrought, 
the orthodox Hindu life may still be regarded in the main as an 
adumbration of the Vedic life, which had never ceased to shed 
its light all through the past. 

Classification of the Vedic literature. 

A beginner who is introduced for the first time to the study 
of later Sanskrit literature is likely to appear somewhat confused 
when he meets with authoritative texts of diverse purport and 
subjects having the same generic name " Veda " or " Sruti " (from 
sru to hear) ; for Veda in its wider sense is not the name of any 



1 2 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [CH. 

particular book, but of the literature of a particular epoch ex 
tending over a long period, say two thousand years or so. As 
this literature represents the total achievements of the Indian 
people in different directions for such a long period, it must of 
necessity be of a diversified character. If we roughly classify 
this huge literature from the points of view of age, language, and 
subject matter, we can point out four different types, namely the 
Samhita or collection of verses (sam together, hita put), Brah 
manas, Aranyakas (" forest treatises ") and the Upanisads. All 
these literatures, both prose and verse, were looked upon as so 
holy that in early times it was thought almost a sacrilege to write 
them; they were therefore learnt by heart by the Brahmins from 
the mouth of their preceptors and were hence called sruti (liter 
ally anything heard) 1 . 

The Samhitas. 

There are four collections or Samhitas, namely Rg-Veda, 
Sama-Veda, Yajur-Veda and Atharva-Veda. Of these the Rg- 
Veda is probably the earliest. The Sama-Veda has practically 
no independent value, for it consists of stanzas taken (excepting 
only 75) entirely from the Rg-Veda, which were meant to be 
sung to certain fixed melodies, and may thus be called the book 
of chants. The Yajur-Veda however contains in addition to the 
verses taken from the Rg-Veda many original prose formulas. 
The arrangement of the verses of the Sama-Veda is solely with 
reference to their place and use in the Soma sacrifice; the con 
tents of the Yajur-Veda are arranged in the order in which the 
verses were actually employed in the various religious sacrifices. 
It is therefore called the Veda of Yajus sacrificial prayers. These 
may be contrasted with the arrangement in the Rg-Veda in this, 
that there the verses are generally arranged in accordance with 
the gods who are adored in them. Thus, for example, first we get 
all the poems addressed to Agni or the Fire-god, then all those 
to the god Indra and so on. The fourth collection, the Atharva- 
Veda, probably attained its present form considerably later than 
the Rg-Veda. In spirit, however, as Professor Macdonell says, 
" it is not only entirely different from the Rigveda but represents a 
much more primitive stage of thought. While the Rigveda deals 
almost exclusively with the higher gods as conceived by a com- 

1 Panini, in. iii. 94. 



u] The Brahmanas 1 3 

paratively advanced and refined sacerdotal c\a.ss,theAtAarva-Veda 
is, in the main a book of spells and incantations appealing to the 
demon world, and teems with notions about witchcraft current 
among the lower grades of the population, and derived from an 
immemorial antiquity. These two, thus complementary to each 
other in contents are obviously the most important of the four 
VedasV 

The Brahmanas 2 . 

After the Samhitas there grew up the theological treatises 
called the Brahmanas, which were of a distinctly different literary 
type. They are written in prose, and explain the sacred signi 
ficance of the different rituals to those who are not already 
familiar with them. " They reflect," says Professor Macdonell, 
" the spirit of an age in which all intellectual activity is concen 
trated on the sacrifice, describing its ceremonies, discussing its 
value, speculating on its origin and significance." These works 
are full of dogmatic assertions, fanciful symbolism and specu 
lations of an unbounded imagination in the field of sacrificial 
details. The sacrificial ceremonials were probably never so 
elaborate at the time when the early hymns were composed. 
But when the collections of hymns were being handed down from 
generation to generation the ceremonials became more and more 
complicated. Thus there came about the necessity of the dis 
tribution of the different sacrificial functions amongseveral distinct 
classes of priests. We may assume that this was a period when 
the caste system was becoming established, and when the only 
thing which could engage wise and religious minds was sacrifice 
and its elaborate rituals. Free speculative thinking was thus 
subordinated to the service of the sacrifice, and the result was 
the production of the most fanciful sacramental and symbolic 

1 A. A. Macdonell s History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 31. 

a Weber (Hist. Ind. Lit., p. u, note) says that the word Brahmana signifies "that 
which relates to prayer brahman." Max Miiller (S.B. E. I. p. Ixvi) says that Brah 
mana meant "originally the sayings of Brahmans, whether in the general sense of 
priests, or in the more special sense of Brahman-priests." Eggeling (S. B E. XII. Introd. 
p. xxii) says that the Brahmanas were so called "probably either because they were 
intended for the instruction and guidance of priests (brahman) generally; or because 
they were, for the most part, the authoritative utterances of such as were thoroughly 
versed in Vedic and sacrificial lore and competent to act as Brahmans or superintend 
ing priests. " But in view of the fact that the Brahmanas were also supposed to be as 
much revealed as the Vedas, the present writer thinks that Weber s view is the correct 
one. 



14 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [CH. 

system, unparalleled anywhere but among the Gnostics. It is 
now generally believed that the close of the Brahmana period 
was not later than 500 B.C. 

The Aranyakas. 

As a further development of the Brahmanas however we get 
the Aranyakas or forest treatises. These works were probably 
composed for old men who had retired into the forest and were 
thus unable to perform elaborate sacrifices requiring a multitude 
of accessories and articles which could not be procured in forests. 
In these, meditations on certain symbols were supposed to be of 
great merit, and they gradually began to supplant the sacrifices 
as being of a superior order. It is here that we find that amongst 
a certain section of intelligent people the ritualistic ideas began 
to give way, and philosophic speculations about the nature of 
truth became gradually substituted in their place. To take an 
illustration from the beginning of the Brhadaranyaka we find 
that instead of the actual performance of the horse sacrifice 
(asvamedha) there are directions for meditating upon the dawn 
( Usas) as the head of the horse, the sun as the eye of the horse, 
the air as its life, and so on. This is indeed a distinct advance 
ment of the claims of speculation or meditation over the actual 
performance of the complicated ceremonials of sacrifice. The 
growth of the subjective speculation, as being capable of bringing 
the highest good, gradually resulted in the supersession of Vedic 
ritualism and the establishment of the claims of philosophic 
meditation and self-knowledge as the highest goal of life. Thus 
we find that the Aranyaka age was a period during which free 
thinking tried gradually to shake off the shackles of ritualism 
which had fettered it for a long time. It was thus that the 
Aranyakas could pave the way for the Upanisads, revive the 
germs of philosophic speculation in the Vedas, and develop them 
in a manner which made the Upanisads the source of all philo 
sophy that arose in the world of Hindu thought. 

The Rg-Veda, its civilization. 

The hymns of the Rg-Veda are neither the productions of a 
single hand nor do they probably belong to any single age. They 
were composed probably at different periods by different sages, 
and it is not improbable that some of them were composed 



n] The g- Veda, its civilization 1 5 

before the Aryan people entered the plains of India. They were 
handed down from mouth to mouth and gradually swelled through 
the new additions that were made by the poets of succeeding 
generations. It was when the collection had increased to a very 
considerable extent that it was probably arranged in the present 
form, or in some other previous forms to which the present 
arrangement owes its origin. They therefore reflect the civilization 
of the Aryan people at different periods of antiquity before and 
after they had come to India. This unique monument of a long 
vanished age is of great aesthetic value, and contains much that is 
genuine poetry. It enables us to get an estimate of the primitive 
society which produced it the oldest book of the Aryan race. 
The principal means of sustenance were cattle-keeping and the 
cultivation of the soil with plough and harrow, mattock and hoe, 
and watering the ground when necessary with artificial canals. 
"The chief food consists," as Kaegi says, "together with bread, 
of various preparations of milk, cakes of flour and butter, many 
sorts of vegetables and fruits; meat cooked on the spits or in pots, 
is little used, and was probably eaten only at the great feasts and 
family gatherings. Drinking plays throughout a much more im 
portant part than eating 1 ." The wood -worker built war-chariots 
and wagons, as also more delicate carved works and artistic cups. 
Metal-workers, smiths and potters continued their trade. The 
women understood the plaiting of mats, weaving and sewing ; 
they manufactured the wool of the sheep into clothing for men 
and covering for animals. The group of individuals forming a 
tribe was the highest political unit; each of the different families 
forming a tribe was under the sway of the father or the head of 
the family. Kingship was probably hereditary and in some cases 
electoral. Kingship was nowhere absolute, but limited by the 
will of the people. Most developed ideas of justice, right and 
law, were present in the country. Thus Kaegi says, " the hymns 
strongly prove how deeply the prominent minds in the people 
were persuaded that the eternal ordinances of the rulers of the 
world were as inviolable in mental and moral matters as in the 
realm of nature, and that every wrong act, even the unconscious, 
was punished and the sin expiated 8 ." Thus it is only right and 
proper to think that the Aryans had attained a pretty high degree 

1 The Rigveda, by Kaegi, 1886 edition, p. 13 * Ibid. p. 18. 



1 6 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [CH. 

of civilization, but nowhere was the sincere spirit of the Aryans 
more manifested than in religion, which was the most essential and 
dominant feature of almost all the hymns, except a few secular 
ones. Thus Kaegi says, " The whole significance of the Rigveda 
in reference to the general history of religion, as has repeatedly 
been pointed out in modern times, rests upon this, that it presents 
to us the development of religious conceptions from the earliest 
beginnings to the deepest apprehension of the godhead and its 
relation to man 1 ." 

The Vedic Gods. 

The hymns of the Rg-Veda were almost all composed in 
praise of the gods. The social and other materials are of secondary 
importance, as these references had only to be mentioned inci 
dentally in giving vent to their feelings of devotion to the god. 
The gods here are however personalities presiding over the diverse 
powers of nature or forming their very essence. They have 
therefore no definite, systematic and separate characters like the 
Greek gods or the gods of the later Indian mythical works, the 
Puranas. The powers of nature such as the storm, the rain, the 
thunder, are closely associated with one another, and the gods 
associated with them are also similar in character. The same 
epithets are attributed to different gods and it is only in a few 
specific qualities that they differ from one another. In the later 
mythological compositions of the Puranas the gods lost their 
character as hypostatic powers of nature, and thus became actual 
personalities and characters having their tales of joy and sorrow 
like the mortal here below. The Vedic gods may be contrasted 
with them in this, that they are of an impersonal nature, as the 
characters they display are mostly but expressions of the powers 
of nature. To take an example, the fire or Agni is described, as 
Kaegi has it, as one that " lies concealed in the softer wood, as 
in a chamber, until, called forth by the rubbing in the early 
morning hour, he suddenly springs forth in gleaming brightness. 
The sacrificer takes and lays him on the wood. When the priests 
pour melted butter upon him, he leaps up crackling and neighing 
like a horse he whom men love to see increasing like their own 
prosperity. They wonder at him, when, decking himself with 

1 The Rigveda, by Kaegi, p. 26. 



n] Polytheism, Henotheism and Monotheism 1 7 

changing colors like a suitor, equally beautiful on all sides, he 
presents to all sides his front. 

All-searching is his beam, the gleaming of his light, 
His, the all-beautiful, of beauteous face and glance, 
The changing shimmer like that floats upon the stream, 
So Agni s rays gleam over bright and never cease *." 

R. V. I. 143. 3. 

They would describe the wind (Vata) and adore him and say 

" In what place was he born, and from whence comes he ? 
The vital breath of gods, the world s great offspring, 
The God where er he will moves at his pleasure : 
His rushing sound we hear what his appearance, no one 2 ." 

R, V. x. 168. 3, 4- 

It was the forces of nature and her manifestations, on earth 
here, the atmosphere around and above U9, or in the Heaven 
beyond the vault of the sky that excited the devotion and 
imagination of the Vedic poets. Thus with the exception of a 
few abstract gods of whom we shall presently speak and some 
dual divinities, the gods may be roughly classified as the terres 
trial, atmospheric, and celestial. 

Polytheism, Henotheism and Monotheism. 

The plurality of the Vedic gods may lead a superficial enquirer 
to think the faith of the Vedic people polytheistic. But an in 
telligent reader will find here neither polytheism nor monotheism 
but a simple primitive stage of belief to which both of these may 
be said to owe their origin. The gods here do not preserve their 
proper places as in a polytheistic faith, but each one of them 
shrinks into insignificance or shines as supreme according as it is 
the object of adoration or not. The Vedic poets were the children 
of nature. Every natural phenomenon excited their wonder, 
admiration or veneration. The poet is struck with wonder that 
" the rough red cow gives soft white milk." The appearance or 
the setting of the sun sends a thrill into the minds of the Vedic 
sage and with wonder-gazing eyes he exclaims: 

" Undropped beneath, not fastened firm, how comes it 
That downward turned he falls not downward ? 
The guide of his ascending path, who saw it 1 ?" R. V. IV. 13. 5. 

The sages wonder how " the sparkling waters of all rivers flow 
into one ocean without ever filling it." The minds of the Vedic 

1 The Rigwda, by Kaegi, p. 35. * Ibid. p. 38. 

D. 2 



1 8 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [CH. 

people as we find in the hymns were highly impressionable and 
fresh. At this stage the time was not ripe enough for them to 
accord a consistent and well-defined existence to the multitude 
of gods nor to universalize them in a monotheistic creed. They 
hypostatized unconsciously any force of nature that overawed 
them or filled them with gratefulness and joy by its beneficent or 
aesthetic character, and adored it. The deity which moved the de 
votion or admiration of their mind was the most supreme for the 
time. This peculiar trait of the Vedic hymns Max Miiller has called 
HenotheismorKathehotheism: "a belief in singlegods.each in turn 
standing out as the highest. And since the gods are thought of 
as specially ruling in their own spheres, the singers, in their special 
concerns and desires, call most of all on that god to whom they 
ascribe the most power in the matter, to whose department if I 
may say so, their wish belongs. This god alone is present to the mind 
of the suppliant; with him for the time being is associated every 
thing that can be said of a divine being; he is the highest, the only 
god, before whom all others disappear, there being in this, however, 
no offence or depreciation of any other god 1 ." " Against this theory 
it has been urged," as Macdonell rightly says in his Vedic Myth 
ology*, "that Vedic deities are not represented as independent of 
all the rest, since no religion brings its gods into more frequent 
and varied juxtaposition and combination, and that even the 
mightiest gods of the Veda are made dependent on others. Thus 
Varuna and Surya are subordinate to Indra (i. 101), Varuna and 
the Asvins submit to the power of Visnu (i. 156).... Even when a 
god is spoken of as unique or chief (eka), as is natural enough in 
laudations, such statements lose their temporarily monotheistic 
force, through the modifications or corrections supplied by the con 
text or even by the same verse 3 ." " Henotheism is therefore an 
appearance," says Macdonell, "rather than a reality, an appearance 
produced by the indefiniteness due to undeveloped anthropo 
morphism, by the lack of any Vedic god occupying the position 
of a Zeus as the constant head of the pantheon, by the natural 
tendency of the priest or singer in extolling a particular god to 
exaggerate his greatness and to ignore other gods, and by the 

1 The Rigveda, by Kaegi, p. 27. 

1 See Ibid. p. 33. See also Arrowsmith s note on it for other references to Heno 
theism. 

1 Macdonell s Vedic Mythology, pp. 16, 17. 



n] Growth of a Monotheistic tendency 19 

growing belief in the unity of the gods (cf. the refrain of 3, 35) 
each of whom might be regarded as a type of the divine 1 ." But 
whether we call it Henotheism or the mere temporary exaggera 
tion of the powers of the deity in question, it is evident that this 
stage can neither be properly called polytheistic nor monotheistic, 
but one which had a tendency towards them both, although it 
was not sufficiently developed to be identified with either of them. 
The tendency towards extreme exaggeration could be called a 
monotheistic bias in germ, whereas the correlation of different 
deities as independent of one another and yet existing side by side 
was a tendency towards polytheism. 

Growth of a Monotheistic tendency; Prajapati, Visvakarma. 

This tendency towards extolling a god as the greatest and 
highest gradually brought forth the conception of a supreme 
Lord of all beings (Prajapati), not by a process of conscious 
generalization but as a necessary stage of development of the mind, 
able to imagine a deity as the repository of the highest moral and 
physical power, though its direct manifestation cannot be per 
ceived. Thus the epithet Prajapati or the Lord of beings, which 
was originally an epithet for other deities, came to be recognized 
as a separate deity, the highest and the greatest. Thus it is said 
in R. V. x. I2i 8 : 

In the beginning rose Hiranyagarbha, 

Born as the only lord of all existence. 

This earth he settled firm and heaven established : 

What god shall we adore with our oblations ? 

Who gives us breath, who gives us strength, whose bidding 

All creatures must obey, the bright gods even ; 

Whose shade is death, whose shadow life immortal : 

What god shall we adore with our oblations ? 

Who by his might alone became the monarch 

Of all that breathes, of all that wakes or slumbers, 

Of all, both man and beast, the lord eternal : 

What god shall we adore with our oblations ? 

Whose might and majesty these snowy mountains, 

The ocean and the distant stream exhibit ; 

Whose arms extended are these spreading regions : 

What god shall we adore with our oblations ? 

Who made the heavens bright, the earth enduring, 

Who fixed the firmament, the heaven of heavens ; 

Who measured out the air s extended spaces: 

What god shall we adore with our oblations ? 

1 MacdonelFs Vedic Mythology, p. 17. a The Rigveda, by Kaegi, pp. 88, 89. 

22 



2O The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [CH. 

Similar attributes are also ascribed to the deity Vivakarma 
(All-creator) 1 . He is said to be father and procreator of all beings, 
though himself uncreated. He generated the primitive waters. 
It is to him that the sage says, 

Who is our father, our creator, maker, 

Who every place doth know and every creature, 

By whom alone to gods their names were given, 

To him all other creatures go to ask him 2 . R. V. x. 82. 3. 

Brahma. 

The conception of Brahman which has been the highest glory 
for the Vedanta philosophy of later days had hardly emerged in 
the Rg-Veda from the associations of the sacrificial mind. The 
meanings that Sayana the celebrated commentator of the Vedas 
gives of the word as collected by Haug are: (a) food, food offering, 
(b) the chant of the sama-singer, (c) magical formula or text, 
(d) duly completed ceremonies, (e) the chant and sacrificial gift 
together, (f) the recitatioa of the hotr priest, (g) great. Roth 
says that it also means " the devotion which manifests itself as 
longing and satisfaction of the soul and reaches forth to the 
gods." But it is only in the ^atapatha Brahmana that the con 
ception of Brahman has acquired a great significance as the 
supreme principle which is the moving force behind the gods. 
Thus the atapatha says, " Verily in the beginning this (universe) 
was the Brahman (neut). It created the gods; and, having 
created the gods, it made them ascend these worlds: Agni this 
(terrestrial) world, Vayu the air, and Surya the sky.... Then the 
Brahman itself went up to the sphere beyond. Having gone up 
to the sphere beyond, it considered, How can I descend again 
into these worlds ? It then descended again by means of these 
two, Form and Name. Whatever has a name, that is name ; and 
that again which has no name and which one knows by its form, 
this is (of a certain) form, that is form : as far as there are Form 
and Name so far, indeed, extends this (universe). These indeed 
are the two great forces of Brahman; and, verily, he who knows 
these two great forces of Brahman becomes himself a great force*. 
In another place Brahman is said to be the ultimate thing in the 
Universe and is identified with Prajapati, Purusa and Prana 

1 See The Rigveda, by Kaegi, p. 89, and also Muir s Sanskrit Texts, vol. iv. pp. 5-11. 

8 Kaegi s translation. 

8 See Eggeling s translation of Satapatha Brabmana S. B. E. vol. XLIV. pp. 27, 28. 



n] Sacrifice: the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma 2 1 

(the vital air 1 ). In another place Brahman is described as being 
the Svayambhu (self-born) performing austerities, who offered 
his own self in the creatures and the creatures in his own self, 
and thus compassed supremacy, sovereignty and lordship over 
all creatures 2 . The conception of the supreme man (Purusa) in 
the Rg-Veda also supposes that the supreme man pervades the 
world with only a fourth part of Himself, whereas the remaining 
three parts transcend to a region beyond. He is at once the 
present, past and future 8 . 

Sacrifice; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma. 

It will however be wrong to suppose that these monotheistic 
tendencies were gradually supplanting the polytheistic sacrifices. 
On the other hand, the complications of ritualism were gradually 
growing in their elaborate details. The direct result of this growth 
contributed however to relegate the gods to a relatively unim 
portant position, and to raise the dignity of the magical charac 
teristics of the sacrifice as an institution which could give the 
desired fruits of themselves. The offerings at a sacrifice were not 
dictated by a devotion with which we are familiar under Christian 
or Vaisnava influence. The sacrifice taken as a whole is con 
ceived as Haug notes " to be a kind of machinery in which every 
piece must tally with the other," the slightest discrepancy in the 
performance of even a minute ritualistic detail, say in the pouring 
of the melted butter on the fire, or the proper placing of utensils 
employed in the sacrifice, or even the misplacing of a mere straw 
contrary to the injunctions was sufficient to spoil the whole 
sacrifice with whatsoever earnestness it might be performed. 
Even if a word was mispronounced the most dreadful results 
might follow. Thus when Tvastr performed a sacrifice for the 
production of a demon who would be able to kill his enemy 
Indra, owing to the mistaken accent of a single word the object 
was reversed and the demon produced was killed by Indra. But if 
the sacrifice could be duly performed down to the minutest 
detail, there was no power which could arrest or delay the fruition 
of the object. Thus the objects of a sacrifice were fulfilled not 
by the grace of the gods, but as a natural result of the sacrifice. 
The performance of the rituals invariably produced certain 
mystic or magical results by virtue of which the object desired 

1 See S. B. E. XLIH. pp. 59, 60, 400 and XLIV. p. 409. 

2 See Ibid. XLIV. p. 418. R. V. x. 90, Purusa Sukta. 



22 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [CH. 

by the sacrificer was fulfilled in due course like the fulfilment of 
a natural law in the physical world. The sacrifice was believed 
to have existed from eternity like the Vedas. The creation of 
the world itself was even regarded as the fruit of a sacrifice per 
formed by the supreme Being. It exists as Haug says " as an 
invisible thing at all times and is like the latent power of elec 
tricity in an electrifying machine, requiring only the operation 
of a suitable apparatus in order to be elicited." The sacrifice is 
not offered to a god with a view to propitiate him or to obtain 
from him welfare on earth or bliss in Heaven; these rewards are 
directly produced by the sacrifice itself through the correct per 
formance of complicated and interconnected ceremonies which 
constitute the sacrifice. Though in each sacrifice certain gods 
were invoked and received the offerings, the gods themselves 
were but instruments in bringing about the sacrifice or in com 
pleting the course of mystical ceremonies composing it. Sacrifice 
is thus regarded as possessing a mystical potency superior even to 
the gods, who it is sometimes stated attained to their divine rank 
by means of sacrifice. Sacrifice was regarded as almost the only 
kind of duty, and it was also called karma or kriya (action) and 
the unalterable law was, that these mystical ceremonies for good 
or for bad, moral or immoral (for there were many kinds of 
sacrifices which were performed for injuring one s enemies or 
gaining worldly prosperity or supremacy at the cost of others) 
were destined to produce their effects. It is well to note here that 
the first recognition of a cosmic order or law prevailing in nature 
under the guardianship of the highest gods is to be found in the 
use of the word Rta (literally the course of things). This word 
was also used, as Macdonell observes, to denote the " order 
in the moral world as truth and right and in the religious 
world as sacrifice or rite 1 " and its unalterable law of producing 
effects. It is interesting to note in this connection that it is here 
that we find the first germs of the law of karma, which exercises 
such a dominating control over Indian thought up to the present 
day. Thus we find the simple faith and devotion of the Vedic 
hymns on one hand being supplanted by the growth of a complex 
system of sacrificial rites, and on the other bending their course 
towards a monotheistic or philosophic knowledge of the ultimate 
reality of the universe. 

1 Macdonell s Vedic Mythology, p. n. 



n] Cosmogony Mythological and philosophical 23 

Cosmogony Mythological and philosophical. 

The cosmogony of the Rg-Veda may be looked at from two 
aspects, the mythological and the philosophical. The mythological 
aspect has in general two currents, as Professor Macdonell says, 
" The one regards the universe as the result of mechanical pro 
duction, the work of carpenter s and joiner s skill; the other 
represents it as the result of natural generation 1 ." Thus in the 
Rg-Veda we find that the poet in one place says, " what was 
the wood and what was the tree out of which they built heaven 
and earth 3 ?" The answer given to this question in Taittiriya- 
Brahmana is "Brahman the wood and Brahman the tree from 
which the heaven and earth were made 8 ." Heaven and Earth are 
sometimes described as having been supported with posts*. They 
are also sometimes spoken of as universal parents, and parentage 
is sometimes attributed to Aditi and Daksa. 

Under this philosophical aspect the semi-pantheistic Man- 
hymn 8 attracts our notice. The supreme man as we have already 
noticed above is there said to be the whole universe, whatever 
has been and shall be ; he is the lord of immortality who has become 
diffused everywhere among things animate and inanimate, and 
all beings came out of him ; from his navel came the atmosphere; 
from his head arose the sky ; from his feet came the earth ; from 
his ear the four quarters. Again there are other hymns in which 
the Sun is called the soul (atmari) of all that is movable and 
all that is immovable . There are also statements to the effect 
that the Being is one, though it is called by many names by the 
sages 7 . The supreme being is sometimes extolled as the supreme 
Lord of the world called the golden egg (Hiranyagarbha 8 ). In 
some passages it is said " Brahmanaspati blew forth these births 
like a blacksmith. In the earliest age of the gods, the existent 
sprang from the non-existent. In the first age of the gods, the 
existent sprang from the non-existent: thereafter the regions 
sprang, thereafter, from Uttanapada 9 ." The most remarkable and 
sublime hymn in which the first germs of philosophic speculation 

1 Macdonell s Vedic Mythology, p. n. 

2 R. V. x. 8 1. 4. 8 Taitt. Br. 11. 8. 9. 6. 

4 Macdonell s Vedic Mythology, p. u ; also R. V. n. 15 and iv. 56. 

8 R.V. x. 90. 6 R.V. i. 115. 

R. V. i. 164. 46. 8 R. V. x. in. 

Muir s translation of R. V. x. 73 ; Muir s Sanskrit Texts, vol. v. p. 48. 



24 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [CH. 

with regard to the wonderful mystery of the origin of the world 
are found is the 1 29th hymn of R. V. X. 

1. Then there was neither being nor not-being. 
The atmosphere was not, nor sky above it. 
What covered all ? and where ? by what protected ? 
Was there the fathomless abyss of waters ? 

2. Then neither death nor deathless existed; 

Of day and night there was yet no distinction. 
Alone that one breathed calmly, self-supported, 
Other than It was none, nor aught above It. 

3. Darkness there was at first in darkness hidden; 
The universe was undistinguished water. 
That which in void and emptiness lay hidden 
Alone by power of fervor was developed. 

4. Then for the first time there arose desire, 
Which was the primal germ of mind, within it. 
And sages, searching in their heart, discovered 
In Nothing the connecting bond of Being. 

6. Who is it knows ? Who here can tell us surely 
From what and how this universe has risen? 
And whether not till after it the gods lived ? 
Who then can know from what it has arisen? 

7. The source from which this universe has risen, 
And whether it was made, or uncreated, 

He only knows, who from the highest heaven 
Rules, the all-seeing lord or does not He know 1 ? 

The earliest commentary on this is probably a passage in the 
atapatha Brahmana (X. 5. 3. i) which says that " in the beginning 
this (universe) was as it were neither non-existent nor existent; 
in the beginning this (universe) was as it were, existed and did 
not exist : there was then only that Mind. Wherefore it has been 
declared by the Rishi (Rg-Veda X. 129. i ), There was then neither 
the non-existent nor the existent for Mind was, as it were, neither 
existent nor non-existent. This Mind when created, wished to 
become manifest, more defined, more substantial : it sought after 
a self (a body) ; it practised austerity : it acquired consistency 2 ." 
In the Atharva-Veda also we find it stated that all forms of the 
universe were comprehended within the god Skambha 3 . 

Thus we find that even in the period of the Vedas there sprang 
forth such a philosophic yearning, at least among some who could 

1 The Rigveda, by Kaegi, p. 90. R. V. x. 119. 

2 See Eggeling s translation of S. B., S. B. E. vol. XLIII. pp. 374, 375. 

3 A. V. x. 7. ro. 



n] Eschatologyi the Doctrine of Atman 25 

question whether this universe was at all a creation or not, which 
could think of the origin of the world as being enveloped in the 
mystery of a primal non-differentiation of being and non-being ; 
and which could think that it was the primal One which by its 
inherent fervour gave rise to the desire of a creation as the first 
manifestation of the germ of mind.from which the universe sprang 
forth through a series of mysterious gradual processes. In the 
Brahmanas, however, we find that the cosmogonic view generally 
requires the agency of a creator, who is not however always the 
starting point, and we find that the theory of evolution. is com 
bined with the theory of creation, so that Prajapati is sometimes 
spoken of as the creator while at other times the creator is said 
to have floated in the primeval water as a cosmic golden egg. 

Eschatology ; the Doctrine of Atman. 

There seems to be a belief in the Vedas that the soul could 
be separated from the body in states of swoon, and that it could 
exist after death, though we do not find there any trace of the 
doctrine of transmigration in a developed form. In the Satapatha 
Brahmana it is said that those who do not perform rites with 
correct knowledge are born again after death and suffer death 
again. In a hymn of the Rg-Veda (x. 58) the soul (manas) of a man 
apparently unconscious is invited to come back to him from the 
trees, herbs, the sky, the sun, etc. In many of the hymns there 
is also the belief in the existence of another world, where the 
highest material joys are attained as a result of the performance 
of the sacrifices and also in a hell of darkness underneath 
where the evil-doers are punished. In the atapatha Brahmana 
we find that the dead pass between two fires which burn the evil 
doers, but let the good go by 1 ; it is also said there that everyone 
is born again after death, is weighed in a balance, and receives 
reward or punishment according as his works are good or bad. 
It is easy to see that scattered ideas like these with regard to 
the destiny of the soul of man according to the sacrifice that he 
performs or other good or bad deeds form the first rudiments of 
the later doctrine of metempsychosis. The idea that man enjoys 
or suffers, either in another world or by being born in this world 
according to his good or bad deeds, is the first beginning of the 
moral idea, though in the Brahmanic days the good deeds were 

1 See 5. B. i. 9. 3, and also Macdonell s Vedic Mythology, pp. 166, 167. 



26 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [CH. 

more often of the nature of sacrificial duties than ordinary good 
works. These ideas of the possibilities of a necessary connection 
of the enjoyments and sorrows of a man with his good and bad 
works when combined with the notion of an inviolable law or 
order, which we have already seen was gradually growing with 
the conception of rta, and the unalterable law which produces 
the effects of sacrificial works, led to the Law of Karma and the 
doctrine of transmigration. The words which denote soul in the 
Rg-Veda are manas, dtman and asu. The word dtman however 
which became famous in later Indian thought is generally used 
to mean vital breath. Manas is regarded as the seat of thought 
and emotion, and it seems to be regarded, as Macdonell says, as 
dwelling in the heart 1 . It is however difficult to understand how 
atman as vital breath, or as a separable part of man going out of 
the dead man came to be regarded as the ultimate essence or 
reality in man and the universe. There is however at least one 
passage in the Rg-Veda where the poet penetrating deeper and 
deeper passes from the vital breath (asu) to the blood, and thence 
to atman as the inmost self of the world ; " Who has seen how 
the first-born, being the Bone-possessing (the shaped world), was 
born from the Boneless (the shapeless)? where was the vital 
breath, the blood, the Self (dtman) of the world ? Who went to 
ask him that knows it a ?" In Taittiriya Aranyaka i. 23, however, 
it is said that Prajapati after having created his self (as the world) 
with his own self entered into it. In Taittiriya Brahmana the 
atman is called omnipresent, and it is said that he who knows 
him is no more stained by evil deeds. Thus we find that in the 
pre-Upanisad Vedic literature atman probably was first used to 
denote " vital breath " in man, then the self of the world, and then 
the self in man. It is from this last stage that we find the traces 
of a growing tendency to looking at the self of man as the omni 
present supreme principle of the universe, the knowledge of which 
makes a man sinless and pure. 

Conclusion. 

Looking at the advancement of thought in the Rg-Veda we 
find first that a fabric of thought was gradually growing which 
not only looked upon the universe as a correlation of parts or a 

* Macdonell s Vedic Mythology, p. 166 and R. V. vm 89. 

9 R. V. i. 164. 4 and Deussen s article on Atman in Encyclopaedia of Religion and 
Ethics. 



n] Conclusion 27 

construction made of them, but sought to explain it as having 
emanated from one great being who is sometimes described as 
one with the universe and surpassing it, and at other times as 
being separate from it; the agnostic spirit which is the mother 
of philosophic thought is seen at times to be so bold as to express 
doubts even on the most fundamental questions of creation "Who 
knows whether this world was ever created or not?" Secondly, 
the growth of sacrifices has helped to establish the unalterable 
nature of the law by which the (sacrificial) actions produced their 
effects of themselves. It also lessened the importance of deities 
as being the supreme masters of the world and our fate, and the 
tendency of henotheism gradually diminished their multiple 
character and advanced the monotheistic tendency in some 
quarters. Thirdly, the soul of man is described as being separable 
from his body and subject to suffering and enjoyment in another 
world according to his good or bad deeds; the doctrine that the 
soul of man could go to plants, etc., or that it could again be re 
born on earth, is also hinted at in certain passages, and this may 
be regarded as sowing the first seeds of the later doctrine of 
transmigration. The self (atman) is spoken of in one place as the 
essence of the world, and when we trace the idea in the Brahmanas 
and the Aranyakas we see that atman has begun to mean the 
supreme essence in man as well as in the universe, and has thus 
approached the great Atman doctrine of the Upanisads. 



CHAPTER III 

THE EARLIER UPANISADS 1 . (700 B.C. 600 B.C.) 

The place of the Upanisads in Vedic literature. 

THOUGH it is generally held that the Upanisads are usually 
attached as appendices to the Aranyakas which are again attached 
to the Brahmanas, yet it cannot be said that their distinction as 
separate treatises is always observed. Thus we find in some cases 
that subjects which we should expect to be discussed in a Brahmana 
are introduced into the Aranyakas and the Aranyaka materials 
are sometimes fused into the great bulk of Upanisad teaching. 
This shows that these three literatures gradually grew up in one 

1 There are about 112 Upanisads which have been published by the "Nirnaya- 
Sagara" Press, Bombay, 1917. These are i isa, 2 Kena, 3 Katha, 4 Prasna, 5 Mun- 
daka, 6 Mandukya, 7 Taittiriya, 8 Aitareya, 9 Chandogya, 10 Brhadafanyaka, 
ii vetasVatara, 12 Kausltaki, 13 Maitreyi, 14 Kaivalya, 15 Jabala, 16 Brahma- 
bindu, 17 Harnsa, 18 Arunika, 19 Garbha, 20 Narayana, 21 Narayana, 22 Para- 
mahamsa, 23 Brahma, 24 Amrtanada, 25 Atharva&ras, 26 Atharva^ikha, 27 Mai- 
trayam, 28 Brhajjabala, 29 Nrsimhapurvatapini, 30 Nrsimhottaratapini, 31 Kalag- 
nirudra, 31 Subala, 33 Ksurika, 34 Yantrika, 35 Sarvasara, 36 Niralamba, 37 u- 
karahasya, 38 Vajrasucika, 39Tejobindu, 40 Nadabindu, 41 Dhyanabindu, 42 Brah- 
mavidya, 43 Yogatattva, 44 Atmabodha, 45 Naradaparivrajaka, 46 Trisikhibrahmana, 
47 Sita, 48 Yogacudamani, 49 Nirvana, 50 Mandalabrahmana, 51 Daksinamfirtti, 
52 Sarabha, 53 Skanda, 54 Tripadvibhutimahanarayana, 55 Advayataraka, 56 Rarna- 
rahasya, 57 Ramapurvatapini, 58 Ramottaratapim, 59 Vasudeva, 60 Mudgala, 
6 1 Sandilya, 62 Paingala, 63 Bhiksuka, 64 Maha, 65 6ariraka, 66 Yogasikha, 
67 TuriyatTta, 68 Sarnnyasa, 69 Paramahamsaparivrajaka, 70 Aksamala, 7iAvyakta, 
72 Ekaksara, 73 Annapiirna, 74 Surya, 75 Aksi, 76 Adhyatma, 77 Kundika, 78 Sa- 
vitrl, 79Atman, 80 Pas\ipatabrahma, 81 Parabrahma, 82 Avadhuta, 83 Tripuratapini, 
84 Devi, 85 Tripura, 86 Katharodra, 87 Bhavana, 88 Rudrahrdaya, 89 Yogakundall, 
90 Bhasmajabala, 91 Rudraksajabala, 92 Ganapati, 93 Jabaladariana, 94 Tarasara, 
95 Mahavakya, 96 Paficabrahma, 97 Pranagnihotra, 98 Gopalapurvatapini, 99 Gopa- 
lottaratapini, 100 Krsna, 101 Yajfiavalkya, 102 Varaha, 103 ^athyayanlya, 104 Ha- 
yagriva, 105 Dattatreya, 106 Garuda, 107 Kalisantarana, 108 Jabali, 109 Sau- 
bhagyalaksml, no Sarasvatirahasya, in Bahvrca, 112 Muktika. 

The collection of Upanisads translated by Dara shiko, Aurangzeb s brother, contained 
50 Upanisads. The Muktika Upanisad gives a list of 108 Upanisads. With the exception 
of the first 13 Upanisads most of them are of more or less later date. The Upanisads 
dealt with in this chapter are the earlier ones. Amongst the later ones there are some 
which repeat the purport of these, there are others which deal with the 6aiva, akta, 
the Yoga and the Vaisnava doctrines. These will be referred to in connection with the 
consideration of those systems in Volume II. The later Upanisads which only repeat the 
purport of those dealt with in this chapter do not require further mention. Some of 
the later Upanisads were composed even as late as the fourteenth or the fifteenth century- 



CH. in] The place of the Upanisads in Vedic Literature 29 

process of development and they were probably regarded as parts 
of one literature, in spite of the differences in their subject-matter. 
Deussen supposes that the principle of this division was to be 
found in this, that the Brahmanas were intended for the house 
holders, the Aranyakas for those who in their old age withdrew 
into the solitude of the forests and the Upanisads for those who 
renounced the world to attain ultimate salvation by meditation. 
Whatever might be said about these literary classifications the 
ancient philosophers of India looked upon the Upanisads as being 
of an entirely different type from the rest of the Vedic literature 
as dictating the path of knowledge (Jftana-mdrga) as opposed 
to the path of works (karma-mdrgd) which forms the content 
of the latter. It is not out of place here to mention that the 
orthodox Hindu view holds that whatever may be written in the 
Veda is to be interpreted as commandments to perform certain 
actions (vidht) or prohibitions against committing certain others 
(ntsedha). Even the stories or episodes are to be so interpreted 
that the real objects of their insertion might appear as only to 
praise the performance of the commandments and to blame the 
commission of the prohibitions. No person has any right to argue 
why any particular Vedic commandment is to be followed, for no 
reason can ever discover that, and it is only because reason fails 
to find out why a certain Vedic act leads to a certain effect that 
the Vedas have been revealed as commandments and prohibitions 
to show the true path of happiness. The Vedic teaching belongs 
therefore to that of the Karma-marga or the performance of Vedic 
duties of sacrifice, etc. The Upanisads however do not require 
the performance of any action, but only reveal the ultimate truth 
and reality, a knowledge of which at once emancipates a man. 
Readers of Hindu philosophy are aware that there is a very strong 
controversy on this point between the adherents of the Vedanta 
( Upanisads) and those of the Veda. For the latter seek in analogy 
to the other parts of the Vedic literature to establish the principle 
that the Upanisads should not be regarded as an exception, but 
that they should also be so interpreted that they might also be 
held out as commending the performance of duties ; but the 
former dissociate the Upanisads from the rest of the Vedic litera 
ture and assert that they do not make the slightest reference to 
any Vedic duties, but only delineate the ultimate reality which 
reveals the highest knowledge in the minds of the deserving. 



30 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

^ahkara the most eminent exponent of the Upanisads holds that 
they are meant for such superior men who are already above 
worldly or heavenly prosperities, and for whom the Vedic duties 
have ceased to have any attraction. Wheresoever there may be 
such a deserving person, be he a student, a householder or an 
ascetic, for him the Upanisads have been revealed for his ultimate 
emancipation and the true knowledge. Those who perform the 
Vedic duties belong to a stage inferior to those who no longer 
care for the fruits of the Vedic duties but are eager for final 
emancipation, and it is the latter who alone are fit to hear the 
Upanisads 1 . 

The names of the Upanisads ; Non-Brahmanic influence. 

The Upanisads are also known by another name Vedanta, as 
they are believed to be the last portions of the Vedas (veda-anta, 
end) ; it is by this name that the philosophy of the Upanisads, 
the Vedanta philosophy, is so familiar to us. A modern student 
knows that in language the Upanisads approach the classical 
Sanskrit ; the ideas preached also show that they are the culmina 
tion of the intellectual achievement of a great epoch. As they 
thus formed the concluding parts of the Vedas they retained their 
Vedic names which they took from the name of the different 
schools or branches (sdkhd) among which the Vedas were studied 2 . 
Thus the Upanisads attached to the Brahmanas of the Aitareya 
and Kausltaki schools are called respectively Aitareya and 
Kausltaki Upanisads. Those of the Tandins and Talavakaras of 
the Sama-veda are called the Chandogya and Talavakara (or 
Kena) Upanisads. Those of the Taittirlya school of the Yajurveda 

1 This is what is called the difference of fitness (adhikdribhedd). Those who perform 
the sacrifices are not fit to hear the Upanisads and those who are fit to hear the Upa 
nisads have no longer any necessity to perform the sacrificial duties. 

2 When the Samhita texts had become substantially fixed, they were committed 
to memory in different parts of the country and transmitted from teacher to pupil 
along with directions for the practical performance of sacrificial duties. The latter 
formed the matter of prose compositions, the Brahmanas. These however were 
gradually liable to diverse kinds of modifications according to the special tendencies 
and needs of the people among which they were recited. Thus after a time there 
occurred a great divergence in the readings of the texts of the Brahmanas even of the 
same Veda among different people. These different schools were known by the name 
of particular Sakhas (e.g. Aitareya, Kausltaki) with which the Brahmanas were asso 
ciated or named. According to the divergence of the Brahmanas of the different 
Sakhas there occurred the divergences of content and the length of the Upanisads 
associated with them. 



in] Brahmanas and the Early Upanisads 3 1 

form the Taittiriya and Mahanarayana, of the Katha school 
the Kathaka, of the Maitrayam school the Maitrayanl. The 
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad forms part of the &atapatha Brahmana 
of the Vajasaneyi schools. The Isa Upanisad also belongs to the 
latter school. But the school to which the vetasvatara belongs 
cannot be traced, and has probably been lost. The presump 
tion with regard to these Upanisads is that they represent the 
enlightened views of the particular schools among which they 
flourished, and under whose names they passed. A large number 
of Upanisads of a comparatively later age were attached to the 
Atharva-Veda, most of which were named not according to the 
Vedic schools but according to the subject-matter with which 
they dealt 1 . 

It may not be out of place here to mention that from the 
frequent episodes in the Upanisads in which the Brahmins are 
described as having gone to the Ksattriyas for the highest know 
ledge of philosophy, as well as from the disparateness of the 
Upanisad teachings from that of the general doctrines of the 
Brahmanas and from the allusions to the existence of philo 
sophical speculations amongst the people in Pali works, it may be 
inferred that among the Ksattriyas in general there existed earnest 
philosophic enquiries which must be regarded as having exerted 
an important influence in the formation of the Upanisad doctrines. 
There is thus some probability in the supposition that though the 
Upanisads are found directly incorporated with the Brahmanas 
it was not the production of the growth of Brahmanic dogmas 
alone, but that non-Brahmanic thought as well must have either 
set the Upanisad doctrines afoot, or have rendered fruitful assist 
ance to their formulation and cultivation, though they achieved 
their culmination in the hands of the Brahmins. 

Brahmanas and the Early Upanisads. 

The passage of the Indian mind from the Brahmanic to the 
Upanisad thought is probably the most remarkable event in the 
history of philosophic thought. We know that in the later Vedic 
hymns some monotheistic conceptions of great excellence were 
developed, but these differ in their nature from the absolutism of 
the Upanisads as much as the Ptolemaic and the Copernican 

1 Garbha Upanisad, Atman Upanisad, Pra^na Upanisad, etc. There were however 
some exceptions such as the Mandukya, Jabala, Paingala, 6aunaka, etc. 



32 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

systems in astronomy. The direct translation of VisVakarman or 
Hiranyagarbha into the atman and the Brahman of the Upani 
sads seems to me to be very improbable, though I am quite willing 
to admit that these conceptions were swallowed up by the atman 
doctrine when it had developed to a proper extent. Throughout 
the earlier Upanisads no mention is to be found of Visvakarman, 
Hiranyagarbha or Brahmanaspati and no reference of such a 
nature is to be found as can justify us in connecting the Upanisad 
ideas with those conceptions 1 . The word purusa no doubt occurs 
frequently in the Upanisads, but the sense and the association 
that come along with it are widely different from that of the 
purusa of the Purusasukta of the Rg-Veda. 

When the Rg-Veda describes Visvakarman it describes him 
as a creator from outside, a controller of mundane events, to whom 
they pray for worldly benefits. " What was the position, which 
and whence was the principle, from which the all-seeing Visvakar 
man produced the earth, and disclosed the sky by his might ? The 
one god, who has on every side eyes, on every side a face, on every 
side arms, on every side feet, when producing the sky and earth, 
shapes them with his arms and with his wings Do thou, Visva 
karman, grant to thy friends those thy abodes which are the highest, 
and the lowest, and the middle... may a generous son remain here 
to us 2 "; again in R.V.X.82 we find "Visvakarman is wise, energetic, 

the creator, the disposer, and the highest object of intuition He 

who is our father, our creator, disposer, who knows all spheres and 
creatures, who alone assigns to the gods their names, to him the 
other creatures resort for instruction 8 ." Again about Hiranyagarbha 
we find in R.V. I. 121, " Hiranyagarbha arose in the beginning ; 
born, he was the one lord of things existing. He established the 
earth and this sky ; to what god shall we offer our oblation ? . . . 
May he not injure us, he who is the generator of the earth, who 
ruling by fixed ordinances, produced the heavens, who produced 
the great and brilliant waters ! to what god, etc. ? Prajapati, no 
other than thou is lord over all these created things : may we 
obtain that, through desire of which we have invoked thee; may we 
become masters of riches 4 ." Speaking of the purusa the Rg-Veda 

1 The name VisVakarma appears in 6 vet. IV. 17. Hiranyagarbha appears in 6vet. 
in. 4 and iv. la, but only as the first created being. The phrase Sarvahammani Hiran 
yagarbha which Deussen refers to occurs only in the later Nrsimh. 9. The word Brah 
manaspati does not occur at all in the Upanisads. 

a Muir s Sanskrit Texts, vol. iv. pp. 6, 7. 3 Ibid. p. 7. * Ibid. pp. 16, 17. 



in] How did the Upanisads originate ? 33 

says " Purusha has a thousand heads. . .a thousand eyes, and a thou 
sand feet. On every side enveloping the earth he transcended [it] 
by a space of ten fingers. ...He formed those aerial creatures, and 
the animals, both wild and tame 1 ," etc. Even that famous hymn 
(R.V. X. 129) which begins with "There was then neither being 
nor non-being, there was no air nor sky above " ends with saying 
" From whence this creation came into being, whether it was 
created or not he whp is in the highest sky, its ruler, probably 
knows or does not know." 

In the Upanisads however, the position is entirely changed, 
and the centre of interest there is not in a creator from outside 
but in the self: the natural development of the monotheistic posi 
tion of the Vedas could have grown into some form of developed 
theism, but not into the doctrine that the self was the only reality 
and that everything else was far below it. There is no relation 
here of the worshipper and the worshipped and no prayers are 
offered to it, but the whole quest is of the highest truth, and the true 
self of man is discovered as the greatest reality. This change of 
philosophical position seems to me to be a matter of great interest. 
This change of the mind from the objective to the subjective does 
not carry with it in the Upanisads any elaborate philosophical 
discussions, or subtle analysis of mind. It comes there as a matter 
of direct perception, and the conviction with which the truth has 
been grasped cannot fail to impress the readers. That out of the 
apparently meaningless speculations of the Brahmanas this doc 
trine could have developed, might indeed appear to be too im 
probable to be believed. 

On the strength of the stories of Balaki Gargya and Ajataatru 
(Brh. II. i), Ibvetaketu and Pravahana Jaibali (Cha. V. 3 and Brh. 
VI. 2) and Aruni and ASvapati Kaikeya (Cha. V. 1 1) Garbe thinks 
"that it can be proven that the Brahman s profoundest wisdom, the 
doctrine of All-one, which has exercised an unmistakable influence 
on the intellectual life even of our time, did not have its origin 
in the circle of Brahmans at all a " and that "it took its rise in 
the ranks of the warrior caste 8 ." This if true would of course 
lead the development of the Upanisads away from the influence 
of the Veda, Brahmanas and the Aranyakas. But do the facts 
prove this ? Let us briefly examine the evidences that Garbe him- 

1 Muir s Sanskrit Texts, vol. V. pp. 368, 371. 

2 Garbe s article, "Hindu Monism," p. 68. 3 Ibid. p. 78. 

D. 3 



34 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

self has produced. In the story of Balaki Gargya and Ajataatru 
(Brh. II. i) referred to by him, Balaki Gargya is a boastful man 
who wants to teach the Ksattriya Ajataatru the true Brahman, 
but fails and then wants it to be taught by him. To this 
Ajataatru replies (following Garbe s own translation) " it is 
contrary to the natural order that a Brahman receive instruction 
from a warrior and expect the latter to declare the Brahman to 
him 1 ." Does this not imply that in the natural order of things a 
Brahmin always taught the knowledge of Brahman to the 
Ksattriyas, and that it was unusual to find a Brahmin asking a 
Ksattriya aboutthe trueknowledge of Brahman? At the beginning 
of the conversation, Ajatasatru had promised to pay Balaki one 
thousand coins if he could tell him about Brahman, since all people 
used to run to Janaka to speak about Brahman 8 . The second 
story of vetaketu and Pravahana Jaibali seems to be fairly con 
clusive with regard to the fact that the transmigration doctrines, 
the way of the gods (devaydnd) and the way of -the fathers 
(pitrydna) had originated among the Ksattriyas, but it is without 
any relevancy with regard to the origin of the superior knowledge 
of Brahman as the true self. 

The third story of Aruni and AsVapati Kaikeya (Cha. V. n) 
is hardly more convincing, for here five Brahmins wishing to 
know what the Brahman and the self were, went to Uddalaka 
Aruni ; but as he did not know sufficiently about it he accompanied 
them to the Ksattriya king Asvapati Kaikeya who was studying 
the subject. But AsVapati ends the conversation by giving them 
certain instructions about the fire doctrine (vaisvdnara agni) and 
the import of its sacrifices. He does not say anything about the 
true self as Brahman. We ought also to consider that there are 
only the few exceptional cases where Ksattriya kings were in 
structing the Brahmins. But in all other cases the Brahmins were 
discussing and instructing the atman knowledge. I am thus led 
to think that Garbe owing to his bitterness of feeling against the 
Brahmins as expressed in the earlier part of the essay had been 
too hasty in his judgment. The opinion of Garbe seems to have 
been shared to some extent by Winternitz also, and the references 
given by him to the Upanisad passages are also the same as we 

1 Garbe s article, "Hindu Monism," p. 74. 

2 Brh. n., compare also Brh. iv. 3, how Yajftavalkya speaks to Janaka about the 
brahmavidya. 



in] Aranyakas and the Upanisads 35 

just examined 1 . The truth seems to me to be this, that the 
Ksattriyas and even some women took interest in the religio- 
philosophical quest manifested in the Upanisads. The enquirers 
were so eager that either in receiving the instruction of Brahman 
or in imparting it to others, they had no considerations of sex and 
birth*; and there seems to be no definite evidence for thinking 
that the Upanisad philosophy originated among the Ksattriyas 
or that the germs of its growth could not be traced in the 
Brahmanas and the Aranyakas which were the productions of 
the Brahmins. 

The change of the BrShmana into the Aranyaka thought is 
signified by a transference of values from the actual sacrifices to 
their symbolic representations and meditations which were re 
garded as being productive of various earthly benefits. Thus we 
find in the Brhadaranyaka (l. i) that instead of a horse sacrifice 
the visible universe is to be conceived as a horse and meditated 
upon as such. The dawn is the head of the horse, the sun is the 
eye, wind is its life, fire is its mouth and the year is its soul, and so 
on. What is the horse that grazes in the field and to what good 
can its sacrifice lead ? This moving universe is the horse which is 
most significant to the mind, and the meditation of it as such is 
the most suitable substitute of the sacrifice of the horse, the mere 
animal. Thought-activity as meditation, is here taking the place 
of an external worship in the form of sacrifices. The material 
substances and the most elaborate and accurate sacrificial rituals 
lost their value and bare meditations took their place. Side 
by side with the ritualistic sacrifices of the generality of the 
Brahmins, was springing up a system where thinking and sym 
bolic meditations were taking the place of gross matter and 
action involved in sacrifices. These symbols were not only 
chosen from the external world as the sun, the wind, etc., from 
the body of man, his various vital functions and the senses, but 
even arbitrary alphabets were taken up and it was believed that 
the meditation of these as the highest and the greatest was pro 
ductive of great beneficial results. Sacrifice in itself was losing 
value in the eyes of these men and diverse mystical significances 
and imports were beginning to be considered as their real truth 8 . 

1 Winternitz s Geschichte der indischen Litteratur^ I. pp. 197 ff. 
J The story of Maitreyl and Yajflavalkya (Brh. n. 4) and that of Satyakama son of 
Jabala and his teacher (Cha. iv. 4). 8 Cha. v. n. 

32 



36 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

The Uktha (verse) of Rg-Veda was identified in the Aitareya 
Aranyaka under several allegorical forms with the Prana 1 , the 
Udgltha of the Samaveda was identified with Om, Prana, sun and 
eye ; in Chandogya II. the Saman was identified with Om, rain, 
water, seasons, Prana, etc., in Chandogya III. 16-17 man was 
identified with sacrifice ; his hunger, thirst, sorrow, with initia 
tion ; laughing, eating, etc., with the utterance of the Mantras ; 
and asceticism, gift, sincerity, restraint from injury, truth, with 
sacrificial fees (daksina). The gifted mind of these cultured Vedic 
Indians was anxious to come to some unity, but logical precision 
of thought had not developed, and as a result of that we find in the 
Aranyakas the most grotesque and fanciful unifications of things 
which to our eyes have little or no connection. Any kind of instru 
mentality in producing an effect was often considered as pure 
identity. Thus in Ait. Aran. II. I. 3 we find "Then comes the origin 
of food. The seed of Prajapati are the gods. The seed of the gods 
is rain. The seed of rain is herbs. The seed of herbs is food. The 
seed of food is seed. The seed of seed is creatures. The seed of 
creatures is the heart. The seed of the heart is the mind. The seed 
of the mind is speech. The seed of speech is action. The act done 
is this man the abode of Brahman 8 ." 

The word Brahman according to Sayana meant mantras 
(magical verses), the ceremonies, the hotr priest, the great. 
Hillebrandt points out that it is spoken of in R.V. as being new, 
"as not having hitherto existed," and as "coming into being from 
the fathers." It originates from the seat of the Rta, springs forth 
at the sound of the sacrifice, begins really to exist when the soma 
juice is pressed and the hymns are recited at the savana rite, 
endures with the help of the gods even in battle, and soma is its 
guardian (R.V. vin. 37. i, vin. 69. 9, VI. 23. 5, i. 47. 2, vn. 22. 9, 
VI. 52. 3, etc.). On the strength of these Hillebrandt justifies the 
conjecture of Haug that it signifies a mysterious power which can 
be called forth by various ceremonies, and his definition of it, as 
the magical force which is derived from the orderly cooperation of 
the hymns, the chants and the sacrificial gifts 8 . I am disposed to 
think that this meaning is closely connected with the meaning as 
we find it in many passages in the Aranyakas and the Upanisads. 
The meaning in many of these seems to be midway between 

1 Ait. Aran. II. 1-3. * Keith s Translation of Aitareya Aranyaka. 

* Hillebrandt s article on Brahman, E. R. E. 



in] Aranyakas and the Upanisads 37 

"magical force" and "great," transition between which is 
rather easy. Even when the sacrifices began to be replaced by 
meditations, the old belief in the power of the sacrifices still 
remained, and as a result of that we find that in many passages 
of the Upanisads people are thinking of meditating upon this 
great force " Brahman " as being identified with diverse symbols, 
natural objects, parts and functions of the body. 

When the main interest of sacrifice was transferred from its 
actual performance in the external world to certain forms of 
meditation, we find that the understanding of particular allegories 
of sacrifice having a relation to particular kinds of bodily functions 
was regarded as Brahman, without a knowledge of which nothing 
could be obtained. The fact that these allegorical interpretations 
of the Paficagnividya are so much referred to in the Upanisads 
as a secret doctrine, shows that some people came to think that 
the real efficacy of sacrifices depended upon such meditations. 
When the sages rose to the culminating conception, that he is 
really ignorant who thinks the gods to be different from him, they 
thought that as each man was nourished by many beasts, so the 
gods were nourished by each man, and as it is unpleasant for a 
man if any of his beasts are taken away, so it is unpleasant for 
the gods that men should know this great truth 1 . 

In the Kena we find it indicated that all the powers of 
the gods such as that of Agni (fire) to burn, Vayu (wind) to 
blow, depended upon Brahman, and that it is through Brahman 
that all the gods and all the senses of man could work. The 
whole process of Upanisad thought shows that the magic power 
of sacrifices as associated with Rta (unalterable law) was being 
abstracted from the sacrifices and conceived as the supreme power. 
There are many stories in the Upanisads of the search after the 
nature of this great power the Brahman, which was at first only 
imperfectly realized. They identified it with the dominating power 
of the natural objects of wonder, the sun, the moon, etc. with 
bodily and mental functions and with various symbolical re 
presentations, and deluded themselves for a time with the idea 
that these were satisfactory. But as these were gradually found 
inadequate, they came to the final solution, and the doctrine of 
the inner self of man as being the highest truth the Brahman 
originated. 

1 Brh. I. 4. 10. 



38 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

The meaning of the word Upanisad. 

The word Upanisad is derived from the root sad with the prefix 
ni (to sit), and Max Miiller says that the word originally meant the 
act of sitting down near a teacher and of submissively listening to 
him. In his introduction to the Upanisads he says, "The history 
and the genius of the Sanskrit language leave little doubt that 
Upanisad meant originallysession,particularlya session consisting 
of pupils, assembled at a respectful distance round their teacher 1 ." 
Deussen points out that the word means "secret "or "secret instruc 
tion," and this is borne out by many of the passages of the Upani 
sads themselves. Max Miiller also agrees that the word was used 
in this sense in the Upanisads 8 . There we find that great injunc 
tions of secrecy are to be observed for the communication of the 
doctrines, and it is said that it should only be given to a student 
or pupil who by his supreme moral restraint and noble desires 
proves himself deserving to hear them. Sankara however, the 
great Indian exponent of the Upanisads, derives the word from 
the root sad to destroy and supposes that it is so called because it 
destroys inborn ignorance and leads to salvation by revealing the 
right knowledge. But if we compare the many texts in which the 
word Upanisad occurs in the Upanisads themselves it seems that 
Deussen s meaning is fully justified 8 . 

The composition and growth of diverse Upanisads. 

The oldest Upanisads are written in prose. Next to these we 
have some in verses very similar to those that are to be found in 
classical Sanskrit. As is easy to see, the older the Upanisad the 
more archaic is it in its language. The earliest Upanisads have 
an almost mysterious forcefulness in their expressions at least to 
Indian ears. They are simple, pithy and penetrate to the heart. 
We can read and read them over again without getting tired. 
The lines are always as fresh as ever. As such they have a charm 
apart from the value of the ideas they intend to convey. The word 
Upanisad was used, as we have seen, in the sense of "secret 
doctrine or instruction" ; the Upanisad teachings were also in 
tended to be conveyed in strictest secrecy to earnest enquirers of 
high morals and superior self-restraint for the purpose of achieving 

1 Max MUller s Translation of the Upanishads, S. B.E, vol. I. p. Ixxxi. 

a S. B. E. vol. I. p. Ixxxiii. 

8 Deussen s Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 10-15. 



in] Revival of Upanisad studies 39 

emancipation. It was thus that the Upanisad style of expression, 
when it once came into use, came to possess the greatest charm and 
attraction for earnest religious people ; and as a result of that we 
find that even when other forms of prose and verse had been 
adapted for the Sanskrit language, the Upanisad form of com 
position had not stopped. Thus though the earliest Upanisads 
were compiled by 500 B.C., they continued to be written even so 
late as the spread of Mahommedan influence in India. The 
earliest and most important are probably those that have been 
commented upon by^ankara namely Brhadaranyaka, Chandogya, 
Aitareya, Taittirlya, fsa, Kena, Katha, PraSna, Mundaka and 
Mandukya 1 . It is important to note in this connection that the 
separate Upanisads differ much from one another with regard to 
their content and methods of exposition. Thus while some of 
them are busy laying great stress upon the monistic doctrine of 
the self as the only reality, there are others which lay stress upon 
the practice of Yoga, asceticism, the cult of Siva, of Visnu and 
the philosophy or anatomy of the body, and may thus be 
respectively called the Yoga, aiva, Visnu and J->arira Upanisads. 
These in all make up the number to one hundred and eight. 

Revival of Upanisad studies in modern times. 

How the Upanisads came to be introduced into Europe is an 
interesting story. Dara Shiko the eldest son of the Emperor 
Shah Jahan heard of the Upanisads during his stay in Kashmir 
in 1640. He invited several Pandits from Benares to Delhi, who 
undertook the work of translating them into Persian. In 1775 
Anquetil Duperron, the discoverer of the Zend-Avesta, received 
a manuscript of it presented to him by his friend Le Gentil, the 
French resident in Faizabad at the court of Shuja-uddaulah. 
Anquetil translated it into Latin which was published in 1801- 
1 802. This translation though largely unintelligible was read by 
Schopenhauer with great enthusiasm. It had, as Schopenhauer 
himself admits, profoundly influenced his philosophy. Thus he 

1 Deussen supposes that Kausitaki is also one of the earliest. Max Miiller and 
Schroeder think that Maitrayani also belongs to the earliest group, whereas Deussen 
counts it as a comparatively later production. Winternitz divides the Upanisads into 
four periods. In the first period he includes Brhadaranyaka, Chandogya, Taittiriya, 
Aitareya, Kausitaki and Kena. In the second he includes Kathaka, Ia, SvetasVatara, 
Mundaka, Mahanarayana, and in the third period he includes Pras na, Maitrayani and 
Mandukya. The rest of the Upanisads he includes in the fourth period. 



4O The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

writes in the preface to his Welt als Wille und Vorstellung^, 
"And if, indeed, in addition to this he is a partaker of the benefit 
conferred by the Vedas, the access to which, opened to us through 
the Upanishads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage which this 
still young century enjoys over previous ones, because I believe 
that the influence of the Sanskrit literature will penetrate not less 
deeply than did the revival of Greek literature in the fifteenth 
century: if, I say, the reader has also already received and 
assimilated the sacred, primitive Indian wisdom, then is he best 
of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him. ...I might ex 
press the opinion that each one of the individual and disconnected 
aphorisms which make up the Upanishads may be deduced as 
a consequence from the thought I am going to impart, though 
the converse, that my thought is to be found in the Upanishads 
is by no means the case." Again, "How does every line display 
its firm,definite,and throughout harmonious meaning! From every 
sentence deep, original, and sublime thoughts arise, and the whole 
is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit... In the whole 
world there is no study, except that of the originals, so beneficial 
and so elevating as that of the Oupanikhat. It has been the solace 
of my life, it will be the solace of my death! 1 " Through Schopen 
hauer the study of the Upanisads attracted much attention in 
Germany and with the growth of a general interest in the study 
of Sanskrit, they found their way into other parts of Europe as 
well. 

The study of the Upanisads has however gained a great 
impetus by the earnest attempts of our Ram Mohan Roy who 
not only translated them into Bengali, Hindi and English and 
published them at his own expense, but founded the Brahma 
Samaj in Bengal, the main religious doctrines of which were 
derived directly from the Upanisads. 

1 Translation by Haldane and Kemp, vol. I. pp. xii and xiii. 

1 Max Muller says in his introduction to the Upanishads (S. B. E. I. p. Ixii ; see 
also pp. Ix, bii) "that Schopenhauer should have spoken of the Upanishads as pro 
ducts of the highest wisdom "...that he should have placed the pantheism there taught 
high above the pantheism of Bruno, Malebranche, Spinoza and Scotus Erigena, as 
brought to light again at Oxford in 1681, may perhaps secure a more considerate 
reception for those relics of ancient wisdom than anything that I could say in their 
favour." 



in] The Upanisads and their interpretations 41 

The Upanisads and their interpretations. 

Before entering into the philosophy of the Upanisads it may 
be worth while to say a few words as to the reason why diverse 
and even contradictory explanations as to the real import of the 
Upanisads had been offered by the great Indian scholars of past 
times. The Upanisads, as we have seen, formed the concluding 
portion of the revealed Vedic literature, and were thus called the 
Vedanta. It was almost universally believed by the Hindus that 
the highest truths could only be found in the revelation of the 
Vedas. Reason was regarded generally as occupying a compara 
tively subservient place, and its proper use was to be found in its 
judicious employment in getting out the real meaning of the 
apparently conflicting ideas of the Vedas. The highest know 
ledge of ultimate truth and reality was thus regarded as having 
been once for all declared in the Upanisads. Reason had only to 
unravel it in the light of experience. It is important that readers 
of Hindu philosophy should bear in mind the contrast that it 
presents to the ruling idea of the modern world that new truths 
are discovered by reason and experience every day, and even in 
those cases where the old truths remain, they change their hue 
and character every day, and that in matters of ultimate truths no 
finality can ever be achieved ; we are to be content only with as 
much as comes before the purview of our reason and experience 
at the time. It was therefore thought to be extremely audacious 
that any person howsoever learned and brilliant he might be 
should have any right to say anything regarding the highest 
truths simply on the authority of his own opinion or the reasons 
that he might offer. In order to make himself heard it was neces 
sary for him to show from the texts of the Upanisads that they 
supported him, and that their purport was also the same. Thus 
it was that most schools of Hindu philosophy found it one of their 
principal duties to interpret the Upanisads in order to show that 
they alone represented the true Vedanta doctrines. Any one 
who should feel himself persuaded by the interpretations of any 
particular school might say that in following that school he was 
following the Vedanta. 

The difficulty of assuring oneself that any interpretation is 
absolutely the right one is enhanced by the fact that germs of 
diverse kinds of thoughts are found scattered over the Upanisads 



42 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

which are not worked out in a systematic manner. Thus each 
interpreter in his turn made the texts favourable to his own 
doctrines prominent and brought them to the forefront, and tried 
to repress others or explain them away. But comparing the 
various systems of Upanisad interpretation we find that the in 
terpretation offered by arikara very largely represents the view 
of the general body of the earlier Upanisad doctrines, though 
there are some which distinctly foreshadow the doctrines of other 
systems, but in a crude and germinal form. It is thus that Vedanta 
is generally associated with the interpretation of ^arikara and 
arikara s system of thought is called the Vedanta system, though 
there are many other systems which put forth their claim as repre 
senting the true Vedanta doctrines. 

Under these circumstances it is necessary that a modern in 
terpreter of the Upanisads should turn a deaf ear to the absolute 
claims of these exponents, and look upon the Upanisads not as 
a systematic treatise but as a repository of diverse currents of 
thought the melting pot in which all later philosophic ideas were 
still in a state of fusion, though the monistic doctrine of ^arikara, 
or rather an approach thereto, may be regarded as the purport of 
by far the largest majority of the texts. It will be better that a 
modern interpreter should not agree to the claims of the ancients 
that all the Upanisads represent a connected system, but take the 
texts independently and separately and determine their meanings, 
though keeping an attentive eye on the context in which they 
appear. It is in this way alone that we can detect the germs of 
the thoughts of other Indian systems in the Upanisads, and thus 
find in them the earliest records of those tendencies of thoughts. 



The quest after Brahman: the struggle and the failures. 

The fundamental idea which runs through the early Upanisads 
is that underlying the exterior world of change there is an un 
changeable reality which is identical with that which underlies 
the essence in man 1 . If we look at Greek philosophy in Par- 
menides or Plato or at modern philosophy in Kant, we find the 
same tendency towards glorifying one unspeakable entity as the 
reality or the essence. I have said above that the Upanisads are 

1 Brh. iv. 4. 5, 11. 



m] The Quest after Brahman 43 

no systematic treatises of a single hand, but are rather collations 
or compilations of floating monologues, dialogues or anecdotes. 
There are no doubt here and there simple discussions but there 
is no pedantry or gymnastics of logic. Even the most casual 
reader cannot but be struck with the earnestness and enthusiasm 
of the sages. They run from place to place with great eagerness 
in search of a teacher competent to instruct them about the nature 
of Brahman. Where is Brahman? What is his nature? 

We have noticed that during the closing period of the Samhita 
there were people who had risen to the conception of a single 
creator and controller of the universe, variously called Prajapati, 
VisVakarman, Purusa, Brahmanaspati and Brahman. But this 
divine controller was yet only a deity. The search as to the 
nature of this deity began in the Upanisads. Many visible objects 
of nature such as the sun or the wind on one hand and the various 
psychological functions in man were tried, but none could render 
satisfaction to the great ideal that had been aroused. The sages 
in the Upanisads had already started with the idea that there was 
a supreme controller or essence presiding over man and the 
universe. But what was its nature? Could it be identified with 
any of the deities of Nature, was it a new deity or was it no deity 
at all? The Upanisads present to us the history of this quest and 
the results that were achieved. 

When we look merely to this quest we find that we have not 
yet gone out of the Aranyaka ideas and of symbolic (pratika) 
forms of worship. Prana (vital breath) was regarded as the most 
essential function for the life of man, and many anecdotes are 
related to show that it is superior to the other organs, such as the 
eye or ear, and that on it all other functions depend. This 
recognition of the superiority of prana brings us to the meditations 
on prana as Brahman as leading to the most beneficial results. 
So also we find that owing to the presence of the exalting 
characters of omnipresence and eternality dkd&a (space) is 
meditated upon as Brahman. So also manas and Aditya (sun) 
are meditated upon as Brahman. Again side by side with the 
visible material representation of Brahman as the pervading Vayu, 
or the sun and the immaterial representation as akasa, manas or 
prana, we find also the various kinds of meditations as substitutes 
for actual sacrifice. Thus it is that there was an earnest quest 
after the discovery of Brahman. We find a stratum of thought 



44 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

which shows that the sages were still blinded by the old ritualistic 
associations, and though meditation had taken the place of sacrifice 
yet this was hardly adequate for the highest attainment of 
Brahman. 

Next to the failure of the meditations we have to notice the 
history of the search after Brahman in which the sages sought to 
identify Brahman with the presiding deity of the sun, moon, 
lightning, ether, wind, fire, water, etc., and failed; for none of 
these could satisfy the ideal they cherished of Brahman. It is 
indeed needless here to multiply these examples, for they are 
tiresome not only in this summary treatment but in the original 
as well. They are of value only in this that they indicate how 
toilsome was the process by which the old ritualistic associations 
could be got rid of; what struggles and failures the sages had to 
undergo before they reached a knowledge of the true nature of 
Brahman. 

Unknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method. 

It is indeed true that the magical element involved in the 
discharge of sacrificial duties lingered for a while in the symbolic 
worship of Brahman in which He was conceived almost as a deity. 
The minds of the Vedic poets so long accustomed to worship 
deities of visible manifestation could not easily dispense with the 
idea of seeking after a positive and definite content of Brahman. 
They tried some of the sublime powers of nature and also many 
symbols, but these could not render ultimate satisfaction. They 
did not know what the Brahman was like, for they had only a 
dim and dreamy vision of it in the deep craving of their souls 
which could not be translated into permanent terms. But this 
was enough to lead them on to the goal, for they could not be 
satisfied with anything short of the highest. 

They found that by whatever means they tried to give a 
positive and definite content of the ultimate reality, the Brahman, 
they failed. Positive definitions were impossible. They could not 
point out what the Brahman was like in order to give an utterance 
to that which was unutterable, they could only say that it was not 
like aught that we find in experience. Yajfiavalkya said "He 
the atman is not this, nor this (neti neti). He is inconceivable, 
for he cannot be conceived, unchangeable, for he is not changed, 
untouched, for nothing touches him ; he cannot suffer by a stroke 



in] The Negative Method and the Atman doctrine 45 

of the sword, he cannot suffer any injury 1 ." He is asaf, non-being, 
for the being which Brahman is, is not to be understood as such 
being as is known to us by experience ; yet he is being, for he alone 
is supremely real, for the universe subsists by him. We ourselves 
are but he, and yet we know not what he is. Whatever we can 
experience, whatever we can express, is limited, but he is the 
unlimited, the basis of all. "That which is inaudible, intangible, 
invisible, indestructible, which cannot be tasted, nor smelt, eternal, 
without beginning or^nd, greater than the great (makat\\he fixed. 
He who knows it is released from the jaws of death 3 ." Space, time 
and causality do not appertain to him, for he at once forms their 
essence and transcends them. He is the infinite and the vast, ye.t 
the smallest of the small, at once here as there, there as here; no 
characterisation of him is possible, otherwise than by the denial 
to him of all empirical attributes, relations and definitions. He 
is independent of all limitations of space, time, and cause which 
rules all that is objectively presented, and therefore the empirical 
universe. When Bahva was questioned by Vaskali, he expounded 
the nature of Brahman to him by maintaining silence "Teach 
me," said Vaskali, "most reverent sir, the nature of Brahman." 
Bahva however remained silent. But when the question was put 
forth a second or third time he answered, " I teach you indeed but 
you do not understand; the Atman is silence 8 ." The way to in 
dicate it is thus by neti neti, it is not this, it is not this. We 
cannot describe it by any positive content which is always limited 
by conceptual thought. 

The Atman doctrine. 

The sum and substance of the Upanisad teaching is involved 
in the equation Atman = Brahman. We have already seen that the 
word Atman was used in the Rg-Veda to denote on the one hand 
the ultimate essence of the universe, and on the other the vital 
breath in man. Later on in the Upanisads we see that the word 
Brahman is generall> used in the former sense, while the word 
Atman is reserved to denote the inmost essence in man, and the 

1 Brh. IV. 5. 15. Deussen, Max Miiller and Roer have all misinterpreted this 
passage; asito has been interpreted as an adjective or participle, though no evidence 
has ever been adduced ; it is evidently the ablative of asi, a sword. 

a Katha III. 15. 

3 Ssankara on BraJimasiitra, III. t. 17, and also Deussen, Philosophy of the Upani- 
skads, p. 156, 



46 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

Upanisads are emphatic in their declaration that the two are one 
and the same. But what is the inmost essence of man? The self 
of man involves an ambiguity, as it is used in a variety of senses. 
Thus so far as man consists of the essence of food (i.e. the physical 
parts of man) he is called annamaya. But behind the sheath of 
this body there is the other self consisting of the vital breath 
which is called the self as vital breath (prdnamaya dtman), 
Behind this again there is the other self "consisting of will" called 
the manomaya dtman. This again contains within it the self 
"consisting of consciousness" called the vijndnamaya dtman. But 
behind it we come to the final essence the self as pure bliss (the 
dnandamaya dtman). The texts say: "Truly he is the rapture; 
for whoever gets this rapture becomes blissful. For who could 
live, who could breathe if this space (dkdsa) was not bliss? For 
it is he who behaves as bliss. For whoever in that Invisible, Self- 
surpassing, Unspeakable, Supportless finds fearless support, he 
really becomes fearless. But whoever finds even a slight difference, 
between himself and this Atman there is fear for him 1 ." 

Again in another place we find that Prajapati said: "The self 
(dtman) which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and 
grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires are true, whose cogita 
tions are true, that is to be searched for, that is to be enquired ; 
he gets all his desires and all worlds who knows that self 3 ." The 
gods and the demons on hearing of this sent Indra and Virocana 
respectively as their representatives to enquire of this self from 
Prajapati. He agreed to teach them, and asked them to look 
into a vessel of water and tell him how much of self they could 
find. They answered : " We see, this our whole self, even to the 
hair, and to the nails." And he said, "Well, that is the self, that 
is the deathless and the fearless, that is the Brahman." They went 
away pleased, but Prajapati thought, "There they go away, 
without having discovered, without having realized the self." 
Virocana came away with the conviction that the body was the 
self ; but Indra did not return back to the gods, he was afraid and 
pestered with doubts and came back to Prajapati and said, "just 
as the self becomes decorated when the body is decorated, well- 
dressed when the body is well-dressed, well-cleaned when the 
body is well-cleaned, even so that image self will be blind when 
the body is blind, injured in one eye when the body is injured in 
one eye, and mutilated when the body is mutilated, and it perishes 
1 Taitt. n. 7. 2 Cha. vin. 7. i. 



in] Atman as changeless 47 

when the body perishes, therefore I can see no good in this theory." 
Prajapati then gave him a higher instruction about the self, and 
said, "He who goes about enjoying dreams, he is the self, this 
is the deathless, the fearless, this is Brahman." Indra departed 
but was again disturbed with doubts, and was afraid and came 
back and said "that though the dream self does not become blind 
when the body is blind, or injured in one eye when the body is 
so injured and is not affected by its defects, and is not killed by 
its destruction, but yet it is as if it was overwhelmed, as if it suffered 
and as if it wept in this I see no good." Prajapati gave a still 
higher instruction : "When a man, fast asleep, in total contentment, 
does not know any dreams, this is the self, this is the deathless, 
the fearless, this is Brahman." Indra departed but was again 
filled with doubts on the way, and returned again and said "the 
self in deep sleep does not know himself, that I am this, nor does 
he know any other existing objects. He is destroyed and lost. 
I see no good in this." And now Prajapati after having given a 
course of successively higher instructions as self as the body, as 
the self in dreams and as the self in deep dreamless sleep, and 
having found that the enquirer in each case could find out that this 
was not the ultimate truth about the self that he was seeking, 
ultimately gave him the ultimate and final instruction about the 
full truth about the self, and said "this body is the support of the 
deathless and the bodiless self. The self as embodied is affected 
by pleasure and pain, the self when associated with the body can 
not get rid of pleasure and pain, but pleasure and pain do not 
touch the bodiless self 1 ." 

As the anecdote shows, they sought such a constant and un 
changeable essence in man as was beyond the limits of any change. 
This inmost essence has sometimes been described as pure subject- 
object-less consciousness, the reality, and the bliss. He is the 
seer of all seeing, the hearer of all hearing and the knower of all 
knowledge. He sees but is not seen, hears but is not heard, knows 
but is not known. He is the light of all lights. He is like a lump 
of salt, with no inner or outer, which consists through and through 
entirely of savour; as in truth this Atman has no inner or outer, 
but consists through and through entirely of knowledge. Bliss is 
not an attribute of it but it is bliss itself. The state of Brahman 
is thus likened unto the state of dreamless sleep. And he who 
has reached this bliss is beyond any fear. It is dearer to us than 

1 Cha. vm. 7-i. 



48 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

son, brother, wife, or husband, wealth or prosperity. It is for it 
and by it that things appear dear to us. It is the dearest par 
excellence, our inmost Atman. All limitation is fraught with pain ; 
it is the infinite alone that is the highest bliss. When a man 
receives this rapture, then is he full of bliss ; for who could breathe, 
who live, if that bliss had not filled this void (akdsd)1 It is he 
who behaves as bliss. For when a man finds his peace, his fearless 
support in that invisible, supportless, inexpressible, unspeakable 
one, then has he attained peace. 

Place of Brahman in the Upanisads. 

There is the atman not in man alone but in all objects of the 
universe, the sun, the moon, the world ; and Brahman is this atman. 
There is nothing outside the atman, and therefore there is no 
plurality at all. As from a lump of clay all that is made of clay 
is known, as from an ingot of black iron all that is made of 
black iron is known, so when this atman the Brahman is known 
everything else is known. The essence in man and the essence 
of the universe are one and the same, and it is Brahman. 

Now a question may arise as to what may be called the nature 
of the phenomenal world of colour, sound, taste, and smell. But 
we must also remember that the Upanisads do not represent so 
much a conceptional system of philosophy as visions of the seers 
who are possessed by the spirit of this Brahman. They do not 
notice even the contradiction between the Brahman as unity and 
nature in its diversity. When the empirical aspect of diversity 
attracts their notice, they affirm it and yet declare that it is all 
Brahman. From Brahman it has come forth and to it will it 
return. He has himself created it out of himself and then entered 
into it as its inner controller (antarydmin). Here is thus a glaring 
dualistic trait of the world of matter and Brahman as its controller, 
though in other places we find it asserted most emphatically that 
these are but names and forms, and when Brahman is known 
everything else is known. No attempts at reconciliation are made 
for the sake of the consistency of conceptual utterance, as 
^aiikara the great professor of Vedanta does by explaining away 
the dualistic texts. The universe is said to be a reality, but the 
real in it is Brahman alone. It is on account of Brahman that 
the fire burns and the wind blows. He is the active principle in 
the entire universe, and yet the most passive and unmoved. The 



in] Brahman in the Upanisads 49 

world is his body, yet he is the soul within. "He creates all, 
wills all, smells all, tastes all, he has pervaded all, silent and un 
affected 1 ". He is below, above, in the back, in front, in the south 
and in the north, he is all this 2 . "These rivers in the east and 
in the west originating from the ocean, return back into it and 
become the ocean themselves, though they do not know that they 
are so. So also all these people coming into being from the Being 
do not know that they have come from the Being.... That which 
is the subtlest that is the self, that is all this, the truth, that self 
thou art O Svetaketu 3 ." "Brahman," as Deussen points out, 
"was regarded as the cause antecedent in time, and the universe 
as the effect proceeding from it; the inner dependence of the 
universe on Brahman and its essential identity with him was 
represented as a creation of the universe by and out of Brahman." 
Thus it is said in Mund. I. i. 7: 

As a spider ejects and retracts (the threads), 

As the plants shoot forth on the earth, 

As the hairs on the head and body of the living man, 

So from the imperishable all that is here. 

As the sparks from the well-kindled fire, 

In nature akin to it, spring forth in their thousands, 

So, my dear sir, from the imperishable 

Living beings of many kinds go forth, 

And again return into him 4 . 

Yet this world principle is the dearest to us and the highest 
teaching of the Upanisads is "That art thou." 

Again the growth of the doctrine that Brahman is the "inner 
controller" in all the parts and forces of nature and of mankind as 
the atman thereof, and that all the effects of the universe are the 
result of his commands which no one can outstep, gave rise to a 
theistic current of thought in which Brahman is held as standing 
aloof as God and controlling the world. It is by his ordaining, it 
is said, that the sun and moon are held together, and the sky and 
earth stand held together 5 . God and soul are distinguished again 
in the famous verse of Svetasvatara 6 : 

Two bright-feathered bosom friends 

Flit around one and the same tree ; 

One of them tastes the sweet berries, 

The other without eating merely gazes down. 

1 Cha. Hi. 14. 4. 2 Ibid. vn. 25. i; also Mundaka II. i. n. s Cha. VI. 10. 
4 Deussen s translation in Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 164. 5 Brh. m. 8. i. 
6 Svetasvatara iv. 6, and Mundaka ill. i. i, also Deussen s translation in Philosophy 
of the Upanishads, p. 177. 

D. A 



50 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

But in spite of this apparent theistic tendency and the occa 
sional use of the word Isa or hdna, there seems to be no doubt 
that theism in its true sense was never prominent, and this acknow 
ledgement of a supreme Lord was also an offshoot of the exalted 
position of the atman as the supreme principle. Thus we read in 
Kausltaki Upanisad 3. 9, " He is not great by good deeds nor low 
by evil deeds, but it is he makes one do good deeds whom he 
wants to raise, and makes him commit bad deeds whom he wants 
to lower down. He is the protector of the universe, he is the 
master of the world and the lord of all; he is my soul (atman)." 
Thus the lord in spite of his greatness is still my soul. There are 
again other passages which regard Brahman as being at once 
immanent and transcendent. Thus it is said that there is that 
eternally existing tree whose roots grow upward and whose 
branches grow downward. All the universes are supported in it 
and no one can transcend it. This is that, " . . .from its fear the fire 
burns, the sun shines, and from its fear Indra, Vayu and Death 
the fifth (with the other two) run on 1 ." 

If we overlook the different shades in the development of the 
conception of Brahman in the Upanisads and look to the main 
currents, we find that the strongest current of thought which has 
found expression in the majority of the texts is this that the 
Atman or the Brahman is the only reality and that besides this 
everything else is unreal. The other current of thought which is 
to be found in many of the texts is the pantheistic creed that 
identifies the universe with the Atman or Brahman. The third 
current is that of theism which looks upon Brahman as the Lord 
controlling the world. It is because these ideas were still in the 
melting pot, in which none of them were systematically worked 
out, that the later exponents of Vedanta, ^ankara, Ramanuja, 
and others quarrelled over the meanings of texts in order to 
develop a consistent systematic philosophy out of them. Thus it 
is that the doctrine of Maya which is slightly hinted at once in 
Brhadaranyaka and thrice in ^veta^vatara, becomes the founda 
tion of ankara s philosophy of the Vedanta in which Brahman 
alone is real and all else beside him is unreal 2 . 

1 Katha n. 6. i and 3. a Brh. II. 5. 19, vet. I. 10, IV. 9, 10. 



m] The World 51 

The World. 

We have already seen that the universe has come out of 
Brahman, has its essence in Brahman, and will also return back 
to it. But in spite of its existence as Brahman its character as 
represented to experience could not be denied. Sankara held 
that the Upanisads referred to the external world and accorded 
a reality to it consciously with the purpose of treating it as merely 
relatively real, which will eventually appear as unreal as soon 
as the ultimate truth, the Brahman, is known. This however 
remains to be modified to this extent that the sages had not 
probably any conscious purpose of according a relative reality to 
the phenomenal world, but in spite of regarding Brahman as the 
highest reality they could not ignore the claims of the exterior 
world, and had to accord a reality to it. The inconsistency of this 
reality of the phenomenal world with the ultimate and only 
reality of Brahman was attempted to be reconciled by holding 
that this world is not beside him but it has come out of him, it 
is maintained in him and it will return back to him. 

The world is sometimes spoken of in its twofold aspect, the i 
organic and the inorganic. All organic things, whether plants, ) 
animals or men, have souls 1 . Brahman desiring to be many created 
fire (tejas\ water (ap) and earth (ksiti). Then the self-existent 
Brahman entered into these three, and it is by their combination 
that all other bodies are formed 2 . So all other things are produced 
as a result of an alloying or compounding of the parts of these three 
together. In this theory of the threefold division of the primitive 
elements lies the earliest germ of the later distinction (especially 
in the Samkhya school) of pure infinitesimal substances (tanmdtrd) 
and gross elements, and the theory that each gross substance is 
composed of the atoms of the primary elements. And in Prana 
IV. 8 we find the gross elements distinguished from their subtler 
natures, e.g. earth (prthivt), and the subtler state of earth 
(prthivtmdtra). In the Taittirlya, II. i, however, ether (dkdsa) 
is also described as proceeding from Brahman, and the other 
elements, air, fire, water, and earth, are described as each pro 
ceeding directly from the one which directly preceded it. 

1 Cha. vi. 1 1. * ibid. vi. 2, 3, 4. 

42 



52 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

The World-Soul. 

The conception of a world-soul related to the universe as the 
soul of man to his body is found for the first time in R.V. X. 121. I, 
where he is said to have sprung forth as the firstborn of creation 
from the primeval waters. This being has twice been referred 
to in the vetavatara, in III. 4 and IV. 1 2. It is indeed very strange 
that this being is not referred to in any of the earlier Upanisads. 
In the two passages in which he has been spoken of, his mythical 
character is apparent. He is regarded as one of the earlier 
products in the process of cosmic creation, but his importance 
from the point of view of the development of the theory of 
Brahman or Atman is almost nothing. The fact that neither the 
Purusa, nor the ViSvakarma, nor the Hiranyagarbha played an 
important part in the earlier development of the Upanisads 
leads me to think that the Upanisad doctrines were not directly 
developed from the monotheistic tendencies of the later Rg-Veda 
speculations. The passages in &vetas" vatara clearly show how from 
the supreme eminence that he had in R.V. X. 121, Hiranyagarbha 
had been brought to the level of one of the created beings. Deussen 
in explaining the philosophical significance of the Hiranyagarbha 
doctrine of the Upanisads says that the "entire objective universe is 
possible only in so far as it is sustained by a knowing subject. This 
subject as a sustainer of the objective universe is manifested in 
all individual objects but is by no means identical with them. For 
the individual objects pass away but the objective universe con 
tinues to exist without them; there exists therefore the eternal 
knowing subject also (hiranyagarbhd) by whom it is sustained. 
Space and time are derived from this subject. It is itself accord 
ingly not in space and does not belong to time, and therefore 
from an empirical point of view it is in general non-existent; it 
has no empirical but only a metaphysical reality 1 ." This however 
seems to me to be wholly irrelevant, since the Hiranyagarbha 
doctrine cannot be supposed to have any philosophical importance 
in the Upanisads. 

The Theory of Causation. 

There was practically no systematic theory of causation in the 
Upanisads. Sankara, the later exponent of Vedanta philosophy, 
always tried to show that the Upanisads looked upon the cause 

1 Deussen s Philosophy of the Upaniskads, p. 201. 



in] Transmigration 53 

as mere ground of change which though unchanged in itself in 
reality had only an appearance of suffering change. This he did 
on the strength of a series of examples in the Chandogya 
Upanisad (vi. i) in which the material cause, e.g. the clay, is 
spoken of as the only reality in all its transformations as the pot, 
the jug or the plate. It is said that though there are so many 
diversities of appearance that one is called the plate, the other the 
pot, and the other the jug, yet these are only empty distinctions of 
name and form, for the only thing real in them is the earth which 
in its essence remains ever the same whether you call it the pot, 
plate, or jug. So it is that the ultimate cause, the unchangeable 
Brahman, remains ever constant, though it may appear to suffer 
change as the manifold world outside. This world is thus only 
an unsubstantial appearance, a mirage imposed upon Brahman, 
the real par excellence. 

It seems however that though such a view may be regarded 
as having been expounded in the Upanisads in an imperfect 
manner, there is also side by side the other view which looks 
upon the effect as the product of a real change wrought in the 
cause itself through the action and combination of the elements 
of diversity in it. Thus when the different objects of nature have 
been spoken of in one place as the product of the combination 
of the three elements fire, water and earth, the effect signifies a real 
change produced by their compounding. This is in germ (as we 
shall see hereafter) the Parinama theory of causation advocated 
by the Samkhya school 1 . 

Doctrine of Transmigration. 

When the Vedic people witnessed the burning of a dead body 
they supposed that the eye of the man went to the sun, his breath 
to the wind, his speech to the fire, his limbs to the different parts 
of the universe. They also believed as we have already seen in 
the recompense of good and bad actions in worlds other than our 
own, and though we hear of such things as the passage of the 
human soul into trees, etc., the tendency towards transmigration 
had but little developed at the time. 

In the Upanisads however we find a clear development in 
the direction of transmigration in two distinct stages. In the one 
the Vedic idea of a recompense in the other world is combined with 

1 Cha. vi. 4-4. 



54 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

the doctrine of transmigration, whereas in the other the doctrine 
of transmigration comes to the forefront in supersession of the 
idea of a recompense in the other world. Thus it is said that 
those who performed charitable deeds or such public works as the 
digging of wells, etc., follow after death the way of the fathers 
(J>itryana\ in which the soul after death enters first into smoke, 
then into night, the dark half of the month, etc., and at last reaches 
the moon ; after a residence there as long as the remnant of his 
good deeds remains he descends again through ether, wind, smoke, 
mist, cloud, rain, herbage, food and seed, and through the assimi 
lation of food by man he enters the womb of the mother and is 
born again. Here we see that the soul had not only a recompense 
in the world of the moon, but was re-born again in this world 1 . 

The other way is the way of gods (devaydna), meant for those 
who cultivate faith and asceticism (tafias). These souls at death 
enter successively into flame, day, bright half of the month, bright 
half of the year, sun, moon, lightning, and then finally into 
Brahman never to return. Deussen says that "the meaning of 
the whole is that the soul on the way of the gods reaches regions 
of ever-increasing light, in which is concentrated all that is bright 
and radiant as stations on the way to Brahman the light of 
lights " {jyotisam jyotiK)*- 

The other line of thought is a direct reference to the doctrine 
of transmigration unmixed with the idea of reaping the fruits of 
his deeds (karma) by passing through the other worlds and with 
out reference to the doctrine of the ways of the fathers and gods, 
the Yanas. Thus Yajnavalkya says, "when the soul becomes 
weak (apparent weakness owing to the weakness of the body with 
which it is associated) and falls into a swoon as it were, these senses 
go towards it. It (Soul) takes these light particles within itself and 
centres itself only in the heart. Thus when the person in the eye 
turns back, then the soul cannot know colour; (the senses) become 
one(with him); (people about him) say he does not see; (the senses) 
become one (with him), he does not smell, (the senses) become 
one (with him), he does not taste, (the senses) become one (with 
him), he does not speak, (the senses) become one (with him), he 
does not hear, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not 
think, (the senses) become one with him, he does not touch, (the 
senses) become one with him, he does not know, they say. The 

1 Cha. V. 10. 2 Deussen s Philosophy of the Upaniskads, p. 335. 



in] Transmigration 55 

tip of his heart shines and by that shining this soul goes out. 
When he goes out either through the eye, the head, or by any 
other part of the body, the vital function (prdnd) follows and all 
the senses follow the vital function (prdna) in coming out. He 
is then with determinate consciousness and as such he comes 
out. Knowledge, the deeds as well as previous experience (prajfta) 
accompany him. Just as a caterpillar going to the end of a blade 
of grass, by undertaking a separate movement collects itself, so 
this self after destroying this body, removing ignorance, by a 
separate movement collects itself. Just as a goldsmith taking a 
small bit of gold, gives to it a newer and fairer form, so the soul 
after destroying this body and removing ignorance fashions a 
newer and fairer form as of the Pitrs, the Gandharvas, the gods, 
of Prajapati or Brahma or of any other being.... As he acts and 
behaves so he becomes, good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds, 
virtuous by virtuous deeds and vicious by vice. The man is full 
of desires. As he desires so he wills, as he wills so he works, as 
the work is done so it happens. There is also a verse, being 
attached to that he wants to gain by karma that to which he 
was attached. Having reaped the full fruit (lit. gone to the 
end) of the karma that he does here, he returns back to this 
world for doing karma 1 . So it is the case with those who have 
desires. He who has no desires, who had no desires, who has 
freed himself from all desires, is satisfied in his desires and in 
himself, his senses do not go out. He being Brahma attains 
Brahmahood. Thus the verse says, when all the desires that are 
in his heart are got rid of, the mortal becomes immortal and 
attains Brahma here" (Brh. IV. iv. 1-7). 

A close consideration of the above passage shows that the 
self itself destroyed the body and built up a newer and fairer 
frame by its own activity when it reached the end of the present 
life. At the time of death, the self collected within itself all 
senses and faculties and after death all its previous knowledge, 
work and experience accompanied him. The falling off of the 
body at the time of death is only for the building of a newer 
body either in this world or in the other worlds. The self which 
thus takes rebirth is regarded as an aggregation of diverse cate 
gories. Thus it is said that "he is of the essence of understanding, 

1 It is possible that there is a vague and obscure reference here to the doctrine that 
thi fruits of our deeds are reaped in other worlds. 



56 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

of the vital function, of the visual sense, of the auditory sense, of 
the essence of the five elements (which would make up the 
physical body in accordance with its needs) or the essence of de 
sires, of the essence of restraint of desires, of the essence of anger, of 
the essence of turning off from all anger, of the essence of dharma, 
of the essence of adharma, of the essence of all that is this 
(manifest) and that is that (unmanifest or latent)" (Brh. IV. iv. 5). 
The self that undergoes rebirth is thus a unity not only of moral 
and psychological tendencies, but also of all the elements which 
compose the physical world. The whole process of his changes 
follows from this nature of his ; for whatever he desires, he wills 
and whatever he wills he acts, and in accordance with his acts 
the fruit happens. The whole logic of the genesis of karma and 
its fruits is held up within him, for he is a unity of the moral 
and psychological tendencies on the one hand and elements of 
the physical world on the other. 

The self that undergoes rebirth being a combination of diverse 
psychological and moral tendencies and the physical elements 
holds within itself the principle of all its transformations. The 
root of all this is the desire of the self and the consequent fruition 
of it through will and act. When the self continues to desire and 
act, it reaps the fruit and comes again to this world for performing 
acts. This world is generally regarded as the field for perform 
ing karma, whereas other worlds are regarded as places where the 
fruits of karma are reaped by those born as celestial beings. But 
there is no emphasis in the Upanisads on this point. The Pitryana 
theory is not indeed given up, but it seems only to form a part 
in the larger scheme of rebirth in other worlds and sometimes in 
this world too. All the course of these rebirths is effected by the 
self itself by its own desires, and if it ceases to desire, it suffers no 
rebirth and becomes immortal. The most distinctive feature of 
this doctrine is this, that it refers to desires as the cause of rebirth 
and not karma. Karma only comes as the connecting link between 
desires and rebirth for it is said that whatever a man desires he 
wills, and whatever he wills he acts. 

Thus it is said in another place " he who knowingly desires is 
born by his desires in those places (accordingly), but for him whose 
desires have been fulfilled and who has realized himself, all his 
desires vanish here" (Mund III. 2. 2). This destruction of desires 
is effected by the right knowledge of the self. " He who knows 



in] Transmigration 57 

his self as I am the person for what wish and for what desire 
will he trouble the body,... even being here if we know it, well if 
we do not, what a great destruction" (Brh. IV. iv. 12 and 14). " In 
former times the wise men did not desire sons, thinking what 
shall we do with sons since this our self is the universe " (Brh. IV. 
iv. 22). None of the complexities of the karma doctrine which 
we find later on in more recent developments of Hindu thought 
can be found in the Upanisads. The whole scheme is worked 
out on the principle of desire (kfimd) and karma only serves as 
the link between it and the actual effects desired and willed by 
the person. 

It is interesting to note in this connection that consistently 
with the idea that desires (k&ma) led to rebirth, we find that 
in some Upanisads the discharge of the semen in the womb of a 
woman as a result of desires is considered as the first birth of 
man, and the birth of the son as the second birth and the birth 
elsewhere after death is regarded as the third birth. Thus it is 
said, "It is in man that there comes first the embryo, which is 
but the semen which is produced as the essence of all parts of 
his body and which holds itself within itself, and when it is put 
in a woman, that is his first birth. That embryo then becomes 
part of the woman s self like any part of her body ; it therefore 
does not hurt her ; she protects and develops the embryo within 
herself. As she protects (the embryo) so she also should be 
protected. It is the woman who bears the embryo (before birth) 
but when after birth the father takes care of the son always, he 
is taking care only of himself, for it is through sons alone that 
the continuity of the existence of people can be maintained. This 
is his second birth. He makes this self of his a representative 
for performing all the virtuous deeds. The other self of his after 
realizing himself and attaining age goes away and when going 
away he is born again that is his third birth " (Aitareya, II. 1-4)*. 
No special emphasis is given in the Upanisads to the sex-desire 
or the desire for a son ; for, being called kama, whatever was the 
desire for a son was the same as the desire for money and the 
desire for money was the same as any other worldly desire (Brh. 
iv. iv. 22), and hence sex-desires stand on the same plane as any 
other desire. 

1 See also Kausitaki, II. 15. 



58 The Earlier Upanisads [CH. 

Emancipation. 

The doctrine which next attracts our attention in this connec 
tion is that of emancipation (mukti). Already we know that the 
doctrine of Devayana held that those who were faithful and per 
formed asceticism (tapas) went by the way of the gods through 
successive stages never to return to the world and suffer rebirth. 
This could be contrasted with the way of the fathers (pitrydnd) 
where the dead were for a time recompensed in another world and 
then had to suffer rebirth. Thus we find that those who are faith 
ful and perform sraddhd had a distinctly different type of goal from 
those who performed ordinary virtues, such as those of a general 
altruistic nature. This distinction attains its fullest development 
in the doctrine of emancipation. Emancipation or Mukti means 
in the Upanisads the state of infiniteness that a man attains 
when he knows his own self and thus becomes Brahman. The 
ceaseless course of transmigration is only for those who are 
ignorant. The wise man however who has divested himself of all 
passions and knows himself to be Brahman, at once becomes 
Brahman and no bondage of any kind can ever affect him. 

He who beholds that loftiest and deepest, 
For him the fetters of the heart break asunder, 
For him all doubts are solved, 
And his works become nothingness 1 . 

The knowledge of the self reveals the fact that all our passions 
and antipathies, all our limitations of experience, all that is 
ignoble and small in us, all that is transient and finite in us is 
false. We " do not know " but are " pure knowledge " ourselves. 
We are not limited by anything, for we are the infinite; we do 
not suffer death, for we are immortal. Emancipation thus is not 
a new acquisition, product, an effect, or result of any action, but 
it always exists as the Truth of our nature. We are always 
emancipated and always free. We do not seem to be so and 
seem to suffer rebirth and thousands of other troubles only because 
we do not know the true nature of our self. Thus it is that the 
true knowledge of self does not lead to emancipation but is 
emancipation itself. All sufferings and limitations are true only 
so long as we do not know our self. Emancipation is the natural 
and only goal of man simply because it represents the true nature 
and essence of man. It is the realization of our own nature that 

1 Deussen s Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 353. 



in] Emancipation 59 

is called emancipation. Since we are all already and always in 
our own true nature and as such emancipated, the only thing 
necessary for us is to know that we are so. Self-knowledge is there 
fore the only desideratum which can wipe off all false knowledge, 
all illusions of death and rebirth. The story is told in the Katha 
Upanisad that Yama, the lord of death, promised Naciketas, 
the son of Gautama, to grant him three boons at his choice. 
Naciketas, knowing that his father Gautama was offended with 
him, said, " O death let Gautama be pleased in mind and forget 
his anger against me." This being granted Naciketas asked the 
second boon that the fire by which heaven is gained should be 
made known to him. This also being granted Naciketas said, 
" There is this enquiry, some say the soul exists after the death 
of man ; others say it does not exist. This I should like to know 
instructed by thee. This is my third boon." Yama said, " It was 
inquired of old, even by the gods ; for it is not easy to under 
stand it Subtle is its nature, choose another boon. Do not- 
compel me to this." Naciketas said, " Even by the gods was it 
inquired before, and even thou O Death sayest that it is not easy 
to understand it, but there is no other speaker to be found like 
thee. There is no other boon like this." Yama said, " Choose sons 
and grandsons who may live a hundred years, choose herds of 
cattle ; choose elephants and gold and horses ; choose the wide 
expanded earth, and live thyself as many years as thou wishest 
Or if thou knowest a boon like this choose it together with wealth 
and far-extending life. Be a king on the wide earth. I will make 
thee the enjoyer of all desires. All those desires that are difficult 
to gain in the world of mortals, all those ask thou at thy pleasure ; 
those fair nymphs with their chariots, with their musical instru 
ments; the like of them are not to be gained by men. I will give 
them to thee, but do not ask the question regarding death." 
Naciketas replied, " All those enjoyments are of to-morrow and 
they only weaken the senses. All life is short, with thee the 
dance and song. Man cannot be satisfied with wealth, we could 
obtain wealth, as long as we did not reach you we live only as 
long as thou pleasest. The boon which I choose I have said." 
Yama said, " One thing is good, another is pleasant. Blessed is 
he who takes the good, but he who chooses the pleasant loses 
the object of man. But thou considering the objects of desire, 
hast abandoned them. These two, ignorance (whose object is 



6o The Earlier Upani$ads [CH. 

what is pleasant) and knowledge (whose object is what is good), 
are known to be far asunder, and to lead to different goals. 
Believing that this world exists and not the other, the careless 
youth is subject to my sway. That knowledge which thou hast 
asked is not to be obtained by argument. I know worldly hap 
piness is transient for that firm one is not to be obtained by what 
is not firm. The wise by concentrating on the soul, knowing him 
whom it is hard to behold, leaves both grief and joy. Thee 
O Naciketas, I believe to be like a house whose door is open to 
Brahman. Brahman is deathless, whoever knows him obtains 
whatever he wishes. The wise man is not born; he does not die; 
he is not produced from anywhere. Unborn, eternal, the soul is 
not slain, though the body is slain ; subtler than what is subtle, 
greater than what is great, sitting it goes far, lying it goes every 
where. Thinking the soul as unbodily among bodies, firm among 
fleeting things, the wise man casts off all grief. The soul cannot 
be gained by eloquence, by understanding, or by learning. It 
can be obtained by him alone whom it chooses. To him it reveals 
its own nature 1 ." So long as the Self identifies itself with its desires, 
he wills and acts according to them and reaps the fruits in the 
present and in future lives. But when he comes to know the 
highest truth about himself, that he is the highest essence and prin 
ciple of the universe, the immortal and the infinite,he ceases to have 
desires, and receding from all desires realizes the ultimate truth 
of himself in his own infinitude. Man is as it were the epitome 
of the universe and he holds within himself the fine constituents 
of the gross body (annamaya kosa\ the vital functions (prZlna- 
maya kosa) of life, the will and desire (ntanomayd) and the 
thoughts and ideas (vijndnamaya\ and so long as he keeps him 
self in these spheres and passes through a series of experiences 
in the present life and in other lives to come, these experiences 
are willed by him and in that sense created by him. He suffers 
pleasures and pains, disease and death. But if he retires from 
these into his true unchangeable being, he is in a state where he 
is one with his experience and there is no change and no move 
ment. What this state is cannot be explained by the use of 
concepts. One could only indicate it by pointing out that it is 
not any of those concepts found in ordinary knowledge ; it is not 

1 Katha n. The translation is not continuous. There are some parts in the extract 
which may be differently interpreted. 



in] Emancipation 6 1 

whatever one knows as this and this (neti neti). In this infinite 
and true self there is no difference, no diversity, no meum and 
tuum. It is like an ocean in which all our phenomenal existence 
will dissolve like salt in water. "Just as a lump of salt when put 
in water will disappear in it and it cannot be taken out separately 
but in whatever portion of water we taste we find the salt, so, 
Maitreyi, does this great reality infinite and limitless consisting 
only of pure intelligence manifesting itself in all these (phenomenal 
existences) vanish in them and there is then no phenomenal know 
ledge" (Brh. II. 4. 12). The true self manifests itself in all the 
processes of our phenomenal existences, but ultimately when it 
retires back to itself, it can no longer be found in them. It is a 
state of absolute infinitude of pure intelligence, pure being, and 
pure blessedness. 



CHAPTER IV 

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS 
OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 

In what Sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible ? 

IT is hardly possible to attempt a history of Indian philosophy 
in the manner in which the histories of European philosophy have 
been written. In Europe from the earliest times, thinkers came 
one after another and offered their .independent speculations 
on philosophy. The work of a modern historian consists in 
chronologically arranging these views and in commenting upon 
the influence of one school upon another or upon the general 
change from time to time in the tides and currents of philosophy. 
Here in India, however, the principal systems of philosophy had 
their beginning in times of which we have but scanty record, and 
it is hardly possible to say correctly at what time they began, 
or to compute the influence that led to the foundation of so many 
divergent systems at so early a period, for in all probability these 
were formulated just after the earliest Upanisads had been com 
posed or arranged. 

The systematic treatises were written in short and pregnant 
half-sentences (sutras) which did not elaborate the subject in 
detail, but served only to hold before the reader the lost threads 
of memory of elaborate disquisitions with which he was already 
thoroughly acquainted. It seems, therefore, that these pithy half- 
sentences were like lecture hints, intended for those who had had 
direct elaborate oral instructions on the subject It is indeed 
difficult to guess from the sutras the extent of their significance, 
or how far the discussions which they gave rise to in later days were 
originally intended by them. The sutras of the Vedanta system, 
known as the ^arlraka-sutras or Brahma-sutras of Badarayana 
for example were of so ambiguous a nature that they gave rise 
to more than half a dozen divergent interpretations, each one 
of which claimed to be the only faithful one. Such was the high 
esteem and respect in which these writers of the sutras were held 
by later writers that whenever they had any new speculations to 



CH. iv] Schools of Philosophy 63 

offer, these were reconciled with the doctrines of one or other of 
the existing systems, and put down as faithful interpretations of 
the system in the form of commentaries. Such was the hold of 
these systems upon scholars that all the orthodox teachers since 
the foundation of the systems of philosophy belonged to one or 
other of these schools. Their pupils were thus naturally brought 
up in accordance with the views of their teachers. All the in 
dependence of their thinking was limited and enchained by the 
faith of the school to which they were attached. Instead of 
producing a succession of free-lance thinkers having their own 
systems to propound and establish, India had brought forth 
schools of pupils who carried the traditionary views of particular 
systems from generation to generation, who explained and ex 
pounded them, and defended them against the attacks of other 
rival schools which they constantly attacked in order to establish 
the superiority of the system to which they adhered. To take an 
example, the Nyaya system of philosophy consisting of a number 
of half-sentences or sutras is attributed to Gautama, also called 
Aksapada. The earliest commentary on these sutras, called the 
Vdtsydyana bhdsya, was written by Vatsyayana. This work was 
sharply criticized by the Buddhist Dinnaga, and to answer these 
criticisms Udyotakara wrote a commentary on this commentary 
called the Bhdsyavdttika 1 . As time went on the original force 
of this work was lost, and it failed to maintain the old dignity of 
the school. At this Vacaspati MiSra wrote a commentary called 
Vdrttika-tdtparyatlkd on this second commentary, where he tried 
to refute all objections against the Nyaya system made by other 
rival schools and particularly by the Buddhists. This commentary, 
called Nydya-tdtparyattkd, had another commentary called Nydya- 
tdtparyatlkd-parisuddhi written by the great Udayana. This 
commentary had another commentary called Nydya-nibandha- 
prakdsa written by Varddhamana the son of the illustrious 
Gangesa. This again had another commentary called Varddha- 
mdnendu upon it by Padmanabha Misra, and this again had 
another named Nydya-tdtparyamandana by &afikara Misra. The 
names of Vatsyayana, Vacaspati, and Udayana are indeed very 
great, but ever they contented themselves by writing com 
mentaries on commentaries, and did not try to formulate any 

1 I have preferred to spell Dinnaga after Vacaspati s Tdtparyattka (p. i) and net 
Dignaga as it is generally spelt. 



64 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [CH. 

original system. Even ankara, probably the greatest man of 
India after Buddha, spent his life in writing commentaries on the 
Brahma-sutras, the Upanisads, and the Bhagavadgltd. 

As a system passed on it had to meet unexpected opponents 
and troublesome criticisms for which it was not in the least pre 
pared. Its adherents had therefore to use all their ingenuity and 
subtlety in support of their own positions, and to discover the 
defects of the rival schools that attacked them. A system as it was 
originally formulated in the sutras had probably but few problems 
to solve, but as it fought its way in the teeth of opposition of 
other schools, it had to offer consistent opinions on other problems 
in which the original views were more or less involved but to 
which no attention had been given before. 

The contributions of the successive commentators served to 
make each system more and more complete in all its parts, and 
stronger and stronger to enable it to hold its own successfully 
against the opposition and attacks of the rival schools. A system 
in the sutras is weak and shapeless as a newborn babe, but if 
we take it along with its developments down to the beginning 
of the seventeenth century it appears as a fully developed man 
strong and harmonious in all its limbs. It is therefore not possible 
to write any history of successive philosophies of India, but it is 
necessary that each system should be studied and interpreted in 
all the growth it has/ acquired through the successive ages of 
history from its conflicts with the rival systems as one whole 1 . 
In the history of Indian philosophy we have no place for systems 
which had their importance only so long as they lived and were 
then forgotten or remembered only as targets of criticism. Each 
system grew and developed by the untiring energy of its adherents 
through all the successive ages of history, and a history of this 
growth is a history of its conflicts. No study of any Indian system 
is therefore adequate unless it is taken throughout all the growth 
it attained by the work of its champions, the commentators whose 
selfless toil for it had kept it living through the ages of history. 

1 In the case of some systems it is indeed possible to suggest one or two earlier 
phases of the system, but this principle cannot be carried all through, for the supple 
mentary information and arguments given by the later commentators often appear as 
harmonious elaborations of the earlier writings and are very seldom in conflict with them. 



iv] Growth of the Philosophic Literature 65 

Growth of the Philosophic Literature. 

It is difficult to say how the systems were originally formulated, 
and what were the influences that led to it. We know that a 
spirit of philosophic enquiry had already begun in the days of the 
earliest Upanisads. The spirit of that enquiry was that the final 
essence or truth was the atman, that a search after it was our 
highest duty, and that until we are ultimately merged in it we 
can only feel this truth and remain uncontented with everything 
else and say that it is not the truth we want, it is not the truth we 
want (neti neti}. Philosophical enquires were however continuing 
in circles other than those of the Upanisads. Thus the Buddha 
who closely followed the early Upanisad period, spoke of and enu 
merated sixty-two kinds of heresies 1 , and these can hardly be 
traced in the Upanisads. The Jaina activities were also probably 
going on contemporaneously but in the Upanisads no reference 
to these can be found. We may thus reasonably suppose that there 
were different forms of philosophic enquiry in spheres other than 
those of the Upanisad sages, of which we have but scanty records. 
It seems probable that the Hindu systems of thought originated 
among the sages who though attached chiefly to the Upanisad 
circles used to take note of the discussions and views of the antago 
nistic and heretical philosophic circles. In the assemblies of these 
sages and their pupils, the views of the heretical circles were prob 
ably discussed and refuted. So it continued probably for some time 
when some illustrious member of the assembly such as Gautama 
or Kanada collected the purport of these discussions on various 
topics and problems, filled up many of the missing links, classified 
and arranged these in the form of a system of philosophy and 
recorded it in sutras. These sutras were intended probably for 
people who had attended the elaborate oral discussions and thus 
could easily follow the meaning of the suggestive phrases con 
tained in the aphorisms. The sutras thus contain sometimes 
allusions to the views of the rival schools and indicate the way in 
which they could be refuted. The commentators were possessed 
of the general drift of the different discussions alluded to and 
conveyed from generation to generation through an unbroken 
chain of succession of teachers and pupils. They were however 
free to supplement these traditionary explanations with their own 

1 Brahmajala-sutla, Digha, I. p. 12 ff. 
D 5 



66 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [CH. 

views or to modify and even suppress such of the traditionary 
views with which they did not agree or which they found it diffi 
cult to maintain. Brilliant oppositions from the opposing schools 
often made it necessary for them to offer solutions to new problems 
unthought of before, but put forward by some illustrious adherent 
of a rival school. In order to reconcile these new solutions with 
the other parts of the system, the commentators never hesitated to 
offer such slight modifications of the doctrines as could harmonize 
them into a complete whole. These elaborations or modifications 
generally developed the traditionary system, but did not effect any 
serious change in the system as expounded by the older teachers, 
for the new exponents always bound themselves to the explana 
tions of the older teachers and never contradicted them. They 
would only interpret them to suit their own ideas, or say new things 
only in those cases where the older teachers had remained silent. 
It is not therefore possible to describe the growth of any system 
by treating the contributions of the individual commentators sepa 
rately. This would only mean unnecessary repetition. Except 
when there is a specially new development, the system is to be 
interpreted on the basis of the joint work of the commentators 
treating their contributions as forming one whole. 

The fact that each system had to contend with other rival 
systems in order to hold its own has left its permanent mark 
upon all the philosophic literatures of India which are always 
written in the form of disputes, where the writer is supposed to 
be always faced with objections from rival schools to whatever 
he has got to say. At each step he supposes certain objections 
put forth against him which he answers, and points out the defects 
of the objector or shows that the objection itself is ill founded. It 
is thus through interminable byways of objections, counter-objec 
tions and their answers that the writer can wend his way to his 
destination. Most often the objections of the rival schools are 
referred to in so brief a manner that those only who know the 
views can catch them. To add to these difficulties the Sanskrit 
style of most of the commentaries is so condensed and different 
from literary Sanskrit, and aims so much at precision and brevity, 
leading to the use of technical words current in the diverse systems, 
that a study of these becomes often impossible without the aid 
of an expert preceptor; it is difficult therefore for all who are not 
widely read in all the different systems to follow any advanced 



iv] Different Types of Literature 67 

work of any particular system, as the deliberations of that par 
ticular system are expressed in such close interconnection with 
the views of other systems that these can hardly be understood 
without them. Each system of India has grown (at least in 
particular epochs) in relation to and in opposition to the growth 
of other systems of thought, and to be a thorough student of Indian 
philosophy one should study all the systems in their mutual 
opposition and relation from the earliest times to a period at 
which they ceased to grow and came to a stop a purpose for 
which a work like the present one may only be regarded as 
forming a preliminary introduction. 

Besides the sutras and their commentaries there are also in 
dependent treatises on the systems in verse called kdrikds % which 
try to summarize the important topics of any system in a succinct 
manner; the Sdmkhya kdrikd may be mentioned as a work of this 
kind. In addition to these there were also long dissertations, 
commentaries, or general observations on any system written in 
verses called the varttikas; the Slokavdrttika, of Kumarilaor the 
Vdrttika of SuresVara may be mentioned as examples. All these 
of course had their commentaries to explain them. In addition 
to these there were also advanced treatises on the systems in prose 
in which the writers either nominally followed some selected 
sutras or proceeded independently of them. Of the former class 
the Nydyamanjarl of Jayanta may be mentioned as an example 
and of the latter the Prasastapdda bhdsya, the Advaitasiddhi of 
Madhusudana Sarasvati or the Veddnta-paribhdsd of Dharmara- 
jadhvarindra. The more remarkable of these treatises were of a 
masterly nature in which the writers represented the systems they 
adhered to in a highly forcible and logical manner by dint of 
their own great mental powers and genius. These also had their 
commentaries to explain and elaborate them. The period of the 
growth of the philosophic literatures of India begins from about 
500 B.C. (about the time of the Buddha) and practically ends in 
the later half of the seventeenth century, though even now some 
minor publications are seen to come out. 

The Indian Systems of Philosophy. 

The Hindus classify the systems of philosophy into two classes, 
namely, the nastika and the dstika. The nastika (na asti "it is 
not") views are those which neither regard the Vedas as infallible 

52 



68 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [CH. 

nor try to establish their own validity on their authority. These are 
principally three in number, the Buddhist, Jaina and the Carvaka. 
The astika-mata or orthodox schools are six in number, Samkhya, 
Yoga, Vedanta, Mlmamsa, Nyaya and Vaisesika, generally known 
as the six systems (saddarsana 1 }. 

The Samkhya is ascribed to a mythical Kapila, but the 
earliest works on the subject are probably now lost. The Yoga 
system is attributed to Patafljali and the original sutras are called 
the Pdtanjala Yoga sutras. The general metaphysical position 
of these two systems with regard to soul, nature, cosmology and 
the final goal is almost the same, and the difference lies in this 
that the Yoga system acknowledges a god (Isvara) as distinct 
from Atman and lays much importance on certain mystical 
practices (commonly known as Yoga practices) for the achieve 
ment of liberation, whereas the Samkhya denies the existence of 
Isvara and thinks that sincere philosophic thought and culture 
are sufficient to produce the true conviction of the truth and 
thereby bring about liberation. It is probable that the system 
of Samkhya associated with Kapila and the Yoga system 
associated with Pataftjali are but two divergent modifications of 
an original Samkhya school, of which we now get only references 
here and there. These systems therefore though generally counted 
as two should more properly be looked upon as two different 
schools of the same Samkhya system one may be called the 
Kapila Samkhya and the other Pataftjala Samkhya. 

The Purva Mlmamsa (from the root man to think rational 
conclusions) cannot properly be spoken of as a system of philo 
sophy. It is a systematized code of principles in accordance with 
which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted for purposes of sacrifices. 

1 The word "darfana" in the sense of true philosophic knowledge has its earliest 
use in the Vatiesika sutras of Kanada (IX. ii. 13) which I consider as pre- Buddhistic. 
The Buddhist pitakas (400 B.C.) called the heretical opinions "ditthi" (Sanskrit drsti 
from the same root drs from which darana is formed). Haribhadra (fifth century A.D.) 
uses the word Dars"ana in the sense of systems of philosophy (sarvadarsancrvacyt? 
rthah Saddarsanasamuccaya I.). Ratnakirtti (end of the tenth century A.D.) uses the 
word also in the same sense (" Yadi nama darfane darfane nanaprakaram sattvalak- 
sanam uktamasti." Ksanabhangasiddhi in Six Buddhist Nyaya tracts, p. 20). Madhava 
(1331 A.D. ) calls his Compendium of all systems of philosophy, Sarvadarsanasamgraha. 
The word "mata" (opinion or view) was also freely used in quoting the views of other 
systems. But there is no word to denote philosophers in the technical sense. The 
Buddhists used to call those who held heretical views " tairthika." The words "siddha," 
"jndnin" etc. do not denote philosophers in the modern sense, they are used rather in 
the sense of " seers" or "perfects." 



iv] Purva Mlmamsa 69 

The Vedic texts were used as mantras (incantations) for sacrifices, 
and people often disputed as to the relation of words in a 
sentence or their mutual relative importance with reference to the 
general drift of the sentence. There were also differences of view 
with regard to the meaning of a sentence, the use to which it may 
be applied as a mantra, its relative importance or the exact 
nature of its connection with other similar sentences in a complex 
Vedic context. The Mlmamsa formulated some principles accord 
ing to which one could arrive at rational and uniform solutions 
for all these difficulties. Preliminary to these its main objects, it 
indulges in speculations with regard to the external world, soul, 
perception, inference, the validity of the Vedas, or the like, for in 
order that a man might perform sacrifices with mantras, a definite 
order of the universe and its relation to man or the position and 
nature of the mantras of the Veda must be demonstrated and 
established. Though its interest in such abstract speculations is 
but secondary yet it briefly discusses these in order to prepare a 
rational ground for its doctrine of the mantras and their practical 
utility for man. It is only so far as there are these preliminary 
discussions in the Mlmamsa that it may be called a system of 
philosophy. Its principles and maxims for the interpretation of 
the import of words and sentences have a legal value even to this 
day. The sutras of Mlmamsa are attributed to Jaimini, and abara 
wrote a bhasya upon it. The two great names in the history of 
Mlmamsa literature after Jaimini and abara are Kumarila Bhatta 
and his pupil Prabhakara, who criticized the opinions of his master 
so much, that the master used to call him guru (master) in sarcasm, 
and to this day his opinions pass as guru-mata, whereas the views 
of Kumarila Bhatta pass as bhatta-matd 1 . It may not be out of 
place to mention here that Hindu Law (smrtt) accepts without 
any reservation the maxims and principles settled and formulated 
by the Mlmamsa. 

1 There is a story that Kumarila could not understand the meaning of a Sanskrit 
sentence " Atra tunoktam tatrapinoktam iti paunaruktam" (hence spoken twice). 
Tunoktam phonetically admits of two combinations, tu noktam (but not said) and tuna 
uktam (said by the particle tu) and tatrapi noktam as tatra api na uktam (not said also 
there) and tatra apina uktam (said there by the particle apt). Under the first inter 
pretation the sentence would mean, " Not spoken here, not spoken there, it is thus spoken 
twice." This puzzled Kumarila, when Prabhakara taking the second meaning pointed 
out to him that the meaning was here it is indicated by tu and there by api, and so it is 
indicated twice." Kumarila was so pleased that he called his pupil "Guru" (master) 
at this. 



7o Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [CH. 

The Veddnta sutras, also called Uttara Mlmamsa, written by 
Badarayana, otherwise known as the Brahma-sutras, form the 
original authoritative work of Vedanta. The word Vedanta means 
"end of the Veda," i.e. the Upanisads, and the Veddnta sutras are 
so called as they are but a summarized statement of the general 
views of the Upanisads. This work is divided into four books or 
adhyayas and each adhyaya is divided into four padas or chapters. 
The first four sutras of the work commonly known as Catuhsutri 
are (i) How to ask about Brahman, (2) From whom proceed birth 
and decay, (3) This is because from him the Vedas have come forth, 
(4) This is shown by the harmonious testimony of the Upanisads. 
The whole of the first chapter of the second book is devoted to 
justifying the position of the Vedanta against the attacks of the 
rival schools. The second chapter of the second book is busy in 
dealing blows at rival systems. All the other parts of the book are 
devoted to settling the disputed interpretations of a number of in 
dividual Upanisad texts. The really philosophical portion of the 
work is thus limited to the first four sutras and the first arid second 
chapters of the second book. The other portions are like com 
mentaries to the Upanisads, which however contain many theo 
logical views of the system. The first commentary of the Brahma- 
siitra was probably written by Baudhayana, which however is not 
available now. The earliest commentary that is now found is that 
of the great Sankara. His interpretations of the Brahma-sutras 
together with all the commentaries and other works that follow 
his views are popularly known as Vedanta philosophy, though 
this philosophy ought more properly to be called Visuddhadvaita- 
vada school of Vedanta philosophy (i.e. the Vedanta philosophy 
of the school of absolute monism). Variant forms of dualistic 
philosophy as represented by the Vaisnavas, aivas, Ramayatas, 
etc., also claim to express the original purport of the Brahma 
sutras. We thus find that apostles of dualistic creeds such as 
Ramanuja, Vallabha, Madhva, rlkantha, Baladeva, etc., have 
written independent commentaries on the Brahma-sutra to show 
that the philosophy as elaborated by themselves is the view of 
the Upanisads and as summarized in the Brahma-sutras. These 
differed largely and often vehemently attacked Sarikara s inter 
pretations of the same sutras. These systems as expounded by 
them also pass by the name of Vedanta as these are also claimed 
to be the real interpretations intended by the Vedanta (Upanisads) 



iv] Some Points of Agreement 7 i 

and the Veddnta sutras. Of these the system of Ramanuja has 
great philosophical importance. 

The Ny ay a sutras attributed to Gautama, called also Aksapada, 
and the VaiSesika sutras attributed to Kanada, called also Uluka, 
represent the same system for all practical purposes. They are 
in later times considered to differ only in a few points of minor 
importance. So far as the sutras are concerned the Nydya sutras 
lay particular stress on the cultivation of logic as an art, while 
the Vaisesika sutras deal mostly with metaphysics and physics. 
In addition to these six systems, the Tantras had also philoso 
phies of their own, which however may generally be looked upon 
largely as modifications of the Samkhya and Vedanta systems, 
though their own contributions are also noteworthy. 

Some fundamental Points of Agreement, 
i. The Karma Theory. 

It is, however, remarkable that with the exception of the 
Carvaka materialists all the other systems agree on some funda 
mental points of importance. The systems of philosophy in India 
were not stirred up merely by the speculative demands of the 
human mind which has a natural inclination for indulging in 
abstract thought, but by a deep craving after the realization of 
the religious purpose of life. It is surprising to note that the ] 
postulates, aims and conditions for such a realization were found / 
to be identical in all the conflicting systems. Whatever may be 
their differences of opinion in other matters, so far as the general 
postulates for the realization of the transcendent state, the summum 
bonum of life, were concerned, all the systems were practically in 
thorough agreement It may be worth while to note some of them 
at this stage. 

First, the theory of Karma and rebirth. All the Indian systems 
agree in believing that whatever action is done by an individual 
leaves behind it some sort of potency which has the power to 
ordain for him joy or sorrow in the future according as it is good 
or bad. When the fruits of the actions are such that they cannot 
be enjoyed in the present life or in a human life, the individual 
has to take another birth as a man or any other being in order to 
suffer them. 

The Vedic belief that the mantras uttered in the correct accent 
at the sacrifices with the proper observance of all ritualistic 




72 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [CH. 

details, exactly according to the directions without the slightest 
error even in the smallest trifle, had something like a magical 
virtue automatically to produce the desired object immediately 
or after a lapse of time, was probably the earliest form of the 
Karma doctrine. It postulates a semi-conscious belief that certain 
mystical actions can produce at a distant time certain effects 
without the ordinary process of the instrumentality of visible 
agents of ordinary cause and effect When the sacrifice is per 
formed, the action leaves such an unseen magical virtue, called 
the adrsta (the unseen) or the apurva (new), that by it the desired 
object will be achieved in a mysterious manner, for the modus 
operandi of the apurva is unknown. There is also the notion 
prevalent in the Samhitas, as we have already noticed, that he 
who commits wicked deeds suffers in another world, whereas he 
who performs good deeds enjoys the highest material pleasures. 
These were probably associated with the conception of rta, the 
inviolable order of things. Thus these are probably the elements 
which built up the Karma theory which we find pretty well 
established but not emphasized in the Upanisads, where it is said 
that according to good or bad actions men will have good or bad 
births. 

To notice other relevant points in connection with the Karma 
doctrine as established in the astika systems we find that it was 
believed that the unseen {adrsta) potency of the action generally 
required some time before it could be fit for giving the doer the 
merited punishment or enjoyment These would often accumulate 
and prepare the items of suffering and enjoyment for the doer in 
his next life. Only the fruits of those actions which are extremely 
wicked or particularly good could be reaped in this life. The 
nature of the next birth of a man is determined by the nature of 
pleasurable or painful experiences that have been made ready for 
him by his maturing actions of this life. If the experiences deter 
mined for him by his action are such that they are possible to be 
realized in the life of a goat, the man will die and be born as a 
goat. As there is no ultimate beginning in time of this world 
process, so there is no time at which any person first began his 
actions or experiences. Man has had an infinite number of past 
lives of the most varied nature, and the instincts of each kind of 
life exist dormant in the life of every individual, and thus when 
ever he has any particular birth as this or that animal or man, 



iv] Theory of Karma 73 

the special instincts of that life (technically called vdsana) come 
forth. In accordance with these vasanas the person passes through 
the painful or pleasurable experiences as determined for him by 
his action. The length of life is also determined by the number 
and duration of experiences as preordained by the fructifying 
actions of his past life. When once certain actions become fit for 
giving certain experiences, these cannot be avoided, but those 
actions which have not matured are uprooted once for all if the 
person attains true knowledge as advocated by philosophy. But 
even such an emancipated (muktd} person has to pass through 
the pleasurable or painful experiences ordained for him by the 
actions just ripened for giving their fruits. There are four kinds 
of actions, white or virtuous (sukla), black or wicked (krsna), 
white-black or partly virtuous and partly vicious (fukla-krsna) as 
most of our actions are, neither black nor white (asuklakrsqa), 
i.e. those acts of self-renunciation or meditation which are not 
associated with any desires for the fruit. It is only when a person 
can so restrain himself as to perform only the last kind of action 
that he ceases to accumulate any new karma for giving fresh fruits. 
He has thus only to enjoy the fruits of his previous karmas which 
have ripened for giving fruits. If in the meantime he attains true 
knowledge, all his past accumulated actions become destroyed, 
and as his acts are only of the aSuklakrsna type no fresh karma 
for ripening is accumulated, and thus he becomes divested of all 
karma after enjoying the fruits of the ripened karmas alone. 

The Jains think that through the actions of body, speech 
and mind a kind of subtle matter technically called karma is pro 
duced. The passions of a man act like a viscous substance that 
attracts this karma matter, which thus pours into the soul and 
sticks to it. The karma matter thus accumulated round the soul 
during the infinite number of past lives is technically called kdr- 
masartra,v/hich encircles the soul as it passes on from birth to birth. 
This karma matter sticking to the soul gradually ripens and ex 
hausts itself in ordaining the sufferance of pains or the enjoyment 
of pleasures for the individual. While some karma matter is being 
expended in this way, other karma matters are accumulating by 
his activities, and thus keep him in a continuous process of 
suffering and enjoyment. The karma matter thus accumulated 
in the soul produces a kind of coloration called lesyd, such as 
white, black, etc., which marks the character of the soul. The 



74 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [CH. 

idea of the ukla and krsna karmas of the Yoga system was pro 
bably suggested by the Jaina view. But when a man is free from 
passions, and acts in strict compliance with the rules of conduct, 
his actions produce karma which lasts but for a moment and is 
then annihilated. Every karma that the sage has previously 
earned has its predestined limits within which it must take effect 
and be purged away. But when by contemplation and the strict 
adherence to the five great vows, no new karma is generated, and 
when all the karmas are exhausted the worldly existence of the 
person rapidly draws towards its end. Thus in the last stage of 
contemplation, all karma being annihilated, and all activities 
having ceased, the soul leaves the body and goes up to the top 
of the universe, where the liberated souls stay for ever. 

Buddhism also contributes some new traits to the karma 
theory which however being intimately connected with their 
metaphysics will be treated later on. 

2. The Doctrine of Mukti. 

Not only do the Indian systems agree as to the cause of the 
inequalities in the share of sufferings and enjoyments in the case 
of different persons, and the manner in which the cycle of births 
and rebirths has been kept going from beginningless time, on the 
basis of the mysterious connection of one s actions with the 
happenings of the world, but they also agree in believing that 
this beginningless chain of karma and its fruits, of births and re 
births, this running on from beginningless time has somewhere 
its end. This end was not to be attained at some distant time or 
in some distant kingdom, but was to be sought within us. Karma 
leads us to this endless cycle, and if we could divest ourselves of 
all such emotions, ideas or desires as lead us to action we should 
find within us the actionless self which neither suffers nor enjoys, 
neither works nor undergoes rebirth. When the Indians, wearied 
by the endless bustle and turmoil of worldly events, sought for and 
believed that somewhere a peaceful goal could be found, they 
generally hit upon the self of man. The belief that the soul could 
be realized in some stage as being permanently divested of all 
action, feelings or ideas, led logically to the conclusion that the 
connection of the soul with these worldly elements was extraneous, 
artificial or even illusory. In its true nature the soul is untouched 
by the impurities of our ordinary life, and it is through ignorance 



iv] Pessimism and Optimism 75 

and passion as inherited from the cycle of karma from beginning- 
less time that we connect it with these. The realization of this 
transcendent state is the goal and final achievement of this endless 
cycle of births and rebirths through karma. The Buddhists did 
not admit the existence of soul, but recognized that the final 
realization of the process of karma is to be found in the ultimate 
dissolution called Nirvana, the nature of which we shall discuss 
latei on. 

3. The Doctrine of Soul. 

All the Indian systems except Buddhism admit the existence 
of a permanent entity variously called atman, purusa or jlva. 
As to the exact nature of this soul there are indeed diver 
gences of view. Thus while the Nyaya calls it absolutely 
qualityless and characterless, indeterminate unconscious entity, 
Samkhya describes it as being of the nature of pure conscious 
ness, the Vedanta says that it is that fundamental point of unity 
implied in pure consciousness (cit\ pure bliss (dnanda), and pure 
being (sat). But all agree in holding that it is pure and unsullied 
in its nature and that all impurities of action or passion do not 
form a real part of it. The summum bonum of life is attained 
when all impurities are removed and the pure nature of the self 
is thoroughly and permanently apprehended and all other ex 
traneous connections with it are absolutely dissociated. 

The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the 
Optimistic Faith in the end. 

Though the belief that the world is full of sorrow has not been 
equally prominently emphasized in all systems, yet it may be 
considered as being shared by all of them. It finds its strongest 
utterance in Samkhya, Yoga, and Buddhism. This interminable 
chain of pleasurable and painful experiences was looked upon as 
nearing no peaceful end but embroiling and entangling us in the 
meshes of karma, rebirth, and sorrow. What appear as pleasures 
are but a mere appearance for the attempt to keep them steady is 
painful, there is pain when we lose the pleasures or when we are 
anxious to have them. When the pleasures are so much asso 
ciated with pains they are but pains themselves. We are but duped 
when we seek pleasures, for they are sure to lead us to pain. All 
our experiences are essentially sorrowful and ultimately sorrow- 
begetting. Sorrow is the ultimate truth of this process of the 



76 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [CH. 

world. That which to an ordinary person seems pleasurable 
appears to a wise person or to a yogin who has a clearer vision as 
painful. The greater the knowledge the higher is the sensitiveness 
to sorrow and dissatisfaction with world experiences. The yogin 
is like the pupil of the eye to which even the smallest grain of dis 
turbance is unbearable. This sorrow of worldly experiences cannot 
be removed by bringing in remedies for each sorrow as it comes, 
for the moment it is remedied another sorrow comes in. It cannot 
also be avoided by mere inaction or suicide, for we are continually 
being forced to action by our nature, and suicide will but lead to 
another life of sorrow and rebirth. The only way to get rid of 1 
it is by the culmination of moral greatness and true knowledge 
which uproot sorrow once for all. It is our ignorance that the self 1 
is intimately connected with the experiences of life or its pleasures, 
that leads us to action and arouses passion in us for the enjoy 
ment of pleasures and other emotions and activities. Through 
the highest moral elevation a man may attain absolute dispassion 
towards world-experiences and retire in body, mind, and speech 
from all worldly concerns. When the mind is so purified, the self 
shines in its true light, and its true nature is rightly conceived. 
When this is once done the self can never again be associated 
with passion or ignorance. It becomes at this stage ultimately 
dissociated from citta which contains within it the root of all 
emotions, ideas, and actions. Thus emancipated the self for ever 
conquers all sorrow. It is important, however, to note in this 
connection that emancipation is not based on a general aversion 
to intercourse with the world or on such feelings as a disappointed 
person may have, but on the appreciation of the state of mukti 
as the supremely blessed one. The details of the pessimistic 
creed of each system have developed from the logical necessity 
peculiar to each system. There was never the slightest tendency 
to shirk the duties of this life, but to rise above them through 
right performance and right understanding. It is only when a 
man rises to the highest pinnacle of moral glory that he is fit for 
aspiring to that realization of selfhood in comparison with which 
all worldly things or even the joys of Heaven would not only 
shrink into insignificance, but appear in their true character as 
sorrowful and loathsome. It is when his mind has thus turned from 
all ordinary joys that he can strive towards his ideal of salvation. 
In fact it seems to me that a sincere religious craving after some 



iv] Unity in Sadhana 77 

ideal blessedness and quiet of self-realization is indeed the funda 
mental fact from which not only her philosophy but many of the 
complex phenomena of the civilization of India can be logically 
deduced. The sorrow around us has no fear for us if we remember 
that we are naturally sorrowless and blessed in ourselves. The 
pessimistic view loses all terror as it closes in absolute optimistic 
confidence in one s own self and the ultimate destiny and goal of 
emancipation. 

Unity in Indian Sadhana (philosophical, religious 
and ethical endeavours). 

As might be expected the Indian systems are all agreed upon 
the general principles of ethical conduct which must be followed 
for the attainment of salvation. That all passions are to be con 
trolled, no injury to life in any form should be done, and that all 
desire for pleasures should be checked, are principles which are 
almost universally acknowledged. When a man attains a very 
high degree of moral greatness he has to strengthen and prepare 
his mind for further purifying and steadying it for the attainment 
of his ideal; and most of the Indian systems are unanimous with 
regard to the means to be employed for the purpose. There are 
indeed divergences in certain details or technical names, but the 
means to be adopted for purification are almost everywhere essen 
tially the same as those advocated by the Yoga system. It is only 
in later times that devotion (bhaktf) is seen to occupy a more 
prominent place specially in Vaisnava schools of thought. Thus 
it was that though there were many differences among the various 
systems, yet their goal of life, their attitude towards the world and 
the means for the attainment of the goal (sadhana) being funda 
mentally the same, there was a unique unity in the practical sadhana 
of almost all the Indian systems. The religious craving has been 
universal in India and this uniformity of sadhana has therefore 
secured for India a unity in all her aspirations and strivings. 



CHAPTER V 

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY 

MANY scholars are of opinion that the Samkhya and the Yoga 
represent the earliest systematic speculations of India. It is also 
suggested that Buddhism drew much of its inspiration from them. 
It may be that there is some truth in such a view, but the 
systematic Samkhya and Yoga treatises as we have them had 
decidedly been written after Buddhism. Moreover it is well-known 
to every student of Hindu philosophy that a conflict with the 
Buddhists has largely stimulated philosophic enquiry in most of 
the systems of Hindu thought. A knowledge of Buddhism is 
therefore indispensable for a right understanding of the different 
systems in their mutual relation and opposition to Buddhism. It 
seems desirable therefore that I should begin with Buddhism 
first 

The State of Philosophy in India before the Buddha. 

It is indeed difficult to give a short sketch of the different 
philosophical speculations that were prevalent in India before 
Buddhism. The doctrines of the Upanisads are well known, and 
these have already been briefly described. But these were not the 
only ones. Even in the Upanisads we find references to diverse 
atheistical creeds 1 . We find there that the origin of the world 
and its processes were sometimes discussed, and some thought 
that " time " was the ultimate cause of all, others that all these 
had sprung forth by their own nature (svabhdVa\ others that 
everything had come forth in accordance with an inexorable 
destiny or a fortuitous concourse of accidental happenings, or 
through matter combinations in general. References to diverse 
kinds of heresies are found in Buddhist literature also, but no 
detailed accounts of these views are known. Of the Upanisad 
type of materialists the two schools of Carvakas (Dhurtta and 
SuSiksita) are referred to in later literature, though the time in 
which these flourished cannot rightly be discovered 2 . But it seems 

1 i->vetas"vatara, I. 2, kalah svabhabo niycUiryadrcchd bhutaniyonih purusa iti cintyam. 

2 Lokayata (literally, that which is found among people in general) seems to have 
been the name by which all carvaka doctrines were generally known. See Gunaratna 
on the Lokayatas. 



CH. v] C&rvakas 79 

probable however that the allusion to the materialists contained 
in the Upanisads refers to these or to similar schools. The 
Carvakas did not believe in the authority of the Vedas or any 
other holy scripture. According to them there was no soul. Life 
and consciousness were the products of the combination of matter, 
just as red colour was the result of mixing up white with 
yellow or as the power of intoxication was generated in molasses 
(madasakti). There is no after-life, and no reward of actions, as 
there is neither virtue nor vice. Life is only for enjoyment. So 
long as it lasts it is needless to think of anything else, as every 
thing will end with death, for when at death the body is burnt 
to ashes there cannot be any rebirth. They do not believe in 
the validity of inference. Nothing is trustworthy but what can 
be directly perceived, for it is impossible to determine that the 
distribution of the middle term (hetu) has not depended upon 
some extraneous condition, the absence of which might destroy 
the validity of any particular piece of inference. If in any case 
any inference comes to be true, it is only an accidental fact and 
there is no certitude about it They were called Carvaka because 
they would only eat but would not accept any other religious or 
moral responsibility. The word comes from caru to eat. The 
Dhurtta Carvakas held that there was nothing but the four 
elements of earth, water, air and fire, and that the body was but the 
result of atomic combination. There was no self or soul, no 
virtue or vice. The Susiksita Carvakas held that there was 
a soul apart from the body but that it also was destroyed with 
the destruction of the body. The original work of the Carvakas 
was written in sutras probably by Brhaspati. Jayanta and Gunar- 
atna quote two sutras from it. Short accounts of this school may be 
found in Jayanta s Nydyamanjari, Madhava s Sarvadarsanasam- 
graha and Gunaratna s Tarkarahasyadipikd. Mahdbhdrata gives 
an account of a man called Carvaka meeting Yudhisthira. 

Side by side with the doctrine of the Carvaka materialists we 
are reminded of the Ajlvakas of which Makkhali Gosala, probably 
a renegade disciple of the Jain saint Mahavira and a contemporary 
of Buddha and Mahavira, was the leader. This was a thorough 
going determinism denying the free will of man and his moral 
responsibility for any so-called good or evil. The essence of 
Makkhali s system is this, that "there is no cause, either proximate 
or remote, for the depravity of beings or for their purity. They 



8o Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

become so without any cause. Nothing depends either on one s 
own efforts or on the efforts of others, in short nothing depends 
on any human effort, for there is no such thing as power or energy, 
or human exertion. The varying conditions at any time are due 
to fate, to their environment and their own nature 1 ." 

Another sophistical school led by Ajita Kesakambali taught 
that there was no fruit or result of good or evil deeds ; there is no 
other world, nor was this one real; nor had parents nor any 
former lives any efficacy with respect to this life. Nothing that 
we can do prevents any of us alike from being, wholly brought to 
an end at death 2 . 

There were thus at least three currents of thought: firstly the 
sacrificial Karma by the force of the magical rites of which any 
person could attain anything he desired ; secondly the Upanisad 
teaching that the Brahman^ the self, is the ultimate reality and 
being, and all else but name and form which pass away but do 
not abide. That which permanently abides without change is the 
real and true, and this is self. .Thirdly the nihilistic conceptions 
that there is no law, no abiding reality, that everything comes 
into being by a fortuitous concourse of circumstances or by some 
unknown fate. In each of these schools, philosophy had probably 
come to a deadlock. There were the Yoga practices prevalent in 
the country and these were accepted partly on the strength of 
traditional custom among certain sections, and partly by virtue 
of the great spiritual, intellectual and physical power which they 
gave to those who performed them. But these had no rational 
basis behind them on which they could lean for support. These 
were probably then just tending towards being affiliated to the 
nebulous Samkhya doctrines which had grown up among certain 
sections. It was at this juncture that we find Buddha erecting 
a new superstructure of thought on altogether original lines which 
thenceforth opened up a new avenue of philosophy for all posterity 
to come. If the Being of the Upanisads, the superlatively motion 
less, was the only real, how could it offer scope for further new 
speculations, as it had already discarded all other matters of 
interest? If everything was due to a reasonless fortuitous con 
course of circumstances, reason could not proceed further in the 
direction to create any philosophy of the unreason. The magical 

1 Samannaphaia-sutta, Digha, li. 20 Hoemle s article on the Ajivakas, E. R. E. 

2 Sdmannaphala-sutta, II. 23. 



v] Buddha s Life 81 

force of the hocus-pocus of sorcery or sacrifice had but little that 
was inviting for philosophy to proceed on. If we thus take into 
account the state of Indian philosophic culture before Buddha, 
we shall be better able to understand the value of the Buddhistic 
contribution to philosophy. 

Buddha : his Life. 

Gautama the Buddha was born in or about the year 560 B.C. 
in the Lumbini Grove near the ancient town of Kapilavastu in 
the now dense terai region of Nepal. His father was Suddhodana, 
a prince of the Sakya clan, and his mother Queen Mahamaya. 
According to the legends it was foretold of him that he would 
enter upon the ascetic life when he should see " A decrepit old 
man, a diseased man, a dead man, and a monk." His father tried 
his best to keep him away from these by marrying him and 
surrounding him with luxuries. But on successive occasions, 
issuing from the palace, he was confronted by those four 
things, which filled him with amazement and distress, and 
realizing the impermanence of all earthly things determined to 
forsake his home and try if he could to discover some means to 
immortality to remove the sufferings of men. He made his " Great 
Renunciation " when he was twenty-nine years old. He travelled 
on foot to Rajagrha (Rajgir) and thence to Uruvela, where in 
company with other five ascetics he entered upon a course of 
extreme self-discipline, carrying his austerities to such a length 
that his body became utterly emaciated and he fell down sense 
less and was believed to be dead. After six years of this great 
struggle he was convinced that the truth was not to be won by 
the way of extreme asceticism, and resuming an ordinary course 
of life at last attained absolute and supreme enlightenment There 
after the Buddha spent a life prolonged over forty-five years in 
travelling from place to place and preaching the doctrine to 
all who would listen. At the age of over eighty years Buddha 
realized that the time drew near for him to die. He then entered 
into Dhyana and passing through its successive stages attained 
nirvana 1 . The vast developments which the system of this great 
teacher underwent in the succeeding centuries in India and in 
other countries have not been thoroughly studied, and it will 
probably take yet many years more before even the materials for 

1 Mahdparinibbanasutfanta, Dtgha, XVI. 6, 8, 9. 
D. 6 



82 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

such a study can be collected. But from what we now possess 
it is proved incontestably that it is one of the most wonderful and 
subtle productions of human wisdom. It is impossible to over 
estimate the debt that the philosophy, culture and civilization 
of India owe to it in all her developments for many succeeding 
centuries. 

Early Buddhist Literature. 

The BuddhistPali Scriptures containthree different collections : 
the Sutta (relating to the doctrines), the Vinaya (relating to the 
discipline of the monks) and the Abhidhamma (relating generally 
to the same subjects as the suttas but dealing with them in a 
scholastic and technical manner). Scholars of Buddhistic religious 
history of modern times have failed as yet to fix any definite dates 
for the collection or composition of the different parts of the 
aforesaid canonical literature of the Buddhists. The suttas were 
however composed before the Abhidhamma and it is very 
probable that almost the whole of the canonical works were 
completed before 241 B.C., the date of the third council during 
the reign of King Asoka. The suttas mainly deal with the doctrine 
(Dhamma) of the Buddhistic faith whereas the Vinaya deals 
only with the regulations concerning the discipline of the monks. 
The subject of the Abhidhamma is mostly the same as that 
of the suttas, namely, the interpretation of the Dhamma. 
Buddhaghosa in his introduction to Atthasdlinl^ the commentary 
on the Dhammasangani, says that the Abhidhamma is so called 
(abhi and dhamma) because it describes the same Dhammas as are 
related in the suttas in a more intensified (dhammatirekd) and 
specialized (dhammavisesatthend) manner. The Abhidhammas 
do not give any new doctrines that are not in the suttas, but 
they deal somewhat elaborately with those that are already found 
in the suttas. Buddhaghosa in distinguishing the special features 
of the suttas from the Abhidhammas says that the acquirement 
of the former leads one to attain meditation (samadhi) whereas 
the latter leads one to attain wisdom (panndsampadam). The force 
of this statement probably lies in this, that the dialogues of the 
suttas leave a chastening effect on the mind, the like of which is 
not to be found in the Abhidhammas, which busy themselves in 
enumerating the Buddhistic doctrines and defining them in a 
technical manner, which is more fitted to produce a reasoned 



v] Early Buddhist Literature 83 

insight into the doctrines than directly to generate a craving 
for following the path of meditation for the extinction of sorrow. 
The Abhidhamma known as the Kathavatthu differs from the 
other Abhidhammas in this, that it attempts to reduce the views 
of the heterodox schools to absurdity. The discussions proceed 
in the form of questions and answers, and the answers of the 
opponents are often shown to be based on contradictory 
assumptions. 

The suttas contain five groups of collections called the Nikayas. 
These are (i) Dlgha Nikdya, called so on account of the length 
of the suttas contained in it; (2) Majjhima Nikaya (middling 
Nikaya), called so on account of the middling extent of the 
suttas contained in it ; (3) Samyutta Nikdya (Nikayas relating 
to special meetings), called samyutta on account of their being 
delivered owing to the meetings (samyogd) of special persons which 
were the occasions for them ; (4) Anguttara Nikdya, so called be 
cause in each succeeding book of this work the topics of discussion 
increase by one 1 ; (5) Khuddaka Nikdya containing Khuddaka 
patha, Dhammapada, Uddna, Itivuttaka, Sutta Nipdta, Vimdna- 
vatthu, Petavatthu, Theragathd, Therlgdthd, Jdtaka, Niddesa, 
Patisambhiddmagga, Apaddna, Buddhavamsa, Carydpitaka. 

The Abhidhammas are Patthdna, Dhammasangani, Dhdtu- 
kathd, Puggalapannatti, Vibhanga, Yamaka and Kathavatthu. 
There exists also a large commentary literature on diverse parts 
of the above works known as atthakatha. The work known as 
Milinda Panha (questions of King Milinda), of uncertain date, is 
of considerable philosophical value. 

The doctrines and views incorporated in the above literature 
is generally now known as Sthaviravada or Theravada. On the 
origin of the name Theravada (the doctrine of the elders) Dlpa- 
vamsa says that since the Theras (elders) met (at the first council) 
and collected the doctrines it was known as the Thera Vada*. It 
does not appear that Buddhism as it appears in this Pali litera 
ture developed much since the time of Buddhaghosa (400 A.D.), the 
writer of "Visuddhimagga (a compendium of theravada doctrines) 
and the commentator of Dlghanikdya, Dhammasangani^ etc. 

Hindu philosophy in later times seems to have been influenced 
by the later offshoots of the different schools of Buddhism, but 
it does not appear that Pali Buddhism had any share in it. I 

1 See Buddhaghosa s Atthasdlini, p. 25. z Oldenberg s Dipavamsa, p. 31. 

62 



84 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

have not been able to discover any old Hindu writer who could 
be considered as being acquainted with Pali. 

The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism 1 . 

The word Dhamma in the Buddhist scriptures is used generally 
in four senses: (i) Scriptural texts, (2) quality (guna), (3) cause 
(hetu) and (4) unsubstantial and soulless (nissatta nijjlva?). Of 
these it is the last meaning which is particularly important from 
the point of view of Buddhist philosophy. The early Buddhist 
philosophy did not accept any fixed entity as determining all 
reality; the only things with it were the unsubstantial pheno 
mena and these were called jjharnmas. The question arises that 
if there is no substance or reality how are we to account for the 
phenomena? But the phenomena are happening and passing 
away and the main point of interest with the Buddha was to find 
out " What being what else is," " What happening what else 
happens" and " What not being what else is not." The pheno 
mena are happening in a series and we see that there being 
certain phenomena there become some others; by the happening 
of some events others also are produced. This is called (paticca- 
samuppddd) dependent origination. But it is difficult to understand 
what is the exact nature of this dependence. The question as 
Samyutta Nikdya (II. 5) has it with which the Buddha started 
before attaining Buddhahood was this: in what miserable condition 
are the people ! they are born, they decay, they die, pass away 
and are born again ; and they do not know the path of escape 

i from this decay, death and misery. 

How to know the way to escape from this misery of decay 
and death. Then it occurred to him what being there, are decay 
and death, depending on what do they come? As he thought 
deeply into the root of the matter, it occurred to him that decay 
and death can only occur when there is birth (jdti), so they depend 

1 There are some differences of opinion as to whether one could take the doctrine 
of the twelve links of causes as we find it in the Samyutta Nikdya as the earliest 
Buddhist view, as Samyutta does not represent the oldest part of the suttas. But as 
this doctrine of the twelve causes became regarded as a fundamental Buddhist doctrine 
and as it gives us a start in philosophy I have not thought it fit to enter into conjec 
tural discussions as to the earliest form. Dr E. J. Thomas drew my attention to this fact. 

a Atthasdtini, p. 38. There are also other senses in which the word is used, as 
dhamma desand where it means religious teaching. The Lankavat&rn described Dharmma 
as gunadravyapurvaka dharmma, i.e. Dharmmas are those which are associated as attrii 
butes and substances. 



v] Doctrine of Causal Connection 85 

on birth. What being there, is there birth, on what does birth 
depend ? Then it occurred to him that birth could only be if 
there were previous existence (bhava) 1 . But on what does this 
existence depend, or what being there is there bhava. Then it 
occurred to him that there could not be existence unless there 
were holding fast (updddnd)*. But on what did upadana depend? 
It occurred to him that it was desire (tanha) on which upadana 
depended. There can be upadana if there is desire (tanha)*. But 
what being there, can there be desire ? To this question it 
occurred to him that there must be feeling (yedana) in order that 
there may be desire. But on what does vedana depend, or rather 
what must be there, that there may be feeling (vedanaft To this 
it occurred to him that there must be a sense-contact (phassa) 
in order that there may be feeling 4 . If there should be no sense- 
contact there would be no feeling. But on what does sense- 
contact depend ? It occurred to him that as there are six sense- 
contacts, there are the six fields of contact (dyatana)*. But on 
what do the six ayatanas depend ? It occurred to him that 
there must be the mind and body (ndmariipa) in order that there 
may be the six fields of contact 6 ; but on what does namarupa 
depend ? It occurred to him that without consciousness (vinndnd) 
there could be no namarupa 6 . But what being there would there 

1 This word bhava is interpreted by Candraklrtti in his Madhyamika vrtti, p. 565 
(La Vallee Poussin s edition) as the deed which brought about rebirth (punarbhava- 

janakam karma samutthdpayati k.yena vdcd manasd ca). 

2 Atthasalini, p. 385,upadanantidalhagahanarn. Candraklrtti in explaining upadana 
says that whatever thing a man desires he holds fast to the materials necessary for 
attaining it (yatra vastuni satrsnastasya vastuno rjandya vidhapandya updddnamupd- 
datte tatra tatra prdrthayate). Madhyamika vrtti, p. 565. 

3 Candraklrtti describes trsna as dsvddandbhinandanddhyavasdnasthdndddtmapri- 
yarupairviyogo md bhut, nityamapantydgo bhavediti, yeyam prdrthand the desire 
that there may not ever be any separation from those pleasures, etc., which are dear to 
us. Ibid. 565. 

4 We read also of phassayatana and phassakaya. M. N. II. 261, III. 280, etc. Can- 
drakirtti says that sadbhirdyatanadvdraih krtyaprakriydh pravarttante prajAdyante. 
tanndmarupapratyayam saddyatanamucyate. sadbhyafcdyatanebhyah satsparSakdydh 
pravarttante. M. V. 565. 

5 Ayatana means the six senses together with their objects. Ayatana literally is 
" Field of operation." Salayatana means six senses as six fields of operation. Candra 
klrtti has dyatanadvdraih. 

8 I have followed the translation of Aung in rendering namarupa as mind and body, 
Compendium, p. 271. This seems to me to be fairly correct. The four skandhas are called 
nama in each birth. These together with rupa (matter) give us namarupa (mind 
and body) which being developed render the activities through the six sense-gates 
possible so that there may be knowledge. Cf.M. V. 564. Govindananda, the commentator 



86 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

be viftftana. Here it occurred to him that in order that there 
might be viftftana there must be the conformations (sankhdra) 1 . 
But what being there are there the sarikharas ? Here it occurred 
to him that the sarikharas can only be if there is ignorance 
(avijja). If avijja could be stopped then the sankharas will be 
stopped, and if the sarikharas could be stopped viftflana could be 
stopped and so on*. 

It is indeed difficult to be definite as to what the Buddha 
actually wished to mean by this cycle of dependence of existence 
sometimes called Bhavacakra (wheel of existence). Decay and 
death (jardmarand) could not have happened if there was no 
birth*. This seems to be clear. But at this point the difficulty 
begins. We must remember that the theory of rebirth was 

on Sankara s bhasya on the Brahma-sutras (n. ii. 19), gives a different interpretation of 
Namarupa which may probably refer to the Vijnanavada view though we have no means 
at hand to verify it. He says To think the momentary as the permanent is Avidya; 
from there come the samskaras of attachment, antipathy or anger, and infatuation ; from 
there the first vijftana or thought of the foetus is produced ; from that alayavijfiana, and 
the four elements (which are objects of name and are hence called nama) are produced, 
and from those are produced the white and black, semen and blood called rupa. 
Both Vacaspati and Amalananda agree with Govindananda in holding that nama 
signifies the semen and the ovum while rupa means the visible physical body built out 
of them. Vijflana entered the womb and on account of it namarupa were produced 
through the association of previous karma. See Vedantakalpataru, pp. 274, 275. On 
the doctrine of the entrance of vijfiana into the womb compare D. N. n. 63. 

1 It is difficult to say what is the exact sense of the word here. The Buddha was 
one of the first few earliest thinkers to introduce proper philosophical terms and phraseo 
logy with a distinct philosophical method and he had often to use the same word in 
more or less different senses. Some of the philosophical terms at least are therefore 
rather elastic when compared with the terms of precise and definitemeaningwhichwe find 
in later Sanskrit thought. Thus in S. N. III. p. 87, " Sankhatam abhisahkharonti" 
sankhara means that which synthesises the complexes. In the Compendium it is trans 
lated as will, action. Mr Aung thinks that it means the same as karma ; it is here used 
in a different sense from what we find in the word sankhara khandha (viz. mentat 
states). We get a list of 51 mental states forming sankhara khandha in Dhamma 
Sangani, p. 18, and another different set of 40 mental states in Dharmasamgraha, p. 6. 
In addition to these forty cittasamprayuktasamskara, it also counts thirteen cittavi- 
prayuktasainskara. Candrakirtti interprets it as meaning attachment, antipathy and 
infatuation, p. 563. Govindananda, the commentator on Sankara s Brahma-sutra (ll. ii. 
19), also interprets the word in connection with the doctrine of Pratityasamutpada as 
attachment, antipathy and infatuation. 

a Samyutta Nikdya, II. 7-8. 

3 Jara and marana bring in oka (grief), paridevana (lamentation), duhkha (suffer 
ing), daurmanasya (feeling of wretchedness and miserableness) and upayasa (feeling of 
extreme destitution) at the prospect of one s death or the death of other dear ones. 
All these make up suffering and are the results of jati (birth). M. V. (B. T. S. p. ao8). 
Sankara in his bhasya counted all the terms from jara, separately. The whole series 
is to be taken as representing the entirety of duhkhaskandha. 



v] Theory of Rebirth 87 

enunciated in the Upanisads. The Brhadaranyaka says that just 
as an insect going to the end of a leaf of grass by a new effort 
collects itself in another so does the soul coming to the end of 
this life collect itself in another. This life thus presupposes 
another existence. So far as I remember there has seldom been 
before or after Buddha any serious attempt to prove or disprove 
the doctrine of rebirth 1 . All schools of philosophy except the 
Carvakas believed in it and so little is known to us of the Car- 
vaka sutras that it is difficult to say what they did to refute this 
doctrine. The Buddha also accepts it as a fact and does not 
criticize it. This life therefore comes only as one which had an 
infinite number of lives before, and which except in the case of 
a few emancipated ones would have an infinite number of them 
in the future. It was strongly believed by all people, and the 
Buddha also, when he came to think to what our present birth 
might be due, had to fall back upon another existence (bhava). 
If bhava means karma which brings rebirth as Candraklrtti takes 
it to mean, then it would mean that the present birth could only 
take place on account of the works of a previous existence which 
determined it. Here also we are reminded of the Upanisad note I 
N / < as a man does so will he be born " ( Yat karma kurute tadabhi- 
sampadyate, Brh. IV. iv. 5). Candraklrtti s interpretation of "bhava" 
as Karma (Jrunarbhavajanakam karma) seems to me to suit 
better than " existence." The word was probably used rather 
loosely for kammabhava. The word bhava is not found in the 
earlier Upanisads and was used in the Pali scriptures for the 
first time as a philosophical term. But on what does this 
bhava depend ? There could not have been a previous existence 
if people had not betaken themselves to things or works they 
desired. This betaking oneself to actions or things in accord 
ance with desire is called upadana. In the Upanisads we read, 
" whatever one betakes himself to, so does he work" ( Yatkratur- 
bhavati tatkarmma kurute, Brh. IV. iv. 5). As this betaking to 
the thing depends upon desire (trsnd), it is said that in order 
that there may be upadana there must be tanha. In the Upani 
sads also we read "Whatever one desires so does he betake 
himself to" (sa yathdkamo bhavati tatkraturbhavati). Neither 
the word upadana nor trsna (the Sanskrit word corresponding 

1 The attempts to prove the doctrine of rebirth in the Hindu philosophical works 
such as the Nyaya, etc., are slight and inadequate. 



88 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

to tanha) is found in the earlier Upanisads, but the ideas contained 
in them are similar to the words "kratu" and "kdma." Desire 
(tanha) is then said to depend on feeling or sense-contact. 
Sense-contact presupposes the six senses as fields of operation 1 . 
These six senses or operating fields would again presuppose the 
whole psychosis of the man (the body and the mind together) 
called namarupa. We are familiar with this word in the Upani 
sads but there it is used in the sense of determinate forms and 
names as distinguished from the indeterminate indefinable 
reality 2 . Buddhaghosa in the Visuddhimagga says that by 
" Name " are meant the three groups beginning with sensation 
(i.e. sensation, perception and the predisposition); by "Form" 
the four elements and form derivative from the four elements 1 . 
He further says that name by itself can produce physical changes, 
such as eating, drinking, making movements or the like. So form 
also cannot produce any of those changes by itself. But like 
the cripple and the blind they mutually help one another and 
effectuate the changes 4 .( But there exists no heap or collection 
of material for the production of Name and Form ; " but just as 
when a lute is played upon, there is no previous store of sound ; 
and when the sound comes into existence it does not come from 
any such store ; and when it ceases, it does not go to any of the 
cardinal or intermediate points of the compass ;...in exactly the 
same way all the elements of being both those with form and 
those without, come into existence after having previously been 
non-existent and having come into existence pass away 5 ." Nama 
rupa taken in this sense will not mean the whole of mind and 
body, but only the sense functions and the body which are found 
to operate in the six doors of sense (saldyatand). If we take 
namarupa in this sense, we can see that it may be said to depend 
upon the vinflana (consciousness). Consciousness has been com 
pared in the Milinda Panha with a watchman at the middle of 

1 The word ayatana is found in many places in the earlier Upanisads in the sense 
of "field or place," Cha. I. 5, Brh. in. 9. 10, but sadayatana does not occur. 

2 Candraklrtti interprets nama as Vedanddayo rtipinas catvarah skandhdstatra tatra 
bha-vt namayantiti nama. saha rupaskandhena ca ndma rupam ctti namarupamucyate. 
The four skandhas in each specific birth act as name. These together with rupa make 
namarupa. M. V. 564. 

1 Warren s Buddhism in Translations, p. 184. 

* Ibid. p. 185, Visuddhimagga, Ch. xvn. 

* Ibid. pp. 185-186, Visuddhimagga, Ch. xvn. 



v] Theory of Consciousness 89 

the cross-roads beholding all that come from any direction 1 . Bud- 
dhaghosa in the Atthasdlini also says that consciousness means 
that which thinks its object. If we are to define its characteristics 
we must say that it knows (vijdnana), goes in advance (pubbah- 
gama\ connects (sandhdna), and stands on namarupa (ndmarupa- 
padatthdnam). When the consciousness gets a door, at a place 
the objects of sense are discerned (drammana-vibhdvanatthdne) 
and it goes first as the precursor. When a visual object is seen 
by the eye it is known only by the consciousness, and when the 
dhammas are made the objects of (mind) mano, it is known only 
by the consciousness 2 . Buddhaghosa also refers here to the passage 
in the Milinda Pahha we have just referred to. He further goes 
on to say that when states of consciousness rise one after another, 
they leave no gap between the previous state and the later and 
consciousness therefore appears as connected. When there are the 
aggregates of the five khandhas it is lost ; but there are the four 
aggregates as namarupa, it stands on nama and therefore it is 
said that it stands on namarupa. He further asks, Is this con 
sciousness the same as the previous consciousness or different 
from it? He answers that it is the same. Just so, the sun shows 
itself with all its colours, etc., but he is not different from those 
in truth ; and it is said that just when the sun rises, its collected 
heat and yellow colour also rise then, but it does not mean that 
the sun is different from these. So the citta or consciousness 
takes the phenomena of contact, etc., and cognizes them. So 
though it is the same as they are yet in a sense it is different 
from them*. 

To go back to the chain of twelve causes, we find that jati 
(birth) is the cause of decay and death, jardmarana, etc. Jati is 
the appearance of the body or the totality of the five skandhas 4 . 
Coming to bhava which determines jati, I cannot think of any 
better rational explanation of bhava, than that I have already 

1 Warren s Buddhism in Translations, p. 182. Milinda Panha (62 s ). 

8 Atthasdlini, p. in. 

1 Ibid. p. 113, Yathd hi rupddtni upaddya pannattd suriyddayo na atthato rupd- 
dihi anne honti ten 1 eva yasmin samaye suriyo udeti tasmin samayc fossa tejd-san- 
khdtam rupam piti evam vuccamdne pi na rupddihi anno suriyo ndma atthi. Tatha 
cittam phassddayo dhammc upaddya pafinapiyati. Atthato pan ettha tehi annam eva. 
Tena yasmin samaye cittam uppannam hoti ekamsen eva tasmin samaye phassadihi 
atthato annad eva hoti ti. 

4 "Jdtirdehajanma pancaskandhasamuddyah" Govindananda s Ratnaprabhd on 
Sankara s bhasya, II. ii. 19. 



9O Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

suggested, namely, the works (karma) which produce the birth 1 . 
Upadana is an advanced trsna leading to positive clinging 2 . It 
is produced by trsna (desire) which again is the result of vedana 
(pleasure and pain). But this vedana is of course vedana with 
ignorance (avtdyd), for an Arhat may have also vedana but as 
he has no avidya, the vedana cannot produce trsna in turn. On 
its development it immediately passes into upadana. Vedana 
means pleasurable, painful or indifferent feeling. On the one 
side it leads to trsna (desire) and on the other it is produced by 
sense-contact (sparsa). Prof. De la Valise Poussin says that 
Irmlabha distinguishes three processes in the production of 
vedana. Thus first there is the contact between the sense and 
the object ; then there is the knowledge of the object, and then 
there is the vedana. Depending on Majjhima Nikdya, iii. 242, 
Poussin gives the other opinion that just as in the case of two 
sticks heat takes place simultaneously with rubbing, so here also 
vedana takes place simultaneously with sparsa for they are 
" produits par un meme complexe de causes (sdmagri)*" 

Sparsa is produced by sadayatana, sadayatana by riamarupa, 
and namarupa by vijfiana, and is said to descend in the womb 
of the mother and produce the five skandhas as namarupa, out 
of which the six senses are specialized. 

Vijflana in this connection probably means the principle or 
germ of consciousness in the womb of the mother upholding the 
five elements of the new body there. It is the product of the 
past karmas (sahkhdrd) of the dying man and of his past 
consciousness too. 

We sometimes find that the Buddhists believed that the last 
thoughts of the dying man determined the nature of his next 

1 Govindananda in his Ratnaprabha on ankara s bhasya, II. ii. 19, explains " bhava " 
as that from which anything becomes, as merit and demerit (dkarmddi). See also 
Vibhanga, p. 137 and Warren s Buddhism in Translations, p. 201. Mr Aung says in 
Abhidhammatthasangaha, p. 189, that bhavo includes kamraabhavo (the active side of 
an existence) and upapattibhavo (the passive side). And the commentators say that 
bhava is a contraction of " kammabhava " or Karma becoming i.e. karmic activity. 

2 Prof. De la Vallee Poussin in his Thtorie des Douse Causes, p. 26, says that 
Salistambhasutra explains the word "upadana" as "trsnavaipulya" or hyper-trsna 
and Candrakirtti also gives the same meaning, M. V. (B. T. S. p. 210). Govindananda 
explains "upadana" as pravrtti (movement) generated by trsna (desire), i.e. the active 
tendency in pursuance of desire. But if upadana means "support" it would denote all 
the five skandhas. Thus Madhyamaka vrtti says upaddnam pancaskandhalaksanam . . . 
pancopadanaskandhakhyam up&ddnam. M. V. xxvn. 6. 

3 Poussin s Thorie des Douzt Causes, p. 23. 



v] Consciousness and Rebirth 91 

birth 1 . The manner in which the vijftana produced in the womb 
is determined by the past vijnana of the previous existence is 
according to some authorities of the nature of a reflected image, 
like the transmission of learning from the teacher to the disciple, 
like the lighting of a lamp from another lamp or like the impress 
of a stamp on wax. As all the skandhas are changing in life, 
so death also is but a similar change ; there is no great break, 
but the same uniform sort of destruction and coming into being. 
New skandhas are produced as simultaneously as the two scale 
pans of a balance rise up and fall, in the same manner as a lamp 
is lighted or an image is reflected. At the death of the man the 
vijftana resulting from his previous karmas and vijftanas enters 
into the womb of that mother (animal, man or the gods) in which 
the next skandhas are to be matured. This vijftana thus forms 
the principle of the new life. It is in this vijftana that name 
(ndma) and form (rupd) become associated. 

The vijftana is indeed a direct product of the samskaras and 
the sort of birth in which vijftana should bring down (ndmayati) 
the new existence (upapatti) is determined by the samskaras 8 , for 
in reality the happening of death (maranabhavd) and the instil 
lation of the vijftana as the beginning of the new life (upapatti- 
bkava) cannot be simultaneous, but the latter succeeds just at 
the next moment, and it is to signify this close succession that 
they are said to be simultaneous. If the vijftana had not entered 
the womb then no namarupa could have appeared*. 

This chain of twelve causes extends over three lives. Thus 
avidya and samskara of the past life produce the vijftana, nama- 

1 The deities of the gardens, the woods, the trees and the plants, finding the 
master of the house, Citta, ill said " make your resolution, May I be a cakravartti 
king in a next existence, " Samyutta, iv. 303. 

* "ja cedanandavijnanam matuhkuksim ndvakrameta, na tat kalalam kalalatvaya 
sannivartteta" M. V, 552. Compare Caraka, $drtra, ill. 5-8, where he speaks of a 
"upapaduka sattva" which connects the soul with body and by the absence of which 
the character is changed, the senses become affected and life ceases, when it is in a 
pure condition one can remember even the previous births ; character, purity, antipathy, 
memory, fear, energy, all mental qualities are produced out of it. Just as a chariot is 
made by the combination of many elements, so is the foetus. 

8 Madhyamaka vrtti (B.T. S. 102-203). Poussin quotes from Dtgka t n. 63, "si le 
vijnana ne descendait pas dans le sein maternel la namarupa s y constituerait-il ? " 
Govindananda on Sankara s commentary on the Brahma-sutras (n. ii. 19) says that the 
first consciousness (vijfiana) of the foetus is produced by the samskaras of the previous 
birth, and from that the four elements (which he calls nama) and from that the white 
and red, semen and ovum, and the first stage of the foetus (kalala-budbudavastha) is 
produced. 



92 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

rupa, sadayatana, sparSa, vedana, trsna, upadana and the bhava 
(leading to another life) of the present actual life. This bhava 
produces the jati and jaramarana of the next life 1 . 

It is interesting to note that these twelve links in the chain 
extending in three sections over three lives are all but the 
manifestations of sorrow to the bringing in of which they natur 
ally determine one another. Thus Abhidhammatthasangaha 
says " each of these twelve terms is a factor. For the composite 
term sorrow, etc. is only meant to show incidental consequences 
of birth. Again when ignorance and the actions of the 
mind have been taken into account, craving (trmd\ grasping 
(updddnd) and (karma) becoming (bhava} are implicitly ac 
counted for also. In the same manner when craving, grasping 
and (karma ) becoming have been taken into account, ignorance 
and the actions of the mind are (implicitly) accounted for, also ; 
and when birth, decay, and death are taken into account, even 
the fivefold fruit, to wit (rebirth), consciousness, and the rest are 
accounted for. And thus : 

Five causes in the Past and Now a fivefold fruit. 

Five causes Now and yet to come a fivefold fruit make up 
the Twenty Modes, the Three Connections (i. sahkhara and 
viftnana, 2. vedana and tanha, 3. bhava and jati) and the four 
groups (one causal group in the Past, one resultant group in the 
Present, one causal group in the Present and one resultant 
group in the Future, each group consisting of five modes) 2 ." 

These twelve interdependent links (dvddasahgd) represent 
the paticcasamuppada {pratityasamutpdda) doctrines (dependent 
origination) 3 which are themselves but sorrow and lead to cycles 
of sorrow. The term paticcasamuppada or pratltyasamutpada 
has been differently interpreted in later Buddhist literature 4 . 

1 This explanation probably cannot be found in the early Pali texts ; but Buddha- 
ghosa mentions it in Sumangalavilasini on Mahanidana suttanta. We find it also in 
Abhidhammatthasangaha, vin. 3. Ignorance and the actions of the mind belong to 
the past; "birth," "decay and death" to the future; the intermediate eight to the 
present. It is styled as trikandaka (having three branches) in Abhidharmakoia, in. 
20-14. Two in the past branch, two in the future and eight in the middle "sa 
pratityasamutpado dvadajangastrikandakah purvaparantayordve dve madhyestau." 

2 Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids translation of Abhidhammatthasangaha, pp. 189-190. 

3 The twelve links are not always constant. Thus in the list given in the Dialogues 
of the Buddha, n. 23 f., avijja and sankhara have been omitted and the start has been 
made with consciousness, and it has been said that "Cognition turns back from name 
and form ; it goes not beyond." 

4 M. V. p. 5 f. 



v] Avijja in Paticcasamuppada 93 

Samutpada means appearance or arising (prddurbhdva) and pra- 
titya means after getting (prati+i+ya)\ combining the two we 
find, arising after getting (something). The elements, depending 
on which there is some kind of arising, are called hetu (cause) and 
paccaya (ground). These two words however are often used in 
the same sense and are interchangeable. But paccaya is also 
used in a specific sense. Thus when it is said that avijja is the 
paccaya of sarikhara it is meant that avijja is the ground (thiti) 
of the origin of the sarikharas, is the ground of their movement, 
of the instrument through which they stand (nimittatthiti\ of 
their ayuhana (conglomeration), of their interconnection, of their 
intelligibility, of their conjoint arising, of their function as cause 
and of their function as the ground with reference to those which 
are determined by them. Avijja in all these nine ways is 
the ground of sarikhara both in the past and also in the future, 
thoug a avijja itself is determined in its turn by other grounds 1 . 
When we take the hetu aspect of the causal chain, we cannot 
think of anything else but succession, but when we take the 
paccaya aspect we can have a better vision into the nature of the 
cause as ground. Thus when avijja is said to be the ground 
of the sarikharas in the nine ways mentioned above, it seems 
reasonable to think that the sarikharas were in some sense 
regarded as special manifestations of avijja 8 . But as this point 
was not further developed in the early Buddhist texts it would 
be unwise to proceed further with it. 

The Khandhas.^ 

The word khandha (Skr. skandha) means the trunk of a tree 
and is generally used to mean group or aggregate*. We have 
seen that Buddha said that there was no atman (soul). He said 
that when people held that they found the much spoken of soul, 
they really only found the five khandhas together or any one of 
them. The khandhas are aggregates of bodily and psychical 
states which are immediate with us and are divided into five 

1 See Patisambhiddmagga, vol. I. p. 50 ; see also Majjhima Nikaya, I. 67, san- 

khara...avijjanidana avijjasamudaya avijjajatikd avijjapabhava. 

2 In the Yoga derivation of asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dvesa (antipathy) 
and abhinivesa (self love) from avidya we find also that all the five are regarded as the 
five special stages of the growth of avidya (pancaparva avidya}. 

3 The word skandha is used in Chandogya, n. 23 (trayo dharmaskandhdh yajnah 
adhyayanam ddnam) in the sense of branches and in almost the same sense in Maitri, 



94 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

classes: (i) rupa (four elements, the body, the senses), sense 
data, etc., (2) vedana (feeling pleasurable, painful and in 
different), (3) saflna (conceptual knowledge), (4) saiikhara (syn 
thetic mental states and the synthetic functioning of compound 
sense-affections, compound feelings and compound concepts), 
(5) vinnana (consciousness) 1 . 

All these states rise depending one upon the other (paticca- 
samuppannd) and when a man says that he perceives the self he 
only deludes himself, for he only perceives one or more of these. 
The word rupa in rupakhandha stands for matter and material 
qualities, the senses, and the sense data 2 . But " rupa " is also 
used in the sense of pure organic affections or states of mind 
as we find in the Khandha Yamaka, I. p. 16, and also in Sam- 
yutta Nikdya, III. 86. Rupaskandha according to Dharma- 
samgraha means the aggregate of five senses, the five sensations, 
and the implicatory communications associated in sense per 
ceptions (vijnapti). 

The elaborate discussion of Dhammasangani begins by defin 
ing rupa as " cattdro ca mahdbhiitd catunnanca mahdbhutdnam 
updddya rupam" (the four mahabhutas or elements and that 
proceeding from the grasping of that is called rupa) 3 . Buddha- 
ghosa explains it by saying that rupa means the four maha 
bhutas and those which arise depending (nissdyd) on them as 
a modification of them. In the rupa the six senses including 
their affections are also included. In explaining why the four 
elements are called mahabhutas, Buddhaghosa says : "Just as a 
magician (mdydkdrd) makes the water which is not hard appear 
as hard, makes the stone which is not gold appear as gold ; 
just as he himself though not a ghost nor a bird makes himself 
appear as a ghost or a bird, so these elements though not them 
selves blue make themselves appear as blue (nllam upddd rupam), 
not yellow, red, or white make themselves appear as yellow, red 
or white (pddtam updddrilpani), so on account of their similarity 
to the appearances created by the magician they are called 
mahabhuta 4 ." 

In the Samyutta Nikdya we find that the Buddha says, "O 
Bhikkhus it is called rupam because it manifests (rupyati}\ how 

1 Samyutta Nikaya, ill. 86, etc. 

2 Abhidhammatthasangaha, J. P. T. S. 1884, p. 27 ff. 

3 Dhammasangani, pp. 124-179. 4 Atthasalini, p. 299. 



v] Theory of Matter 95 

does it manifest? It manifests as cold, and as heat, as hunger and 
as thirst, it manifests as the touch of gnats, mosquitos, wind, the 
sun and the snake; it manifests, therefore it is called rupa 1 ." 

If we take the somewhat conflicting passages referred to above 
for our consideration and try to combine them so as to understand 
what is meant by rupa, I think we find that that which mani 
fested itself to the senses and organs was called rupa No dis 
tinction seems to have been made between the sense-data as 
colours, smells, etc., as existing in the physical world and their 
appearance as sensations. They were only numerically different 
and the appearance of the sensations was dependent upon the 
sense-data and the senses but the sense-data and the sensations 
were " rupa." Under certain conditions the sense-data were fol 
lowed by the sensations. Buddhism did not probably start with 
the same kind of division of matter and mind as we now do. 
And it may not be out of place to mention that such an opposi 
tion and duality were found neither in the Upanisads nor in the 
Samkhya system which is regarded by some as pre-Buddhistic. 
The four elements manifested themselves in certain forms and 
were therefore called rupa ; the forms of affection that appeared 
were also called rupa ; many other mental states or features 
which appeared with them were also called rupa 2 . The ayatanas 
or the senses were also called rupa*. The mahabhutas or four 
elements were themselves but changing manifestations, and they 
together with all that appeared in association with them were 
called rupa and formed the rupa khandha (the classes of sense- 
materials, sense-data, senses and sensations). 

In Samyutta Nikdya (ill. 101) it is said that "the four 
mahabhutas were the hetu and the paccaya for the communica 
tion of the rupakkhandha (rupakkhandhassa panndpandya). Con 
tact (sense-contact, phassa) is the cause of the communication of 
feelings (vedana) ; sense-contact was also the hetu and paccaya 
for the communication of the sanftakkhandha ; sense-contact is 
also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the sahkhara- 
kkhandha. But namarOpa is the hetu and the paccaya for the 
communication of the viftnanakkhandha." Thus not only feelings 
arise on account of the sense-contact but saftfia and sarikhara 
also arise therefrom. Sanna is that where specific knowing or 

1 Samyutta Nikaya, III. 86. 2 Khandhayamaka. 

3 Dhammasangani, p. 124 ff. 



g6 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

conceiving takes place. This is the stage where the specific dis 
tinctive knowledge as the yellow or the red takes place. 

Mrs Rhys Davids writing on saftfta says: "In editing the 
second book of the Abhidhamma pitaka I found a classification 
distinguishing between sanfta as cognitive assimilation on occasion 
of sense, and sanfta as cognitive assimilation of ideas by way of 
naming. The former is called perception of resistance, or opposi 
tion (patigha-safina). This, writes Buddhaghosa, is perception on 
occasion of sight, hearing, etc., when consciousness is aware of the 
impact of impressions ; of external things as different, we might 
say. The latter is called perception of the equivalent word or 
name (adhivackdnd-sannd) and is exercised by the sensus com- 
munis (mano), when e.g. one is seated... and asks another who 
is thoughtful : "What are you thinking of?" one perceives through 
his speech. Thus there are two stages of saftfia-consciousness, 
i. contemplating sense-impressions, 2. ability to know what they 
are by naming 1 ." 

About saiikhara we read in Samyutta Nikdya (ill. 87) that it 
is called sankhara because it synthesises (abhisankharonti), it is 
that which conglomerated rupa as rupa, conglomerated sanfta 
as saftna, sankhara as sankhara and consciousness (vinndnd) 
as consciousness. It is called sankhara because it synthesises 
the conglomerated (sankhatam abhisankharonti). It is thus a 
synthetic function which synthesises the passive rupa, saftna, 
sankhara and viftftana elements. The fact that we hear of 52 
sankhara states and also that the saiikhara exercises its syn 
thetic activity on the conglomerated elements in it, goes to show 
that probably the word sankhara is used in two senses, as mental 
states and as synthetic activity. 

Viftftana or consciousness meant according to Buddhaghosa, 
as we have already seen in the previous section, both the stage 
at which the intellectual process started and also the final 
resulting consciousness. 

Buddhaghosa in explainingthe process of Buddhist psychology 
says that "consciousness (citta) first comes into touch (phassa) with 
its object (arammana) and thereafter feeling, conception (sanna) 
and volition (cetana) come in. This contact is like the pillars of 
a palace, and the rest are but the superstructure built upon it 
(dabbasambhdrasadisd). But it should not be thought that contact 

1 Buddhist Psychology, pp. 49, 50. 



v] Theory of Sense-contact 97 

is the beginning of the psychological processes, for in one whole 
consciousness (ekacittasmim) it cannot be said that this comes 
first and that comes after, so we can take contact in association 
with feeling (vedand), conceiving (sanna) or volition (cetana); 
it is itself an immaterial state but yet since it comprehends 
objects it is called contact." "There is no impinging on one side 
of the object (as in physical contact), nevertheless contact causes 
consciousness and object to be in collision, as visible object and 
visual organs, sound and hearing; thus impact is Its function; or 
it has impact as its essential property in the sense of attainment, 
owing to the impact of the physical basis with the mental object. 
For it is said in the Commentary: "contact in the four planes of 
existence is never without the characteristic of touch with the 
object; but the function of impact takes place in the five doors. 
For to sense, or five-door contact, is given the name having the 
characteristic of touch as well as having the function of impact. 
But to contact in the mind-door there is only the characteristic 
of touch, but not the function of impact. And then this Sutta is 
quoted As if, sire, two rams were to fight, one ram to represent 
the eye, the second the visible object, and their collision contact. 
And as if, sire, two cymbals were to strike against each other, or 
two hands were to clap against each other, one hand would 
represent the eye, the second the visible object and their collision 
contact. Thus contact has the characteristic of touch and the 
function of impact 1 . Contact is the manifestation of the union 
of the three (the object, the consciousness and the sense) and its 
effect is feeling (vedana)\ though it is generated by the objects 
it is felt in the consciousness and its chief feature is experiencing 
(anubhavd) the taste of the object. As regards enjoying the 
taste of an object, the remaining associated states enjoy it only 
partially. Of contact there is (the function of) the mere touching, 
of perception the mere noting or perceiving, of volition the mere 
coordinating, of consciousness the mere cognizing. But feeling 
alone, through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the taste 
of an object. For feeling is like the king, the remaining states 
are like the cook. As the cook, when he has prepared food of 
diverse tastes, puts it in a basket, seals it, takes it to the king, 
breaks the seal, opens the basket, takes the best of all the soup 
and curries, puts them in a dish, swallows (a portion) to find out 

1 Atthasalini, p. 108; translation, pp. 143-144. 
D. 7 



98 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

whether they are faulty or not and afterwards offers the food of 
various excellent tastes to the king, and the king, being lord, 
expert, and master, eats whatever he likes, even so the mere tasting 
of the food by the cook is like the partial enjoyment of the object 
by the remaining states, and as the cook tastes a portion of the 
food, so the remaining states enjoy a portion of the object, and 
as the king, being lord, expert and master, eats the meal according 
to his pleasure so feeling being lord expert, and master, enjoys 
the taste of the object and therefore it is said that enjoyment or 
experience is its function 1 ." 

The special feature of sanna is said to be the recognizing 
(paccabhinna) by means of a sign (abhinndnend). According to 
another explanation, a recognition takes place by the inclusion 
of the totality (of aspects) sabbasahgahikavasena. The work of 
volition (cetand} is said to be coordination or binding together 
(abhisandahand), "Volition is exceedingly energetic and makes 
a double effort, a double exertion. Hence the Ancients said 
Volition is like the nature of a landowner, a cultivator who taking 
fifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He was 
exceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous ; he doubled his 
strength and said "Take your sickles" and so forth, pointed out 
the portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers, 
etc., and took an equal share of the work. The simile should be 
thus applied: volition is like the cultivator, the fifty-five moral 
states which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-five 
strong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effort 
by the cultivator is the doubled strength, doubled effort of 
volition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts 8 ." It 
seems that probably the active side operating in sarikhara was 
separately designated as cetana (volition). 

"When one says I, what he does is that he refers either to 
all the khandhas combined or any one of them and deludes him 
self that that was I. Just as one could not say that the 
fragrance of the lotus belonged to the petals, the colour or the 
pollen, so one could not say that the rupa was I or that the 
vedana was I or any of the other khandhas was I. There is 
nowhere to be found in the khandhas I am 3 ." 

1 Atthasalinl, pp. 109-110; translation, pp. 145-146. 

2 Ibid. p. in ; translation, pp. 147-148. 

3 Samyutta Nikaya, III. 130. 



v] Ignorance 99 

Avijja and Asava. 

As to the question how the avijja (ignorance) first started 
there can be no answer, for we could never say that either 
ignorance or desire for existence ever has any beginning 1 . Its 
fruition is seen in the cycle of existence and the sorrow that comes 
in its train, and it comes and goes with them all. Thus as we 
can never say that it has any beginning, it determines the elements 
which bring about cycles of existence and is itself determined by 
certain others. This mutual determination can only take place 
in and through the changing series of dependent phenomena, for 
there is nothing which can be said to have any absolute priority 
in time or stability. It is said that it is through the coming into 
being of the asavas or depravities that the avijja came into 
being, and that through the destruction of the depravities (asava) 
the avijja was- destroyed 2 . These asavas are classified in the 
Dhammasangani as kamasava, bhavasava, ditthasava and avij- 
jasava. Kamasava means desire, attachment, pleasure, and thirst 
after the qualities associated with the senses; bhavasava means 
desire, attachment and will for existence or birth; ditthasava 
means the holding of heretical views, such as, the world is eternal 
or non-eternal, or that the world will come to an end or will not 
come to an end, or that the body and the soul are one or are 
different; avijjasava means the ignorance of sorrow, its cause, its 
extinction and its means of extinction. Dhammasangani adds 
four more supplementary ones, viz. ignorance about the nature of 
anterior mental khandhas, posterior mental khandhas, anterior 
and posterior together, and their mutual dependence 8 . Kamasava 
and bhavasava can as Buddhaghosa says be counted as one, for 
they are both but depravities due to attachment 4 . 

1 Warren s Buddhism in Translations (Visuddhimagga, chap, xvn.), p. 175. 

2 M. N. i. p. 54. Childers translates "asava" as "depravities" and Mrs Rhys 
Davids as " intoxicants." The word "asava" in Skr. means " old wine." It is derived 
from "su" to produce by Buddhaghosa and the meaning that he gives to it is "cira 
parivasikatthena" (on account of its being stored up for a long time like wine). They 
work through the eye and the mind and continue to produce all beings up to Indra. 
As those wines which are kept long are called "asavas" so these are also called 
asavas for remaining a long time. The other alternative that Buddhaghosa gives is 
that they are called asava on account of their producing samsaradukkha (sorrows of 
the world), Atthasalini, p. 48. Contrast it with Jaina asrava (flowing in of karma 
matter). Finding it difficult to translate it in one word after Buddhaghosa, I have 
translated it as "depravities," after Childers. 

3 See Dhammasangani, p. 195. 4 Buddhaghosa s Atthasdltni, p. 371. 

72 



ioo Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

The ditthasavas by clouding the mind with false metaphysical 
views stand in the way of one s adopting the true Buddhistic doc 
trines. The kamasavas stand in the way of one s entering into 
the way of Nirvana (andgdmimagga} and the bhavasavas and 
avijjasavas stand in the way of one s attaining arhattva or final 
emancipation. When the Majjhima Nikdya says that from the 
rise of the asavas avijja rises, it evidently counts avijja there as 
in some sense separate from the other asavas, such as those of 
attachment and desire of existence which veil the true know 
ledge about sorrow. 

The afflictions (kilesas} do not differ much from the asavas 
for they are but the specific passions in forms ordinarily familiar 
to us, such as covetousness (lob/ia), anger or hatred (dosa), 
infatuation (moha), arrogance, pride or vanity (mdna), heresy 
(ditthi), doubt or uncertainty (vicikicchd), idleness (thina), boast- 
fulness (udhacca\ shamelessness (ahirikd) and hardness of heart 
(anottapd); these kilesas proceed directly as a result of the asavas. 
In spite of these varieties they are often counted as three (lobha, 
dosa, moha) and these together are called kilesa. They are 
associated with the vedanakkhandha, safifiakkhandha, sarikharak- 
khandha and viftnanakkhandha. From these arise the three kinds 
of actions, of speech, of body, and of mind 1 . 

Sila and Samadhi. 

We are intertwined all through outside and inside by the 
tangles of desire (tanhd jatd), and the only way by which these 
may be loosened is by the practice of right discipline (slid), con 
centration (samddhi) and wisdom (panna). Sila briefly means 
the desisting from committing all sinful deeds (sabbapdpassa 
akaranam). With slla therefore the first start has to be made, 
for by it one ceases to do all actions prompted by bad desires 
and thereby removes the inrush of dangers and disturbances. 
This serves to remove the kilesas, and therefore the proper per 
formance of the slla would lead one to the first two successive 
stages of sainthood, viz. the sotapannabhava (the stage in which 
one is put in the right current) and the sakadagamibhava (the 
stage when one has only one more birth to undergo). Samadhi 
is a more advanced effort, for by it all the old roots of the old 
kilesas are destroyed and the tanha or desire is removed and 

1 Dhammasahgani) p. 180. 



v] Right Conduct 101 

by it one is led to the more advanced states of a saint. It 
directly brings in panna (true wisdom) and by paftfia the saint 
achieves final emancipation and becomes what is called an 
arhat 1 . Wisdom {panna) is right knowledge about the four 
ariya saccas, viz. sorrow, its cause, its destruction and its cause 
of destruction. 

Slla means those particular volitions and mental states, etc. 
by which a man who desists from committing sinful actions 
maintains himself on the right path. Slla thus means i. right 
volition (cetana), 2. the associated mental states (cetasika\ 
3. mental control (samvara) and 4. the actual non-transgression 
(in body and speech) of the course of conduct already in the mind 
by the preceding three silas called avitikkama. Samvara is 
spoken of as being of five kinds. I. Patimokkhasamvara (the 
control which saves him who abides by it), 2. Satisamvara (the 
control of mindfulness), 3. Nanasamvara (the control of know 
ledge), 4. Khantisamvara (the control of patience), 5. Viriya- 
samvara (the control of active self-restraint). Patimokkha 
samvara means all self-control in general. Satisamvara means 
the mindfulness by which one can bring in the right and good 
associations when using one s cognitive senses. Even when 
looking at any tempting object he will by virtue of his mindful- 
ness (sati) control himself from being tempted by avoiding to 
think of its tempting side and by thinking on such aspects of it 
as may lead in the right direction. Khantisamvara is that by 
which one can remain unperturbed in heat and cold. By the 
proper adherence to slla all our bodily, mental and vocal activities 
(kamma) are duly systematized, organized, stabilized (samddhd- 
nam, upadhdranam, patittha)*. 

The sage who adopts the full course should also follow a 
number of healthy monastic rules with reference to dress, sitting, 
dining, etc., which are called the dhutahgas or pure disciplinary 
parts 8 . The practice of slla and the dhutaiigas help the sage to 
adopt the course of samadhi. Samadhi as we have seen means 
the concentration of the mind bent on right endeavours (kusala- 
cittekaggatd samddhih) together with its states upon one parti 
cular object (ekdrammana) so that they may completely cease to 
shift and change (sammd ca avikkhipamdndy. 

1 Visuddhimagga Niddnddikathd. 8 Visuddhimagga-silaniddeso, pp. 7 and 8. 

3 Visuddhimajga, n. * Visuddhimagga, pp. 84-85. 



IO2 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

The man who has practised slla must train his mind first 
in particular ways, so that it may be possible for him to acquire 
the chief concentration of meditation called jhana (fixed and 
steady meditation). These preliminary endeavours of the mind 
for the acquirement of jhanasamadhi eventually lead to it 
and are called upacara samadhi (preliminary samadhi) as dis 
tinguished from the jhanasamadhi called the appanasamadhi 
(achieved samadhi) 1 , Thus as a preparatory measure, firstly he 
has to train his mind continually to view with disgust the appe 
titive desires for eating and drinking (ahare pa(ikkulasafina) by 
emphasizing in the mind the various troubles that are associated 
in seeking food and drink and their ultimate loathsome trans 
formations as various nauseating bodily elements. When a man 
continually habituates himself to emphasize the disgusting 
associations of food and drink, he ceases to have any attach 
ment to them and simply takes them as an unavoidable evil, 
only awaiting the day when the final dissolution of all sorrows 
will come 8 . Secondly he has to habituate his mind to the idea 
that all the parts of our body are made up of the four elements, 
ksiti (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire) and wind (air), like the carcase 
of a cow at the butcher s shop. This is technically called catu- 
dhatuvavatthanabhavana (the meditation of the body as being 
made up of the four elements) 3 . Thirdly he has to habituate his 
mind to think again and again (anussati} about the virtues or 
greatness of the Buddha, the sarigha (the monks following the 
Buddha), the gods and the law (dhammd) of the Buddha, about 
the good effects of slla, and the making of gifts (cdgdnussati), 
about the nature of death (marandnussati) and about the deep 
nature and qualities of the final extinction of all phenomena 
(upasamanussati} 4 . 

1 As it is not possible for me to enter into details, I follow what appears to me to 
be the main line of division showing the interconnection of jhana (Skr. dhvana] vith 
its accessory stages called parikammas (Visuddhimagga, pp. 85 f.). 

2 Visuddhimagga, pp. 341-347; mark the intense pessimistic attitude, " 1 mart, ca 
pana ahare patikulasaftflam anuyitttassa bhikkhuno rasatanhaya cittam patiliyati, 
patikuttati, pativattati ; so, kantdranittharanatthiko viya piittamamsam vigatamado 
aharam ahareti yavadeva dukkhassa nittharanatthdya" p. 347. The mind of him who 
inspires himself with this supreme disgust to all food, becomes free from all desires for 
palatable tastes, and turns its back to them and flies off from them. As a means of 
getting rid of all sorrow he takes his food without any attachment as one would eat 
the flesh of his own son to sustain himself in crossing a forest. 

* Visuddhimagga, pp. 347-370. * Visuddhimagga, pp. 197-794. 



v] Meditation \ 03 

Advancing further from the preliminary meditations or pre 
parations called the upacara samadhi we come to those other 
sources of concentration and meditation called the appanasamadhi 
which directly lead to the achievement of the highest samadhi. 
The processes of purification and strengthening of the mind 
continue in this stage also, but these represent the last attempts 
which lead the mind to its final goal Nibbana. In the first part 
of this stage the sage has to go to the cremation grounds and 
notice the diverse horrifying changes of the human carcases and 
think how nauseating, loathsome, unsightly and impure they are, 
and from this he will turn his mind to the living human bodies 
and convince himself that they being in essence the same as the 
dead carcases are as loathsome as they 1 . This is called asubhakam- 
matthana or the endeavour to perceive the impurity of our bodies. 
He should think of the anatomical parts and constituents of the 
body as well as their processes, and this will help him to enter 
into the first jhana by leading his mind away from his body. 
This is called the kayagatasati or the continual mindfulness 
about the nature of the body 2 . As an aid to concentration the 
sage should sit in a quiet place and fix his mind on the inhaling 
(passdsa) and the exhaling (dssdsa) of his breath, so that instead 
of breathing in a more or less unconscious manner he may be 
aware whether he is breathing quickly or slowly; he ought to 
mark it definitely by counting numbers, so that by fixing his 
mind on the numbers counted he may fix his mind on the whole 
process of inhalation and exhalation in all stages of its course. 
This is called the anapanasati or the mindfulness of inhalation 
and exhalation 3 . 

Next to this we come to Brahmavihara, the fourfold medi 
tation of metta (universal friendship), karuna (universal pity), 
mudita (happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all) and 
upekkha (indifference to any kind of preferment of oneself, his 
friend, enemy or a third party). In order to habituate oneself to 
the meditation on universal friendship, one should start with think 
ing how he should himself like to root out all misery and become 
happy, how he should himself like to avoid death and live cheer 
fully, and then pass over to the idea that other beings would also 
have the same desires. He should thus habituate himself to think 
that his friends, his enemies, and all those with whom he is -ot 

1 Vmiddhimagga, VI. 2 Ibid. pp. 239-266. 3 Ibid. pp. 266-192. 



IO4 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

connected might all live and become happy. He should fix himself 
to such an extent in this meditation that he would not find any 
difference between the happiness or safety of himself and of others. 
He should never become angry with any person. Should he at any 
time feel himself offended on account of the injuries inflicted on 
him by his enemies, he should think of the futility of doubling 
his sadness by becoming sorry or vexed on that account. He 
should think that if he should allow himself to be affected by 
anger, he would spoil all his sila which he was so carefully prac 
tising. If anyone has done a vile action by inflicting injury, 
should he himself also do the same by being angry at it ? If he 
were finding fault with others for being angry, could he himself 
indulge in anger? Moreover he should think that all the dhammas 
are momentary (khanikatta) ; that there no longer existed the 
khandhas which had inflicted the injury, and moreover the inflic 
tion of any injury being only a joint product, the man who was 
injured was himself an indispensable element in the production 
of the infliction as much as the man who inflicted the injury, and 
there could not thus be any special reason for making him re 
sponsible and of being angry with him. If even after thinking 
in this way the anger does not subside, he should think that by 
indulging in anger he could only bring mischief on himself through 
his bad deeds, and he should further think that the other man 
by being angry was only producing mischief to himself but not 
to him. By thinking in these ways the sage would be able to 
free his mind from anger against his enemies and establish him 
self in an attitude of universal friendship 1 . This is called the 
metta-bhavana. In the meditation of universal pity (karuna) 
also one should sympathize with the sorrows of his friends and 
foes alike. The sage being more keen-sighted will feel pity for 
those who are apparently leading a happy life, but are neither 
acquiring merits nor endeavouring to proceed on the way to 
Nibbana, for they are to suffer innumerable lives of sorrow 2 . 

We next come to the jhanas with the help of material things 
as objects of concentration called the Kasinam. These objects of 
concentration may either be earth, water, fire, wind, blue colour, 
yellow colour, red colour, white colour, light or limited space 
(paricchinndkdsa). Thus the sage may take a brown ball of earth 
and concentrate his mind upon it as an earth ball, sometimes 

1 Visuddhimagga, pp. 295-314. 2 Ibid. pp. 314-315. 



v] Meditation 105 

with eyes open and sometimes with eyes shut. When he finds 
that even in shutting his eyes he can visualize the object in his 
mind, he may leave off the object and retire to another place to 
concentrate upon the image of the earth ball in his mind. 

In the first stages of the first meditation (pathamam jhdnani) 
the mind is concentrated on the object in the way of understanding 
it with its form and name and of comprehending it with its diverse 
relations. This state of concentration is called vitakka (discursive 
meditation). The next stage of the first meditation is that in 
which the mind does not move in the object in relational terms 
but becomes fixed and settled in it and penetrates into it without 
any quivering. This state is called vicara (steadily moving). The 
first stage vitakka has been compared in Buddhaghosa s Visud- 
dhimagga to the flying of a kite with its wings flapping, whereas 
the second stage is compared to its flying in a sweep without the 
least quiver of its wings. These two stages are associated with 
a buoyant exaltation (/z7z)and a steady inward bliss called sukha 1 
instilling the mind. The formation of this first jhana roots out 
five ties of avijja, kamacchando (dallying with desires), vyapado 
(hatred), thlnamiddham (sloth and torpor), uddhaccakukkuccam 
(pride and restlessness), and vicikiccha (doubt). The five elements 
of which this jhana is constituted are vitakka, vicara, plti, sukham 
and ekaggata (one pointedness). 

When the sage masters the first jhana he finds it defective 
and wants to enter into the second meditation (dutiyam jhdnam), 
where there is neither any vitakka nor vicara of the first jhana, 
but the mind is in one unruffled state (ekodibhavam). It is a 
much steadier state and does not possess the movement which 
characterized the vitakka and the vicara stages of the first jhana 
and is therefore a very placid state (vitakka-vicdrakkhobha- 
virahena ativiya acalatd suppasannata ca). It is however associ 
ated with plti, sukha and ekaggata as the first jhana was. 

When the second jhana is mastered the sage becomes disin 
clined towards the enjoyment of the plti of that stage and becomes 
indifferent to them (upekkhako). A sage in this stage sees the 
objects but is neither pleased nor displeased. At this stage all 
the asavas of the sage become loosened (khtndsavd). Th 
enjoyment of sukha however still remains in the stage and th 

1 Where there is plti there is sukha, but where there is sukha there may not 
necessarily be piti. Visuddhimagga, p. 145. 



106 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

mind if not properly and carefully watched would like sometimes 
to turn back to the enjoyment of piti again. The two character 
istics of this jhana are sukha and ekaggata. It should however 
be noted that though there is the feeling of highest sukha here, 
the mind is not only not attached to it but is indifferent to it 
(atimadhurasukhe sukhapdramippatte pi tatiyajjhdne upekkhako, 
na tattha sukhdbhisangena dkaddhiyatiy . The earth ball (pathavi] 
is however still the object of the jhana. 

In the fourth or the last jhana both the sukha (happiness) and 
the dukkha (misery) vanish away and all the roots of attachment 
and antipathies are destroyed. This state is characterized by 
supreme and absolute indifference (upekkhd) which was slowly 
growing in all the various stages of the jhanas. The characteris 
tics of this jhana are therefore upekkha and ekaggata. With the 
mastery of this jhana comes final perfection and total extinction 
of the citta called cetovimutti, and the sage becomes thereby an 
arhat 2 . There is no further production of the khandhas,-no rebirth, 
and there is the absolute cessation of all sorrows and sufferings 
Nibbana. 

Kamma. 

In the Katha (II. 6) Yama says that "a fpol who is blinded 
with the infatuation of riches does not believe in a future life; he 
thinks that only this life exists and not any other, and thus he 
comes again and again within my grasp." In the Dlgha Nikaya 
also we read how Payasi was trying to give his reasons in support 
of his belief that "Neither is there any other world, nor are there 
beings, reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there fruit or 
result of deeds well done or ill done 3 ." Some of his arguments 
were that neither th vicious nor the virtuous return to tell us 
that they suffered or enjoyed happiness in the other world, that 
if the virtuous had a better life in store, and if they believed 
in it, they would certainly commit suicide in order to get it at 
the earliest opportunity, that in spite of taking the best precau 
tions we do not find at the time of the death of any person that 
his soul goes out, or that his body weighs less on account of 
the departure of his soul, and so on. Kassapa refutes his argu 
ments with apt illustrations. But in spite of a few agnostics of 

1 Visuddhimagga, p. 163. 

2 Majjhima Nikaya, I. p. 296, and Visuddhimagja, pp. 167-168. 

3 Dialogues of the Buddha, II. p. 349; D.N. II. pp. 317 ff. 



v] Deeds and Desires 107 

Payasi s type, we have every reason to believe that the doctrine 
of rebirth in other worlds and in this was often spoken of in the 
Upanisads and taken as an accepted fact by the Buddha. In 
the Milinda Panha, we find Nagasena saying " it is through a 
difference in their karma that men are not all alike, but some 
long lived, some short lived, some healthy and some sickly, some 
handsome and some ugly, some powerful and some weak, some 
rich and some poor, some of high degree and some of low 
degree, some wise and some foolish 1 ." We have seen in the 
third chapter that the same sort of views was enunciated by the 
Upanisad sages. 

But karma could produce its effect in this life or any 
other life only when there were covetousness, antipathy and in 
fatuation. But " when a man s deeds are performed without 
covetousness, arise without covetousness and are occasioned with 
out covetousness, then inasmuch as covetousness is gone these 
deeds are abandoned, uprooted, pulled out of the ground like a 
palmyra tree and become non-existent and not liable to spring 
up again in the future 2 ." Karma by itself without craving (tanha) 
is incapable of bearing good or bad fruits. Thus we read in the 
Mahdsatipatthana sutta, "even this craving, potent for rebirth, 
that is accompanied by lust and self-indulgence, seeking satis 
faction now here, now there, to wit, the craving for the life of 
sense, the craving for becoming (renewed life) and the craving 
for not becoming (for no new rebirth) 8 ." " Craving for things 
visible, craving for things audible, craving for things that may 
be smelt, tasted, touched, for things in memory recalled. These 
are the things in this world that are dear, that are pleasant. 
There does craving take its rise, there does it dwell 4 ." Pre-occu- 
pation and deliberation of sensual gratification giving rise to 
craving is the reason why sorrow comes. And this is the first 
arya satya (noble truth). 

The cessation of sorrow can only happen with "the utter 
cessation of and disenchantment about that very craving, giving 
it up, renouncing it and emancipation from it 8 ." 

When the desire or craving (tanhd) has once ceased the 
sage becomes an arhat, and the deeds that he may do after 
that will bear no fruit. An arhat cannot have any good or bad 

1 Warren s Buddhism in Translations, p. 215. 2 Ibid. pp. 216-217. 

3 Dialogues of the Buddha, II. p. 340. 4 Ibid. p. 341. 8 Ibid. p. 341. 



io8 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

fruits of whatever he does. For it is through desire that karma 
finds its scope of giving fruit. With the cessation of desire all 
ignorance, antipathy and grasping cease and consequently there 
is nothing which can determine rebirth. An arhat may suffer the 
effects of the deeds done by him in some previous birth just as 
Moggallana did, but in spite of the remnants of his past karma 
an arhat was an emancipated man on account of the cessation of 
his desire 1 . 

Kammas are said to be of three kinds, of body, speech and 
mind (kdyika, vacika and mdnasika). The root of this kamma 
is however volition (cetana) and the states associated with it 2 . If 
a man wishing to kill animals goes out into the forest in search of 
them, but cannot get any of them there even after a long search, 
his misconduct is not a bodily one, for he could not actually 
commit the deed with his body. So if he gives an order for com 
mitting a similar misdeed, and if it is not actually carried out 
with the body, it would be a misdeed by speech (vacika) and not 
by the body. But the merest bad thought or ill will alone whether 
carried into effect or not would be a kamma of the mind (mdna- 
sika)*. But the mental kamma must be present as the root of 
all bodily and vocal kammas, for if this is absent, as in the case 
of an arhat, there cannot be any kammas at all for him. 

Kammas are divided from the point of view of effects into 
four classes, viz. (i) those which are bad and produce impurity, 
(2) those which are good and productive of purity, (3) those 
which are partly good and partly bad and thus productive of 
both purity and impurity, (4) those which are neither good nor 
bad and productive neither of purity nor of impurity, but which 
contribute to the destruction of kammas 4 . 

Final extinction of sorrow (nibbdnd) takes place as the natural 
result of the destruction of desires. Scholars of Buddhism have 
tried to discover the meaning of this ultimate happening, and 
various interpretations have been offered. Professor De la Valle"e 
Poussin has pointed out that in the Pali texts Nibbana has 
sometimes been represented as a happy state, as pure annihila 
tion, as an inconceivable existence or as a changeless state 5 . 

1 See Kathavatlhu and Warren s Buddhism in Translations, pp. 111 ff. 

2 Atthasdlini) p. 88. * See Atthasalini, p. 90. 4 See Atthasalini, p. 89. 
6 Prof. De la Vallee Poussin s article in the E. K. E. on Nirvana. See also 

Cullavagga, ix. i. 4; Mrs Rhys Davids s Psalms of the early Buddhists, I. and n., 
Introduction, p. xxxvii; Digha, II. 15; Udana, vm. ; Samyutta, in. 109. 



v] Nibbana 1 09 

Mr Schrader, in discussing Nibbana in Pali Text Society Journal, 
1905, says that the Buddha held that those who sought to become 
identified after death with the soul of the world as infinite space 
(akasa) or consciousness (yiiindna) attained to a state in which 
they had a corresponding feeling of infiniteness without having 
really lost their individuality. This latter interpretation of 
Nibbana seems to me to be very new and quite against the spirit 
of the Buddhistic texts. It seems to me to be a hopeless task 
to explain Nibbana in terms of worldly experience, and there 
is no way in which we can better indicate it than by saying that 
it is a cessation of all sorrow; the stage at which all worldly 
experiences have ceased can hardly be described either as positive 
or negative. Whether we exist in some form eternally or do not 
exist is not a proper Buddhistic question, for it is a heresy to 
think of a Tathagata as existing eternally (sdsvatd) or not- 
existing (asdsvata) or whether he is existing as well as not 
existing or whether he is neither existing nor non-existing. Any 
one who seeks to discuss whether Nibbana is either a positive 
and eternal state or a mere state of non-existence or annihilation, 
takes a view which has been discarded in Buddhism as heretical. 
It is true that we in modern times are not satisfied with it, for 
we want to know what it all means. But it is not possible to 
give any answer since Buddhism regarded all these questions as 
illegitimate. 

Later Buddhistic writers like Nagarjuna and Candraklrtti 
took advantage of this attitude of early Buddhism and inter 
preted it as meaning the non-essential character of all existence. 
Nothing existed, and therefore any question regarding the exist 
ence or non-existence of anything would be meaningless. There 
is no difference between the wordly stage (samsdra) and Nibbana, 
for as all appearances are non-essential, they never existed during 
the samsara so that they could not be annihilated in Nibbana. 

Upanisads and Buddhism. 

The Upanisads had discovered that the true self was ananda 
(bliss) 1 . We could suppose that early Buddhism tacitly pre 
supposes some such idea. It was probably thought that if there was 
the self (atta) it must be bliss. The Upanisads had asserted that 
the st\f(dtman) was indestructible and eternal*. If we are allowed 
1 Tail. n. 5. 2 Brh. iv. 5. 14. Katha. v. 13. 



no Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

to make explicit what was implicit in early Buddhism we could 
conceive it as holding that if there was the self it must be bliss, 
because it was eternal. This causal connection has not indeed 
been anywhere definitely pronounced in the Upanisads, but he 
who carefully reads the Upanisads cannot but think that the 
reason why the Upanisads speak of the self as bliss is that it is 
eternal. But the converse statement that what was not eternal 
was sorrow does not appear to be emphasized clearly in the 
Upanisads. The important postulate of the Buddha is that that 
which is changing is sorrow, and whatever is sorrow is not self 1 . 
The point at which Buddhism parted from the Upanisads lies 
in the experiences of the self. The Upanisads doubtless con 
sidered that there were many experiences which we often iden 
tify with self, but which are impermanent. But the belief is 
found in the Upanisads that there was associated with these a 
permanent part as well, and that it was this permanent essence 
which was the true and unchangeable self, the blissful. They con 
sidered that this permanent self as pure bliss could not be defined 
as this, but could only be indicated as .not this, not this (neti 
netiy. But the early Pali scriptures hold that we could nowhere 
find out such a permanent essence, any constant self, in our 
changing experiences. All were but changing phenomena and 
therefore sorrow and therefore non-self, and what was non-self 
was not mine, neither I belonged to it, nor did it belong to me 
as my self 8 . 

The true self was with the Upanisads a matter of tran 
scendental experience as it were, for they said that it could not 
be described in terms of anything, but could only be pointed out 
as " there," behind all the changing mental categories. The 
Buddha looked into the mind and saw that it did not exist. But 
how was it that the existence of this self was so widely spoken 
of as demonstrated in experience ? To this the reply of the 
Buddha was that what people perceived there when they said 
that they perceived the self was but the mental experiences 
either individually or together. The ignorant ordinary man did 
not know the noble truths and was not trained in the way of wise 
men, and considered himself to be endowed with form (rupa) 
or found the forms in his self or the self in the forms. He 

1 Samyutta Nikdya, in. pp. 44-45 if. 

- See Brh. IV. iv. Chandogya, vin. 7-12. 3 Samyutta Nikaya, III. 45. 



v] Upanisads and Buddhism 1 1 1 

experienced the thought (of the moment) as it were the self or ex 
perienced himself as being endowed with thought, or the thought 
in the self or the self in the thought. It is these kinds of experi 
ences that he considered as the perception of the self 1 . 

The Upanisads did not try to establish any school of discipline 
or systematic thought. They revealed throughout the dawn of an 
experience of an immutable Reality as the self of man, as the only 
abiding truth behind all changes. But Buddhism holds that this 
immutable self of man is a delusion and a false knowledge. 
The first postulate of the system is that impermanence is sorrow. 
Ignorance about sorrow, ignorance about the way it originates, 
ignorance about the nature of the extinction of sorrow, and ignorf- 
ance about the means of bringing about this extinction represent 
the fourfold ignorance (avijj d) 2 . The avidya, which is equivalent 
to the Pali word avijja, occurs in the Upanisads also, but there! 
it means ignorance about the atman doctrine, and it is sometimes 
contrasted with vidya or true knowledge about the self (atmari)*. 
With the Upanisads the highest truth was the permanent self, 
the bliss, but with the Buddha there was nothing permanent; and 
all was change; and all change and impermanence was sorrow 4 . 
This is, then, the cardinal truth of Buddhism, and ignorance con 
cerning it in the above fourfold ways represented the fourfold 
ignorance which stood in the way of the right comprehension of 
the fourfold cardinal truths (ariya saccd) sorrow, cause of the 
origination of sorrow, extinction of sorrow, and the means thereto. 

There is no Brahman or supreme permanent reality and no 
self, and this ignorance does not belong to any ego or self as we 
may ordinarily be led to suppose. 

Thus it is said in the Visuddhimagga " inasmuch however 
as ignorance is empty of stability from being subject to a coming 
into existence and a disappearing from existence... and is empty 
of a self-determining Ego from being subject to dependence, 
...or in other words inasmuch as ignorance is not an Ego, and 
similarly with reference to Karma and the rest therefore is it 
to be understood of the wheel of existence that it is empty with 
a twelvefold emptiness 8 ." 

1 Samyutta Nikaya, III. 46. 2 Majjhima Nikdya, I. p. 54. 

3 Cha. i. i. 10. Brh. iv. 3. 20. i here are some passages where vidya and avidya 
have been used in a different and rather obscure sense, Is^i 9-1 r. 

4 Ang. Nikdya, in. 85. 

5 Warren s Budakism in Translations {Visuddhimagga, chap. xvn. ), p. 175. 



1 1 2 Buddhist Philosophy [CH, 

The Schools of Theravada Buddhism. 

There is reason to believe that the oral instructions of the 
Buddha were not collected until a few centuries after his death. 
Serious quarrels arose amongst his disciples or rather amongst 
the successive generations of the disciples of his disciples about 
his doctrines and other monastic rules which he had enjoined 
upon his followers. Thus we find that when the council of Vesali 
decided against the Vrjin monks, called also the Vajjiputtakas, 
they in their turn held another great meeting (Mahasarigha) and 
came to their own decisions about certain monastic rules and thus 
came to be called as the Mahasarighikas 1 . According to Vasu- 
mitra as translated by Vassilief, the Mahasarighikas seceded in 
400 B.C. and during the next one hundred years they gave rise 
first to the three schools Ekavyavaharikas, Lokottaravadins, and 
Kukkulikas and after that the Bahusrutlyas. In the course of the 
next one hundred years, other schools rose out of it namely the 
Prajfiaptivadins, Caittikas, Aparasailas and Uttarasailas. The 
Theravada or the Sthaviravada school which had convened the 
council of Vesali developed during the second and first century B.C. 
into a number of schools, viz. the Haimavatas, Dharmaguptikas, 
Mahlsasakas, Kasyaplyas, Sarikrantikas (more well known as 
Sautrantikas)andtheVatsiputtrIyas which latter was again split up 
into the Dharmottariyas, Bhadrayaniyas, Sammitlyas and Chan- 
nagarikas. The main branch of the Theravada school was from 
the second century downwards known as the Hetuvadins or 
Sarvastivadins 2 . The Mahdbodhivamsa identifies the Theravada 
school with the Vibhajjavadins. The commentator of the Kathd- 
vatthu who probably lived according to Mrs Rhys Davids some 
time in the fifth century A.D. mentions a few other schools of 
Buddhists. But of all these Buddhist schools we know very little. 
Vasumitra (100 A.D.) gives us some very meagre accounts of 

1 The Mahavamsa. differs from Dipa-vamsa in holding that the Vajjiputtakas did 
not develop into the Mahasanghikas, but it was the Mahasarighikas who first seceded 
while the Vajjiputtakas seceded independently of them. The Mahdbodhivamsa, which 
according to Professor Geiger was composed 975 A.D. IOOOA.D., follows the Maha 
vamsa in holding the Mahasanghikas to be the first seceders and Vajjiputtakas to have 
seceded independently. 

Vasumitra confuses the council of Vesali with the third council of Pataliputra. See 
introduction to translation of Kathavatthu by Mrs Rhys Davids. 

2 For other accounts of the schism see Mr Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids s translation 
of Kathavatthu, pp. xxxvi-xlv. 



v] Schools of Buddhism 113 

certain schools, of the Mahasarighikas, Lokottaravadins, Ekavya- 
vaharikas, Kukkulikas, Prajfiaptivadins and Sarvastivadins, but 
these accounts deal more with subsidiary matters of little philo 
sophical importance. Some of the points of interest are (i) that the 
Mahasarighikas were said to believe that the body was filled with 
mind (cittd) which was represented as sitting, (2) that the Prajfiap 
tivadins held that there was no agent in man, that there was no 
untimely death, for it was caused by the previous deeds of man, 
(3) that the Sarvastivadins believed that everything existed. From 
the discussions found in the Kathdvatthu also we may know the 
views of some of the schools on some points which are not always 
devoid of philosophical interest. But there is nothing to be found 
by which we can properly know the philosophy of these schools. It 
is quite possible however that these so-called schools of Buddhism 
were not so many different systems but only differed from one 
another on some points of dogma or practice which were con 
sidered as being of sufficient interest to them, but which to us now 
appear to be quite trifling. But as we do not know any of their 
literatures, it is better not to make any unwarrantable surmises. 
These schools are however not very important for a history of later 
Indian Philosophy, for none of them are even referred to in any 
of the systems of Hindu thought. The only schools of Buddhism 
with which other schools of philosophical thought came in direct 
contact, are the Sarvastivadins including the Sautrantikas and 
the Vaibhasikas, the Yogacara or the Vijfianavadins and the 
Madhyamikas or the unyavadins. We do not know which of the 
diverse smaller schools were taken up into these four great schools, 
the Sautrantika, Vaibhasika, Yogacara and the Madhyamika 
schools. But as these schools were most important in relation 
to the development of the different systems in Hindu thought, 
it is best that we should set ourselves to gather what we can 
about these systems of Buddhistic thought. 

When the Hindu writers refer to the Buddhist doctrine in 
general terms such as "the Buddhists say" without calling 
them the Vijflanavadins or the Yogacaras and the ^unyavadins, 
they often refer to the Sarvastivadins by which they mean 
both the Sautrantikas and the Vaibhasikas, ignoring the differ 
ence that exists between these two schools. It is well to 
mention that there is hardly any evidence to prove that the 
Hindu writers were acquainted with the Theravada doctrines 

D. 8 



H4 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

as expressed in the Pali works. The Vaibhasikas and the Sau 
trantikas have been more or less associated with each other. Thus 
the Abhidharmakosasdstra of Vasubandhu who was a Vaibhasika 
was commented upon by Yasomitra who was a Sautrantika. The 
difference between the Vaibhasikas and the Sautrantikas that 
attracted the notice of the Hindu writers was this, that the former 
believed that external objects were directly perceived, whereas 
the latter believed that the existence of the external objects could 
only be inferred from our diversified knowledge 1 . Gunaratna 
(fourteenth century A.D.) in his commentary Tarkarahasyadipikd 
QftSaddarsanasamuccaya says that the Vaibhasika was but another 
name of the Aryasammitlya school. According to Gunaratna the 
Vaibhasikas held that things existed for four moments, the 
moment of production, the moment of existence, the moment of 
decay and the moment of annihilation. It has been pointed out 
in Vasubandhu s Abhidharmakosa that the Vaibhasikas believed 
these to be four kinds of forces which by coming in combination 
with the permanent essence of an entity produced its imperma 
nent manifestations in life (see Prof. Stcherbatsky s translation 
of Yasomitra on Abhidharmakosa kdrikd, V. 25). The self called 
pudgala also possessed those characteristics. Knowledge was 
formless and was produced along with its object by the very 
same conditions (arthasahabhdsi ekasamdgryadhtnak). The Sau 
trantikas according to Gunaratna held that there was no soul but 
only the five skandhas. These skandhas transmigrated. The past, 
the future, annihilation, dependence on cause, akasa and pudgala 
are but names (samjndmdtram}, mere assertions (flrattjndmdtram), 
mere limitations (samvrtamdtram) and mere phenomena (vya- 
vaharamdtram). By pudgala they meant that which other people 
called eternal and all pervasive soul. External objects are never 
directly perceived but are only inferred as existing for explaining 
the diversity of knowledge. Definite cognitions are valid; all 
compounded things are momentary (ksanikdh sarvasamskdrd/i}. 

1 Madhavacarya s Sarvadarfanasamgraha, chapter n. Sastradipika, the discussions 
on Pratyaksa, Amalananda s commentary (on Bhamati} Vedantakalpataru, p. 286, 
vaibhasikasya bahyo rthah pratyaksah, sautrantikasya jftanagatakarcmaicitryen 
anumeyah." The nature of the inference of the Sautrantikas is shown thus by Amala- 
nanda (1247-1260 A.D.) "ye yasmin satyapi kddacitkdh te tadatiriktapeksah" (those 
(i.e. cognitions) which in spite ol certain unvaried conditions are of unaccounted 
diversity must depend on other things in addition to these, i.e. the external objects) 
Veddntakalpataru, p. 289. 



v] Schools of Buddhism 115 

The atoms of colour, taste, smell and touch, and cognition are 
being destroyed every moment. The meanings of words always 
imply the negations of all other things, excepting that which is 
intended to be signified by that word (anydpohah sabdarthah). 
Salvation (mok$a) comes as the result of the destruction of the 
process of knowledge through continual meditation that there 
is no soul 1 . 

One of the main differences between the Vibhajjavadins, Sau- 
trantikas and the Vaibhasikas or the Sarvastivadins appears to 
refer to the notion of time which is a subject of great interest 
with Buddhist philosophy. Thus Abhidharmakosa (v. 24...) 
describes the Sarvastivadins as those who maintain the universal 
existence of everything past, present and future. The Vibhajja 
vadins are those " who maintain that the present elements and 
those among the past that have not yet produced their fruition, 
are existent, but they deny the existence of the future ones and 
of those among the past that have already produced fruition." 
There were four branches of this school represented by Dhar- 
matrata, Ghosa, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Dharmatrata main 
tained that when an element enters different times, its existence 
changes but not its essence, just as when milk is changed into curd 
or a golden vessel is broken, the form of the existence changes 
though the essence remains the same. Ghosa held that " when 
an element appears at different times, the past one retains its 
past aspects without being severed from its future and present 
aspects, the present likewise retains its present aspect without 
completely losing its past and future aspects," just as a man in 
passionate love with a woman does not lose his capacity to love 
other women though he is not actually in love with them. Vasu 
mitra held that an entity is called present, past and future accord 
ing as it produces its efficiency, ceases to produce after having 
once produced it or has not yet begun to produce it. Buddha 
deva maintained the view that just as the same woman may 
be called mother, daughter, wife, so the same entity may be 
called present, past or future in accordance with its relation to the 
preceding or the succeeding moment. 

All these schools are in some sense Sarvastivadins, for they 
maintain universal existence. But the Vaibhasika finds them all 
defective excepting the view of Vasumitra. For Dharmatrata s 

1 Gunaratna s TarkarahasyadJpika, pp. 46-47. 

82 



u6 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

view is only a veiled Samkhya doctrine; that of Ghosa is a 
confusion of the notion of time, since it presupposes the co 
existence of all the aspects of an entity at the same time, and 
that of Buddhadeva is also an impossible situation, since it would 
suppose that all the three times were found together and included 
in one of them. The Vaibhasika finds himself in agreement 
with Vasumitra s view and holds that the difference in time 
depends upon the difference of the function of an entity ; at the 
time when an entity does not actually produce its function it is 
future; when it produces it, it becomes present; when after having 
produced it, it stops, it becomes past ; there is a real existence 
of the past and the future as much as of the present. He thinks 
that if the past did not exist and assert some efficiency it could 
not have been the object of my knowledge, and deeds done in 
past times could not have produced its effects in the present 
time. The Sautrantika however thought that the Vaibhasika s 
doctrine would imply the heretical doctrine of eternal existence, 
for according to them the stuff remained the same and the time- 
difference appeared in it. The true view according to him was, 
that there was no difference between the efficiency of an entity, 
the entity and the time of its appearance. Entities appeared 
from non-existence, existed for a moment and again ceased to 
exist. He objected to the Vaibhasika view that the past is to 
be regarded as existent because it exerts efficiency in bringing 
about the present on the ground that in that case there should 
be no difference between the past and the present, since both 
exerted efficiency. If a distinction is made between past, present 
and future efficiency by a second grade of efficiencies, then we 
should have to continue it and thus have a vicious infinite. We 
can know non-existent entities as much as we can know existent 
ones, and hence our knowledge of the past does not imply 
that the past is exerting any efficiency. If a distinction is 
made between an efficiency and an entity, then the reason why 
efficiency started at any particular time and ceased at another 
would be inexplicable. Once you admit that there is no dif 
ference between efficiency and the entity, you at once find that 
there is no time at all and the efficiency, the entity and the 
moment are all one and the same. When we remember a thing 
of the past we do not know it as existing in the past, but in the 
same way in which we knew it when it was present. We are 



v] Vasubandhu and the Vatsiputtriyas 117 

never attracted to past passions as the Vaibhasika suggests, but 
past passions leave residues which become the causes of new 
passions of the present moment 1 . 

Again we can have a glimpse of the respective positions of 
the Vatsiputtriyas and the Sarvastivadins as represented by 
Vasubandhu if we attend to the discussion on the subject of 
the existence of soul in Abhidharmakosa, The argument of 
Vasubandhu against the existence of soul is this, that though 
it is true that the sense organs may be regarded as a deter 
mining cause of perception, no such cause can be found which 
may render the inference of the existence of soul necessary. 
If soul actually exists, it must have an essence of its own and 
must be something different from the elements or entities of a 
personal life. Moreover, such an eternal, uncaused and un 
changing being would be without any practical efficiency (artha- 
kriydkdritva) which alone determines or proves existence. The 
soul can thus be said to have a mere nominal existence as a 
mere object of current usage. There is no soul, but there are 
only the elements of a personal life. But the Vatslputtrlya 
school held that just as fire could not be said to be either the 
same as the burning wood or as different from it, and yet it is 
separate from it, so the soul is an individual (pudgala) which has 
a separate existence, though we could not say that it was 
altogether different from the elements of a personal life or the 
same as these. It exists as being conditioned by the elements 
of personal life, but it cannot further be defined. But its existence 
cannot be denied, for wherever there is an activity, there must 
be an agent (e.g. Devadatta walks). To be conscious is likewise 
an action, hence the agent who is conscious must also exist. 
To this Vasubandhu replies that Devadatta (the name of a 
person) does not represent an unity. " It is only an unbroken 
continuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which 
simple people believe to be a unity and to which they give the 
name Devadatta. Their belief that Devadatta moves is con 
ditioned, and is based on an analogy with their own experience, 
but their own continuity of life consists in constantly moving 
from one place to another. This movement, though regarded as 

1 I am indebted for the above account to the unpublished translation from Tibetan 
of a small portion of Abhidharmakota by my esteemed friend Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky 
of Petrograd. I am grateful to him that he allowed me to utilize it. 



1 1 8 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

belonging to a permanent entity, is but a series of new produc 
tions in different places, just as the expressions fire moves, 
sound spreads have the meaning of continuities (of new pro 
ductions in new places). They likewise use the words Devadatta 
cognises in order to express the fact that a cognition (takes place 
in the present moment) which has a cause (in the former moments, 
these former moments coming in close succession being called 
Devadatta)." 

The problem of memory also does not bring any difficulty, 
for the stream of consciousness being one throughout, it produces 
its recollections when connected with a previous knowledge of 
the remembered object under certain conditions of attention, 
etc., and absence of distractive factors, such as bodily pains or 
violent emotions. No agent is required in the phenomena of 
memory. The cause of recollection is a suitable state of mind 
and nothing else. When the Buddha told his birth stories saying 
that he was such and such in such and such a life, he only 
meant that his past and his present belonged to one and the 
same lineage of momentary existences. Just as when we say 
" this same fire which had been consuming that has reached this 
object," we know that the fire is not identical at any two 
moments, but yet we overlook the difference and say that it is 
the same fire. Again, what we call an individual can only be 
known by descriptions such as " this venerable man, having this 
name, of such a caste, of such a family, of such an age, eating 
such food, finding pleasure or displeasure in such things, of such 
an age, the man who after a life of such length, will pass away 
having reached an age." Only so much description can be 
understood, but we have never a direct acquaintance with the 
individual ; all that is perceived are the momentary elements of 
sensations, images, feelings, etc., and these happening at the 
former moments exert a pressure on the later ones. The in 
dividual is thus only a fiction, a mere nominal existence, a mere 
thing of description and not of acquaintance ; it cannot be 
grasped either by the senses or by the action of pure intellect. 
This becomes evident when we judge it by analogies from other 
fields. Thus whenever we use any common noun, e.g. milk, we 
sometimes falsely think that there is such an entity as milk, but 
what really exists is only certain momentary colours, tastes, etc., 
fictitiously unified as milk; and "just as milk and water are 



v] Sabbatthivadins 119 

conventional names (for a set of independent elements) for some 
colour, smell (taste and touch) taken together, so is the designa 
tion individual but a common name for the different elements 
of which it is composed." 

The reason why the Buddha declined to decide the question 
whether the " living being is identical with the body or not " is 
just because there did not exist any living being as " individual," 
as is generally supposed. He did not declare that the living 
being did not exist, because in that case the questioner would 
have thought that the continuity of the elements of a life was 
also denied. In truth the " living being " is only a conventional 
name for a set of constantly changing elements 1 . 

The only book of the Sammitlyas known to us and that by 
name only is the Sammitlyasdstra translated into Chinese between 
350 A.D. to 431 A.D.; the original Sanskrit works are however 
probably lost 2 . 

The Vaibhasikas are identified with the Sarvastivadins who 
according to Dipavamsa V. 47, as pointed out by Takakusu, 
branched off from the Mahiasakas, who in their turn had 
separated from the Theravada school. 

From the Kathdvatthu we know (i) that the Sabbatthivadins 
believed that everything existed, (2) that the dawn of right attain 
ment was not a momentary flash of insight but by a gradual 
process, (3) that consciousness or even samadhi was nothing but 

1 This account is based on the translation of Aftamakofasthananibaddhah pudgala- 
viniscayah, a special appendix to the eighth chapter of Abhidharmakosa^ by Prof. Th. 
Stcherbatsky, Bulletin de FAcadtmie des Sciences defiusste, 1919. 

* Professor De la Vall6e Poussin has collected some of the points of this doctrine 
in an article on the Sammitiyas in the . R. E. He there says that in the Abhidhar- 
makoiavyakhya the Sammitiyas have been identified with the Vatsiputtriyas and that 
many of its texts were admitted by the Vaibhasikas of a later age. Some of their views 
are as follows: (i) An arhat in possession of nirvana can fall away; (i) there is an 
intermediate state between death and rebirth called antarabhava ; (3) merit accrues not 
only by gift (tyaganvaya) but also by the fact of the actual use and advantage reaped 
by the man to whom the th*ng was given (paribhog&nvaya puny a) ; (4) not only 
abstention from evil deeds but a declaration of intention to that end produces merit 
by itself alone ; (5) they believe in a pudgala (soul) as distinct from the skandhas from 
which it can be said to be either different or non-different. " The pudgala cannot be 
said to be transitory (anitya) like the skandhas since it transmigrates laying down 
the burden (skandhas) shouldering a new burden ; it cannot be said to be permanent, 
since it is made of transitory constituents." This pudgala doctrine of the Sammitiyas 
as sketched by Professor De la Valle e Poussin is not in full agreement with the 
pudgala doctrine of the Sammitiyas as sketched by Gunaratna which we have noticed 
above. 



1 20 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

a flux and (4) that an arhat (saint) may fall away 1 . The Sab- 
batthivadins or Sarvastivadins have a vast Abhidharma literature 
still existing in Chinese translations which is different from the 
Abhidharma of the Theravada school which we have already 
mentioned". These are I . Jndnaprasthdna Sdstra of Katyayanl- 
puttra which passed by the name of Mahd Vibhdsd from which 
the Sabbatthivadins who followed it are called Vaibhasikas 3 . This 
work is said to have been given a literary form by Asvaghosa. 
2. Dharmaskandlia by Sariputtra. 3. Dhdtukdya by Purna. 
4. Prajnaptisdstra by Maudgalyayana. 5. Vijndnakdya by De- 
vaksema. 6. Sangltiparyydya by Sariputtra and Prakaranapdda 
by Vasumitra. Vasubandhu (420 A.D. 500 A.D.) wrote a work on 
the Vaibhasika 4 system in verses (kdrikd) known as the Abhidhar- 
makosa, to which he appended a commentary of his own which 
passes by the name Abhidharma Kosabhdsya in which he pointed 
out some of the defects of the Vaibhasika school from the Sau 
trantika point of view 5 . This work was commented upon by 
Vasumitra and Gunamati and later on by Ya^omitra who was 
himself a Sautrantika and called his work Abhidharmakosa 
vydkhyd ; Sanghabhadra a contemporary of Vasubandhu wrote 
Samayapradipa and Nydydnusdra (Chinese translations of which 
are available) on strict Vaibhasika lines. We hear also of other 
Vaibhasika writers such as Dharmatrata, Ghosaka, Vasumitra 
and Bhadanta, the writer of Samyuktdbhidharmasdstra and Ma- 
hdvibhdsd. Dirinaga (480 A.D.), the celebrated logician, a Vaibhasika 
or a Sautrantika and reputed to be a pupil of Vasubandhu, wrote 
his famous work Pramdnasamuccaya in which he established 
Buddhist logic and refuted many of the views of Vatsyayana 
the celebrated commentator of the Nydya sutras; but we regret 

1 See Mrs Rhys Davids s translation Kath&vatthu, p. xix, and Sections I. 6, 7 ; 
ii. 9 and xi. 6. 

z Mahavyutpatti gives two names for Sarvastivada, viz. Mulasarvastivada and Ary- 
yasarvastivada. Itsing (671-695 A.D.) speaks of Aryyamulasarvastivada and Mulasar 
vastivada. In his time he found it prevailing in Magadha, Guzrat, Sind, S. India, 
E. India. Takakusu says (P. T.S. 1904-1905) that Paramartha, in his life of Vasu 
bandhu, says that it was propagated from Kashmere to Middle India by Vasubhadra, 
who studied it there. 

8 Takakusu says (P. T.S. 1904-1905) that Katyayaniputtra s work was probably 
a compilation from other Vibhasas which existed before the Chinese translations and 
Vibhisa texts dated 383 A.D. 

4 See Takak usu s article J.R. A.S. 1905. 

5 The Sautrantikas did not regard the Abhidharmas of the Vaibhasikas as authentic 
and laid stress on the suttanta doctrines as given in the Suttapitaka. 



v] Sabbatthivadins 1 2 1 

to say tnat none of the above works are available in Sanskrit, 
nor have they been retranslated from Chinese or Tibetan into 
any of the modern European or Indian languages. 

The Japanese scholar Mr Yamakami Sogen, late lecturer at 
Calcutta University, describes the doctrine of the Sabbatthivadins 
from the Chinese versions of the Abhidharmakosa, Mahdvibhd- 
sdsdstra, etc., rather elaborately 1 . The following is a short sketch, 
which is borrowed mainly from the accounts given by Mr Sogen. 

The Sabbatthivadins admitted the five skandhas, twelve 
ayatanas, eighteen dhatus, the three asamskrta dharmas of 
pratisamkhyanirodha apratisamkhyanirodha and akasa, and the 
samskrta dharmas (things composite and interdependent) of rupa 
(matter), citta (mind), caitta (mental) and cittaviprayukta (non- 
mental) 11 . All effects are produced by the coming together 
(samskrta) of a number of causes. The five skandhas, and the 
rupa, citta, etc., are thus called samskrta dharmas (composite 
things or collocations sambhuyakdri). The rupa dharmas are 
eleven in number, one citta dharma, 46 caitta dharmas and 14 
cittaviprayukta samskara dharmas (non-mental composite things); 
adding to these the three asamskrta dharmas we have the seventy- 
five dharmas. Rupa is that which has the capacity to obstruct the 
sense organs. Matter is regarded as the collective organism or 
collocation, consisting of the fourfold substratum of colour, smell, 
taste and contact. The unit possessing this fourfold substratum 
is known as paramanu, which is the minutest form of rupa. It 
cannot be pierced through or picked up or thrown away. It is 
indivisible, unanalysable, invisible, inaudible, untastable and in 
tangible. But yet it is not permanent, but is like a momentary 
flash into being. The simple atoms are called dravyaparamdyu 
and the compound ones samghataparamaqu. In the words of 
Prof. Stcherbatsky " the universal elements of matter are mani 
fested in their actions or functions. They are consequently more 
energies than substances." The organs of sense are also regarded 
as modifications of atomic matter. Seven such paramanus com 
bine together to form an anu, and it is in this combined form 
only that they become perceptible. The combination takes 
place in the form of a cluster having one atom at the centre and 

1 Systems of Buddhistic Thought, published by the Calcutta University. 
8 Sankara in his meagre sketch of the doctrine of the Sarvastivadins in his bhasya 
on the Brahma-sutras n. ? notices some of the categories mentioned by Sogen. 



122 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

others around it. The point which must be remembered in con 
nection with the conception of matter is this, that the qualities 
of all the mahabhutas are inherent in the paramanus. The special 
characteristics of roughness (which naturally belongs to earth), 
viscousness (which naturally belongs to water), heat (belonging 
to fire), movableness (belonging to wind), combine together to 
form each of the elements ; the difference between the different 
elements consists only in this, that in each of them its own special 
characteristics were predominant and active, and other charac 
teristics though present remained only in a potential form. The 
mutual resistance of material things is due to the quality of 
earth or the solidness inherent in them ; the mutual attraction of 
things is due to moisture or the quality of water, and so forth. 
The four elements are to be observed from three aspects, namely, 
(i) as things, (2) from the point of view of their natures (such as 
activity, moisture, etc.), and (3) function (such as dhrti or attrac 
tion, samgraha or cohesion, pakti or chemical heat, and vyuliana 
or clustering and collecting). These combine together naturally 
by other conditions or causes. The main point of distinction 
between the Vaibhasika Sarvastivadins and other forms of Bud 
dhism is this, that here the five skandhas and matter are re 
garded as permanent and eternal ; they are said to be momentary 
only in the sense that they are changing their phases constantly, 
owing to their constant change of combination. Avidya is not 
regarded here as a link in the chain of the causal series of 
pratltyasamutpada ; nor is it ignorance of any particular in 
dividual, but is rather identical with " moha " or delusion and 
represents the ultimate state of immaterial dharmas. Avidya, 
which through samskara, etc., produces namarupa in the case of 
a particular individual, is not his avidya in the present existence 
but the avidya of his past existence bearing fruit in the present 
life. 

" The cause never perishes but only changes its name, when 
it becomes an effect, having changed its state." For example, 
clay becomes jar, having changed its state ; and in this case the 
name clay is lost and the name jar arises 1 . The Sarvastivadins 
allowed simultaneousness between cause and effect only in the 
case of composite things (samprayukta hettt} and in the case of 

1 Sogen s quotation from Kumarajlva s Chinese version of Aryyadeva s commentary 
on the Aladhyamika Jastra (chapter XX. Karika 9). 



v] Sabbatthivadins 123 

the interaction of mental and material things. The substratum 
of "vijftana" or "consciousness" is regarded as permanent and 
the aggregate of the five senses (indriyas) is called the perceiver. 
It must be remembered that the indriyas being material had a 
permanent substratum, and their aggregate had therefore also a 
substratum formed of them. 

The sense of sight grasps the four main colours of blue, yellow, 
red, white, and their combinations, as also the visual forms of 
appearance (samsthdna) of long, short, round, square, high, low, 
straight, and crooked. The sense of touch (kdyendriya) has for 
its object the four elements and the qualities of smoothness, 
roughness, lightness, heaviness, cold, hunger and thirst. These 
qualities represent the feelings generated in sentient beings by 
the objects of touch> hunger, thirst, etc., and are also counted 
under it, as they are the organic effects produced by a touch 
which excites the physical frame at a time when the energy of 
wind becomes active in our body and predominates over other 
energies ; so also the feeling of thirst is caused by a touch which 
excites the physical frame when the energy of the element of fire 
becomes active and predominates over the other energies. The 
indriyas (senses) can after grasping the external objects arouse 
thought (vijndna) ; each of the five senses is an agent without 
which none of the five vijftanas would become capable of per 
ceiving an external object. The essence of the senses is entirely 
material. Each sense has two subdivisions, namely, the principal 
sense and the auxiliary sense. The substratum of the principal 
senses consists of a combination of paramanus, which are ex 
tremely pure and minute, while the substratum of the latter is 
the flesh, made of grosser materials. The five senses differ from 
one another with respect to the manner and form of their respec 
tive atomic combinations. In all sense-acts, whenever an act is 
performed and an idea is impressed, a latent energy is impressed 
on our person which is designated as avijftapti rupa. It is called 
rupa because it is a result or effect of rupa-contact ; it is called 
avijftapti because it is latent and unconscious ; this latent energy 
is bound sooner or later to express itself in karma effects and is 
the only bridge which connects the cause and the effect of karma 
done by body or speech. Karma in this school is considered 
as twofold, namely, that as thought (cetana karma) and that as 
activity (caitasika karma}. This last, again, is of two kinds, viz. 



1 24 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

that due to body-motion (kdyika karma) and speech (vdcika 
karma). Both these may again be latent (avijnapti) and patent 
(yijnapti), giving us the kayika-vijftapti karma, kayikavijftapti 
karma, vacika-vijfiapti karma and vacikavijftapti karma. Avijflapti 
rupa and avijflapti karma are what we should call in modern 
phraseology sub-conscious ideas, feelings and activity. Corre 
sponding to each conscious sensation, feeling, thought or activity 
there is another similar sub-conscious state which expresses itself 
in future thoughts and actions ; as these are not directly known but 
are similar to those which are known, they are called avijflapti. 

The mind, says Vasubandhu, is called cittam, because it 
wills (cetati), manas because it thinks (manvate) and vijftana 
because it discriminates (nirdisati). The discrimination may be 
of three kinds: (i) svabhava nirdesa (natural perceptual discrimi 
nation), (2) prayoga nirdeSa (actual discrimination as present, 
past and future), and (3) anusmrti nirdesa (reminiscent discrimi 
nation referring only to the past). The senses only possess the 
svabhava nzrdesa,the other two belong exclusively to manovijftana. 
Each of the vijflanas as associated with its specific sense dis 
criminates its particular object and perceives its general charac 
teristics; the six vijflanas combine to form what is known as the 
Vijftanaskandha, which is presided over by mind (mano). There 
are forty-six caitta samskrta dharmas. Of the three asamskrta 
dharmas akasa (ether) is in essence the freedom from obstruction, 
establishing it as a permanent omnipresent immaterial substance 
(nirupdkhya, non-rupa). The second asamskrta dharma, aprati- 
samkhya nirodha, means the non-perception of dharmas caused 
by the absence of pratyayas or conditions. Thus when I fix my 
attention on one thing, other things are not seen then, not because 
they are non-existent but because the conditions which would 
have made them visible were absent. The third asamskrta 
dharma, pratisamkhya nirodha, is the final deliverance from 
bondage. Its essential characteristic is everlastingness. These 
are called asamskrta because being of the nature of negation 
they are non-collocative and hence have no production or dis 
solution. The eightfold noble path which leads to this state 
consists of right views, right aspirations, right speech, right con 
duct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right rapture 1 . 

1 Mr Sogen mentions the name of another Buddhist Hlnayana thinker (about 
750 A. D.), Harivarman, who founded a school known as Satyasiddhi school, which 



v] Mahay anism 125 

Mahay anism. 

It is difficult to say precisely at what time Mahayanism took 
its rise. But there is reason to think that as the Mahasanghikas 
separated themselves from the Theravadins probably some time in 
400 B.C. and split themselves up into eight different schools, those 
elements of thoughts and ideas which in later days came to be 
labelled as Mahayana were gradually on the way to taking their 
first inception. We hear in about 100 A.D. of a number of works 
which are regarded as various Mahayana sutras, some of which 
are probably as old as at least 100 B.C. (if not earlier) and others 
as late as 300 or 400 A.D. 1 . These Mahayanasutras, also called 
the Vaipulyasutras, are generally all in the form of instructions 
given by the Buddha. Nothing is known about their authors or 
compilers, but they are all written in some form of Sanskrit and 
were probably written by those who seceded from the Theravada 
school. 

The word Hlnayana refers to the schools of Theravada, and 
as such it is contrasted with Mahayana. The words are generally 
translated as small vehicle (hma= small, ydna= vehicle) and great 
vehicle (mahd great, ydna vehicle). But this translation by 
no means expresses what is meant by Mahayana and Hlna 
yana 3 . Asahga (480 A.D.) in his Mahay anasutrdlamkdra gives 

propounded the same sort of doctrines as those preached by Nagarjuna. None of his 
works are available in Sanskrit and I have never come across any allusion to his name 
by Sanskrit writers. 

1 Quotations and references to many of these sutras are found in Candraklrtti s com 
mentary on the Mddkyamtka karikas of Nagarjuna ; some of these are the following : 
Astasdhasrikdprajndpdramitd (translated into Chinese 164 A.D.-i67 A.D.), Satasahas- 
rikdprajndpdramitd, Gaganaganja, Samddhisutra, Tathdgataguhyasutra y Drdhddhyd- 
Sayasancodandsutra, Dhydyitamusttsutra, Pitdputrasamdgamasutra, Mahay anasutra, 
Mtlradamanasutra, Ratnakutasutra, Ratnacutldpariprcchasutra, Ratnameghasutra, 
RatnardSisutra, Ratndkarasutra, Rdstrapdlapariprcchdsutra, Lankdvatdrasutra, 
Lalitavistarasutra, Vajracchedikasutra, VimalakirttinirdeSasutra, Salistambhasutra, 
Samddhirajasutra, Sukhavativyuha, SuvarnaprabkasasiUra, Saddharmapundarika 
(translated into Chinese A.D. 255), Amitdyurdkydnasutra, Haslikdkhyasutra, etc. 

3 The word Yana is generally translated as vehicle, but a consideration of numerous 
contexts in which the word occurs seems to suggest that it means career or course or 
way, rather than vehicle (Lalitavistara, pp. 25, 38; Prajn&paramitd^ pp. 24, 319; 
Samddkirdjasutra, p. i ; Karundpundarika, p. 67; Lankavatarasutra, pp. 68, 108, 132). 
The word Yana is as old as the Upanisads where we read of Devayana and Pitryana. 
There is no reason why this word should be taken in a different sense. We hear in 
Lankdvatdra of Sravakayana (career of the 6ravakas or the Theravadin Buddhists), 
Pratyekabuddhayana (the career of saints before the coming of the Buddha), Buddha 
yana (career of the Buddhas), Ekayana (one career), Devayana (career of the gods), 



126 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

us the reason why one school was called Hinayana whereas the 
other, which he professed, was called Mahayana. He says that, 
considered from the point of view of the ultimate goal of religion, 
the instructions, attempts, realization, and time, the Hlnayana 
occupies a lower and smaller place than the other called Maha 
(great) Yana, and hence it is branded as Hlna (small, or low). 
This brings us to one of the fundamental points of distinction 
between Hlnayana and Mahayana. The ultimate good of an 
adherent of the Hlnayana is to attain his own nirvana or salva 
tion, whereas the ultimate goal of those who professed the Maha 
yana creed was not to seek their own salvation but to seek the 
salvation of all beings. So the Hlnayana goal was lower, and in 
consequence of that the instructions that its followers received, 
the attempts they undertook, and the results they achieved were 
narrower than that of the Mahayana adherents. A Hlnayana man 
had only a short business in attaining his own salvation, and this 
could be done in three lives, whereas a Mahayana adherent was 
prepared to work for infinite time in helping all beings to attain 
salvation. So the Hlnayana adherents required only a short period 
of work and may from that point of view also be called hma, or 
lower. 

This point, though important from the point of view of the 
difference in the creed of the two schools, is not so from the point 
of view of philosophy. But there is another trait of the Maha- 
yanists which distinguishes them from the Hmayanists from the 
philosophical point of view. The Mahayanists believed that all 
things were of a non-essential and indefinable character and 
void at bottom, whereas the Hmayanists only believed in the 
impermanence of all things, but did not proceed further than 
that. 

It is sometimes erroneously thought that Nagarjuna first 
preached the doctrine of 6unyavada (essencelessness or voidness 
of all appearance), but in reality almost all the Mahayana sutras 
either definitely preach this doctrine or allude to it. Thus if we 
take some of those sutras which were in all probability earlier than 
Nagarjuna, we find that the doctrine which Nagarjuna expounded 

Brahmayana (career of becoming a Brahma), Tathagatayana (career of a Tathagata). 
In one place Lankavatara says that ordinarily distinction is made between the three 
careers and one career and no career, but these distinctions are only for the ignorant 
(Lankavatara, p. 68). 



v] Mahay ana Philosophy 127 

with all the rigour of his powerful dialectic was quietly accepted 
as an indisputable truth. Thus we find Subhuti saying to 
the Buddha that vedana (feeling), samjfta (concepts) and the 
samskaras (conformations) are all maya (illusion) 1 . All the 
skandhas, dhatus (elements) and ayatanas are void and absolute 
cessation. The highest knowledge of everything as pure void 
is not different from the skandhas, dhatus and ayatanas, and this 
absolute cessation of dharmas is regarded as the highest know 
ledge (prajndpdramita)*. Everything being void there is in reality 
no process and no cessation. The truth is neither eternal (sdsvata) 
nor non-eternal (asdsvata) but pure void. It should be the object 
of a saint s endeavour to put himself in the " thatncss" (tat/tatd) and 
consider all things as void. The saint (bodhisatlvd) has to estab 
lish himself in all the virtues (pdramita}, benevolence (dana- 
pdramitd\ the virtue of character (silapdramitd\ the virtue of 
forbearance (ksdntipdramitd), the virtue of tenacity and strength 
(ylryyapdramitd) and the virtue of meditation (dhydnapdra- 
mitd). The saint (bodhisattvd) is firmly determined that he will 
help an infinite number of souls to attain nirvana. In reality, 
however, there are no beings, there is no bondage, no salva 
tion ; and the saint knows it but too well, yet he is not afraid 
of this high truth, but proceeds on his career of attaining for 
all illusory beings illusory emancipation from illusory bondage. 
The saint is actuated with that feeling and proceeds in his 
work on the strength of his paramitas, though in reality there 
is no one who is to attain salvation in reality and no one who 
is to help him to attain it*. The true prajnaparamita is the 
absolute cessation of all appearance (yah anupalambhah sarva- 
dharmdndm sa prajndpdramitd ityucyate) . 

The Mahayana doctrine has developed on two lines, viz. that 
of unyavada or the Madhyamika doctrine and Vijftanavada. 
The difference between ^unyavada and Vijftanavada (the theory 
that there is only the appearance of phenomena of consciousness) 
is not fundamental, but is rather one of method. Both of them 
agree in holding that there is no truth in anything, everything 
is only passing appearance akin to dream or magic. But 
while the unyavadins were more busy in showing this indefin- 
ableness of all phenomena, the Vijftanavadins, tacitly accepting 

1 Astasahasrikaprajnaparamita, p. 16. a Ibid. p. 177. 

8 Ibid. p. 21. 4 Ibid. p. 177. 



128 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

the truth preached by the Sunyavadins, interested themselves in 
explaining the phenomena of consciousness by their theory of 
beginningless illusory root-ideas or instincts of the mind (vasana). 

Asvaghosa (100 A.D.) seems to have been the greatest teacher 
of a new type of idealism (vijhdnavddd) known as the Tathata 
philosophy. Trusting in Suzuki s identification of a quotation in 
Asvaghosa s Sraddhotpddasdstra as being made from Lankdva- 
tdrasiitra, we should think of the Lankdvatdrasutra as being one 
of the early works of the Vijnanavadins 1 . The greatest later writer 
of the Vijfianavada school was Asariga (400 A.D.), to whom are 
attributed the Saptadasabhumi sutra, Mahdydna sutra, Upadesa, 
Mahay dnasamparigraha sdstra, Yogdcdrabhumi sdstra and 
Mahay dnasutrdlamkdra. None of these works excepting the 
last one is available to readers who have no access to the 
Chinese and Tibetan manuscripts, as the Sanskrit originals are 
in all probability lost. The Vijfianavada school is known to 
Hindu writers by another name also, viz. Yogacara, and it does 
not seem an improbable supposition that Asanga s Yogdcdra 
bhumi Sdstra was responsible for the new name. Vasubandhu, 
a younger brother of Asanga, was, as Paramartha (499-569) tells 
us, at first a liberal Sarvastivadin, but was converted to Vijfia 
navada, late in his life, by Asanga. Thus Vasubandhu, who 
wrote in his early life the great standard work of the Sarvasti- 
vadins, Abhidharmakosa, devoted himself in his later life to Vijfia 
navada 2 . He is said to have commented upon a number of 
Mahayana sutras, such zsAvatamsaka, Nirvana, Saddharmapun- 
darlka, Prajndpdramitd, Vimalaklrtti and Srtmdldsimhandda, and 
compiled some Mahayana sutras, such as Vijndnamdtrasiddhi, 
Ratnatraya, etc. The school of Vijfianavada continued for at 
least a century or two after Vasubandhu, but we are not in 
possession of any work of great fame of this school after him. 

We have already noticed that the Sunyavada formed the fun 
damental principle of all schools of Mahayana. The most powerful 
exponent of this doctrine was Nagarjuna (100 A.D.), a brief account 
of whose system will be given in its proper place. Nagarjuna s 
karikas (verses) were commented upon by Aryyadeva, a disciple 
of his, Kumarajlva (383 A.D.), Buddhapalita and Candraklrtti 
(55OA.D.). Aryyadeva in addition to this commentary wrote at 

1 Dr S. C. Vidyabhushana thinks that Lankavatara belongs to about 300 A.D. 

2 Takakusu s "A study of the Paramartha s life of Vasubandhu, " J. R.A. S. 1905. 



vj Aryyadevas Philosophy 129 

least three other books, viz. Catuhsataka, Hastabdlaprakarana- 
vrtti and Cittavisuddhiprakarana^. In the small work called 
Hastabdlaprakaranavrtti Aryyadeva says that whatever depends 
for its existence on anything else may be proved to be illusory ; 
all our notions of external objects depend on space perceptions 
and notions of part and whole and should therefore be regarded 
as mere appearance. Knowing therefore that all that is depen 
dent on others for establishing itself is illusory, no wise man 
should feel attachment or antipathy towards these mere phe 
nomenal appearances. In his Cittavisuddhiprakaratia he says 
that just as a crystal appears to be coloured, catching the reflec 
tion of a coloured object, even so the mind though in itself 
colourless appears to show diverse colours by coloration of ima 
gination (vikalpa). In reality the mind (citta) without a touch 
of imagination (kalpand) in it is the pure reality. 

It does not seem however that the unyavadins could produce 
any great writers after Candraklrtti. References to unyavada 
show that it was a living philosophy amongst the Hindu writers 
until the time of the great Mlmamsa authority Kumarila who 
flourished in the eighth century; but in later times the Sunyavadins 
were no longer occupying the position of strong and active dis 
putants. 

The Tathata Philosophy of ASvaghosa (SoA.D.) 2 . 

Asvaghosa was the son of a Brahmin named Saimhaguhya 
who spent his early days in travelling over the different parts of 
India and defeating the Buddhists in open debates. He was pro 
bably converted to Buddhism by Parva who was an important 
person in the third Buddhist Council promoted, according to 
some authorities, by the King of Kashmere and according to other 
authorities by Punyayaas 8 . 

1 Aryyadeva s Hastabalaprakaranavrtti has been reclaimed by Dr F. W. Thomas. 
Fragmentary portions of his CittavUuddhiprakarana were published by Mahamahopad- 
hyaya Haraprasada s astri in the Bengal Asiatic Society s journal, 1898. 

2 The above section is based on) the Awakening of Faith, an English trans 
lation by Suzuki of the Chinese version of Sraddhotpadaiastra by Asvaghosa, the 
Sanskrit original of which appears to have been lost. Suzuki has brought forward a 
mass of evidence to show that Asvaghosa was a contemporary of Kaniska. 

* Taranatha says that he was converted by Aryadeva, a disciple of Nagarjuna, 
Geschichte des Buddhismus, German translation by Schiefner, pp. 84-85. See Suzuki s 
Awakening of Faith, pp. 24-32. Asvaghosa wrote the Buddkacaritakavya, of great 
poetical excellence, and the Mahtilatnkilrahlstra. He was also a musician and had 



130 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

He held that in the soul two aspects may be distinguished 
the aspect as thatness (bhutatathata) and the aspect as the cycle 
of birth and death (samsdra). The soul as bhutatathata means 
the oneness of the totality of all things (dharmadhdtu). Its essen 
tial nature is uncreate and external. All things simply on account 
of the beginningless traces of the incipient and unconscious 
memory of our past experiences of many previous lives (smrti) 
appear under the forms of individuation 1 . If we could overcome 
this smrti "the signs of individuation would disappear and there 
would be no trace of a world of objects." "All things in their 
fundamental nature are not nameable or explicable. They can 
not be adequately expressed in any form of language. They 
possess absolute sameness (samatd}. They are subject neither to 
transformation nor to destruction. They are nothing but one soul " 
thatness (bhutatathata). This "thatness" has no attribute and 
it can only be somehow pointed out in speech as "thatness." 
As soon as you understand that when the totality of existence is 
spoken of or thought of, there is neither that which speaks nor 
that which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor 
that which is thought of, "this is the stage of thatness." This 
bhutatathata is neither that which is existence, nor that which is 
non-existence, nor that which is at once existence and non- 
existence, nor that which is not at once existence and non-exist 
ence; it is neither that which is plurality, nor that which is 
at once unity and plurality, nor that which is not at once unity 
and plurality. It is a negative concept in the sense that it is 
beyond all that is conditional and yet it is a positive concept 
in the sense that it holds all within it. It cannot be compre 
hended by any kind of particularization or distinction. It is 
only by transcending the range of our intellectual categories of 
the comprehension of the limited range of finite phenomena that 
we can get a glimpse of it. It cannot be comprehended by the 
particularizing consciousness of all beings, and we thus may call 
it negation, "sunyata," in this sense. The truth is that which 

invented a musical instrument called Rastavara that he might by that means convert the 
people of the city. " Its melody was classical, mournful, and melodious, inducing the 
audience to ponder on the misery, emptiness, and non-atmanness of life." Suzuki, p. 35. 
1 I have ventured to translate "smrti" in the sense of vasana in preference to 
Suzuki s "confused subjectivity" because smrti in the sense of vasana is not unlamiliar 
to the readers of such Buddhist works as Lankavatara* The word "subjectivity" 
seems to be too European a term to be used as a word to represent the Buddhist sense. 



v] Asvagkosds Absolutism 131 

subjectively does not exist by itself, that the negation (sunyata) is 
also void (sunya) in its nature, that neither that which is negated 
nor that which negates is an independent entity. It is the pure 
soul that manifests itself as eternal, permanent, immutable, and 
completely holds all things within it. On that account it may be 
called affirmation. But yet there is no trace of affirmation in it, 
because it is not the product of the creative instinctive memory 
(smrti) of conceptual thought and the only way of grasping the 
truth the thatness, is by transcending all conceptual creations. 

"The soul as birth and death (samsdra) comes forth from 
the Tathagata womb (tathdgatagarbha\ the ultimate reality. 
But the immortal and the mortal coincide with each other. 
Though they are not identical they are not duality either. Thus 
when the absolute soul assumes a relative aspect by its self- 
affirmation it is called the all-conserving mind (dlayavijndnd). 
It embraces two principles, (i) enlightenment, (2) non -enlighten 
ment. Enlightenment is the perfection of the mind when it is 
free from thje corruptions of the creative instinctive incipient 
memory (smrti). It penetrates all and is the unity of all (dharma- 
dhdtu). That is to say, it is the universal dharmakaya of all 
Tathagatas constituting the ultimate foundation of existence. 

"When it is said that all consciousness starts from this funda 
mental truth, it should not be thought that consciousness had any 
real origin, for it was merely phenomenal existence a mere ima 
ginary creation of the perceivers under the influence of the 
delusive smrti. The multitude of people (bahujand) are said to be 
lacking in enlightenment, because ignorance (avidya) prevails, 
there from all eternity, because there is a constant succession of 
smrti (past confused memory working as instinct) from which 
they have never been emancipated. But when they are divested 
of this smrti they can then recognize that no states of mentation, 
viz. their appearance, presence, change and disappearance, have 
any reality. They are neither in a temporal nor in a spatial relation 
with the one soul, for they are not self-existent. 

"This high enlightenment shows itself imperfectly in our cor 
rupted phenomenal experience as prajfta (wisdom) and karma 
(incomprehensible activity of life). By pure wisdom we under 
stand that when one, by virtue of the perfuming power of dharma, 
disciplines himself truthfully (i.e. according to the dharma) and 
accomplishes meritorious deeds, the mind (i.e. the dlayavijndnd) 

92 



132 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

which implicates itself with birth and death will be broken down 
and the modes of the evolving consciousness will be annulled, and 
the pure and the genuine wisdom of the Dharmakaya will manifest 
itself. Though all modes of consciousness and mentation are 
mere products of ignorance, ignorance in its ultimate nature is 
identical and non-identical with enlightenment; and therefore 
ignorance is in one sense destructible, though in another sense 
it is indestructible. This may be illustrated by the simile of the 
water and the waves which are stirred up in the ocean. Here 
the water can be said to be both identical and non-identical 
with the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but the 
water remains the same. When the wind ceases the motion of 
the waves subsides, but the water remains the same. Likewise 
when the mind of all creatures, which in its own nature is pure and 
clean, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (avidya), the waves 
of mentality (vijndna) make their appearance. These three (i.e. 
the mind, ignorance, and mentality) however have no existence, 
and they are neither unity nor plurality. When the ignorance is 
annihilated, the awakened mentality is tranquillized, whilst the 
essence of the wisdom remains unmolested." The truth or the 
enlightenment "is absolutely unobtainable by any modes of rela 
tivity or by any outward signs of enlightenment. All events in 
the phenomenal world are reflected in enlightenment, so that they 
neither pass out of it, nor enter into it, and they neither disappear 
nor are destroyed." It is for ever cut off from the hindrances both 
affectional (klesdvarand) and intellectual (jneydvarana), as well 
as from the mind (i.e. dlayavijnana) which implicates itself with 
birth and death, since it is in its true nature clean, pure, eternal, 
calm, and immutable. The truth again is such that it transforms 
and unfolds itself wherever conditions are favourable in the form 
of a tathagata or in some other forms, in order that all beings 
may be induced thereby to bring their virtue to maturity. 

"Non-elightenment has no existence of its own aside from its 
relation with enlightenment a priori? But enlightenment a priori 
is spoken of only in contrast to non-enlightenment, and as non- 
enlightenment is a non-entity, true enlightenment in turn loses 
its significance too. They are distinguished only in mutual rela 
tion as enlightenment or non-enlightenment. The manifestations 
of non-enlightenment are made in three ways: (i) as a disturb 
ance of the mind (dlayavijnana), by the avidyakarma (ignorant 



v] Theory of world-construction 133 

action), producing misery (duhkhd); (2) by the appearance of an 
ego or of a perceiver ; and (3) by the creation of an external world 
which does not exist in itself, independent of the perceiver. Con 
ditioned by the unreal external world six kinds of phenomena 
arise in succession. The first phenomenon is intelligence (sensa 
tion); being affected by the external world the mind becomes 
conscious of the difference between the agreeable and the disagree 
able. The second phenomenon is succession. Following upon 
intelligence, memory retains the sensations, agreeable as well 
as disagreeable, in a continuous succession of subjective states. 
The third phenomenon is clinging. Through the retention and 
succession of sensations, agreeable as well as disagreeable, there 
arises the desire of clinging. The fourth phenomenon is an attach 
ment to names or ideas (samjnd\ etc. By clinging the mind 
hypostatizes all names whereby to give definitions to all things. 
The fifth phenomenon is the performance of deeds (karma). On 
account of attachment to names, etc., there arise all the variations 
of deeds, productive of individuality. "The sixth phenomenon 
is the suffering due to the fetter of deeds. Through deeds suffering 
arises in which the mind finds itself entangled and curtailed of 
its freedom." All these phenomena have thus sprung forth through 
avidya. 

The relation between this truth and avidya is in one sense 
a mere identity and may be illustrated by the simile of all kinds 
of pottery which though different are all made of the same clay 1 . 
Likewise the undefiled (andsrava} and ignorance (avidya} and 
their various transient forms all come from one and the same 
entity. Therefore Buddha teaches that all beings are from all 
eternity abiding in Nirvana. 

It is by the touch of ignorance (avidya} that this truth assumes 
all the phenomenal forms of existence. 

In the all-conserving mind (alayavijndnd) ignorance manifests 
itself; and from non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that 
which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and 
that which constantly particularizes. This is called ego (manas). 
Five different names are given to the ego (according to its dif 
ferent modes of operation). The first name is activity-conscious 
ness (karmavijndnd) in the sense that through the agency of 
ignorance an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed (or 

1 Compare Chandogya, vi. i. 4. 



1 34 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

awakened). The second name is evolving-consciousness (pravrtti- 
vijndnd) in the sense that when the mind is disturbed, there 
evolves that which sees an external world. The third name is 
representation-consciousness in the sense that the ego (manas) 
represents (or reflects) an external world. As a clean mirror 
reflects the images of all description, it is even so with the repre 
sentation-consciousness. When it is confronted, for instance, with 
the objects of the five senses, it represents them instantaneously 
and without effort. The fourth is particularization-consciousness, 
in the sense that it discriminates between different things defiled 
as well as pure. The fifth name is succession-consciousness, in the 
sense that continuously directed by the awakening consciousness 
of attention (manaskdrd) it (manas) retains all experiences and 
never loses or suffers the destruction of any karma, good as well 
as evil, which had been sown in the past, and whose retribution, 
painful or agreeable, it never fails to mature, be it in the present 
or in the future, and also in the sense that it unconsciously 
recollects things gone by and in imagination anticipates things 
to come. Therefore the three domains (kdmaloka, domain of 
feeling rupaloka, domain of bodily existence arupaloka, domain 
of incorporeality) are nothing but the self manifestation of the 
mind (i.e. dlayavijndna which is practically identical with bhuta- 
tathata). Since all things, owing the principle of their existence 
to the mind (dlayavijndna), are produced by smrti, all the modes 
of particularization are the self-particularizations of the mind. The 
mind in itself (or the soul) being however free from all attributes 
is not differentiated. Therefore we come to the conclusion that 
all things and conditions in the phenomenal world, hypostatized 
and established only through ignorance (avidya) and memory 
(smrti), have no more reality than the images in a mirror. They 
arise simply from the ideality of a particularizing mind. When 
the mind is disturbed, the multiplicity of things is produced; but 
when the mind is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears. 
By ego-consciousness (manovijndnd) we mean the ignorant mind 
which by its succession-consciousness clings to the conception of 
I and Not-I and misapprehends the nature of the six objects of 
sense. The ego-consciousness is also called separation-conscious 
ness, because it is nourished by the perfuming influence of the 
prejudices (dsrava\ intellectual as well as affectional. Thus believ 
ing in the external world produced by memory, the mind becomes 



v] Theory of Good and Evil 135 

oblivious of the principle of sameness (samata) that underlies all 
things which are one and perfectly calm and tranquil and show no 
sign of becoming. 

Non-enlightenment is the raison d etre of samsara. When 
this is annihilated the conditions the external world are also 
annihilated and with them the state of an interrelated mind is also 
annihilated. But this annihilation does not mean the annihilation 
of the mind but of its modes only. It becomes calm like an un 
ruffled sea when all winds which were disturbing it and producing 
the waves have been annihilated. 

In describing the relation of the interaction of avidya (ignor 
ance), karmavijftana (activity-consciousness the subjective mind), 
visaya (external world represented by the senses) and the tathata 
(suchness), Asvaghosa says that there is an interperfuming of 
these elements. Thus AsVaghosa says, "By perfuming we mean 
that while our worldly clothes (viz. those which we wear) have no 
odour of their own, neither offensive nor agreeable, they can yet 
acquire one or the other odour according to the nature of the sub 
stance with which they are perfumed. Suchness (tathata) is likewise 
a pure dharma free from all defilements caused by the perfuming 
power of ignorance. On the other hand ignorance has nothing to 
do with purity. Nevertheless we speak of its being able to do the 
work of purity because it in its turn is perfumed by suchness. 
Determined by suchness ignorance becomes the raison d etre of 
all forms of defilement. And this ignorance perfumes suchness 
and produces smrti. This smrti in its turn perfumes ignorance. 
On account of this (reciprocal) perfuming, the truth is misunder 
stood. On account of its being misunderstood an external world 
of subjectivity appears. Further, on account of the perfuming 
power of memory, various modes of individuation are produced. 
And by clinging to them various deeds are done, and we suffer 
as the result miseries mentally as well as bodily." Again "such- 
ness perfumes ignorance, and in consequence of this perfuming 
the individual in subjectivity is caused to loathe the misery of 
birth and death and to seek after the blessing of Nirvana. This 
longing and loathing on the part of the subjective mind in turn 
perfumes suchness. On account of this perfuming influence we 
are enabled to believe that we are in possession within ourselves 
of suchness whose essential nature is pure and immaculate; and 
we also recognize that all phenomena in the world are nothing 



1 36 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

but the illusory manifestations of the mind (alayavijndna) and 
have no reality of their own. Since we thus rightly understand 
the truth, we can practise the means of liberation, can perform 
those actions which are in accordance with the dharma. We 
should neither particularize, nor cling to objects of desire. By 
virtue of this discipline and habituation during the lapse of innu 
merable asarikhyeyakalpas 1 we get ignorance annihilated. As 
ignorance is thus annihilated, the mind (dlayavijndna) is no longer 
disturbed, so as to be subject to individuation. As the mind is no 
longer disturbed, the particularization of the surrounding world 
is annihilated. When in this wise the principle and the condition 
of defilement, their products, and the mental disturbances are all 
annihilated, it is said that we attain Nirvana and that various 
spontaneous displays of activity are accomplished." The Nirvana 
of the tathata philosophy is not nothingness, but tathata (suchness 
or thatness) in its purity unassociated with any kind of disturbance 
which produces all the diversity of experience. 

To the question that if all beings are uniformly in possession 
of suchness and are therefore equally perfumed by it, how is it 
that there are some who do not believe in it, while others do, 
AsVaghosa s reply is that though all beings are uniformly in 
possession of suchness, the intensity of ignorance and the prin 
ciple of individuation, that work from all eternity, vary in such 
manifold grades as to outnumber the sands of the Ganges, and 
hence the difference. There is an inherent perfuming principle 
in one s own being which, embraced and protected by the love 
(maitrt) and compassion (karuna) of all Buddhas and Bodhisatt- 
vas, is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death, to believe 
in nirvana, to cultivate the root of merit (kusalamula), to habit 
uate oneself to it and to bring it to maturity. In consequence 
of this, one is enabled to see all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and, re 
ceiving instructions from them, is benefited, gladdened and induced 
to practise good deeds, etc., till one can attain to Buddhahood and 
enter into Nirvana. This implies that all beings have such perfum 
ing power in them that they may be affected by the good wishes 
of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas for leading them to the path 
of virtue, and thus it is that sometimes hearing the Bodhisattvas 
and sometimes seeing them, "all beings thereby acquire (spiritual) 
benefits (hitatd}" and "entering into the samadhi of purity, they 

1 Technical name for a very vast period of time. 



v] Theory of Good and Evil 137 

destroy hindrances wherever they are met with and obtain all- 
penetrating insight that enables them to become conscious of 
the absolute oneness (samata) of the universe (sarvalokd) and to 
see innumerable Buddhas and Bodhisattvas." 

There is a difference between the perfuming which is not in 
unison with suchness, as in the case of sravakas (theravadin 
monks), pratyekabuddhas and the novice bodhisattvas, who only 
continue their religious discipline but do not attain to the state 
of non-particularization in unison with the essence of suchness. 
But those bodhisattvas whose perfuming is already in unison with 
suchness attain to the state of non-particularization and allow 
themselves to be influenced only by the power of the dharma. 
The incessant perfuming of the defiled dharma (ignorance from 
all eternity) works on, but when one attains to Buddhahood one 
at once puts an end to it. The perfuming of the pure dharma 
(i.e. suchness) however works on to eternity without any interrup 
tion. For this suchness or thatness is the effulgence of great 
wisdom, the universal illumination of the dharmadhatu (universe), 
the true and adequate knowledge, the mind pure and clean in its 
own nature, the eternal, the blessed, the self-regulating and the 
pure, the tranquil, the inimitable and the free, and this is called 
the tathagatagarbha or the dharmakaya. It may be objected that 
since thatness or suchness has been described as being without 
characteristics, it is now a contradiction to speak of it as embracing 
all merits, but it is held, that in spite of its embracing all merits, 
it is free in its nature from all forms of distinction, because all 
objects in the world are of one and the same taste; and being 
of one reality they have nothing to do with the modes of par- 
ticularization or of dualistic character. "Though all things in their 
(metaphysical) origin come from the soul alone and in truth are 
free from particularization, yet on account of non-enlightenment 
there originates a subjective mind (alayavijndnd) that becomes 
conscious of an external world." This is called ignorance or 
avidya. Nevertheless the pure essence of the mind is perfectly 
pure and there is no awakening of ignorance in it. Hence we assign 
to suchness this quality, the effulgence of great wisdom. It is 
called universal illumination, because there is nothing for it to 
illumine. This perfuming of suchness therefore continues for ever, 
though the stage of the perfuming of avidya comes to an end with 
the Buddhas when they attain to nirvana. All Buddhas while at 



138 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

the stage of discipline feel a deep compassion (mahdkaruna) for all 
beings, practise all virtues (pdramitds) and many other meritorious 
deeds, treat others as their own selves, and wish to work out a 
universal salvation of mankind in ages to come, through limitless 
numbers of kalpas, recognize truthfully and adequately the 
principle of equality (samatd) among people; and do not cling 
to the individual existence of a sentient being. This is what is 
meant by the activity of tathata. The main idea of this tathata 
philosophy seems to be this, that this transcendent "thatness" is 
at once the quintessence of all thought and activity; as avidya veils 
it or perfumes it, the world-appearance springs forth, but as the 
pure thatness also perfumes the avidya there is a striving for the 
good as well. As the stage of avidya is passed its luminous 
character shines forth, for it is the ultimate truth which only 
illusorily appeared as the many of the world. 

This doctrine seems to be more in agreement with the view 
of an absolute unchangeable reality as the ultimate truth than 
that of the nihilistic idealism of Lankdvatdra. Considering the 
fact that Asvaghosa was a learned Brahmin scholar in his early 
life, it is easy to guess that there was much Upanisad influence in 
this interpretation of Buddhism, which compares so favourably 
with the Vedanta as interpreted by Sarikara. The Lankdvatdra 
admitted a reality only as a make-believe to attract the Tairthikas 
(heretics) who had a prejudice in favour of an unchangeable self 
(dtman). But Asvaghosa plainly admitted an unspeakable reality 
as the ultimate truth. Nagarjuna s Madhyamika doctrines which 
eclipsed the profound philosophy of AsVaghosa seem to be more 
faithful to the traditional Buddhist creed and to the Vijftanavada 
creed of Buddhism as explained in the Lankdvatdra 1 . 

The Madhyamika or the Sunyavada school. Nihilism. 

Candrakirtti, the commentator of Nagarjuna s verses known as 
"Madhyamika kdrikd" in explaining the doctrine of dependent 
origination (pratltyasamutpdda) as described by Nagarjuna starts 
with two interpretations of the word. According to one the word 
pratltyasamutpada means the origination (utpdda) of the non 
existent (abhdvd) depending on (pratttya) reasons and causes 

1 As I have no access to the Chinese translation of A^vaghosa s Sraddhotpdda 
Sastra, I had to depend entirely on Suzuki s expressions as they appear in his trans 
lation. 



v] Pratltyasamutpada 1 39 

(hetupratyaya). According to the other interpretation pratltya 
means each and every destructible individual and pratltyasamut 
pada means the origination of each and every destructible in 
dividual. But he disapproves of both these meanings. The 
second meaning does not suit the context in which the Pali 
Scriptures generally speak of pratltyasamutpada (e.g. caksuh 
pratltya rupdni ca utpadyante caksurvijndnam) for it does not 
mean the origination of each and every destructible individual, 
but the originating of specific individual phenomena (e.g. per 
ception of form by the operation in connection with the eye) 
depending upon certain specific conditions. 

The first meaning also is equally unsuitable. Thus for example 
if we take the case of any origination, e.g. that of the visual per 
cept, we see that there cannot be any contact between visual 
knowledge and physical sense, the eye, and so it would not be 
intelligible that the former should depend upon the latter. If we 
interpret the maxim of pratltyasamutpada as this happening that 
happens, that would not explain any specific origination. All 
origination is false, for a thing can neither originate by itself nor 
by others, nor by a co-operation of both nor without any reason. 
For if a thing exists already it cannot originate again by itself. 
To suppose that it is originated by others would also mean 
that the origination was of a thing already existing. If again 
without any further qualification it is said that depending on 
one the other comes into being, then depending on anything any 
other thing could come into being from light we could have dark 
ness! Since a thing could not originate from itself or by others, 
it could not also be originated by a combination of both of them 
together. A thing also could not originate without any cause, 
for then all things could come into being at all times. It is there 
fore to be acknowledged that wherever the Buddha spoke of this 
so-called dependent origination {pratltyasamutpada} it was re 
ferred to as illusory manifestations appearing to intellects and 
senses stricken with ignorance. This dependent origination is 
not thus a real law, but only an appearance due to ignorance 
(avidyd}. The only thing which is not lost (amosadharma) is 
nirvana; but all other forms of knowledge and phenomena 
(samskdras) are false and are lost with their appearances (sarva- 
samskdrdsca mrsdmosadhanndnaK). 

It is sometimes objected to this doctrine that if all appear- 



140 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

ances are false, then they do not exist at all. There are then no 
good or bad works and no cycle of existence, and if such is the 
case, then it may be argued that no philosophical discussion 
should be attempted. But the reply to such an objection is that the 
nihilistic doctrine is engaged in destroying the misplaced con 
fidence of the people that things are true. Those who are really 
wise do not find anything either false or true, for to them clearly 
they do not exist at all and they do not trouble themselves with 
the question of their truth or falsehood. For him who knows thus 
there are neither works nor cycles of births (samsdra) and also he 
does not trouble himself about the existence or non-existence of 
any of the appearances. Thus it is said in the Ratnakutasutra that 
howsoever carefully one may search one cannot discover conscious 
ness (citta)\ what cannot be perceived cannot be said to exist, 
and what does not exist is neither past, nor future, nor present, and 
as such it cannot be said to have any nature at all ; and that which 
has no nature is subject neither to origination nor to extinction. 
He who through his false knowledge (viparyydsa) does not com 
prehend the falsehood of all appearances, but thinks them to be 
real, works and suffers the cycles of rebirth (samsdra}. Like all 
illusions, though false these appearances can produce all the harm 
of rebirth and sorrow. 

It may again be objected that if there is nothing true 
according to the nihilists (sunyavddins), then their statement that 
there is no origination or extinction is also not true. Candraklrtti 
in replying to this says that with sunyavadins the truth is absolute 
silence. When the Sunyavadin sages argue, they only accept for 
the moment what other people regard as reasons, and deal with 
them in their own manner to help them to come to a right 
comprehension of all appearances. It is of no use to say, in spite 
of all arguments tending to show the falsehood of all appearances, 
that they are testified by our experience, for the whole thing that 
we call "our experience" is but false illusion inasmuch as these 
phenomena have no true essence. 

When the doctrine of pratltyasamutpada is described as "this 
being that is," what is really meant is that things can only be 
indicated as mere appearances one after another, for they have 
no essence or true nature. Nihilism (sunyavdda) also means just 
this. The true meaning of pratltyasamutpada or sunyavada is 
this, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that 



v] Essencelessness \ 4 1 

appear 1 . As the phenomena have no essence they are neither 
produced nor destroyed ; they really neither come nor go. They 
are merely the appearance of maya or illusion. The void (sunya) 
does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of 
position. It simply means that none of the appearances have any 
intrinsic nature of their own (nihsvabhdvatvam). 

The Madhyamaka or unya system does not hold that any 
thing has any essence or nature (svabhdvd) of its own; even 
heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire; for both the heat 
and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions, 
and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the 
nature or essence of the thing. That alone may be said to be the 
true essence or nature of anything which does not depend on 
anything else, and sipce no such essence or nature can be pointed 
out which stands independently by itself we cannot say that it 
exists. If a thing has no essence or existence of its own, we can 
not affirm the essence of other things to it (parabhdvd). If we 
cannot affirm anything of anything as positive, we cannot conse 
quently assert anything of anything as negative. If anyone first 
believes in things positive and afterwards discovers that they are 
not so, he no doubt thus takes his stand on a negation (abhdva), 
but in reality since we cannot speak of anything positive, we can 
not speak of anything negative either*. 

It is again objected that we nevertheless perceive a process 
going on. To this the Madhyamaka reply is that a process of 
change could not be affirmed of things that are permanent. But we 
can hardly speak of a process with reference to momentary things; 
for those which are momentary are destroyed the next moment 
after they appear, and so there is nothing which can continue to 
justify a process. That which appears as being neither comes 
from anywhere nor goes anywhere, and that which appears as de 
stroyed also does not come from anywhere nor go anywhere, 
and so a process (samsdra) cannot be affirmed of them. It cannot 
be that when the second moment arose, the first moment had 
suffered a change in the process, for it was not the same as the 
second, as there is no so-called cause-effect connection. In fact 
there being no relation between the two, the temporal determina 
tion as prior and later is wrong. The supposition that there is a 
self which suffers changes is also not valid, for howsoever we 

1 See Madhyamikavrtti (B.T.S.), p. 50. 2 Ibid. pp. 93-100. 



142 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

may search we find the five skandhas but no self. Moreover if 
the soul is a unity it cannot undergo any process or progression, 
for that would presuppose that the soul abandons one character 
and takes up another at the same identical moment which is 
inconceivable 1 . 

But then again the question arises that if there is no process, 
and no cycle of worldly existence of thousands of afflictions, what 
is then the nirvana which is described as the final extinction of 
all afflictions (klesa)t To this the Madhyamaka reply is that it does 
not agree to such a definition of nirvana. Nirvana on the Madhya 
maka theory is the absence of the essence of all phenomena, that 
which cannot be conceived either as anything which has ceased 
or as anything which is produced (aniruddham anutpannam). In 
nirvana all phenomena are lost; we say that the phenomena cease 
to exist in nirvana, but like the illusory snake in the rope they 
never existed*. Nirvana cannot be any positive thing or any sort 
of state of being (bhdva), for all positive states or things are joint 
products of combined causes (samskrta) and are liable to decay 
and destruction. Neither can it be a negative existence, for since 
we cannot speak of any positive existence, we cannot speak of a 
negative existence either. The appearances or the phenomena are 
communicated as being in a state of change and process coming 
one after another, but beyond that no essence, existence, or truth 
can be affirmed of them. Phenomena sometimes appear to be 
produced and sometimes to be destroyed, but they cannot be 
determined as existent or non-existent. Nirvana is merely the 
cessation of the seeming phenomenal flow (prapancapravrttf). It 
cannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative for 
these conceptions belong to phenomena (na cdpravrttimdtram 
bhdvdbhdveti parikalpitum pdryyate evam na bhdvabhdvanir- 
vanam, M.V. 197). In this state there is nothing which is known, 
and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to 
appear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon, 
a mirage or a dream, and so are all his teachings . 

It is easy to see that in this system there cannot exist any 
bondage or emancipation ; all phenomena are like shadows, like 
the mirage, the dream, the maya, and the magic without any real 
nature (nihsvabhdvd). It is mere false knowledge to suppose that 

1 See Madhyamikavrtti (B.T.S.), pp. 101-101. 3 Ibid. p. 194. 

3 Ibid. pp. 162 and 201. 



v] Causal conditions 143 

one is trying to win a real nirvana 1 . It is this false egoism that 
is to be considered as avidya. When considered deeply it is found 
that there is not even the slightest trace of any positive existence. 
Thus it is seen that if there were no ignorance- (avidya), there 
would have been no conformations (samskaras}, and if there were 
no conformations there would have been no consciousness, and so 
on ; but it cannot be said of the ignorance " I am generating the 
samskaras," and it can be said of the samskaras "we are being 
produced by the avidya." But there being avidya, there come the 
samskaras and so on with other categories too. This character of 
the pratltyasamutpada is known as the coming of the consequent 
depending on an antecedent reason (hetupanibandha). 

It can be viewed from another aspect, namely that of depend 
ence on conglomeration or combination (pratyayopanibandhd). 
It is by the combination (samavdyd) of the four elements, space 
(dkdsa) and consciousness (yijndnd) that a man is made. It is 
due to earth (prthivi) that the body becomes solid, it is due to 
water that there is fat in the body, it is due to fire that there is 
digestion, it is due to wind that there is respiration; it is due 
to akaa that there is porosity, and it is due to vijfiana that 
there is mind-consciousness. It is by their mutual combination 
that we find a man as he is. But none of these elements think 
that they have done any of the functions that are considered to be 
allotted to them. None of these are real substances or beings or 
souls. It is by ignorance that these are thought of as existents and 
attachment is generated for them. Through ignorance thus come 
the samskaras, consisting of attachment, antipathy and thought 
lessness (rdga, dvesa, moha) ; from these proceed the vijfiana and 
the four skandhas. These with the four elements bring about name 
and form (ndmarupd), from these proceed the senses (sadayatana), 
from the coming together of those three comes contact (sparsd) ; 
from that feelings, from that comes desire (trsnd) and so on. 
These flow on like the stream of a river, but there is no essence 
or truth behind them all or as the ground of them all 8 . The 
phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either existent or 
non-existent, and no truth can be affirmed of either eternalism 
(sasvatavdda) or nihilism (ucchedavddd), and it is for this reason 

1 See Madhyamikavrtti (B.T.S.), pp. 101-108. 

* Ibid. pp. 209-211, quoted from Salistambhasutra. Vacaspatimis ra also quotes 
this passage in his Bhamati on Sankara s Brahmaputra. 



144 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

that this doctrine is called the middle doctrine (madhyamakci) 1 . 
Existence and non-existence have only a relative truth (sam- 
vrtisatya) in them, as in all phenomena, but there is no true 
reality (paramdrthasatya) in them or anything else. Morality 
plays as high a part in this nihilistic system as it does in any 
other Indian system. I quote below some stanzas from Nagar- 
juna s Suhrllekha as translated by Wenzel (P.T.S. 1886) from 
the Tibetan translation. 

6. Knowing that riches are unstable and void (asard) give according to 
the moral precepts, to Bhikshus, Brahmins, the poor and friends for there is 
no better friend than giving. 

7. Exhibit morality (Silo) faultless and sublime, unmixed and spotless, 
for morality is the supporting ground of all eminence, as the earth is of the 
moving and immovable. 

8. Exercise the imponderable, transcendental virtues of charity, morality, 
patience, energy, meditation, and likewise wisdom, in order that, having 
reached the farther shore of the sea of existence, you may become a Jina 
prince. 

9. View as enemies, avarice (matsaryya], deceit (Jsathya), duplicity (mdya\ 
lust, indolence (kausidya), pride (mana), greed (raga), hatred \dvesa) and 
pride (mada) concerning family, figure, glory, youth, or power. 

15. Since nothing is so difficult of attainment as patience, open no door 
for anger ; the Buddha has pronounced that he who renounces anger shall 
attain the degree of an anagamin (a saint who never suffers rebirth). 

21. Do not look after another s wife; but if you see her, regard her, 
according to age, like your mother, daughter or sinter. 

24. Of him who has conquered the unstable, ever moving objects of the 
six senses and him who has overcome the mass of his enemies in battle, the 
wise praise the first as the greater hero. 

29. Thou who knowest the world, be equanimous against the eight worldly 
conditions, gain and loss, happiness and suffering, fame and dishonour, blame 
and praise, for they are not objects for your thoughts. 

37. But one (a woman) that is gentle as a sister, winning as a friend, 
careful of your well being as a mother, obedient as a servant her (you must) 
honour as the guardian god(dess) of the family. 

40. Always perfectly meditate on (turn your thoughts to) kindness, pity, 
joy and indifference ; then if you do not obtain a higher degree you (certainly) 
will obtain the happiness of Brahman s world (brahmavihara). 

41. By the four dhyanas completely abandoning desire (kama\ reflection 
(vicara), joy (flrttt), and happiness and pain (sukha, duhkhd) you will obtain 
as fruit the lot of a Brahman. 

49. If you say "I am not the form, you thereby will understand I am 
not endowed with form, I do not dwell in form, the form does not dwell in me ; 
and in like manner you will understand the voidness of the other four aggre 
gates." 

50. The aggregates do not arise from desire, nor from time, nor from 

1 See Madhyamikavrtti (B.T.S.), p. 160. 



v] Vijnanavada 145 

nature (J>rakrti), not from themselves (svabkdvat), nor from the Lord (isvara), 
nor yet are they without cause ; know that they arise from ignorance (avidyd) 
and desire (trsnti). 

51. Know that attachment to religious ceremonies (Silabrataparamarsd), 
wrong views (mithyadrstf) and doubt (vicikitsa) are the three fetters. 

53. Steadily instruct yourself (more and more) in the highest morality, 
the highest wisdom and the highest thought, for the hundred and fifty one 
rules (of the Pra timoksci) are combined perfectly in these three. 

58. Because thus (as demonstrated) all this is unstable (anitya) without 
substance (andtma) without help (asarana) without protector (an&tha) and 
without abode (asthana) thou O Lord of men must become discontented with 
this worthless (asara) kadali-tree of the orb. 

104. If a fire were to seize your head or your dress you would extinguish 
and subdue it, even then endeavour to annihilate desire, for there is no other 
higher necessity than this. 

105. By morality, knowledge and contemplation, attain the spotless dig 
nity of the quieting and the subduing nirvana not subject to age, death or 
decay, devoid of earth, water, fire, wind, sun and moon. 

107. Where there is no wisdom (prajna) there is also no contemplation 
(dhyana\ where there is no contemplation there is also no wisdom ; but know 
that for him who possesses these two the sea of existence is like a grove. 



Uncompromising Idealism or the School 
of Vijnanavada Buddhism. 

The school of Buddhist philosophy known as the Vijftanavada 
or Yogacara has often been referred to by such prominent teachers 
of Hindu thought as Kumarila and Sarikara. It agrees to a great 
extent with the ^unyavadins whom we have already described. 
All the dharmas (qualities and substances) are but imaginary 
constructions of ignorant minds. There is no movement in the 
so-called external world as we suppose, for it does not exist. We 
construct it ourselves and then are ourselves deluded that it exists 
\yy\\.s&\f(nirmmitapratimohiy. There are two functions involved 
in our consciousness, viz. that which holds the perceptions (khydti 
vijndna), and that which orders them by imaginary constructions 
(vastuprativikalpavijndnd). The two functions however mutually 
determine each other and cannot be separately distinguished 
(abhinnalaksane anyonyahetuke). These functions are set to work 
on account of the beginningless instinctive tendencies inherent 
in them in relation to the world of appearance (anddikdla-pra- 
panca-vdsandhetukancd) 2 . 

All sense knowledge can be stopped only when the diverse 

1 Lankavatdrasutra, pp. 21-22. 3 Ibid. p. 44. 

D. 10 



1 46 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

unmanifested instincts of imagination are stopped (abkuta- 
parikalpa-vasand-vaicitra-nirodhdy. All our phenomenal know 
ledge is without any essence or truth (nihsvabkdva) and is but a 
creation of maya, a mirage or a dream. There is-nothing which 
may be called external, but all is the imaginary creation of the 
mind (svacittd), which has been accustomed to create imaginary 
appearances from beginningless time. This mind by whose move 
ment these creations take place as subject and object has no 
appearance in itself and is thus without any origination, existence 
and extinction (utpddasthitibhahgavarjjam) and is called the alaya- 
vijflana. The reason why this alayavijftana itself is said to be 
without origination, existence, and extinction is probably this, 
that it is always a hypothetical state which merely explains all 
the phenomenal states that appear, and therefore it has no exist 
ence in the sense in which the term is used and we could not 
affirm any special essence of it. 

We do not realize that all visible phenomena are of nothing 
external but of our own mind (svacitta), and there is also the begin 
ningless tendency for believing and creating a phenomenal world 
of appearance. There is also the nature of knowledge (which 
takes things as the perceiver and the perceived) and there is also 
the instinct in the mind to experience diverse forms. On account 
of these four reasons there are produced in the alayavijftana (mind) 
the ripples of our sense experiences (pravrttivijndna) as in a lake, 
and these are manifested as sense experiences. All the five skan- 
dhas called pancavijhdnakdya thus appear in a proper synthetic 
form. None of the phenomenal knowledge that appears is either 
identical or different from the alayavijftana just as the waves can 
not be said to be either identical or different from the ocean. As 
the ocean dances on in waves so the citta or the alayavijftana 
is also dancing as it were in its diverse operations (vrtti). As 
citta it collects all movements (karma) within it, as manas it 
synthesizes (vidhiyate) and as vijftana it constructs the fivefold 
perceptions (yijUanen vijdndti drsyam kalpate pancabhih)" 1 . 

It is only due to maya (illusion) that the phenomena appear 
in their twofold aspect as subject and object. This must always 
be regarded as an appearance (sarnvrtisatyatd) whereas in the real 
aspect we could never say whether they existed (bhdva) or did not 
exist 8 . 

1 Lankavatdrasiitra, p. 44. 8 Ibid. pp. 50-55. 

8 Asanga s MahayHnasutralamk&ra, pp. 58-59. 



v] Vijnanavada and Vedanta 147 

All phenomena both being and non-being are illusory (sada- 
santah mdyopamdk). When we look deeply into them we find that 
there is an absolute negation of all appearances, including even 
all negations, for they are also appearances. This would make the 
ultimate truth positive. But this is not so, for it is that in which 
the positive and negative are one and the same (bhdvdbhdvasa- 
mdnatd} 1 . Such a state which is complete in itself and has no 
name and no substance had been described in the Larikavatara- 
sutra as thatness (tathata)" . This state is also described in another 
place in the Lankdvatdra as voidness (sunyatd) which is one and 
has no origination and no essence 3 . In another place it is also 
designated as tathagatagarbha 4 . 

It may be supposed that this doctrine of an unqualified 
ultimate truth comes near to the Vedantic atman or Brahman 
like the tathata doctrine of Asvaghosa; and we find in Larika- 
vatara that Havana asks the Buddha " How can you say that 
your doctrine of tathagatagarbha was not the same as the atman 
doctrine of the other schools of philosophers, for those heretics 
also consider the atman as eternal, agent, unqualified, all-per 
vading and unchanged?" To this the Buddha is found to reply 
thus "Our doctrine is not the same as the doctrine of those 
heretics; it is in consideration of the fact that the instruction 
of a philosophy which considered that there was no soul or sub 
stance in anything (nairatmya) would frighten the disciples, that 
I say that all things are in reality the tathagatagarbha. This 
should not be regarded as atman. Just as a lump of clay is made 
into various shapes, so it is the non-essential nature of all 
phenomena and their freedom from all characteristics (sarvavikal- 
palaksanavinivrttam) that is variously described as the garbha 
or the nairatmya (essencelessness). This explanation of tathaga 
tagarbha as the ultimate truth and reality is given in order to 
attract to our creed those heretics who are superstitiously inclined 
to believe in the atman doctrine 6 ." 

So far as the appearance of the phenomena was concerned 
the idealistic Buddhists (yijndnavddins) agreed to the doctrine of 
pratltyasamutpada with certain modifications. There was with 
them an external pratltyasamutpada just as it appeared in the 

1 Asanga s Mahdydnasutr&lamkdra, p. 65. 

2 Lankavatarasutra, p. 70. 8 Ibid. p. 78. 

4 Ibid. p. 80. 8 Ibid. pp. 80-81. 



102 



148 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

objective aspect and an internal pratityasamutpada. The external 
pratityasamutpada (dependent origination) is represented in the 
way in which material things (e.g. a jug) came into being by the 
co-operation of diverse elements the lump of clay, the potter, 
the wheel, etc. The internal (adhydtmikd) pratityasamutpada 
was represented by avidya, trsna, karma, the skandhas, and the 
ayatanas produced out of them 1 . 

Our understanding is composed of two categories called the 
pravicayabuddhi and the vikalpalaksanagrahdbhinivesapratisthd- 
pikabuddhi. The pravicayabuddhi is that which always seeks to 
take things in either of the following four ways, that they are 
either this or the other (ekatvdnyatvd}\ either both or not both 
(ubhaydnubhayd), either are or are not (astindsti\ either eternal 
or non-eternal (nitydnityd). But in reality none of these can be 
affirmed of the phenomena. The second category consists of that 
habit of the mind by virtue of which it constructs diversities and 
arranges them (created in their turn by its own constructive activity 
parikalpa} in a logical order of diverse relations of subject and 
predicate, causal and other relations. He who knows the nature 
of these two categories of the mind knows that there is no external 
world of matter and that they are all experienced only in the; 
mind. There is no water, but it is the sense construction of 
smoothness (snehd) that constructs the water as an external sub 
stance; it is the sense construction df activity or energy that 
constructs the external substance of fire; it is the sense construc 
tion of movement that constructs the external substance of air. 
In this way through the false habit of taking the unreal as the 
real (mithydsatydbhinivesa) five skandhas appear. If these were 
to appear all together, we could not speak of any kind of causal 
relations, and if they appeared in succession there could be 
no connection between them, as there is nothing to bind them 
together. In reality there is nothing which is produced or 
destroyed, it is only our constructive imagination that builds up 
things as perceived with all their relations, and ourselves as per- 
ceivers. It is simply a convention (yyavahdra) to speak of things 
as known 2 . Whatever we designate by speech is mere speech- 
construction (ydgvikalpa} and unreal. In speech one could not 
speak of anything without relating things in some kind of causal 

1 Lankdvatdrasutra, p. 85. 

a Lankdvatdrasutra, p. 87, compare the term " vyavaharika " as used of the pheno 
menal and the conventional world in almost the same sense by Sahkara. 



v] Voidness of all phenomena 149 

relation, but none of these characters may be said to be true; 
the real truth (paramdrtha) can never be referred to by such 
speech-construction. 

The nothingness (siinyata) of things may be viewed from 
seven aspects (i) that they are alwaysjnterdependent, and hence 
have no special characteristics by themselves, and as they cannot 
be determined in themselves they cannot be determined in terms 
of others, for, their own nature being undetermined, a reference 
to an " other " is also undetermined, and hence they are all in 
definable (laksanasunyata) ; (2) that they haygjno positive jssence 
(bhdvasvabhdvasunyata), since they spring up from a natural non- 
existence (svabhdvdbhdvotpatti); (3) that they are_oLaO--unkr4Own 
type of noji-exjstence (apracaritasiinyata), since all the skandhas 
vanish in the nirvana; (4) that they appear phenomenally as^con- 
nected though non-existent (pracaritasunyatd), for their skandhas 
have no reality in themselves nor are they related to others, but 
yet they appear to be somehow causally connected ; (5) that none 
of the things can be described as having any definite nature, 
they are all undemonstrable by language (nirabhilapyasunyata) ; 
(6) that there cannot be any knowledge^aliQiiLlherrL except that 
which is brought about by the long-standing defects of desires 
which pollute all our vision ; (7) that things are also non-existent 
in the sense that we affirm them to be in a particular place and 
time in which they are not (itaretarasunyatd). 

There is thus only non-existence, which again is neither eternal 
nor destructible, and the world is but a dream and a maya ; the 
two kinds of negation (nirodhd) are akasa (space) and nirvana ; 
things which are neither existent nor non-existent are only 
imagined to be existent by fools. 

This view apparently comes into conflict with the doctrine of 
this school, that the reality is called the tathagatagarbha (the 
womb of all that is merged in thatness) and all the phenomenal 
appearances of the clusters (skandhas}, elements (dhdtus), and 
fields of sense operation (dyatanas) only serve to veil it with 
impurities, and this would bring it nearer to the assumption of a 
universal soul as the reality. But the Lankdvatdra attempts to 
explain away this conflict by suggesting that the reference to 
the tathagatagarbha as the reality is only a sort of false bait to 
attract those who are afraid of listening to the nairatmya (non- 
soul) doctrine 1 . 

1 Lank&vatarasutra, p. 80. 



1 50 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

The Bodhisattvas may attain their highest by the fourfold 
knowledge of (i) svacittadrsyabhdvand, (2) utpddasthitibhanga- 
vivarjjanata, (3) bdhyabhavabhavopalaksanata and (4) svapra- 
tydryyajndnddhigamdbhinnalaksanatd. The first means that all 
things are but creations of the imagination of one s mind. The 
second means that as things have no essence there is no origina 
tion, existence or destruction. The third means that one should 
know the distinctive sense in which all external things are said 
either to be existent or non-existent, for their existence is merely 
like the mirage which is produced by the beginningless desire 
(vdsana) of creating and perceiving the manifold. This brings us 
to the fourth one, which means the right comprehension of the 
nature of all things. 

The four dhyanas spoken of in the Lankdvatdra seem to be 
different from those which have been described in connection with 
the Theravada Buddhism. These dhyanas are called (i) bdlo- 
pacdrika, (2) arthapravicaya, (3) tathatalambana and (4) tathd- 
gata. The first one is said to be that practised by the ravakas 
and the pratyekabuddhas. It consists in concentrating upon the 
doctrine that there is no soul (pudgalanairdtmyd), and that every 
thing is transitory, miserable and impure. When considering all 
things in this way from beginning to end the sage advances on 
till all conceptual knowing ceases (dsamjndnirodhdt); we have 
what is called the valopacarika dhyana (the meditation for be 
ginners). 

The second is the advanced state where not only there is 
full consciousness that there is no self, but there is also the com 
prehension that neither these nor the doctrines of other heretics 
may be said to exist, and that there is none of the dharmas that 
appears. This is called the arthapravicayadkydna, for the sage 
concentrates here on the subject of thoroughly seeking out (pra- 
vicayd) the nature of all things (arthd). 

The third dhyana, that in which the mind realizes that the 
thought that there is no self nor that there are the appearances, 
is itself the result of imagination and thus lapses into the thatness 
(tathata). This dhyana is called tathatalambana^ because it has for 
its object tathata or thatness. 

The last or the fourth dhyana is that in which the lapse of 
the mind into the state of thatness is such that the nothingness 
and incomprehensibility of all phenomena is perfectly realized; 



v] Ultimate goal 1 5 1 

and nirvana is that in which all root desires (vdsana) manifesting 
themselves in knowledge are destroyed and the mind with know 
ledge and perceptions, making false creations, ceases to work. This 
cannot be called death, for it will not have any rebirth and it can 
not be called destruction, for only compounded things (samskrtd) 
suffer destruction, so that it is different from either death or 
destruction. This nirvana is different from that of the s"ravakas 
and the pratyekabuddhas for they are satisfied to call that state 
nirvana, in which by the knowledge of the general characteristics 
of all things (transitoriness and misery) they are not attached to 
things and cease to make erroneous judgments 1 . 

Thus we see that there is no cause (in the sense of ground) 
of all these phenomena as other heretics maintain. When it is 
said that the world is maya or illusion, what is meant to be 
emphasized is this, that there is no cause, no ground. The pheno 
mena that seem to originate, stay, and be destroyed are mere 
constructions of tainted imagination, and the tathata or thatness 
is nothing but the turning away of this constructive activity or 
nature of the imagination (vikalpa) tainted with the associations 
of beginningless root desires (vasana)*. The tathata has no 
separate reality from illusion, but it is illusion itself when the 
course of the construction of illusion has ceased. It is therefore 
also spoken of as that which is cut off or detached from the mind 
(cittavimukta\ for here there is no construction of imagination 
(sarvakalpandvirahitam)*. 

Sautrantika Theory of Perception. 

Dharmottara (847 A.D.), a commentator of Dharmakirtti s 4 
(about 635 A.D.) Nydyabindu, a Sautrantika logical and episte- 
mological work, describes right knowledge (samyagjnana) as an 
invariable antecedent to the accomplishment of all that a man 

1 Lankdvatdrasutra, p. 100. 2 Ibid. p. 109. 

8 This account of the Vijftanavada school is collected mainly from Lankavatara- 
sutra, as no other authentic work of the Vijfianavada school is available. Hindu 
accounts and criticisms of this school may be had in such books as Rumania s Sloka 
vdrttika or Sahkara s bhasya, II. ii, etc. Asanga s Mahayanasutralamkara deals more 
with the duties concerning the career of a saint (Bodhisattva) than with the metaphysics 
of the system. 

4 Dharmaklrtti calls himself an adherent of Vijnanavada in his Santdndntara- 
siddhi, a treatise on solipsism, but his Nyayabitidu seems rightly to have been considered 
by the author of Nyayabindutikdtippani (p. 19) as being written from the Sautrantika 
point of view. 



152 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

desires to have (samyagjitdnapurvikd sarvapurusdrthasiddhiy. 
When on proceeding, in accordance with the presentation of % any 
knowledge, we get a thing as presented by it we call it right 
knowledge. Right knowledge is thus the knowledge by which one 
can practically acquire the thing he wants to acquire (arthddhi- 
gati). The process of knowledge, therefore, starts with the per 
ceptual presentation and ends with the attainment of the thing 
represented by it and the fulfilment of the practical need by it 
(arthddhigamdt samdptah pramdnavydpdrati). Thus there are 
three moments in the perceptual acquirement of knowledge : 
(i) the presentation, (2) our prompting in accordance with it, 
and (3) the final realization of the object in accordance with 
our endeavour following the direction of knowledge. Inference 
is also to be called right knowledge, as it also serves our practical 
need by representing the presence of objects in certain connec 
tions and helping us to realize them. In perception this presen 
tation is direct, while in inference this is brought about indirectly 
through the liriga (reason). Knowledge is sought by men for the 
realization of their ends, and the subject of knowledge is dis 
cussed in philosophical works only because knowledge is sought 
by men. Any knowledge, therefore, which will not lead us to 
the realization of the object represented by it could not be called 
right knowledge. All illusory perceptions, therefore, such as the 
perception of a white conch-shell as yellow or dream perceptions, 
are not right knowledge, since they do not lead to the realization 
of such objects as are presented by them. It is true no doubt 
that since all objects are momentary, the object which was per 
ceived at the moment of perception was not the same as that 
which was realized at a later moment. But the series of existents 
which started with the first perception of a blue object finds itself 
realized by the realization of other existents of the same series 
(nllddau ya eva santdnah paricchinno nllajndnena sa eva tena 
prdpitah tena nllajndnam pramdnam}*. 

When it is said that right knowledge is an invariable ante 
cedent of the realization of any desirable thing or the retarding 
of any undesirable thing, it must be noted that it is not meant 

1 Brief extracts from the opinions of two other commentators of Nyayabindu, 
Vinltadeva and 6antabha.dra (seventh century), are found in Nyayabindutikatippani, 
a commentary of Nyayabindutika of Dharmmottara, but their texts are not available 
to us. 

2 Nyayabindutikatippani, p. n. 



v] Theory of Perception 153 

that right knowledge is directly the cause of it ; for, with the rise 
of any right perception there is a memory of past experiences, 
desire is aroused, through desire an endeavour in accordance with 
it is launched, and as a result of that there is realization of the 
object of desire. Thus, looked at from this point of view, right 
knowledge is not directly the cause of the realization of the object. 
Right knowledge of course directly indicates the presentation, the 
object of desire, but so far as the object is a mere presentation it 
is not a subject of enquiry. It becomes a subject of enquiry only in 
connection with our achieving the object presented by perception. 
Perception (pratyaksd) has been defined by Dharmaklrtti as 
a presentation, which is generated by the objects alone, unasso- 
ciated by any names or relations (kalpand} and which is not 
erroneous (kalpandpodhamabhrdntamy. This definition does not 
indeed represent the actual nature (svarufa) of perception, but only 
shows the condition which must be fulfilled in order that anything 
may be valid perception. What is meant by saying that a per 
ception is not erroneous is simply this, that it will be such that 
if one engages himself in an endeavour in accordance with it, 
he will not be baffled in the object which was presented to him 
by his perception (tasmddgrdhye qrthe vasturiipe yadaviparyastam 
tadabhrdntamiha veditavyam). It is said that a right perception 
could not be associated with names (kalpand or abhildpd). This 
qualification is added only with a view of leaving out all that is not 
directly generated by the object. A name is given to a thing 
only when it is associated in the mind, through memory, as being 
the same as perceived before. This cannot, therefore, be regarded 
as being produced by the object of perception. The senses present 
the objects by coming in contact with them, and the objects also 
must of necessity allow themselves to be presented as they are 
when they are in contact with the proper senses. But the work 
of recognition or giving names is not what is directly produced 
by the objects themselves, for this involves the unification of 
previous experiences, and this is certainly not what is presented 

1 The definition first given in the Pramanasamuccaya (not available in Sanskrit) of 
Dinnaga (500 A.D.) was " Kalpanapodham." According to Dharmakirtti it is the in 
determinate knowledge (nirvikalpa j fldna) consisting only of the copy of the object 
presented to the senses that constitutes the valid element presented to perception. 
The determinate knowledge (savikalpajftdna), as formed by the conceptual activity of 
the mind identifying the object with what has been experienced before, cannot be 
regarded as truly representing what is really presented to the senses. 



1 54 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

to the sense (purvadrstdparadrstancdrthamekikurvadvijndnam- 
asannihitavisayam purvadrstasydsannihitatvdf). In all illusory 
perceptions it is the sense which is affected either by extraneous 
or by inherent physiological causes. If the senses are not per 
verted they are bound to present the object correctly. Perception 
thus means the correct presentation through the senses of an 
object in its own uniqueness as containing only those features 
which are its and its alone (svalaksanam). The validity of know 
ledge consists in the sameness that it has with the objects presented 
by it (arthena saha yatsdrupyam sddrsyamasya jndnasya tatpra- 
mdnamiha). But the objection here is that if our percept is only 
similar to the external object then this similarity is a thing which 
is different from the presentation, and thus perception becomes 
invalid. But the similarity is not different from the percept which 
appears as being similar to the object It is by virtue of their 
sameness that we refer to the object by the percept (taditi sdrupyam 
tasya vasdt) and our perception of the object becomes possible. 
It is because we have an awareness of blueness that we speak of 
having perceived a blue object. The relation, however, between 
the notion of similarity of the perception with the blue object and 
the indefinite awareness of blue in perception is not one of 
causation but of a determinant and a determinate (yyavasthdpya- 
vyavasthdpakabhdvena). Thus it is the same cognition which in 
one form stands as signifying the similarity with the object of 
perception and is in another indefinite form the awareness as the 
percept (tata ekasya vastunah kincidrupam pramdnam kincitpra- 
mdnaphalam na virudhyate). It is on account of this similarity 
with the object that a cognition can be a determinant of the 
definite awareness (yyavasthdpanaheturhi sdrupyam), so that by 
the determinate we know the determinant and thus by the 
similarity of the sense-datum with the object (pramdna) we come 
to think that our awareness has this particular form as "blue" 
(pramdnaphala). If this sameness between the knowledge and its 
object was not felt we could not have spoken of the object from 
the awareness (sdrupyamanubhutam vyavasthdpanahetuft). The 
object generates an awareness similar to itself, and it is this 
correspondence that can lead us to the realization of the object 
so presented by right knowledge 1 . 

1 See also pp. 340 and 409. It is unfortunate that, excepting the Nydyabindu, 
Nydyabindutikd, Nydyabindutikatippani (St Petersburg, 1909), no other works dealing 
with this interesting doctrine of perception are available to us. Nydyabindu is probably 



v] Inference 155 



Sautrantika theory of Inference 1 . 

According to the Sautrantika doctrine of Buddhism as de 
scribed by Dharmaklrtti and Dharmmottara which is probably the 
only account of systematic Buddhist logic that is now available to 
us in Sanskrit, inference (anumdna) is divided into two classes, 
called svarthanumana (inferential knowledge attained by a person 
arguing in his own mind or judgments), and pararthanumana (in 
ference through the help of articulated propositions for convincing 
others in a debate). The validity of inference depended, like the 
validity of perception, on copying the actually existing facts of 
the external world. Inference copied external realities as much 
as perception did ; just as the validity of the immediate perception 
of blue depends upon its similarity to the external blue thing 
perceived, so the validity of the inference of a blue thing also, 
so far as it is knowledge, depends upon its resemblance to the 
external fact thus inferred (sdrupyavasaddhi tannllapratitirupam 
sidhyati}. 

The reason by which an inference is made should be such 
that it may be present only in those cases where the thing to 
be inferred exists, and absent in every case where it does not 
exist. It is only when the reason is tested by both these joint 
conditions that an unfailing connection ( prattbandha) between 
the reason and the thing to be inferred can be established. It is 
not enough that the reason should be present in all cases where 
the thing to be inferred exists and absent where it does not 
exist, but it is necessary that it should be present only in the 
above case. This law (niyamd) is essential for establishing 
the unfailing condition necessary for inference 2 . This unfailing 
natural connection (svabhdvapratibandhd) is found in two types 

one of the earliest works in which we hear of the doctrine of arthakriyakaritva (practical 
fulfilment of our desire as a criterion of right knowledge). Later on it was regarded 
as a criterion of existence, as Ratnakirtti s works and the profuse references by Hindu 
writers to the Buddhistic doctrines prove. The word arthakriyd is found in Candra- 
klrtti s commentary on Nagarjunaand also in such early works as Lalitavistara (pointed 
out to me by Dr E. J. Thomas of the Cambridge University Library) but the word 
has no philosophical significance there. 

1 As the Pramanasamuccaya of Dihnaga is not available in Sanskrit, we can hardly 
know anything of developed Buddhist logic except what can be got from the Nyaya- 
bindutika of Dharmmottara. 

2 tasmat niyamauatorevdnvayavyatirekayoh prayogah karttavyah yena pratibandko 
gamy eta sadhanyasa sddhyena. Nyayabindutika, p. 44. 



156 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

of cases. The first is that where the nature of the reason is con 
tained in the thing to be inferred as a part of its nature, i.e. where 
the reason stands for a species of which the thing to be inferred 
is a genus; thus a stupid person living in a place full of tall pines 
may come to think that pines are called trees because they are 
tall and it may be useful to point out to him that even a small 
pine plant is a tree because it is pine; the quality of pineness 
forms a part of the essence of treeness, for the former being 
a species is contained in the latter as a genus ; the nature of the 
species being identical with the nature of the genus, one could 
infer the latter from the former but not vice versa; this is called 
the unfailing natural connection of identity of nature (tdddtmyd). 
The second is that where the cause is inferred from the effect 
which stands as the reason of the former. Thus from the smoke 
the fire which has produced it may be inferred. The ground of 
these inferences is that reason is naturally indissolubly connected 
with the thing to be inferred, and unless this is the case, no 
inference is warrantable. 

This natural indissoluble connection (svabhdvapratibandha), 
be it of the nature of identity of essence of the species in the 
genus or inseparable connection of the effect with the cause, is 
the ground of all inference 1 . The svabhavapratibandha deter 
mines the inseparability of connection (avinabhavaniyama) and 
the inference is made not through a series of premisses but 
directly by the liriga (reason) which has the inseparable con 
nection 8 . 

The second type of inference known as pararthanumana 
agrees with svarthanumana in all essential characteristics; the 
main difference between the two is this, that in the case of 
pararthanumana, the inferential process has to be put verbally in 
premisses. 

Pandit Ratnakarasanti, probably of the ninth or the tenth cen 
tury A.D., wrote a paper named Antarvyaptisamarthana in which 

1 na hi yo yalra svabhavena na pratibaddhah sa tarn apratibaddhavisayamavaiya- 
meva na vyabhicaratiti nasti tayoravyabhicaraniyamah. Nyayabindutika, p. 29. 

2 The inseparable connection determining inference is only possible when the 
linga satisfies the three following conditions, viz. (i) paksasattva (existence of the 
linga in the paksa the thing about which something is inferred) ; (2) sapaksasattva 
(existence of the linga in those cases where the sadhya or probandum existed), and 
(3) vipaksasattva (its non-existence in all those places where the sadhya did not exist). 
The Buddhists admitted three propositions in a syllogism, e.g. The hill has fire, because 
it has smoke, like a kitchen but unlike a lake. 



v] Inference 157 

he tried to show that the concomitance is not between those 
cases which possess the liriga or reason with the cases which 
possess the sadhya (probandum) but between that which has the 
characteristics of the liriga with that which has the characteristics 
of the sadhya (probandum); or in other words the concomitance 
is not between the places containing the smoke such as kitchen, 
etc., and the places containing fire but between that which has the 
characteristic of the liriga, viz. the smoke, and that which has the 
characteristic of the sadhya, viz. the fire. This view of the nature 
of concomitance is known as inner concomitance (antarvyapti), 
whereas the former, viz. the concomitance between the thing 
possessing liriga and that possessing sadhya, is known as outer 
concomitance (bahirvyapti} and generally accepted by the Nyaya 
school of thought. This antarvyapti doctrine of concomitance is 
indeed a later Buddhist doctrine. 

It may not be out of place here to remark that evidences of 
some form of Buddhist logic probably go back at least as early 
as the Kathdvatthu (200 B.C.). Thus Aung on the evidence of 
the Yamaka points out that Buddhist logic a t the time of Asoka 
"was conversant with the distribution of terms" and the process 
of conversion. He further points out that the logical premisses 
such as the udaharana ( Yo yo aggimd so so dhumava whatever is 
fiery is -smoky), the upanayana (ayam pabbato dhumava this 
hill is smoky) and the niggama (tasmddayam aggimd therefore 
that is fiery) were also known. (Aung further sums up the 
method of the arguments which are found in the Kathdvatthu as 
follows: 

"Adherent. Is A J3? (thdpana). 
Opponent. Yes. 
Adherent. Is CD} (pdpand). 
Opponent. No. 
Adherent. But if A be B then (you should have said) C is D. 

That B can be affirmed of A but D of C is false. 

Hence your first answer is refuted.") 

The antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed 
thapana, because the opponent s position, A is , is conditionally 
established for the purpose of refutation. 

The consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed 
papana because it is got from the antecedent. And the con- 



158 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

elusion is termed ropana because the regulation is placed on the 
opponent. Next: 

"If D be derived of C. 
Then B should have been derived of A. 
But you affirmed B of A. 

(therefore) That B can be affirmed of A but not of D or C is 
wrong." 

This is the patiloma, inverse or indirect method, as contrasted 
with the former or direct method, anuloma. In both methods the 
consequent is derived. But if we reverse the hypothetical major 
in the latter method we get 

If A is B CisD. 
But A is B. 
Therefore C is D. 

By this indirect method the opponent s second answer is re 
established 1 ." 

The Doctrine of Momentariness. 

Ratnakirtti (950 A.D.) sought to prove the momentariness of 
all existence (sattva), first, by the concomitance discovered by the 
method of agreement in presence (anvayavydpti), and then by the 
method of difference by proving that the production of effects 
could not be justified on the assumption of things being per 
manent and hence accepting the doctrine of momentariness 
as the only alternative. Existence is defined as the capacity of 
producing anything (arthakriydkaritva). The form of the first 
type of argument by anvayavyapti may be given thus: "What 
ever exists is momentary, by virtue of its existence, as for example 
the jug; all things about the momentariness of which we are dis 
cussing are existents and are therefore momentary." It cannot 
be said that the jug which has been chosen as an example of an 
existent is not momentary; for the jug is producing certain 
effects at the present moment; and it cannot be held that these 
are all identical in the past and the future or that it is producing 
no effect at all in the past and future, for the first is impossible, 
for those which are done now could not be done again in the 
future; the second is impossible, for if it has any capacity to 

1 See introduction to the translation of Kathavatthu (Points of Controversy) by 
Mrs Rhys Davids. 



v] Momentariness 159 

produce effects it must not cease doing so, as in thai case one 
might as well expect that there should not be any effect even at 
the present moment. Whatever has the capacity of producing 
anything at any time must of necessity do it. So if it does pro 
duce at one moment and does not produce at another, this 
contradiction will prove the supposition that the things were 
different at the different moments. If it is held that the nature 
of production varies at different moments, then also the thing at 
those two moments must be different, for a thing could not have 
in it two contradictory capacities. 

Since the jug does not produce at the present moment the 
work of the past and the future moments, it cannot evidently do 
so, and hence is not identical with the jug in the past and in the 
future, for the fact that the jug has the capacity and has not the 
capacity as well, proves that it is not the same jug at the two 
moments (saktdsaktasvabhdvatayd pratiksanam bhedati). The 
capacity of producing effects (arthakriydsakti), which is but the 
other name of existence, is universally concomitant with momen- 
tariness (ksanikatvavydpta). 

The Nyaya school of philosophy objects to this view and says 
that the capacity of anything cannot be known until the effect 
produced is known, and if capacity to produce effects be regarded 
as existence or being, then the being or existence of the effect 
cannot be known, until that has produced another effect and 
that another ad infinitum. Since there can be no being that has 
not capacity of producing effects, and as this capacity can 
demonstrate itself only in an infinite chain, it will be impossible 
to know any being or to affirm the capacity of producing effects 
as the definition of existence. Moreover if all things were 
momentary there would be no permanent perceiver to observe 
the change, and there being nothing fixed there could hardly be 
any means even of taking to any kind of inference. To this 
Ratnaklrtti replies that capacity (sdmarthyd) cannot be denied, 
for it is demonstrated even in making the denial. The observation 
of any concomitance in agreement in presence, or agreement in 
absence, does not require any permanent observer, for under 
certain conditions of agreement there is the knowledge of the 
concomitance of agreement in presence, and in other conditions 
there is the knowledge of the concomitance in absence. This 
knowledge of concomitance atthe succeeding momentholds within 



160 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

itself the experience of the conditions of the preceding moment, 
and this alone is what we find and not any permanent observer. 

The Buddhist definition of being or existence (sattva) is 
indeed capacity, and we arrived at this when it was observed that 
in all proved cases capacity was all that could be defined of 
being; seed was but the capacity of producing shoots, and 
even if this capacity should require further capacity to produce 
effects, the fact which has been perceived still remains, viz. that 
the existence of seeds is nothing but the capacity of producing 
the shoots and thus there is no vicious infinite 1 . Though things are 
momentary, yet we could have concomitance between things only 
so long as their apparent forms are not different (atadriipa- 
pardvrttayoreva sddhyasddhanayoh pratyaksena vydptigrahandf). 
The vyapti or concomitance of any two things (e.g. the fire and 
the smoke) is based on extreme similarity and not on identity. 

Another objection raised against the doctrine of momentariness 
is this, that a cause (e.g. seed) must wait for a number of other 
collocations of earth, water, etc., before it can produce the effect 
(e.g. the shoots) and hence the doctrine must fail. To this Ratna- 
klrtti replies that the seed does not exist before and produce the 
effect when joined by other collocations, but such is the special 
effectiveness of a particular seed-moment, that it produces both 
the collocations or conditions as well as the effect, the shoot. 
How a special seed-moment became endowed with such special 
effectiveness is to be sought in other causal moments which 
preceded it, and on which it was dependent. Ratnaklrtti wishes to 
draw attention to the fact that as one perceptual moment reveals 
a number of objects, so one causal moment may produce a number 
of effects. Thus he says that the inference that whatever has 
being is momentary is valid and free from any fallacy. 

It is not important to enlarge upon the second part of 
Ratnaklrtti s arguments in which he tries to show that the pro 
duction of effects could not be explained if we did not suppose 

1 The distinction between vicious and harmless infinites was known to the Indians 
at least as early as the sixth or the seventh century. Jayanta quotes a passage which 
differentiates the two clearly (Nydyamanjari, p. 22) : 

" mulaksatikarimahuranavastham hi dusanam. 

mulasiddhau tvarucydpi ndnavasthd nivdryate." 

The infinite regress that has to be gone through in order to arrive at the root 
matter awaiting to be solved destroys the root and is hence vicious, whereas if the 
root is saved there is no harm in a regress though one may not be willing to have it. 



v] Momentariness 1 6 1 

all things to be momentary, for this is more an attempt to refute 
the doctrines of Nyaya than an elaboration of the Buddhist 
principles. 

The doctrine of momentariness ought to be a direct corollary 
of the Buddhist metaphysics. But it is curious that though all 
dharmas were regarded as changing, the fact that they were all 
strictly momentary (ksanika i.e. existing only for one moment) 
was not emphasized in early Pali literature. Asvaghosa in his 
Sraddhotpadasastra speaks of all skandhas as ksanika (Suzuki s 
translation, p. 105). Buddhaghosa also speaks of the meditation 
of the khandhas as khanika in his Visuddhimagga. But from the 
seventh century A.D. till the tenth century this doctrine together 
with the doctrine of arthakriyakaritva received great attention at 
the hands of the Sautrantikas and the Vaibhasikas. All the 
Nyaya and Vedanta literature of this period is full of refutations 
and criticisms of these doctrines. The only Buddhist account 
available of the doctrine of momentariness is from the pen of 
Ratnaklrtti. Some of the general features of his argument in 
favour of the view have been given above. Elaborate accounts of it 
may be found in any of the important Nyaya works of this period 
such as NyQyamaftjari, Tdtparyyatlkd of Vacaspati Misra, etc. 

Buddhism did not at any time believe anything to be per 
manent. With the development of this doctrine they gave great 
emphasis to this point. Things came to view at one moment and 
the next moment they were destroyed. Whatever is existent is 
momentary. It is said that our notion of permanence is derived 
from the notion of permanence of ourselves, but Buddhism denied 
the existence of any such permanent selves. What appears as 
self is but the bundle of ideas, emotions, and active tendencies 
manifesting at any particular moment. The next moment these 
dissolve, and new bundles determined by the preceding ones 
appear and so on. The present thought is thus the only thinker. 
Apart from the emotions, ideas, and active tendencies, we cannot 
discover any separate self or soul. It is the combined product of 
these ideas, emotions, etc., that yield the illusory appearance of 
self at any moment. The consciousness of self is the resultant pro 
duct as it were of the combination of ideas, emotions, etc., at any 
particular moment. As these ideas, emotions, etc., change every 
moment there is no such thing as a permanent self. 

The fact that I remember that I have been existing for 

D. II 



1 62 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

a long time past does not prove that a permanent self has been 
existing for such a long period. When I say this is that book, I 
perceive the book with my eye at the present moment, but that 
"this book" is the same as "that book" (i.e. the book arising in 
memory), cannot be perceived by the senses. It is evident 
that the "that book" of memory refers to a book seen in the 
past, whereas "this book " refers to the book which is before 
my eyes. The feeling of identity which is adduced to prove per 
manence is thus due to a confusion between an object of memory 
referring to a past and different object with the object as perceived 
at the present moment by the senses 1 . This is true not only of 
all recognition of identity and permanence of external objects but 
also of the perception of the identity of self, for the perception of 
self-identity results from the confusion of certain ideas or emotions 
arising in memory with similar ideas of the present moment. But 
since memory points to an object of past perception, and the per 
ception to another object of the present moment, identity cannot 
be proved by a confusion of the two. Every moment all objects 
of the world are suffering dissolution and destruction, but yet 
things appear to persist, and destruction cannot often be noticed. 
Our hair and nails grow and are cut, but yet we think that we 
have the same hair and nail that we had before, in place of old 
hairs new ones similar to them have sprung forth, and they leave 
the impression as if the old ones were persisting. So it is that 
though things are destroyed every moment, others similar to 
these often rise into being and are destroyed the next moment 
and so on, and these similar things succeeding in a series produce 
the impression that it is one and the same thing which has been 
persisting through all the passing moments 2 . Just as the flame 
of a candle is changing every moment and yet it seems to us as 
if we have been perceiving the same flame all the while, so 
all our bodies, our ideas, emotions, etc., all external objects 
around us are being destroyed every moment, and new ones are 
being generated at every succeeding moment, but so long as the 
objects of the succeeding moments are similar to those of the 
preceding moments, it appears to us that things have remained 
the same and no destruction has taken place. 

1 See pratyabhijnanirasa of the Buddhists, Nyayamanjari, V.S. Series, pp. 449, etc. 

2 See Tarkarahasyadipikd of Gunaratna, p. 30, and also Nyayamanjari, V.S. 
edition, p. 450. 



v] Causal Efficiency 1 63 

The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine 
of Causal Efficiency (Arthakriyakaritva). 

It appears that a thing or a phenomenon may be defined from 
the Buddhist point of view as being the combination of diverse 
characteristics 1 . What we call a thing is but a conglomeration of 
diverse characteristics which are found to affect, determine or 
influence other conglomerations appearing as sentient or as 
inanimate bodies. So long as the characteristics forming the 
elements of any conglomeration remain perfectly the same, the 
conglomeration may be said to be the same. As soon as any of 
these characteristics is supplanted by any other new characteristic, 
the conglomeration is to be called a new one 2 . Existence or 
being of things means the work that any conglomeration does or 
the influence that it exerts on other conglomerations. This in 
Sanskrit is called arthakriydkdritva which literally translated 
means the power of performing actions and purposes of some 
kind 3 . The criterion of existence or being is the performance of 
certain specific actions, or rather existence means that a certain 
effect has been produced in some way (causal efficiency). That 
which has produced such an effect is then called existent or sat. 
Any change in the effect thus produced means a corresponding 
change of existence. Now, that selfsame definite specific effect 

1 Compare Milindapanha, n. i. i The Chariot Simile. 

2 Compare Tarkarahasyadipika of Gunaratna, A. S. s edition, pp. 34, 28 and 
Nyayamanjarf, V.S. edition, pp. 445, etc., and also the paper on Ksanabhanga- 
siddhi by Ratnaklrtti in Six Buddhist Nyaya tracts. 

3 This meaning of the word "arthakriyakaritva" is different from the meaning of 
the word as we found in the section "sautrantika theory of perception." But we find 
the development of this meaning both in Ratnaklrtti as well as in Nyaya writers who 
referred to this doctrine. With Vinitadeva (seventh century A. D.) the word " arthakriya- 
siddhi" meant the fulfilment of any need such as the cooking of rice by fire (artha- 
Sabdena prayojanamucyate purusasya prayojanam darupakadi tasya siddhih nispattih 
the word artha means need ; the need of man such as cooking by logs, etc. ; siddhi of 
that, means accomplishment). With Dharmottara who flourished about a century and 
a half later arlhasiddhi means action (anusthiti) with reference to undesirable and 
desirable objects (heyopadeyarthavisaya). But with Ratnaklrtti (950 A.D.) the word 
arthakriyakaritva has an entirely different sense. It means with him efficiency of 
producing any action or event, and as such it is regarded as the characteristic definition 
of existence (sattva). Thus he says in his Ksanabhangasiddhi, pp. 20, 21, that though 
in different philosophies there are different definitions of existence or being, he will 
open his argument with the universally accepted definition of existence as arthakriya 
karitva (efficiency of causing any action or event). Whenever Hindu writers after 
Ratnakirtti refer to the Buddhist doctrine of arthakriyakaritva they usually refer to this 
doctrine in Ratnakirtti s sense. 

II 2 



164 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

which is produced now was never produced before, and cannot 
be repeated in the future, for that identical effect which is once 
produced cannot be produced again. So the effects produced in 
us by objects at different moments of time may be similar but 
cannot be identical. Each moment is associated with a new effect 
and each new effect thus produced means in each case the coming 
into being of a correspondingly new existence of things. If things 
were permanent there would be no reason why they should be 
performing different effects at different points of time. Any 
difference in the effect produced, whether due to the thing itself 
or its combination with other accessories, justifies us in asserting 
that the thing has changed and a new one has come in its place. 
The existence of a jug for example is known by the power it 
has of forcing itself upon our minds; if it had no such power 
then we could not have said that it existed. We can have no 
notion of the meaning of existence other than the impression 
produced on us; this impression is nothing else but the power 
exerted by things on us, for there is no reason why one should 
hold that beyond such powers as are associated with the pro 
duction of impressions or effects there should be some other 
permanent entity to which the power adhered, and which existed 
even when the power was not exerted. We perceive the power 
of producing effects and define each unit of such power as 
amounting to a unit of existence. And as there would be 
different units of power at different moments, there should also 
be as many new existences, i.e. existents must be regarded as 
momentary, existing at each moment that exerts a new power. 
This definition of existence naturally brings in the doctrine of 
momentariness shown by Ratnaklrtti. 

Some Ontological Problems on which the 
Different Indian Systems Diverged. 

We cannot close our examination of Buddhist philosophy 
without briefly referring to its views on some ontological problems 
which were favourite subjects of discussion in almost all philo 
sophical circles of India. These are in brief: (i) the relation of 
cause and effect, (2) the relation of the whole (avayavi} and the 
part (avayava\ (3) the relation of generality (s&mdnya) to the 
specific individuals, (4) the relation of attributes or qualities and 
the substance and the problem of the relation of inherence, (5) the 



v] Ontological Problems 165 

relation of power (sakti) to the power-possessor (saktimdri). Thus 
on the relation of cause and effect, &arikara held that cause alone 
was permanent, real, and all effects as such were but impermanent 
illusions due to ignorance, Samkhya held that there was no 
difference between cause and effect, except that the former was 
only the earlier stage which when transformed through certain 
changes became the effect. The history of any causal activity is 
the history of the transformation of the cause into the effects. 
Buddhism holds everything to be momentary, so neither cause nor 
effect can abide. One is called the effect because its momentary 
existence has been determined by the destruction of its momen 
tary antecedent called the cause. There is no permanent reality 
which undergoes the change, but one change is determined by 
another and this determination is nothing more than "that 
happening, this happened." On the relation of parts to whole, 
Buddhism does not believe in the existence of wholes. According 
to it, it is the parts which illusorily appear as the whole, the 
individual atoms rise into being and die the next moment and 
thus there is no such thing as " whole 1 ." The Buddhists hold again 
that there are no universals, for it is the individuals alone which 
come and go. There are my five fingers as individuals but there 
is no such thing as fingerness (angulitva) as the abstract universal 
of the fingers. On the relation of attributes and substance we 
know that the Sautrantika Buddhists did not believe in the exist 
ence of any substance apart from its attributes ; what we call a 
substance is but a unit capable of producing a unit of sensation. 
In the external world there are as many individual simple units 
(atoms) as there are points of sensations. Corresponding to each 
unit of sensation there is a separate simple unit in the objective 
world. Our perception of a thing is thus the perception of the 
assemblage of these sensations. In the objective world also there 
are no substances but atoms or reals, each representing a unit of 
sensation, force or attribute, rising into being and dying the next 
moment. Buddhism thus denies the existence of any such rela 
tion as that of inherence (samavayd) in which relation the attri 
butes are said to exist in the substance, for since there are no 
separate substances there is no necessity for admitting the relation 
of inherence. Following the same logic Buddhism also does not 

1 See Avayavinirdkarana, Six Buddhist Nydya tracts, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 
1910. 



1 66 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. 

believe in the existence of a power-possessor separate from the 
power. 

Brief survey of the evolution of Buddhist Thought. 

In the earliest period of Buddhism more attention was paid 
to the four noble truths than to systematic metaphysics. What 
was sorrow, what was the cause of sorrow, what was the cessation 
of sorrow and what could lead to it ? The doctrine of paticcasa- 
muppdda was offered only to explain how sorrow came in and 
not with a view to the solving of a metaphysical problem. The 
discussion of ultimate metaphysical problems, such as whether 
the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathagata 
existed after death or not, were considered as heresies in early 
Buddhism. Great emphasis was laid on slla, samadhi and pafifia 
and the doctrine that there was no soul. The Abhidhammas 
hardly give us any new philosophy which was not contained in 
the Suttas. They only elaborated the materials of the suttas with 
enumerations and definitions. With the evolution of Mahaynna 
scriptures from some time about 200 B.C. the doctrine of the non- 
essentialness and voidness of all dhammas began to be preached. 
This doctrine, which was taken up and elaborated by Nagarjuna, 
Aryyadeva, Kumarajlva and Candraklrtti, is more or less a co 
rollary from the older doctrine of Buddhism. If one could not 
say whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a 
Tathagata existed or did not exist after death, and if there was 
no permanent soul and all the dhammas were changing, the only 
legitimate way of thinking about all things appeared to be to 
think of them as mere void and non-essential appearances. These 
appearances appear as being mutually related but apart from 
their appearance they have no other essence, no being or reality. 
The Tathata doctrine which was preached by Asvaghosa oscillated 
between the position of this absolute non-essentialness of all 
dhammas and the Brahminic idea that something existed as the 
background of all these non-essential dhammas. This he called 
tathata, but he could not consistently say that any such per 
manent entity could exist. The Vijflanavada doctrine which also 
took its rise at this time appears to me to be a mixture of the 
Sunyavada doctrine and the Tathata doctrine; but when carefully 
examined it seems to be nothing but Sunyavada, with an attempt 
at explaining all the observed phenomena. If everything was 



v] Buddhist Schools 167 

non-essential howdid it originate? Vijftanavada proposes to give an 
answer, and says that these phenomena are all but ideas of the mind 
generated by the beginningless vasana (desire) of the mind. The 
difficulty which is felt with regard to the Tathata doctrine that 
there must be some reality which is generating all these ideas 
appearing as phenomena, is the same as that in the Vijflanavada 
doctrine. The Vijftanavadins could not admit the existence of such 
a reality, but yet their doctrines led them to it. They could not 
properly solve the difficulty, and admitted that their doctrine was 
some sort of a compromise with the Brahminical doctrines of 
heresy, but they s aid that this was a compromise to make the 
doctrine intelligible to the heretics; in truth however the reality 
assumed in the doctrine was also non-essential. The Vijflanavada 
literature that is available to us is very scanty and from that we 
are not in a position to judge what answers Vijflanavada could give 
on the point. These three doctrines developed almost about the 
same time and the difficulty of conceiving Sunya (void), tathata, 
(thatness) and the alayavijftana of Vijflanavada is more or less 
the same. 

The Tathata doctrine of ASvaghosa practically ceased with 
him. But the unyavada and the Vijflanavada doctrines which 
originated probably about 200 B.C. continued to develop probably 
till the eighth century A.D. Vigorous disputes with Sunyavada 
doctrines are rarely made in any independent work of Hindu 
philosophy, after Kumarila and Sankara. From the third or 
ihe fourth century A.D. some Buddhists took to the study of 
systematic logic and began to criticize the doctrine of the Hindu 
logicians. Dirinaga the Buddhist logician (500 A.D.) probably 
started these hostile criticisms by trying to refute the doctrines 
of the great Hindu logician Vatsyayana, in his Pramana- 
samuccaya. In association with this logical activity we find the 
activity of two other schools of Buddhism, viz. the Sarvastivadins 
(known also as Vaibhasikas) and the Sautrantikas. Both the 
Vaibhasikas and the Sautrantikas accepted the existence of the 
external world, and they were generally in conflict with the 
Hindu schools of thought Nyaya-Vaisesika and Samkhya which 
also admitted the existence of the external world. Vasubandhu 
(420-500 A.D.) was one of the most illustrious names of this school. 
We have from this time forth a number of great Buddhist 
thinkers such as Yasomitra (commentator of Vasubandhu s work), 



1 68 Buddhist Philosophy [CH. v 

Dharmmaklrtti (writer of Nyayabindu 635 A.D.), Vinltadeva and 
Santabhadra (commentators of Nyayabindu), Dharmmottara 
(commentator of Nyayabindu 847 A.D.), Ratnaklrtti (950 A.D.), 
Pandita Asoka, and Ratnakara Santi, some of whose contributious 
have been published in the Six Buddhist Nydya Tracts, published 
in Calcutta in the Bibliotheca Indica series. These Buddhist 
writers were mainly interested in discussions regarding the nature 
of perception, inference, the doctrine of momentariness, and 
the doctrine of causal efficiency (arthakriydkaritva) as demon 
strating the nature of existence. On the negative side they were 
interested in denying the ontological theories of Nyaya and 
Samkhya with regard to the nature of class-concepts, negation, 
relation of whole and part, connotation of terms, etc. These 
problems hardly attracted any notice in the non-Sautrantika and 
non-Vaibhasika schools of Buddhism of earlier times. They of 
course agreed with the earlier Buddhists in denying the existence 
of a permanent soul, but this they did with the help of their 
doctrine of causal efficiency. The points of disagreement between 
Hindu thought up to Sarikara (800 A.D.) and Buddhist thought 
till the time of Sarikara consisted mainly in the denial by the 
Buddhists of a permanent soul and the permanent external world. 
For Hindu thought was more or less realistic, and even the 
Vedanta of Sarikara admitted the existence of the permanent 
external world in some sense. With Sankara the forms of the 
external world were no doubt illusory, but they all had a per 
manent background in the Brahman, which was the only reality 
behind all mental and the physical phenomena. The Sautrantikas 
admitted the existence of the external world and so their quarrel 
with Nyaya and Samkhya was with regard to their doctrine 
of momentariness; their denial of soul and their views on the 
different ontological problems were in accordance with their 
doctrine of momentariness. After the twelfth century we do not 
hear much of any new disputes with the Buddhists. From this 
time the disputes were mainly between the different systems of 
Hindu philosophers, viz. Nyaya, the Vedanta of the school of 
Sarikara and the Theistic Vedanta of Ramanuja, Madhva, etc. 



CHAPTER VI 
THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY 

The Origin of Jainism. 

NOTWITHSTANDING the radical differences in their philosophical 
notions Jainism and Buddhism, which were originally both orders 
of monks outside the pale of Brahmanism, present some re 
semblance in outward appearance, and some European scholars 
who became acquainted with Jainism through inadequate samples 
of Jaina literature easily persuaded themselves that it was an off 
shoot of Buddhism, and even Indians unacquainted with Jaina 
literature are often found to commit the same mistake. But it 
has now been proved beyond doubt that this idea is wrong 
and Jainism is at least as old as Buddhism, The oldest Buddhist 
works frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect, under their 
old name Jjjgantha and their leader Nataputta Varddhamana 
Mahavira, the last prophet of the Jains. The canonical books of 
the Jains mention as contemporaries of Mahavira the same kings 
as reigned during Buddha s career. 

Thus Mahavira was a contemporary of Buddha, but unlike 
Buddha he was neither the author of the religion nor the founder 
of the sect, but a monk who having espoused the Jaina creed 
afterwards became the seer and the last prophet (Tlrtharikara) of 
Jainism 1 . His predecessor ParSva, the last Tlrtharikara but one, 
is said to have died 250 years before Mahavira, while Parsva s 
predecessor Aristanemi is said to have died 84,000 years before 
Mahavlra s Nirvana. The story in Uttarddkyayan&sutra that a 
disciple of ParSva met a disciple of Mahavira and brought about 
the union of the old Jainism and that propounded by Mahavira 
seems to suggest that this ParsVa was probably a historical person. 

According to the belief of the orthodox Jains, the Jaina religion 
is eternal, and it has been revealed again and again in every one 
of the endless succeeding periods of the world by innumerable 
Tlrtharikaras. In the present period the first Tlrtharikara was 
Rsabha and the last, the 24th, was Vardham5na Mahavira. All 

1 See Jacobi s article on Jainism, E. R. . 



170 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

Tlrtharikaras have reached moksa at their death, and they 
neither care for nor have any influence on worldly affairs, but yet 
they are regarded as "Gods" by the Jains and are worshipped 1 

Two Sects of Jainism 2 . 

There are two main sects of Jains, Svetambaras (wearers of 
white cloths) and Digambaras (the naked). They are generally 
agreed on all the fundamental principles of Jainism. The tenets 
peculiar to the Digambaras are firstly that perfect saints such as 
the Tlrtharikaras live without food, secondly that the embryo of 
Mahavira was not removed from the womb of Devananda to that 
of Trisala as the Svetambaras contend, thirdly that a monk 
who owns any property and wears clothes cannot reach Moksa, 
fourthly that no woman can reach Moksa 3 . The Digambaras 
deny the canonical works of the Svetambaras and assert that 
these had been lost immediately after Mahavira. The origin of 
the Digambaras is attributed to Sivabhuti (A.D. 83) by the 
Svetambaras as due to a schism in the old Svetambara church, 
of which there had already been previous to that seven other 
schisms. The Digambaras in their turn deny this, and say that 
they themselves alone have preserved the original practices, and 
that under Bhadrabahu, the eighth sage after Mahavira, the last 
Tlrtharikara, there rose the sect of Ardhaphalakas with laxer 
principles, from which developed the present sect of Svetambaras 
(A.D. 80). The Digambaras having separated in early times 
from the Svetambaras developed peculiar religious ceremonies of 
their own, and have a different ecclesiastical and literary history, 
though there is practically no difference about the main creed. 
It may not be out of place here to mention that the Sanskrit 
works of the Digambaras go back to a greater antiquity than 
those of the Svetambaras, if we except the canonical books of 
the latter. It may be noted in this connection that there developed 
in later times about 84 different schools of Jainism differing from 
one another only in minute details of conduct. These were called 
gacchas, and the most important of these is the Kharatara Gaccha, 
which had split into many minor gacchas. Both sects of Jains have 

1 See " Digumbara Jain Iconography (\. A, xxxii [1903] p. 459" of J. Burgess, and 
Biihler s "Specimens of Jina sculptures from Mathura," in Epigraphica Indica, II. 
pp. 31 1 etc. See also Jacobi s article on Jainism, E. R. E. 

2 See Jacohi s article on Jainism, E. R. E, 

3 See Gunaratna s commentary on Jainism in Saddartanasamuccaya. 



vi] Jama Literature 171 

preserved a list of the succession of their teachers from Mahavlra 
(sthavirdvali, pattdvali, gurvdvali) and also many legends about 
them such as those in the Kalpasiitra, the Paris ista-parvan of 
Hemacandra, etc. 

The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains. 

According to the Jains there were originally two kinds of 
sacred books, the fourteen Purvas and the eleven Arigas. The 
Purvas continued to be transmitted for some time but were 
gradually lost. The works known as the eleven Arigas are now 
the oldest parts of the existing Jain canon. The names of these 
are Acdra, Sutrakrta, Sthdna, Samavdya Bhagavati, Jndtadhar^ 
makathds, Updsakadasds, Antakrtadasds Anuttaraupapdtikadasds, 
Prasnavydkarana, Vipdka. In addition to these there are the twelve 
Updngas 1 , the ten Prakirnas*, six Chedasutras 3 , Ndndl and Anu- 
yogadvdra and four Mulasutras (Uttarddhyayana, Avasyaka^ 
Dasavaikdlika, and Pindaniryukti], The Digambaras however 
assert that these original works have all been lost, and that the 
present works which pass by the old names are spurious. The 
original language of these according to the Jains was Ardhama- 
gadhl, but these suffered attempts at modernization and it is best 
to call the language of the sacred texts Jaina Prakrit and that 
of the later works Jaina Maharastn. A large literature of glosses 
and commentaries has grown up round the sacred texts. And 
besides these, the Jains possess separate works, which contain 
systematic expositions of their faith in Prakrit and Sanskrit. 
Many commentaries have also been written upon these indepen 
dent treatises. One of the oldest of these treatises is Umasvati s 
Tattvarthadhigamasutra (1-85 A.D. ). Some of the most important 
later Jaina works on which this chapter is based are Visesdva- 
syakabhdsya, Jaina Tarkavdrttika, with the commentary of 
antyacaryya, Dravyasamgraha of Nemicandra (1150 A.D.), 
Syddvddamanjari of Mallisena (1292 A.D.), Nydydvatdra of 
Siddhasena Divakara (533 A.D.), Partksdmukhasutralaghuvrtti of 
Anantavlryya (1039 A.D.), Prameyakamalamdrtanda of Prabha- 

1 Aupafidttka, Rajapratnlya, Jivdbhigama, Prajn&pana, [ambudvipaprajnapti, 
Candraprajnapti, Suryaprajnapti, Niraydvali, fCalpdvatamsikd, Puspikd, Puspaculikd, 
Vrsnidcdas. 

3 CatuhSarana, Samstdra, Aturapratydkhydna, Bhaktdparijnd, Tandulavaiydlf, 
Canddvija, Devendraslava, Ganivija, Mahapratydkhydna, Virastava. 

3 NiJitAa, Mahdniiitha, Vyavahdra, Datairutaskandha, Brhatkalpa, Pancakalpa, 



172 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

candra(825 A.D.), Yogasastrasi Hemacandra(io88-i i72A.D.),and 
Pramdnanayatattvdlokdlamkdra of Deva Suri (1086-1 169 A.D.). 
I am indebted for these dates to Vidyabhusana s Indian Logic. 

It may here be mentioned that the Jains also possess a secular 
literature of their own in poetry and prose, both Sanskrit and 
Prakrit. There are also many moral tales (e.g. Samardicca-kahd, 
Upamitabhavaprapanca-kathd in Prakrit, and the Yasastilaka of 
Somadevaand Dhanapala s Tilakamanjarl}; Jaina Sanskrit poems 
both in the Purana and Kavya style and hymns in Prakrit and 
Sanskrit are also very numerous. There are also many Jaina 
dramas. The Jaina authors have also contributed many works, 
original treatises as well as commentaries, to the scientific litera 
ture of India in its various branches: grammar, biography, metrics, 
poetics, philosophy, etc. The contributions of the Jains to logic 
deserve special notice 1 . 

Some General Characteristics of the Jains. 

The Jains exist only in India and their number is a little less 
than a million and a half. The Digambaras are found chiefly in 
Southern India but also in the North, in the North-western pro 
vinces, Eastern Rajputana and the Punjab. The head-quarters of 
the Svetambaras are in Gujarat and Western Rajputana, but they 
are to be found also all over Northern and Central India. 

The outfit of a monk, as Jacobi describes it, is restricted to 
bare necessaries, and these he must beg clothes, a blanket, an alms- 
bowl, a stick, a broom to sweep the ground, a piece of cloth to cover 
his mouth when speaking lest insects should enter it 2 . The outfit of 
nuns is the same except that they have additional clothes. The 
Digambaras have a similar outfit, but keep no clothes, use brooms 
of peacock s feathers or hairs of the tail of a cow (cdmara) 3 . The 
monks shave the head or remove the hair by plucking it out The 
latter method of getting rid of the hair is to be preferred, and is 
regarded sometimes as an essential rite. The duties of monks 
are very hard. They should sleep only three hours and spend 
the rest of the time in repenting of and expiating sins, meditating, 
studying, begging alms (in the afternoon), and careful inspection of 
their clothes and other things for the removal of insects. The lay 
men should try to approach the ideal of conduct of the monks 

1 See Jacobi s article on Jainism, E. R. . a See Jacobi, loc. cit. 

3 See Saddartanasamuccaya, chapter IV. 



vi] Mahavtra 173 

by taking upon themselves particular vows, and the monks are 
required to deliver sermons and explain the sacred texts in 
the upasrayas (separate buildings for monks like the Buddhist 
viharas). The principle of extreme carefulness not to destroy any 
living being has been in monastic life carried out to its very 
last consequences, and has shaped the conduct of the laity in a 
great measure. No layman will intentionally kill any living being, 
not even an insect, however troublesome. He will remove it care 
fully without hurting it. The principle of not hurting any living 
being thus bars them from many professions such as agriculture, 
etc., and has thrust them into commerce 1 . 

Life of Mahavira. 

Mahavlra, the last prophet of the Jains, was a Ksattriya of 
the Jftata clan and a native of Vaisali (modern Besarh, 27 miles 
north of Patna). He was the second son of Siddhartha and Trisala. 
The ^vetambaras maintain that the embryo of the Tlrthahkara 
which first entered the womb of the Brahmin lady Devananda 
was then transferred to the womb of Trisala. This story the 
Digambaras do not believe as we have already seen. His parents 
were the worshippers of Parsva and gave him the name Varddha- 
mana (Vlra or Mahavlra). He married Yasoda and had a daughter 
by her. In his thirtieth year his parents died and with the per 
mission of his brother Nandivardhana he became a monk. After 
twelve years of self-mortification and meditation he attained 
omniscience (kevala, cf. bodhi of the Buddhists). He lived to 
preach for forty-two years more, and attained moksa (emanci 
pation) some years before Buddha in about 480 B.C. 8 . 

The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology. 

A thing (such as clay) is seen to assume various shapes and 
to undergo diverse changes (such as the form of a jug, or 
pan, etc.), and we have seen that the Chandogya Upanisad held 
that since in all changes the clay-matter remained permanent, 
that alone was true, whereas the changes of form and state 
were but appearances, the nature of which cannot be rationally 

1 See Jacobi s article on Jainism, E. R. . 

* See Hoernle s translation of Uvasagadasao, Jacobi, loc. ctt., and Hoernle s article 
on the Ajlvakas, E. R. E. The S-ivetambaras, however, say that this date was 527 B.C., 
and the Digambaras place it eighteen years later. 



174 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

demonstrated or explained. The unchangeable substance (e.g. 
the clay-matter) alone is true, and the changing forms are mere 
illusions of the senses, mere objects of name (ndma-rupay. What 
we call tangibility, visibility, or other sense-qualities, have no real 
existence, for they are always changing, and are like mere phan 
toms of which no conception can be made by the light of reason. 

The Buddhists hold that changing qualities can alone be per 
ceived and that there is no unchanging substance behind them. 
What we perceive as clay is but some specific quality, what we 
perceive as jug is also some quality. Apart from these qualities 
we do not perceive any qualitiless substance, which the Upan- 
isads regard as permanent and unchangeable. The permanent 
and unchangeable substance is thus a mere fiction of ignorance, 
as there are only the passing collocations of qualities. Qualities 
do not imply that there are substances to which they adhere, 
for the so-called pure substance does not exist, as it can neither 
be perceived by the senses nor inferred. There are only the 
momentary passing qualities. We should regard each change of 
quality as a new existence. 

The Jains we know were the contemporaries of Buddha and 
possibly of some of the Upanisads too, and they had also a solu 
tion to offer. They held that it was not true that substance 
alone was true and qualities were mere false and illusory ap 
pearances. Further it was not true as the Buddhists said that 
there was no permanent substance but merely the change of 
passing qualities, for both these represent two extreme views 
and are contrary to experience. Both of them, however, contain 
some elements of truth but not the whole truth as given in 
experience. Experience shows that in all changes there are 
three elements: (i) that some collocations of qualities appear 
to remain unchanged; (2) that some new qualities are generated ; 
(3) that some old qualities are destroyed. It is true that qualities 
of things are changing every minute, but all qualities are not 
changing. Thus when a jug is made, it means that the clay-lump 
has been destroyed, a jug has been generated and the clay is 
permanent, i.e. all production means that some old qualities have 
been lost, some new ones brought in, and there is some part in 
it which is permanent The clay has become lost in some form, 
has generated itself in another, and remained permanent in still 

1 See Chandogya, vi. i. 



vi] Relative Pluralism 175 

another form. It is by virtue of these unchanged qualities that a 
thing is said to be permanent though undergoing change. Thus 
when a lump of gold is turned into a rod or a ring, all the specific 
qualities which come under the connotation of the word "gold" 
are seen to continue, though the forms are successively changed, 
and with each such change some of its qualities are lost and some 
new ones are acquired. Such being the case, the truth comes to 
this, that there is always a permanent entity as represented by the 
permanence of such qualities as lead us to call it a substance in 
spite of all its diverse changes. The nature of being (sat) then is 
neither the absolutely unchangeable, nor the momentary changing 
qualities or existences, but involves them both. Being then, as is 
testified by experience, is that which involves a permanent unit, 
which is incessantly every moment losing some qualities and 
gaining new ones. The notion of being involves a permanent 
(dhruva) accession of some new qualities (utpadd) and loss of 
some old qualities (vyaydy. The solution of Jainism is thus a re 
conciliation of the two extremes of Vedantism and Buddhism on 
grounds of common-sense experience. 

The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (anekantavada). 

This conception of being as the union of the permanent and 
change brings us naturally to the doctrine of Anekantavada or 
what we may call relative pluralism as against the extreme abso 
lutism of the Upanisads and the pluralism of the Buddhists. 
The Jains regarded all things as anekdnta (na-ekdnta\ or in 
other words they held that nothing could be affirmed absolutely, 
as all affirmations were true only under certain conditions and 
limitations. Thus speaking of a gold jug, we see that its exist 
ence as a substance (dravyd) is of the nature of a collocation 
of atoms and not as any other substance such as space (akdsa), 
i.e. a gold jug is a dravya only in one sense of the term and 
not in every sense; so it is a dravya in the sense that it is a 
collocation of atoms and not a dravya in the sense of space or 
time (kdla). It is thus both a dravya and not a dravya at one 
and the same time. Again it is atomic in the sense that it is a 
composite of earth-atoms and not atomic in the sense that it is 

1 See Tattvdrthadkigamasutra, and Gunaratna s treatment of Jainism in Saddar- 
ianasamuccaya. 



176 The jaina Philosophy [CH. 

not a composite of water-atoms. Again it is a composite of earth- 
atoms only in the sense that gold is a metallic modification of 
earth, and not any other modification of earth as clay or stone. 
Its being constituted of metal-atoms is again true in the sense 
that it is made up of gold-atoms and not of iron-atoms. It 
is made up again of gold-atoms in the sense of melted and un 
sullied gold and not as gold in the natural condition. It is again 
made up of such unsullied and melted gold as has been hammered 
and shaped by the goldsmith Devadatta and not by Yajnadatta. 
Its being made up of atoms conditioned as above is again only 
true in the sense that the collocation has been shaped as a jug 
and not as a pot and so on. Thus proceeding in a similar manner 
the Jains say that all affirmations are true of a thing only in a 
certain limited sense. All things (vastu) thus possess an infinite 
number of qualities (anantadharmdtmakam vastu}, each of which 
can only be affirmed in a particular sense. Such an ordinary thing 
as a jug will be found to be the object of an infinite number of 
affirmations and the possessor of an infinite number 6f qualities 
from infinite points of view, which are all true in certain restricted 
senses and not absolutely 1 . Thus in the positive relation riches 
cannot be affirmed of poverty but in the negative relation such 
an affirmation is possible as when we say "the poor man has no 
riches." The poor man possesses riches not in a positive but in 
a negative way. Thus in some relation or other anything may be 
affirmed of any other thing, and again in other relations the very 
same thing cannot be affirmed of it. The different standpoints 
from which things (though possessed of infinite determinations) 
can be spoken of as possessing this or that quality or as ap 
pearing in relation to this or that, are technically called naya*. 

The Doctrine of Nayas. 

In framing judgments about things there are two ways open 
to us, firstly we may notice the manifold qualities and character 
istics of anything but view them as unified in the thing; thus when 
we say "this is a book" we do not look at its characteristic 
qualities as being different from it, but rather the qualities or 
characteristics are perceived as having no separate existence from 

1 See Gunaratna on Jainaniata in SaddarSanasamuccaya, pp. 211, etc., and also 
Tattvarthadhigamasiitra. 

2 See Tattvarthadhigamasutra, and Vitesavatyaka bhdsya, pp. 895-923. 



vi] Standpoints of Judgment 177 

the thing. Secondly we may notice the qualities separately and 
regard the thing as a mere non-existent fiction (cf. the Buddhist 
view); thus I may speak of the different qualities of the book 
separately and hold that the qualities of things are alone percep 
tible and the book apart from these cannot be found. These two 
points of view are respectively called dravyanaya&fr&paryayanaya>. 
The dravyanaya again shows itself in three forms, and paryaya- 
naya in four forms, of which the first form only is important for 
our purposes, the other three being important rather from the 
point of view of grammar and language had better be omitted 
here. The three nayas under dravyanaya are called naigama-naya, 
samgraha-naya and vyavahara-naya. 

When we speak of a thing from a purely common sense point 
of view, we do not make our ideas clear or precise. Thus I may 
hold a book in my hand and when asked whether my hands are 
empty, I may say, no, I have something in my hand, or I may say, 
I have a book in my hand. It is evident that in the first answer 
I looked at the book from the widest and most general point of 
view as a "thing," whereas in the second I looked at it in its 
special existence as a book. Again I may be reading a page of 
a book, and I may say I am reading a book, but in reality I was 
reading only one of the pages of the book. I may be scribbling 
on loose sheets, and may say this is my book on Jaina philosophy, 
whereas in reality there were no books but merely some loose 
sheets. This looking at things from the loose common sense view, 
in which we do not consider them from the point of view of their 
most general characteristic as "being" or as any of their special 
characteristics, but simply as they appear at first sight, is techni 
cally called the naigama standpoint. This empirical view probably 
proceeds on the assumption that a thing possesses the most 
general as well as the most special qualities, and hence we may 
lay stress on any one of these at any time and ignore the other 
ones. This is the point of view from which according to the 
Jains the Nyaya and Vaiesika schools interpret experience. 

Samgraha-naya is the looking at things merely from the 
most general point of view. Thus we may speak of all individual 
things from their most general and fundamental aspect as "being." 
This according to the Jains is the Vedanta way of looking at 
things. 

1 Syadvddamanjart, pp. 171-173. 
D. 12 



178 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

The vyavahSra-naya standpoint holds that the real essence 
of things is to be regarded from the point of view of actual prac 
tical experience of the thing, which unifies within it some general 
as well as some special traits, which has been existing from past 
times and remain in the future, but yet suffer trifling changes 
all the while, changes which are serviceable to us in a thousand 
ways. Thus a "book" has no doubt some general traits, shared 
by all books, but it has some special traits as well. Its atoms are 
continually suffering some displacement and rearrangement, but 
yet it has been existing as a book for some time past and will 
exist for some time in the future as well. All these characteristics, 
go to make up the essence of the "book" of our everyday ex 
perience, and none of these can be separated and held up as being 
the concept of a "book." This according to the Jains is the 
Samkhya way of looking at things. 

The first view of paryaya-naya called rjusutra is the Buddhist 
view which does not believe in the existence of the thing in the 
past or in the future, but holds that a thing is a mere conglomera 
tion of characteristics which may be said to produce effects at 
any given moment. At each new moment there are new colloca 
tions of new qualities and it is these which may be regarded as 
the true essence of our notion of things 1 . 

The nayas as we have already said are but points of view, or 
aspects of looking at things, and as such are infinite in number. 
The above four represent only a broad classification of these. The 
Jains hold that the Nyaya-Vais"esika, the Vedanta, the Samkhya, 
and the Buddhist, have each tried to interpret and systematize 
experience from one of the above four points of view, and each re 
gards the interpretation from his point of view as being absolutely 
true to the exclusion of all other points of view. This is their error 
(naydbhdsa\ for each standpoint represents only one of the many 
points of view from which a thing can be looked at. The affirma 
tions from any point of view are thus true in a limited sense and 
under limited conditions. Infinite numbers of affirmations may 
be made of things from infinite points of view. Affirmations or 
judgments according to any naya or standpoint cannot therefore 
be absolute, for even contrary affirmations of the very selfsame 

1 The other standpoints of paryaya-naya, which represent grammatical and lin 
guistic points of view, are fabda-naya, samabhirudha-naya, and cvambhuta-naya. See 
Viies&vaiyaka bhdsya, pp. 895-923. 



vi] Syadvada 179 

things may be held to be true from other points of view. The 
truth of each affirmation is thus only conditional, and incon 
ceivable from the absolute point of view. To guarantee correctness 
therefore each affirmation should be preceded by the phrase sydt 
(may be). This will indicate that the affirmation is only relative, 
made somehow, from some point of view and under some reser 
vations and not in any sense absolute. There is no judgment 
which is absolutely true, and no judgment which is absolutely 
false. All judgments are true in some sense and false in another. 
This brings us to the famous Jaina doctrine of Syadvada 1 . 

The Doctrine of Syadvada. 

The doctrine of Syadvada holds that since the most contrary 
characteristics of infinite variety may be associated with a thing, 
affirmation made from whatever standpoint (nayd) cannot be re 
garded as absolute. All affirmations are true (in some syddasti or 
"may be it is" sense); all affirmations are false in some sense; 
all affirmations are indefinite or inconceivable in some sense 
(syddavaktavya) ; all affirmations are true as well as false in some 
sense (syddasti sydnndsti) ; all affirmations are true as well as in 
definite (syddasti cdvaktavyascd) ; all affirmations are false as well 
as indefinite; all affirmations are true and false and indefinite in 
some sense (syddasti sydnndsti syddavaktavyasca). Thus we may 
say "the jug is" or the jug has being, but it is more correct to 
say explicitly that "may be (sydt) that the jug is," otherwise if 
"being" here is taken absolutely of any and every kind of being, 
it might also mean that there is a lump of clay or a pillar, or a 
cloth or any other thing. The existence here is limited and defined 
by the form of the jug. "The jug is" does not mean absolute 
existence but a limited kind of existence as determined by the 
form of the jug, "The jug is" thus means that a limited kind of 
existence, namely the jug-existence is affirmed and not existence 
in general in the absolute or unlimited sense, for then the sentence 
"the jug is" might as well mean "the clay is," "the tree is," "the 
cloth is," etc. Again the existence of the jug is determined by the 
negation of all other things in the world ; each quality or charac 
teristic (such as red colour) of the jug is apprehended and defined 
by the negation of all the infinite varieties (such as black, blue, 
golden), etc., of its class, and it is by the combined negation of all 

1 See VifesavaSyaka bhdsya, pp. 895, etc., and Syadvadamanjari, pp. 170, etc. 

12 2 



180 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

the infinite number of characteristics or qualities other than those 
constituting the jug that a jug may be apprehended or defined. 
What we call the being of the jug is thus the non-being of all the 
rest except itself. Thus though looked at from one point of view 
the judgment "the jug is" may mean affirmation of being, looked 
at from another point of view it means an affirmation of non-being 
(of all other objects). Thus of the judgment "the jug is" one may 
say, may be it is an affirmation of being (syddasti), may be it is a 
negation of being (sydnndsti}; or I may proceed in quite another 
way and say that "the jug is" means "this jug is here," which 
naturally indicates that "this jug is not there" and thus the judg 
ment "the jug is" (i.e. is here) also means that "the jug is not 
there," and so we see that the affirmation of the being of the jug 
is true only of this place and false of another, and this justifies us 
in saying that "may be that in some sense the jug is," and "may 
be in some sense that the jug is not." Combining these two 
aspects we may say that in some sense "may be that the jug is," 
and in some sense "may be that the jug is not." We understood 
here that if we put emphasis on the side of the characteristics 
constituting being, we may say "the jug is," but if we put emphasis 
on the other side, we may as well say "the jug is not." Both the 
affirmations hold good of the jug according as the emphasis is 
put on either side. But if without emphasis on either side we try 
to comprehend the two opposite and contradictory judgments 
regarding the jug, we see that the nature of the jug or of the ex 
istence of the jug is indefinite, unspeakable and inconceivable 
avaktavya, for how can we affirm both being and non-being of 
the same thing, and yet such is the nature of things that we cannot 
but do it. Thus all affirmations are true, are not true, are both 
true and untrue, and are thus unspeakable, inconceivable, and 
indefinite. Combining these four again we derive another three, 
(i) that in some sense it may be that the jug is, and (2) is yet 
unspeakable, or (3) that the jug is not and is unspeakable, or 
finally that the jug is, is not, and is unspeakable. Thus the Jains 
hold that no affirmation, or judgment, is absolute in its nature, each 
is true in its own limited sense only, and for each one of them any 
of the above seven alternatives (technically called saptabhangl} 
holds good 1 . The Jains say that other Indian systems each from 
its own point of view asserts itself to be the absolute and the only 

1 See Syadvadamanjari, with Hemacandra s commentary, pp. 166, etc. 



vi] Relativity of Judgments 181 

point of view. They do not perceive that the nature of reality 
is such that the truth of any assertion is merely conditional, 
and holds good only in certain conditions, circumstances, or 
senses (upddhi). It is thus impossible to make any affirmation 
which is universally and absolutely valid. For a contrary or 
contradictory affirmation will always be found to hold good of 
any judgment in some sense or other. As all reality is partly 
permanent and partly exposed to change of the form of losing 
and gaining old and new qualities, and is thus relatively perma 
nent and changeful, so all our affirmations regarding truth are also 
only relatively valid and invalid. Being, non-being and indefinite, 
the three categories of logic, are all equally available in some sense 
or other in all their permutations for any and every kind of 
judgment. There is no universal and absolute position or negation, 
and all judgments are valid only conditionally. The relation of 
the naya doctrine with the syadvada doctrine is therefore this, that 
for any judgment according to any and every naya there are as 
many alternatives as are indicated by syadvada. The validity of 
such a judgment is therefore only conditional. If this is borne 
in mind when making any judgment according to any naya, 
the naya is rightly used. If, however, the judgments are made ab 
solutely according to any particular naya without any reference to 
other nayas as required by the syadvada doctrine the nayas are 
wrongly used as in the case of other systems, and then such 
judgments are false and should therefore be called false nayas 
(naydbhdsa) \ 

Knowledge, its value for us. 

The Buddhist Dharmottara in his commentary on Nydyabindu 
says that people who are anxious to fulfil some purpose or end in 
which they are interested, value the knowledge which helps them 
to attain that purpose. It is because knowledge is thus found 
to be useful and sought by men that philosophy takes upon it the 
task of examining the nature of true knowledge (samyagjiidna or 
pramdna). The main test of true knowledge is that it helps us 
to attain our purpose. The Jains also are in general agreement 
with the above view of knowledge of the Buddhists 2 . They also 

1 The earliest mention of the doctrine of syadvada and saptabhahgi probably occurs 
in Bhadrabahu s (433-357 B.C.) commentary Sutrakrtanganiryukti. 

2 See Pramana-naya-tattvalokalamkdra (Benares), p. 16 , also Partksa-mukha- 
sutra-vrtti (Asiatic Society), ch. I. 



1 82 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

say that knowledge is not to be valued for its own sake. The 
validity (prdmdnyd) of anything consists in this, that it directly 
helps us to get what is good for us and to avoid what is bad 
for us. Knowledge alone has this capacity, for by it we can 
adapt ourselves to our environments and try to acquire what 
is good for us and avoid what is bad 1 . The conditions that 
lead to the production of such knowledge (such as the presence 
of full light and proximity to the eye in the case of seeing an 
object by visual perception) have but little relevancy in this con 
nection. For we are not concerned with how a cognition is 
produced, as it can be of no help to us in serving our purposes. 
It is enough for us to know that external objects under certain 
conditions assume such a special fitness (yogyatd} that we can 
have knowledge of them. We have no guarantee that they 
generate knowledge in us, for we are only aware that under 
certain conditions we know a thing, whereas under other con 
ditions we do not know it 2 . The enquiry as to the nature of the 
special fitness of things which makes knowledge of them pos 
sible does not concern us. Those conditions which confer such 
a special fitness on things as to render them perceivable have but 
little to do with us; for our purposes which consist only in the 
acquirement of good and avoidance of evil, can only be served by 
knowledge and not by those conditions of external objects. 

Knowledge reveals our own self as a knowing subject as well 
as the objects that are known by us. We have no reason to 
suppose (like the Buddhists) that all knowledge by perception of 
external objects is in the first instance indefinite and indeterminate, 
and that all our determinate notions of form, colour, size and other 
characteristics of the thing are not directly given in our perceptual 
experience, but are derived only by imagination (utpreksd), and 
that therefore true perceptual knowledge only certifies the validity 
of the indefinite and indeterminate crude sense data (nirvikalpa 
jfidna). Experience shows that true knowledge on the one hand 
reveals us as subjects or knowers, and on the other hand gives 
a correct sketch of the external objects in all the diversity of 
their characteristics. It is for this reason that knowledge is our 
immediate and most prominent means of serving our purposes. 

1 Pramdna-naya-tattvdlokdlamkara, p. 26. 

2 See Pariksa-mukha-sutra, II. 9, and its vrtti, and also the concluding vrtti of 
ch. II. 



vi] Knowledge 183 

Of course knowledge cannot directly and immediately bring to 
us the good we want, but since it faithfully communicates to us 
the nature of the objects around us, it renders our actions for the 
attainment of good and the avoidance of evil, possible; for if 
knowledge did not possess these functions, this would have been 
impossible. The validity of knowledge thus consists in this, that 
it is the most direct, immediate, and indispensable means for 
serving our purposes. So long as any knowledge is uncontra- 
dicted it should be held as true. False knowledge is that 
which represents things in relations in which they do not exist. 
When a rope in a badly lighted place gives rise to the illusion of 
a snake, the illusion consists in taking the rope to be a snake, i.e. 
perceiving a snake where it does not exist. Snakes exist and 
ropes also exist, there is no untruth in that 1 . The error thus con 
sists in this, that the snake is perceived where the rope exists. 
The perception of a snake under relations and environments in 
which it was not then existing is what is meant by error here. 
What was at first perceived as a snake was later on contradicted 
and thus found false. Falsehood therefore consists in the mis 
representation of objective facts in experience. True knowledge 
therefore is that which gives such a correct and faithful repre 
sentation of its object as is never afterwards found to be contra 
dicted. Thus knowledge when imparted directly in association 
with the organs in sense-perception is very clear, vivid, and 
distinct, and is called perceptional (pralyaksa); when attained 
otherwise the knowledge is not so clear and vivid and is then 
called non-perceptional (parok$a*). 

Theory of Perception. 

The main difference of the Jains from the Buddhists in the 
theory of perception lies, as we have already seen, in this, that the 
Jains think that perception (pratyak^a) reveals to us the external 
objects just as they are with most of their diverse characteristics of 
colour, form, etc., and also in this, that knowledge arises in the soul 

1 Illusion consists in attributing such spatial, temporal or other kinds of relations 
to the objects of our judgment as do not actually exist, but the objects themselves 
actually exist in other relations. When I mistake the rope for the snake, the snake 
actually exists though its relationing with the " this " as " this is a snake " does not 
exist, for the snake is not the rope. This illusion is thus called satkhyati or misrelationing 
of existents (sat). 

a See Jaina-tarka-varttika of Siddhasena, ch. I., and vrtti by Santyacarya, 
Pramananayatattvalokalamkara, ch. I., Pariksd-mukha-sutra-vrtti, ch. I. 



184 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

from within it as if by removing a veil which had been covering it 
before. Objects are also not mere forms of knowledge (as the Vi- 
jflanavadin Buddhist thinks) but are actually existing. Knowledge 
of external objects by perception is gained through the senses. 
The exterior physical sense such as the eye must be distinguished 
from the invisible faculty or power of vision of the soul, which 
alone deserves the name of sense. We have five such cognitive 
senses. But the Jains think that since by our experience we are 
only aware of five kinds of sense knowledge corresponding to the 
five senses, it is better to say that it is the "self" which gains of 
itself those different kinds of sense-knowledge in association with 
those exterior senses as if by removal of a covering, on account 
of the existence of which the knowledge could not reveal itself 
before. The process of external perception does not thus involve 
the exercise of any separate and distinct sense, though the rise 
of the sense-knowledge in the soul takes place in association with 
the particular sense-organ such as eye, etc. The soul is in touch 
with all parts of the body, and visual knowledge is that knowledge 
which is generated in the soul through that part of it which is 
associated with, or is in touch with the eye. To take an example, 
I look before me and see a rose. Before looking at it the know 
ledge of rose was in me, but only in a covered condition, and 
hence could not get itself manifested. The act of looking at the 
rose means that such a fitness has come into the rose and into 
myself that the rose is made visible, and the veil over my know 
ledge of rose is removed. When visual knowledge arises, this 
happens in association with the eye ; I say that I see through 
the visual sense, whereas in reality experience shows that I have 
only a knowledge of the visual type (associated with eye). As 
experience does not reveal the separate senses, it is unwarrantable 
to assert that they have an existence apart from the self. Pro 
ceeding in a similar way the Jains discard the separate existence 
of manas (mind-organ) also, for manas also is not given in ex 
perience, and the hypothesis of its existence is unnecessary, as 
self alone can serve its purpose 1 . Perception of an object means 

1 Tanna indriyam bhautikam kim lu atma ca indriyam.. .anupahatataksuradidesesu 
eva atmanah karmaksayopcdamastenasthagitagavaksattilyani caksuradini upakaranani. 
faina-Vattika-Vrtfi, n. p. 98. In many places, however, the five senses, such as 
eye, ear, etc., are mentioned as senses, and living beings are often classified according 
>o the number of senses they possess. (See Pramanamimamsa. See also Tatlfartha- 
Jhii^at? asutra, ch. n. etc.) But this is with reference to the sense organs. The denial 



vi] Non-perceptual Knowledge 185 

that the veil of ignorance upon the "self" regarding the object has 
been removed. Inwardly this removal is determined by the 
karma of the individual, outwardly it is determined by the pre 
sence of the object of perception, light, the capacity of the sense 
organs, and such other conditions. Contrary to the Buddhists 
and many other Indian systems, the Jains denied the existence 
of any nirvikalpa (indeterminate) stage preceding the final savi- 
kalpa (determinate) stage of perception. There was a direct 
revelation of objects from within and no indeterminate sense- 
materials were necessary for the development of determinate 
perceptions. We must contrast this with the Buddhists who 
regarded that the first stage consisting of the presentation of in 
determinate sense materials was the only valid part of perception. 
The determinate stage with them is the result of the application 
of mental categories, such as imagination, memory, etc., and hence 
does not truly represent the presentative part 1 . 

Non-Perceptual Knowledge. 

Non-perceptual knowledge (parokfa) differs from pratyaksa 
in this, that it does not give us so vivid a picture of objects as the 
latter. Since the Jains do not admit that the senses had any func 
tion in determining the cognitions of the soul, the only distinction 
they could draw between perception and other forms of knowledge 
was that the knowledge of the former kind (perception) gave us 
clearer features and characteristics of objects than the latter. 
Paroksa thus includes inference, recognition, implication, memory, 
etc. ; and this knowledge is decidedly less vivid than perception. 

Regarding inference, the Jains hold that it is unnecessary to 
have five propositions, such as: (i) "the hill is fiery," (2) "because 
of smoke," (3) "wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the 
kitchen," (4) "this hill is smoky," (5) "therefore it is fiery," called 
respectively pralijnd, hetu, drstdnla, upanaya and nigamana, ex 
cept for the purpose of explicitness. It is only the first two 
propositions which actually enter into the inferential process 
(Prameyakamalamdrtanda, pp. 108, 109). When we make an 

of separate senses is with reference to admitting them as entities or capacities having 
a distinct and separate category of existence from the soul. The sense organs are like 
windows for the soul to look out. They cannot thus modify the sense-knowledge 
which rises in the soul hy inward determination ; for it is already existent in it ; the 
perceptual process only means that the veil which was observing it is removed. 
1 Prameyakamalamartanda, pp. 8-n. 



1 86 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

inference we do not proceed through the five propositions as 
above. They who know that the reason is inseparably connected 
with the probandum either as coexistence (sahabhdva) or as in 
variable antecedence (kramabhdva) will from the mere statement 
of the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the 
conclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting of 
five propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child 
than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an 
inference 1 . 

As regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit the 
authority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures give 
us right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who 
have lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and 
right knowledge have conquered all passions and removed all 
ignorance 2 . 

Knowledge as Revelation. 

The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of 
anything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us. 
That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that 

1 As regards concomitance (vydpti) some of the Jaina logicians like the Buddhists 
prefer antarvyapti (between smoke and fire) to bahirvyapti (the place containing smoke 
with the place containing fire). They also divide inference into two classes, svartha- 
numdna for one s own self and pardrthdnumdna for convincing others. It may rot 
be out of place to note that the earliest Jaina view as maintained by Bhadrabahu in his 
Das"avaikalikaniryukti was in favour of ten propositions for making an inference ; 
(i) Pratijnd (e.g. non-injury to life is the greatest virtue), (2) Pratijftavibhakti (non-in 
jury to life is the greatest virtue according to Jaina scriptures), (3) Hetu (because those 
who adhere to non-injury are loved by gods and it is meritorious to do them honour), 
(4) Hetu vibhakti (those who do so are the only persons who can live in the highest 
places of virtue), (5) Vipaksa (but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by 
reviling Jaina scriptures one may attain merit as is the case with Brahmins), (6) Vipaksa 
pratisedha (it is not so, it is impossible that those who despise Jaina scriptures should 
be loved by gods or should deserve honour), (7) Drstdnta (the Arhats take food from 
householders as they do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects), (8) As- 
arika (but the sins of the householders should touch the arhats, for they cook for them), 
(9) Asankdpratisedha (this cannot be, for the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly, 
so it could not be said that the cooking was undertaken for them), (10) Naigamana 
(non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) (Vidyabhusana s Indian Logic). These are 
persuasive statements which are often actually adopted in a discussion, but from a 
formal point of view many of these are irrelevant. When Vatsyayana in his Nyaya- 
sutrabkdsya, I. i. 32, says that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions as 
against the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, he probably had 
this Jaina view in his mind. 

2 See Jainatarkavdrttika, and Pariksaniukhasutravrtti, and Saddarfanasamuccaya 
with Gunaratna on Jainism. 



vi] Theory of Being 187 

which could not non-existent. In fact production of effect was 
with them the only definition of existence (being). Theoretically 
each unit of effect being different from any other unit of effect, 
they supposed that there was a succession of different units of 
effect or, what is the same thing, acknowledged a succession of 
new substances every moment. All things were thus momentary. 
The Jains urged that the reason why the production of effect 
may be regarded as the only proof of being is that we can assert 
only that thing the existence of which is indicated by a corre 
sponding experience. When we have a unit of experience we 
suppose the existence of the object as its ground. This being so, 
the theoretical analysis of the Buddhists that each unit of effect 
produced in us is not exactly the same at each new point of time, 
and that therefore all things are momentary, is fallacious; for ex 
perience shows that not all of an object is found to be changing 
every moment ; some part of it (e.g. gold in a gold ornament) is 
found to remain permanent while other parts (e.g. its form as ear 
rings or bangles) are seen to undergo change. How in the face 
of such an experience can we assert that the whole thing vanishes 
every moment and that new things are being renewed at each 
succeeding moment? Hence leaving aside mere abstract and 
unfounded speculations, if we look to experience we find that the 
conception of being or existence involves a notion of permanence 
associated with change parydya (acquirement of new qualities 
and the loss of old ones). The Jains hold that the defects of other 
systems lie in this, that they interpret experience only from one 
particular standpoint (nayd) whereas they alone carefully weigh 
experience from all points of view and acquiesce in the truths 
indicated by it, not absolutely but under proper reservations and 
limitations. The Jains hold that in formulating the doctrine of 
arthakriydkdritva the Buddhists at first showed signs of starting 
on their enquiry on the evidence of experience, but soon they 
became one-sided in their analysis and indulged in unwarrantable 
abstract speculations which went directly against experience. 
Thus if we go by experience we can neither reject the self nor 
the external world as some Buddhists did. Knowledge which 
reveals to us the clear-cut features of the external world certifies 
at the same time that such knowledge is part and parcel of myself 
as the subject. Knowledge is thus felt to be an expression of my 
own self. We do not perceive in experience that knowledge 



1 88 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

in us is generated by the external world, but there is in us the 
rise of knowledge and of certain objects made known to us by it. 
The rise of knowledge is thus only parallel to certain objective 
collocations of things which somehow have the special fitness 
that they and they alone are perceived at that particular moment. 
Looked at from this point of view all our experiences are centred 
in ourselves, for determined somehow, our experiences come to us 
as modifications of our own self. Knowledge being a character 
of the self, it shows itself as manifestations of the self independent 
of the senses. No distinction should be made between a conscious 
and an unconscious element in knowledge as Samkhya does. Nor 
should knowledge be regarded as a copy of the objects which it 
reveals, as the Sautrantikas think, for then by copying the materi 
ality of the object, knowledge would itself become material. 
Knowledge should thus be regarded as a formless quality of the 
self revealing all objects by itself. But the Mlmamsa view that the 
validity (pramanyd) of all knowledge is proved by knowledge it- 
self (svatahprdmdnya) is wrong. Both logically and psychologically 
the validity of knowledge depends upon outward correspondence 
(sanivdda} with facts. But in those cases where by previous 
knowledge of correspondence a right belief has been produced 
there may be a psychological ascertainment of validity without 
reference to objective facts (prdmdnyamutpattau parata eva 
jnaptau svakdrye ca svatah paratasca abhydsdnabhydsdpeksayaj 1 . 
The objective world exists as it is certified by experience. But 
that it generates knowledge in us is an unwarrantable hypo 
thesis, for knowledge appears as a revelation of our own self. This 
brings us to a consideration of Jaina metaphysics. 

The JIvas. 

The Jains say that experience shows that all things may be 
divided into the living (jtva) and the non-living (ajlva\ The 
principle of life is entirely distinct from the body, and it is most 
erroneous to think that life is either the product or the property 
of the body 2 . It is on account of this life-principle that the body 
appears to be living This principle is the soul. The soul is 
directly perceived (by introspection) just as the external things 
are. It is not a mere symbolical object indicated by a phrase or 

1 Prameyakamalamdrtanifa, pp. 38-43. 

2 See Jaina Vdrttika, p. 60. 



vi] Souls 189 

a description. This is directly against the view of the great 
Mlmamsa authority Prabhakara 1 . The soul in its pure state is 
possessed of infinite perception (ananta-darsand), infinite know 
ledge (ananta-jftdna\ infinite bliss (ananta-sukhd) and infinite 
power (ananta-vlrya)*. It is all perfect. Ordinarily however, with 
the exception of a few released pure souls (mukta-jwd), all the 
other jlvas (samsdriri) have all their purity and power covered with 
a thin veil of karma matter which has been accumulating in them 
from beginningless time. These souls are infinite in number. They 
are substances and are eternal. They in reality occupy innumer 
able space-points in our mundane world (lokdkdsa}, have a limited 
size (madhyama-parimdna) and are neither all-pervasive (yibhii) 
nor atomic (anu); it is on account of this that jwa is called 
Jivdstikdya. The word astikdya means anything that occupies 
space or has some pervasiveness; but these souls expand and 
contract themselves according to the dimensions of the body 
which they occupy at any time (bigger in the elephant and 
smaller in the ant life). It is well to remember that according to 
the Jains the soul occupies the whole of the body in which it 
lives, so that from the tip of the hair to the nail of the foot, 
wherever there may be any cause of sensation, it can at once feel 
it. The manner in which the soul occupies the body is often ex 
plained as being similar to the manner in which a lamp illumines 
the whole room though remaining in one corner of the room. The 
Jains divide the jlvas according to the number of sense-organs 
they possess. The lowest class consists of plants, which possess 
only the sense-organ of touch. The next higher class is that 
of worms, which possess two sense-organs of touch and taste. 
Next come the ants, etc., which possess touch, taste, and smell. 
The next higher one that of bees, etc., possessing vision in 
addition to touch, taste, and smell. The vertebrates possess all 
the five sense-organs. The higher animals among these, namely 
men, denizens of hell, and the gods possess in addition to these 
an inner sense-organ namely manas by virtue of which they are 

1 See Prameyakamalamartanda, p. 33. 

2 The Jains distinguish between dariana a.ndjftana. Dars"ana is the knowledge of 
things without their details, e.g. I see a cloth. Jnana means the knowledge of details, 
e.g. I not only see the cloth, but know to whom it belongs, of what quality it is, 
where it was prepared, etc. In all cognition we have first dars"ana and then jflana. 
The pure souls possess infinite general perception of all things as well as infinite 
knowledge of all things in all their details. 



190 The Jaina Philosophy [CH. 

called rational (samjniri) while the lower animals have no reason 
and are called asamjnin. 

Proceeding towards the lowest animal we find that the Jains 
regard all the four elements (earth, water, air, fire) as being ani 
mated by souls. Thus particles of earth, etc., are the bodies of 
souls, called earth-lives, etc. These we may call elementary lives; 
they live and die and are born again in another elementary body. 
These elementary lives are either gross or subtle; in the latter case 
they are invisible. The last class of one-organ lives are plants. 
Of some plants each is the body of one soul only; but of other 
plants, each is an aggregation of embodied souls, which have all 
the functions of life such as respiration and nutrition in common. 
Plants in which only one soul is embodied are always gross ; they 
exist in the habitable part of the world only. But those plants 
of which each is a colony of plant lives may also be subtle and 
invisible, and in that case they are distributed all over the world. 
The whole universe is full of minute beings called nigodas; they 
are groups of infinite number of souls forming very small clusters, 
having respiration and nutrition in common and experiencing ex 
treme pains. The whole space of the world is closely packed with 
them like a box filled with powder. The nigodas furnish the supply 
of souls in place of those that have reached Moksa. But an 
infinitesimally small fraction of one single nigoda has sufficed to 
replace the vacancy caused in the world by the Nirvana of all the 
souls that have been liberated from beginningless past down to 
the present. Thus it is evident the samsara will never be empty 
of living beings. Those of the nigodas who long for development 
come out and contiune their course of progress through successive 
stages 1 . 

Karma Theory. 

It is on account of their merits or demerits that the jlvas are 
born as gods, men, animals, or denizens of hell. We have already 
noticed in Chapter III that the cause of the embodiment of soul 
is the presence in it of karma matter. The natural perfections of 
the pure soul are sullied by the different kinds of karma matter. 
Those which obscure right knowledge of details (jndna) are 
called jndnavaraniya, those which obscure right perception 
(darsana) as in sleep are called darsandvaraniya, those which 

1 See Jacobi s article on Jainism, E. R. ., and Lokaprakdfa, vi. pp. 31 ff. 



vi] Effects of Karma 191 

obscure the bliss-nature of the soul and thus produce pleasure and 
pain are vedaniya, and those which obscure the right attitude of the 
soul towards faith and right conduct mohaniya 1 . In addition to 
these four kinds of karma there are other four kinds of karma which 
determine (i) the length of life in any birth, (2) the peculiar body 
with its general and special qualities and faculties, (3) the nation 
ality, caste, family, social standing, etc., (4) the inborn energy of the 
soul by the obstruction of which it prevents the doing of a good 
action when there is a desire to do it. These are respectively called 
(l) dynska karma, (2) ndma karma, (3) gotra karma, (4) antardya 
karma. By our actions of mind, speech and body, we are con 
tinually producing certain subtle karma matter which in the first 
instance is called bhdva karma, which transforms itself into dravya 
karma and pours itself into the soul and sticks there by coming 
into contact with the passions (kasdya} of the soul. These act like 
viscous substances in retaining the inpouring karma matter. This 
matter acts in eight different ways and it is accordingly divided 
into eight classes, as we have already noticed. This karma is the 
cause of bondage and sorrow. According as good or bad karma 
matter sticks to the soul it gets itself coloured respectively as 
golden, lotus-pink, white and black, blue and grey and they are 
called the lesyds. The feelings generated by the accumulation of 
the karma-matter are called bhdva-lesya and the actual coloration 
of the soul by it is called dravya-lesyd. According as any karma 
matter has been generated by good, bad, or indifferent actions, it 
gives us pleasure, pain, or feeling of indifference. Even the know 
ledge that we are constantly getting by perception, inference, etc., 
is but the result of the effect of karmas in accordance with which 
the particular kind of veil which was obscuring any particular kind 
of knowledge is removed at any time and we have a knowledge 
of a corresponding nature. By our own karmas the veils over our 
knowledge, feeling, etc., are so removed that we have just that 
kind of knowledge and feeling that we deserved to have. All 
knowledge, feeling, etc., are thus in one sense generated from 
within, the external objects which are ordinarily said to be 
generating them all being but mere coexistent external con 
ditions. 

1 The Jains acknowledge five kinds of knowledge : (r) matijfUna (ordinary cog 
nition), (?) fruti (testimony), (3) avadhi (supernatural cognition), (4) manahparydya 
(thought-reading), (5) kevala-jAHna (omniscience). 



192 The Jaina Philosophy [CH.